September 25, 2019- CYFD v. Sara T., No. A-1-CA-37880

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

6)

7

8)

9

10)

11

12

13

14
15

16)
17
18
19
20

21
22

23

Corrections to this opinion not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM
Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE SIATE OF NEW MEXICO
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex re. Ot od OOS DOI CAL AM.
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES s
DEPARTMENT, A. [>

a
Petitioner Appellee, Mark Reynolds
V. No. A-1-CA-37880
SARA T,,
Respondent- Appellant,
and
VICENTE T. SR.,

Respondent,
IN THE MATTER OF VICENIE T. JR.,
Child.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DONA ANA COUNTY
Mara E. Beyer, District J udge

Children, Y outh & Families Department

Rebecca J. Liggett, Chief Children’s Court Attomey
Robert Retherford, Children’s Court Attomey

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Jane B. Yohalem
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

2
ChavezLaw, LLC	1
Rosenda Chavez	2
Las Cruces, NM	3
Guardian Ad Litem	4
DECISION	5
BOGARDUS, Judge.	6
{1} 	Sara T. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son,	7
Vincente 	T., 	Jr. 	(Child). 1 Mother 	advances 	three 	arguments: 	(1) 	there 	was	8
insufficient evidence “to establish that Mother would not be able to remedy the	9
causes and conditions of neglect in the foreseeable future[;]” (2) the district court	10
erred in “valuing swift permanency . . . over family reunification[;]” and (3)	11
Mother’s telephonic appearance at the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing	12
was insufficient to protect her right to due process. Unpersuaded, we affirm.	13
{2} 	Because this a non-precedential expedited bench decision and the parties are	14
familiar with the facts and procedural posture of this case, our decision includes only	15
those facts and law necessary to decide the merits. See In re Court of Appeals	16
Caseload, Misc. Order No. 01-57, ¶ 4(C) (Sept. 19, 2016).	17
1 Father, Vincente T., Sr., also had his parental rights terminated in the same
proceeding, but has not appealed that decision. Therefore, our opinion addresses
only the facts and law relevant to Mother’s appeal.

3
BACKGROUND2
1
{3} 	In March 2017, Child tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamines, and	2
marijuana while in the care of Mother. As a result of Child’s drug exposure, Mother	3
was arrested and, as a condition of release, was not allowed to have contact with	4
Child. Child was placed with his paternal aunt, Kalissa M., who had been appointed	5
as a safety monitor. Approximately seven months later, on October 12, 2017, Kalissa	6
M., informed Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) that she was no	7
longer able to care for Child due to the limited resources provided. An alternate	8
safety monitor and another paternal aunt of Child, Marissa T., informed CYFD she	9
was only able to keep Child for the night. The following day, Child was placed into	10
CYFD’s custody.	11
{4} 	On October 17, 2017, CYFD filed a petition alleging that Child was abused	12
and neglected as defined in the Abuse and Neglect Act (the Act), NMSA 1978,	13
§§ 32A-4-1 to -35 (1993, as amended through 2019). See § 32A-4-2(B)(1) (defining	14
“abused child” as one “who has suffered or who is at risk of suffering serious harm	15
because of the action or inaction of the child’s parent”); § 32A-4-2(B)(4) (defining	16
2 The facts contained in this section are set forth to explain the context of the
termination of Mother’s parental rights. All facts relied on in our affirmance of the
termination of Mother’s parental rights are set forth in the subsection titled
“Sufficiency of the Evidence” below. See Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v.
Brandy S., 2007-NMCA-135, ¶¶ 31-32, 142 N.M. 705, 168 P.3d 1129 (indicating
that, generally, a district court must rely on evidence introduced at the TPR hearing
to make findings of fact relation to the termination of parental rights).

4
“abused child” as one “whose parent . . . has knowingly, intentionally, or negligently	1
placed the child in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health”); and	2
§ 32A-4-2(G)(2) (defining “neglected child” as one “who is without proper parental	3
care and control or subsistence, education, medical or other care or control necessary	4
for the child’s well-being because of the faults or habits of the child’s parent . . . or	5
the failure or refusal of the parent, . . . when able to do so, to provide them”). The	6
district court issued an ex parte custody order placing Child into CYFD’s custody.	7
Child was then placed in non-relative foster care because no relative was able or	8
willing to care for him. Child’s care was subsequently moved to another non-relative	9
foster care placement.	10
{5} 	On February 5, 2018, pursuant to Mother’s no contest plea, the district court	11
entered a stipulated judgment and order that Child was neglected under Section 32A-	12
4-2(G)(2). The district court found that Mother was unable to properly care and	13
provide for Child due to her illegal drug use and conditions of release which	14
prevented her from having contact with Child. Mother’s court-ordered treatment	15
plan required her to: (1) maintain open and regular contact with CYFD; (2)	16
participate in and complete the Esperanza program or another similar program to	17
obtain and maintain sobriety; (3) address her legal issues to be able to have contact	18
with Child; (4) participate in a parenting program to attain age appropriate	19
expectations of children and effectively demonstrate the utilization of those skills;	20

5
(5) utilize resources to maintain safe housing; and (6) participate in a psychological	1
evaluation and follow any recommendations that arise from the evaluation.	2
{6} 	On March 26, 2018, the district court entered an initial judicial review order	3
after a hearing on the matter. While acknowledging that Mother complied with her	4
treatment plan by contacting CYFD following her release from custody and by	5
“respond[ing] to text messages most of the time[,]” the district court found that	6
Mother failed to otherwise comply with her treatment plan. Specifically, the district	7
court found that Mother had: not maintained open contact with CYFD; not answered	8
phone calls from her case worker; missed five meetings with her case worker;	9
refused to meet with her case worker while at the Doña Ana Detention Center; made	10
two appointments with the infant mental health clinician then failed to attend the	11
appointments or return calls and messages from the provider trying to reschedule;	12
not resolved her legal no contact order; neither attended nor completed her scheduled	13
psychological evaluation; scheduled at least three home visits from which she was	14
then absent; and not completed the required hair follicle drug test. Based on this, the	15
district court found that Mother had not progressed in her case plan and entered a	16
finding of futility, which relieved CYFD from its obligation to make reasonable	17
efforts to implement Mother’s case plan.	18
{7} 	Four days after the initial judicial review, Child’s placement was changed for	19
a third time at CYFD’s request due to an emergency. Four days after that placement,	20

6
Child’s care provider requested that the placement be changed and Child was placed	1
with a fourth care provider. Child remained with his fourth placement through the	2
TPR hearing.	3
{8} 	On May 22, 2018, CYFD moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights to	4
Child. In the motion, CYFD alleged that Mother was unable or unwilling to provide	5
proper parental care or control for Child and had not utilized or benefited from the	6
services offered by CYFD to remedy the conditions and causes of Child’s neglect.	7
CYFD further alleged that it was unlikely that the situation would change in the	8
foreseeable future. The TPR hearing was scheduled for September 10, 2018.	9
{9} 	On July 31, 2018, Mother was sentenced to a term of incarceration of three	10
years in relation to her criminal child abuse charge. On August 2, 2018, CYFD took	11
Child to the Doña Ana Detention Center to visit with Mother. Mother was	12
subsequently transferred to the Western New Mexico Correctional Facility for	13
classification in mid-August 2018. Mother was then transferred to the Springer	14
Correctional Facility on or about August 30, 2018.	15
{10} 	At Mother’s request, the first scheduled hearing on CYFD’s TPR motion was	16
continued after the Doña Ana County Sheriff’s Department was unable to transport	17
Mother to the hearing as a result of her transfer within the New Mexico Department	18
of Corrections. On November 2, 2018, three days before the rescheduled TPR	19
hearing, Mother again moved to continue the hearing because her transport order	20

7
had been rejected by the Doña Ana County Sheriff’s Department without notice to	1
her counsel or the district court. After the parties presented argument on Mother’s	2
motion to continue, the district denied the motion. The TPR hearing was held on	3
November 5, 2018.	4
{11} 	Mother appeared telephonically at the TPR hearing, conferred with her	5
counsel after the close of CYFD’s evidence, and testified on her own behalf.	6
Following the hearing, the district court granted CYFD’s motion, issued findings of	7
fact, and concluded that, despite CYFD’s reasonable effort to assist Mother in	8
addressing the conditions that rendered her unable to provide for Child, it was in	9
Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals.	10
DISCUSSION	11
I. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence	12
A. 	Standard of Review	13
{12} 	Section 32A-4-28(B)(2) provides that the district 	court 	shall terminate	14
parental rights when	15
the child has been a neglected or abused child as defined in the [Act]	16
and the court finds that the conditions and causes of the neglect and	17
abuse 	are 	unlikely 	to 	change 	in 	the 	foreseeable 	future 	despite	18
reasonable efforts by [CYFD] to assist the parent in adjusting the	19
conditions that render the parent unable to properly care for the child.	20
“It is [CYFD’s] burden to prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and	21
convincing evidence.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Tammy S.,	22

8
1999-NMCA-009, ¶ 13, 126 N.M. 664, 974 P.2d 158. “Clear and convincing	1
evidence means evidence that instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative when	2
weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact[-]finder’s mind is left with	3
an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.” State ex rel. Children, Youth &	4
Families Dep’t v. Nathan H., 2016-NMCA-043, ¶ 31, 370 P.3d 782 (internal	5
quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court must “give primary	6
consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional welfare and needs” of children	7
when considering terminating parental rights. Section 32A-4-28(A).	8
{13} 	“This Court will uphold the termination if, viewing the evidence in the light	9
most favorable to the judgment, a fact[-]finder could properly determine that the	10
clear and convincing standard was met.” Tammy S., 1999-NMCA-009, ¶ 13. Our	11
standard of review does not require us to determine “whether the [district] court	12
could have reached a different conclusion.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families	13
Dep’t v. Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 31, 132 N.M. 299, 47 P.3d 859. “On	14
appeal, this Court may not reweigh the evidence.” In re Termination of Parental	15
Rights of Eventyr J., 1995-NMCA-087, ¶ 3, 120 N.M. 463, 902 P.2d 1066. “[O]ur	16
job is not to determine whether CYFD did everything possible; our task is limited	17
by our statutory scope of review to whether CYFD complied with the minimum	18
required under law.” Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 28.	19

9
B. 	Clear and Convincing Evidence Supported the District Court’s Finding	1
That the Causes and Conditions of Neglect Were Unlikely to Change in	2
the Foreseeable Future	3
{14} 	Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence “to establish that Mother	4
would not be able to remedy the causes and conditions of neglect in the foreseeable	5
future.” Rather, Mother contends that CYFD relied on stale evidence when it granted	6
CYFD’s motion to terminate her parental rights to Child.3 We disagree.	7
{15} 	“We have interpreted the term ‘foreseeable future’ to refer to corrective	8
change within ‘a reasonably definite time or within the near future.’ ” Id. ¶ 34	9
(quoting In re Termination of Parental Rights of Rueben & Elizabeth O., 1986-	10
NMCA-03, ¶ 30, 104 N.M. 644, 725 P.2d 844). This Court has also recognized that,	11
“in balancing the interests of the parents and children, the court is not required to	12
place the children indefinitely in a legal holding pattern.” Id. (internal quotation	13
marks and citation omitted).	14
3 Mother contends that she is entitled to additional time to establish her ability
to care for Child because “[o]vercoming an addiction to methamphetamine is
especially difficult.” Mother cites a healthcare guide from Colorado for the
proposition 	that 	six-month 	inpatient 	programs 	are 	successful 	in 	treating
methamphetamine addiction but does not cite authority indicating she is entitled to
additional time to establish her ability to care for Child based upon the nature of her
addiction or its unique rehabilitative needs. Therefore, we decline to review this
contention. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676
P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we
may assume no such authority exists).

10
{16} 	To establish Mother’s noncompliance with the treatment plan and failure to	1
address the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect at the TPR hearing, CYFD	2
relied on testimony from Evelyn Anderson-Martin, a clinician with Amistad Family	3
Services, and Claudia Cavazos, the CYFD permanency planning worker assigned to	4
the case. We summarize their testimony as follows.	5
{17} 	Ms. Anderson-Martin stated that Mother was referred to her agency in	6
October 2017 for infant mental health and child-parent psychotherapy services. Ms.	7
Anderson-Martin further stated that Mother scheduled two intake appointments that	8
Mother neither attended nor cancelled despite being advised that the appointments	9
were part of her treatment plan. Ms. Anderson-Martin reported that she had	10
undertaken therapy with Child and his foster parents since June 2018. From that	11
therapy, 	Ms. 	Anderson-Martin 	stated 	Child’s 	trauma 	comes 	from 	both 	the	12
circumstances that brought him into CYFD’s custody and from having had several	13
different placements. Ms. Anderson-Martin testified that having several different	14
placements affects Child’s ability to trust and build relationships as well as his ability	15
to attach to any caregiver.	16
{18} 	Despite Mother’s treatment plan, Ms. Cavazos testified that Mother had not:	17
maintained communication with CYFD; provided anything indicating she had done	18
any sort of drug therapy; provided anything indicating that she had gone to parenting	19
classes 	or 	completed 	the 	infant 	mental 	health 	program; 	or 	completed 	her	20

11
psychological evaluation. Ms. Cavazos testified that, to her knowledge, Mother had	1
not done anything on her treatment plan. Ms. Cavazos further testified that she did	2
not believe that Mother would be able to complete any of the items on her treatment	3
plan in a reasonable amount of time.	4
{19} 	Mother then testified on her own behalf and identified the steps she had taken	5
since she was transferred to the Springer Correctional Facility on or about August	6
30, 2018. Mother testified that she had undergone regular drug testing and that all	7
tests had come back clean. Mother also described her participation in an intensive	8
outpatient program that was mostly directed to drug addiction. Mother also reported	9
that she had taken classes that dealt with drug addiction and understanding one’s	10
child.	11
{20} 	At the time of the TPR hearing, Child had been in CYFD custody for nearly	12
thirteen 	months. 	Mother 	indicated 	that 	she 	expected 	to 	be 	released 	from	13
incarceration in approximately one year. Mother conceded that she would need	14
additional time, approximately three months, after she was released to be in a	15
position to parent Child. Based on that timeline, Mother asked that Child be kept in	16
foster care for at least an additional fifteen months.	17
{21} 	Based on all of the evidence in front of it, which included Mother’s abundant	18
failures to adhere to the terms of her treatment plan during the time she was not in	19
custody, the district court could have reasonably concluded that the causes and	20

12
conditions of neglect were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Furthermore,	1
based on that same evidence, the district court could have reasonably concluded that	2
it would be detrimental to Child’s welfare to continue to wait in hope that Mother	3
could maintain sobriety and provide for Child’s well-being at some indefinite point	4
in the future. To this latter point, Child would have had to wait at least an additional	5
fifteen months in order to determine whether Mother would be in a position to parent	6
Child at that time, more than doubling the thirteen months Child had already spent	7
in CYFD custody and between four different placements. See Eventyr J., 1995-	8
NMCA-087, ¶ 34 (“There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound	9
development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current home, under	10
the care of his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty is	11
prolonged.” (internal quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted)). In 	reaching 	its	12
conclusion, the district court was soundly within its adjudicatory authority to	13
consider Mother’s past conduct as it related to her ability to parent Child in the	14
future. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. William M., 2007-	15
NMCA-055, ¶ 65, 141 N.M. 765, 161 P.3d 262. Therefore, we conclude that the	16
district court’s finding that Mother was unlikely to ameliorate the causes and	17
conditions of Child’s neglect in the foreseeable future was supported by clear and	18
convincing evidence.	19

13
C. 	Clear and Convincing Evidence Supported the District Court’s Finding	1
That CYFD Made Reasonable Efforts to Place Child With a Relative	2
{22} 	Mother contends that the district court erred in “valuing swift permanency	3
only 	eight 	months 	after 	the 	adjudication 	over 	family 	reunification.” 	Mother	4
additionally argues that “[r]estoring Child’s placement with [g]randmother while	5
Mother completes her rehabilitation or placing Child in a guardianship with his aunt	6
for that period continues to be in Child’s best interests as defined by our Legislature.”	7
Mother’s argument is not supported by the factual record nor the applicable law.	8
{23} 	We begin by noting that Child has multiple grandmothers and aunts identified	9
in the record. Mother’s argument does not specifically identify which of Child’s	10
grandmothers or aunts it relates to. However, based on the context and relevant facts,	11
we believe Mother’s argument to be addressing Child’s maternal grandmother,	12
Jacqueline T., and Child’s paternal aunt, Kalissa M. To the extent that Mother is	13
arguing 	for 	placement 	with 	another 	aunt 	or 	grandmother, 	her 	argument 	is	14
undeveloped and we decline to address it. See Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071,	15
¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not	16
adequately developed.”).	17
{24} 	We also note that the district court held the initial permanency hearing on May	18
21, 2018, wherein it changed Child’s permanency plan to adoption. At that hearing,	19
neither Mother nor Child’s guardian ad litem objected to the district court’s finding	20
that CYFD had made reasonable efforts to place Child with a family member.	21

14
Nevertheless, we briefly set forth the relevant law and CYFD’s efforts to place Child	1
with family.	2
{25} 	The Legislature has expressly required that courts consider family placement,	3
family connections, and family identity when placing children. See § 32A-4-22(A)	4
(listing relevant concerns in placement of child, including several aimed at the	5
identification, location, and investigation of relatives for possible placement). For	6
the reasons that follow, we conclude that Child’s placement satisfied the legislative	7
intent that courts make reasonable efforts to place children with family. See § 32A-	8
4-22(A)(6)-(8) (requiring district court to enter findings considering whether	9
reasonable efforts have been made to evaluate family placement and consider family	10
identity and connections); State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Laura	11
J., 2013-NMCA-057, ¶ 50, 301 P.3d 860 (“Section 32A-4-25.1(D) indicates that	12
[CYFD] has a duty to make reasonable efforts to identify, locate, and conduct home	13
studies on willing and appropriate relatives who could potentially serve as placement	14
for a child.”); see also § 32A-4-25(I)(6) (permitting district court to overrule	15
CYFD’s placement decision only where “the court determines [CYFD] . . . abused	16
its discretion in the placement or proposed placement of the child”).	17
{26} 	Nothing in the record indicates that Child was ever placed with his maternal	18
grandmother, Jacqueline T. (Grandmother). Rather, the record indicates that when	19
initially contacted on October 16, 2017, Grandmother reported that she could not	20

15
care for Child because she was already caring for Mother’s eldest daughter, Child’s	1
half-sister, over whom Grandmother had been awarded guardianship. Grandmother	2
again reported that she was not a placement possibility when she was contacted by	3
CYFD on the following dates: November 20, 2017; January 18, 2018; and April 4,	4
2018. Therefore, we reject Mother’s argument as it relates to Grandmother.	5
{27} 	Child’s paternal aunt, Kalissa M., advised CYFD that she could no longer be	6
a caregiver for Child after having Child placed with her for nearly seven months	7
without any assistance from either of Child’s parents. At some later date, Kalissa M.	8
contacted a supervisor at the Mesilla Valley CASA and indicated that she was	9
willing to take placement of Child with some assistance from CYFD. On May 21,	10
2018, the district court ordered CYFD to make another attempt to determine whether	11
Kalissa M. was a willing and appropriate relative placement. Mother does not direct	12
us to anything in the record to establish that CYFD failed to comply with the district	13
court’s order. Instead, the record reflects that the next permanency hearing report,	14
filed with the district court on November 2, 2018, indicated that “at this time there	15
are no relatives that are able and willing to care for [C]hild.” Therefore, we also	16
reject Mother’s argument as it relates to Kalissa M.	17
{28} 	Additionally, we note that CYFD held a family-centered meeting on April 26,	18
2018. By that time, CYFD had recommended to the district court that Child’s	19
permanency plan be changed to adoption. Therefore, any relative placement would	20

16
additionally have had to be willing to adopt Child. After the family-centered	1
meeting, CYFD determined that Child did not have any relatives that were able and	2
willing to be both a relative placement and adoptive placement.	3
{29} 	Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court’s finding that CYFD	4
had made reasonable efforts to identify a familial placement for Child was supported	5
by clear and convincing evidence.	6
II. 	Mother’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated	7
{30} 	We now turn to Mother’s final argument—that her telephonic appearance at	8
the TPR hearing was insufficient to protect her right to due process. Specifically,	9
Mother contends her telephonic appearance rendered her unable to assist in her	10
defense because Mother was unable to consult with her counsel before cross-	11
examination of the State’s witnesses. “Whether an individual was afforded due	12
process is a question of law that we review de novo.” State ex rel. Children, Youth	13
& Families Dep’t v. Rosalia M., 2017-NMCA-085, ¶ 8, 406 P.3d 972 (alteration,	14
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	15
{31} 	“To evaluate the due process owed to a parent in termination proceedings, we	16
use the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 . . . (1976).” Rosalia M.,	17
2017-NMCA-085, ¶ 9. Three factors are weighed under that test: “the parent’s	18
interest; the risk to the parent of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures	19
used in light of the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural	20

17
safeguards; and the government’s interest.” Id. A parent’s fundamental interest in	1
the parent-child relationship and the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of	2
children balance equally; therefore, the second Mathews’ factor is dispositive. State	3
ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 20, 133	4
N.M. 827, 70 P.3d 1266. “Our conclusion does not depend on a showing that Mother	5
would have been successful if she had been provided with the additional procedures	6
she alleges should have been provided; rather, Mother need only show that there is	7
a reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different.” State ex rel.	8
Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Browind C., 2007-NMCA-023, ¶ 31, 141 N.M.	9
166, 152 P.3d 153 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	10
{32} 	To support her argument, Mother cites State ex rel. Children, Youth &	11
Families Dep’t v. Ruth Anne E., 1999-NMCA-035, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164.	12
However, nothing in Ruth Anne E. supports Mother’s argument that she should have	13
been allowed to “consult with counsel before cross-examination of [CYFD]’s	14
witnesses.” We explain.	15
{33} 	Mother’s argument relies on language contained in a parenthetical citation.	16
See id. ¶ 18 (citing State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Stevens, 786 P.2d 1296, 1299	17
(1990) (in banc)). While the language of the parenthetical could arguably offer some	18
support for Mother’s position, a review of the cited case indicates that the case itself	19
does not offer.	20

18
{34} 	In Stevens, the Oregon Court of Appeals noted that the following facts	1
suggested the father was “able effectively to consult with counsel[:]” (1) the father	2
“testified by telephone and was able to consult with his counsel in the same way[;]”	3
(2) the father’s “testimony followed that of the adverse witnesses and responded to	4
it point by point[;]” and (3) the father’s “counsel was able to cross-examine the	5
adverse witnesses meaningfully.” 786 P.3d at 1299 (footnote omitted). Nothing	6
suggests that the father in Stevens was allowed to consult with his counsel before	7
cross-examination or that such was a requirement of termination hearings in which	8
a 	parent 	participates 	telephonically. 	Therefore, 	we 	reject 	this 	argument 	as	9
unsupported by cited authority. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2.	10
Additionally, Mother has not argued that the cross-examination undertaken by her	11
counsel was in any way defective or incomplete nor has she identified how her	12
physical presence at the hearing would have affected cross-examination of CYFD’s	13
witnesses. Because we reject this argument and Mother does not advance any other	14
due process arguments, we conclude that Mother’s due process rights were not	15
violated.	16
CONCLUSION	17
{35} 	We affirm the district court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.	18
{36} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	19
_____________________________	20
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	21

WN

oS

WE CONCUR:

o Mine

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

Zi

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

19