Burbank v. Evnen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
Cynthia Burbank, also known as Cindy Burbank,
appellant, v. Robert B. Evnen, in his official capacity
as Nebraska Secretary of State, appellee, and the
Nebraska Republican Party, intervenor.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 23, 2026. 	No. S-26-208.
1. Mandamus. Whether to grant a writ of mandamus is within a court’s
discretion.
2. Actions: Mandamus. An action for a writ of mandamus is a law action.
3. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. In a bench trial of a law
action, the trial court’s factual findings have the effect of a jury verdict,
and an appellate court will not disturb those findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. However, questions of law and statutory interpreta-
tion require an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the
decision made by the court below.
4. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Mootness is a justi-
ciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from exercising juris-
diction, and an appellate court reviews mootness determinations under
the same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions.
5. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional
question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter
of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the decisions made by lower courts.
6. Moot Question. Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a
suit that eradicate the requisite personal interest in the dispute’s resolu-
tion that existed at the beginning of the litigation.
7. Actions: Moot Question. An action becomes moot when the issues
initially presented in the proceedings no longer exist or the parties lack
a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the action.
8. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A moot case is one that seeks to
determine a question that no longer rests upon existing facts or rights—
i.e., a case in which the issues presented are no longer alive.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:48 AM CDT

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
9. Moot Question. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether
changes in circumstances have forestalled any occasion for meaning-
ful relief.
10. ____. A moot case is subject to dismissal.
11. Mandamus: Words and Phrases. Mandamus is a law action and repre-
sents an extraordinary remedy, not a writ of right.
12. Mandamus: Proof. Mandamus relief is available if the movant can
show (1) a clear right to the relief sought, (2) a corresponding clear duty
to perform the act requested, and (3) no other plain and adequate remedy
is available in the ordinary course of law.
13. ____: ____. In a mandamus action, the party seeking mandamus has the
burden of proof and must show clearly and conclusively that such party
is entitled to the particular thing the relator asks and that the respondent
is legally obligated to act.
14. Mandamus: Public Officers and Employees. Mandamus is available
to enforce the performance of ministerial duties of a public official but
is not available if the duties are quasi-judicial or discretionary.
15. ____: ____. A duty imposed by law which may be enforced by writ of
mandamus must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station.
16. Mandamus. The general rule is that an act or duty is ministerial only
if there is an absolute duty to perform in a specified manner upon the
existence of certain facts.
17. ____. A duty or act is ministerial when there is no room for the exercise
of discretion, official or otherwise, the performance being required by
direct and positive command of the law.
18. Public Officers and Employees. A ministerial duty is not dependent
upon a public officer’s judgment or discretion--it is performed under
the conditions specified in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard for the exercise of the officer’s judgment upon the pro-
priety of the act being done.
19. Mandamus. To warrant the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus
to compel the performance of a legal duty to act, (1) the duty must
be imposed by law, (2) the duty must still exist at the time the writ is
applied for, and (3) the duty must be clear.
20. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The text of a statute is to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
direct, and unambiguous.
21. Voting: Time. Regardless of who is objecting to a candidate filing form,
the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-624 (Supp. 2025) requires

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
that unless the written objection is made within 7 days after the filing
deadline, the candidate filing form shall be deemed valid.
22. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In construing a statute, the legislative
intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the whole
act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the par-
ticular topic under which the language in question is found.
23. Voting: Words and Phrases. When a candidate filing form is
deemed valid by operation of law, the candidate is one who “is enti-
tled to be voted for” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-801
(Reissue 2016).
24. Mandamus: Public Officers and Employees. Absent an objection to a
candidate filing, the Secretary of State’s statutory certification duty is a
purely ministerial one, enjoined by law, involving no discretion.
25. ____: ____. When a candidate filing form has been deemed to be valid,
it gives rise to a ministerial duty requiring the Secretary of State to
include the candidate when certifying the ballot.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: John
A. Colborn, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Vincent M. Powers and Kathleen M. Neary, of Powers
Law, and David Fox, Jacob D. Shelly, Derek A. Zeigler, and
Max Accardi, of Elias Law Group, L.L.P., pro hac vice, for
appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Cody S. Barnett, and
Zachary B. Pohlman, for appellee.
Brenna M. Grasz, of Keating, O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, P.C.,
L.L.O., and Erin Morrow Hawley and John S. Ehrett, of Lex
Politica, P.L.L.C., pro hac vice, for intervenor.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Per Curiam.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cynthia Burbank filed with the Nebraska Secretary of State
(Secretary) to be a Democratic Party candidate for U.S. Senate
in the 2026 primary election. When the Secretary refused to

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321 Nebraska Reports
BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
certify Burbank for inclusion on the primary election ballot,
Burbank filed a verified complaint seeking mandamus and
other relief. The district court denied all requested relief, and
Burbank appeals.
For reasons we will explain, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand the cause with directions to enter a
peremptory writ of mandamus directing the Secretary to certify
Burbank as a Democratic Party candidate for U.S. Senate for
the primary election to be held on May 12, 2026.
II. BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2026, Burbank filed a verified complaint
against the Secretary in the district court for Lancaster County.
The complaint was styled as multiple causes of action, includ-
ing one titled “Petition for Writ of Mandamus under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-2156.” Because the mandamus action is dispositive
of the issues raised on appeal, we do not discuss the other
causes of action.
1. Mandamus Petition
Burbank’s verified petition alleged that the Secretary has
a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to place her name on the
2026 primary election ballot as a Democratic Party candi-
date for U.S. Senate. 1 In support of that contention, Burbank
alleged that (1) she satisfied the constitutional requirements to
be a U.S. Senator 2; (2) prior to the applicable filing deadline
for nonincumbent candidates on March 2, 2026, she completed
and submitted the required candidate filing form with the
Secretary and paid the required filing fee to be a placed on the
2026 primary election ballot as a Democratic Party candidate
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-801 (Reissue 2016) (setting out ballot certification
requirements and procedure).
2 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“[n]o Person shall be a Senator who shall
not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen
of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen”).

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
for U.S. Senate 3; and (3) no written objection to her candidacy
was filed prior to the statutory deadline of March 9, 2026. 4
Regarding the candidate filing form, Burbank alleged that
she
accurately completed every field in her filing form,
including the name by which she is generally known in
the community, her contact information, and the required
oath: “I hereby swear that I will abide by the laws of the
State of Nebraska regarding the results of the primary and
general elections, that I am a registered voter and quali-
fied to be elected, and that I will serve if elected.”
Burbank alleged that on March 16, 2026, the Secretary sua
sponte determined that Burbank “‘has no intention of holding
the office that she purportedly seeks’” and announced that he
would not certify her as a candidate on the primary election
ballot. Attached as an exhibit to Burbank’s verified petition
was a letter from the Secretary explaining his reasoning.
In that letter, the Secretary acknowledged that Burbank
had filed to run as a Democratic Party candidate in the 2026
primary election for U.S. Senate and that she had filed her
candidate filing form in person at the Secretary of State
Elections Division office. The Secretary also acknowledged
that in that filing form, Burbank swore to the oath required
by § 32-607(1)(a), which states, among other things, “I will
serve if elected.”
The Secretary’s letter also discussed a written objection to
Burbank’s candidate filing form received from the Nebraska
Republican Party. The objection asked the Secretary to reject
Burbank’s filing form and withhold her name from the 2026
primary 	ballot 	for 	U.S. 	Senate, 	asserting 	that 	statements
appearing on Burbank’s public website, and public statements
about Burbank made by the chair of the Nebraska Democratic
3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-606 to 32-608 (Cum. Supp. 2024 & Supp.
2025).
4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-624(1) (Supp. 2025).

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
Party, showed that Burbank is a “‘plant’” candidate who “has
no intention of serving if elected, in violation of her oath and
the statute requiring it.” The Secretary expressly denied the
Nebraska Republican Party’s objection as untimely, finding
that objections must be made “within seven days after the fil-
ing deadline” 5 and the Nebraska Republican Party’s objection
was filed after that 7-day period had passed.
But the Secretary’s letter went on to conclude that he had
the authority, sua sponte, to refuse to put a candidate’s name
on the ballot even in the absence of a timely filed objection
under § 32-624. The Secretary stated that he “will not certify
. . . Burbank for the primary ballot,” reasoning, among other
things, that statements on Burbank’s website demonstrated that
“[c]ontrary to her oath, she has no intention to serve.”
Burbank’s verified petition alleged that nothing in Nebraska
law authorized the Secretary to refuse to certify her for the
2026 primary ballot when no timely objection under § 32-624
had been made, and she requested issuance of a peremptory
writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to list her as a
Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate when certifying the
ballot for the May 12, 2026, primary election. She also asked
that the matter be advanced on the district court’s docket and
“decided no later than Wednesday, March 18, 2026.”
2. Expedited Hearing
On March 18, 2026, Burbank and the Secretary appeared
by counsel for an expedited hearing on Burbank’s verified
complaint, including the petition for writ of mandamus. Also
appearing was counsel for the Nebraska Republican Party,
who sought leave to intervene and align with the Secretary
in the action. The court allowed intervention over Burbank’s
objection.
All parties adduced evidence in support of their respec-
tive positions. Burbank offered her verified complaint with
attached exhibits, which the court received without objection.
5 Id.

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321 Nebraska Reports
BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
The Secretary offered his own affidavit, attached to which
were copies of screenshots from Burbank’s campaign website,
an email from the Nebraska Democratic Party chair, and other
information that the Secretary said he considered and relied
upon when preparing the letter announcing that he would not
certify Burbank for the primary election ballot. The interve-
nor offered its verified petition to intervene and answer, with
attached exhibits, which the court also received. After consid-
ering the parties’ arguments, the district court took the matter
under advisement.
3. Order of Dismissal
On March 19, 2026, the district court entered a judgment,
styled as an order, denying all relief and dismissing Burbank’s
complaint in its entirety. As relevant to the verified peti-
tion for writ of mandamus, the district court’s order recited
the general requirements for entitlement to mandamus relief
and concluded that “Burbank has not carried her burden of
proof for a peremptory writ of mandamus.” The order did not
include specific factual findings, and none were requested by
the parties.
Burbank filed her notice of appeal later the same day, and
we moved the appeal to our docket on our motion. The fol-
lowing day, we ordered expedited briefing and submitted the
appeal without oral argument.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Burbank assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district
court erred in failing to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus
compelling the Secretary to certify her as a Democratic Party
candidate for U.S. Senate in the 2026 primary election.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-3] Whether to grant a writ of mandamus is within a
court’s discretion. 6 An action for a writ of mandamus is a law
6 State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing, 319 Neb. 663, 24
N.W.3d 861 (2025).

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
action. 7 In a bench trial of a law action, the trial court’s factual
findings have the effect of a jury verdict, and an appellate court
will not disturb those findings unless they are clearly errone-
ous. 8 However, questions of law and statutory interpretation
require an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of
the decision made by the court below. 9
[4,5] Mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates to
prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, and an appel-
late court reviews mootness determinations under the same
standard of review as other jurisdictional questions. 10 When a
jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, its
determination is a matter of law, which requires an appellate
court to reach a conclusion independent of the decisions made
by lower courts. 11
V. ANALYSIS
1. Appeal Is Not Moot
Before reaching the merits of Burbank’s appeal, we address
a threshold issue: Whether her appeal is moot. The Secretary
argues that it is, and he filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground of mootness, which we held in abeyance pending
plenary submission.
[6-10] Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing
of a suit that eradicate the requisite personal interest in the
dispute’s resolution that existed at the beginning of the litiga-
tion. 12 An action becomes moot when the issues initially pre-
sented in the proceedings no longer exist or the parties lack
7 State ex rel. Seeman v. Lower Republican NRD, 319 Neb. 681, 24 N.W.3d
874 (2025).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living v. Royce, 320 Neb. 830, 30 N.W.3d
838 (2026).
11 Id.
12 City of Hastings v. Sheets, 317 Neb. 88, 8 N.W.3d 771 (2024).

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the action. 13 A
moot case is one that seeks to determine a question that no
longer rests upon existing facts or rights—i.e., a case in which
the issues presented are no longer alive. 14 The central question
in a mootness analysis is whether changes in circumstances
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief. 15 A moot
case is subject to dismissal. 16
The Secretary argues that this case is moot because he
has already certified the ballot for the 2026 primary elec-
tion. To support this argument, the Secretary submitted an
affidavit, signed by his assistant deputy for elections, stating
that the ballot for the 2026 primary election was certified
on Thursday, March 19, 2026. The Secretary argues that
“[p]ursuant to his earlier decision excluding Burbank from
the ballot and the district court’s dismissal of Burbank’s chal-
lenge to that decision, [the Secretary] certified statewide pri-
mary ballots that do not include [Burbank’s] name as a can-
didate in the Democratic primary for United States Senate.” 17
The Secretary contends that his certification of the ballot
resulted in a change of circumstances that effectively prevents
this court from affording Burbank the relief she seeks.
We disagree that the Secretary’s certification of the primary
ballot has forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief. The
relief Burbank seeks in this appeal is a writ of mandamus
compelling the Secretary to list her as a Democratic candi-
date for U.S. Senate when certifying the 2026 primary elec-
tion ballot. Even though the Secretary has already certified
the 2026 primary election ballot without listing Burbank as
a candidate, we know of no legal or practical barrier that
would prevent the Secretary from recertifying the primary
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Brief for appellee in support of motion to dismiss at 3.

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
ballot to list Burbank as a candidate if such relief were
ordered by this court. Nor has the Secretary offered any legal
authority suggesting that once a primary election ballot is
certified, he would lack the authority to recertify as required
by a court order.
Furthermore, at this stage, no statutory deadline has passed
that would arguably preclude the Secretary from recertify-
ing the primary election ballot. The Secretary is required by
§ 32-801 to certify the official ballot “[a]t least fifty days
before any statewide primary or general election.” Because
the primary election is scheduled to occur on Tuesday, May
12, 2026, the statutory deadline for the Secretary to certify
the ballot is 5 p.m. on Monday, March 23. 18 Although we see
nothing in the statutory scheme that prevented the Secretary
from certifying the ballot prior to the statutorily mandated
deadline, doing so does not prevent this court from ordering
recertification in the form of mandamus relief if that is what
the law requires.
For the sake of completeness, we acknowledge that the
Secretary refers to the 2026 official election calendar for the
State of Nebraska, and he observes that it shows a deadline
of March 20, 2026, to certify the primary election ballot. We
do not understand the Secretary to argue that March 20 is,
in fact, the statutory deadline to certify the primary ballot.
But to the extent the Secretary suggests, based on the official
election calendar, that the statutory deadline for certification
has already passed, we cannot agree. Under Nebraska statute,
the official election calendar “shall be merely a guideline
and shall in no way legally bind the Secretary of State or
the Attorney General.” 19 As such, even if a different date
18 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-206(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (“any filing or other
act required to be performed by a specified day shall be performed by 5
p.m. of such day, except that if such day falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday, performance shall be required on the next business day”).
19 § 32-206(1).

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BURBANK v. EVNEN
Cite as 321 Neb. 65
for the certification deadline appears on the official election
calendar, the math shows that the statutory deadline for the
Secretary to certify the ballot is 5 p.m. on Monday, March
23, 2026.
Because the Secretary’s certification of the ballot has not
resulted in a change of circumstances that effectively prevents
this court from affording any meaningful relief, this appeal is
not moot. We overrule the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot.
2. Mandamus Relief
Burbank’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in denying her request for a peremptory writ of
mandamus directing the Secretary to include her name as a
Democratic Party candidate for the U.S. Senate when certify-
ing the 2026 primary election ballot.
[11-13] Mandamus is a law action and represents an extraor-
dinary remedy, not a writ of right. 20 Mandamus relief is avail-
able if the movant can show (1) a clear right to the relief
sought, (2) a corresponding clear duty to perform the act
requested, and (3) no other plain and adequate remedy is avail-
able in the ordinary course of law. 21 In a mandamus action,
the party seeking mandamus has the burden of proof and must
show clearly and conclusively that such party is entitled to
the particular thing the relator asks and that the respondent is
legally obligated to act. 22
[14-18] Mandamus is available to enforce the performance
of ministerial duties of a public official but is not available if
the duties are quasi-judicial or discretionary. 23 A duty imposed
by law which may be enforced by writ of mandamus must be
one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
20 State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing, supra note 6.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.

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an office, trust, or station. 24 The general rule is that an act or
duty is ministerial only if there is an absolute duty to perform
in a specified manner upon the existence of certain facts. 25 A
duty or act is ministerial when there is no room for the exer-
cise of discretion, official or otherwise, the performance being
required by direct and positive command of the law. 26 A min-
isterial duty is not dependent upon a public officer’s judgment
or discretion—it is performed under the conditions specified
in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
for the exercise of the officer’s judgment upon the propriety of
the act being done. 27
[19] To warrant the issuance of a peremptory writ of
mandamus to compel the performance of a legal duty to act,
(1) the duty must be imposed by law, (2) the duty must still
exist at the time the writ is applied for, and (3) the duty must
be clear. 28
To analyze whether Burbank is entitled to mandamus relief
on this record, we first review the statutory ballot certification
process regarding candidates for office and the Secretary’s
statutory duties in that regard.
(a) Ballot Certification Process
and Secretary’s Duties
Under Nebraska’s Election Act, 29 a “[c]andidate” is defined
as a “registered voter for whom votes may be cast at any
election and who, either tacitly or expressly, consents to be
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 State ex rel. AMISUB v. Buckley, 260 Neb. 596, 618 N.W.2d 684 (2000).
29 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-101 to 32-1552 (Reissue 2016, Cum. Supp. 2024 &
Supp. 2025).

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considered.” 30 Generally speaking, the process for becoming a
candidate is set out in §§ 32-606 through 32-608.
Section 32-606 states, in relevant part: “Any candidate may
place his or her name on the primary election ballot by filing a
candidate filing form prescribed by the [Secretary] as provided
in section 32-607.” 31 Section 32-607, in turn, provides, in rel-
evant part:
All candidate filing forms shall contain the following
statement: I hereby swear that I will abide by the laws
of the State of Nebraska regarding the results of the
primary and general elections, that I am a registered
voter and qualified to be elected, and that I will serve
if elected. Candidate filing forms shall also contain
the 	following 	information 	regarding 	the 	candidate:
Name, as provided under subdivision (b) of this sub-
section; residence address; mailing address if different
from the residence address; telephone number; office
sought; party affiliation if the office sought is a parti-
san office . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.) Candidates filing for “national, state, or
congressional office” are to file their forms “in the office of
the [Secretary].” 32 And § 32-608 requires a filing fee to be
paid on behalf of each candidate prior to filing for office, with
certain exceptions not relevant here.
The validity of a candidate filing form is addressed in
§ 32-624(1), which states, in relevant part: “A candidate filing
form filed for the primary or general election pursuant to sec-
tion 32-606 shall be deemed to be valid unless objections are
made in writing within seven days after the filing deadline.”
(Emphasis supplied.) The effect of the italicized language is
30 § 32-104.
31 § 32-606(1).
32 § 32-607(2).

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to create a conclusive presumption of validity when no writ-
ten objections are made to a candidate filing form within the
statutory period. 33 But when a timely objection is made, all
affected candidates must be given notice and “the validity of
such objection” 34 shall be determined by “[t]he filing officer
with whom the candidate filing form was filed.” 35 Such offi-
cer’s “decision shall be final unless an order is made in the
matter by a judge of the county court, district court, Court
of Appeals, or Supreme Court on or before the fifty-fifth day
preceding the election.” 36
Finally, § 32-801 sets out the ballot certification timeline
and process. As relevant here, that statute provides that “[a]t
least fifty days before any statewide primary or general elec-
tion, the [Secretary] shall transmit in ballot form to each
election commissioner or county clerk a certification of the
candidates . . . that appear on the state ballot.” 37 The form of
the required certification for primary elections is also set out in
§ 32-801, which states that such certification
shall name the office to be filled, the length of the term,
the number of candidates to be voted for, the name
of each candidate for whom candidate filing forms
. . . have been filed in the office of the [Secretary] and
who is entitled to be voted for at such primary election,
33 See Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, 311 Neb. 160, 164, 971 N.W.2d
128, 134 (2022) (“[u]nless objections are made, a candidate filing form
which appears to conform with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-606 (Supp. 2021)
and 32-607 shall be deemed to be valid”). See, also, Salem Grain Co.
v. City of Falls City, 302 Neb. 548, 924 N.W.2d 678 (2019) (discussing
effect of conclusive presumptions of validity enacted by Legislature).
34 § 32-624(2).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 § 32-801.

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and the party affiliation or nonpartisan status of each
candidate.
With this statutory certification procedure in mind, we turn
now to Burbank’s argument that the district court erred by
denying her request for a peremptory writ of mandamus direct-
ing the Secretary to include her name as a Democratic Party
candidate for U.S. Senate when certifying the 2026 primary
election ballot. Before analyzing this argument, we review the
Secretary’s stated reasons for refusing to list Burbank as a can-
didate when certifying the 2026 primary ballot.
The Secretary does not contend that Burbank’s candidate
filing form was incomplete or untimely, nor is there any
evidence in the record to support such a contention. Instead,
the Secretary’s letter shows that the reason he refused to
certify Burbank as a candidate on the primary ballot was
his conclusion, based on public statements by Burbank and
others regarding her intentions in running for U.S. Senate,
that the oath Burbank swore in her candidate filing form to
“serve if elected” lacked veracity. As such, the substance of
the Secretary’s letter necessarily makes a written objection
to the validity of Burbank’s candidate filing form. Assuming
without deciding that the Secretary can, sua sponte, object to
a candidate filing form, the question becomes whether such
objections are subject to the strict 7-day deadline set out in
§ 32-624. We conclude they are.
(b) All Objections Are Subject to
Time Limit in § 32-624
Section 32-624(1) unambiguously provides that a candidate
filing form “shall be deemed to be valid unless objections
are made in writing within seven days after the filing dead-
line.” The record shows the Secretary’s written objection to
Burbank’s filing form was made well beyond that timeframe,
but we understand him to argue this is inconsequential because

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the 7-day period in § 32-624 only applies to “third parties” 38
and “does not cabin the Secretary’s authority.” 39 We disagree.
[20,21] There is no language in § 32-624 limiting the 7-day
time limit to “third parties,” and we decline to read such lan-
guage into the statute. The text of a statute is to be given its
plain and ordinary meaning, 40 and an appellate court will not
resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory
words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 41 We hold
that regardless of who is objecting to a candidate filing form,
the plain language of § 32-624 requires that unless the written
objection is made within 7 days after the filing deadline, the
candidate filing form shall be deemed valid.
[22] 	Furthermore, 	construing 	the 	term 	“objections” 	in
§ 32-624(1) to plainly encompass objections raised by anyone
is consistent with the statutory scheme. In construing a statute,
the legislative intention is to be determined from a general con-
sideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter
to which it applies and the particular topic under which the
language in question is found. 42 In Nebraska Republican Party
v. Gale, 43 we recognized that when the Legislature enacted
§§ 32-624 and 32-801, it “established by statute strict statu-
tory deadlines which must be met in order to guarantee that
the state’s election process is safeguarded against uncertainty
and disruption.” 44 We see no principled basis to exclude the
38 See brief for appellee at 9 (suggesting only “a third party” could object
under § 32-624) and 20 (contending § 32-624 sets out a procedure
“whereby third parties can file objections”).
39 Brief for appellee at 20.
40 E.g., Flinn v. Strode, 320 Neb. 813, 30 N.W.3d 661 (2026).
41 E.g., Jones v. Colgrove, 319 Neb. 461, 24 N.W.3d 1 (2025).
42 Flinn v. Strode, supra note 40.
43 Nebraska Republican Party v. Gale, 283 Neb. 596, 812 N.W.2d 273
(2012).
44 Id. at 599, 812 N.W.2d at 276.

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Secretary from the strict statutory deadline for objecting to
candidate filing forms under § 32-624.
Having concluded that the Secretary’s written objection to
Burbank’s candidate filing form was subject to the 7-day time
period in § 32-624 and that such objection was made after that
statutory time period expired, we next consider the legal effect
of a record that shows no timely objections to Burbank’s can-
didate filing form.
(c) Burbank’s Candidate Filing Form Is
Deemed Valid by Operation of Law
Once the 7-day deadline in § 32-624 passed without a writ-
ten objection being made to Burbank’s candidate filing form,
that form was conclusively “deemed to be valid” 45 by opera-
tion of law. Because both the Secretary’s objection and the
Nebraska Republican Party’s objection were untimely under
§ 32-624, there is no reason to consider or address the merits
of those objections to Burbank’s candidate filing form, and
we express no opinion in that regard. Instead, we turn our
attention to the Secretary’s legal duty under the certification
statute when a candidate filing form is conclusively deemed
to be valid.
(d) Secretary Has Ministerial Duty to
Include Burbank When Certifying
2026 Primary Ballot
[23] As stated, under § 32-801, the Secretary is required
to certify the candidates and offices that appear on the state
ballot at least 50 days before any statewide primary election.
Such certification must include “the name of each candidate for
whom candidate filing forms . . . have been filed in the office
of the [Secretary] and who is entitled to be voted for at such
primary election.” 46 When a candidate filing form is deemed
45 § 32-624(1).
46 § 32-801.

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valid by operation of law, the candidate is one who “is entitled
to be voted for” within the meaning of § 32-801.
[24,25] It has long been the rule in Nebraska that absent an
objection to a candidate filing, the Secretary’s statutory certi-
fication duty is “purely a ministerial one[,] enjoined by law,
involving no discretion.” 47 As such, when a candidate filing
form has been deemed to be valid, it gives rise to a ministe-
rial duty requiring the Secretary to include the candidate when
certifying the ballot. 48 Because Burbank’s candidate filing form
is conclusively deemed to be valid by operation of law, the
Secretary has an absolute duty under § 32-801, when certify-
ing the primary election ballot, to include Burbank’s name as a
Democratic Party candidate for U.S. Senate.
(e) Burbank Entitled to Peremptory Writ
On this record, Burbank met her burden to clearly and con-
clusively show that her candidate filing form is valid and that
she is entitled to be included on the 2026 primary election bal-
lot as a Democratic Party candidate for U.S. Senate. She has
also shown that the Secretary has a corresponding clear legal
duty, imposed by law and existing at the time the writ was
applied for, to include her name when certifying the 2026 pri-
mary election ballot. To the extent the district court concluded
otherwise, it erred.
VI. CONCLUSION
On this record, we conclude the Secretary had a ministe-
rial, nondiscretionary duty to include Burbank’s name as
a Democratic Party candidate for U.S. Senate when certi-
fying the 2026 primary election ballot. The district court
thus erred in denying Burbank’s request for a peremptory
writ of mandamus.
47 State v. Piper, 50 Neb. 25, 33, 69 N.W. 378, 381 (1896).
48 § 32-801. See, also, § 32-606 (“[a]ny candidate may place his or her name
on the primary election ballot by filing a candidate filing form prescribed
by the [Secretary]”).

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We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the
cause with directions to immediately upon receipt of the man-
date, and no later than 10 a.m. on Monday, March 23, 2026,
issue a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the Secretary
to certify Burbank as a Democratic Party candidate for U.S.
Senate for the primary election to be held on May 12, 2026.
Mandate to issue forthwith, for immediate delivery.
Reversed and remanded with directions.