State v. Martinez

Office of the Director New Mexico
08:07:07 2022.02.15 Compilation
'00'07- Commission

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2022-NMSC-004

Filing Date: November 1, 2021

No. S-1-SC-37938

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JULIAN A. MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Petitioner.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Robert A. Aragon, District Judge

Released for Publication February 22, 2022.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Charles Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Eran Shemuel Sharon, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

OPINION

THOMSON, Justice

{1} In this opinion, we clarify that the return of a jury’s guilty verdict does not divest a
district court of its inherent authority to determine whether the evidence presented at
trial was legally insufficient to support a conviction. We also conclude that the State may
appeal such a determination without offending the principles of double jeopardy. We
reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings to consider the
sufficiency of the evidence.
I. BACKGROUND

{2} The Court of Appeals determined, without actually reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, that the district court did not have the authority to review the sufficiency of
the evidence after it accepted the jury’s verdict. See State v. Martinez, A-1-CA-37798,
mem. op. ¶¶ 1-3 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2019). Therefore, we recount only the facts
relevant to whether the district court had authority to rule as it did, which are minimal
and, primarily, procedural.

{3} Defendant Julian A. Martinez was charged with committing multiple crimes,
including criminal sexual penetration, battery against a household member, and false
imprisonment. At trial, the district court denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict,
determining that there was sufficient evidence presented to submit the questions of guilt
on five counts to the jury. The jury returned two guilty verdicts, convicting Defendant of
criminal sexual penetration and battery against a household member, and the district
court accepted the verdicts. Two days later, on its own motion, the district court vacated
both convictions, concluding that the State failed to establish that Defendant was the
person who committed the crimes. The State appealed.

{4} The Court of Appeals summarily reversed the district court in a nonprecedential,
memorandum opinion, relying almost entirely on language quoted from State v. Torrez,
2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 10, 305 P.3d 944: “A district court does not have the authority to
override a jury’s verdict and enter a verdict different than that handed down by the jury.”
Martinez, A-1-CA-37798, mem. op. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari
review, which we granted. See Rule 12-502 NMRA (providing for “review of decisions of
the Court of Appeals”). We now determine whether a district court’s authority to review
the sufficiency of the evidence ends when the jury returns a verdict. We conclude it
does not.

II. ANALYSIS

{5} Whether a district court has the authority to determine the evidence was
insufficient postverdict is a legal question we review de novo. See State v. Gonzales,
2005-NMSC-025, ¶ 21, 138 N.M. 271, 119 P.3d 151 (observing that questions which
“require a court to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles” or
“consider abstract legal doctrines” and “balance competing legal interests” are subject
to de novo review (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); State v. Frank,
2002-NMSC-026, ¶10, 132 N.M. 544, 52 P.3d 404 (observing that “matters of law,” such
as whether a court has the authority to act, are reviewed de novo (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).

{6} The New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure “are intended to provide for the
just determination of criminal proceedings [and] shall be construed to secure simplicity
in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay.” Rule 5-101(B) NMRA. These rules are applied with an understanding of a court’s
“inherent power to see that a [defendant’s] fundamental rights are protected in every
case” and that “[every] court has the power, in its discretion, to relieve [a defendant of
the error] and to see that injustice is not done.” State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009,
¶ 12, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Because a court’s inherent power is at the core of judicial authority, it is the province of
this Court to define the contours of that power.” State ex rel. N.M. State Highway and
Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 20, 120 N.M. 1, 896 P.2d 1148.

{7} With this in mind, we conclude that nothing in Torrez or the cases upon which the
State relies alters a district court’s inherent authority to determine that the evidence
presented was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. See Martinez, A-1-CA-37798,
mem. op. ¶¶ 2-3. This conclusion does not alter, but rather strengthens, two
requirements of our Rules of Criminal Procedure: (1) A district court’s duty to examine
the sufficiency of the evidence prior to submitting a question of guilt to the jury and (2)
the prohibition of a district court from invading the fact-finding province of a jury. See
Rule 5-607(E), (K) NMRA (establishing the “order of trial” and providing that “out of the
presence of the jury, the court shall determine the sufficiency of the evidence, whether
or not a motion for directed verdict is made”); Rule 5-701(A) NMRA (“If the defendant is
found guilty, a judgment of guilty shall be rendered. If the defendant has been acquitted,
a judgment of not guilty shall be rendered.”).

{8} Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question that “may and
should be raised by the court of its own motion, if necessary to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.” Ansley v. United States, 135 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1943).

A. A Court’s Inherent Authority to Render a Postverdict Decision on the
Sufficiency of the Evidence Is Not Limited by New Mexico Precedent

{9} The State maintains that Torrez bars the district court’s sufficiency review once
the jury has returned a guilty verdict. The State also argues that our Rules of Criminal
Procedure as construed by State v. Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, 97 N.M. 745, 643 P.2d
614, and State v. Willyard, 2019-NMCA-058, 450 P.3d 445, similarly bar such review.
We disagree, as the proper application of these cases depends on the procedural
context in which they are applied and none of the cases relied upon by the State answer
the question raised here. We address each separately.

1. Torrez—invasion of the province of the jury

{10} The holding in Torrez resulted from a defendant’s second appeal following a
second trial. See Torrez, 2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 5. “In his first trial, [the d]efendant was
charged with first degree murder under two alternative theories: felony murder and
depraved mind murder.” Id. ¶ 6; see also NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A) (1994) (establishing
three possible theories of first-degree murder: willful, deliberate, and premeditated;
felony; or depraved mind). The jury convicted Torrez under a general verdict, which
meant that it “did not specify whether its verdict was based on felony murder, depraved
mind murder, or both.” See Torrez, 2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 10. Disregarding the nature of a
general verdict, the district court entered a judgment indicating Defendant committed
first-degree (felony) murder but did not commit first-degree (depraved mind) murder. Id.
¶¶ 6, 10. The propriety and effect of entering a judgment specifying a single alternative
theory of conviction after a jury returns a general verdict based on more than one
alternative was not raised by either party or addressed as part of the first appeal. See
State v. Torrez, 2009-NMSC-029, ¶ 1, 146 N.M. 331, 210 P.3d 228 (enumerating the
issues raised on appeal). Instead, the convictions were reversed because of wrongly
admitted “expert testimony.” Id. ¶ 34.

{11} In Torrez’s second appeal following retrial, he advanced a double jeopardy claim
and argued that he could not be retried for depraved mind murder because the district
court’s prior judgment indicated he had been acquitted. Torrez, 2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 8.
This Court held that a district court cannot select one theory of conviction and acquit a
defendant of the alternative theories when a jury renders a general verdict because a
district court “[cannot] know under which theory [a defendant is] convicted” and “does
not have the authority to override a jury’s verdict and enter a verdict different than that
handed down by the jury.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 9-10. Thus, the issue in Torrez was procedurally and
substantively different from the issue in this case. Entering a different verdict in the
context presented by Torrez invades the province of the jury. Id. ¶ 10; see Rule 5-
701(A); cf. State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057
(providing that it is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence to arrive at a verdict).

{12} However, in this case, the province of the jury was not invaded. Rather than
assessing witness credibility or weighing evidence, the district court considered the
evidence supporting the conviction and applied the proper standard to determine the
evidence was legally insufficient. See State v. Galindo, 2018-NMSC-021, ¶ 12, 415
P.3d 494 (reiterating the applicable appellate standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency
of the evidence). Thus, we reject the application or expansion of the holding in Torrez to
this case. We next address Davis, on which Torrez relied and which the State argues
supports affirming the Court of Appeals.

2. Davis—application of Rule 5-607 and Rule 5-701

{13} The State maintains that the Court of Appeals’ decision is supported by Davis,
which concluded that “[t]he trial court did not comply with its mandatory duty to rule on
the sufficiency of the evidence.” 1982-NMCA-057, ¶ 11. The Davis Court then
summarily applied two procedural rules to affirm the defendant’s conviction. Id. ¶¶ 13-
15. Like Torrez, the application of Davis to this case is not justified.

{14} In Davis, the district court took a motion for directed verdict under advisement. Id.
¶¶ 9-12. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the district court determined that the
defendant’s postverdict motion “for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict
. . . was ‘well taken’ and entered a judgment of not guilty.” Id. ¶ 1. The Davis Court
concluded that error resulted because the district court failed to follow Rule of Criminal
Procedure 40, the precursor to Rule 5-607, which then governed the order of trial and
established a district court’s “mandatory duty to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence”
prior to submitting the question of guilt to the jury. 1 Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, ¶ 12. The
Davis Court similarly concluded that Rule of Criminal Procedure 40 did not allow for
motions for directed verdict to be taken under advisement. See Davis, 1982-NMCA-057,
¶ 14. That conclusion also avoids due process concerns, which could be raised by the
failure to comply with the “mandatory duty to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence”
prior to submitting the question of guilt to the jury. See id. ¶ 10. Massachusetts, for
example, has found that a district court violates a “defendant’s right to due process”
when it reserves ruling on a motion for directed verdict and then grants the motion after
a jury returns a verdict of guilty. Commonwealth v. Yasin, 132 N.E.3d 531, 535, 540,
542-543 (Mass. 2019) (“When the judge reserved decision on the defendant’s motion
for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, she deprived the
defendant of his right to insist that the Commonwealth prove each element of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt before he decided whether to rest or to present a
defense.”).

{15} We agree with the Davis Court’s interpretation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 40
and Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, now codified as Rule 5-607 and Rule 5-701,
respectively, 2 that a district court may not decline to rule on a motion for directed
verdict, submit the question of guilt to the jury, and then simply “enter a judgment of not
guilty.” Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 1, 13, 14. This opinion does not disturb the
conclusion in Davis. When a district court reweighs the evidence, the court violates the
rule of criminal procedure that establishes the exclusive province of the jury as fact-
finder. See Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, ¶ 15 (“The trial court’s noncompliance with Rule of
Crim. Proc. 46 requires a reversal of its judgment of not guilty.”); see also Rule 5-
701(A). The State wants this Court to expand Davis to prohibit a district court from not
only reweighing the evidence, but also from making a legal determination on the
sufficiency of the evidence. However, neither Davis nor Rule 5-607 nor Rule 701(A)
prohibits a court from considering the sufficiency of the evidence after the jury returns a
verdict.

{16} It is crucial to note the Davis Court was asked and specifically declined to resolve
the question we answer today, whether a district court has the inherent authority to
review the sufficiency of the evidence after the jury verdict is returned. The Davis Court
concluded that “it [was] unnecessary to decide whether, apart from the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict [was] authorized.” 1982-
NMCA-057, ¶¶ 5-6.

{17} A court’s inherent authority to examine the sufficiency of the evidence before a
case is submitted to the jury and to review the sufficiency of the evidence postverdict
serves and balances two purposes. First, it fulfills a district court’s “mandatory duty to

1Rule of Criminal Procedure 40 cited in Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, ¶ 14, is virtually identical to the rule as it
is now codified. Compare Rule of Crim. Proc. 40(e), (k) (1975) (requiring that “the court shall determine
the sufficiency of the evidence, whether or not a motion for directed verdict is made” at the close of the
state’s case and prior to instructing the jury at the close of evidence), with Rule 5-607(E), (K) (same).
2“Rule of Crim. Proc. 46 state[d]: If the defendant is found guilty, a judgment of guilty shall be rendered.”
Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, ¶ 13. This rule is identical to the current rule, which is before this Court in this
case. See Rule 5-701(A); see also ¶ 14 n.1, supra.
rule on the sufficiency of the evidence”; second, it preserves the state’s right to appeal.
See Davis, 1982-NMCA-057, ¶ 12 (“The trial court did not comply with its mandatory
duty to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence.”); State v. Baca, 2015-NMSC-021, ¶ 21,
352 P.3d 1151 (observing that the state loses the right to appeal a district court’s
acquittal of a defendant by determining there is insufficient evidence prior to submitting
the question of guilt to the jury “even where the determination of insufficiency of
evidence results from an erroneous evidentiary ruling”); see also Yasin, 132 N.E.3d at
535, 542 (determining that reserving ruling on a motion for directed verdict until after a
verdict is rendered violates due process and, if allowed to stand, deprives a state of the
right to appeal the issue of sufficiency). Here the district court complied with its
mandatory duty and preserved the issue of sufficiency for appeal.

{18} The district court accepted the jury’s verdict and made a legal determination on
the sufficiency of the evidence, using the standard applicable on appeal, and
importantly, providing its reasoning that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to
identify Defendant as the individual that actually committed the crime. This strikes the
proper balance encouraged by our Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Rule 5-101(B). We
now turn to the State’s argument that Willyard supports affirming the Court of Appeals.

3. Willyard—Rule 5-701(A) does not require a mechanical entry of judgment

{19} The State also argues that Willyard requires a district court to mechanically enter
a jury’s verdict, which fails to acknowledge the circumstances of that case and the
specific question presented to the appellate court. For many of the reasons already
stated, we disagree.

{20} In Willyard, the district court granted a new trial because it determined the
defendant was convicted based on insufficient evidence. 2019-NMCA-058, ¶ 5. The
Court of Appeals reversed, concluding “that it would be inherently inconsistent to allow a
motion for new trial to be granted based on insufficiency of the evidence when that
insufficiency bars retrial.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Baca, 2015-NMSC-021, ¶ 21. The district
court’s remedy of granting a new trial in this circumstance is clearly improper because it
offends the principles of double jeopardy. Willyard, 2019-NMCA-058, ¶ 14; see also
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 1 (1978) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause precludes
a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient.”). “It
is settled law that if a conviction is overturned for insufficient evidence, the reversal is
treated as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.” State v. Gonzales, 2013-NMSC-
016, ¶ 17, 301 P.3d 380. In contrast to Willyard, the district court here did not grant a
new trial; it found the evidence legally insufficient and dismissed “[a]ll charges . . . with
prejudice” postverdict. The district court acted in conformity with its inherent authority
and duty to act in the interest of justice by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict and ruling
on the sufficiency of the evidence postverdict.

{21} We also note that the Willyard Court, analogous to the Davis Court, expressly
declined to consider whether a district court’s review of “its rulings on directed verdict
motions” or review of the sufficiency of the evidence “after the jury has rendered its
verdict” because the defendant did not cite supporting authority. Willyard, 2019-NMCA-
058, ¶ 20. As we previously explained, Rule 5-701(A) does not require that a district
court mechanically enter the jury’s verdict. Instead, it codifies the principle that a district
court should not invade the province of the jury by rendering a judgment based on its
assessment of witness credibility or otherwise reweighing the evidence presented at
trial. Cf. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5 (providing that it is the province of the jury to
determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence to arrive at a
verdict).

{22} Willyard does not apply in this case. The district court here did not attempt to
grant a new trial, which would violate the principles of double jeopardy. See Willyard,
2019-NMCA-058, ¶ 10. Instead, the district court relied upon its inherent authority to
rule on the legal sufficiency of the evidence postverdict. In a close case, this balances a
defendant’s right to due process and a court’s duty to ensure justice. Double jeopardy is
not offended when reversal on appeal would “merely reinstate the jury’s verdict.” United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 344-345 (1975) (“Since reversal on appeal would
merely reinstate the jury’s verdict, review of such an order does not offend the policy
against multiple prosecution.”). This procedure does not expose a defendant to a retrial
after an apparent acquittal, and therefore, complies with double jeopardy protections.
See State v. Aguilar, 1981-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 5-6, 95 N.M. 578, 624 P.2d 520 (recognizing
the state’s right to appeal as “an aggrieved party” under Article VI, Section 2 of the New
Mexico Constitution when there is “a disposition contrary to law in a criminal
proceeding”).

B. The Rules of Criminal Procedure for State Courts Committee Should
Consider Drafting Additional Procedural Rules on Postverdict Judgments
of Acquittal

{23} Both Defendant and the State urge this Court to consider the procedural rules of
foreign jurisdictions that govern postverdict judgments of acquittal. Defendant maintains,
without supporting authority, that “[e]very single jurisdiction in the United States other
than New Mexico allows a trial court to vacate a conviction post-verdict based on a
finding of insufficient evidence.” The State argues to the contrary, suggesting that “[t]he
majority of jurisdictions either prohibit a [judgment notwithstanding the verdict or] require
the defendant to move for one . . . .” Both parties cannot be correct.

{24} Regardless, the parties’ broad assertions—that the majority of state and federal
statutes and rules support their respective positions—do not sufficiently take into
account the interpretation and application of those statutes and rules by the relevant
foreign jurisdictions. For example, the State argues that ten states, including North
Carolina, require a defendant to file a motion before a court is permitted to consider
postverdict relief, citing, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1414 (2021). However, our review
of North Carolina law suggests otherwise. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that “[a] trial judge may set aside a guilty verdict that is contrary to the weight of the
evidence pursuant to a motion by the defendant, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1414(a) (1988),
or upon its own motion whenever the defendant is entitled to relief. Id. § 15A-1420(d).”
State v. Morgan, 425 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, our review of case law
revealed that federal courts have acknowledged there is a continuing inherent authority,
if not a duty, to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Broadus, 664 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.D.C. 1987) (“[A] trial court, with jurisdiction over a
criminal case, has inherent power to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
conviction at any time while its jurisdiction over the case continues.” (emphasis added));
see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b), (c) (providing that postverdict judgments of acquittal are
appropriate when (1) a court reserves its decision on a preverdict motion or (2) a
defendant “move[s] for a judgment of acquittal, or renew[s] such a motion” within a
specified period). Fortunately, the Court need not look to foreign jurisdictions to
delineate the inherent authority of New Mexico courts. See State ex rel. N.M. State
Highway and Transp. Dep’t, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 20.

{25} Those critiques aside, having resolved the discrete issue before this Court by
determining that a district court has the inherent authority to review the sufficiency of the
evidence postverdict, we decline to undertake an extensive review of the rules in foreign
jurisdictions which govern the procedures therein. The Rules of Criminal Procedure of
State Courts Committee is better suited to consider, and further develop if necessary,
the rules that govern the procedure prior to appeal to ensure the effective and efficient
administration of justice. We accordingly refer the matter to the committee for its
consideration.

III. CONCLUSION

{26} It is worth reiterating the Fifth Circuit’s statement concerning the inherent
authority of any court: “It is true that the question [of the sufficiency of the evidence] may
and should be raised by the court of its own motion, if necessary to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.” Ansley, 135 F.2d at 208. A district court has the inherent
authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence postverdict on its own motion, so long
as it retains jurisdiction over the matter.

{27} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the matter
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice