In re Estate of Schneider

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
In re Estate of Franklin Schneider, deceased.
Chris Schneider, appellant, v. Kyle Schneider,
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Franklin Schneider, deceased, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 8, 2026. 	No. S-25-297.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In the absence of
an equity question, an appellate court, reviewing probate matters, exam-
ines for error appearing on the record made in the county court. When
reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent
evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
2. Decedents’ Estates: Wills: Trusts: Judgments: Appeal and Error.
The interpretation of the words in a will or a trust presents a question of
law. When reviewing questions of law in a probate matter, an appellate
court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by
the court below.
3. Decedents’ Estates: Wills: Intent. The cardinal rule concerning a
decedent’s will is the requirement that the intention of the testator shall
be given effect, unless the maker of the will attempts to accomplish a
purpose or to make a disposition contrary to some rule of law or pub-
lic policy.
4. ____: ____: ____. To arrive at a testator’s intention expressed in a will,
a court must examine the decedent’s will in its entirety, consider and lib-
erally interpret every provision in a will, employ the generally accepted
literal and grammatical meaning of words used in the will, and assume
that the maker of the will understood words stated in the will.
5. Wills. When language in a will is clear and unambiguous, construction
of a will is unnecessary and impermissible.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:38 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
6. Wills: Words and Phrases. Ambiguity exists in a will when a word,
phrase, or provision in the instrument has, or is susceptible of, at least
two reasonable interpretations or meanings.
7. Wills: Intent: Words and Phrases. A patent ambiguity is one which
exists on the face of an instrument and must be removed by interpreta-
tion according to legal principles, and the intention of the testator must
be found in the will.
8. Decedents’ Estates: Wills. A latent ambiguity exists when the testa-
tor’s words are susceptible of more than one meaning, and the uncer-
tainty arises not upon the words of the will as looked at in themselves,
but upon those words when applied to the object or subject which
they describe.
9. Parol Evidence: Wills: Intent. Parol evidence is inadmissible to deter-
mine the intent of a testator as expressed in his or her will, unless there
is a latent ambiguity therein which makes his or her intention obscure
or uncertain.
10. Wills: Evidence. Extrinsic evidence is admissible both to disclose and
to remove latent ambiguity of a will.
11. Trial: Evidence: Proof. Where a party has shown that competent
evidence exists to support his or her burden of proof, and competent evi-
dence to the contrary has been produced, or different conclusions or
inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, it is then exclu-
sively the province of the fact finder to determine the weight of the
evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.
12. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
before it.
Appeal 	from 	the 	County 	Court 	for 	Douglas 	County:
Sheryl L. Lohaus, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
William N. Beerman, Benjamin C. Deaver, and Sydney M.
Grad, of Pansing Hogan Ernst & Buser, L.L.P., for appellant.
Anne Marie O’Brien and Anthony T. Baudler, of Smith
Pauley, L.L.P., for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
Cassel, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decedent’s will gave to one of his sons “any business
or interest in any business I own.” The issue is whether
that provision included certain real estate owned by dece-
dent. The county court found no ambiguity on the face of
the will and refused to consider extrinsic evidence. Because
the admitted evidence disclosed a factual dispute and the
court’s order did not determine whether there was latent ambi-
guity, the decision does not conform to the law. Accordingly,
we reverse the county court’s order and remand the cause for
further proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Will
Franklin 	Schneider 	(decedent) 	died 	on 	November 	29,
2022, and is survived by two sons, Kyle Schneider and Chris
Schneider. Two months before his death, decedent executed
a “Last Will and Testament.” One provision gave to Chris
$50,000 and “any pieces of equipment of his choosing that
I own at my death” and stated that the bequest was intended
to allow Chris to start his own business. A different provision
gave “all the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both
real and personal,” to Kyle and three others, with each indi-
vidual receiving 25 percent.
The focus of this appeal is “Article Tenth.” It stated: “I
give, devise and bequeath any business or interest in any
business I own at my death in its entirety to my son CHRIS
SCHNEIDER. In so doing, CHRIS SCHNEIDER is autho-
rized to take any action and to enter into any transaction,
agreement or commitment which he deems advisable.”
2. Informal Probate and
Amended Inventory
Kyle filed an application for informal probate of the will and
for his appointment as personal representative. The registrar

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
issued a statement of informal probate of the will and appointed
Kyle as personal representative.
Kyle later filed an amended inventory. Schedule A listed five
parcels of real estate owned by decedent with a total fair market
value of $1,081,500. Schedule B identified stocks and bonds
totaling over $700,000. Schedule C showed “Mortgages, Notes
and Cash” of approximately $53,000. Schedule F cataloged
property owned by “CBJ, Inc.” It identified bank accounts and
equipment worth $867,515.97.
3. Petition for Supervised Administration
and Determination of Entitlement
to Estate Assets
Chris filed a petition seeking supervised administration and
a determination of entitlement to estate assets. He alleged that
Kyle had failed to fully carry out Article Tenth of the will.
According to the petition, decedent’s businesses and business
interests at the time of death included “C.B.J. Construction
Co., Inc.”; “CBJ Construction”; a commercial real estate
business encompassing commercial real estate located on I
Street in Omaha, Nebraska (the shop); and a residential real
estate rental business encompassing rental property located on
Monroe Street in Omaha. According to Chris, the shop was
CBJ Construction’s physical location and place of operation.
Chris acknowledged that title to the real estate was held in
decedent’s name, but Chris asserted that decedent “effectively
held his commercial real estate business as an unincorporated
sole proprietorship.” Chris alleged that supervised administra-
tion was necessary because Kyle did not intend to distribute
the shop to Chris.
4. Hearing
The court held a hearing on the petition. Without objection,
it received three exhibits: Chris’ affidavit, Kyle’s affidavit, and
the affidavit of decedent’s accountant.
Chris stated in his affidavit that in 2004, he began work-
ing with decedent at CBJ Construction, a concrete business.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
According to Chris, CBJ Construction had operated out of
the shop since at least 1995 and decedent purchased the two
real estate parcels composing the shop in 2006. Chris stated
that decedent paid himself rent from CBJ Construction. Chris
attached to his affidavit records from the county assessor’s
office showing that the class for one of the parcels compos-
ing the shop was listed as “‘Commercial’” and the class for
the other as “‘Industrial.’” Chris noted that in 2021, C.B.J.
Construction Co., Inc., maintained a commercial property
insurance policy covering the shop.
Chris also relied on income tax returns for 2021. Decedent’s
individual income tax return reported the 2021 rent payments
he received from C.B.J. Construction Co., Inc., as business
income and claimed business depreciation on the shop to offset
the business income. Further, decedent reported the rent pay-
ments as qualified business income and designated the rental
payments for the shop under “‘Commercial Building - Safe
Harbor.’” Decedent also specifically claimed the “Section
199A Trade or Business Safe Harbor for Rental Real Estate”
and identified the shop as being a commercial property. The
tax return for C.B.J. Construction Co., Inc., claimed a deduc-
tion for the rent payments as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense.
The affidavits of Kyle and decedent’s accountant reflect
that they did not know decedent to have any sort of com-
mercial real estate business. To Kyle’s knowledge, decedent
purchased the shop with personal funds and not business
funds. Kyle stated that decedent used the shop “for much
more than just business operations related to CBJ Construction
Co., Inc.,” and “did many things” there outside the scope of
the concrete-pumping business, including woodworking. He
stated that decedent’s personal property remains at the shop
and that decedent continues to have personal mailings sent
there. Kyle stated that “the majority of business operations
occurred off-site” and “not where CBJ Construction Co., Inc.
leased premises to house its materials.” Decedent’s accountant

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
stated that “neither the Properties nor the equipment stored on
the Properties were used in furtherance of any commercial real
estate business” and that decedent’s concrete-pumping busi-
ness was his only business venture.
5. County Court’s Order
The court summarized the parties’ arguments regarding the
shop. It framed the issue as determining whether decedent’s
“intention is clear on the face of the Will or whether an ambi-
guity exists” and stated that parol evidence is inadmissible to
determine the testator’s intent where the ambiguity is on the
face of the instrument. The court quoted a legal dictionary’s
definitions of “business” and “interest.”
The court declared that it found no ambiguity on the face
of the will. It made no comment about the existence of any
latent ambiguity. The court stated that using the common
meanings of “business” and “interest,” Chris was entitled to
the business assets on the amended inventory—assets he had
already received from Kyle. It further stated that the evidence
submitted in exhibit 9—Chris’ affidavit and attachments—
was extrinsic evidence, which the court was “prohibited from
considering.” The court found that the evidence failed to
show Kyle had breached his duties as personal representative.
Accordingly, the court denied Chris’ request for entitlement of
the estate assets and his request for court supervision.
Chris filed a timely appeal, and we moved the case to
our docket. 1
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Chris alleges that the county court erred in (1) finding that
the will was unambiguous; (2) finding that it was prohibited
from considering Chris’ affidavit; (3) failing to find that the
shop was either a business, part of a business, or an inter-
est in a business within the meaning of Article Tenth of the
will; (4) endorsing the amended inventory and finding that all
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
“business” assets had already been distributed to Chris; and (5)
denying Chris’ request for supervised administration.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] In the absence of an equity question, an appellate court,
reviewing probate matters, examines for error appearing on the
record made in the county court. 2 When reviewing a judgment
for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the
decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evi-
dence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 3
[2] The interpretation of the words in a will or a trust
presents a question of law. 4 When reviewing questions of law
in a probate matter, an appellate court reaches a conclusion
independent of the determination reached by the court below. 5
V. ANALYSIS
1. Interpretation of Will
Chris’ first three assigned errors relate to the court’s read-
ing of the will. Chris contends that there is a latent ambiguity
because decedent did not define “business” or “interest in any
business.” Thus, Chris argues that the court erred in finding
that the will was unambiguous and finding that it was prohib-
ited from considering Chris’ affidavit.
(a) General Principles
[3-5] The cardinal rule concerning a decedent’s will is the
requirement that the intention of the testator shall be given
effect, unless the maker of the will attempts to accomplish a
purpose or to make a disposition contrary to some rule of law
or public policy. 6 To arrive at a testator’s intention expressed in
2 In re Estate of Barger, 303 Neb. 817, 931 N.W.2d 660 (2019).
3 Id.
4 In re Estate of Brinkman, 308 Neb. 117, 953 N.W.2d 1 (2021).
5 Id.
6 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
a will, a court must examine the decedent’s will in its entirety,
consider and liberally interpret every provision in a will,
employ the generally accepted literal and grammatical mean-
ing of words used in the will, and assume that the maker of the
will understood words stated in the will. 7 When language in a
will is clear and unambiguous, construction of a will is unnec-
essary and impermissible. 8
(b) Ambiguity
[6] Ambiguity exists in a will when a word, phrase, or pro-
vision in the instrument has, or is susceptible of, at least two
reasonable interpretations or meanings. 9 An ambiguity may be
either patent or latent. 10
[7] A patent ambiguity is one which exists on the face of an
instrument and must be removed by interpretation according to
legal principles, and the intention of the testator must be found
in the will. 11
[8] A latent ambiguity exists when the testator’s words are
susceptible of more than one meaning, and the uncertainty
arises not upon the words of the will as looked at in them-
selves, but upon those words when applied to the object or
subject which they describe. 12
(c) Extrinsic Evidence
[9,10] Two equally important principles define the role of
parol, i.e., extrinsic, evidence. Parol evidence is inadmissible
to determine the intent of a testator as expressed in his or her
will, unless there is a latent ambiguity therein which makes
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 In re Estate of Barger, supra note 2.
10 See, e.g., In re Estate of Brinkman, supra note 4.
11 Id.
12 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
his or her intention obscure or uncertain. 13 Extrinsic evidence
is admissible both to disclose and to remove latent ambiguity
of a will. 14
(d) Application
The county court found “no ambiguity on [the will’s] face.”
Its order did not explicitly mention either a patent or a latent
ambiguity. On appeal, no party contends that there is patent
ambiguity. We agree that there is not.
Chris argues that there is latent ambiguity as to the scope of
decedent’s business and interest in any business. He points out
that decedent’s will did not define “business” or “interest in
any business,” nor did it include a list of assets falling within
Article Tenth. Both parties offered extrinsic evidence on the
issue, which the court received without objection.
However, it is not apparent from the court’s order that it
considered whether there was a latent ambiguity. The court’s
statements—that there was no ambiguity and that it was pro-
hibited from considering extrinsic evidence—lead us to believe
that it did not.
But extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambi-
guity in a will, where such evidence is necessary to enable the
court to ascertain the intention of the testator. 15 Here, it was
needed, both to disclose and to remove latent ambiguity.
The extrinsic evidence offered demonstrates a factual dis-
pute. Decedent conducted personal and business activities at
the shop. He held title to the shop in his individual name
and paid himself rent from CBJ Construction. Chris points to
evidence that decedent insured the shop as commercial prop-
erty and indicated in his tax return that the shop was a rental
real estate enterprise. But Kyle and decedent’s accountant
13 In re Estate of Barger, supra note 2.
14 Id.
15 See Krueger v. Krueger, 169 Neb. 82, 98 N.W.2d 360 (1959).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
contend that decedent did not have any kind of commercial real
estate business.
A treatise concerning wills explains that “‘[b]usiness’ is an
ambiguous expression, which sometimes passes little more
than good-will and sometimes passes property and capital.” 16
What the term includes “depends, in part, upon the language
which is used in the will, and, in part, upon the view which the
court takes of the prima facie meaning of ‘business.’” 17
We have considered testamentary gifts involving a busi-
ness. In a case involving a bequest to a brother of “‘all my
interest in and to the HUB BAR . . . , which generally is
the ownership of said business,’” the issue was whether that
brother was entitled to the deposit of money in the bar’s
bank account or whether that money fell under the residuary
clause. 18 The county court determined in that case that the
deceased did not intend to devise to his brother the accu-
mulated profits from the bar, and the district court agreed.
We stated that “it is necessary to understand the relation of
the deceased to the Hub Bar, as shown by the record,” 19 and
ultimately determined that “the testator by the language he
employed in his will intended to and did give to his brother
the one-half interest in the Hub Bar bank account which
belonged to, and had been accumulated in, that business and
was a part thereof.” 20
In a different case, a testator sold his elevator business—
the buildings, the lease, the machinery, and the equipment—
approximately 5 months prior to his death. His will gave to
his son the “‘Grain Elevator property’” 21 but stated that if
16 4 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 33.33
at 347 (rev. ed. 1961).
17 Id.
18 In re Estate of Zents, 148 Neb. 104, 105, 26 N.W.2d 793, 794 (1947).
19 Id. at 106, 26 N.W.2d at 794.
20 Id. at 115, 26 N.W.2d at 798.
21 See Scriven v. Scriven, 153 Neb. 655, 658, 45 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1951).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
the testator sold the property, the son would be entitled to
the proceeds from the sale. We considered what the testa-
tor intended his son should take in the event of a sale of the
elevator property, particularly whether it included the busi-
ness’ accounts receivable at the time of the sale. In doing
so, we stated that the will’s language left the testator’s intent
“somewhat obscure” and that it was “not improper” to con-
sider extrinsic evidence in determining what was included in
the sale of the elevator property. 22 Based on the contract for
the sale of the elevator property and the testator’s practice of
handling his bank accounts and collections, we determined
that the testator did not intend to include accounts receivable
in the event of a sale of the property.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania faced an issue somewhat
similar to that before us. 23 There, a testator’s will bequeathed
all of his “‘interest in my business’” 24 to certain beneficiaries.
The testator’s business was originally conducted on leased
property, but the testator later acquired title to the property in
his name. He purchased the realty using both personal funds
and partnership funds. The appellant argued that the real estate
was the testator’s individual property and not an asset of the
business. The appellate court considered that the testator was
credited in the partnership’s capital account for the personal
funds used to purchase the realty, that the partnership’s books
showed the realty belonged to the partnership, and that the
partnership did not pay rent to the testator. The court deter-
mined that the realty was included in the testator’s bequest of
his interest in the partnership business.
Here, uncertainty arises by decedent’s use of the phrase
“any business or interest in any business I own at my death”
with respect to the shop. In light of the evidence produced,
22 Id. at 664, 45 N.W.2d at 766.
23 See In re Gerlach’s Estate, 364 Pa. 207, 72 A.2d 271 (1950).
24 Id. at 209, 72 A.2d at 272.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
this constituted a latent ambiguity. Because it does not appear
that the county court considered whether there was a latent
ambiguity, its decision does not conform to the law.
[11] But we cannot resolve questions of fact in the first
instance. Where a party has shown that competent evidence
exists to support his or her burden of proof, and competent
evidence to the contrary has been produced, or different con-
clusions or inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evi-
dence, it is then exclusively the province of the fact finder to
determine the weight of the evidence and judge the credibility
of witnesses. 25 The initial fact finding regarding latent ambigu-
ity must be made by the county court.
Accordingly, we reverse the county court’s order and remand
the cause for further proceedings. Upon remand, the court is
not restricted to the existing record.
2. Remaining Assignments of Error
[12] Chris also assigned errors concerning the amended
inventory and the denial of his request for supervised admin-
istration. Because we have determined that the county court’s
order must be reversed and the cause remanded to the county
court for further proceedings, we need not resolve these issues.
An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that
is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before
it. 26 To the extent that these issues may recur on remand, reso-
lution of them will be guided by the court’s resolution of the
will’s latent ambiguity.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we conclude the following:
• To the extent the county court determined that there was no
patent ambiguity, i.e., no ambiguity existing on the face of the
will, we agree.
25 In re Estate of Walker, 315 Neb. 510, 997 N.W.2d 595 (2023).
26 Edwards v. Estate of Clark, 313 Neb. 94, 982 N.W.2d 788 (2022).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF SCHNEIDER
Cite as 321 Neb. 350
• Because the extrinsic evidence showed a dispute about the
nature of the shop and whether the decedent intended the shop
to be included in the gift of his “business or interest in any
business,” the court’s order—which made no mention of latent
ambiguity and stated that the court was prohibited from con-
sidering extrinsic evidence—was contrary to law.
Accordingly, we reverse the county court’s order and remand
the cause for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.