Raisah Thomas v. New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student Protection, 6/14/2024, (#231-24)

231-24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Raisah Thomas,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education,
Office of Student Protection,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner challenged the determination of the New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student
Protection (DOE), permanently disqualifying her from employment in schools under the supervision of the
Department of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.2 after a criminal history background check
revealed that in 2009, petitioner pled guilty in United States District Court, Newark, to a misdemeanor crime
of “Possession of Stolen Bank Checks” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Petitioner
contended that her 2009 plea was to a “low-level misdemeanor” and that this does not meet the standard
of being a disqualifying crime. The DOE filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since petitioner did not
challenge the fact that she was convicted of the crime, the only issue for determination is whether that crime
was “substantially equivalent” to one of the disqualifying offenses enumerated under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1.
Petitioner failed to respond to the motion.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: petitioner has failed to appear for hearings related to this case despite
proper notice; petitioner was convicted of a theft-related federal misdemeanor in 2010; the statute under
which she was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), is “substantially equivalent” to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; her
conviction would have qualified as a third-degree indictable offense under New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
2(b)(2)(a); and under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 et seq., a third-degree theft conviction covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
3 disqualifies petitioner from employment in “a facility, center, school, or school system under the
supervision of the Department of Education.” The ALJ concluded that the DOE’s decision to disqualify
petitioner from employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, et seq. was appropriate and that no facts
have been presented to demonstrate that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, the
ALJ granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that petitioner’s criminal history disqualifies her
from employment in schools under the supervision of the DOE. Accordingly, the Initial Decision was
adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of appeal was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

231-24
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 00914-23
Agency Dkt. No. 306-11/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Raisah Thomas,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education,
Office of Student Protection,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge that petitioner is
disqualified from employment in schools under the supervision of the Department of Education.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter. Respondent’s
motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: June 14, 2024
Date of Mailing: June 18, 2024
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00914-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 306-11/23
RAISAH THOMAS,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
OFFICE OF STUDENT PROTECTION,
Respondent.
_________________________________________
Raisah Thomas, petitioner, pro se
Kevin F. Milton, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: May 16, 2024 	Decided: May 17, 2024
BEFORE MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, 	Raisah 	Thomas 	appeals 	the 	September 	19, 	2023, 	decision 	of
respondent New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student Protection, to
disqualify her, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.2, “from serving in any position, paid or

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
2
unpaid, with any education institution under the supervision of the Department of
Education.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Raisah Thomas was issued a Certificate of Eligibility with Advanced Standing with
a K−6 Elementary School Teacher Endorsement on May 1, 2005. 	She was issued her
standard teaching certificate in 2007 with the same endorsement, which she currently
holds. On September 19, 2023, petitioner was notified by the Office of Student Protection
(OSP) that based on findings made during a criminal background check conducted
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.2, she was “permanently disqualified from serving in any
position, paid or unpaid, with any education institution under the supervision of the
Department of Education.”
On November 13, 2023, Ms. Thomas emailed a Petition for Appeal to the State
Department of Education’s Office of Controversies and Disputes. 	After supplying proof
of service on respondent on November 22, 2023, the appeal was transmitted to the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was received on December 19, 2023, for a hearing
as a contested case. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
On 	December 	18, 	2023, prior 	to 	the matter 	being 	forwarded to 	the 	OAL,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of Answer.
An initial conference was scheduled for March 26, 2024, at which time petitioner
failed to appear. Nonetheless, a briefing schedule was set, with Ms. Thomas being given
until May 6, 2024 to file opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and respondent until May 16,
2024 to serve a reply brief.
Having given Ms. Thomas more than sufficient time in which to communicate with
the OAL and having not heard from her, the record formally closed on May 16, 2024.

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
3
INITIAL FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT
The following FACTS of the case are not in dispute:
1. 	On or about May 1, 2005, Raisah Thomas was issued a Certificate of Eligibility
with Advanced Standing Teacher of K−6 Elementary School by the State Board of
Examiners. 	A standard certificate was issued in 2007 and on June 1, 2014, that
certificate was renewed. (C-A.)
2. 	On September 19, 2023, a criminal background investigation, including a
fingerprint check, revealed that on November 16, 2009, Ms. Thomas had pled guilty
in the United States District Court, Newark, to the misdemeanor offense of
“Possession of Stolen Bank Checks” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) & 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. Ms. Thomas was sent a disqualification letter at that time. (R-A.)
3. 	The specific allegations against petitioner are detailed in an August 25, 2008,
criminal complaint. (R-B.)
4. 	When she received the disqualification letter, Ms. Thomas was employed as a
“Teacher 3” at Northern State Prison in Newark, New Jersey.
5. 	On March 18, 2010, Ms. Thomas was sentenced to one year of probation,
assessed a fee and ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution to the victim. A Judgment of
Conviction was entered by the Hon. Joel A. Pisano that day. (R-C.)
6. 	Ms. Thomas has not received a pardon for the conviction, nor has it been
expunged.1
1 In fact, only certain low-level drug offenses are eligible for expungement in the federal system. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3607(a).

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
4
MOTION
The respondent argued that the motion to dismiss is appropriate here since, per
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10, even if petitioner’s factual allegations are all found to be true, there is
no legal basis for her appeal.
More specifically, respondent argues that since Ms. Thomas is not challenging the
fact that she was convicted of the crime alleged, the only issue to be decided is a legal one:
whether that crime (a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2) is a “substantially
equivalent 	crime” 	to 	disqualifying 	New 	Jersey 	criminal 	statute 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:6-7.1.
Respondent posits that petitioner’s federal conviction is “substantially equivalent” to theft by
unlawful taking, a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). When the amount in dispute is over $500
but less than $75,000, that is a crime of the third degree,2 which, per N.J.A.C. 18A:6-
7.1(c)(2), is a crime for which conviction would disqualify her from employment in “a facility,
center, school, or school system under the supervision of the Department of Education.”
Ms. Thomas has not responded to the motion. However, she did present an argument
in her initial appeal which will be reviewed below.
APPEAL
In her appeal to the Board, Ms. Thomas wrote:
I have been a working professional and productive for over 16
years under my Standard Education license without blemish,
and to now take that away from [me] would be a major detriment
to me as well as my family. 	I was awarded my Standard
teaching license after the said offense in 2007, and to take it
back after a 16 year clean slate is the reason why I am
contesting this.
In 	the 	written 	communication 	from 	the 	Office 	of 	Student
Protection the investigator was not specific as to what was the
disqualifying offense. It was rather ambiguous. I do not have
an 	extensive 	criminal 	history. 	I 	have 	a 	low 	degree
2 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(a).

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
5
misdemeanor, that allowed me to continue working and for the
State of NJ. To my knowledge, my record does not reflect any
violent offenses, nor does my misdemeanor fall into any of the
categories of the first or second degree offense listed in
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.2, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.13 or N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
1.2. My offense did not deal with child abuse, or drug offenses.
I did not serve any jail time. Additionally, under the laws of the
state, 10 years or more without any offenses added to my
record, 	should 	qualify 	me 	for 	some 	type 	of 	clean 	slate
expungement of my record.
[A-A.]
THE CRIMINAL ALLEGATIONS
On August 25, 2008, an FBI agent swore out a criminal complaint against petitioner
alleging, in essence, that from November, 2007 through April, 2008, she possessed and
used checks stolen during a bank robbery. (R-B.)
The complaint alleged that on October 12, 2007, an armed robbery was committed
at a Bank of America branch in Edison, New Jersey. Included in the haul were American
Express Travelers Cheques and Gift Cheques. 	Following the robbery, a cooperating
witness informed the FBI that in November, 2007, Ms. Thomas and her husband
approached him and offered him $50 to store a pouch with the words “Bank of America”
printed on it which contained gift checks. He agreed.
On April 13, 2008, Ms. Thomas retrieved some of the checks and gave two of them
to the cooperating witness as compensation for storing them. Then, both the witness and
the petitioner went shopping utilizing the checks. 	The following day, Ms. Thomas
allegedly negotiated at least twenty of the checks at a credit union in Rahway.
On April 18, 2008, the FBI executed a search warrant at petitioner’s home, at which
time she admitted that she knew that the checks were stolen, that she had taken the
pouch containing the checks to the witness’s home and had asked the witness to store it.
The witness turned the bag over to the FBI and it was found to contain American Express
Gift Cheques and Traveler’s Cheques in excess of $10,000. (R-B.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
6
CRIMINAL LAWS
Ms. Thomas was initially charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. 	Ultimately, however, she pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)3 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2.
Those statutes read as follows:
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (bank robbery and incidental crimes)
(b) 	Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or
purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value
exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or
purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value not
exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (principals)
(a) 	Whoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) 	Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
Ms. Thomas was sentenced to one year of probation, assessed a $25 fee and
ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution to Bank of America. (R-C.)
3 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) merely dictates the same penalties for the “taker” and the “storer”.

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
7
Respondent argues that the federal statutes above are “substantially equivalent”
to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a), which reads:
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition
a. 	Movable property. 	A person is guilty of theft if he
unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable
property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(a), “theft constitutes a crime of the third degree
if: (a) The amount involved exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000.”
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A motion to dismiss filed per N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g) is the functional equivalent of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed in civil court per R. 4:6-2(e). Graves v.
State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2417 (App Div.
Sept. 26, 2017). The court stated the standard for the granting of same:
When 	reviewing 	a 	Rule 	4:6-2(e) 	motion, 	a 	court 	must
determine the adequacy of the pleading and decide whether
a cause of action is “suggested” by the facts. 	Printing Mart-
Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)
(quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189,
192 (1988)). The court must “search[] the complaint in depth
and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a
cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure
statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if
necessary.” Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l
Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).
[Id. at *8.]
The law cited by the respondent in support of its decision is N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1,
which reads in pertinent part:
A 	facility, 	center, 	school, 	or 	school 	system 	under 	the
supervision of the Department of Education and board of
education which cares for, or is involved in the education of
children under the age of 18 shall not employ for pay or

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
8
contract for the paid services of any teaching staff member
. . . unless the employer has first determined consistent with
the requirements and standards of this act, that no criminal
history record information exists on file . . . which would
disqualify that individual from being employed or utilized in
such capacity or position. . . .
An individual, except as provided in subsection g. of this
section, shall be permanently disqualified from employment or
service under this act if the individual’s criminal history record
check reveals a record of conviction for any crime of the first
or second degree; or
. . . .
c.
. . . .
(2) 	A crime as set forth in chapter 39 of Title 2C
of the New Jersey Statutes, a third degree crime as
set forth in chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey
Statutes, or a crime as listed below:
. . . .
d. 	For the purposes of this section, a conviction exists
if the individual has at any time been convicted under the
laws of this State or under any similar statutes of the
United States or any other state for a substantially
equivalent crime or other offense.
e. 	Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, an
individual shall not be disqualified from employment or
service under this act on the basis of any conviction
disclosed by a criminal record check performed pursuant
to 	this 	act 	without 	an 	opportunity 	to 	challenge 	the
accuracy of the disqualifying criminal history record.
. . . .
g. 	This 	section shall 	first 	apply 	to criminal history
record checks conducted on or after the effective date of
P.L. 1998, c. 31 (C.18A:6-7.1c et al.) . . . .
As noted above, respondent argues that, per N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d), the charges
to which Ms. Thomas pled guilty to in 2009 are “substantially equivalent” to New Jersey’s

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
9
statute covering “[t]heft by unlawful taking or disposition,” N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3. 	In her
appeal, Ms. Thomas argues that her 2009 plea was to a “low-level misdemeanor” and
that this does not meet the standard of being a disqualifying crime.
First, a little background. 	As is well established, New Jersey does not follow the
classic “misdemeanor—felony” language employed in the federal system and by many
states. Rather, New Jersey offenses generally follow the “disorderly persons—indictable”
verbiage. For the purposes of simplicity, the terminology is roughly equivalent. However,
for legal purposes, it is not.
In the federal system, sentencing classifications are dictated by 18 U.S.C. § 1559.
This code provision separates felonies into five classes and misdemeanors into three
classes; these are a single class of infractions (the lowest-level offense). 	For the
highest-grade misdemeanor, the maximum prison sentence is, in essence, six to twelve
months. Given that the maximum sentence for 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) is “imprisonment by
not more than one year,” it is by definition a Class A misdemeanor.
In 	New 	Jersey, 	indictable offenses are 	separated 	into four 	“degrees,” 	with
fourth-degree offenses being the least severe. 	N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1. 	There are two
classifications of disorderly persons offenses, petty disorderly and disorderly, as well as
simply “offenses,” such as ordinance violations. 	For “DPs,” maximum sentences are
dictated by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8: 	DPs carry a maximum jail sentence of six months, while
the maximum for “PDPs” is thirty days.
However, while the length of the potential penalty is certainly interesting, it has
become clear that it is the language of the statutes and how New Jersey treats the crime
that is more important in determining how the out-of-jurisdiction offense is viewed.
There is limited case law concerning this issue. 	However, it was most recently
addressed directly in Bazerman v. New Jersey Department of Education, 2023 N.J. Agen.
LEXIS 439 (August 29, 2023). There, the petitioner was convicted in New York of “official
misconduct,” which is a Class A misdemeanor. 	However, in New Jersey, “official
misconduct” is a second-degree indictable crime. 	The basic allegation was that in his

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10
employment as a police officer, Mr. Bazerman was authorized to purchase equipment
related to surveillance and wiretap activities and would then receive reimbursement for
same. However, he was unable to account for the equipment for which he had received
reimbursement. He was thereafter charged with official misconduct, pled guilty and was
barred from future public employment and paid restitution of over $5,000, but did not
serve any jail time and the conviction was later expunged.
Respondent 	argued 	that 	the 	New 	York 	official-misconduct 	offense 	was
substantially equivalent to New Jersey’s and because in New Jersey it is a second-degree
crime, Bazerman was automatically disqualified. Among other issues, the Commissioner
found that the ALJ had “erroneously focused his analysis on the penalties that courts may
impose at sentencing for each offense instead of the nearly identical statutory language
defining the elements of each offense.” Id. at *3.
The Commissioner emphasized the similarities of the statutory language and noted
that a plain-language reading is how the similarity issue should be approached. Id. at *6
(citing In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 18 (2020)). The Commissioner also
cited to Kelly v. New Jersey State Department of Education, Criminal History Review Unit,
Commissioner 	Decision 	No. 	396-18R 	(Dec. 	18, 	2018),
https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2018/dec/396-18R.pdf, 	where 	the
focus “centered around the statutory elements of each crime and not their degree or the
penalties associated with them.” Id. at *7.
In a somewhat similar case involving an unsuccessful applicant for a security
officer position, Bugge v. New Jersey State Police, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2514
(App. Div. Nov. 15, 2018), Bugge had previously pled guilty to a “general violation of civil
service law” in New York, a misdemeanor. 	However, the respondent deemed that
violation to be “the equivalent of a fourth-degree crime in New Jersey.” Id. at *2.
The ALJ had upheld respondent’s denial and that was affirmed in the final agency
decision, with the Commissioner noting that the conviction in New York, while a
misdemeanor there, was, per N.J.S.A. 11A:10-2, a fourth-degree crime in New Jersey,

OAL DKT. NO. EDE 00914-24
11
which is the substantive equivalent of a felony, not a misdemeanor. 	Id. at *5; see also
Medica v. New Jersey State Police, 2020 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 602 (June 5, 2020).
Here, 	respondent’s 	disqualification 	decision 	was 	based 	on 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:6-
7.1(c)(2), which covers a wide variety of third-degree theft-related offenses. 	(N.J.S.A.
2C:20 et seq.)4 	It is argued here that the only difference between third-degree theft by
unlawful taking in New Jersey (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) and the federal bank-robbery statute
(18 U.S.C. § 2113) is that the New Jersey statute is not specifically directed to banks.5 In
the relatively rare New Jersey cases involving the theft of money from banks, the
appropriate charges have been found to be second-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
1(a)(2)) and third-degree theft (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)). See State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592,
601 (2021); State v. King, 215 N.J. Super. 504, 508 (App. Div. 1987).
I agree with respondent. In comparing the language of the two relevant statutes,
the second part of the federal statute is clearly the “substantial equivalent” of New
Jersey’s theft by unlawful taking statute. 	Both have essentially identical mens rea
requirements and require specific amounts of property/money to be stolen (and there is
no question that those minimums have been met).
I further agree with respondent’s argument that the passage of time since the
offense does not impact the disqualification law’s effect. As was detailed in In re Tenure
Hearing of John Socrates, 2011 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 591 (June 24, 2011), in 1998, N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1 was amended to remove extensive verbiage permitting an individual to
demonstrate 	rehabilitation 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing evidence 	in 	order 	to 	maintain
employment. That language was replaced with the current language which only provides
the individual with the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the information discovered
in the background check. Id. at *3.6
4 It also covers weapons-related offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:39 et seq.).
5 In fact, New Jersey does not have specific bank robbery-related statutes. Rather, these crimes are covered by
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 et seq. (robbery) and N.J.S.A. 2C:20 et seq. (theft). Most bank robberies are actually covered by
federal law due to the involvement of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
6 1998 N.J.S.N. 851 (enacted June 30, 1998).

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While I am not completely unsympathetic to petitioner’s argument that a substantial
period of time has elapsed since her conviction, her offense falls directly within the scope
of the disqualification statute and the Legislature explicitly removed the rehabilitation
“exception” from the plain language of the statute.
Given the above, I FIND the following:
a. 	That Ms. Thomas was convicted of a theft-related federal
misdemeanor in 2010.
b. 	That the statute under which she was convicted, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(b), is “substantially equivalent” to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3.
c. 	That given the dollar value of the theft, her conviction would
have qualified as a third-degree indictable offense under New
Jersey law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(a).
d. 	That per N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 et seq., a third-degree theft
conviction 	covered 	by 	N.J.S.A. 	2C:20-3 	disqualifies
Ms. Thomas from employment in “a facility, center, school, or
school system under the supervision of the Department of
Education.”
Ultimately, I CONCLUDE that the respondent’s decision to disqualify petitioner
from employment pursuant to the dictates of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, et seq. was appropriate
and that no facts have been presented to demonstrate that it was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss be and is hereby GRANTED and;

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13
It 	is 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Ms. 	Thomas’s 	appeal 	be 	and 	is 	hereby
DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B 10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 	100 	Riverview 	Plaza, 	4th 	Floor, 	PO 	Box 	500, 	Trenton, 	New 	Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
May 17, 2024
DATE 	MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	May 17, 2024
Date Mailed to Parties: 	May 17, 2024
sej

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APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For Court:
C-A 	Petitioner’s certificate status
For petitioner:
A-A 	Appeal (November 13, 2023)
For respondent:
R-A 	Disqualification letter from DOE/OSP to petitioner (September 19, 2023)
with background check
R-B 	Criminal Complaint with attachments (August 25, 2008)
R-C 	Judgment of Conviction (March 18, 2010)