September 8, 2020- Morris K. Estep v. Mary L. Estep, No. A-1-CA-37806

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
MORRIS K. ESTEP,	2
Petitioner-Appellant,	3
v. 	No. A-1-CA-37806	4
MARY L. ESTEP,	5
Respondent-Appellee.	6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY	7
Mary W. Rosner, District Judge	8
Durham, Pittard & Spalding, LLP	9
Caren I. Friedman	10
Santa Fe, NM	11
for Appellant	12
Law Office of Martinez-Salopek, LLC	13
Ramona J. Martinez-Salopek	14
Las Cruces, NM	15
for Appellee	16
MEMORANDUM OPINION	17
HANISEE, Chief Judge.	18
{1} 	Morris Estep (Husband) appeals the district court’s orders related to divorce	19
and 	child 	custody 	proceedings 	between 	Husband 	and 	Mary 	Estep 	(Wife),	20
challenging the district court’s decisions regarding (1) relocation of their two	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 9/8/2020 10:50 AM

2
children (Children), (2) child support, (3) spousal support, (4) Husband’s military	1
retirement benefits and federal thrift savings plan, and (5) attorney fees. We affirm.	2
BACKGROUND	3
{2} 	Given that the parties are familiar with the facts and details of this case, we	4
only briefly set forth pertinent facts and applicable law in this memorandum opinion,	5
reserving further discussion of specific facts where necessary to our analysis. See	6
Rule 12-405(B) NMRA (providing that appellate courts may dispose of a case by	7
non-precedential 	order, 	decision, 	or 	memorandum 	opinion 	under 	certain	8
circumstances); State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040, ¶ 48, 110 N.M. 218, 794 P.2d	9
361 (“[M]emorandum opinions are not meant to be cited as controlling authority	10
because such opinions are written solely for the benefit of the parties[ and s]ince the	11
parties know the details of the case, such an opinion does not describe at length the	12
context of the issue decided[.]”).	13
{3} 	The parties were married in 2002, and Husband filed a petition for dissolution	14
of marriage on May 20, 2016. They entered into a stipulated marital settlement	15
agreement and parenting plan on May 25, 2016, and the district court entered a	16
stipulated judgment and final decree of dissolution of marriage on the same date.	17
Thereafter, Wife obtained counsel and filed a motion for relief from judgment	18
alleging that Husband never served her with the petition for dissolution of marriage	19
and that Husband obtained her signature on the marital settlement agreement and	20

3
parenting plan by deception, misrepresentation, and misconduct. Granting Wife’s	1
motion, the district court set aside the marital settlement agreement, the parenting	2
plan, and the final decree of dissolution of marriage by order on March 28, 2017. Its	3
order was supported by written findings of fact and conclusions of law filed	4
therewith, including findings that Husband “overreached in his part of the divorce	5
transactions[,]” breached his fiduciary duty to Wife, and that while Wife did sign	6
“important legal documents, [she did so] under duress.”	7
{4} 	Following the district court’s order, litigation between the parties continued,	8
which led to multiple hearings in district court. In one such hearing on July 23, 2018,	9
(the July hearing), the district court awarded primary physical custody of Children	10
to Wife. This was a departure from the court’s previous temporary custody order—	11
which had been based on recommendations by an appointed expert custody	12
evaluator—wherein the district court awarded primary physical custody to Husband	13
and allowed him to relocate Children to Texas.	14
{5} 	The district court filed three separate orders following the July hearing: an	15
order dividing military retirement, an order dividing Husband’s federal thrift savings	16
plan, and a general order that included a summary of the district court’s reasoning	17
for altering the custody and timesharing arrangement. Husband thereafter filed	18
multiple motions including a motion for extension of time to file proposed findings	19
of fact and conclusions of law in response to the July hearing, a motion seeking	20

4
reconsideration and withdrawal of the district court’s orders dividing military	1
retirement benefits, and a motion to alter the three orders filed after the July hearing.	2
Although the July hearing is referred to as the “final” hearing by the district court,	3
the court held another hearing on Husband’s ensuing motions on October 4, 2018	4
(the October hearing). Following the October hearing, the district court filed four	5
additional orders: (1) an amended order dividing military retirement, (2) an order	6
regarding Husband’s motion to alter orders, (3) an order denying Husband’s motion	7
for extension of time to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and	8
(4) an order denying Husband’s motion to reconsider. Husband appeals from the	9
four final orders.	10
DISCUSSION	11
{6} 	On appeal, Husband argues the district court erred in the following ways: (1)	12
granting 	primary 	physical 	custody 	to 	Wife 	after 	having 	previously 	awarded	13
temporary, primary physical custody to Husband and allowing Husband to relocate	14
with Children to Texas; (2) calculating and awarding child support; (3) awarding	15
spousal support; (4) dividing Husband’s military retirement benefits; (5) dividing	16
Husband’s federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP); and (6) awarding attorney fees. We	17
address each argument in turn.	18

5
I. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Its Custody Determination	1
{7} 	Husband argues that the district court erred in awarding primary physical	2
custody to Wife because there was no intervening change in circumstances that could	3
justify a modification to the previous custody arrangement. Husband additionally	4
argues that the district court made no findings reflecting a substantial and material	5
change in circumstances affecting the welfare of Children, and thus, the district	6
court’s custody modification was erroneous.	7
{8} 	“A trial court has wide discretion in awarding custody of a child in a divorce	8
case, and the welfare of the child is of primary importance in making the award.”	9
Creusere v. Creusere, 1982-NMSC-126, ¶ 5, 98 N.M. 788, 653 P.2d 164. “We	10
review a district court’s child custody determination for abuse of discretion.”	11
Hopkins v. Wollaber, 2019-NMCA-024, ¶ 9, 458 P.3d 583 (internal quotation marks	12
and citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly	13
contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the	14
case.” Hough v. Brooks, 2017-NMCA-050, ¶ 18, 399 P.3d 387 (internal quotation	15
marks and citation omitted). Under such review, “we will uphold the district court’s	16
findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence is	17
such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a	18
conclusion.” Id. (internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	Additionally,	19
pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-7(G) (1997), “[t]he court may modify and	20

6
change any order or agreement merged into an order in respect to the guardianship,	1
care, custody, maintenance or education of the children whenever circumstances	2
render such change proper[,]” but “only upon . . . showing . . . a substantial change	3
in 	circumstances 	since 	the 	prior 	order 	that 	affects 	the 	best 	interests 	of 	the	4
children.” Grant v. Cumiford, 2005-NMCA-058, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 485, 112 P.3d 1142	5
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	6
{9} 	Here, the district court initially issued a temporary custody and timeshare	7
order on August 3, 2017, awarding primary physical custody to Husband and	8
explaining 	that 	based 	on 	recommendations 	by 	an 	appointed 	expert 	custody	9
evaluator, it was “in the best interests of [C]hildren” to relocate with Husband to	10
Texas. However, at the July hearing, the district court instead awarded primary	11
physical custody to Wife. At the hearing, Husband’s counsel asked for a statement	12
of findings by the district court justifying the reversal of primary physical custody	13
and the propriety of Children’s relocation to Texas with Husband. The district	14
court—referring to evidence that, since having relocated with Husband, Children	15
“continually express[ed]” their desire to be with Wife—cited to NMSA 1978,	16
Section 40-4-9(A) (1977), which provides that when considering the custody of a	17
minor under the age of fourteen, a court’s determinations must be in accordance with	18
the best interests of the child and that in making such determinations, a court shall	19
consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to:	20

7
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his [or her] custody;	1
(2) the wishes of the child as to his [or her] custodian;	2
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his [or her]	3
parents, 	his 	[or 	her] 	siblings, 	and 	any 	other 	person 	who 	may	4
significantly affect the child’s best interest;	5
(4) the child’s adjustment to his [or her] home, school and community;	6
and	7
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.	8
(Emphasis added.) While a court must consider the desired custodial arrangement of	9
a minor over the age of fourteen, see § 40-4-9(B), where, as here, Children are under	10
the age of fourteen, the court has discretion to consider Children’s wishes when	11
awarding custody.	12
{10} 	While the district court exercised its discretion to consider the wishes of	13
Children to live with Wife, we disagree with Husband’s contention that the district	14
court’s decision to modify primary physical custody was based solely on the wishes	15
of Children. Rather, the district court heard and relied on testimony from the	16
appointed parenting coordinator who stated that relocation to Texas had adversely	17
impacted Children because, although they had “settled in” and adapted to their new	18
community, they did not have frequent contact with Wife. The parenting coordinator	19
also testified that Wife was “far more psychologically stable” than previously	20
evaluated. The district court also heard and relied on testimony from the appointed	21
expert child custody evaluator who stated that based on the changes in circumstances	22
testified to by the parenting coordinator, he could not again recommend that	23
Husband relocate Children to Texas and his earlier report and recommendation were	24

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now “stale,” emphasizing that he “hope[d] the [c]ourt would place more weight on	1
what is going on at this point in time than perhaps what was going on a year ago”	2
when he first issued his report.	3
{11} 	On the record before us, we conclude that the district court based its custody	4
order 	on 	evidence 	demonstrating 	a 	substantial 	change 	in 	circumstances 	in	5
accordance with applicable statutory requirements. See State ex rel. Children, Youth	6
& Families Dep’t v. Michelle B., 2001-NMCA-071, ¶ 27, 130 N.M. 781, 32 P.3d	7
790 (recognizing that child custody may be properly modified upon a showing of	8
material changes in circumstances affecting the best interest of the child and	9
explaining that a failure to apply requisite statutory guidelines when modifying a	10
custody order constitutes an abuse of discretion). The record reflects that the district	11
court considered the applicable statute, testimony given at the hearing, the opinions	12
of experts, and the changed circumstances from the outset of the case and its issuance	13
of its temporary order. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the	14
district 	court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	in 	issuing 	its 	ultimate 	physical 	custody	15
determination regarding Children.	16
II. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding Child Support	17
{12} 	Husband argues that the district court’s award of child support is erroneous	18
because it relied on an inaccurate calculation of Husband’s income. “Child support	19
determinations are made at the discretion of the district court and are reviewed for	20

9
abuse of discretion.” Jury v. Jury, 2017-NMCA-036, ¶ 26, 392 P.3d 242. “A district	1
court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive	2
law, or its discretionary decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” Id.	3
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	4
{13} 	Generally, “[t]he basic child support obligation shall be calculated based on	5
the combined income of both parents and shall be paid by them proportionately	6
pursuant to Subsection K of [NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-11.1 (2008)].” Section 40-	7
4-11.1(E). Subsection K of Section 40-4-11.1 provides a “basic child support	8
schedule” that fixes each parent’s child support obligation based on the parents’	9
combined income and the number of children they have. This number is then	10
adjusted upward or downward using the physical custody arrangement set out in the	11
court’s most recent child custody adjudication. Section 40-4-11.1(F). The physical	12
custody adjustment is made using one of two worksheets set out in Subsection K:	13
Worksheet A or Worksheet B. The applicable worksheet is determined by the type	14
of custody arrangement in effect: if the custody arrangement has the children	15
spending less than thirty-five percent of the time with one parent, then Worksheet A	16
applies; if both parents have the children for more than thirty-five percent of the	17
time, 	Worksheet 	B 	applies. 	Section 	40-4-11.1(D), 	(F); see 	also Erickson 	v.	18
Erickson, 1999-NMCA-056, ¶ 3, 127 N.M. 140, 978 P.2d 347. The statutory child	19
support guidelines, as adjusted within the designated worksheet, “are presumed to	20

10
provide the proper amount of child support.” Leeder v. Leeder, 1994-NMCA-105,	1
¶ 6, 118 N.M. 603, 884 P.2d 494.	2
{14} 	Here, the district court used Worksheet A to determine a monthly child	3
support amount owed by Husband to Wife in the amount of $2,140 per month. At	4
the October 4, 2018 hearing, Husband argued that there was an error in his income	5
as documented on Worksheet A, stating that his reported income was approximately	6
$6,000 per month higher than the income he in fact received. Husband stated that	7
this discrepancy was the basis for his motion to alter orders in which Husband stated	8
simply that the child support determination in the district court’s order was	9
“erroneous because it does not reflect the evidence and testimony concerning the	10
parties’ financials.” The district court informed Husband that his motion to alter	11
orders was insufficient, and in order to issue a new order changing Husband’s child	12
support obligation, Husband needed to file a Rule 1-060(B) NMRA motion and	13
therein provide the court with new evidence that could reveal a mistake, excusable	14
neglect, or a change in circumstances demonstrating the original child support order	15
was erroneous. The district court then directed Husband—multiple times—to file	16
such a Rule 1-060(B) motion. Husband filed no such motion, nor did he provide the	17
district court with the requested evidence demonstrating error in the original child	18
support order through some alternative means. Our review of the record indicates	19
that the district court’s original child support order was supported by evidence and	20

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based on correct standards and law. As such, and because Husband failed to more	1
specifically 	articulate 	the 	errors 	he 	alleged 	occurred 	in 	the 	district 	court’s	2
consideration of evidence and subsequent order, we cannot conclude that the district	3
court abused its discretion in awarding child support. See Jury, 2017-NMCA-036,	4
¶ 26.	5
III. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding Spousal Support	6
{15} 	Husband argues that the district court’s award of spousal support is also	7
erroneous because the court “failed to follow the [applicable] statutory factors” and	8
there was insufficient evidence to support the amount and duration of the spousal	9
support awarded. 1 We similarly review a district court’s award of spousal support	10
for an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Clark, 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 8, 320 P.3d 991.	11
1Husband argues as well that Wife’s remarriage following the district court
proceedings indicates that her demonstrated need, as determined by the district court,
is diminished. Because Husband’s briefing indicates his intention to file a motion to
modify the spousal support award in district court, we will not address this argument
further and instead presume Husband intends to file his motion stated to us. See § 40-
4-7(B)(2)(a) (explaining that the district court may modify any order awarding
spousal support “whenever the circumstances render such change proper”); Kuert v.
Kuert, 1956-NMSC-002, ¶ 18, 60 N.M. 432, 292 P.2d 115 (stating that upon the
divorced husband’s motion, the district court may abate spousal support payments
to the divorced wife as of the date of her subsequent remarriage “unless she proves
extraordinary conditions justifying continuance” of the original payments); Mindlin
v. Mindlin, 1937-NMSC-012, ¶ 14, 41 N.M. 155, 66 P.2d 260 (explaining that “[t]he
law seems to be well settled that the marriage of the wife does not of itself abate the
[spousal support] due from her former husband,” and that such relief must arise from
a motion before the district court).

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{16} 	“In determining whether to order spousal support, the district court is to	1
consider: (1) the needs of the proposed recipient, (2) the proposed recipient’s age,	2
health, and means of self support; (3) the proposed payor’s earning capacity and	3
future earnings; (4) the duration of the marriage; and (5) the amount of property	4
owned by the parties.” Rabie v. Ogaki, 1993-NMCA-096, ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 143, 860	5
P.2d 785; see § 40-4-7(E). “The actual need of the proposed recipient is a focal	6
consideration in determining whether to order spousal support.” Clark, 2014-	7
NMCA-030, ¶ 7. “Whether to order spousal support, how much to order, and the	8
duration of the order are within the sound discretion of the district court.” Rabie,	9
1993-NMCA-096, ¶ 5.	10
{17} 	Here, the district court ordered Husband to pay Wife spousal support in the	11
amount of $2,000 per month for a period of six years, and $1,000 per month	12
thereafter. This determination was based on the district court’s findings that Husband	13
was employed by the military during the majority of the parties’ fourteen-year	14
marriage, that Wife was supportive of Husband’s military career while acting	15
predominantly as a stay-at-home parent, and that, as such, Wife demonstrated a	16
financial need following the dissolution of the marriage and Husband had an ability	17
to pay spousal support.	18
{18} 	Our review indicates that the district court properly considered the evidence	19
on the record in accordance with the statutory requirements and that its decision	20

13
regarding spousal support was consistent with the logical inferences of the facts and	1
circumstances of the case. See Clark, 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we	2
cannot, on the record before us, conclude that the district court abused its discretion	3
in awarding spousal support.	4
IV. 	The 	District 	Court 	Did 	Not 	Err 	in 	Dividing 	Husband’s 	Military	5
Retirement Benefits	6
{19} 	Husband argues the district court’s order dividing military retirement benefits	7
is erroneous because the district court failed to follow applicable law. Specifically,	8
Husband claims that the district court failed to properly apply provisions of the	9
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), affecting the division of military	10
retirement benefits under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act	11
(USFSPA), 	when 	dividing 	Husband’s 	military 	retirement 	benefits. 	Because	12
Husband’s argument regarding the division of military retirement benefits presents	13
a question of the district court’s application of law to the facts, we review this issue	14
de novo. Paz v. Tijerina, 2007-NMCA-109, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 391, 165 P.3d 1167	15
(“[O]ur review of legal questions and the application of the law to the facts is	16
conducted de novo.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	17
{20} 	“[T]he USFSPA authorizes state courts to treat disposable retired pay as	18
property of the military member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the	19
jurisdiction of such court.” Scheidel v. Scheidel, 2000-NMCA-059, ¶ 6, 129 N.M.	20
223, 4 P.3d 670 (alteration, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation	21

14
omitted); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2018). “Disposable retired pay is defined as the	1
total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled, less certain deductions.”	2
Scheidel, 2000-NMCA-059, ¶ 6 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation	3
omitted); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4). On December 23, 2016, Congress passed the	4
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year	5
2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 641, 130 Stat. 2000 (2017). In relevant part, passage	6
of the NDAA amended certain provisions of the USFSPA, including 10 U.S.C.	7
§ 1408(a)(4)(B)(i), which provides:	8
[I]n the case of a division of property as part of a final decree of divorce,	9
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation that becomes final prior to	10
the date of a member’s retirement, the total monthly retired pay to	11
which the member is entitled shall be . . . the amount of retired pay to	12
which the member would have been entitled using the member’s retired	13
pay base and years of service on the date of the decree of divorce,	14
dissolution, 	annulment, 	or 	legal 	separation, 	as 	computed 	under	15
[S]ection . . . 1407.	16
(Emphasis added.) According to the Department of Defense Financial Management	17
Regulations, the changes implemented by the NDAA apply to cases where the	18
former spouse and member were divorced after December 23, 2016. Dep’t of Def.	19
Fin. Mgmt. Reg., DoD 7000.14-R, vol. 7B, ch. 29, para. 290801 (July 2019).	20
{21} 	Husband contends that the NDAA amendments to the USFSPA apply in the	21
present case because “the court did not enter final orders, including the order	22
dividing military retirement, until 2018[,]” and therefore the amount of divided	23
military retirement benefits awarded to Wife was erroneous. We are unpersuaded.	24

15
Here, the date of divorce between the parties—which has never been challenged—	1
was May 25, 2016. After careful review of Husband’s citations to secondary sources	2
and non-precedential opinions2 from other jurisdictions to support his argument that	3
the NDAA amendments to the USFSPA should apply to the parties’ divorce, we	4
disagree with Husband’s position and conclude that because the NDAA applies to	5
2Husband cites Fulgium v. Fulgium, 203 A.3d 33, 40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2019) for the proposition that the NDAA amendments to the USFSPA were
“intended to modify the division of military retired pay in a divorce decree to the
amount the member would be entitled based upon the member’s pay grade and years
of service at the time of the divorce rather than at the time of retirement.” (Emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Husband also cites Sample
v. Sample, 2018 WL 4203545, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018), for general
background information regarding the NDAA and its effect on the division of
military benefits. Consistent with Fulgium, Sample reiterates the proposition that
“[t]he amount of retired pay is limited to that which the member would have been
entitled using the member’s retired pay base and years of service on the date of the
final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation.” Sample, 2018
WL 4203545, at *4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Indeed, both cases set forth the USFSPA’s requirement that the date of
divorce must be used to calculate the amount of retired pay. Here, it is uncontested
that the district court relied on the date of divorce when dividing Husband’s military
retirement benefits. It appears that Husband’s primary argument regarding the
NDAA’s amendment of the USFSPA centers not on a contention that the district
court used the wrong date in dividing military retirement benefits, but rather that the
district court’s order failed to include findings—which would be required by the
NDAA amendments, if applicable—within its order, and, thus, the order was
erroneous. Our review of the secondary sources and non-precedential opinions cited
by Husband, along with the record in this case, makes clear that even if such findings
were 	included 	within 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	dividing 	military 	benefits 	in
conformance to the NDAA amendments, the resulting division of Husband’s
military benefits would remain as ordered by the district court because the date of
divorce would be relied upon in either analysis as mandated by the USFSPA, the
NDAA amendments, and Husband’s cited sources.

16
divorces after December 23, 2016, the NDAA’s amendments to the USFSPA do not	1
apply in this case where the parties were divorced as of May 25, 2016. Accordingly,	2
we hold there was no error in the district court’s division of military retirement	3
benefits.	4
V. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Dividing the TSP	5
{22} 	In conjunction with his argument regarding military retirement benefits,	6
Husband also argues the district court erred in dividing the TSP from Husband’s	7
service in the military. Following the July hearing, the district court filed its order	8
dividing the TSP, stating that the order “creates and recognizes the existence of	9
[Wife’s] right to receive a portion of [Husband’s] benefit payable under the [TSP]	10
which is administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board.” The	11
district court’s order assigned to Wife fifty percent of Husband’s total balance	12
accumulated under the TSP during the parties’ marriage. However, Husband later	13
made clear that after parties’ attorney fees were paid out of the TSP, the TSP’s	14
balance was zero and the order assigning fifty percent of the value to Wife was not	15
satisfied. In response, the district court directed Husband to submit within thirty days	16
a detailed accounting proving how the TSP funds—estimated at over $40,000—were	17
spent.	18
{23} 	Based on our own thorough review of the record, it is unclear whether	19
Husband submitted the accounting as requested by the court, and Husband provides	20

17
no citation to the record from which we could determine how the TSP funds were	1
spent. Without such accounting information, we cannot know whether the TSP funds	2
were withdrawn for justifiable reasons. Nevertheless, Husband now makes the	3
argument—unsupported by either cited authority or citations to the record proper—	4
that the district court erred in dividing the TSP because “[t]he district court should	5
have treated the former value of the TSP as a community debt, rather than awarding	6
Wife one[-]half of the former value.” We consider this assertion to be undeveloped	7
and unsupported by citations to either authority or the record proper and, thus, we	8
do not address it further. See Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28, 329 P.3d	9
701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately	10
developed.”); Chan v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-072, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 44, 256 P.3d 987	11
(“It is not our practice to rely on assertions of counsel unaccompanied by support in	12
the record. The mere assertions and arguments of counsel are not evidence.” (internal	13
quotation marks and citation omitted)); In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024,	14
¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments in briefs are	15
unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable to find any	16
supporting authority. We therefore will not do this research for counsel. Issues raised	17
in appellate briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be reviewed by	18
us on appeal.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, “[w]hen there exist reasons both	19
supporting and detracting from a trial court decision, there is no abuse of discretion.”	20

18
Talley v. Talley, 1993-NMCA-003, ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 89, 847 P.2d 323. Here, even	1
assuming, without deciding, that an accounting from Husband could prove the TSP	2
value was justifiably depleted through payment of both parties’ attorney fees, there	3
would remain reasons and evidence in support of the district court’s decision.	4
Accordingly, on the record before us, we are presented no basis upon which we	5
might conclude the district court abused its discretion in dividing the TSP.	6
VI. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding Attorney Fees	7
{24} 	Husband’s final argument on appeal is that the district court erred in awarding	8
attorney fees to Wife because (1) Wife failed to file a motion seeking fees, (2) the	9
district court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its	10
award of attorney fees, and (3) the district court’s award of attorney fees was based	11
solely on disparity of income between the parties. “The decision whether to grant or	12
deny a request for attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the district	13
court.” Garcia v. Jeantette, 2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 776, 82 P.3d 947.	14
Thus, 	we 	review 	the 	district 	court’s 	decision 	awarding 	attorney 	fees 	for	15
an abuse of discretion. Id.	16
{25} 	Here, the district court awarded attorney fees to Wife under Section 40-4-	17
7(A), which provides in part that “[t]he court may make an order, relative to the	18
expenses of the proceeding, as will ensure either party an efficient preparation and	19
presentation of his case.” We have held that Section 40-4-7(A) supports a district	20

19
court’s award of attorney fees, recognizing “that the central purpose of an award of	1
attorney fees under Section 40-4-7(A) is to remedy any financial disparity between	2
the divorcing parties so that each may make an efficient and effective presentation	3
of his or her claims in the underlying divorce case.” Garcia, 2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 19.	4
Further, the “primary test” to determine whether such an award is warranted is “a	5
showing of economic disparity, the need of one party, and the ability of the other to	6
pay[.]” Quintana v. Eddins, 2002-NMCA-008, ¶ 33, 131 N.M. 435, 38 P.3d 203	7
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	8
{26} 	Regarding Husband’s first argument—that Wife never filed a motion seeking	9
attorney fees—we point to Wife’s motion for relief from judgment, filed on June 7,	10
2016, in which she moved for attorney fees. Similarly, regarding Husband’s second	11
argument that the district court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law	12
supporting its award of attorney fees, we note that the district court’s findings of fact	13
and conclusions of law and final order, filed on March 28, 2017, includes—per its	14
title—both findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the parties’ disparity of	15
income and the district court’s reliance on such in awarding attorney fees. The	16
district court’s order also specified that Husband would have fifteen days in which	17
“to respond as to the reasonableness and necessity of attorney[] fees and costs.”	18
Husband did not file his motion opposing attorney fees until April 27, 2017, thirty	19
days after the district court’s order.	20

20
{27} 	Finally, Husband argues that the district court’s award of attorney fees	1
constitutes an abuse of discretion because the district court based its award “on	2
disparity of income alone without considering other relevant factors.” Husband cites	3
to Gomez v. Gomez for the proposition that when awarding attorney fees, a court	4
should 	consider 	not 	only 	the 	economic 	disparity 	of 	the 	parties—the 	“most	5
important” factor—but also “the nature of the proceedings, the complexity of the	6
issues, the relief sought and recovered, the ability of the parties’ attorneys and the	7
ability of the parties to pay.” 1995-NMCA-049, ¶ 12, 119 N.M. 755, 895 P.2d 277	8
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), superseded by statute on other	9
grounds as stated in Erickson, 1999-NMCA-056, ¶ 25. Here, we conclude that the	10
district court sufficiently considered other factors beyond the disparity of income	11
between the parties. Regarding the nature of the proceedings and the complexity of	12
the issues, the district court characterized the case as “a nightmare” during the July	13
hearing, citing the long timeline of ongoing litigation between the parties, and stating	14
that the case presented “the most awkward unfolding . . . of evidence.” Similarly, at	15
the October hearing, the district court noted the “awkward” and convoluted nature	16
of the case’s procedural history, stating that in the years of litigation between the	17
parties, the court had “pulled out all of the bells and whistles.” We disagree with	18
Husband’s 	implication 	that 	all 	the 	Gomez 	factors 	must 	be 	considered 	and	19
documented in findings of fact and conclusions of law by the district court. As the	20

21
court noted, economic disparity is listed as the “most important” factor, and our	1
review of the record reveals that the district court adequately weighed and	2
considered 	factors 	beyond 	economic 	disparity 	to 	satisfy 	the 	boundaries	3
contemplated by our case law. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not	4
err in awarding attorney fees.	5
CONCLUSION	6
{28} 	For these reasons, we affirm.	7
{29} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	8
_________________________________	9
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge	10
WE CONCUR:	11
_________________________________	12
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	13
_________________________________	14
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	15