D.A., on behalf of minor children, W.A. and W.A. v. Board of Education of the Township of Lumberton, Burlington County, 6/2/26 (#191-26)

191-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 08503-25
Agency Dkt. No. 132-5/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
D.A., on behalf of minor children, W.A. and
W.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of
Lumberton, Burlington County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by the petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Lumberton Board of
Education’s (Board) reply thereto have been reviewed and considered.
This matter involves the Board’s determination that petitioner does not reside in
Lumberton and that her children are therefore not entitled to attend school in the district.1 In
2018, petitioner was a victim of domestic violence, and she lost her home. The family briefly
stayed with friends and then moved to emergency assistance housing in Mount Holly in October
2018. In March 2019, petitioner signed a lease for a property in Mount Holly, which included a
provision indicating that the property could be used as transitional housing for 24 months.
1 The petition of appeal named both of petitioner’s children. However, because students from Lumberton
and students from Mount Holly attend the same high school, there is no longer a residency issue regarding
petitioner’s older son.

2
Petitioner provided this lease to the district, which determined that W.A. could continue
attending school in Lumberton. In 2023, the district requested verification that petitioner was
still residing in transitional housing. Petitioner signed a transitional housing form, indicating that
she continued to reside in the Mount Holly property, but she informed the district that she did
not have an updated lease. 	In 2025, following additional requests for petitioner to provide
updated information, the Board determined that petitioner and her family were not homeless
and that W.A. is not entitled to attend middle school in Lumberton. Petitioner appealed.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that petitioner is not homeless as defined
by the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (Act) because she has a fixed, regular, and
adequate residence. The ALJ noted that petitioner has been living in the same property since
2019, and not only had petitioner failed to present any evidence that the property constituted
transitional housing, but petitioner’s landlord had confirmed that it was not. 	The ALJ also
indicated that petitioner had not presented any evidence that she was searching for a new
residence in Lumberton. 	Based on these facts, the ALJ concluded that petitioner was not
homeless, had become a resident of Mount Holly, and was no longer domiciled in Lumberton.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ was biased against her. According to
petitioner, the ALJ ignored all of the evidence she provided to demonstrate that she was
homeless, as well as evidence that she had been searching for a residence in Lumberton.2
Petitioner contends that the respondent’s answer to her petition should not have been accepted
2 Petitioner references a PDF file she sent regarding her search for rentals, although she does not indicate
to whom she sent the PDF file or when she sent it. No documentation regarding her search for a residence
in Lumberton was entered as an exhibit during the hearing or attached to any of petitioner’s pleadings.
Petitioner did testify that she attempted to find a residence in Lumberton but her applications were
denied for various reasons, or properties were too expensive. Tr. 13:18-24.

3
because it was not timely filed. Petitioner argues that she resides in transitional housing, and
even though it has been the same housing for several years, that does not make it permanent
housing. Petitioner asks that the testimony of the district’s homelessness liaison be deemed not
credible and be stricken from the record, because he is not an expert in the Act and ignored her
family’s circumstances. Finally, petitioner argues that the ALJ ignored various provisions of the
Act in reaching her conclusions.
In response, the Board argues that the ALJ correctly found that petitioner had established
a residence in Mount Holly and was no longer legally homeless, and that W.A. should attend
school in Mount Holly rather than Lumberton. 	The Board contends that the ALJ applied the
proper standard and assessed petitioner’s current living status rather than the circumstances
that initially rendered her homeless.
Under the Act, homeless children are defined as “individuals who lack a fixed, regular and
adequate nighttime residence.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 11434a(2). 	Similarly, under state law, homeless
children are defined as “child[ren] or youth who lack[] a fixed, regular and adequate residence
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12 and N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2.” N.J.A.C. 6A:17-1.2. “[D]omicile attaches
immediately if a student’s dwelling is found to be fixed, regular and adequate.” Bd. of Educ. of
Twp. of Egg Harbor v. Bd. of Educ. of Mainland Reg’l Sch. Dist., Commissioner Decision No. 555-
10 at 4 (Dec. 30, 2010) (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:17B-12(c)).
The Commissioner has previously held that homelessness status “is best viewed in a
continuum.” St.-Op. Sch. Dist. of Camden v. Volk, Commissioner Decision No. 172-17R at 11 (June
20, 2017). For instance, a family may move into a home “out of necessity and hardship, but over
time, that home may become a regular residence.” Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Pennsauken, Camden

4
Cnty. v. Pugh-Bassett, Commissioner Decision No. 122-22 at 6 (June 16, 2022). 	Conducting a
homelessness evaluation to determine whether a child’s home is considered fixed, regular and
adequate requires a fact-specific analysis. 	M. O’K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Cresskill,
Commissioner Decision No. 325-14 at 3 (August 12, 2014), aff’d, A-0828-14T4 (App. Div. Sept. 8,
2016). In conducting such a fact-specific inquiry, the Commissioner must consider the totality of
the circumstances, as “[t]he reasons for the children’s homelessness, their living conditions, and
the resources and intentions of the parents or custodians are relevant.” Ibid.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner is no longer
homeless as defined by the Act, that she has established a residence in Mount Holly, and that
W.A. is no longer entitled to attend school in Lumberton.
The Commissioner does not find petitioner’s exceptions to be persuasive. The fact that
the Mount Holly property was originally characterized as transitional housing by petitioner’s
lease is not dispositive. The Commissioner addressed a question of transitional housing in Bd. of
Educ. of Bound Brook v. Bd. of Educ. of Somerville and K.B., Commissioner Decision No. 140-25
140-25 (Apr. 21, 2025). In that matter, Somerville argued that the family resided in transitional
housing because the parent relied on financial support from Norwescap and the Department of
Community Affairs’ Homelessness Prevention Program to pay her security deposit and rent. The
Commissioner noted that N.J.A.C. 6A:17-1.2 defines a transitional living facility as “a temporary
facility that provides housing to a child due to domestic violence.”3 The Commissioner found
that while the family initially relocated due to domestic violence, there was no evidence that
3 The Act refers to “emergency or transitional shelters.” 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2)(B)(i).

5
their new residence fit within this definition of a temporary facility; rather, it was a fixed, regular,
and adequate residence in which the family had lived for more than three years. Id. at 10.
Petitioner and her children similarly resided at the Mount Holly property for an extended
period – at this time, they have lived there for more than seven years. Even accepting petitioner’s
argument that she did not initially move to the property by choice but instead moved due to
homelessness caused by domestic violence and financial circumstances, that does not end the
inquiry, as the Commissioner must review the continuum of the circumstances and analyze the
family’s current living situation as well. 	Petitioner and her family continued to reside at the
Mount Holly property after their first lease expired, and the record indicates the family’s
residence there was continuous and without interruption. Furthermore, petitioner and her two
children were the sole occupants of the property that consisted of two bedrooms, one bathroom,
a living room/den, and a kitchen; there is no indication that the property does not have standard
amenities such as running water, heat, and electricity. 	While petitioner testified about her
concerns regarding drugs, violence, and harassment in the area in which the property is located,
those concerns do not render the property itself inadequate.
The only documentary evidence in the record that potentially supports petitioner’s
homelessness claim is her lease for the period from April 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020, which
indicates, “Tenants have been notified [the property] is part of Transitional Housing Services.
Property can be utilized as transitional housing for 24 months.” Exhibit R-N. Petitioner submitted
two unsigned leases for later years that contain similar transitional housing language, but they

6
are of limited evidential value because they are not signed by petitioner’s landlord.4 	Exhibits P-
4 and P-5. Petitioner’s lease verification form, which is signed by her landlord in 2025, does not
indicate that her property is transitional housing.5 	Exhibit P-1. 	Petitioner also submitted an
undated and unidentified payment history, which she testified showed payments she made to
PSE&G, and a payment history for her rent; neither document refers to transitional housing.
Exhibits P-2 and P-3. 	While petitioner testified that she believes the property is transitional
housing, that belief cannot overcome the fact that there is no documentary evidence to support
her claim or the fact that the nature and length of petitioner’s residence in the property is not
consistent with a temporary facility.
When a homeless family moves into a “home that is adequate – and the adults in the
family are sufficiently employed with the financial means to find alternative housing, and the
family continues to live in the home for an extended period of time without any imminent or
foreseeable risk of losing their place in that home, and they share the space as a cohesive unit –
a finding of homelessness would be improper.” 	Camden, supra. 	The record reflects that
petitioner is employed as a classroom assistant, and she is not currently enrolled in any rental
assistance program. 	Tr. 42:16-25; 33:18-23. 	While her financial circumstances may limit the
properties available to her, the Commissioner cannot conclude that she is financially incapable
of finding another residence. The Commissioner also finds that petitioner’s expressed desire to
4 Petitioner was asked in discovery to produce signed leases, but she failed to do so. She testified that she
did not receive fully signed leases from her landlord for each year that she lived at the property, and that
she was unable to locate in her records any signed leases that may have existed. Tr. 28:3-11.
5 Petitioner testified that she used this verification form to obtain assistance from a program identified as
“BCAP” for her PSE&G payments. Tr. 40:1-15.

7
move back to Lumberton is insufficient to support a finding of homelessness when considered in
light of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., J.G v. Bd. of Educ. of Edison, Commissioner
Decision No. 125-20 (June 15, 2020). 6 The Mount Holly property is a fixed, regular, and adequate
nighttime residence, and petitioner is therefore not homeless pursuant to the definition
established by the Act. 	42 U.S.C.A. § 11434a(2). 	The other provisions of the Act cited by
petitioner, including 42 U.S.C.A. § 11432(g)(3)(A)(i),7 42 U.S.C.A. § 11432g(3)(B)(i),8 and 42
U.S.C.A. § 11432(g)(3)(C)(i)(I),9 only apply to children who meet the definition of homeless; they
do not independently provide a basis for categorizing a child as homeless.10
6 Because petitioner’s intentions alone are insufficient to establish homelessness, the Commissioner finds
that even if petitioner had entered evidence of her search for another residence in Lumberton as a hearing
exhibit or attached same to her pleadings, that evidence would not change the conclusion that she is not
currently homeless.
7 The district “shall, according to the child’s or youth’s best interest continue the child or youth’s education
in the school of origin for the duration of homelessness.”
8 The district shall “presume that keeping the child or you in the school of origin is in the child or youth’s
best interest.”
9 The district “shall immediately enroll the homeless child or youth, even if the child or youth is unable to
produce records normally requirement for enrollment, such as previous academic records, records of
immunization and other required health records, proof of residency, or other documentation.”
10 Additionally, petitioner’s argument that the testimony of the district’s homelessness liaison should be
discredited because he did not understand these statutes is unavailing. The liaison testified regarding the
reasons for the determination he made at the district level. If his reasoning was inconsistent with the Act,
the appeal process petitioner pursued here provides an opportunity to challenge that reasoning and the
related decision; it is not a reason to throw out the testimony itself. Furthermore, the Commissioner
rejects petitioner’s argument that the district was required by the Act to enroll her child without
paperwork. The district’s enrollment obligation does not preclude it from re-assessing the child’s status
subsequent to enrollment. Moreover, the Commissioner notes that the district in fact allowed the child
to remain enrolled in the district for several years after the expiration of her initial lease reflecting that
the property was transitional housing, without any updated lease supporting her claim of homelessness.

8
With regard to petitioner’s claim that the Board’s answer should not have been accepted
because it was not timely filed, the Commissioner notes that N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(e) provides that
when an answer is not filed within 20 days after the filing of a petition, the Commissioner may
decide the matter on a summary basis. 	The use of the word “may” demonstrates that the
Commissioner has discretion not to decide the matter on a summary basis. Additionally, N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.16 allows the Commissioner to relax any rules that do not reflect a specific statutory
requirement or an underlying rule of the OAL. 	In assessing this matter in light of those two
provisions, the Commissioner determined that it was appropriate to accept the Board’s answer
and to transmit the case to the OAL for a contested case hearing, as summary decision is generally
not preferred in this type of matter due to the fact-sensitive nature of a homelessness inquiry.
Finally, petitioner’s claims regarding the alleged bias of the ALJ are not borne out by the
record. Initially, many of petitioner’s complaints concern the ALJ’s demeanor. A review of the
transcripts does not support petitioner’s claim that the ALJ was argumentative or disrespectful,
or that she favored the attorney for the Board. 	The prehearing orders, including the order
regarding the motions to compel discovery, further demonstrates that the ALJ reviewed the
parties’ positions in a balanced manner throughout the proceedings. 	Furthermore, the
Commissioner notes that petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the ALJ, which was denied by the
ALJ. A party may request interlocutory review of an ALJ’s order regarding disqualification with
the Director of the Office of Administrative Law, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10(j), but petitioner
did not do so. Moreover, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10(k), a party may not seek review of an
order regarding disqualification after the judge renders the initial decision, meaning that the
Commissioner lacks the authority to overturn the ALJ’s decision that she was impartial and could

9
consider the matter fairly based on the proofs presented, without animus or bias for or against
either party. The Commissioner’s review of the Initial Decision must be based on the facts and
in light of the applicable law, and, for the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner finds no basis
to disturb the ALJ’s factual findings or legal conclusions.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed. Petitioner must enroll W.A. in school in Mount Holly for
the 2026-2027 school year.11
IT IS SO ORDERED.12
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	June 2, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	June 3, 2026
11 Due to the very short time between the issuance of this decision and the end of the current school year,
the Board shall not disenroll W.A. until after the final day of school in the 2025-2026 school year.
12 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 132-5/25
D.A. ON BEHALF OF
MINOR CHILDREN W.A. AND W.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF LUMBERTON
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
BURLINGTON COUNTY,
Respondent.
D.A., on behalf of W.A. and W.A., petitioner, pro se
Susan S. Hodges, Esq., for respondent (Parker McCay, P.A., attorneys)
BEFORE NICOLE MINUTOLI, ALJ:
Record Closed: March 16, 2026 Decided: March 23, 2026

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, D.A., the mother of minor child W.A.,1 challenges respondent,
Lumberton Township School District’s (District or respondent), determination that W.A.
was not domiciled within the Township of Lumberton (Township) and therefore not entitled
to be enrolled at Bobby’s Run School in the Township. Has petitioner shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that W.A. was domiciled within the District and therefore
entitled to be enrolled in the Township for purposes of receiving a thorough and efficient
public education free of charge, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1, for the 2024−2025 school
year? No, petitioner has provided no testimony or documentary evidence that W.A. is
domiciled within the District or entitled to a free public education in the Township.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By letter dated January 3, 2025, respondent, the Lumberton Township Board of
Education (Board), notified petitioner that her child, W.A., was ineligible to continue
attending Bobby’s Run School since W.A. no longer resided in the District. On February
10, 2025, petitioner sought to appeal the Board’s decision. An answer was filed on May
6, 2025, and the Department of Education, Office of Controversies and Disputes,
transmitted this matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where on May 12, 2025,
it was filed as a contested case under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to
-13.
On June 23, 2025, shortly after the matter was assigned, an initial prehearing
conference was conducted. A second prehearing conference was held on July 14, 2025,
to resolve a discovery dispute between the parties. This dispute led to motion practice
by both sides, resulting in the matter being scheduled for oral argument before me on
August 27, 2025. On August 28, 2025, following an extensive review of the submissions,
having conducted oral argument, and having considered both positions, I entered an
1 The pleadings should only have named one son, W.A., because there is no residency issue with
petitioner’s son, W.A., attending high school.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
3
order compelling discovery from both petitioner and respondent. I did not, however, enter
an order granting petitioner “sanctions” or “damages” against respondent.
On September 15, 2025, petitioner filed a motion to recuse. On September 24,
2025, petitioner’s motion was denied. On September 24, 2025, a revised order granting
motions to compel was issued. On or about October 24, 2025, petitioner filed a motion
for a stay. On October 29, 2025, petitioner’s motion for a stay was denied. On October
29, 2025, petitioner filed an application for permission to file an emergent appeal with the
New Jersey Appellate Division following the denial of the motion for a stay. On October
30, 2025, the Appellate Division denied the application. On November 11, 2025, petitioner
applied for emergent relief with the New Jersey Supreme Court. On November 5, 2025,
the Supreme Court denied petitioner’s application.2 On November 10, 2025, I held the
hearing but kept the record open for the parties to obtain transcripts and provide
post-hearing submissions. I closed the record on March 16, 2026.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon a review of the testimony and the documentary evidence presented,
and having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of the
witnesses who testified, I FIND the following pertinent FACTS and accept the testimony
set forth below as FACT.
In 2018, the petitioner and her two children were residents of Lumberton, New
Jersey. In 2018, petitioner was a victim of domestic violence, and the family lost their
housing in Lumberton due to financial hardship in August 2018. From August 2018
through September 2018, the family stayed with friends. From October 2018 through
March 2019, petitioner received emergency assistance housing in Mount Holly. In
November 2018, petitioner notified Lumberton that she had moved to Mount Holly.
2 Petitioner failed to comply with this tribunal’s discovery orders dated August 28, 2025, or September 28,
2025. After the Supreme Court’s denial of the application, the petitioner only partially complied.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
4
On or about March 31, 2019, petitioner signed a one-year residential lease with
the Salt and Light Company, commencing on April 1, 2019, and ending on March 31,
2019, for a new semi-detached apartment located in Mount Holly. (Ex. N.) Petitioner’s
semi-detached apartment has two bedrooms, one bathroom, a den, and a kitchen. The
lease states:
45. OTHER LEASE PROVISIONS, IF ANY: Tenants have
been notified [ ] Church St. is part of Transitional
Housing Services Property can be utilized as
transitional housing for 24 months
[Ex. N.]
Petitioner was aware of the twenty-four-month restriction on this property.
In or about August 2019, Lumberton evaluated whether the petitioner’s sons were
eligible to continue attending the Township school. In September 2019, petitioner
requested that her sons continue attending school in Lumberton, sent a copy of the lease
she signed on March 31, 2019, for her Church Street apartment, and contended that her
family is residing in a “post-transitional home.” (Ex. D.) Lumberton decided to allow her
sons to continue attending school in Lumberton.
Petitioner attempted to move before 2021, but after the COVID pandemic hit, she
requested to remain at the Church Street apartment. In 2023, the petitioner advised
Lumberton that she would be moving from this residence; however, she did not move.
Petitioner contends that the Church Street apartment is in a drug-infested neighborhood,
and her family gets harassed. Petitioner did not provide any documentation or information
indicating that she was actively seeking a residence in Lumberton.
On August 2, 2023, petitioner told the Township that she and her family would be
changing residences and wanted to ensure her children would continue enrollment in
Lumberton. (Ex. I.) In response, Lee Van Fleet (Van Fleet)3, supervisor of special
3 Mr. Van Fleet was trained in the McKinney-Vento Homeless Educational Assistance Improvement Act of
2011.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
5
education and homeless liaison in Lumberton, requested that the petitioner provide
verification that her family was residing in transitional housing. (Ex. J.) Petitioner
provided only her 2019 lease. However, Van Fleet advised petitioner that the Township
needed a 2023 lease for petitioner’s apartment on Church Street in Mount Holly, as
McKinney-Vento reporting must be conducted annually. (Ex. L.) In response, petitioner
told Van Fleet that she hasn’t “had a lease from [her] landlord since 2021.” (Ex. M.)
However, during the hearing, petitioner testified that she had signed lease agreements
since 2021.4
From mid- to late-August 2023, Van Fleet continued to request verification that
petitioner was residing in transitional housing; however, petitioner failed to provide the
documentation and repeatedly stated that her landlord was not in the office and/or out of
town. (Ex. K; Ex. O; Ex. P.) On or about August 29, 2023, petitioner completed a
transitional housing/homeless form, confirming that she and her sons still reside at the
apartment on Church Street in Mount Holly. Petitioner and her sons have resided
continuously in the apartment on Church Street in Mount Holly since April 1, 2019. Since
2019, the petitioner has paid $975 in monthly rent for the Church Street apartment and
has sometimes received assistance from organizations. Petitioners are responsible for
paying all utilities.
Van Fleet reviewed petitioner’s situation and found that her family is not homeless,
living on the streets, or residing in a vehicle. Van Fleet contacted the petitioner’s landlord
on two separate occasions, the last being on November 4 or 5, 2025, who confirmed that
the petitioner’s apartment on Church Street, Mount Holly, is not transitional housing. Van
Fleet determined that petitioner has a fixed and adequate residence, and accordingly,
petitioner’s son, W.A.,5 is not entitled to attend middle school in Lumberton.
On February 7, 2025, the County Superintendent concluded that, as of August
2024, the family had established a permanent residence at Church Street, Mount Holly,
4 Although this tribunal ordered petitioner to provide leases to respondent in discovery, petitioner failed to
comply with the order, only providing two unsigned lease agreements from 2019 and 2021. She testified
that she had the leases in her email but did not have time to look.
5 Petitioner’s eldest son is in high school and no longer a residency issue, as both Lumberton and Mount
Holly residents attend the same high school.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
6
and no longer met the criteria for homelessness; as such, the Mount Holly Township
School District is the district of residence. (Ex. S.)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner does not contest that her family has lived in Mount Holly since 2019.
She contends that her Church Street, Mount Holly apartment is transitional housing and,
therefore, under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Educational Assistance Improvement
Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 11431 et seq. (the Act), is considered homeless. The District
contends that petitioner’s residence is not transitional housing and is fixed, regular, and
adequate.
Under the Act, state educational agencies must ensure that each homeless child
and youth has equal access to public education on the same terms as other children and
youth. The protections offered to homeless students and their parents under the federal
McKinney-Vento Act and New Jersey’s corresponding state law represent an exception
to otherwise applicable residency rules. In contrast to the basic premise that students
must change schools when they leave a school district, the laws protecting homeless
students generally allow parents the choice to keep their children enrolled in their original
school district if the parents relocate to another school district as a result of being
homeless. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(f); N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.2(d). The district of residence for
children whose parents temporarily move from one school district to another as a result
of being homeless shall be the district in which the parent or guardian last resided prior
to becoming homeless. N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(c).
Under the federal McKinney-Vento Act and New Jersey’s corresponding law, the
term “homeless” refers to individuals who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate residence.
Federal law refers to the lack of an adequate “nighttime” residence. 42 U.S.C. § 11434a
(referring to 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a)(1)); N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(c); N.J.A.C. 6A17-1.2.
N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2 states that:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
7
(a) A district board of education shall determine that a child
is homeless for purposes of this subchapter when he
or she resides in any of the following:
1. A publicly or privately operated shelter designed
to provide temporary living accommodations,
including:
i. Hotels or motels;
ii. Congregate shelters, including domestic
violence and runaway shelters;
iii. Transitional housing; and
iv. Homes for adolescent mothers;
2. A public or private place not designated for or
ordinarily used as a regular sleeping
accommodation, including:
i. Cars or other vehicles including mobile
homes;
ii. Tents or other temporary shelters;
iii. Parks;
iv. Abandoned buildings;
v. Bus or train stations; or
vi. Temporary shelters provided to migrant
workers and their children on farm sites;
3. The residence of relatives or friends where the
homeless child resides out of necessity because
his or her family lacks a regular or permanent
residence of its own;
4. Substandard housing; or
5. Any temporary location wherein children and
youth are awaiting foster care placement.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2 (emphasis added).]
This subchapter and subsection, however, must be read in conjunction with 42
U.S.C. § 11302(a)(1), which defines “homeless” for the McKinney-Vento Act, and N.J.S.A.
18A:7B-12(c), which defines “homeless” for school-funding purposes. Under the former,
“homeless” means lacking “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.” Under
the latter, “homeless” means temporarily lacking “a fixed, regular and adequate
residence.” Thus, both definitions have at their core the concept of a fixed, regular, and

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
8
adequate place to live with regular sleeping accommodations. This shared concept is not
coincidental, as the New Jersey regulatory scheme looks to the federal regulatory scheme
for definitions of terms. See N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.1 (“Nothing in this subchapter shall limit
the educational rights of homeless children and youth or school district responsibilities
under Subtitle VII-B of the Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 11431 et seq.)”.)
Determining whether a student is considered “homeless” and thus eligible for the
protections available under the law is fact-sensitive. In M. O’K. and S. O’K., A. O’K. and
C. O’K. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Cresskill and Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of
Little Ferry, OAL No. 14830-13, Agency No. 214-9/13 (N.J. Comm’r of Educ. Aug. 12,
2014); aff’d, 2016 WL, 4699166 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 8, 2016), the school district
argued that the students who lived with their parents in the grandparents’ home were no
longer “homeless” as they had lived there for over a year. The family prevailed in their
argument that they were still “homeless” in part because five people occupied the bottom
floor of the house, which had no shower, sink, or kitchen. This was found to be less than
a regular and adequate nighttime residence. This case is clearly distinguishable from the
present case, as the family is living in a semi-detached two-bedroom apartment with a
kitchen, den, and bathroom.
In State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Camden v. Volk, EDU 4521-16, Initial Decision
(Mar. 22, 2017), modified, Comm’r (June 20, 2017), at *11,
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, an administrative law judge (ALJ) wrote that
“homelessness is best viewed in a continuum.” In that case, the ALJ thoroughly examined
whether a family in a borderline situation was homeless and considered the totality of the
circumstances. Among the factors the ALJ considered were intent, fixed location, regular
use, and adequacy. The ALJ determined that the family intended to stay in their current
living situation because they stopped looking for another place to live; that the location
was fixed and that the use was regular because the family had lived in the same place
for several years; and that their living situation was adequate because the children had a
designated sleeping area and access to a kitchen and bathroom facilities, despite the
sharing of rooms and limited space. To the extent that homeless status is identified as
one without a “fixed, regular, and adequate” living place, given the very lengthy period of

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9
residence, the adequacy of the living place and the regularity of occupation, the ALJ found
that the child did live in a “fixed, regular, and adequate residence” and concluded that she
was not homeless. See also L.C. on behalf of her Minor Child B.C. v. Bd of Educ. of the
Twp. of Branchburg, Somerset Cnty., 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU)1003 (Commissioner found
that “while her living arrangements with her brother [in his apartment] may not be
permanent in the sense that she may wish to eventually return to Branchburg, the
evidence shows them to have become sufficiently fixed, regular, and adequate so as to
preclude a finding of homelessness.”)
Similar to Volk, in J.G., on behalf of minor children, T.G. and C.G. v. Bd. of Educ.
of the Twp. of Edison, et al., Commissioner’s Decision No. 125-20, decided June 15,
2020, the G. family was evicted from their home in Milltown and moved in with J.G.’s
mother in Edison. The family had use of three of the four bedrooms, the kitchen, the
bathrooms, and all common areas and utilities in the Edison home. Although both J.G.
and his wife were employed, they did not pay rent or contribute to housing costs, aside
from food and a storage facility. While they stated that their intent was to move back to
Milltown, there was no documentation of their search for a new home. The Commissioner
found that while J.G.’s intentions may be to eventually move back to Milltown, the totality
of the facts and circumstances demonstrated that the family was no longer homeless.
Respondent argues that petitioner has not presented any evidence that her
apartment is transitional housing, that the family is actively looking for a new residence in
Lumberton, or that the family is experiencing financial hardship. Respondent contends
the family is not homeless and is not entitled to continue school in Lumberton because
petitioner has a fixed, adequate residence in Mount Holly. I agree.
It is undisputed that petitioner and her family have been living in the same apartment
in Mount Holly since 2019. The apartment consists of two bedrooms, one bathroom, a den,
and a kitchen. Petitioner presented no evidence that her apartment constituted transitional
housing. In fact, petitioner’s landlord confirmed that the apartment was not transitional
housing. Further, petitioner failed to present any evidence that she was searching for a new
residence in Lumberton. The totality of the facts and circumstances demonstrates that the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
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petitioner, D.A., and her family are no longer homeless and have become permanent
residents of Mount Holly.
Based upon the facts adduced at the hearing and the exhibits introduced by the
parties, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not demonstrated that she and her family
are homeless. I further CONCLUDE that the petitioner and her family are not domiciled
in Lumberton Township.
ORDER
I ORDER that the petitioner’s residency appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08503-25
11
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
March 23, 2026
DATE NICOLE T. MINUTOLI, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: March 23, 2026
Date Mailed to Parties:
NTM/tc

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APPENDIX
Witnesses
For petitioner:
D.A.
For respondent:
Lee Van Fleet
Exhibits
For petitioner:
P-1 Tenant Lease Verification Form, May 28, 2025
P-2 Unidentified payment history page, dated October 14, 2025
P-3 Tenant payment report, dated October 6, 2025
P-4 Unsigned lease, April 1, 2019
P-5 Unsigned lease April 1, 2021
For respondent:
Ex. A Emails, dated November 10, 2018, to November 20, 2018
Ex. B Emails, dated September 24, 2019
Ex. C Emails, dated September 24, 2019, to October 15, 2019
Ex. D Emails, dated October 7, 2019
Ex. E Emails, dated October 19, 2020
Ex. F Emails, dated July 28, 2021, to August 20, 2021
Ex. G Emails, dated August 20, 2021
Ex. H Emails, dated August 20, 2021, to August 24, 2021
Ex. I Emails, dated August 2, 2023
Ex. J Emails, dated August 3, 2023
Ex. K Emails, dated August 3, 2023, to August 26, 2023

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Ex. L Emails, dated August 28, 2023
Ex. M Emails, dated August 28, 2023
Ex. N Emails, dated August 28, 2023, with lease agreement from March 31, 2019
Ex. O Emails, dated August 29, 2023
Ex. P Emails, dated August 2, 2023, to August 30, 2023
Ex. Q Emails, dated October 2019
Ex. R Emails, dated September 6, 2024
Ex. S Emails, dated February 7, 2025