Jones v. Colgrove

- 461 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
Stacy L. Jones, appellee, and
State of Nebraska, intervenor-appellee,
v. Joshua Colgrove, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 18, 2025. 	No. S-24-018.
1. Modification of Decree: Child Custody: Visitation: Child Support:
Appeal and Error. Modification of a judgment or decree relating to
child custody, visitation, or support is a matter entrusted to the discre-
tion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed de novo on the record,
and will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.
2. Judgments: Child Support: Alimony: Taxation: Appeal and Error.
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determinations on matters such
as child support, alimony, and the child dependency exemption de novo
on the record to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her
discretion.
3. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists
only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just
result in matters submitted for disposition.
4. Parent and Child: Proof. To meet the requirement for “special written
findings” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2932(3) (Reissue 2016), the court
must, at a minimum, specifically state that it finds that the children and
the other parent may be adequately protected from harm by the limits
the court has actually imposed in the parenting plan. The court’s find-
ings should also indicate that the court recognized that the burden on
this issue was on the parent found to have committed the abuse. The
court should further identify what limits it imposed in the parenting plan
that it finds will provide the necessary protection.
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
6. Statutes. Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:06 AM CDT

- 462 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
7. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not resort to inter-
pretation of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of words which
are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
8. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning into
a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a
statute.
9. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case is moot if the facts under-
lying the dispute have changed, such that the issues presented are no
longer alive.
10. Moot Question. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether
changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.
11. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. The public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine requires an appellate court to consider (1) the public
or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an
authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials, and (3) the
likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar problem.
12. Child Custody. When both parents are found to be fit, the inquiry for
the court is the best interests of the children.
13. Child Support: Taxation. A tax dependency exemption is nearly identi-
cal in nature to an award of child support or alimony.
14. Child Support: Taxation: Presumptions. In general, the custodial par-
ent is presumptively entitled to the federal tax exemption for a depen-
dent child.
15. Child Support: Taxation: Waiver. A court may exercise its equitable
powers and order the custodial parent to execute a waiver of his or her
right to claim the tax exemption for a dependent child if the situation of
the parties so requires.
16. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When evidence is in conflict, the appel-
late court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial court
heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
rather than another.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Darla
S. Ideus, Judge. Affirmed.
Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellant.
Eddy M. Rodell for appellee.
Natalie T. Lips, Deputy Lancaster County Attorney, for
intervenor-appellee.

- 463 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Joshua Colgrove (Joshua) appeals the district court’s deci-
sion to grant legal and physical custody of B.C. to B.C.’s
mother, Stacy L. Jones (Stacy). Joshua contends that the dis-
trict court erred in its procedural, legal, and factual conclu-
sions. Because we find that such conclusions were not an abuse
of discretion, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
Joshua and Stacy were in a relationship for several years.
For most of their relationship, the couple and Stacy’s three
children lived together in Joshua’s house in Superior, Nebraska.
During their relationship, the couple had one child together,
B.C., whose custody is the subject of this dispute.
In early 2019, Joshua became ill and was eventually diag-
nosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome. As a result, he spent sev-
eral months in hospitals and rehabilitative facilities and did not
return home until September 2019.
During Joshua’s illness, Stacy filed Joshua’s state and fed-
eral income tax returns. Stacy deposited his state income tax
refund into Joshua’s account but deposited the federal income
tax refund of approximately $7,000 into her account to pay
“bills” because Joshua was in the hospital and unable to work.
Stacy testified that Joshua gave her permission to do this.
Joshua claims he was on pain medications and was uncon-
scious most of the time during his illness and, therefore, could
not and did not give Stacy permission to file his tax returns or
to utilize the subsequent refund.
During 	this 	same 	period, 	Stacy 	also 	established 	a
“GoFundMe” account. The money raised from the account was
ultimately used for “fuel and food.” The parties dispute whether

- 464 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
the money was supposed to be used to pay for Joshua’s medi-
cal expenses.
It was because of this disagreement, in part, that the couple
terminated their relationship. After the separation, Stacy and
her children, including B.C., moved to Lincoln, Nebraska.
There were no formal agreements in place regarding custody
of B.C. at the time of the move.
(a) Procedural History in Juvenile
Court and Supreme Court
In 2019, after the termination of her relationship with
Joshua, Stacy was charged with felony child abuse after an
incident in which she threatened her oldest son with a knife.
She was convicted in 2020 and received a sentence of proba-
tion. As a result, juvenile court proceedings were commenced
for all of Stacy’s children, and B.C. was placed in foster care.
After becoming aware of this situation, Joshua filed a petition
to intervene in the juvenile court matter, requesting that B.C.
be placed with him.
Based on his request, the Nebraska Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) asked that Joshua fulfill vari-
ous tasks intended to evaluate his fitness as a placement for
B.C. Joshua initially complied with DHHS’ requests for a
home inspection. Joshua did not, however, accommodate fur-
ther DHHS requests for permission to conduct background
checks on his family members or for signed releases to access
his medical documentation. Joshua declined to participate
because he “felt like [the DHHS] requests [were going to] be
never ending.”
As a result, Joshua’s request for placement was denied, and
he appealed, eventually leading to three opinions of this court. 1
The full factual and procedural history of the litigation can be
found in those cases, and we do not detail it again here.
1 See, In re Interest of A.A. et al., 307 Neb. 817, 951 N.W.2d 144 (2020),
supplemented by 308 Neb. 749, 957 N.W.2d 138 (2021); In re Interest of
A.A. et al., 310 Neb. 679, 968 N.W.2d 607 (2022).

- 465 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
(b) Procedural History in District Court
Following our three opinions, the juvenile court ultimately
found that Stacy had been rehabilitated and was a fit parent.
It awarded physical and legal custody of B.C. to Stacy, with
Joshua receiving parenting time every other weekend. Under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.02 (Cum. Supp. 2024), the juvenile
court subsequently entered a bridge order on May 11, 2022,
reflecting that decision and transferring its jurisdiction to the
district court. On the same day, the district court entered a
“Custody Decree” consistent with the juvenile court’s order.
On May 18, 2022, Joshua filed a petition for modification
of the bridge order, seeking custody of B.C. Roughly 7 hours
later, however, the juvenile court entered an “Amended Bridge
Order.” Fixing only minor technical errors, the amended
bridge order was identical in substance to the first order. The
amended bridge order was followed by the district court’s
“Amended Custody Decree,” which was also identical to the
previous custody order. Stacy filed an answer to Joshua’s ini-
tial petition for modification.
A few months later, in the same district court case, the State
filed a “Complaint to Modify to Establish Child and Medical
Support.” The State sought to have Joshua pay child support
for B.C. and to have Stacy provide insurance for B.C., so
long as it was “reasonably available” to her. Joshua moved to
dismiss and strike the State’s pleading, reasoning that under
§ 43-246.02 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.08 (Reissue 2016),
the State was pursuing the matter in a procedurally improper
manner. The district court overruled the motion.
In March 2023, the district court entered a “Pretrial Order,”
stating that the only pending pleading seeking modification of
the bridge order was the State’s, since Joshua’s complaint to
modify had been filed before the amended custody decree. In
that order, the district court provided Joshua an opportunity to
file a responsive pleading, including a counterclaim. Joshua
filed motions to reconsider and to strike the amended bridge
order and the amended custody order, which were overruled

- 466 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
without explanation. His subsequently filed answer to the
State’s complaint contained a counterclaim for a modification
of the bridge order.
2. Evidence at Trial
Trial was held in September 2023. The evidence adduced at
trial, and not otherwise addressed above, is summarized below
as it pertains to the primary arguments raised by the parties.
Additional factual information beyond that detailed below is
presented later in the opinion as necessary to resolve the par-
ties’ arguments on appeal.
(a) Stacy’s Actions After Conviction
As mentioned above, Stacy’s child abuse conviction led to a
sentence of probation. Stacy testified that her probation guide-
lines included requirements that she “complete any alcohol,
drug, and/or mental health evaluation[s], counseling, or treat-
ment as directed”; attend no less than two “pro-social activities
per week . . . such as Alcoholics Anonymous, church, etc.”; and
attend and successfully complete parenting education classes.
Stacy testified that she fulfilled these requirements. More spe-
cifically, Stacy testified that she completed a psychological
evaluation, a parenting class, and a “DMT” course. Stacy also
testified that, without prompting, she took a domestic violence
course and participated in individual and family therapy. She
further utilized “Intensive Family Reunification” services.
(b) B.C.’s School Behavior
Evidence at trial showed that B.C., who was in fourth grade
at the time, was subject to an individualized education plan to
manage his “[e]motional [d]isturbance.” As a result of such
“emotional disturbance,” B.C. had been disruptive in the class-
room, and the school had issued 21 “seclusion and restraint”
letters for B.C. B.C. attends individual therapy to assist with
these behavioral problems and, at the time of trial, was sched-
uled to undergo a psychological evaluation. Stacy testified that
staff at the school told her that there might be a correlation
between B.C.’s behavior and his visits with Joshua.

- 467 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
Stacy also testified that she receives daily updates on B.C.’s
behavior and that she frequently communicates with B.C.’s
teachers regarding the same. Stacy uses this information to
reward or discipline B.C. at home. Stacy testified that the par-
enting class she took taught her that children need “routine[s],”
so, with B.C., she enforces a chore schedule, a set bed-
time, limited “electronic[s] time,” and expectations regarding
homework.
Joshua also testified that he has “at least weekly,” but some-
times daily communication with B.C.’s teachers. He similarly
testified to rules and expectations relating to B.C.’s bedtime,
completing chores, “screen time,” and not talking back when
asked to do a task. Joshua also explained that of the 21 seclu-
sion and restraint orders issued by the school, only about half
were immediately before or after visits with Joshua, so he
disputed the correlation drawn by the school.
(c) Communication Between
Stacy and Joshua
Both parties testified to communication difficulties between
them, including a lack of direct communication and difficulty
coordinating video calls.
Testimony and exhibits showed there were instances when
Joshua did not respond to Stacy’s communications regard-
ing B.C. For example, in two emails admitted into evidence,
Stacy suggested to Joshua, first, that they consider family ther-
apy, and, second, that they use “talkingpoints.com” to house
all their communications, since Stacy planned to discontinue
email as a mode of communication. Neither email contained
a reply from Joshua, and he testified that he “supposed [he]
could have not responded.” Likewise, there was no response to
a letter from Stacy to Joshua detailing the dates and times for
B.C.’s upcoming appointments and parenting times.
Both parties also testified to times when video call commu-
nications between B.C. and Joshua ceased. In 2022, the parties
participated in mediation, eventually reaching an agreement

- 468 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
regarding various matters, including video calls. After media-
tion, however, Joshua refused to sign the mediation agreement,
alleging that it did not reflect what he had agreed to. Following
this refusal, there was a period of several months during which
B.C. and Joshua did not have video calls because, according
to Stacy, she was waiting for Joshua to reach out to her to
explain what sort of arrangement he would agree to.
(d) Parties’ Home Lives
Because of Joshua’s medical diagnosis, he does not work
and, instead, receives Social Security disability benefits. Joshua
testified that he has, however, recovered enough to drive and
care for himself and B.C. Joshua owns a four-bedroom home,
which allows B.C. to have his own room. Additionally, B.C.
has a half brother, a grandmother, and other relatives whom he
sees when he is with Joshua.
Stacy works overnight at a hotel, but her boyfriend stays
at her house while she is at work so that the children are not
alone. Stacy currently resides in a two-bedroom duplex where
B.C. shares one of the rooms with his two older, teenaged
siblings, one of whom is a girl. However, Stacy testified that
the children respect each other’s privacy and that her daughter
locks the door while dressing. Stacy admitted that she has been
twice evicted from a residence, but that she is currently “work-
ing with a realtor” to purchase her own home.
Stacy also testified that, despite repair attempts, damage
from a 2019 vehicle accident causes her vehicle to shut down
after 40 minutes, leaving her with unreliable transportation.
3. District Court’s Order
After trial, the district court issued an order for modifica-
tion that adjusted certain provisions of the amended bridge
order but left the overall custody determination in place.
Accordingly, the accompanying parenting plan granted Stacy
full custody of B.C., with Joshua maintaining parenting time
every other weekend from Friday at 5 p.m. to Sunday at 5
p.m. It also established summer and holiday parenting time.

- 469 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
The court ordered Joshua to pay child support in the amount of
$315 per month and ordered Stacy to maintain health insurance
for B.C., so long as it was reasonably available to her.
Of particular relevance to this appeal, the district court also
made the following factual findings: (1) “[Joshua] declined
to sign a medical release, submit himself and other family
members to a background check, or submit to a home visit/
inspection. As a result, [B.C.] was never placed in his care
by the juvenile court and/or DHHS”; (2) “[Joshua] takes little
or no initiative when it comes to [B.C.]”; (3) “[Stacy] tries
to communicate with [Joshua] about matters pertaining to
[B.C.] [Joshua] does not respond”; (4) “[Stacy] complied with
the requirements and recommendations of the juvenile court
and/or DHHS. She has taken the appropriate steps to address
her anger and that which led to the event in . . . 2019”; and
(5) “[Stacy] is taking appropriate steps to assist [B.C.] and his
progress in school.”
Joshua appealed, and we granted his petition to bypass the
Nebraska Court of Appeals. 2
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Joshua assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district
court erred in (1) failing to comply with Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-2932 (Reissue 2016); (2) denying Joshua’s motion to
dismiss and strike the State’s complaint and subsequently
ordering child support; (3) denying Joshua’s motions to strike
the amended bridge order and the amended custody decree;
(4) declining to award legal and physical custody of B.C. to
Joshua and, in doing so, reaching various factual conclusions
about Stacy and Joshua; (5) requiring Joshua to be solely
responsible for B.C.’s transportation to and from parenting
time with Joshua; (6) not awarding Joshua any entitlement to
the child tax credit for B.C.
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

- 470 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Modification of a judgment or decree relating to child
custody, visitation, or support is a matter entrusted to the dis-
cretion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed de novo on
the record, and will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. 3
[2] An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determinations
on matters such as child support, alimony, and the child depen-
dency exemption de novo on the record to determine whether
the trial judge abused his or her discretion. 4
[3] A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the rea-
sons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just
result in matters submitted for disposition. 5
V. ANALYSIS
1. District Court Order
Satisfied § 43-2932
We first address Joshua’s argument that the district court
failed to comply with § 43-2932. Joshua argues that because
Stacy was convicted of child abuse, and because evidence of
that conviction was admitted at trial, the district court was
required to make § 43-2932 findings but that its order fell short
of the statutory requirements.
Specifically, the district court’s order for modification stated,
“[Stacy] can adequately protect [B.C.] and provide for his
safety in her home. The ‘MODIFIED PARENTING PLAN
“EXHIBIT A”’ is in [B.C.’s] best interest and will not endan-
ger him, [Stacy], or [Joshua].” In so holding, the court cited
§ 43-2932.
Section 43-2932 generally provides that if a parent is found
to have committed a specific act, child abuse being the act
relevant here, limits shall be imposed that are reasonably
3 Lizeth E. v. Roberto E., 317 Neb. 971, 12 N.W.3d 809 (2024).
4 Anderson v. Anderson, 290 Neb. 530, 861 N.W.2d 113 (2015).
5 Mann v. Mann, 316 Neb. 910, 7 N.W.3d 845 (2024).

- 471 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
calculated to protect the child or child’s parent from harm.
Section 43-2932 further states:
(3) If a parent is found to have engaged in any activity
specified in subsection (1) of this section, the court shall
not order legal or physical custody to be given to that
parent without making special written findings that the
child and other parent can be adequately protected from
harm by such limits as it may impose under such subsec-
tion. The parent found to have engaged in the behavior
specified in subsection (1) of this section has the burden
of proving that legal or physical custody, parenting time,
visitation, or other access to that parent will not endanger
the child or the other parent.
[4] To meet the requirement for “special written findings”
under § 43-2932(3), the court must, at a minimum, specifi-
cally state that it finds that the children and the other parent
may be adequately protected from harm by the limits the court
has actually imposed in the parenting plan. 6 The court’s find-
ings should also indicate that the court recognized that the
burden on this issue was on the parent found to have commit-
ted the abuse. 7 The court should further identify what limits
it imposed in the parenting plan that it finds will provide the
necessary protection. 8
Joshua contends that the district court’s order failed to
explain that Stacy had the burden of proving that her exercise
of parenting time would not endanger B.C. He also contends
that the district court failed to detail what limitations it was
placing on Stacy’s parenting time to protect B.C.
We disagree with Joshua’s contention that the district court’s
findings were insufficiently specific. The district court found
that Stacy was convicted of child abuse, but it also found that
B.C. and both of his parents would be protected under the
6 Franklin M. v. Lauren C., 310 Neb. 927, 969 N.W.2d 882 (2022).
7 Id.
8 Id.

- 472 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
parenting plan curated by the court. Although not explicitly
stated, the district court’s language, namely its findings that
Stacy’s testimony was credible and that she would be able to
adequately protect B.C. from any harm, indicates the court’s
understanding of Stacy’s burden in this case. As to specific
limits to help ensure B.C.’s protection, the court pointed to the
fact that Stacy had fully complied with all the requirements
and recommendations of her probation and that she had taken
steps to “develop appropriate coping skills and improve her
parenting skills.” The court declared that Stacy had “done all
that was asked of her and more.” This is sufficient to comply
with § 43-2932.
2. District Court Did Not Err in Denying Joshua’s
Motion to Dismiss and Strike State’s Complaint
and to Award Child Support
Second, Joshua assigns that the district court erred in deny-
ing his motion to dismiss and strike the State’s complaint and
in subsequently granting the State’s request to impose child
support obligations on Joshua. Joshua argued, both below
and on appeal, that the State’s intervention was impermissible
under §§ 43-512.08 and 43-246.02(4) and (9).
Section 43-512.08 provides that “the State . . . may intervene
without leave of the court in any proceeding for dissolution of
marriage, paternity, separate maintenance, or child, spousal, or
medical support for the purpose of securing an order for child,
spousal, or medical support.”
Section 43-246.02(4), however, states, in part, that “[a]
bridge order shall only address matters of legal and physi-
cal custody and parenting time. All other matters, including
child support, shall be resolved by filing a separate petition or
motion or by action of the child support enforcement office and
shall be subject to existing applicable statutory provisions.”
Further, § 43-246.02(9) provides for the modification of
a bridge order, noting, in relevant part, that “[f]ollowing
the issuance of a bridge order, a party may file a petition in

- 473 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
district court for modification of the bridge order as to legal
and physical custody or parenting time.”
Based 	on 	these 	provisions, 	Joshua 	asserts 	that 	under
§ 43-246.02(9), the instant proceeding is one for the modifica-
tion of a bridge order, and that under § 43-512.08, the State is
not permitted to intervene in such proceedings. It is Joshua’s
contention that it is not possible for this case to be a paternity
action because under § 43-246.02(4), a bridge order cannot
address any issues beyond those for “legal and physical cus-
tody and parenting time.” Instead, Joshua asserts that the only
permissible way for the State to bring an action for child and
medical support when a bridge order is in place is to com-
mence an entirely separate action.
The 	State, 	however, 	counters 	that 	Joshua’s 	reading 	of
§ 43-246.02(4) is contrary to the plain language of the provi-
sion, which simply requires the filing of a “separate petition or
motion,” as opposed to an entirely separate action. It also notes
that reading the statute to require the filing of a separate action
would be antithetical to principles of judicial economy.
The State further contends that the fact that this action
is a proceeding for the modification of a bridge order does
not prevent it from also being a paternity action. In support
of this contention, the State points out that during the pro-
ceedings of In re Interest of A.A. et al., 9 one of our previous
opinions in this same litigation, the juvenile court received
an “acknowledgment of paternity” that had been notarized,
signed by both parties, and appropriately filed with DHHS.
The State notes that it was because of the introduction of this
acknowledgment that the juvenile court’s amended bridge
order made the finding that “paternity for [B.C.] was addressed
via acknowledg[ment] of paternity” and that the district court
similarly stated, “Joshua [is] the parent[] of [B.C.]” The State
argues that these were determinations of paternity and that
9 In re Interest of A.A. et al., supra note 1, 307 Neb. at 828, 951 N.W.2d at
157.

- 474 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
under § 43-512.08, it is permitted to intervene in actions of
paternity. We agree with the State. We find that the plain lan-
guage of § 43-246.02(4) does not require the commencement
of separate proceedings to address child support and that this
is the type of proceeding in which the State may intervene.
(a) Separate Proceedings Not Required to Address
Child Support Under § 43-246.02(4)
We note that Joshua’s arguments in support of this assign-
ment of error are focused exclusively on statutory interpreta-
tion, and we have limited our analysis accordingly. In doing
so, we find no merit to his arguments because Joshua fails to
consider the plain meaning of the statute, generally, and of the
word “petition,” specifically.
[5-8] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 10
Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text is
to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 11 An appellate
court will not resort to interpretation of statutory language to
ascertain the meaning of words which are plain, direct, and
unambiguous. 12 It is not within the province of the courts to
read meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything
direct and plain out of a statute. 13
Joshua’s interpretation of the statute is at odds with the plain
language of the text. Looking first at subsection (4) within the
broader context of § 43-246.02, it is evident that the limita-
tions it imposes are on the breadth of topics a juvenile court
can include in its bridge order; the plain language does not
purport to place restrictions on the matters the district court
will subsequently be permitted to address in its determina-
tions. Section 43-246.02(11) states that nothing in that section
10 Mullins v. Box Butte County, 317 Neb. 937, 13 N.W.3d 67 (2024).
11 State v. Godek, 312 Neb. 1004, 981 N.W.2d 810 (2022).
12 Id.
13 Id.

- 475 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
shall be construed to interfere with the jurisdictional provi-
sions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740 (Cum. Supp. 2024), which
grants district courts jurisdiction for domestic relations mat-
ters, including child support or medical support. Accordingly,
based on the language of the statute, we see no reason why
district court proceedings could not deal with both the modifi-
cation of a bridge order and other issues, such as child support
or medical support.
Although § 43-246.02(4) provides three possible ways of
addressing “[a]ll other matters, including child support . . . ,”
we look only at the plain meaning of the phrase “by filing a
separate petition,” since that is the statutory option the State
purported to follow. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a
“petition” is “[a] formal written request presented to a court or
other official body.” 14 There are multiple ways for parties to
make a request of the court, whether that be through existing
litigation or through the commencement of new litigation. We
see nothing in the plain language of the phrase that purports
to specify how or in what manner that request must be made;
the Legislature left this language quite broad. Therefore, the
most that can be said of the phrase “a separate petition” in
§ 43-246.02(4) is that some formal written request must be
made apart from the bridge order. We decline to impose a
narrower meaning.
Here, the State sought a determination of child and medical
support through a separate complaint, and we cannot say that
this did not comply with § 43-246.02(4).
(b) This Is Paternity Action in Which State
Could Intervene Under § 43-512.08
We also conclude that this case qualifies as a paternity
action, and thus, the State is permitted to intervene under
§ 43-512.08.
A legal commentator explains that, simply put, a paternity
action is “a finding by the court that a man is the father of
14 Black’s Law Dictionary 1382 (12th ed. 2024).

- 476 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
a child.” 15 Joshua does not contest that the juvenile court’s
amended bridge order and the district court’s order of modifi-
cation made a finding that Joshua is B.C.’s father. Additionally,
under § 43-246.02(1)(b), a bridge order can only be entered
by the juvenile court once a determination of paternity has
been legally established. Therefore, this case is, by definition,
a paternity action. Because a paternity action is specifically
contemplated under § 43-512.08 as the type of action in which
the State can intervene as of right, we hold that the district
court did not err in permitting the State to do so.
3. Issue of District Court Denying Joshua’s Motions
to Reconsider and to Strike Is Moot
As discussed above, Joshua filed his petition for modifica-
tion in the district court between the issuance of the custody
decree and the amended custody decree. As a result, the
district court required him to refile his petition because it
found the amended custody decree, as opposed to the initial
custody decree, to be the operative order. On appeal, Joshua
argues that the entering of these custody orders was improper
and that, accordingly, his motions to reconsider the pretrial
order and to strike the amended documents should have
been granted.
More specifically, Joshua contends that it was improper for
the district court to issue an initial custody decree in the first
place because its issuance was neither required nor autho-
rized by § 43-246.02. Joshua further argues that the juvenile
court improperly issued the amended bridge order because its
jurisdiction terminated when it filed the initial bridge order.
Accordingly, it is Joshua’s position that the amended cus-
tody decree is improper since it was issued in response to the
amended bridge order. Joshua claims that the court’s mistakes
imposed “significant burdens” 16 on him because he had to
15 Christine P. Costantakos, Juvenile Court Law and Practice § 6:6 at 476
(2024).
16 Brief for appellant at 44.

- 477 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
expend unnecessary resources to prepare and file additional
pleadings. He further posits that although the district court’s
final order for modification may have mooted the matter, this
court should still address the issue to ensure that “the will of
the Legislature is honored” and that future litigants have “their
‘day in court.’” 17
Stacy argues that the order for modification did, in fact,
moot the issue and that it does not meet the requirements
necessary to benefit from the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine.
[9-11] A case is moot if the facts underlying the dispute
have changed, such that the issues presented are no longer
alive. 18 The central question in a mootness analysis is whether
changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of
litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief. 19
There are, however, exceptions to the mootness doctrine that
may allow us to reach the merits of an otherwise moot case.
Relevant here, the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine requires an appellate court to consider (1) the public
or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability
of an authoritative adjudication for guidance of public offi-
cials, and (3) the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a
similar problem. 20
We agree with Stacy that the issue is moot. The order for
modification represented the district court’s final determina-
tion as to issues of custody, parenting time, and child support.
Accordingly, its issuance effectively eliminated any authority
held by the amended bridge order and the amended custody
decree, and, in doing so, it mooted the issue at hand. Joshua
would have us address this issue anyway so that in the future,
17 Id.
18 MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, 316 Neb. 746, 6 N.W.3d 799 (2024).
19 Id.
20 Id.

- 478 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
“those in Joshua’s position” are not subjected to the same type
of harm. 21 We decline to do so.
Even assuming that this issue was one of public concern
that would benefit from an authoritative adjudication, the
situation is unlikely to recur. This case presents a specific and
unique set of facts. We have previously declined to extend the
exception to such cases because the factual uniqueness means
the circumstances are unlikely to repeat themselves. 22 Further,
neither party directs us to any comparative cases, and it is
unlikely another situation will arise in which the courts issue
their respective orders, amend the documents, and manage to
catch the petitioner’s complaint in the middle of that process
by a window of 7 hours. Consequently, we decline to apply the
public interest exception.
4. District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Awarding Custody to Stacy or in
Making Factual Determinations
Next, Joshua takes issue with the above-detailed factual
findings of the district court, arguing that they are unsup-
ported by the evidence. As explained below, these claims are
without merit.
[12] The juvenile court explicitly found that Stacy was a fit
parent, and there is no allegation that Joshua is not a fit parent.
Accordingly, when both parents are found to be fit, the inquiry
for the court is the best interests of the children. 23 In deter-
mining a child’s best interests under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364
(Cum. Supp. 2024), courts may consider factors such as gen-
eral considerations of moral fitness of the child’s parents,
including the parents’ sexual conduct; respective environments
offered by each parent; the emotional relationship between
21 Brief for appellant at 44.
22 See NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, 314 Neb. 748, 993 N.W.2d 105
(2023). See, also, Rath v. City of Sutton, 267 Neb. 265, 673 N.W.2d 869
(2004).
23 Maska v. Maska, 274 Neb. 629, 742 N.W.2d 492 (2007).

- 479 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
child and parents; the age, sex, and health of the child and the
parents; the effect on the child as the result of continuing or
disrupting an existing relationship; the attitude and stability of
each parent’s character; parental capacity to provide physical
care and satisfy educational needs of the child; and many other
factors relevant to the general health, welfare, and well-being
of the child. 24 As mentioned above, absent an abuse of discre-
tion, the trial court’s factual determinations regarding the best
interests of the child will normally be affirmed. 25
(a) Finding on Joshua’s Failure to
Comply With DHHS Requests
Joshua claims that the court erred in finding that it was
because Joshua “declined to sign a medical release, submit
himself and other family members to a background check, or
submit to a home visit/inspection” that B.C. was not placed
with him. Alternatively, he asserts that, at the very least, no
weight should have been given to these facts.
We disagree. Although at trial Joshua testified that he
“wasn’t really opposed” to the requests made by DHHS, when
asked whether there were “to[o] many hoops . . . to jump
through that [he was] not willing to do,” Joshua answered,
“Yes.” Further, in our previous opinions in this matter, we
noted such things as “Joshua . . . refused to sign a medical
release” 26 and “[n]either Joshua nor his attorney . . . responded
to [requests from DHHS].” 27 Our opinions also quote the
statements of Joshua’s attorney asserting that DHHS would
not be allowed to “‘ply information from [Joshua] regarding
his physical or mental condition, beliefs, feelings, attitudes,
practices, customs, personal history, associations, affiliations,
or relationships, or the conditions of his home’” and that
24 Id.
25 See Lizeth E., supra note 3.
26 In re Interest of A.A. et al., supra note 1, 307 Neb. at 827, 951 N.W.2d at
157.
27 Id. at 830, 951 N.W.2d at 158.

- 480 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
“‘[t]here’s not going to be a “walkthrough” or any other of
this stuff.’” 28 In one of our earlier opinions in this matter,
we noted that a juvenile court, “in the exercise of its parens
patriae responsibilities, may develop a transition plan consti-
tuting a reasonable intrusion of limited duration into the non-
offending parent’s rights to autonomy in the care and custody
of the child.” 29 In another of our earlier opinions, we noted
that it was because of Joshua’s lack of cooperation that “the
juvenile court found it was not empowered to place custody
with Joshua,” 30 and we decline to revisit the issue. Based on
this history, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
making such a finding.
(b) Finding That Joshua Takes Little
or No Interest in B.C.
Joshua asserts the district court’s statement that he takes
little or no interest in B.C. is “scandalous” 31 because the evi-
dence shows that Joshua has exercised his parenting time, been
active in B.C.’s education, and pursued custody through this
litigation. However, Joshua neglects to consider the fact that
the record also shows behaviors that could be seen to reflect
indifference.
As discussed above, Joshua previously failed to comply
with DHHS requests, which effectively precluded DHHS from
placing B.C. with him. Joshua also testified that he was
not willing to participate in family therapy sessions. When
Stacy asked Joshua if they could make a concerted effort to
communicate so that B.C. could see positive communication
between his parents, Joshua refused, saying he “[didn’t] see
28 In re Interest of A.A. et al., supra note 1, 310 Neb. at 682, 968 N.W.2d at
610.
29 In re Interest of A.A. et al., supra note 1, 307 Neb. at 850, 951 N.W.2d at
170.
30 In re Interest of A.A. et al., supra note 1, 310 Neb. at 683, 968 N.W.2d at
610.
31 Brief for appellant at 37.

- 481 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
how [it was] going to change anything.” Both parties also tes-
tified that there was a span of nearly 6 months during which
B.C. did not have video communication with Joshua because
Joshua had not signed the mediation agreement and, according
to Stacy, he had not contacted her to reach any other resolu-
tion. Based on this information, the district court’s conclusion
is not untenable.
(c) Finding That Joshua Does
Not Respond to Stacy
On this point, Joshua asserts there was evidence in the
record that he has communicated with Stacy regarding mat-
ters pertaining to B.C. and that the court erred in concluding
otherwise.
While we agree that there were two exhibits showing com-
munication between Stacy and Joshua, there were also three
exhibits showing communications to which Joshua “supposed
[he] could have not responded.” Stacy also testified that there
were times that she did not even have Joshua’s phone number
because he “would not provide [it].” Accordingly, we cannot
find that the district court’s conclusion was clearly untenable
or lacking evidentiary support.
(d) Findings Regarding Stacy’s Compliance
With Rehabilitative Measures
Joshua also disputes the district court’s finding that Stacy
had “complied with the requirements and recommendations
of the juvenile court and/or DHHS . . . to address her anger[,]
develop appropriate coping skills and improve her parenting
skills.” Joshua argues that the court erred in making this find-
ing because there were not actually any “requirements and
recommendations” imposed on Stacy by the juvenile court
or DHHS.
Instead, Joshua claims there were only “conditions” put
on B.C.’s return to Stacy’s physical custody in 2021. Joshua
also argues that although Stacy testified to the completion of
several courses, there was no evidence that such courses were

- 482 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
the “appropriate steps” to take and therefore, the court should
not have allocated any weight to these facts.
We conclude otherwise. In addition to the 2021 court order
imposing “conditions” on B.C.’s return to Stacy’s custody, the
record in this case also contains documents from the district
court proceedings underlying Stacy’s child abuse conviction.
Included in those documents is the “Order of Probation,”
which, among other things, includes the requirements detailed
earlier in this opinion. The district court refers to those items
in the order as “condition[s] of probation.”
Further, we have previously held that “‘[t]he basic purpose
of probation [is] namely to provide an individualized program
offering a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to
rehabilitate himself [or herself] without institutional confine-
ment under the tutelage of a probation official and under the
continuing power of the court . . . .’” 32 Based on this idea,
it is only logical that the “condition[s] of probation” were
instituted for the purpose of rehabilitating Stacy. Accordingly,
Stacy’s testimony that she has completed these conditions
would indicate that she has taken the “appropriate steps” to be
rehabilitated.
(e) Finding That Stacy Assists
B.C. in School
Next, Joshua contends that the court erred in finding that
Stacy assists B.C. in school because, he argues, if she did, the
school would not have issued 21 seclusion and restraint orders
for B.C.
Stacy testified that she “work[s] with the school daily”
and “[doesn’t] go a single day without getting an update.”
Stacy explained that she uses the information she gets from
the school about B.C.’s behavior to “implement any sort of
rewards or disciplinary actions that [she] need[s] to after
school.” At the time of trial, Stacy testified that B.C. had lost
the privilege of having “electronic[s] time” because of his
32 State v. Gnewuch, 316 Neb. 47, 74, 3 N.W.3d 295, 316 (2024).

- 483 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
poor behavior during school. Stacy’s testimony also detailed
her expectations that B.C. bring home and complete all home-
work. This evidence supports the conclusion that Stacy helps
B.C. with school, so the court did not abuse its discretion in
making this determination.
5. District Court Did Not Err in Requiring
Joshua to Be Entirely Responsible for
B.C.’s Transportation in Order to
Exercise His Parenting Time
As a separate assignment of error, Joshua contends that
the court abused its discretion when it required that he be
exclusively responsible for picking up and dropping off B.C.
in Lincoln for all parenting time. Instead, he says the district
court’s modified parenting plan should have required the par-
ties to meet halfway in Aurora, Nebraska.
The district court cannot be said to have abused its discre-
tion here because the record before us shows that the arrange-
ment proposed by Joshua would not have been feasible. Stacy
testified that she lacks reliable transportation because her
vehicle will only run for approximately 40 minutes before
shutting down. The drive from Lincoln to Aurora is about an
hour each way. Joshua, on the other hand, testified both that
he does not work and that he is able to drive.
6. Not Abuse of Discretion to Not Award
Child Tax Credit to Joshua
Lastly, Joshua argues that the district court abused its discre-
tion in not awarding the child tax credit for B.C. to Joshua.
In support of this argument, he notes his assertion that Stacy
fraudulently filed his tax returns and deposited the refund into
her own account and wrongly utilized the money from the
“GoFundMe” account for her own purposes. Based on this,
Joshua asserts that it is “unconscionable” for the district court
not to award him the child tax credit at least every other year. 33
33 Brief for appellant at 47.

- 484 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JONES v. COLGROVE
Cite as 319 Neb. 461
[13-15] A tax dependency exemption is nearly identical in
nature to an award of child support or alimony. 34 In general,
the custodial parent is presumptively entitled to the federal
tax exemption for a dependent child. 35 However, a court may
exercise its equitable powers and order the custodial parent to
execute a waiver of his or her right to claim the tax exemp-
tion for a dependent child if the situation of the parties so
requires. 36
[16] Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in not awarding the child
tax credit to Joshua. At trial, the evidence relating to the tax
returns and “GoFundMe” account was conflicting. When evi-
dence is in conflict, the appellate court considers and may give
weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses
and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. 37
The district court heard Joshua’s testimony on the matter.
The district court also heard Stacy’s testimony that her activ-
ity was not fraudulent because Joshua had given her permis-
sion to file the tax returns and to use both the refund and the
GoFundMe account money. Hearing both sides, the district
court, impliedly, did not find Joshua’s argument to be credible
and declined to award Joshua the child tax credit. It is not the
role of this court to question the credibility determinations of
the district court.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we find Joshua’s arguments
to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the
district court.
Affirmed.
34 Emery v. Moffett, 269 Neb. 867, 697 N.W.2d 249 (2005).
35 Anderson, supra note 4.
36 Id.
37 Mann, supra note 5.