October 25, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Steven Padilla, No. A-1-CA-36861

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	2
Plaintiff-Appellant,	3
v. 	No. A-1-CA-36861	4
STEVEN PADILLA,	5
Defendant-Appellee.	6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	7
Brett R. Loveless, District Judge	8
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	9
Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General	10
Santa Fe, NM	11
for Appellant	12
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	13
C. David Henderson, Appellate Defender	14
Santa Fe, NM	15
for Appellee	16
MEMORANDUM OPINION	17
VARGAS, Judge.	18
{1} 	The State appeals the district court’s order sanctioning the State for violating	19
its discovery obligations under Rule 5-409(F)(2) NMRA, as well as its order	20
releasing Defendant from custody without making a determination of whether there	21
were “no release conditions [that] will reasonably protect the safety of any other	22
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 10/25/2019 9:01 AM

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person or the community[,]” as required under Rule 5-409(G). We dismiss for lack	1
of jurisdiction and timeliness.	2
BACKGROUND	3
{2} 	After filing a criminal complaint against Defendant Steven Padilla, the State	4
filed a motion for pretrial detention under Rule 5-409(G). Finding the State failed to	5
comply with its discovery obligations under the rule, the district court sanctioned the	6
State in the amount of $250. This appeal followed.	7
{3} 	Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the	8
facts and procedural background, we reserve discussion of the pertinent facts within	9
the context of the State’s arguments.	10
DISCUSSION	11
{4} 	As a threshold matter, we must first resolve the question of whether we have	12
jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal challenging the district court’s sanction and	13
release orders. The State does not argue we have jurisdiction to hear its appeal under	14
its right to appeal by statute or rule. See State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 138	15
N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (“The [s]tate’s right to appeal an adverse ruling in a	16
criminal proceeding exists only by constitutional provision, statute, or rule.”).	17
Rather, the State argues it has a constitutional right to appeal the district court’s	18
orders. “In considering whether the [s]tate has a constitutional right to appeal, we	19
look at whether the district court’s disposition was contrary to law.” State v.	20

3
Grossetete, 2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 5, 144 N.M. 346, 187 P.3d 692. “[A]s a practical	1
matter, we must decide the merits of the issues the [s]tate raises in order to determine	2
if it has a constitutional right to appeal.” State v. Horton, 2008-NMCA-061, ¶ 1, 144	3
N.M. 71, 183 P.3d 956.	4
{5} 	The State argues the district court’s sanction order was “contrary to law”	5
because: (1) the district court misinterpreted the scope of the State’s discovery	6
obligations under Rule 5-409(F)(2); and (2) although the district court sanctioned	7
the State under its inherent power to sanction, it provided insufficient notice for the	8
subsequent sanction and erred in imposing a monetary sanction without making	9
findings 	regarding 	bad 	faith, 	prejudice, 	or 	its 	consideration 	of 	less 	severe	10
alternatives. Further, the State argues the district court’s release order was “contrary	11
to law” because the district court failed to make a determination of whether there	12
were release conditions that would reasonably protect the safety of any other person	13
or the community. We address each argument in turn to determine whether the State	14
has a constitutional right to appeal.	15
Standard of Review	16
{6} 	“[District] courts 	possess 	broad 	discretionary authority to 	decide 	what	17
sanction to impose when a discovery order is violated.” State v. Le Mier, 2017-	18
NMSC-017, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 959. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is	19
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.	20

4
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “we may characterize	1
as 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	a 	discretionary 	decision 	that 	is 	premised 	on 	a	2
misapprehension of the law.” Harrison v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2013-	3
NMCA-105, ¶ 14, 311 P.3d 1236 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	4
When the district court acts within its discretionary authority, its disposition is not	5
contrary to law. Grossetete, 2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 10.	6
The District Court Did Not Misinterpret the Scope of Rule 5-409(F)(2)	7
{7} 	The State first argues the district court’s sanction order was contrary to law	8
because it misinterpreted the scope of Rule 5-409(F)(2). We note that although the	9
State appears to limit its argument to an interpretation predicated on the 2019 version	10
of Rule 5-409(F)(2), the district court considered the State’s pretrial detention	11
motion well before the 2019 amendments came into effect. Compare Supreme Court	12
Order No. 17-8300-005 (2017) (adopting Rule 5-409 “effective for all cases pending	13
or filed on or after July 1, 2017”), with Supreme Court Order No. 18-8300-024	14
(2018) (amending Rule 5-409 “effective for all cases pending or filed on or after	15
February 1, 2019”). We therefore review the district court’s order under the 2017	16
version of Rule 5-409(F)(2) NMRA (2017).	17
{8} 	Rule 5-409(F)(2) (2017) provided that “[a]t least twenty-four (24) hours	18
before the hearing, the prosecutor shall provide the defendant with all evidence	19
relating to the motion for pretrial detention that is in the possession of the prosecutor	20

5
or is reasonably available to the prosecutor.” (Emphasis added.)1 Further, the rule	1
required the State to disclose “[a]ll exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor[.]”	2
Id.	3
{9} 	When the State filed its pretrial detention motion, it noted Defendant’s prior	4
convictions and provided, with the motion, the criminal complaint for the current	5
charges, a public safety assessment of Defendant, and a booking sheet from the	6
Bernalillo County Detention Center. In the criminal complaint, the affiant police	7
officer mentioned that the victim filled out a written statement, which was “attached	8
to the report.” After the State filed its pretrial detention motion, the district court	9
entered a discovery order directing the State to disclose “all evidence relating to the	10
[m]otion for [p]retrial [d]etention that is in the possession or is reasonably available	11
to the prosecution, including that evidence in the possession of law enforcement that	12
is reasonably available to the prosecution.” The district court further ordered that	13
“[a]ll exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor must be disclosed[,]” that these	14
disclosures “must be provided at least twenty-four (24) hours before the [pretrial	15
detention] hearing[,]” and that “[t]he failure to comply with this [o]rder may result	16
in sanctions.”	17
1 The current version limits the State’s disclosure obligations to “all evidence
that the prosecutor intends to rely on at the hearing” at least twenty-four hours prior
to the hearing. Rule 5-409(F)(2)(a)(i), (b) (emphasis added).

6
{10} 	During the original hearing on the State’s pretrial detention motion, defense	1
counsel indicated the State had not provided any written statements, police reports,	2
or recordings. The State explained that it had provided the evidence it intended to	3
use at the hearing and that its discovery obligations were satisfied. The district court	4
continued the hearing, sanctioned the State, and clarified that the State was required	5
to provide, at a minimum, the police report and written statement referenced in the	6
criminal complaint. The district court noted that it was willing to reconsider the	7
sanction if the State provided “some indication” that the criminal complaint	8
contained the substance of the police report and written statement referenced in the	9
complaint.	10
{11} 	Shortly before the subsequent hearing, the State provided Defendant with belt	11
tapes, but failed to provide the police report and written statement ordered at the	12
prior hearing. During the rescheduled hearing, the State acknowledged that although	13
it provided additional discovery to Defendant, it would “not be able to contest that	14
[it was] in violation of the [discovery] deadline.” The district 	court denied	15
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s pretrial detention motion, continued the	16
hearing on the State’s motion, and ordered Defendant’s release from custody.	17
{12} 	At the third hearing on the State’s motion for pretrial detention, Defendant	18
again indicated the State had failed to provide the police report and written statement	19
mentioned in the criminal complaint. Notwithstanding the State’s failure to do so,	20

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the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s pretrial detention	1
motion, and granted the State’s motion.	2
{13} 	We cannot conclude that the district court’s sanction order was an abuse of its	3
discretion under the circumstances. The district court ordered the timely production	4
of evidence that was related to the State’s pretrial detention motion, including the	5
evidence referenced in the criminal complaint attached to the motion. See Rule 5-	6
409(F)(2) (2017) (requiring the State to provide “all evidence relating to the motion	7
for pretrial detention that is in the possession of the prosecutor or is reasonably	8
available to the prosecutor[, a]t least twenty-four (24) hours before the hearing”	9
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, we conclude the district court’s sanction order was	10
not contrary to law. See Grossetete, 2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 10 (explaining that a	11
disposition 	is 	not 	contrary to 	law when 	“the district 	court 	acted 	within 	its	12
discretionary authority”).	13
The District Court Did Not Err in Imposing a Monetary Sanction	14
{14} 	Having concluded the district court’s interpretation of the State’s discovery	15
obligations under Rule 5-409(F)(2) (2017) was not contrary to law, we now turn to	16
whether the district court’s monetary sanction was contrary to law. As the State	17
notes, Rule 5-409 does not provide for sanctions for violations of its discovery	18
requirements. Nevertheless, the district court retains inherent authority to sanction	19
parties, including public entities, “to ensure compliance with the proceedings of the	20

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court.” Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 15, 26; In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058,	1
¶ 27, 130 N.M. 687, 30 P.3d 376 (explaining that “even though specific judicial	2
authority is not delineated by statute, or stated in a rule of court, a court may exercise	3
authority that is essential to the court’s fulfilling its judicial functions[, and that]	4
[t]his authority embraces the ability of a court to control its docket and the	5
proceedings before it”).	6
{15} 	The State first argues the district court’s discovery order provided insufficient	7
notice that sanctions would be imposed based on its interpretation of the scope of	8
Rule 5-409(F)(2) (2017). However, the State relies on Rule 5-112 NMRA, which	9
provides procedural requirements before imposing sanctions for criminal contempt	10
of court. As the State neither argues the district court’s sanction rose to the level of	11
a punishment for criminal contempt of court, nor cites authority supporting its	12
argument that Rule 5-112’s procedural requirements apply outside the context of	13
criminal contempt sanctions, we decline to review this argument further. See State	14
v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031 (explaining that appellate courts	15
do not review unclear or undeveloped arguments, and that where a party cites to no	16
supporting authority, we assume none exists).	17
{16} 	Next, the State argues the district court was obligated, but failed, to consider	18
whether the State’s failure to comply with the discovery order was willful or in bad	19
faith, whether it was prejudicial, and whether there were less severe sanctions. Our	20

9
Supreme Court has recognized that district courts have the inherent authority “to	1
avail themselves of, and impose, meaningful sanctions where discovery orders are	2
not obeyed and a party’s conduct injects needless delay into the proceedings.” Le	3
Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 16 (citing State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp.	4
Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 1, 896 P.2d 1148). When a district	5
court imposes sanctions for discovery violations, it must evaluate culpability,	6
prejudice, and lesser sanctions and must explain its decision. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-	7
017, ¶ 20. However, the Le Mier Court clarified that to justify a district court’s	8
sanction, these considerations need not all weigh in favor of the sanction. Id.	9
{17} 	Here, the district court appropriately weighed the State’s culpability, finding	10
that the State “did not provide or attempt to provide the information in a timely	11
fashion.” See id. ¶ 24 (concluding that the state’s repeated failure to comply with the	12
district court’s discovery orders was “sufficiently culpable conduct,” and that “a	13
single violation of a discovery order may suffice to support a finding of culpability”).	14
The district court also considered whether the State’s conduct gave rise to prejudice,	15
explaining that “[t]he untimely disclosure . . . resulted in prejudice to Defendant to	16
adequately prepare for the pretrial detention hearing.” See id. ¶ 25 (concluding that	17
the defendant was prejudiced after the state’s failure to comply with the district	18
court’s discovery order caused the court to reset trial, thereby “needlessly delaying	19
[the defendant’s] proverbial ‘day in court’ ”). Further, the district court explained	20

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that the State’s untimely disclosure forced the district court to reschedule the	1
hearing. See id. ¶ 26 (concluding that “the [district] court’s time was wasted, and	2
this is prejudicial”). Finally, the district court evaluated whether the sanction	3
imposed was the least severe sanction. The district court is not “obligated to consider	4
every conceivable lesser sanction[,]” but must instead “fashion the least severe	5
sanction that best fit the situation and which accomplished the desired result.” Id.	6
¶ 27. The district court met its obligation when it reset the hearing “to enable the	7
State an opportunity to prove that no conditions will reasonably protect the	8
community and Defendant an opportunity to argue against pretrial detention.” See	9
id. ¶ 28 (approving of the district court’s sanction when it granted the state’s	10
continuance request, thus providing “ample opportunity to comply with reasonable	11
and clear orders”). The district court also imposed a monetary sanction against the	12
State, which was a lesser sanction than the dismissal sought by Defendant. See id.	13
¶ 29 (holding that a sanction is the least severe sanction in light of the circumstances	14
when “the district court responded to [a] specific violation at issue with a sanction	15
tailored to fit that violation”). We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse	16
its discretion in imposing the monetary sanction against the State.	17
{18} 	The State cites Baca for the proposition that the district court was required to	18
find the State willfully violated its discovery obligation and/or did so in bad faith.	19
1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 12. However, the State’s reliance is misplaced, as Baca required	20

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such findings when awarding attorney fees as a sanction. See id. (holding that a court	1
may “award attorney[] fees as a sanction for bad faith or vexatious litigation or for	2
defiance of a court order”). As the State has failed to cite authority requiring such	3
findings outside the context of awarding attorney fees as a sanction, we assume no	4
such authority exists, and we decline to review this argument further. See Fernandez	5
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 622, 857 P.2d 22	6
(“The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.”	7
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-	8
NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments in	9
briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable	10
to find any supporting authority. We therefore will not do this research for counsel.	11
Issues raised in appellate briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be	12
reviewed by us on appeal.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude the district	13
court’s sanction order was not a disposition contrary to law.	14
The State’s Appeal of the District Court’s Release Order Was Untimely	15
{19} 	The State further argues the district court’s order releasing Defendant from	16
custody was contrary to law, giving rise to its constitutional right to appeal.	17
Notwithstanding any purported error in the district court’s disposition, we note that	18
“[t]he timely filing of [any] appeal is a mandatory precondition to this Court’s	19
exercise of jurisdiction.” State v. Lope, 2015-NMCA-011, ¶ 8, 343 P.3d 186. The	20

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State has made no argument, nor provided any authority, from which we can	1
conclude the State’s appeal from the district court’s order releasing Defendant from	2
custody is not governed by the procedural requirements set forth in our Rules of	3
Appellate Procedure. See Rule 12-204(A), (C)(1) NMRA (providing that [t]his rule	4
governs appeals under Rule 5-405 NMRA from orders regarding release or	5
detention[,]” and that “[a]n appeal under this rule shall be initiated by filing a motion	6
with the clerk of the appropriate appellate court within ten (10) days after the	7
decision of the district court is filed” (emphases added)); Rule 5-405(A)(3)(b)	8
(providing that “[a] party may appeal an order regarding release or detention” and	9
that “the [S]tate may appeal if the district court has denied the prosecutor’s motion	10
for pretrial detention”); State v. Upchurch, 2006-NMCA-076, ¶ 3, 139 N.M. 739,	11
137 P.3d 679 (“Although the [s]tate is an ‘aggrieved party’ from the district court	12
order . . . within the meaning of the New Mexico Constitution, an aggrieved party	13
with the right to appeal must exercise that right within the confines of the Rules of	14
Appellate Procedure.”). The State did not seek appellate review of the district court’s	15
order in a timely fashion. Instead, it filed a notice of appeal almost thirty days after	16
the district court’s release order and has otherwise failed to demonstrate exceptional	17
circumstances. We therefore decline to review its appeal of the district court’s order	18
releasing Defendant. See Upchurch, 2006-NMCA-076, ¶¶ 4-6 (declining to extend	19
the presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel to the state, concluding that “in	20

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the absence of exceptional circumstances, we rigidly enforce the mandatory time	1
limits for filing the notice of appeal[,]” and dismissing the state’s untimely appeal).	2
CONCLUSION	3
{20} 	Because the district court’s sanctions order was not a disposition contrary to	4
law, and the State’s appeal of the district court’s release order was untimely, we	5
dismiss the State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and timeliness. See Grossetete,	6
2008-NMCA-088, ¶ 15 (dismissing the state’s appeal because the district court’s	7
order was not contrary to law and thus the state did not have a constitutional right to	8
appeal); Upchurch, 2006-NMCA-076, ¶ 1 (dismissing the state’s untimely appeal).	9
{21} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	10
______________________________	11
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge	12
WE CONCUR:	13
__________________________________	14
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge	15
__________________________________	16
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	17