April 29, 2020- State of New Mexico v. James Tyrone Manning, No. A-1-CA-37615

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Filed 4/29/2020 9:45 AM

Plaintiff-Appellee, Ad. ~fe4
Mark Reynolds

V. No. A-1-CA-37615
JAMES TYRONE MANNING,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
James W. Counts, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Eran Sharon, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOGARDJUS, Judge.

4 Defendant James Tyrone Manning appeals from his conviction following a

jury trial of trafficking methamphetamine (by possession with intent to distribute),

2
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20(A)(3)(c) (2006).1 Defendant challenges	1
the denial of his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his	2
conviction for trafficking methamphetamine, and the sentence enhancement for his	3
trafficking conviction. We affirm.	4
BACKGROUND	5
{2} 	On September 29, 2015, Officer Kyle Graham of the Alamogordo Police	6
Department was on patrol in his duty uniform and was driving a marked patrol car.	7
While on patrol, Officer Graham saw a vehicle traveling south on Indiana Street.	8
Officer Graham completed a license plate check on the vehicle through dispatch.	9
Officer Graham testified that it was his common practice to complete license plate	10
checks on any vehicle when there were no other calls for service.	11
{3} 	After dispatch informed him that the vehicle’s registration expired in June	12
2015, Officer Graham initiated a traffic stop based on the expired registration. When	13
the vehicle finally came to a stop, Officer Graham spoke with the driver, who	14
identified himself as Defendant. After Defendant reported that he did not have his	15
driver’s license with him, Officer Graham obtained Defendant’s date of birth and	16
address, relayed Defendant’s name and the additional information to dispatch, and	17
1As we explain in the next section, the jury also convicted Defendant of the
other crimes he was charged with. Defendant has not challenged those convictions
in this appeal. Therefore, we discuss those charges and convictions only for context.

3
was told that Defendant had a revoked license with an arrest clause. Officer Graham	1
arrested Defendant.	2
{4} 	As he was walking Defendant to his patrol car, Officer Graham heard	3
something hit the ground and felt his foot kick an object. Officer Graham looked	4
down and saw a clear container with red jeweler-sized bags. Defendant denied	5
multiple times that he dropped the container; however, Officer Graham subsequently	6
found several red, clear jeweler bags in Defendant’s pocket that matched the bags	7
found in the container. Five of the bags in the container contained a white crystal	8
substance that the New Mexico Department of Public Safety Forensic Laboratory	9
later confirmed to be methamphetamine. The recovered methamphetamine weighed	10
2.1 grams. DNA tests conducted on the bags that were found in the container could	11
not eliminate Defendant as a contributor. Officer Graham obtained a search warrant	12
for Defendant’s vehicle and found two additional bags on the driver’s side floor	13
board, a broken methamphetamine pipe in the back seat, and a marijuana roach in a	14
cigarette box.	15
{5} 	Based on the foregoing, Defendant was indicted, in relevant part, on one count	16
of trafficking a controlled substance, contrary to Section 30-31-20(A)(3)(c); one	17
count of possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-	18
25.1(A) (2001, amended 2019); one count of possession of marijuana or synthetic	19
cannabinoids, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(A) (2011, amended 2019);	20

4
one count of driving with a revoked license, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-	1
39.1(B) (2013); one count of driving without insurance, contrary to NMSA 1978,	2
Section 66-5-205 (2013); and one count of improper display of a registration plate,	3
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-3-18(A) (2005, amended 2018).	4
{6} 	Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result	5
of the traffic stop pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States	6
Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. Defendant	7
argued that Officer Graham lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and asserted	8
that the traffic stop was pretextual. The State filed a response and argued that because	9
there was reasonable suspicion for the initial stop, it was Defendant’s burden to show	10
the stop was unreasonable and that Officer Graham had an unrelated motive to stop	11
him. 2 The matter proceeded to trial without resolution of Defendant’s motion to	12
suppress.	13
{7} 	Defendant raised his motion to suppress again at trial during Officer Graham’s	14
testimony. The district court excused the jury and gave Defendant the opportunity	15
to voir dire Officer Graham. During Defendant’s voir dire, Officer Graham was	16
unable to recall whether he had to turn around to be able to follow Defendant to	17
2Defendant’s theory of pretext was not clear in his motion to suppress, but he
did note his race when outlining the factual basis supporting his motion. In its
response to Defendant’s motion, the State noted that Defendant was possibly arguing
that his race was the pretextual basis for the stop.

5
obtain his license plate information. Nevertheless, Defendant argued there was no	1
reason for Officer Graham to turn around and run Defendant’s license plate and	2
therefore the stop was pretextual. 3 The State argued that there was reasonable	3
suspicion for the stop—the expired registration—and that running license plates was	4
part of Officer Graham’s routine. The district court stated that the law in New	5
Mexico allows an officer to pull over a motorist for expired registration and that	6
there is nothing wrong with an officer being proactive and checking license plates.	7
The district court further stated it had no evidence to suggest that Officer Graham	8
was motivated by anything other than general enforcement of motor vehicle laws	9
and concluded the stop was not pretextual. For those reasons, the district court	10
denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.	11
{8} 	The jury ultimately convicted Defendant on all counts. Before sentencing, the	12
State 	filed 	a 	supplemental 	information 	and 	a 	brief 	in 	support 	of 	enhancing	13
Defendant’s sentence to a first degree felony for committing a second trafficking	14
offense. Defendant filed a response. After a hearing on the matter, the district court	15
ruled that this was Defendant’s second trafficking conviction and enhanced his	16
sentence to a first degree felony pursuant to Section 30-31-20(B)(2). The district	17
court sentenced Defendant to a total of nineteen years of incarceration.	18
3Defendant’s theory of pretext was also not clear at the mid-trial hearing on
his motion to suppress, other than an assertion that he was “singled out.”

6
DISCUSSION	1
I. 	We Affirm the District Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress	2
{9} 	In this appeal, developing the argument raised in district court, Defendant	3
argues that his race, not the vehicle’s expired registration, was the true basis for the	4
stop. 4 Accordingly, Defendant contends that the stop was pretextual and any	5
evidence that was recovered following the stop should have been suppressed.	6
Defendant’s argument relies heavily on this Court’s decision in State v. Ochoa,	7
2009-NMCA-002, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143.	8
{10} 	“The district court’s denial of [a] motion to suppress evidence presents a	9
mixed question of fact and law.” State v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d	10
183. “We view the facts in the manner most favorable to the prevailing party and	11
defer to the district court’s findings of fact if substantial evidence exists to support	12
those findings.” State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964.	13
“[W]e review the district court’s application of the law to those facts de novo to	14
4As we have noted, Defendant’s theory of pretext was unclear as litigated at
the district court. See State v. Frohnhofer, 2011-NMCA-109, ¶ 12, 150 N.M. 643,
264 P.3d 739 (“We review the case litigated below [and] not the case that is fleshed
out for the first time on appeal.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted)). Nevertheless, we believe that the argument advanced by Defendant at the
district court could reasonably be interpreted to be consistent with the argument
advanced on appeal. Furthermore, both here and in front of the district court, the
State addressed race as Defendant’s alleged pretextual basis for the stop.

7
determine whether the search or seizure was constitutionally reasonable.” State v.	1
Chacon, 2018-NMCA-065, ¶ 19, 429 P.3d 347.	2
{11} 	In 	Ochoa, this Court 	defined a pretextual traffic stop as “a detention	3
supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic	4
offense has occurred, but is executed as a pretense to pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different	5
more serious investigative agenda for which there is no reasonable suspicion or	6
probable cause.” 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 25. Said another way, “[i]n performing a	7
pretextual traffic stop, a police officer is stopping the driver, not to enforce the traffic	8
code, but to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving.” Id. ¶ 16	9
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where there is a factual finding of	10
pretext, that the officer had a constitutionally invalid purpose for the stop which is	11
not exempt from the warrant requirement, the stop violates the New Mexico	12
Constitution, and the evidentiary fruits of the stop are inadmissible.” Id. ¶ 42.	13
{12} 	The Ochoa Court also explained the burdens the parties must carry when a	14
defendant asserts pretext:	15
First, the [district] court must determine whether there was reasonable	16
suspicion or probable cause for the stop. As usual, the [s]tate has the	17
burden of proof to justify the stop under an exception to the warrant	18
requirement. If the stop can be justified objectively on its face and the	19
defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	seizure 	was 	nevertheless 	unreasonable	20
because it was pretextual under the New Mexico Constitution, then the	21
district court must decide whether the officer’s motive for the stop was	22
unrelated to the objective existence of reasonable suspicion or probable	23
cause. The defendant has the burden of proof to show pretext based on	24
the totality of the circumstances. If the defendant has not placed	25

8
substantial facts in dispute indicating pretext, then the seizure is not	1
pretextual. If the defendant shows sufficient facts indicating the officer	2
had an unrelated motive that was not supported by reasonable suspicion	3
or probable cause, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the stop	4
was pretextual. The burden shifts to the state to establish that, based on	5
the totality of the circumstances, even without that unrelated motive,	6
the officer would have stopped the defendant.	7
Id. ¶ 40 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).	8
{13} 	Defendant does not appear to challenge that the State met its initial burden to	9
demonstrate that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Instead, Defendant	10
acknowledges that (1) Officer Graham did not need reasonable suspicion to	11
complete the license plate check, see State v. Herrera, 2010-NMCA-006, ¶ 12, 147	12
N.M. 441, 224 P.3d 668; and (2) “[a] traffic stop for an expired registration is	13
constitutionally proper under the [F]ederal and [S]tate [C]onstitutions.” Because	14
Officer Graham learned of the expired registration after completing the license plate	15
check but before stopping Defendant, we conclude that Officer Graham’s stop of	16
Defendant’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion. See § 66-3-18(C)	17
(prohibiting driving with an invalid vehicle registration displayed).	18
{14} 	After the State met its initial burden, it was then Defendant’s burden “to show	19
pretext based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 40.	20
Facts that may be relevant to that inquiry include	21
whether the defendant was arrested for and charged with a crime	22
unrelated to the stop; the officer’s compliance or non-compliance with	23
standard police practices; whether the officer was in an unmarked car	24
or was not in uniform; whether patrolling or enforcement of the traffic	25

9
code were among the officer’s typical employment duties; whether the	1
officer had information, which did not rise to the level of reasonable	2
suspicion or probable cause, relating to another offense; the manner of	3
the stop, including how long the officer trailed the defendant before	4
performing the stop, how long after the alleged suspicion arose or	5
violation was committed the stop was made, how many officers were	6
present for the stop; the conduct, demeanor, and statements of the	7
officer during the stop; the relevant characteristics of the defendant;	8
whether the objective reason articulated for the stop was necessary for	9
the protection of traffic safety; and the officer’s testimony as to the	10
reason for the stop.	11
Id. ¶ 41. Rather than identifying any specific facts in the record bearing on Officer	12
Graham’s motivation for the traffic stop, Defendant simply italicizes three of the	13
foregoing “facts” in his briefing: (1) “whether the defendant was arrested for and	14
charged with a crime unrelated to the stop”; (2) “whether the objective reason	15
articulated for the stop was necessary for the protection of traffic safety”; and (3)	16
“the officer’s testimony as to the reason for the stop.” Id. Defendant does not explain	17
the significance of his italicizations, and we will not attempt to divine the	18
significance nor are we obligated to review this undeveloped argument. See State v.	19
Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031 (stating that appellate courts are	20
under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); see also State v.	21
Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 15, 387 P.3d 885 (“For this Court to rule on an	22
inadequately briefed constitutional issue would essentially require it to do the work	23
on behalf of [the d]efendant.”). Nevertheless, even when we consider the “facts”	24
identified by Defendant, we are not persuaded.	25

10
{15} 	Officer Graham’s testimony suggested that he intended to perform a license	1
plate check of a vehicle he encountered on the road while on patrol, as was his	2
common practice when there were no other calls for service. Only after performing	3
that check and learning that the vehicle had an expired registration did he initiate the	4
traffic stop. As soon as he got to the vehicle, Officer Graham introduced himself and	5
informed Defendant that he pulled him over because of the expired registration.	6
Officer Graham then asked Defendant whether he had insurance on the vehicle and	7
asked for Defendant’s driver’s license. After Defendant admitted that he did not have	8
his license with him, Officer Graham provided Defendant’s name, date of birth, and	9
current address to dispatch. Nothing that occurred in this interaction suggests that	10
Officer Graham was motivated to stop Defendant for anything other than the expired	11
registration.	12
{16} 	Furthermore, none of the evidence presented during trial or during the mid-	13
trial hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress suggested that (1) the traffic stop	14
was motivated by Defendant’s race; or (2) Officer Graham was aware of Defendant’s	15
race when he initiated the traffic stop. When considered in light of the foregoing,	16
Officer Graham’s further inquiry, which revealed additional facts that led to	17
Defendant’s arrest—i.e., that he was driving on a revoked license with an arrest	18
clause—and the fact that Defendant was charged with other unrelated crimes is	19
insufficient, without more, to raise a rebuttal presumption that the stop was	20

11
pretextual in light of the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that	1
Defendant failed to meet his burden. See Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 40 (“If the	2
defendant has not placed substantial facts in dispute indicating pretext, then the	3
seizure is not pretextual.”).	4
{17} 	Because the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and Defendant	5
has failed to raise a rebuttal presumption that the stop was pretextual, we conclude	6
that Officer Graham’s stop of Defendant was not pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm	7
the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.	8
II. 	Substantial Evidence Supported Defendant’s Conviction for Trafficking	9
Methamphetamine	10
{18} 	To find Defendant guilty of trafficking methamphetamine, the jury was	11
instructed that the State had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable	12
doubt:	13
1. [D]efendant had methamphetamine in his possession;	14
2. [D]efendant knew it was methamphetamine or believed it to be	15
methamphetamine or believed it to be some drug or other substance	16
the possession of which is regulated or prohibited by law;	17
3. [D]efendant intended to transfer it to another;	18
4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 29th day of	19
September, 2015.	20
See UJI 14-3111 NMRA. The jury was also instructed as follows on constructive	21
possession:	22

12
A person is in possession of methamphetamine . . . when he	1
knows it is on his person or in his presence, and he exercises control	2
over it.	3
Even if the substance is not in his physical presence, he is in	4
possession if he knows where it is, and he exercises control over it.	5
Two or more people can have possession of a substance at the	6
same time.	7
A person’s presence in the vicinity of the substance or his	8
knowledge of the existence or the location of the substance, is not, by	9
itself, possession.	10
See UJI 14-3130 NMRA.	11
{19} 	In places in his briefing, Defendant appears to only argue that there was	12
insufficient evidence that he had control over the methamphetamine as required to	13
support a finding of constructive possession. In other places, Defendant appears to	14
also challenge whether there was sufficient evidence that he had the requisite intent.	15
Accordingly, we analyze both arguments: whether there was sufficient evidence that	16
(1) Defendant had control over the methamphetamine; and (2) Defendant acted with	17
the requisite intent.	18
{20} 	“The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of	19
either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a	20
reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v.	21
Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52, 345 P.3d 1056 (internal quotation marks and	22
citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind	23

13
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. ¶ 53 (alteration, internal	1
quotation marks, and citation omitted). When reviewing for substantial evidence, an	2
appellate court “views the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict,	3
indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in	4
favor of the verdict.” Id. ¶ 52 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation	5
omitted). We also disregard all evidence and inferences that support a different	6
result. State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. “The	7
question before the reviewing court is not whether [it] would have had a reasonable	8
doubt about guilt but whether it would have been impermissibly unreasonable for a	9
jury to have concluded otherwise.” Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52 (alterations,	10
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	11
{21} 	The 	following 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	Defendant’s 	control 	over 	the	12
methamphetamine was presented at trial. Officer Graham testified that he heard	13
something hit the ground and felt his foot kick an object as he was walking	14
Defendant to his patrol car. When Officer Graham looked down, he saw a clear	15
container with red jeweler-sized bags inside. The content of five of the bags in the	16
container was later confirmed to be methamphetamine. DNA testing could not	17
eliminate Defendant as a source of the DNA mixture found on the bags that were	18
inside the container. Furthermore, no evidence was presented at trial that suggested	19
any person, except Officer Graham, was in the area where the methamphetamine	20

14
was found. Based on the foregoing, the jury could reasonably conclude that	1
Defendant exercised control over the methamphetamine as he walked to Officer	2
Graham’s patrol car.	3
{22} 	As to Defendant’s intent, Officer Graham testified that, based on his training	4
and experience, the amount of methamphetamine found in the bags in the container	5
was inconsistent with personal use. Officer Graham further testified that he found	6
bags matching the bags found in the container in Defendant’s pocket. As to the	7
significance of empty bags—like those found in Defendant’s pocket—Officer	8
Graham testified that they indicate that a person is packaging drugs to sell. The	9
foregoing evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Defendant intended	10
to transfer the methamphetamine to another rather than intending to keep the	11
methamphetamine for personal use as Defendant contends. See Rojo, 1999-NMSC-	12
001, ¶ 19 (“[T]he jury is free to reject [the d]efendant’s version of the facts.”).	13
{23} 	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant’s conviction for	14
trafficking methamphetamine was supported by substantial evidence.	15
III. 	Defendant’s Sentence Was Properly Enhanced	16
{24} 	Defendant asserts that the district court erred in enhancing his current	17
conviction under Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Defendant argues that because he was	18
convicted under an entirely different statute, it was improper for his sentence to be	19
enhanced. Defendant furthers argues that the enhancement of his conviction by the	20

15
district court from a second degree felony to a first degree felony violates his rights	1
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II,	2
Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution.	3
{25} 	“The application and interpretation of law is subject to a de novo review.”	4
State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130. “In New	5
Mexico, the court’s sentencing authority is limited by statute[, and t]he [L]egislature	6
must give express authorization for a sentence to be imposed.” State v. Lacey, 2002-	7
NMCA-032, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 684, 41 P.3d 952 (citation omitted). When interpreting a	8
statute, we seek to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and do so by looking first	9
to the plain meaning of the statute’s language. State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-012,	10
¶ 11, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.3d 125. “[W]hen a statute contains clear and unambiguous	11
language, 	we 	will 	heed 	that 	language 	and 	refrain 	from 	further 	statutory	12
interpretation.” Id.	13
{26} 	Defendant’s first argument—that his sentence cannot be enhanced because his	14
prior conviction was under a different statute—is contrary to our Supreme Court’s	15
decision in State v. Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, 93 N.M. 335, 600 P.2d 281. In that	16
case, the defendant “was convicted of two counts of trafficking . . . a controlled	17
substance contrary to [Section] 30-31-20(A).” Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, ¶ 2.	18
Based on his prior federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute a	19
controlled substance, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976), the district court enhanced	20

16
the defendant’s sentence for his violations of Section 30-31-20(A) pursuant to	1
Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, ¶ 2. On appeal, the defendant	2
contended “that ‘second and subsequent offense’ mean[t] a second or subsequent	3
violation of [Section] 30-31-20, and that a federal offense cannot be used to increase	4
the penalty for the state offense.” Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, ¶ 5.	5
{27} 	Our Supreme Court was not persuaded, noting that the statute “merely refers	6
to ‘second and subsequent offenses’ ” and “does not specify that the prior offense	7
must have been committed in New Mexico or prosecuted under [the New Mexico	8
Controlled Substances] Act.” Id. Because “[t]he statutes proscribe the same acts and	9
require the same knowledge or intent” and “[t]he elements necessary to prove the	10
federal offense were the same as those required to prove the state charges[,]” our	11
Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he federal offense was a prior conviction for	12
purposes of the penalty provisions of . . . [Section] 30-31-20(B)(2).” Garduno, 1979-	13
NMSC-072, ¶¶ 6-7. Accordingly, our Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s	14
enhancement of the defendant’s sentence. Id. ¶ 8.	15
{28} 	As in Garduno, when we compare the elements of Defendant’s trafficking	16
offense 	under 	Section 	30-31-20(A)(3)(c) 	with 	the 	elements 	of 	his 	previous	17
conviction for possession with intent to distribute under NMSA 1978, Section 30-	18
31-22(A)(2)(a) 	(1990, 	amended 	2011), 	we 	conclude 	that 	that 	“[t]he 	statutes	19
proscribe the same acts and require the same knowledge or intent.” Garduno, 1979-	20

17
NMSC-072, ¶ 6. Both Defendant’s conviction under Section 30-31-20(A)(3)(c) and	1
his conviction under Section 30-31-22(A)(2)(a) (1990) required the State to prove,	2
in relevant part, that (1) Defendant had a controlled substance in his possession; (2)	3
Defendant knew that it was a controlled substance or believed it to be a controlled	4
substance or believed it to be some drug or other substance the possession of which	5
is regulated or prohibited by law; and (3) Defendant intended to transfer it to another.	6
Compare UJI 14-3111, with UJI 14-3104 NMRA. Based on the foregoing, we	7
conclude that Defendant’s conviction under Section 30-31-22(A)(2)(a) (1990) was	8
a prior offense for purposes of Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Accordingly, we conclude	9
that the district court did not err in enhancing his sentence pursuant to Section 30-	10
31-20(B)(2).5
11
{29} 	Next, we address Defendant’s argument that the internal enhancement of his	12
conviction from a second degree felony to a first degree felony violates his rights	13
under the Eight Amendment and Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico	14
5In his briefing, Defendant notes that trial counsel attempted to distinguish
Garduno on notice grounds, specifically that he “was never put on notice that a
future trafficking conviction would result in a first-degree felony conviction.” It is
not clear whether Defendant is also arguing that we should distinguish Garduno on
that ground in this appeal. To the extent that Defendant is making that argument, we
decline to address it because his argument is undeveloped and is not supported by
citation to authority. See Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21 (stating that appellate
courts are under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); State
v. Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60, 327 P.3d 1129 (“[A]ppellate courts will not
consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue and that, given no
cited authority, we assume no such authority exists[.]”).

18
Constitution. In New Mexico the Supreme Court has “(1) recognized that the length	1
of a sentence is a legislative prerogative, and (2) absent a compelling reason, the	2
judiciary shall not impose its own views concerning the appropriate punishment for	3
crimes.” State v. Harris, 1984-NMCA-003, ¶ 50, 101 N.M. 12, 677 P.2d 625.	4
Additionally, New Mexico case law demonstrates that “it is an exceedingly rare case	5
where a term of incarceration, which has been authorized by the Legislature, will be	6
found to be excessively long or inherently cruel.” State v. Augustus, 1981-NMCA-	7
118, ¶ 8, 97 N.M. 100, 637 P.2d 50. Defendant was convicted of trafficking	8
methamphetamine in the first degree for a second offense. The sentence he received	9
was twice as long as that of a first offense because the judge imposed the lawful and	10
statutorily mandated sentence. A review of the legislative intent of New Mexico’s	11
Controlled Substance Act reveals the intent for repeat offenders to serve longer	12
sentences than first time offenders. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Defendant’s	13
sentence enhancement and resulting period of incarceration was either cruel or	14
unusual or a violation of his state or federal constitutional rights.	15
CONCLUSION	16
{30} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for trafficking	17
methamphetamine.	18
{31} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	19
_________________________________	20
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	21

1
WE CONCUR:
Chile 4. Vargar
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge
19
2 3 4 5