Mellk Cridge, LLC v. Board of Education of the City of New Brunswick, Middlesex County, 6/27/25 (#330-25)

330-25
OAL Dkt. No. 04455-23
Agency Dkt. No. 114-4/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Mellk Cridge, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the City of New Brunswick,
Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), and
the exceptions filed by the parties pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner served as legal counsel to an employee of the New Brunswick Board of Education
(Board) who was investigated by the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Institutional
Abuse Investigation Unit (IAIU). Petitioner sought indemnification of its legal fees and costs from the
Board, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6. 	Following cross-motions for summary decision, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that petitioner’s claim failed because it had not notified
the Board of the indemnification request within a reasonable period of time after learning of the
charges against the employee. 	Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary
decision.
In its exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ imposed a de facto statute of limitations for
indemnification requests, without having the authority to do so. Petitioner also contends that the
ALJ’s decision would require employees under IAIU investigation to seek indemnification before their

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claims accrued. Finally, according to petitioner, it would be impossible for the Board to take all the
steps necessary to assign counsel to an employee before an IAIU investigation concluded, such that
requiring notice to the Board would leave the employee without the benefit of legal counsel during
the course of the IAIU investigation.
The Board argues that the ALJ properly found that petitioner did not provide the Board timely
notice of the indemnification request.1
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner failed to give the Board
reasonable notice of its indemnification request, for the reasons detailed in the Initial Decision. An
employee seeking reimbursement from a board of education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 “cannot
wait until the action is completed and must provide the school board with reasonable notice after
the initiation of the proceeding.” Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Trenton, 477 N.J. Super. 427,
432 (App. Div. 2023). 	The Commissioner concludes that petitioner’s delay in requesting
indemnification until after the conclusion of the IAIU investigation was not reasonable.
The Commissioner does not find petitioner’s exceptions persuasive. While IAIU timelines are
shorter than those that may be involved in civil litigation, in this matter, the record demonstrates
that the allegations were referred to the IAIU on or about October 27, 2022, and the IAIU issued a
determination that they were unfounded on January 2, 2023. Petitioner’s assertion that the Board
would have been unable to review an indemnification request and assign counsel to the employee
within that period of time is speculative and not supported by anything in the record. 	The
Commissioner declines to accept petitioner’s assumption, particularly when petitioner’s failure to
1 Additionally, the Board took exception to the ALJ’s conclusion that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 applies to IAIU
investigations. Because the decision herein was made on other grounds, the Commissioner does not
reach this issue.

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give the Board notice deprived the Board of any opportunity to demonstrate that it could complete
those steps in a timely manner.
Furthermore, even if petitioner is correct that the Board could not have assigned counsel
before the IAIU investigation was concluded, the Board’s response to the request for indemnification
is irrelevant; what Azzaro holds is that the party seeking indemnification must make the request
within a reasonable time of learning about the charges. Id. at 442-443. Indeed, the Appellate Division
specifically noted that it was aware that a board of education may deny an employee’s
indemnification request, but “the fact that the Board may have declined petitioners’ request for
defense costs is not a basis to refrain from requesting defense and indemnification under N.J.S.A.
18A:16-6.” Id. at 441. Similarly, the Commissioner concludes that, here, the fact that the board may
have failed to respond to petitioner’s request – either quickly or at all – was not a basis to refrain
from requesting defense and indemnification.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the ALJ did not create an immediate notice requirement
that is applicable in all circumstances, or a de facto statute of limitations. Citing to Azzaro, the ALJ
acknowledged that what constitutes reasonable notice is a fact-specific inquiry, and she found that
immediate notice would have been reasonable under the circumstances present in this matter. The
ALJ noted that that the IAIU did not interview the employee until December 2, 2022, almost a month
after petitioner began to represent him. The Commissioner finds that petitioner could have made an
indemnification request at any point during that time. Furthermore, even if the Commissioner were
to reject the “immediate” notice that the ALJ found reasonable here, the fact remains that the
investigation continued for more than two months after the allegation was referred to the IAIU. The
Commissioner concludes that petitioner’s failure to make its indemnification request during that

4
period was unreasonable, and it was further compounded by petitioner’s failure to request
indemnification for more than three weeks after the investigation was completed.
Finally, the Commissioner rejects petitioner’s argument that its claim did not accrue until the
IAIU issued its finding that the allegations were unfounded. The Appellate Division rejected a similar
ripeness argument in Azzaro, concluding that “unlike N.J.S.A.18A:16-6.1, which requires an employee
to wait until the dismissal of a criminal action to seek reimbursement of legal fees, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6
has no such requirement.” Id. at 441. Moreover, the Appellate Division concluded that if the board
of education denied the employee’s indemnification request because it had determined that her
actions were outside the scope of her employment, the employee could have challenged that
determination; nonetheless, the employee was “obligated to request the Board to provide defense
costs even if the request may have initially been rejected.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition
of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	June 27, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	June 30, 2025
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 114-4/23
MELLK CRIDGE, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
Edward A. Cridge, Esq., for petitioner (Mellk Cridge, LLC, attorneys)
George 	F. 	Hendricks, 	Esq., 	for 	respondent 	(Hendricks 	& 	Hendricks, 	LLC,
attorneys)
Record closed: February 3, 2025 	Decided: April 10, 2025
BEFORE JUDITH LIEBERMAN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, law firm Mellk Cridge LLC, seeks indemnification from respondent City
of New Brunswick Board of Education (“Board”), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18:16-6, for costs

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
2
and fees associated with its representation of an employee of respondent who was the
subject of an investigation by the Department of Children and Families, Institutional Abuse
Investigation Unit (“IAIU”). The parties filed cross-motions for summary decision.
Petitioner contends that it is entitled to be indemnified because the employee’s
conduct was within the scope of their employment. It also contends that it did not violate
the “reasonable notice” requirement established by Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton,
477 N.J. Super. 427 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 258 N.J. 438 (2024), because it could
not have requested indemnification from respondent until after the IAIU matter concluded.
Respondent contends that petitioner is ineligible for indemnification because it did
not provide timely notice to respondent of its intent to request representation or
indemnification. 	It 	also 	contends 	that 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:16-6 	does 	not 	authorize
indemnification of attorney fees and costs incurred with respect to an IAIU investigation.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Department of Education transmitted this matter to the Office of Administrative
Law (“OAL”), where it was filed on May 18, 2023, as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A.
52:14B-1 to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to N.J.S.A. 52:14F-13. Orders of
Inactivity were issued on August 1, 2023, February 15, 2024, and August 26, 2024,
pending the disposition of Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 477 N.J. Super. 427 (App.
Div. 2023), certif. denied, 258 N.J. 438 (2024), because the issue presented in that case
is substantially similar to an issue presented here. 	The August 26, 2024, Order of
Inactivity was lifted after the Supreme Court denied certification of the Appellate Division’s
decision in Azzaro. 	The parties filed their cross-motions for summary decision on
February 3, 2025, and the record for the motions closed that day.
Respondent also filed a motion to consolidate this matter with Mellk Cridge, LLC
v. Borough of Sayreville Bd. of Educ., Middlesex County, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09083-22.1
1 Respondent did not seek leave to file this motion.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
3
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
The parties stipulated to the following, which I FIND as FACT.
1. 	At all times relevant to this matter, A.F. was employed by the Board as a
non-tenured, certified teaching staff member.
2. 	In connection with and arising out of his employment with the Board, A.F.
was the subject of an investigation (“A.F. Investigation”) conducted by the
IAIU.
3. 	The A.F. Investigation was conducted pursuant to N.J.A.C. 3A:10-1.1
to -8.5, Child Protection Investigations. 	It addressed allegations of abuse
of one of the Board’s students by A.F.
4. 	As a result of the investigation, Mellk Cridge LLC was assigned by A.F.’s
union, the New Jersey Education Association, to represent and defend A.F.
Accordingly, Mellk Cridge LLC represented A.F. before the IAIU throughout
the investigatory process.
5. 	At the conclusion of the A.F. Investigation, the IAIU determined that the
allegations of abuse/neglect against A.F. were “Unfounded, pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4).”
6. 	The Board reported the allegations against A.F. to the IAIU on or about
October 27, 2022. 	The IAIU conducted its investigation into A.F. in
November and December 2022. The IAIU issued its Findings Letter,
concluding its investigation, on January 2, 2023. J-B.
7. 	The legal services that petitioner provided to A.F. in connection with the A.F.
Investigation, which are the subject of petitioner’s petition, were performed
between November 8, 2022, and December 20, 2022.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
4
8. 	Petitioner’s records, included in their January 27, 2023, correspondence to
Board counsel, report that the IAIU interviewed A.F. on December 2, 2022.
J-C at 2.
9. 	Petitioner first made its claim to respondent for reimbursement of the costs
and fees associated with the A.F. Investigation, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:16-6, by way of a letter sent to the Board’s counsel on or about January
27, 2023. J-C.
10. 	Prior to January 27, 2023, petitioner did not demand that the Board assign
counsel to A.F. to represent A.F. in connection with the A.F. Investigation,
nor did petitioner notify the Board that it would make any claim for legal fees
for its representation of A.F. in connection with the A.F. Investigation.
11. 	Prior to January 27, 2023, A.F. did not request that the Board assign
counsel to represent him in connection with the A.F. Investigation, nor did
A.F. notify the Board that petitioner would be making any claim for legal fees
in connection with the A.F. Investigation.
12. 	The Board had meetings on November 15, 2022, December 10, 2022, and
January 24, 2023.
13. 	By correspondence dated February 2, 2023, the Board, by and through its
counsel, declined to pay to petitioner the costs and fees sought by petitioner
in connection with the A.F. Investigation. J-D.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Consolidation
Respondent seeks to consolidate this matter with Mellk Cridge, LLC v. Borough of
Sayreville Bd. of Educ., Middlesex Cnty., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09083-22, because the
cases present similar facts and legal issues, including whether N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 applies
to an “unfounded” IAIU investigation. Sayreville is currently pending before me, and the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
5
parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 	In that case, the respondent
previously filed a motion to dismiss that argued, in part, that the indemnification statute
did not apply to IAIU investigations. On May 2, 2023, I denied the motion, and on June
1, 2023, the acting commissioner denied respondent’s request for interlocutory review.
Thus, there is not full commonality of issues between the two cases, and the motion to
consolidate is denied.
Summary Decision Standard of Review
Summary decision is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. 	Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). A “determination
whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment
requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient
to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party.” Ibid. The facts relied upon by both parties concerning the initiation of
the IAIU investigation, petitioner’s representation of A.F., the IAIU’s findings, and
petitioner’s communication with respondent concerning indemnification are not in dispute.
Summary decision is, therefore, appropriate.
Indemnification
“Under the civil indemnification statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, a board of education
employee may be indemnified for attorney's fees and costs incurred defending civil
actions arising out of an act or omission that took place in the course and scope of
employment duties.” L.A. v. Bd. of Educ., City of Trenton of Mercer Cnty., 221 N.J. 192,
201–202 (2015). N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 provides:
Whenever any civil or administrative action or other legal
proceeding has been or shall be brought against any person
holding 	any 	office, 	position 	or 	employment 	under 	the
jurisdiction of any board of education, including any student
teacher or person assigned to other professional pre-teaching
field experience, for any act or omission arising out of and in
the course of the performance of the duties of such office,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
6
position, employment or student teaching or other assignment
to professional field experience, the board shall defray all
costs of defending such action, including reasonable counsel
fees and expenses, together with costs of appeal, if any, and
shall 	save 	harmless 	and 	protect 	such 	person 	from 	any
financial loss resulting therefrom; provided that
a. 	no employee shall be entitled to be held harmless
or have his defense costs defrayed in a disciplinary
proceeding instituted against him by the board or
when the employee is appealing an action taken by
the board; and
b. 	indemnification for exemplary or punitive damages
shall not be mandated and shall be governed by the
standards 	and 	procedures 	set 	forth 	in 	N.J.S.
59:10-4.
Any 	board 	of 	education 	may 	arrange 	for 	and 	maintain
appropriate insurance to cover all such damages, losses and
expenses.
In Bower v. Bd. of Educ., 149 N.J. 416 (1997), the Supreme Court addressed the
statutory prerequisite. 	It held that the statute requires “mere proof by a preponderance
of the evidence that the act on which the charges are predicated arose out of and in the
course of performance of the duties of employment.” Id. at 434. See also Waters v. Bd.
of Educ. of Toms River, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3083, *12 (December 22, 2011).
(“In the context of the defense of a civil action, the outcome of the litigation is irrelevant,
the statute protects both successful and unsuccessful litigants as long as” the cause of
action arose out of the performance of the employee’s duties and occurred in the
performance of the duties.) (citing Lonky v. Bd. of Educ. of Bayonne, OAL Dkt. No. EDU
07205-05, 	final 	decision, 	(July 	7, 	2008) 	(slip 	op. 	at 	3),
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.shtml).2
Covered Proceeding
Respondent contends that an IAIU investigation that results in a finding of
“unfounded” is not an administrative action covered by N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6. Instead, it was
2 Unpublished Appellate Division and administrative decisions are not precedential. They are offered in
this Initial Decision because they provide relevant guidance.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
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a procedural action that resulted in an “unpublished and private result.” Resp. Br. at 6. It
notes that it would be exceedingly burdensome on boards of education if these actions
were subject to the indemnification provision of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, as there are many
such investigations that result in “unfounded” findings. However, if an IAIU investigation
determined that the school employee abused or neglected a student, “with ensuing
charges resulting in civil, administrative or other legal action,” it would “fully acknowledge
its obligation to retain counsel on behalf of the employee.” Id. at 6. Petitioner, conversely,
argues that these investigations are covered by the statute.
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 originally applied to only civil or criminal actions. In 2001, it was
amended to include “administrative action[s] or other legal proceeding.” 	The legislative
committees that considered and approved the legislation expressly stated their intention
to broaden the application of the statute. 	The Assembly Education and Appropriations
Committees and the Senate Education Committee each wrote in their committee
statements that the amendment was intended to “expand the indemnification presently
provided under the statute[ ] . . . to school board employees.” (Committee statements to
A1755 (October 16, 2000, November 9, 2000, and February 26, 2001)) (emphasis
added).3
The 	Supreme 	Court 	addressed 	“administrative 	action” 	and 	observed 	that
“[i]nformal agency action includes investigating, publicizing, planning, and supervising a
3 	At the same time, the Legislature amended the statute to specifically exclude certain matters from
indemnification:
a. 	no employee shall be entitled to be held harmless or have his
defense costs defrayed in a disciplinary proceeding instituted
against him by the board or when the employee is appealing an
action taken by the board; and
b. 	indemnification for exemplary or punitive damages shall not be
mandated 	and 	shall 	be 	governed 	by 	the 	standards 	and
procedures set forth in N.J.S. 59:10-4.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6.]
It is reasonable to conclude that, had the Legislature wished to exclude investigations, it would have done
so expressly. See Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Ltd. v. American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc., 444
N.J. Super. 530, 535 (App. Div. 2016), certif. den., 227 N.J. 149 (2016) (“explicitly naming one or more
things implies the exclusion of all other things”).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
8
regulated industry.” In re Request for Solid Waste Util. Customer Lists, 106 N.J. 508, 519
(1987) (citation omitted). 	See also In re Atty. Gen. Law Enforcement Directive Nos.
2020-5 and 2020-6, 246 N.J 462, 490 (2021) (“agencies can also act in a hybrid manner,
with features of rulemaking and adjudication, or in an informal fashion, without a hearing”)
(citation omitted). Thus, it would appear that an IAUA investigation of a school employee
would at least fall into the category of “other legal proceeding.”
Furthermore, an IAUA investigation can result in or ultimately be related to a civil
action. The school employee in L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Trenton, Mercer Cnty., 221
N.J. 192 (2015) was charged criminally with having engaged in unlawful sexual conduct
with two minor students. 	After he pled guilty to some of the charges and the remaining
charges were dismissed, a civil action was filed against him. 	On appeal, the Supreme
Court addressed the facts that should have been considered when determining whether
his acts occurred within the scope of his employment duties. 	Among the relevant
considerations was the evidence taken from the IAIU report, which substantiated the
allegations. The Court wrote:
We note that the IAIU report, being investigative in nature, is
distinguishable from an adjudicatory finding. 	In re R.P., 333
N.J. Super. 105, 116–17, 754 A.2d 615 (App. Div.2000).
However, the report could have been offered into evidence at
a hearing with the testimony of the DCF investigator, which
would have afforded L.A. “an opportunity to cross-examine
the investigator and other witnesses [offered] and to present
evidence to rebut the charge.” Id. at 117, 754 A.2d 615.
[221 N.J. at 205.]
Thus, an IAIU investigation can be closely linked to, and supportive of, future legal
action against a school employee. 	Indeed, the Commissioner has determined that an
“IAUA investigation, and the results thereof, were an integral part of the successful
defense of the criminal complaint against” a school employee. 	Greene v. Bd. of Educ.,
EDU 	04772-12, 	final 	decision, 	(March 	20, 	2014),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/final/edu04772-12_1.html). 	For this reason, the
Commissioner found that “the hours devoted to the IAIU investigation were part and

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
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parcel of the [law] firm’s efforts in defense of the criminal complaint” and, thus, were
properly considered when addressing indemnification of legal fees. Ibid.
While Greene is distinguishable from this case because criminal charges were filed
against the school employee in that case, the central principle, that an IAIU investigation
can be an “integral part of the successful defense” of a criminal complaint, is instructive.
Ibid. A successful defense of an investigation may contribute to the defense or prevention
of future criminal or civil charges. The Board should not be able to evade reimbursement
merely because charges have not been filed during or after the investigation. 	For the
foregoing reasons, I CONCLUDE that N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 applies to IAIU investigations.
Statutory Prerequisite
As discussed above, for a party to be entitled to indemnification, there must be a
showing that the actions that are the subject of the underlying action arose out of the
scope of the employee’s work duties. Petitioner asserts that this has been demonstrated
because the IAIU determined that accusations against A.F. were unfounded.4
“Unfounded” means that “there is not a preponderance of the evidence indicating
that a child is an abused or neglected child . . . and the evidence indicates that a child
was not harmed or placed at a risk of harm.” 	N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4). 	There is no
evidence in the record concerning A.F.’s actions other than the determination that the
allegations against him were unfounded. 	As there is no evidence in the record
demonstrating wrongdoing by A.F. or that he engaged in acts outside the scope of his
duties, the undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that he was acting within the
scope of his duties at the relevant time.
Reasonable Notice Requirement
Parties seeking reimbursement from a board of education pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:16-6 must act “within a reasonable period of time after learning of the charges . . . to
4 Respondent did not address this issue.

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10
put the Board on notice of [their] request for defense costs.” Azzaro, 477 N.J. Super. at
444. 	The court did not establish a bright-line rule concerning the timing of the notice.
Rather, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time may be a fact-specific inquiry in certain
cases.” Ibid.5 The underlying principle is that the employer should at least be aware of
the possibility of costs: it “should have some control over costs, and at least be in a
position to know in advance what those costs will be.” Id. at 442, n.7 (quoting Edison v.
Mezzacca, 147 N.J. Super. 9, 15 (App. Div. 1977)).
In so holding, the court directed employees and their counsel to not prejudge the
outcome. 	Instead, they should allow boards of education to evaluate their ability and
willingness to provide representation and offer alternatives if they decide they cannot
provide representation at the time of the request. By way of example, the prospect of a
conflict of interest between the employee and the board of education does not justify
withholding notice. 	Rather, the Azzaro court recognized that, if there is a perceived or
actual conflict, a board could opt to assign outside counsel or “come to an agreement with
counsel of [petitioner’s] choosing . . . and the costs thereof.” Id. at 442 (quoting Edison,
147 N.J. Super. at 15). See also A.B. v. Montville Bd. of Educ., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1086 (App. Div. 2012) (in which a school board told its employee that it would ask
its insurance carrier about representation but also recommended that the employee seek
representation through the NJEA; the NJEA retained counsel through its insurance carrier
and paid the costs and fees of the employee’s defense; the board was later required to
reimburse NJEA’s legal fees and costs).
Petitioner argues that it could not have notified the Board sooner because the
investigation proceeded rapidly, and it would have been impossible for the Board to
receive and consider its request in time. 	Petitioner is correct that the regulations
governing IAIU investigations demand that they start and end quickly. The investigation
of a report of abuse must start “no later than the end of the work day or within 24 hours
of the State Central Registry representative determining the time frame,” and findings
must be made within sixty days of the abuse report being received at the Registry.
5 In Azzaro, the parties seeking indemnification did not request indemnification until after the underlying
litigation of an Order to Show Cause that was issued by the State Board of Education was concluded. That
matter spanned twelve years.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
11
N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.2(a), N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(b). However, petitioner asserts, without citing
authority for its position, that the subject of an IAIU investigation cannot unilaterally extend
the investigatory timeline to secure counsel, and if the agency is unable to “obtain a
statement/information from the subject” within the required timeframe, it “may simply
conclude the investigation without that person’s input.” Pet’r’s Br. at 8.6
Notwithstanding the rapid timeline for IAIU investigations, as Azzaro explained,
petitioner was not obligated to predict the Board’s capacity and willingness to address a
request for representation. Instead, petitioner’s obligation was merely to notify the Board
that it sought representation or indemnification. 	If the Board were unable to respond to
the request in a timely manner, it would have at least been on notice that it would be
asked to pay petitioner’s fees and costs when the investigation was finished.
Here, given petitioner’s expectation that the IAIU investigation would proceed
rapidly, it would have been reasonable for petitioner7 to notify respondent immediately.
However, according to petitioner’s account of its work on behalf of A.F., IAIU did not meet
with A.F. until December 2, 2022, almost a month after petitioner began to represent him.
This calls into question the rationale for the delayed notice. 	Nonetheless, while
petitioner’s request for indemnification was made only twenty-four days after the IAIU
issued its findings letter, which closed its investigation, petitioner has not demonstrated
why it was reasonable to wait until the investigation was over to request indemnification.
For these reasons, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has not demonstrated that its delay was
reasonable, and therefore, it is not entitled to the relief it seeks from respondent.
6 Rather, the regulations contemplate that the investigatory body may extend its investigation under certain
circumstances. See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(b) (while findings shall be made within sixty days, this deadline
may be extended “for good cause approved by the office manager or designee. The office manager or
designee may grant extensions in increments of 30 days, if the child protective investigator is continuing
efforts to confirm credible information”).
7 Or A.F.

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ORDER
I ORDER that respondent’s cross-motion for summary decision is GRANTED and
petitioner’s cross-motion for summary decision is DENIED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies and
Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
April 10, 2025
DATE 	JUDITH LIEBERMAN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
JL/mg

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04455-23
14
APPENDIX
Joint Exhibits:
J-A 	Stipulation of Facts
J-B 	IAIU Findings Letter, January 3, 2023
J-C 	Petitioner’s claim for reimbursement, January 27, 2023
J-D 	Letter to petitioner, February 2, 2023
J-E 	District Policy, re: Reporting Potentially Missing or Abused Children
For petitioner:
Brief in support of motion for summary decision, February 3, 2025
P-B 	Order Denying Motion to Dismiss May 2, 2023
For respondent:
Brief in support of cross-motion for summary decision, February 3, 2025