In re Interest of Edward B.

556 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
I n re I nterest of edward B., a chIld
under 18 years of age.
state of neBraska, appellee, v.
edward B., appellant.
827 N.W.2d 805
Filed March 22, 2013. 	Nos. S-12-342 through S-12-345.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings. When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court
may give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts over the other.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently decides questions
of law, including issues of statutory interpretation, presented by an appeal.
3. Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual
dispute presents a question of law.
4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction
over an appeal if a party fails to properly perfect it.
5. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, any
final order entered by a juvenile court may ordinarily be appealed to the Nebraska
Court of Appeals in the same manner as an appeal from the district court.
6. Affidavits: Fees: Appeal and Error. The filing of a poverty affidavit, properly
confirmed by oath or affirmation, serves as a substitute for the docket fee for
an appeal.
7. Jurisdiction: Notice: Affidavits: Appeal and Error. An in forma pauperis
appeal is perfected when the appellant timely files a notice of appeal and an
affidavit of poverty.
8. Minors: Juvenile Courts. Juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil proceed-
ings directed toward the education, treatment, and rehabilitation of the child.
9. Minors: Juvenile Courts: Affidavits: Parties: Appeal and Error. In a juve-
nile’s appeal from a delinquency proceeding, the poverty affidavit of the juve-
nile’s parent may be filed in support of the juvenile’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis, and a parent is a party who may state a belief that the juvenile is
entitled to relief.
Appeals from the County Court for Adams County: MIchael
offner, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel C. Pauley, of Dunmire, Fisher & Hastings, for
appellant.
Alyson Keiser Roudebush, Deputy Adams County Attorney,
for appellee.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:39 AM CST

IN RE INTEREST OF EDWARD B. 	557
Cite as 285 Neb. 556
heavIcan, c.J., wrIght, connolly, stephan, MccorMack,
MIller-lerMan, and cassel, JJ.
connolly, J.
SUMMARY
In these consolidated appeals, Edward B. appeals from
a disposition order of the county court sitting as a juvenile
court. The court found that Edward had violated the terms of
his probation in two of these cases. In all four cases, the court
found that it was in Edward’s best interests to be commit-
ted to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS) with placement
at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC) at
Kearney, Nebraska.
The main issue is whether we have jurisdiction. The State
contends that Edward failed to perfect this appeal because
he did not sign the affidavit for an in forma pauperis appeal.
Instead, his mother signed the affidavit.
We conclude that we have jurisdiction. In a juvenile’s in
forma pauperis appeal from a delinquency proceeding, the
poverty affidavit of the juvenile’s parent is sufficient to vest
this court with appellate jurisdiction. We further hold that
the court properly determined that Edward’s best interests
and the safety of the community required his placement at
the YRTC.
BACKGROUND
In January and May 2011, the State filed the first two juve-
nile petitions against Edward. It alleged that on two separate
days, Edward had been in a fight and had threatened another
person in a menacing manner or had caused bodily harm to the
other person. The alleged conduct constituted a third degree
assault. Edward pleaded no contest in one case, and the court
found that the State had proved its allegations in the other case.
In both cases, the court adjudicated Edward under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2008), meaning that Edward’s con-
duct would constitute a misdemeanor if a court treated him as
an adult. The court placed Edward on supervised probation for
4 years, under specified conditions. Those conditions included
the requirements that Edward not violate any laws; that he not

558 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
possess firearms, alcohol, tobacco, or controlled substances;
and that he attend school.
In January 2012, the State filed two new juvenile petitions.
In the first petition, the State alleged that Edward had partici-
pated in an armed robbery of a store. In the second petition,
the State alleged that Edward had stolen merchandise valued
over $500 from a retail store and had sold an imitation con-
trolled substance at school. He was in the 10th grade at that
time, and the school expelled him over the latter allegation.
Because Edward was on probation, the State removed him
from his home and placed him in a juvenile detention facil-
ity pending the court’s disposition order. Edward pleaded no
contest in both cases, and the court accepted the State’s fac-
tual bases for the pleas. For the allegation that he had sold
an imitation controlled substance, the court again adjudicated
Edward under § 43-247(1). For the allegations of theft and rob-
bery, it adjudicated Edward under § 43-247(2), meaning that
Edward’s conduct would constitute felonies if a court treated
him as an adult. The court ordered OJS to conduct a predispo-
sition evaluation.
On the same day that the State filed the new petitions, it also
filed allegations that Edward had violated the conditions of his
probation in the two earlier cases. In February 2012, the State
asked the court to revoke his probation in those cases.
On March 28, 2012, the court held a disposition hearing
on all four cases. Edward’s biological mother was present, as
was Sharon B., Edward’s biological grandmother and adop-
tive mother. The court asked Edward’s counsel whether he
had reviewed OJS’ evaluation, which had been submitted that
day. Edward’s counsel said that he had reviewed the report but
that he had only 10 to 15 minutes to go over it with Edward,
which he believed was inadequate. So the court summarized
to the parties why OJS was recommending that the court place
Edward at the YRTC.
The court explained that Edward’s score on the evaluation
tests placed him in the high-risk category, requiring supervised
treatment in a treatment facility. OJS concluded that Edward
did not appreciate the seriousness of the charges against him
and posed a safety risk to the public. The court stated that

IN RE INTEREST OF EDWARD B. 	559
Cite as 285 Neb. 556
in the evaluation, Edward had expressed no remorse for his
involvement in the armed robbery and had stated that his
involvement was “just charges to me.” Although the court rec-
ognized that Edward’s attitude might be due to a low intellect,
it concluded that his lack of understanding was a reason for
ordering treatment at the YRTC. The court found that Edward
had a history of being physically aggressive and that Edward
had admitted he was likely beyond the control of both Sharon
and his biological mother.
The court stated that even when Edward was in school,
he had skipped school two to three times per week and had
admitted to frequently using marijuana. Sharon vigorously
argued that Edward had learning disabilities, that almost all
the school he had missed was for court hearings, and that she
did not believe he had used drugs excessively, as OJS had
reported. But Edward’s probation officer testified that Edward
had admitted to drug use during probation, and when asked
by the court, Edward admitted that at one point, he had used
marijuana every day. The court stated that Edward’s placement
at the YRTC was in his best interests and that Edward had no
ability to pay court costs or restitution.
The court revoked Edward’s probation in the two earlier
cases. In all four cases, it found that because of Edward’s ongo-
ing and uncontrolled criminal conduct, he could not remain in
his home, and that his best interests and protection of the pub-
lic required his placement at the YRTC.
On April 4, 2012, Sharon moved for appointed counsel for
Edward to prosecute an appeal in each case from the court’s
disposition orders. On April 5, the court granted appointed
counsel. On April 16, Sharon filed poverty affidavits, which
she signed, providing her income and liabilities. She again
requested appointed counsel and requested waivers of fees,
bonds, 	and 	costs. 	After 	reviewing 	Edward’s 	applications
to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, the court granted
his requests.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Edward assigns, restated, that the county court erred as
follows:

560 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
(1) finding that Edward’s placement at the YRTC was nec-
essary to protect the public and in his best interests under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-286(1)(b) (Supp. 2011); and
(2) implicitly finding—by relying on OJS’ evaluation report
for its disposition—that Edward was a delinquent and habitual
offender under §§ 43-247 and 43-286, without (a) giving
adequate consideration to Edward’s reduced intellect and abil-
ity to understand questions posed to him during OJS’ evalua-
tion and the absence of any input from Edward’s guardian,
or (b) giving Edward an adequate opportunity to review the
OJS report so that he could object to allegations that affected
his disposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-3] We review juvenile cases de novo on the record and
reach our conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s
findings.1 When the evidence is in conflict, however, we may
give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the wit-
nesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other.2
We independently decide questions of law, including issues
of statutory interpretation, presented by an appeal.3 A jurisdic-
tional issue that does not involve a factual dispute presents a
question of law.4
ANALYSIS
JurIsdIctIon
[4] As stated, the State contends that Edward has not per-
fected his appeals because Sharon, his adoptive mother, signed
the poverty affidavits instead of Edward, as required by our
court rules and by statute. We do not acquire jurisdiction over
an appeal if a party fails to properly perfect it.5
1 In re Interest of Kendra M. et al., 283 Neb. 1014, 814 N.W.2d 747 (2012).
2 Id.
3 See id.
4 Molczyk v. Molczyk, ante p. 96, 825 N.W.2d 435 (2013).
5 See, In re Interest of Jamyia M., 281 Neb. 964, 800 N.W.2d 259 (2011);
State v. Ruffin, 280 Neb. 611, 789 N.W.2d 19 (2010); State v. Haase, 247
Neb. 817, 530 N.W.2d 617 (1995).

IN RE INTEREST OF EDWARD B. 	561
Cite as 285 Neb. 556
The State argues that rules governing who can sign a pov-
erty affidavit ensure that only an appellant with standing to
seek redress can appeal from a court’s order or judgment. It
contends that in delinquency dispositional orders for juveniles
adjudicated under § 43-247(1), (2), (3)(b) or (c), and (4), the
juvenile’s parent is not a party, and therefore cannot be a party
entitled to redress. Because the poverty affidavit must state the
affiant’s belief that he or she is entitled to redress, the State
argues that the juvenile must sign it.
Edward contends that the State did not contest Sharon’s
signing of the poverty affidavits at the trial level and that
under State v. Dallmann,6 it cannot do so now. Edward
asserts that in his applications to proceed in forma pauperis,
he stated that he did not have money to pay for the fees and
costs of litigation and that he was entitled to redress. The
State concedes this point. Edward argues that because the
court granted his motions and appointed Edward counsel for
the appeals, the State’s questioning of his financial status is
an attack on the court’s previous determinations that Edward
lacked the necessary resources for the appeals. Alternatively,
he argues that under our previous decisions, his circum-
stances presented good cause for not personally signing the
poverty affidavits.
In Dallmann, we rejected the State’s argument that the
defendant failed to perfect his appeal because he did not
state the nature of the action and that he believed he was
entitled to redress. We stated that challenges to the language
in the affidavit must be made at the trial level. Because the
trial court had sustained the defendant’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis, we determined that we had jurisdiction
over his appeal. In State v. Ruffin,7 however, we clarified that
Dallmann “does not change the requirement that the poverty
affidavit must be properly signed under oath by the party,
rather than the party’s attorney, in order to serve as a substi-
tute for the payment of the docket fee and to vest an appellate
court with jurisdiction.”
6 State v. Dallmann, 260 Neb. 937, 621 N.W.2d 86 (2000).
7 State v. Ruffin, supra note 5, 280 Neb. at 618-19, 789 N.W.2d at 25.

562 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
We agree that the State cannot now attack Edward’s abil-
ity to pay court fees and costs for his appeals.8 But the State’s
argument is that Edward has not perfected his appeals because
he did not personally sign the poverty affidavits accompany-
ing his requests to proceed in forma pauperis. We turn to
that argument.
[5] Under the Nebraska Juvenile Code,9 any final order
entered by a juvenile court may ordinarily be appealed to
the Nebraska Court of Appeals in the same manner as an
appeal from the district court.10 That is true here. Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Reissue 2008) sets out the require-
ments for perfecting an appeal. Together, §§ 25-1912(1) and
43-2,106.01(1) require a party appealing from a juvenile
court’s final order to (1) file a notice of appeal with the juve-
nile court, (2) deposit the docket fee for an appeal with the
clerk of the juvenile court, and (3) fulfill both requirements
within 30 days of the court’s order.11 These requirements
are mandatory, and a party must satisfy them for an appel-
late court to acquire jurisdiction over an appeal.12 But under
Nebraska’s in forma pauperis statutes,13 a juvenile court can
authorize a party to prosecute an appeal without paying fees
and costs.14
[6,7] The filing of a poverty affidavit, properly confirmed
by oath or affirmation, serves as a substitute for the docket fee
for an appeal.15 An in forma pauperis appeal is perfected when
8 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2301.02(1) (Reissue 2008).
9 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245 to 43-2,127 (Reissue 2008, Cum. Supp.
2010 & Supp. 2011).
10 See, § 43-2,106.01(1); In re Interest of Rebecca B., 280 Neb. 137, 783
N.W.2d 783 (2010).
11 See, In re Interest of Noelle F. & Sarah F., 249 Neb. 628, 544 N.W.2d 509
(1996); In re Interest of T.W. et al., 234 Neb. 966, 453 N.W.2d 436 (1990).
12 See id. See, also, Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-101(A) (rev. 2010).
13 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2301 to 25-2310 (Reissue 2008).
14 In re Interest of Noelle F. & Sara F., supra note 11; In re Interest of T.W.
et al., supra note 11.
15 See In re Interest of Fedalina G., 272 Neb. 314, 721 N.W.2d 638 (2006).

IN RE INTEREST OF EDWARD B. 	563
Cite as 285 Neb. 556
the appellant timely files a notice of appeal and an affidavit
of poverty.16
In both civil and criminal cases, § 25-2301.01 sets out the
procedures for applying to proceed in forma pauperis at trial or
on appeal:
An application to proceed in forma pauperis shall include
an affidavit stating that the affiant is unable to pay the
fees and costs or give security required to proceed with
the case, the nature of the action, defense, or appeal, and
the affiant’s belief that he or she is entitled to redress.
In a juvenile case terminating the parents’ parental rights,
we held that “generally, in the absence of good cause evi-
dent in the record, it is necessary for a party appealing to
personally sign the affidavit in support of her or his motion
to proceed in forma pauperis.”17 In criminal cases, we have
similarly held that absent good cause evident in the record,
the affidavit must be signed by the party appealing—not the
party’s attorney.18
Contrary to the State’s argument, however, this rule does
not exist to ensure that the party appealing has standing to
seek redress. Standing is jurisdictional, and we would address
standing even if a party has properly perfected an in forma
pauperis appeal. Instead, the rule is based on the statutory
requirements for invoking an appellate court’s jurisdiction.
In addition, we have reasoned that an attorney’s statement
of a client’s financial status is hearsay and puts the attorney
in a position of a witness, “‘thus compromising his role as
an advocate.’”19
But appeals by a parent from a juvenile case or by an adult
defendant in a criminal case are obviously distinguishable from
a juvenile’s appeal. When the appellant is an adult, only the
16 Id. See In re Interest of N.L.B., 234 Neb. 280, 450 N.W.2d 676 (1990).
17 See In re Interest of T.W. et al., supra note 11, 234 Neb. at 968, 453
N.W.2d at 437.
18 State v. Ruffin, supra note 5.
19 See id. at 615, 789 N.W.2d at 22 (quoting In re Interest of T.W. et al.,
supra note 11).

564 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
appellant’s financial resources are relevant to a finding that the
appellant is unable to pay the fees and costs of an appeal. That
is not true with a juvenile’s appeal. Section 25-2301.01 does
not literally require that the affiant declaring poverty be the
party appealing. And we have never held that in a juvenile’s
appeal, a poverty affidavit must be signed by the juvenile. That
holding would be contrary to the juvenile code’s concern with
a parent’s financial resources.
Specifically, § 43-272(1) requires a juvenile court to con-
sider a parent’s ability to pay for an attorney in determining
whether to appoint counsel for the juvenile:
When any juvenile shall be brought without counsel
before a juvenile court, the court shall advise such juve-
nile and his or her parent or guardian of their right to
retain counsel and shall inquire of such juvenile and his
or her parent or guardian as to whether they desire to
retain counsel. The court shall inform such juvenile and
his or her parent or guardian of such juvenile’s right
to counsel at county expense if none of them is able to
afford counsel. If . . . the court ascertains that none of
such persons are able to afford an attorney, the court
shall forthwith appoint an attorney to represent such
juvenile for all proceedings before the juvenile court,
except that if an attorney is appointed to represent such
juvenile and the court later determines that a parent
of such juvenile is able to afford an attorney, the court
shall order such parent or juvenile to pay for services
of the attorney . . . . If the parent willfully refuses to
pay any such sum, the court may commit him or her for
contempt . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
A juvenile court may also order a parent to pay for other
state services related to juvenile proceedings.20 It follows from
these provisions that a parent’s financial status is also a neces-
sary inquiry in determining whether a juvenile has the means
of paying the fees and costs for an appeal. Obviously, the State
20 See § 43-290.

IN RE INTEREST OF EDWARD B. 	565
Cite as 285 Neb. 556
can object if it believes that the juvenile has other resources.21
But in the majority of cases, the financial status of the juve-
nile’s parent, guardian, or custodian will be the only relevant
consideration. So, in many cases involving a juvenile’s appeal,
a court could not sensibly apply the rule that the party appeal-
ing must personally sign the poverty affidavit.
[8] We also reject the State’s argument that a parent is not a
party to a delinquency proceeding and, thus, cannot be an affi-
ant with a belief that he or she is entitled to redress. Contrary
to the thrust of the State’s argument, juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings are civil proceedings directed toward the education,
treatment, and rehabilitation of the child.22 The juvenile code
explicitly recognizes a parent’s interests in his or her child’s
disposition by making the parent a party.
Under § 43-2,106.01(2), an appeal from a juvenile court’s
final order or judgment may be taken by, among other persons,
the juvenile or the juvenile’s parent. Section 43-2,106.01 con-
fers a statutory right of appeal without making a distinction
between neglect proceedings and delinquency proceedings.
And we have previously stated that § 43-2,106.01 “delineates
those persons or entities which may be considered parties and
therefore have standing to appeal.”23
But the State argues that because § 43-2,106.01(2) is
necessarily broad enough to apply to both neglect and delin-
quency proceedings, we should not interpret it to apply to
delinquency disposition orders. It argues that In re Interest
of Dalton S.24 supports its position that the juvenile is the
only party with rights at stake in a delinquency proceeding.
We disagree.
In In re Interest of Dalton S., the juvenile court adjudicated
a 9-year-old boy under § 43-247(1) for disorderly conduct at
school. When the court explained to the child his rights and
21 See § 25-2301.02.
22 See In re Interest of Laurance S., 274 Neb. 620, 742 N.W.2d 484 (2007).
23 See, In re Interest of William G., 256 Neb. 788, 792, 592 N.W.2d 499, 503
(1999); § 43-245(15).
24 In re Interest of Dalton S., 273 Neb. 504, 730 N.W.2d 816 (2007).

566 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
accepted his plea, he was not represented, but his mother was
present and advised the boy to waive his right to counsel. At a
disposition hearing the next year, the court determined that the
child should be placed in a treatment foster home. The child
appealed, arguing that at the adjudication, the court had failed
to adequately advise him of his right to counsel.
We rejected that argument. We concluded that the court had
adequately advised the juvenile as required by statute. In deter-
mining whether the child had knowingly, voluntarily, and intel-
ligently waived his right to counsel, we noted that the mother
was actively involved in the waiver and that the record did not
show that she had a conflict of interest which should discount
her involvement.
The facts of In re Interest of Dalton S. undermine the State’s
argument that a parent does not have an interest in delinquency
proceedings. It illustrates that the State may seek to adjudi-
cate very young children under the delinquency provisions of
§ 43-247 and that a parent’s participation may be crucial to the
child’s understanding of the proceedings.
Additionally, 	“unless 	the 	context 	otherwise 	requires,”
§ 43-245(15) provides that the term “[p]arties” in the juve-
nile code shall mean “the juvenile as described in section
43-247 and his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.” Section
43-279(1) clarifies that in the context of delinquency proceed-
ings, a parent is a party with a right of appeal:
When the petition alleges the juvenile to be within the
provisions of subdivision (1), (2), (3)(b), or (4) of section
43-247 and the juvenile or his or her parent, guardian, or
custodian appears with or without counsel, the court shall
inform the parties:
(a) Of the nature of the proceedings and the possible
consequences or dispositions . . . .
. . . .
. . . and
(g) Of the right to appeal and have a transcript for
such purpose.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, apart from the parent’s potential financial liabilities
under the juvenile code, a parent obviously has a substantial

IN RE INTEREST OF EDWARD B. 	567
Cite as 285 Neb. 556
right at stake in a disposition order placing his or her child in
a treatment facility. So we reject the State’s argument that a
parent has no interest to redress in a juvenile’s appeal from a
disposition order in a delinquency proceeding.
[9] We hold that in a juvenile’s appeal from a delinquency
proceeding, the poverty affidavit of the juvenile’s parent may
be filed in support of the juvenile’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis. We further hold that a parent is a party who may
state a belief that the juvenile is entitled to relief. Because the
affidavit was timely filed, the appeal was properly perfected.
The State’s jurisdiction argument is without merit. Having
determined that we have jurisdiction, we turn to Edward’s
assigned errors.
court’s dIsposItIon order was correct
Section 43-286 governs a juvenile court’s disposition of
a juvenile when the court adjudicated the juvenile under
§ 43-247(1), (2), or (4). And it permitted the court to commit
Edward to OJS and place him at the YRTC.25 Also, because
the court found that Edward had violated the terms of his
probation, it could enter any disposition that it could have
made at the time that that the original order of probation
was entered.26
Edward contends that the court should have considered a
different disposition than placing him at the YRTC, but he
does not specify the disposition that he believes would have
been appropriate. He also contends that the court failed to
ensure that Edward’s responses during the OJS evaluation
were accurate because Edward lacked the requisite intellect
to have knowingly answered the evaluator’s questions. He
also argues that Sharon was not present during the evalua-
tion process.
The State argues that Edward’s most serious offenses were
committed while Edward was on probation and that the court
correctly determined that Edward needed the help that he
would get at the YRTC. We agree.
25 See § 43-286(1)(b).
26 See § 43-286(5)(b)(v).

568 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Edward cites no authority for his contention that a juvenile’s
parent must be present during the State’s assessment of the
juvenile’s treatment needs, and the record shows that Sharon
participated telephonically during a clinical evaluation. OJS
included her comments in its report. Moreover, the record
shows that the professionals evaluating Edward’s treatment
needs fully considered his psychiatric and intellectual needs
during their testing. And Edward fails to identify any state-
ments that he made during the evaluation process that were
inaccurate or that would have changed the recommendation
in these cases. More important, rehabilitation under any lesser
disposition would depend on Edward’s compliance with a
probation program, which he had already failed.27 The court
did not err in concluding that probation had been inadequate
and that Edward’s conduct and the public’s safety required his
treatment in a secure facility.
affIrMed.
27 See § 43-286(1)(a).
thoMas l. pearson, appellant, v. archer-danIels -MIdland
MIllIng coMpany, appellee.
828 N.W.2d 154
Filed March 22, 2013. 	No. S-12-729.
1. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. In determining whether to affirm,
modify, reverse, or set aside a judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Court
review panel, a higher appellate court reviews the findings of the trial judge who
conducted the original hearing; the findings of fact of the trial judge will not be
disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong.
2. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Competent evidence means evidence that tends
to establish the fact in issue.
3. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In testing the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact by the Workers’
Compensation Court, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable
to the successful party, every controverted fact must be resolved in favor of the
successful party, and the successful party will have the benefit of every inference
that is reasonably deducible from the evidence.