August 23, 2011 – State of New Mexico v. Garrell Ray Tsosie, No. 30,070

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: ___________
Filing Date: August 23, 2011
NO. 30,070
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GARRELL RAY TSOSIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
Thomas J. Hynes, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C.
Nancy L. Simmons
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant

OPINION
GARCIA, Judge.
{1} 	Defendant Garrell Tsosie appeals the district court’s order for conditional
discharge and supervised probation following his plea to one count of battery upon a
health care worker, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-9.2(E) (2006). The State
alleged that Tsosie struck Alan Albo, an employee of the Four Winds Recovery
Center, Inc. in Farmington, New Mexico (Four Winds). 	Tsosie filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the charges lacked a legally sufficient basis because Albo was
not a health care worker employed at a health facility as contemplated by Section 30-
3-9.2(A)(1) and (2). The district court denied Tsosie’s motion, concluding that the
Four Winds Protective Care Unit (the PCU) constitutes a health facility and that Albo
was both employed there and engaged in the performance of the duties of a health care
worker at the time of the alleged battery. Tsosie subsequently entered a conditional
guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss.
{2} 	Tsosie 	raises 	three 	issues 	on 	appeal: 	(1) 	whether 	the 	New 	Mexico
Detoxification Reform Act (the DRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 43-2-1.1 to -23 (1949, as
amended through 2005), precludes the State from prosecuting Tsosie for battery upon
a health care worker; (2) whether Albo met the definition of a health care worker

2
employed by a health facility as contemplated by Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1) and (2),
thereby precluding prosecution under Section 30-3-9.2(E); and (3) whether Section
30-3-9.2(A) and (E) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We hold that (1) the
DRA does not preclude prosecution of Tsosie for battery upon a health care worker;
(2) Albo was a health care worker employed by a health facility at the time of the
alleged battery; and (3) Section 30-3-9.2(A) and (E) are not unconstitutionally vague
or overbroad. As a result, we affirm the district court’s denial of Tsosie’s motion to
dismiss.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{3} 	On August 3, 2009, law enforcement officers brought Tsosie to the PCU for
the purposes of protective custody and detoxification, pursuant to Section 43-2-
8(A)(7) of the DRA. Section 43-2-8(A)(7) provides that an intoxicated person may
be committed to a treatment facility for protective custody if there is probable cause
to believe that the person being committed is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs.
{4} 	When Tsosie arrived at the PCU, Albo was on duty and checked his vital signs
and admitted him to the PCU. Approximately ten minutes later, Albo served Tsosie
a cup of soup instead of the tray of food that earlier arrivals had received since the
meal count had already been completed for the evening. Tsosie became upset and
began to throw other clients’ trays on the ground. When Albo attempted to restrain

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him, Tsosie grabbed Albo’s neck and injured him. Albo then punched Tsosie in the
face. 	Tsosie had not yet received a formal assessment at the time of the incident
because he was still intoxicated, and formal assessments do not occur until clients
have been at the PCU for twenty-four hours and are no longer under the influence of
alcohol or drugs.
{5} 	Tsosie moved to dismiss the charge of battery upon a health care worker on the
grounds that (1) the DRA does not allow prosecution for batteries committed while
a person was under the influence of alcohol; (2) Albo was not a health care worker at
a health facility as defined by Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1) and (2); and (3) Section 30-3-
9.2(A) and (E) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Tsosie contended that
dismissal was appropriate because the undisputed facts did not provide a legally
sufficient basis for the charges. 	The State filed a response to all three contentions
raised in Tsosie’s motion to dismiss.
{6} 	At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court clarified that it was
deciding as a matter of law whether Albo was a health care worker employed by a
health facility based upon the undisputed facts regarding the facility and the nature of
Albo’s employment. 	Accordingly, this question of law was appropriate for
disposition in a motion to dismiss. See State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 4, 147
N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (concluding that where the facts were undisputed, it was

4
appropriate for the district court to determine as a matter of law whether security
guards were “school employees” as envisioned in a statute prohibiting battery upon
school personnel upon a motion to dismiss).
{7} 	The record reflects that the following undisputed facts were heard by the district
court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Four Winds is licensed by the New
Mexico Department of Health and Safety (the Department) as an adult residential care
facility, and the PCU does not hold a separate license. 	The PCU is one of several
buildings at Four Winds, which also includes an administrative building, a treatment
facility, and a long-term treatment facility. The PCU is under the same management
as the rest of Four Winds, and the PCU does not receive any separate funding.
{8} 	When clients arrive at Four Winds, they are initially admitted to the PCU if they
are intoxicated or test positive for any drug at the time of their arrival. Clients are not
permitted to leave the PCU for at least twenty-four hours and usually remain in
protective custody for seventy-two hours. At that point, they may choose to remain
at the PCU for up to twelve days before they are either released or moved to another
Four Winds facility for further treatment.
{9} 	Employees such as Albo are given the title of Counselor Aides. When clients
arrive at the PCU, Counselor Aides check clients’ vital signs, perform various
laboratory testing, question clients regarding their medical history, dispense meals,

5
and provide care for clients. After clients are admitted to the PCU, Counselor Aides
continue checking the clients’ vital signs approximately every two hours, including
temperature, respiration, blood pressure, and heart rate. Counselor Aides also monitor
the blood sugar of clients with diabetes. As soon as PCU clients are sober enough to
interact with the staff, they also begin receiving substance abuse treatment. Treatment
may include talking to clients about their drinking behavior and its consequences,
prescribing and dispensing medication, and completing behavioral therapy. 	After
clients have been at the PCU for twenty-four hours, formal assessments are completed,
and treatment plans are developed. 	If clients wish to be referred to long-term
treatment, then additional assessments must be completed.
{10} 	Counselor Aides receive special training and become certified medical
technicians. They are trained to take vital signs and identify issues associated with
detoxification, and they are also instructed regarding the past medical history of
specific clients. 	Counselor Aides are required to have current CPR and first aid
certification. Although Albo testified that he had not yet received his certification as
a medical technician at the time of the alleged incident, he had prior medical
experience, was trained in how to use the equipment, and had also completed his
training with Four Winds. Once certified, Counselor Aides at the PCU are permitted
to dispense prescription medication. One trained nurse on staff also serves the Four

6
Winds facility, including the PCU. Finally, Four Winds employs a physician who is
on call twenty-four hours per day and visits the facility weekly.
{11} 	The district court denied Tsosie’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Four
Winds was a health facility as defined by Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1), that Albo was
employed at Four Winds, and that Albo was engaged in the performance of the duties
of a health care worker at the time of the alleged battery. Tsosie subsequently entered
a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss. We must now review the district court’s denial of Tsosie’s motion
to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
The DRA Does Not Preclude Prosecution of Tsosie for Battery Upon a Health
Care Worker
{12} 	Tsosie argues that because he was in protective custody due to intoxication at
the time of the incident, the DRA precludes his prosecution for battery upon a health
care worker. Specifically, he contends that because the DRA is more specific than the
battery upon a health care worker statute, the DRA controls. Tsosie reasons that the
broader criminal statute prohibiting battery upon a health care worker cannot impinge
upon the specific protections the DRA affords to intoxicated persons and that the
criminal 	statute 	must 	yield 	to 	the 	DRA 	in 	order 	to 	achieve 	a 	harmonious
interpretation.

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{13} 	The issue of whether the DRA precludes prosecution of intoxicated persons
such as Tsosie for battery upon a health care worker is a question of statutory
interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. See State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-
032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. “Our ultimate goal in statutory construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We determine legislative intent by “first look[ing] at the
words chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of those words.” 	State v.
Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579. 	“[W]hen a statute
contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that
language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” 	State v. Rivera, 2004-
NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). 	Furthermore, where multiple statutes are applicable, we attempt to read
them in harmony with each other. State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-012, ¶ 22, 146 N.M.
14, 206 P.3d 125. If two statutes cannot be harmonized, then the more specific statute
controls. State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23.
{14} 	Battery upon a health care worker is defined as “the unlawful, intentional
touching[,] or application of force to the person of a health care worker who is in the
lawful discharge of the health care worker’s duties, when done in a rude, insolent[,]
or angry manner.” 	Section 30-3-9.2(E). 	Battery upon a health care worker is

8
punishable as a fourth degree felony. 	Id. 	The statutory language contained in the
DRA must also be considered. In pertinent part, the DRA states:
It is the policy of this state that intoxicated and incapacitated
persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution, but rather should
be afforded protection. It is further the policy of this state that alcohol-
impaired 	persons 	and 	drug-impaired 	persons 	should 	be 	afforded
treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive
members of society.
Section 43-2-3.
{15} 	In State v. Correa, 2009-NMSC-051, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 291, 222 P.3d 1, our
Supreme Court addressed a similar issue regarding whether the DRA precludes
prosecution for disorderly conduct. 	Correa held that the DRA does not prohibit
criminal prosecution for disorderly conduct merely because the accused party was
intoxicated, as long as the statutory elements of the charge are satisfied. 	Id. ¶ 1.
Correa reasoned that the Legislature’s intent in adopting Section 43-2-3 was to
address substance abuse issues, rather than “to make a radical change in existing
criminal law.” 	Correa, 2009-NMSC-051, ¶ 15. 	Correa rejected an expansive
interpretation of Section 43-2-3 under which “an accused would not be criminally
liable for murder, burglary, assault, or battery if he was intoxicated when he
committed the offense.” 	Correa, 2009-NMSC-051, ¶ 16. 	In doing so, Correa
reasoned that the Legislature did not intend for “voluntary intoxication [to] provide
wholesale immunity to the accused, or preclude the State from pursuing criminal

9
sanctions.” 	Id. 	Instead, Correa determined that “[w]hile intoxication itself is not
criminal, any criminal offenses committed while an accused is intoxicated are still
punishable under the Criminal Code.” Id. ¶ 19. Finally, Correa concluded the DRA
did not conflict with the Criminal Code. Id.
{16} 	Relying on Correa, we conclude that the DRA does not preclude Tsosie’s
prosecution for battery upon a health care worker under Section 30-3-9.2. 	Our
Court’s reasoning that “any criminal offenses committed while an accused is
intoxicated are still punishable under the Criminal Code” encompasses the criminal
offense of battery upon a health care worker. 	Correa, 2009-NMSC-051, ¶ 19
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court specifically indicated that the Legislature
did not intend for the DRA to eliminate criminal liability for “murder, burglary,
assault, or battery” merely because an accused was intoxicated when he committed
the offense. 	Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). 	Here, Tsosie was not prosecuted for
intoxication itself, but rather for a battery allegedly committed while he was
intoxicated.
{17} 	Tsosie has not distinguished his case from Correa in any meaningful way.
Instead, he argues that we should interpret the criminal statute regarding battery upon
a health care worker as more broad than the DRA, and thus treat the DRA as an
exception which prohibits prosecution in this case. 	However, this principle is not

10
applicable if the DRA does not conflict with the battery on a health care worker
statute. See id. ¶ 19; see also Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 17 (reasoning that the more
specific of two statutes controls only if the statutes cannot be harmonized). Consistent
with Correa, Tsosie is not being criminally prosecuted for intoxication contrary to the
DRA, but only for a criminal offense committed while he was intoxicated. See 2009-
NMSC-051, ¶ 19. Accordingly, we hold that the DRA does not preclude the State
from prosecuting Tsosie for battery upon a health care worker merely because he was
in protective custody due to his intoxication at the time of the offense. Although the
DRA does not preclude prosecution, the State was still required to carry the burden
of proving all of the statutory elements of battery upon a health care worker. See id.
Albo Met the Definition of a Health Care Worker Under Section 30-3-9.2
{18} 	Next, we address the issue regarding whether Albo was a health care worker
pursuant to Section 30-3-9.2(E). See Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 9 (concluding that
“[t]he issue of whether security guards are ‘school employees’ as defined in the
battery upon school personnel statute is a purely legal question”). Because this issue
presents a matter of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. State v. Lucero,
2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489.
{19} 	As previously discussed, we first seek to give effect to the language of a statute
as written. 	State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299.

11
“[W]here a statute specifically defines a term, we interpret the statute according to
those definitions[] because those definitions reflect legislative intent.” State v. Smith,
2009-NMCA-028, 	¶ 	13, 	145 	N.M. 	757, 	204 	P.3d 	1267, 	cert. 	quashed,
2009-NMCERT-012, 147 N.M. 601, 227 P.3d 91. “When a term is not defined in a
statute, we must construe it, giving those words their ordinary meaning absent clear
and express legislative intention to the contrary.” 	Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	Where “language is doubtful,
ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice,
absurdity[,] or contradiction,” we construe a statute “according to its obvious spirit or
reason.” State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064.
{20} 	As previously noted, battery upon a health care worker is defined as “the
unlawful, intentional touching[,] or application of force to the person of a health care
worker who is in the lawful discharge of the health care worker’s duties, when done
in a rude, insolent[,] or angry manner.” 	Section 30-3-9.2(E). 	As defined in the
statute, a “health care worker” is “an employee of a health facility or a licensed
emergency medical technician[.]” Section 30-3-9.2(A)(2). Additionally, Section 30-
3-9.2(A)(1) defines a “health facility” as follows:
a public or private hospital, outpatient facility, diagnostic and treatment
center, rehabilitation center[,] or infirmary. 	‘Health facility’ also
includes those facilities that, by federal regulation, must be licensed by
the state to obtain or maintain full or partial, permanent or temporary

12
federal funding, but ‘health facility’ does not include a skilled nursing
facility, a nursing facility[,] or other long-term residential care facility[.]
{21} 	Two categories of persons are considered health care workers under Section 30-
3-9.2(A)(2); employees of a health facility or licensed emergency medical technicians.
The district court determined that Albo was a health care worker because he was an
employee of a health facility. The parties agree that Albo was an employee of Four
Winds at the time of the alleged incident. However, they disagree as to whether Four
Winds, and specifically the PCU therein, constitutes a health facility as envisioned by
Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1). Therefore, in order to determine whether Albo was a health
care worker as contemplated by Section 30-3-9.2(A)(2), we must determine whether
the Four Winds PCU meets the definition of a health facility under Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(1).
{22} 	The district court concluded that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a health
facility because it met the definition of a “diagnostic and treatment center” under
Section 30-3-9.2(A). 	Although Section 30-3-9.2 provides a definition for “health
facility” and “health care worker,” “diagnostic and treatment center” is not defined by
Section 30-3-9.2 or by the general definitions applicable in the Criminal Code. See
NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12 (1963) (providing general definitions applicable in the
Criminal Code). Furthermore, Section 30-3-9.2 does not indicate that the Legislature
intended for a meaning other than the ordinary meaning of “diagnostic and treatment

13
center” to apply under the Criminal Code. 	Therefore, we examine the ordinary
meaning of “diagnostic and treatment center.” See Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶¶ 10-
11 (concluding that the ordinary meaning of “school employee” applied where the
term was not defined in the relevant statutory section or elsewhere in the Criminal
Code).
{23} 	“Diagnostic” means “[o]f, relating to, or used in a diagnosis.” 	Am. Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 500 (4th ed. 2000). “Diagnosis” is “[t]he act or
process of identifying or determining the nature and cause of a disease or injury
through evaluation of patient history, examination, and review of laboratory data.”
Id. Additionally, “treatment” is defined in pertinent part as the “[a]dministration or
application of remedies to a patient or for a disease or injury; medicinal or surgical
management; therapy.” Id. at 1838. Counselor Aides at the Four Winds PCU identify
issues associated with detoxification, and they are also instructed regarding the past
medical history of specific clients. Counselor Aides also question clients regarding
their 	medical 	history, 	talk 	to 	clients 	about 	their 	drinking 	behavior 	and 	its
consequences, take vital signs, and perform various laboratory testing. After clients
have been at the PCU for twenty-four hours, formal assessments are completed and
treatment plans are developed. Treatment may include prescribing and dispensing
medication as well as behavioral therapy. We conclude that the ordinary meaning of

14
“diagnostic and treatment center” includes the Four Winds PCU because the PCU
identifies substance abuse issues based upon patient history, laboratory testing, and
formal assessments and then develops treatment plans based upon those observations.
{24} 	We also look to related provisions of the DRA to determine whether facilities
such as the Four Winds PCU are traditionally viewed as diagnostic and treatment
centers. 	See Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 16 (examining related provisions of the
Administrative Code to determine whether school guards are traditionally viewed as
“school employees” when determining the ordinary meaning of statutory language).
Tsosie was admitted to the Four Winds PCU pursuant to the DRA, that provides that
“[a]n intoxicated or incapacitated person may be committed to a treatment facility.”
Section 43-2-8(A) (emphasis added). 	The DRA provides definitions for both
“treatment” and “treatment facility.” Section 43-2-2(L), (M). According to Section
43-2-2(L), “treatment” is defined to include “the broad range of emergency,
outpatient, intermediate[,] and inpatient services and care, including protective
custody, diagnostic evaluation, medical, psychiatric, psychological and social service
care, vocational rehabilitation and career counseling, which may be extended to
alcohol-impaired, drug-impaired[,] and intoxicated persons[.]” 	(Emphasis added.)
Section 43-2-2(M) defines “treatment facility” to include:
(1) 	an institution under the supervision of the [D]epartment and
approved by the [D]epartment for the care and treatment of alcohol-

15
impaired persons or drug-impaired persons;
(2) 	a public institution approved by the [D]epartment for the
care and treatment of alcohol-impaired persons or drug-impaired
persons, but not specifically under the supervision of the [D]epartment;
or
(3) 	any other facility that provides any of the services specified
in the [DRA] and is licensed by the [D]epartment for those services.
(Emphasis added.)
{25} 	The Four Winds PCU falls within the meaning of “treatment” as defined by the
DRA. 	Section 43-2-2(L) specifically includes “protective custody” as one of the
services that constitutes “treatment.” It is undisputed that the Four Winds PCU was
a “protective custody” unit. It is also undisputed that Tsosie was brought to the PCU
for the purposes of protective custody and detoxification because he was alcohol-
impaired. Based on the plain meaning of Section 43-2-2(L), the services provided to
Tsosie at the PCU clearly constituted “treatment” as defined by the DRA.
{26} 	Furthermore, the PCU constitutes a “treatment facility” under the definition
provided by the DRA. Under Section 43-2-2(M), a treatment facility is an institution
that provides any of the services enumerated in the DRA and is licensed by the
Department for those services. As previously discussed, the PCU provides protective
custody to alcohol-impaired persons, a service which is specifically enumerated in the
DRA’s definition of “treatment.” Section 43-2-2(L). Furthermore, it is undisputed

16
that Four Winds is licensed by the Department as an adult residential health facility.
Because the Four Winds PCU provides enumerated services and is licensed by the
Department for those services, we conclude that the Four Winds PCU meets the
definition of “treatment facility” as defined by the DRA. Based upon the ordinary
meaning of a “diagnostic and treatment center” and the DRA’s traditional inclusion
of facilities such as the PCU in the definition of a “treatment facility,” we conclude
that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a “health facility” for purposes of the battery
upon a health care worker statute.
{27} 	Tsosie argues that the Four Winds PCU is not a health facility because it is not
a hospital or outpatient facility in its capacity as a protective custody facility. Section
30-3-9.2(A)(1) defines a health facility as “a public or private hospital, outpatient
facility, diagnostic and treatment center, rehabilitation center[,] or infirmary.”
(Emphasis added.) The Legislature’s use of the word “or” indicates that any of the
listed definitions brings a facility within the definition of a health facility. See State
v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 30, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (stating that as a rule
of statutory construction, the word “or” should be given its normal disjunctive
meaning unless the context of the statute demands a different meaning). As a result,
we conclude that the Four Winds PCU is a health facility because it meets the
definition of a diagnostic and treatment center, regardless of whether it meets the

17
additional definitions under the statute.
{28} 	Finally, Tsosie argues that the Four Winds PCU is not a health facility because
it is licensed as an adult residential care facility and therefore is a long-term residential
care facility excluded under the definition of a health facility under Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(1). This argument is unconvincing, as the undisputed testimony indicated that
the PCU is not a long-term treatment facility because clients are not permitted to stay
beyond a maximum of twelve days. 	Additionally, if clients wish to be referred to
long-term treatment upon their release from the PCU, then additional assessments
must be completed. As a result, the undisputed testimony established that the Four
Winds PCU is not a long-term residential care facility.
{29} 	Based upon the ordinary meaning of a “diagnostic and treatment center” and the
DRA’s traditional consideration of facilities such as the PCU as treatment facilities,
we hold that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a “health facility” under Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(1). 	As a result, Albo qualifies as a health care worker under Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(2) because he was employed at Four Winds at the time of the alleged incident.
The Battery Upon a Health Care Worker Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally
Vague
{30} 	Tsosie argues that Section 30-3-9.2(A) and (E) are unconstitutionally vague.
Specifically, Tsosie contends that the imprecise definition of “health facility” in
Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1) provides no notice to a reasonable person that an employee of

18
a detoxification facility’s protective custody unit is a “health care worker” and that
such a person is afforded special protection against battery.
{31} 	We review a vagueness challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo
in light of the particular facts of the case and the conduct prohibited by the statute.
State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 525, 212 P.3d 413, cert. quashed,
2010-NMCERT-006, 148 N.M. 584, 241 P.3d 182. This Court applies a two-part test
for vagueness, considering whether the statute (1) “fails to provide persons of ordinary
intelligence using ordinary common sense a fair opportunity to determine whether
their conduct is prohibited[,]” or (2) “fails to create minimum guidelines for . . .
enforcement . . . [and thus] encourages subjective and ad hoc application [of the law].”
State v. Jacquez, 2009-NMCA-124, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 313, 222 P.3d 685. Tsosie bears
the burden of overcoming the strong presumption of a statute’s constitutionality by
proving that Section 30-3-9.2 is unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt. State
v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, ¶ 24, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. Furthermore, if the
statute clearly applies to Tsosie’s conduct, he cannot succeed on his claim of
vagueness. Jacquez, 2009-NMCA-124, ¶ 6. On appeal, Tsosie disputes only that the
statute provides fair notice of the prohibited conduct, so we do not address whether
the statute creates any potential for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement. 	See
State v. Torres, 2005-NMCA-070, ¶ 34, 137 N.M. 607, 113 P.3d 877 (stating that this

19
Court will not address issues not briefed, argued, or supported by authority).
{32} 	“A statute may be void for vagueness if its meaning is so uncertain that the
court is unable, by the application of known and accepted rules of construction, to
determine what the Legislature intended with any reasonable degree of certainty.”
State v. Castillo, 2011-NMCA-046, ¶ 22, 149 N.M.536, 252 P.3d 760, (alterations
omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 	cert. denied, 2011-
NMCERT-___, ___ N.M. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 32,913, Apr. 13, 2011). We have
concluded above that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a “health facility” under the
plain meaning of Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1). 	Because we were able to determine the
statutory meaning using accepted principles of statutory construction, we conclude
that Section 30-3-9.2 is not unconstitutionally vague. See Castillo, 2011-NMCA-046,
¶ 22 (holding that the statute prohibiting fraudulent use of a debit card was not
unconstitutionally vague because this Court was able to determine legislative intent
using established statutory construction principles). 	We hold that Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(1) and (E) are sufficiently definite to provide fair warning to a reasonable
person that a battery upon an employee of a health facility, such as the Four Winds
PCU, would result in prosecution for battery upon a health care worker.
CONCLUSION
{33} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Tsosie’s

20
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the district court did not err by accepting Tsosie’s
plea and sentencing him to a conditional discharge with probationary supervision.
{34} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
_________________________________
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge