Doris Rowell v. Sharnell S. Morgan, Pleasantville Board of Education, Atlantic County, 9/30/26 (#396-26SEC)

396-26SEC
SEC Dkt. No. C61-24
Agency Dkt. No. 327-07-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Doris Rowell,
Complainant,
v.
Sharnell S. Morgan, Pleasantville Board of Education,
Atlantic County,
Respondent.
The Commissioner has reviewed the record of this matter and the July 28, 2026 decision of the School
Ethics Commission (SEC). The SEC found that respondent Sharnell S. Morgan, a member of the Pleasantville
Board of Education (Board), violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) of the School Ethics Act
(Act). The SEC recommended a penalty of censure for the violation. The SEC’s decision was forwarded to the
Commissioner for final determination on the recommended penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29(c).
Respondent neither filed exceptions to the recommended penalty nor instituted an appeal, pursuant to N.J.A.C.
6A:4-1 et seq., of the SEC’s underlying finding of violation.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the penalty recommended by the SEC for respondent’s
actions. Accordingly, respondent is hereby censured as a school official found to have violated the Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 30, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	September 30, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of
mailing of this decision.

Before the School Ethics Commission
OAL Docket No.: EEC 11099-25
SEC Docket No.: C61-24
Final Decision
Doris Rowell,
Complainant
v.
Sharnell S. Morgan,
Pleasantville Board of Education, Atlantic County,
Respondent
I. 	Procedural History
The above-captioned matter arises from a Complaint that was filed with the School
Ethics Commission (Commission) on August 1, 2024, by Doris Rowell (Complainant), alleging
that Sharnell Morgan (Respondent), a member of the Pleasantville Board of Education (Board),
violated the School Ethics Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 et seq. More specifically, the
Complaint alleged Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) (Counts 1-7), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(b) (Count 3), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c) (Counts 3 and 5), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Counts 3
and 5), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Counts 1-7), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) (Counts 1, 4, and 7),
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) (Counts 5 and 7) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5) of the
Code of Ethics for School Board Members (Code). Respondent filed a Written Statement on
December 9, 2024.
At its meeting on June 17, 2025, and after review of the Complaint and the Written
Statement, the Commission adopted a decision finding that there were sufficient facts and
circumstances pled in the Complaint and in the Written Statement to lead a reasonable person to
believe that that N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Counts 3 and 5), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3),
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) (Count 5), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5) were violated
but insufficient facts and circumstances to lead a reasonable person to believe that the remaining
allegations in the Complaint were violated. Based on its finding of probable cause, the
Commission voted to transmit the above-captioned matter to the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) for a hearing where Complainant would carry the burden to prove the remaining
allegations that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Counts 3 and 5), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(e) (Count 3), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) (Count 5), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and
5).
At the OAL, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing on March 19,
2026. Thereafter, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision on May 15, 2026, finding that Respondent

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violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 3), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3)1, N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1(i) (Count 5), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5); but finding that
Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 5); and recommending a penalty of
censure. Respondent filed exceptions to the Initial Decision, in accordance with N.J.A.C. 1:1-
18.4.
At its meeting on June 23, 2026, the Commission discussed the above-captioned matter,
and at its meeting on July 28, 2026, the Commission voted to adopt the Initial Decision’s
findings of fact, as well as the legal conclusions that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(e) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5) and did not violate N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 5); but voted to modify the ALJ’s legal conclusion to find that
Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i)
(Count 5)2; and voted to recommend that a penalty of censure be imposed.
II. 	Initial Decision
Based on the documentary evidence and witness testimony, the ALJ issued the following
findings of fact:
• 	On May 14, 2024, the Board held its regular Board action meeting.
• 	Among the items listed on the agenda was a motion for the Board to accept the
recommendation of the Superintendent approving the reduction in force eliminating
staff positions for the 2024-2025 school year.
• 	Many of the staff slated for elimination and their supporters were present at the
meeting to express their concerns and displeasure during public comment.
• 	Individuals who wished to speak during public comment were required to write their
name and address on a sign-in sheet. Only those individuals who signed the sheet
were invited to speak at the microphone during public comment. A disclaimer was
included 	on 	the sign-in-sheet 	that 	outlined 	the procedures 	for 	offering 	public
comments.
• 	Prior to the start of the meeting, Respondent signed the sheet to speak. When her
name was called, Respondent left her seat on the stage where she was seated with the
other Board members and went to the microphone designated for public comment.
Respondent stated that she was stepping down as a Board member to speak as a
taxpayer, citizen, and community liaison. She wanted the record to reflect that she did
not have her Board member hat on because she did not want to get anyone in trouble
for her words.
1 The ALJ found a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 5; however, the Commission did not
find probable cause for a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 5. Accordingly, it has not been
discussed here.
2 To the extent that the ALJ found a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 5, the Commission
modifies that conclusion and finds that Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 5
because the Commission did not find probable cause or transmit that alleged violation to the OAL.

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• 	Respondent’s public comments were recorded during the meeting. The testimony
from Complainant and Respondent were consistent with the recording.
• 	Respondent stated that she was displeased with what she was hearing from her
Muslim community members about how the District did not honor its promise for a
dedicated place for members to pray and break their fast during the month of
Ramadan. She also praised the District for marking the celebration of Eid with a day
off from school. After noting the Superintendent’s support for Respondent’s Muslim
community members, she criticized the Superintendent for allegedly ridiculing a
Muslim man by questioning why he was wearing an Izar, a religious garment.
Respondent also repeated a story that the Superintendent had usurped the Juneteenth
event, after it had been planned. Respondent used the word “stolen” to describe how
the Superintendent took credit for the work performed by others. Because her three
minutes had ended, Complainant attempted to cut off Respondent and move to the
next speaker. Respondent continued to speak despite Complainant’s efforts to stop
her. The next speaker attempted to give Respondent her time, which created some
confusion because Respondent claimed she signed the sheet twice and did not need
additional time. Respondent relinquished the microphone and returned to her seat on
the stage as a Board member.
• 	Respondent’s second comments were made from her seat on the stage as a Board
member. In commenting about the staff non-renewal process, Respondent used the
word “trickery” and stated that “skin-color” was a common component among the
eliminated staff. Respondent also stated that she received complaints and saw pictures
of food contaminated with mold being served to the students. Respondent sent a text
message to the Superintendent about the contaminated food and inquired whether
someone had to contract food poisoning before action was taken. Finally, Respondent
stated that she heard from staff members that they were told not to speak to Board
members 	or 	there 	would 	be 	consequences. 	Respondent 	believed 	that 	the
Superintendent threatened the staff members with retaliation for speaking to Board
members and suggested that the retaliation was the non-renewal of their contracts.
Initial Decision at 3-7.
The ALJ noted that according to Respondent’s testimony, Respondent sought advice
from Board counsel prior to speaking at a Board meeting the first time. Respondent did not recall
what attorney she spoke to but noted that it was not the current attorney. Respondent stated that
the advice was to “disclose that she was speaking as a private citizen and not as a member of the
Board.” Id. at 7.
The ALJ noted she was satisfied that the witnesses testified in accordance with their
beliefs about the ethical responsibilities of Board members, who are elected to serve the children
in the community. Id. at 8. However, the ALJ further noted when Respondent chose to speak at a
public meeting on May 14, 2024, “her words had consequences.” Ibid.
According to the ALJ, as to Count 3, Respondent “stepped down as a Board member to
address the public as a private citizen, taxpayer, and community liaison.” Id. at 9. The ALJ noted
Respondent stated that she was “taking her Board hat off, because she had a lot of things to say.”
Ibid. However, the ALJ further noted Respondent proceeded to make allegations against the

4
Superintendent for “ridiculing a Muslim man for wearing his Izar, and for not supporting
Muslims during Ramadan as promised with a room to pray and break their fast.” Ibid. Moreover,
the ALJ maintained Respondent insinuated that the Superintendent “stole staff ideas and usurped
the planned Juneteenth holiday celebration.” Id. at 9-10. The ALJ further maintained Respondent
admitted that she did not have firsthand knowledge of these allegations but was sharing what she
had heard. Id. at 10. Per the ALJ, Complainant alleged that when Respondent stepped down from
her position as a board member to speak as a community liaison, she stopped working “together
with her fellow board members but rather against them.” Ibid.
The ALJ noted “based upon the testimony and documentation, there were no factual
indications that Respondent gave a ‘direct order’ to school personnel.” Ibid. However, according
to the ALJ, “by going to the microphone to speak as a community liaison and voice complaints
against the Superintendent based on allegations that had undertones of religious discrimination
and unfair practices, Respondent involved herself in activities or functions that are the
responsibility of school personnel.” Ibid. The ALJ contended Respondent testified that the
assistant superintendent gave her the information that she publicized. The ALJ further contended
instead of directing the assistant superintendent to the proper channels to make a complaint,
Respondent “removed her Board member hat and publicized the allegations as a private citizen
and community liaison on her behalf at a public Board meeting.” Ibid. The ALJ stated
Respondent “attempted to circumvent her ethical obligations as a Board member, by figuratively
removing her Board hat.” Ibid.
The ALJ found that while “there is no dispute that Board members do not surrender their
right to free speech, there remains a balance between the Board member’s rights as a private
citizen and the specific standards of conduct under the [Act.]” Ibid. The ALJ further found that
while “normally a disclaimer is required so there is no mistake when the Board member is acting
solely as a private citizen,” the Commission has also held in prior cases that the use of a
disclaimer “does not give a school official carte blanche to then discuss Board business and/or
matters in a way that is, or appears to be, on behalf of the Board.” Ibid citing In the Matter of
Christopher T. Treston, Randolph Township Board of Education, Morris County, OAL Dkt. No.
EEC 09014-19, Final Decision, (April 27, 2021).
The ALJ concluded that in this matter the lines between Respondent’s roles were
“blurred” because during the same meeting, Respondent acted in both capacities, as both a
member of the public and a member of the Board. Ibid. Moreover, the ALJ concluded that by
“repeating allegations which may have been false, and which involved the day-to-day activities
of the school, simply removing her Board hat was not enough to shield her words from her
ethical obligations as a Board member.” Ibid. According to the ALJ, Respondent testified that
the assistant superintendent gave her the information; therefore, Respondent’s responsibility as a
Board member was clear. Ibid. Therefore, the ALJ found that Complainant has met her burden of
proof that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), as alleged in Count 3 “when she
repeated 	allegations 	against 	the 	superintendent 	at 	the 	public 	microphone 	that 	involved
accusations affecting the daily operations of the school.” Id. at 11.
As to a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), as alleged in Count 5, Complainant asserted
that Respondent informed the public that she administers the schools and encouraged the staff to
come to her with their concerns. Ibid. Complainant further claimed Respondent “informed the
public that she handles the day-to-day operations” of the school. Ibid. The ALJ found that “the

5
testimony from the witnesses did not support [Respondent] making any direct statements that she
handles the day-to-day operations.” Ibid. Instead, the ALJ maintained Respondent’s testimony
revealed that she understood her role as a Board member. Ibid. Therefore, the ALJ found that
there was nothing in the record to support Complainant’s claims as alleged in Count 5 and found
that Complainant has not met her burden of proof to demonstrate that Respondent violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), as alleged in Count 5. Ibid.
Regarding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 3, the ALJ noted that Dr.
Martinez (Superintendent) testified that Respondent’s public accusations against her were false.
The ALJ 	further 	found 	that 	these 	statements 	were 	“disparaging 	and 	suggested 	that 	the
[S]uperintendent acted in a racist manner and stole credit from her staff.” Id. at 12. Per the ALJ,
“[i]f these were actual complaints, Respondent’s public statements were neither an attempt to
resolve a complaint nor an investigation of a complaint.” Ibid. The ALJ noted Respondent’s only
defense was that she was acting in her role as a community liaison, not as a Board member. Ibid.
The ALJ further noted Respondent attempted, by invoking a disclaimer, to keep her comments
separate from her official duties as a Board member. Ibid. However, the ALJ maintained
Respondent’s actions in “leaving the stage and stating that she was taking off her Board hat
because she did not want to get the Board in trouble by what she was about to say did not shield
the Board from being compromised by her statements.” Ibid. The ALJ further maintained
Respondent “removed her Board hat to repeat disparaging comments” that were told to her about
the Superintendent. Ibid. The ALJ noted Respondent admitted that “she did not know whether
the statements were true, but she publicly stated them anyway.” Ibid. According to the ALJ, such
behavior, even with a disclaimer, had the ability to compromise the Board and put the Board
“publicly at odds with the Superintendent,” and therefore, the ALJ found that Complainant met
her burden of proof under N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(5), that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(e), as alleged in Count 3.3 Ibid.
As to a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) in Count 5, the ALJ asserted there is “no
factual basis to support that [Respondent] stated she handles the day-to-day operations of the
school or encouraged staff to come to her with their concerns.” Id. at 13. However, the ALJ
further found that by “publicly stating that she was hurt to hear that the staff were not allowed to
speak directly with Board members,” Respondent took a public position in contradiction to Dr.
Martinez’s position. Ibid. Per the ALJ, Dr. Martinez testified that staff should not bring their
concerns directly to Board members because it creates confusion and disrupts the process. Ibid.
The ALJ noted Respondent’s comments that the Superintendent eliminated staff positions based
on race, trickery, and retaliation for talking to Board members resulted in her undermining the
superintendent 	in 	the 	proper 	performance 	of 	her 	duties. Therefore, 	the ALJ 	found 	that
Complainant has met her burden of proof under N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(9), that Respondent
violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i), “when she took deliberate action by her choice of words to
undermine the Superintendent in the proper performance of her duties.” Id. at 13-14.
Regarding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j), first in Count 3, the ALJ maintained
although Respondent testified that the assistant superintendent told her about the incidents,
3 The ALJ also addressed a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 5; however, the Commission
did not find probable cause for a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 5. Accordingly, it has not
been discussed here.

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Respondent “did not offer an explanation about the contents of their conversation or why she did
not refer the matters to Dr. Martinez.” Id. at 14. Per the ALJ, instead, Respondent “figuratively
removed her Board member’s hat, left her place on the stage with the other Board members to
applause from the crowd, and spoke at the public microphone.” Ibid. The ALJ noted Respondent
admitted that she did not refer these complaints to Dr. Martinez for an administrative solution,
and therefore, the ALJ found that Complainant has met her burden of proof under N.J.A.C.
6A:28-6.4(a)(10), that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j), under Count 3, when she
failed to bring complaints to the chief administrative officer.
Next, as to a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) in Count 5, the ALJ contended that
Respondent’s 	public 	statements 	“undermined 	the 	renewal 	process 	and 	attacked 	the
superintendent.” Id. at 14-15. The ALJ noted that all complaints regarding the renewal process
must proceed through proper channels; therefore, the ALJ found that Complainant met her
burden of proof under N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(10), that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(j), under Count 5, by making public complaints about the renewal process without referring
such complaints to the chief administrative officer.
Having found that Complainant has met her burden of proof pertaining to Respondent’s
public 	comments 	against 	the 	Superintendent 	at 	the 	Board 	meeting, 	the 	ALJ 	concluded
Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i)
and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j).
Turning to penalty, the ALJ noted that although Respondent is a dedicated and committed
community liaison, she could not “circumvent her ethical obligations as a Board member by
figuratively removing her Board member hat to accuse the [S]uperintendent of wrongdoing at a
Board 	meeting.” Id. 	at 	16. 	The ALJ 	further 	noted 	that Respondent 	made “serious 	and
inflammatory accusations” against the Superintendent in violation of the Act. The ALJ found
that Respondent, a long-standing Board member, used her position on the Board to advocate for
community members and staff, when she repeated false accusations against the Superintendent
and undermined her authority as the chief administrator of the school. Therefore, the ALJ
concluded that a penalty of censure would be appropriate. Id. at 17.
III. 	Exceptions
Respondent’s Exceptions
Respondent initially argues that her actions and conduct during the May 14 Board
meeting were done in exercise of her freedom of speech under the First Amendment and related
New Jersey law. Respondent notes that she provided a disclaimer during the times when she was
speaking as taxpayer and community liaison, not as a Board member. Moreover, Respondent
further notes Complainant failed to establish that Respondent violated School Ethics Law by
failing to establish the requirements as set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a).
Respondent argues she did not make any allegations against the Superintendent; however,
she did indicate that she received phone calls and she provided that information. She argues that
she was providing information, only, as to what was communicated to her; she did not

7
“insinuate” anything the Superintendent did nor did not do; she was not voicing her complaints
against the Superintendent but communicating to the public information that was shared to her as
a community member and liaison; she relied upon prior board counsel’s legal advice that she was
permitted to take off her Board member hat and speak as a citizen and/or community liaison; and
she made it perfectly clear when she stated “she was stepping down as a Board Member to speak
as a tax payer and community liaison during Public Comment and wants the record to reflect that
she does not have her board member hat on and that she is a taxpayer and community leader.”
Respondent further argues at no time did she administer the schools, she did not interfere
with the Superintendent’s administration of the schools in any way, and asserts that at no time
did she make any personal promises or take any private action that compromised the Board.
Respondent states she spoke as a community member and shared information that was provided
to her, and she was providing her opinion on an issue that was affecting staff eliminations.
Respondent also argues Complainant did not meet her burden that Respondent made personal
promises or took any private action that may compromise the Board. Respondent maintains she
received information not as a Board member but as a member of the community, and therefore,
she was not required to go to the Superintendent with those complaints.
Respondent contends she provided the appropriate disclaimer and noted when she was
speaking as a community liaison and taxpayer, she physically went off the dais in order to
address concerns of the public. Respondent further contends she wanted to make this clear, as
not to compromise the Board or make comments that would be attributed to the Board.
According to Respondent, her comments and discussion were to state her opinion on ensuring
the District acknowledge and respect culture and customs of the Muslim community and to
acknowledge staff members and other personnel who have worked hard for the District.
Respondent notes she referenced that this was approved of by the Board and on the school
calendar. Respondent further notes she stated her personal opinion on such topics, provided
information that was truthful in accordance with her experiences as a community liaison, and did
not violate the Code. Moreover, Respondent maintains Complainant did not present any factual
evidence that Respondent questioned how the Board was handling public concerns and directed
community members to share their concerns with the principal or the Superintendent but instead
gave a direct order to school personnel or became directly involved in activities or functions that
are the responsibility of school personnel in the day-to-day administration of the school district.
Respondent further maintains Complainant also failed to present any evidence that Respondent
attempted to resolve a complaint or investigated a complaint before referring the matter to the
chief administrative officer or acted outside of a public meeting and prior to the failure of an
administrative solution.
Finally, Respondent asserts she testified that she consulted with prior Board counsel who
advised her that she could leave the dais and speak as a citizen and not a Board member on prior
occasions. 	Respondent 	maintains 	that 	this 	factual 	evidence 	is 	unrefuted, 	and 	therefore,
Respondent can rely upon the advice of counsel and specifically the advice-of-counsel defense.
Respondent vehemently disagrees with the findings that the charges are sustained.

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IV. 	Analysis
Upon a thorough, careful, and independent review of the record, the Commission adopts
the ALJ’s findings of fact, as well as the legal conclusion that Respondent violated N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5) and did not violate
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 5); but voted to modify the ALJ’s legal conclusion to find that
Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i)
(Count 5); and voted to recommend that a penalty of censure be imposed.
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) requires a Board member to not administer the schools, but,
together with their fellow board members, to see that they are well run. Pursuant to N.J.A.C.
6A:28-6.4(a), factual evidence of a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) shall include, but not be
limited to, evidence that the respondent gave a direct order to school personnel or became
directly involved in activities or functions that are the responsibility of school personnel or the
day-to-day administration of the school district, the charter school, or the renaissance school
project. The Commission finds that the record does not establish that Respondent violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) in Count 3 “when she repeated allegations against the superintendent at
the public microphone that involved accusations affecting the daily operations of the school.”
Simply repeating allegations is not evidence that Respondent gave a direct order to school
personnel or that she became directly involved in activities or functions that are the responsibility
of school personnel or the day-to-day administration. Therefore, the Commission finds that
Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) in Count 3.
The Commission agrees with the ALJ that Complainant did not meet her burden of proof
and did not demonstrate that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) in Count 5 as “the
testimony from the witnesses did not support [Respondent] making any direct statements that she
handles the day-to-day operations.” Accordingly, the Commission does not find that Respondent
violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) in Count 5.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), a board member must recognize that authority rests
with the board and a board member shall not make any personal promises nor take any private
action that may compromise the board. In accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a), factual
evidence of a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) shall include evidence that Respondent made
personal promises or took action beyond the scope of her duties such that, by its nature, had the
potential to compromise the board. The Commission has often said that board members do not
give up their right to voice their opinions simply because they are on a board of education. In the
current matter though, the Commission finds that while Respondent has a right to speak, her
statements that the Superintendent acted “in a racist manner and stole credit from her staff,”
undermined the investigation and complaint process, as well as the chain of command.
Moreover, 	Respondent 	testified 	that 	she 	received 	that 	information 	from 	the 	assistant
superintendent. If it were not for her position on the Board, the assistant superintendent would
not have a reason to share such information with Respondent. Further, instead of discussing the
information directly with the Superintendent to attempt to resolve the matter, Respondent chose
to share the information, true or not, with the public. Therefore, the Commission concurs that
Respondent took action beyond the scope of her duties that compromised the Board and finds
that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) in Count 3.

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N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) requires a board member to support and protect school personnel
in the proper performance of their duties. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a), factual evidence of
a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) shall include evidence that Respondent took deliberate
action which resulted in undermining, opposing, compromising or harming school personnel in
the proper performance of their duties. The ALJ found that Respondent violated N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1(i) in Count 5, “when she took deliberate action by her choice of words to
undermine the Superintendent in the proper performance of her duties.” The Commission
disagrees and notes that not every negative comment about the superintendent undermines the
superintendent or school personnel. The Commission further notes that the allegation that
Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) in Count 5 stemmed from her statement that she
handled the day-to-day operations of the school and encouraged staff to come to her with their
concerns rather than the administration. However, the ALJ found there was “no factual basis to
support that [Respondent] stated she handles the day-to-day operations of the school or
encouraged staff to come to her with their concerns.” Such comments may have been action that
would have resulted in undermining, opposing, compromising or harming school personnel in
the proper performance of her duties, but the ALJ found those facts were not demonstrated.
Therefore, the Commission finds that Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) in
Count 5.
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) requires a board member to refer all complaints to the chief
administrative officer and will act on the complaints at public meetings only after failure of an
administrative solution. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a), factual evidence of a violation of
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) shall include evidence that Respondent acted on or attempted to resolve
a complaint, or conducted an investigation or inquiry related to a complaint (i) prior to referral to
the chief administrative officer, or (ii) at a time or place other than a public meeting and prior to
the failure of an administrative solution. By Respondent’s own testimony, Respondent did not
refer the complaints to the chief administrative officer. The Commission agrees with the ALJ
that Respondent did not refer the complaints in Counts 3 and 5 to the Superintendent for an
administrative solution, and therefore, Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j).
As to Respondent’s argument that she relied on the advice of counsel prior to speaking
during public comment, the Commission notes that it is not finding that Respondent violated the
Act or Code by speaking at a Board meeting as a member of the public. Instead, the Commission
has already established that board members do not abdicate their rights to freedom of speech
simply because they are on the board. However, the Commission finds that Respondent violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5) because she did
not follow the chain of command and instead chose to publicly repeat information that she
received before discussing the information with the Superintendent, as she was required to do.
Respondent shared the complaints publicly before the administration was aware of the concerns
or had the opportunity 	to address them, such action therefore compromised the Board.
Respondent does not assert that she asked Board counsel for advice regarding this.
Finally, the Commission agrees with the ALJ that a censure is the appropriate penalty for
Respondent’s violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j)
(Counts 3 and 5). Respondent spoke at a Board meeting where she mentioned complaints

10
without referring them to the Superintendent in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3
and 5) and made comments that compromised the investigation and complaint process, as well as
the chain of command and, thus, compromised the Board in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)
(Count 3). As Respondent’s actions occurred in public, the Commission finds that the public
should be aware of her sanction. Accordingly, the Commission finds that a penalty of censure is
warranted in this circumstance.
IV. 	Decision
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Commission adopts the Initial Decision’s
findings of fact, adopts the legal conclusion that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)
(Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5) and did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(d) (Count 5); but modifies the ALJ’s legal conclusion to find that Respondent did not
violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) (Count 5); and adopts the
recommended penalty of censure.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29(c), this decision shall be forwarded to the Commissioner
of Education for review of the Commission’s recommended penalty. The parties may either:
1) file exceptions to the recommended sanction; 2) file an appeal of the Commission’s finding of
a violation; or 3) file both exceptions to the recommended sanction together with an appeal of the
finding of a violation.
Parties taking exception to the recommended sanction of the Commission but not
disputing the Commission’s finding of a violation may file, within thirteen (13) days from the
date the Commission’s decision is forwarded to the Commissioner, written exceptions regarding
the recommended penalty to the Commissioner. The forwarding date shall be the mailing date to
the parties, as indicated below. Such exceptions must be forwarded to: Commissioner of
Education, c/o Office of Controversies and Disputes, P.O. Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625,
marked 	“Attention: 	Comments 	on 	Ethics 	Commission 	Sanction,” 	as 	well 	as 	to
(ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov). A copy must also be sent to the Commission
(school.ethics@doe.nj.gov) and all other parties.
Parties seeking to appeal the Commission’s finding of violation must file an appeal
pursuant to the standards set forth at N.J.A.C. 6A:4:1 et seq. within thirty (30) days of the filing
date of the decision from which the appeal is taken. The filing date shall be three (3) days after
the date of mailing to the parties, as shown below. In such cases, the Commissioner’s review of
the 	Commission’s 	recommended 	sanction 	will 	be 	deferred 	and 	incorporated 	into 	the
Commissioner’s review of the finding of violation on appeal. Where a notice of appeal has been
filed on or before the due date for exceptions to the Commission’s recommended sanction
(thirteen (13) days from the date the decision is mailed by the Commission), exceptions need not
be filed by that date, but may be incorporated into the appellant’s briefs on appeal.
Dennis M. Roberts, Chairperson
Mailing Date: July 28, 2026

11
Resolution Adopting Decision
in Connection with C61-24
Whereas, at its meeting on June 17, 2025, the School Ethics Commission (Commission)
voted to transmit the above-captioned matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a
plenary hearing; and
Whereas, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision dated May 15,
2026; and
Whereas, the ALJ found that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1(e), 	N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) 	and 	N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) 	and recommended 	a
penalty of censure; and
Whereas, Respondent filed exceptions to the Initial Decision; and
Whereas, at its meeting on June 23, 2026, the Commission discussed adopting the Initial
Decision’s findings of fact, as well as the legal conclusions that Respondent violated N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5,) and did not violate
N.J.S.A. 	18A:12-24.1(d) 	(Count 	5); 	modifying 	the 	ALJ’s 	legal 	conclusion 	to 	find 	that
Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i)
(Count 5); and recommending a penalty of censure be imposed; and
Whereas, at its meeting on July 28, 2026, the Commission reviewed and voted to
approve the within decision as accurately memorializing its actions/findings from its meeting on
June 23, 2026; and
Now Therefore Be It Resolved, the Commission hereby adopts the within decision.
____________________________________
Dennis M. Roberts, Chairperson
I hereby certify that this Resolution was duly
adopted by the School Ethics Commission
at its meeting on July 28, 2026.
________________________________
Brigid C. Martens, Director
School Ethics Commission