Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.

No. 13 	March 21, 2019 	263
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION
Senator Brian J. BOQUIST
and Senator Herman Baertschiger,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon,
Defendant.
(TC 5332)
Plaintiffs (taxpayers) sought a declaratory judgment in the Regular Division
that Oregon Laws 2018, chapter 108 (Senate Bill (SB) 1528) (requiring, in part,
Oregon taxpayers to “add” to their federal taxable income any amount allowable
as a deduction under 26 USC section 199A(a)) violated Article IV, sections 18 and
25(2), of the Oregon Constitution (respectively the Origination and Supermajority
Clauses). Taxpayers argued that SB 1528 was a “bill for raising revenue” and
was invalid because it neither originated in the House of Representatives nor
passed both houses of the legislature by a three-fifths majority as required by
the Origination and Supermajority Clauses. On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the court held that SB 1528 was not a “bill for raising revenue” because,
even though it did collect or bring money into the treasury, it did not possess the
essential features of a bill levying a tax because it only regulated the tax base.
Oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment
was held October 19, 2018, in the courtroom of the Oregon
Tax Court, Salem.
Nathan R. Rietmann, Attorney at Law, Salem, filed the
motion and argued the cause for Plaintiffs (taxpayers).
Marilyn Harbur, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Salem, filed the cross-motion and
argued the cause for Defendant Department of Revenue
(department).
Decision for Defendant rendered March 21, 2019.
ROBERT T. MANICKE, Judge.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Senate
Bill (SB) 1528 of the 2018 legislative session1 was a “bill for
1 Or Laws 2018, ch 108.

264 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
raising revenue” enacted in violation of the “Origination”
and “Supermajority” Clauses of the Oregon Constitution,
Article IV, sections 18 and 25(2), respectively. The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment solely on that
issue.
II. 	BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2017, United States Congress
made wide-ranging changes to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 in a law popularly known as The Tax Cuts and
Jobs Acts (TCJA). 2 In one such change, the TCJA created a
20-percent deduction from taxable income for a noncorporate
taxpayer with “qualified business income” from a domes-
tic business operated as a sole proprietorship or through a
partnership or S corporation. IRC § 199A(a) (2017) (“Section
199A(a)”); see also Prop Treas Reg § 1.199A-1, 83 Fed Reg
40884, 40885 (Aug 16, 2018) (to be codified at 26 CFR
pt 1). Section 199A(a) applies to tax years commencing after
December 31, 2017. Pub L No 115-97, § 11011(e).
The 	2018 	Oregon 	legislative 	session 	began 	on
February 5, 2018. On March 2, 2018, one day before adjourn-
ment, the legislature passed SB 1528. Section 10 of the bill
requires Oregon taxpayers to “add” to their federal taxable
income any amount allowable as a deduction under Section
199A(a):
“There shall be added to federal taxable income for Oregon
tax purposes the amount allowable as a deduction under
section 199A(a) of the Internal Revenue Code for the tax
year.”
Or Laws 2018, ch 108, § 10. Section 9 adds section 10 to
chapter 316 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, the Oregon
Personal Income Tax Act of 1969. See ORS 316.002. 3 Section
2 Pub L No 115-97, 131 Stat 2063 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 USC). For procedural reasons related to its passage under budget “reconcil-
iation” rules, the act’s title was changed at a late stage from “The Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act” to “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of
the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” 2 USC § 644 (2018)
(codifying the “Byrd Rule”); see also 2 USC § 641 (reconciliation procedure and
rules).
3 Unless otherwise noted, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised
Statutes (ORS) are to 2017.

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	265
11 states that section 10 (like Section 199A(a)) applies to tax
years beginning on or after January 1, 2018. Finally, section
12 sets the effective date of the bill as the 91st day after the
end of the legislative session (June 2, 2018).4
Each plaintiff asserts that he may be eligible for
the Section 199A(a) deduction because he is an owner of
one or more entities that are capable of generating “quali-
fied business income.” Each also is a duly elected member
of the Oregon Senate. Defendant Department of Revenue
(department) agrees that Plaintiffs have standing to bring
this action as Oregon taxpayers. 5
On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff Boquist filed the origi-
nal complaint in this case. Plaintiff Baertschiger joined the
case on July 6, 2018, when he and Plaintiff Boquist together
filed an amended complaint before any response was filed
by the department. Plaintiffs (taxpayers) later filed their
Second Amended Complaint, in which the sole change was
to remove individual officials originally named as codefen-
dants with the department. The sole claim of taxpayers is
that SB 1528 is of no legal force or effect because it was a “bill
for raising revenue” enacted in violation of the Origination
and Supermajority Clauses.6
The Origination Clause, Article IV, section 18, was
adopted as part of the original Oregon Constitution and
provides:
“Where bills to originate. Bills may originate in either
house, but may be amended, or rejected in the other; except
4 Sections 1 through 8 establish a new “Opportunity Grant Fund,” to provide
an income tax credit for direct taxpayer contributions to that fund, and direct the
Department of Revenue to auction off credits at no less than 95 percent of their
face value and deposit the proceeds into the fund.
5 Plaintiff Boquist initially claimed standing both as a taxpayer and as an
Oregon senator, but neither plaintiff asserts that basis for standing in the Second
Amended Complaint.
6 Taxpayers do not assert that anything about sections 1 through 8 would
cause SB 1528 to be a bill for raising revenue, either standing alone or in combi-
nation with sections 9 through 12. Nor does the department claim that sections
1 through 8 would prevent SB 1528 from being a bill for raising revenue if the
court were to conclude that it is one based on sections 9 through 12. The court
thus focuses its analysis on sections 9 through 12. Unless otherwise indicated,
references to SB 1528 are to sections 9 through 12.

266 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives.”
(Emphasis added.) The Supermajority Clause, Article IV,
section 25(2), was adopted by amendment on May 21, 1996,
and provides:
“Three-fifths of all members elected to each House shall
be necessary to pass bills for raising revenue.”
(Emphasis added.) The parties agree that SB 1528 did
not originate in the House of Representatives or receive
the approval of a three-fifths majority in either legislative
chamber. See Status Report for Legislative Measures, 79th
Legislative Assembly - 2018 Regular Session, 6-7 (originat-
ing in the Senate and passing with 16 ayes and 13 nays; in
the House, passing with 32 ayes and 28 nays).
III. 	ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Oregon Supreme Court has identified three
basic levels of inquiry when interpreting a provision of the
Oregon Constitution: “[I]ts specific wording [of the provi-
sion], the case law surrounding it, and the historical cir-
cumstances that led to its creation.” Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or
411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992). When applying Priest to a
provision of the original constitution, the purpose “is not
to freeze the meaning of the state constitution in the mid-
nineteenth century. Rather it is to identify, in light of the
meaning understood by the framers, relevant underlying
principles that may inform our application of the constitu-
tional text to modern circumstances.” State v. Davis, 350
Or 440, 445-46, 256 P3d 1075 (2011) (citing State v. Hirsch/
Friend, 338 Or 622, 631, 114 P3d 1104 (2005), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 40, 307 P3d
429 (2013)). When interpreting a constitutional amendment,
the court looks to the text, context and legislative history
of the amendment, including documents introduced during
any legislative referral. See State v. Lane, 357 Or 619, 624,
355 P3d 914 (2015).
A. 	Bobo’s Two-Part Test for “Bills for Raising Revenue”
The Oregon Supreme Court first applied the Priest
analysis to the phrase “bills for raising revenue” in Bobo

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	267
v. Kulongoski, 338 Or 111, 119-20, 107 P3d 18 (2005). Bobo
concerned SB 963 (2001), which retroactively transferred
certain Medicaid funds out of the General Fund, result-
ing in a reduction of the amount of money to be returned
to taxpayers as part of the statutory “kicker” refund. Id. at
113. Petitioners sought declaratory relief against the state,
challenging SB 963 as invalidly enacted because it did not
originate in the House of Representatives or receive a three-
fifths vote in each chamber. Id.
After considering the text of the phrase “bills for
raising revenue” as used in the Origination Clause, the
history of that clause,7 and the case law surrounding it, 8
7 The requirement that “bills to raise revenue” originate in the House of
Representatives can be traced back to the practices of the British Parliament.
Bobo, 338 Or at 120 (citing Dale v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 240, 242-43, 905 P2d
844 (1995)). “The requirement consistently has reflected a belief that the branch
of government closest to the people ‘will be more watchful and cautious in the
imposition of taxes’ and thus should be the source of those bills.” Id. at 120 (quot-
ing Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 338-39
(1883)).
8 Northern Counties Trust v. Sears, 30 Or 388, 400, 41 P 931 (1895), was the
leading case on Oregon’s Origination Clause and is discussed extensively in Bobo.
For convenience, the court lists here the additional pre-Bobo Oregon state court
opinions of which the court is aware: Manning v. Klippel, 9 Or 367, 373 (1881)
(invalidating 1880 act providing for sheriff and court clerk fees as impermissible
“local” law; declining to reach validity under Origination Clause but noting: “It
would probably be valid under every other clause in the constitution.”); Mumford
v. Sewall, 11 Or 67, 71 (1883) (discussed below; 1882 law treating mortgages as
taxable property did not violate Contracts Clause as applied to mortgages held
by a nonresident; declining to invalidate law under Origination Clause, an issue
that had not been briefed); State v. Wright, 14 Or 365, 367 (1887) (bill increasing
charge for liquor license is exercise of state police power and not bill for raising
revenue), overruled on other grounds by Warren v. Crosby, 24 Or 558, 568, 34 P 661
(1893); Herbring v. Brown, 92 Or 176, 181, 180 P 328 (1919) (discussing the mean-
ing of the word “bill” as used in Article IV, sections 1, 18, and 19, and Article V,
section 15, of the Oregon Constitution). See also Dale, 322 Or 240 (phrase “raising
revenue” in certified ballot title of measure later enacted as the Supermajority
Clause complied with requirement that titles be simple and easily understood);
DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or 425, 453, 51 P3d 1232 (2002) (citing Northern
Counties, 30 Or at 401-02) (statute allocating percentage of punitive damage
award to the state is not a revenue bill because plaintiffs had no prejudgment
property interest in the award). This court first considered the Origination
Clause in Barnum v. Dept. of Rev., 5 OTR 508, 523, aff’d without separate opin-
ion, 270 Or 867, 530 P2d 28 (1974) (citing Northern Counties, 30 Or at 388)
(then-current version of Oregon adoption statute, ORS 109.041, which served
as grounds to deny tax exemption to plaintiff-adoptee was not a “bill[ ] for rais-
ing revenue” when read together with inheritance tax statute in effect at the
time, ORS 118.100, because the denial of exemption only “incidentally” produced
revenue).

268 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
the court established a two-part framework to determine
whether a bill is “for raising revenue”:
“[The first question] is whether the bill collects or brings
money into the treasury. If it does not, that is the end of
the inquiry. If a bill does bring money into the treasury,
the remaining question is whether the bill possesses the
essential features of a bill levying a tax.”
Id. at 122. The court held that SB 963 was not “for rais-
ing revenue” within the meaning of the Origination Clause
because it failed the first test in the framework: it did not
“collect” or “bring” money into the treasury consistent with
the meaning of those words as understood at the time the
Clause was drafted. Id. “Raise” would have meant:
“[t]o collect; to obtain; to bring into a sum or fund.
Government raises money by taxes, excise and imposts.”
Id. at 120 (quoting Noah Webster, An American Dictionary
of the English Language (1828) (emphasis in original)). 9
The court noted that the bill did not “impose a new tax” or
“increase an existing one.” 338 Or at 122. Rather, the bill
transferred funds already in hand from one program (the
“kicker” tax refund) to another set of programs (expendi-
tures for health-related purposes). Id. (“A bill that allocates
existing monies among different programs does not ‘raise’
revenue within the meaning of [the Origination Clause] and
did not have to originate in the House of Representatives.”).
The court then held that the same interpretation applied
to the Supermajority Clause because the court saw noth-
ing in the text or context of the Supermajority Clause that
suggested that the phrase had a different meaning than in
the Origination Clause. Id. at 123. The court did not need
to reach the second part of its framework and thus did not
determine whether SB 963 had the essential features of a
bill levying a tax.
B. 	City of Seattle’s Application of Bobo
Ten years later, the Oregon Supreme Court had
occasion to apply both parts of the Bobo framework, in City
9 The court also identified the meaning of “revenue” as “[t]he annual produce
of taxes, excise, customs, duties, rents, &c. which a nation or state collects and
receives into the treasury for public use.” Id. (quoting Webster, 1828).

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	269
of Seattle v. Dept. of Rev., 357 Or 718, 731-42, 357 P3d 979
(2015). The issue was whether SB 495 (2009), a Senate bill
repealing a property tax exemption for out-of-state public enti-
ties,10 was a “bill[ ] for raising revenue” within the meaning of
the Origination Clause.11 See former ORS 307.090(3) (2005),
repealed by SB 495 (codified as Or Laws 2009, ch 804, § 1).
The court in City of Seattle easily concluded that,
by repealing the property tax exemption, SB 495 “br[ought]
money into the treasury,” thereby satisfying the first test
within the Bobo framework. 357 Or at 732. In analyzing
whether the bill “possesses the essential features of a bill
levying a tax” under the second part of the Bobo framework,
the court turned to its most recent pre-Bobo substantive
opinion, Northern Counties, 30 Or at 388.12
Northern Counties involved an 1893 act, and its
1895 amendatory act, that changed the system of fees that
county officials charged for various services and instituted
fixed salaries for sheriffs, county clerks and others. The
sheriff of Multnomah County refused to serve a summons in
a civil suit, demanding additional fees from the plaintiff as
allowed by prior law. The sheriff claimed that the 1893 and
1895 laws were invalid because they were enacted as bills
for raising revenue that had been introduced in the Senate.
The court considered federal cases involving three types
of bills. First, the court looked to a case involving a postal
rate increase bill, which the federal district court concluded
was not a bill for raising revenue because a postal transac-
tion involves a “ ‘fixed service for the fixed rate * * *.’ ” Id. at
10 The plaintiffs were cities in the state of Washington that had entered into
“Capacity Owner Agreements” regarding the Pacific Northwest AC Intertie, an
arrangement that the court earlier had determined was subject to property tax
under the provisions applicable to centrally assessed taxpayers. Pacificorp Power
Marketing v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or 204, 211, 131 P3d 725 (2006).
11 The Supermajority Clause was not at issue because the bill passed
with sufficient votes to satisfy it. Journal of the House of Representatives, 75th
Legislative Assembly - 2009 Regular Session, S-94, available at https://www.
oregonlegislature.gov/chief-clerk /Documents/chiefclerk_2009-2010_house_
journal.pdf (accessed Mar 14, 2019).
12 Two relatively recent cases were not instructive. DeMendoza held only that
plaintiffs lacked a property interest in the item they claimed was being taxed.
334 Or at 453. Dale held only that the phrase “raising revenue” in a certified
ballot title complied with the requirement that ballot titles be simple and easily
understood. 322 Or at 240.

270 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
402 (quoting United States v. James, 13 Blatch 207, 26 F Cas
577 (SDNY 1875)).
Second, the court in Northern Counties analyzed
The Nashville, 4 Biss 188, 17 F Cas 1176, 1178-79 (1868), in
which the federal district court for Indiana held that a fed-
eral law requiring any steamboat operator to prominently
display a safety inspector’s certificate was not a bill for rais-
ing revenue, even though the consequence of failure to do
so was a fine payable to the United States Treasury. The
district court held that the sole purpose of the law was to
protect passengers and property, and that the law only inci-
dentally generated revenue. Id.
Third, the court in Northern Counties focused on
the decision of Judge Deady in Dundee Mortgage Trust Co.
v. Parrish, 24 F 197 (D Or 1885). In that case, three compa-
nies sought to enjoin local officials from collecting property
tax on mortgages the companies held. Oregon’s 1882 “mort-
gage tax law” had been held to change the situs, for property
tax purposes, of certain taxable mortgages or debts from the
county where the lender resided to the county where the real
property securing the debt was located. Id. at 198.13 Judge
13 In spirited opinions in an earlier case, Judge Deady concluded that the
mortgage tax law had, in fact, imposed property tax on mortgages for the first
time in Oregon history and that the law violated several provisions of the Oregon
Constitution other than the Origination Clause. See Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv.
Co. v. School Dist. No. 1, 21 F 151, 154-58 (D Or Aug 18, 1884) (“I think it is com-
mon knowledge that [prior law] was never understood to include either notes or
mortgages as taxable property, but only the solvent debts evidenced by them, and
that no mortgage was ever listed as such for taxation in this state prior to the act
of 1882.”) (holding 1882 act violated Oregon Uniformity Clauses and prohibition
against “special or local laws,” Or Const, Art IX, § 1; Or Const, Art I, § 32; Or
Const, Art IV, § 23(10)); see also Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. School Dist.
No. 1, 19 F 359, 363-64 (Mar 6, 1884) (explaining Judge Deady’s theory of corrupt
origin and application of mortgage tax law). The following year, however, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that the mortgage tax law was not unconstitutional
and had merely changed the situs for taxation of the underlying debt, which was
taxable under pre-1882 law, declining to lend any significance to any distinction
between taxation of a mortgage and taxation of the debt. See Crawford v. Linn
County, 11 Or 482, 495-96 (1884). Judge Deady followed Crawford in the 1885
case cited above, Dundee Mortgage, 24 F 197. However, litigation over other chal-
lenges to the mortgage tax continued for many years, including in the United
States Supreme Court. E.g., King v. Dundee Mortg. & Trust Inv. Co., 28 F 33
(D Or 1886) (declining to apply Crawford retroactively); Savings & Loan Soc. v.
Multnomah County, 169 US 421, 18 S Ct 392, 42 L Ed 803 (1898) (upholding mort-
gage tax law in federal constitutional challenge).

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	271
Deady described a “bill for raising revenue” as a “bill levy-
ing a tax on all or some of the persons, property, or business
of the country for a public purpose.” Id. at 201. By contrast, a
bill that “regulat[es]” the “assessment, or listing and valua-
tion of the polls or property preliminary thereto,” is not a bill
for raising revenue, but merely a measure “to secure what
may be deemed a just or expedient basis for the levying of a
tax or raising revenue thereon.” Id. Judge Deady concluded
that the situs-changing feature of the bill did not “levy” a
tax or “rais[e] a cent of revenue,” but merely “regulated” the
assessment by altering what today is commonly referred to
as the “tax base.”14 Id.
Judge Deady also cited with approval a statement
by the Oregon Supreme Court in Mumford v. Sewall, 11
Or 67, 71, 4 P 585 (1883). Id. at 200. Mumford involved a
Contracts Clause challenge to the same mortgage tax law,
and although the Origination Clause issue apparently was
not argued or briefed, the court in Mumford observed in
passing that the mortgage tax law did not seem to consti-
tute a bill for raising revenue because it merely repealed
exemption for a particular class of property:
“Some of us have considerable doubt whether the bill is
not properly a bill for raising revenue, and therefore in vio-
lation of sec. 18 of art. 4 of the state constitution, because it
originated in the senate. But it is not sufficiently clear that
a law which merely declares that certain property there-
tofore exempt from taxation, shall thereafter be subject to
taxation, is strictly a law for raising revenue.”
Mumford, 11 Or at 71.15
14 Webster’s defines “tax base” as “the wealth (such as real estate or income)
within a jurisdiction that is liable to taxation.” Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary (unabridged ed 2018); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed 2014)
(“1. The total property, income, or wealth subject to taxation in a given jurisdic-
tion. 2. The aggregate value of the property being taxed by a particular tax.”).
15 Judge Deady quoted the first sentence above, but not the second, presum-
ably because of the court’s conclusion in Crawford, a few months after Mumford,
that the mortgages actually had never been exempt from tax under pre-1882 law,
a determination that was significant under the then-current understanding of
Oregon’s Uniformity Clauses. See generally Standard Lbr. Co. v. Pierce et al., 112
Or 314, 333-35, 228 P 812 (1924) (discussing Crawford and the later amendment
of the Uniformity Clauses (Or Const, Art I, § 32; Or Const, Art IX, § 1)); Wade J.
Newhouse, Jr., Constitutional Uniformity and Equality in State Taxation 455-60
(1959).

272 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
The court in Northern Counties, having thus dis-
cussed cases involving user fees for government transac-
tions, fines for a regulatory purpose, and changes to the
tax base, then turned to the 1893 county fee law before it.
The court held that that law, too, was not a bill for raising
revenue because it fell into the first category of exclusions,
resembling the postal rate case because it exacted a charge
from litigants for use of the courts, i.e., a fee for the use of
a particular government service, in contrast to a true “tax,”
which confers only the unquantifiable “benefit of good gov-
ernment” and affects all citizens alike. 30 Or at 402-03.
The court in City of Seattle applied the narrow stan-
dard of interpretation in Northern Counties to the second test
in the two-part Bobo framework. Citing Dundee Mortgage
and Mumford, the court concluded that the bill repealing
exemption from property tax for property interests held by
out-of-state public bodies did not possess the essential fea-
tures of a bill levying a tax because it merely “collaterally
provide[d] for assessment or regulation of levied taxes.” 357
Or at 735-36. The court briefly recounted the parties’ argu-
ments about whether the bill’s primary purpose was to raise
revenue or to “level the playing field” among users of cer-
tain property. Id. at 734-35. However, the court declared it
unnecessary to decide the bill’s primary purpose because
the bill merely affected the tax base. Id. at 735.
As a lower court, the Tax Court is required to apply
the framework set forth in Bobo, as well as the additional
teachings of City of Seattle. See Re v. PERS, 256 Or App
52, 54, 301 P3d 932, rev den, 353 Or 867 (2013) (“It is not
this court’s role to overrule, directly or indirectly, Supreme
Court case law.”); State v. Turner, 235 Or App 462, 466, 234
P3d 993 (2010) (declining state’s invitation to cease treating
venue as a material allegation that must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt “because we remain bound by Supreme
Court precedent until such time as that court reconsid-
ers and disavows it.”). The court nevertheless notes that
the trend among federal and state courts, like the Oregon
framework, has favored a narrow interpretation of the term
“bills for raising revenue” and similar common constitu-
tional terms, limiting their application to bills to directly

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	273
levy taxes in the strict sense of the word.16 With apparently
16 Representative cases involving the Origination Clause of the United
States Constitution include: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 395,
110 S Ct 1964, 109 L Ed 2d 384 (1990) (upholding as not subject to the federal
Origination Clause a “special assessment” levied on federal criminal offenders
for a victims’ fund) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Sissel v. Dept. of Health
and Human Services, 760 F3d 1, 10 (DC Cir 2014) (holding that the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) was not a “a bill for raising revenue” subject to the provisions of
Article I, section 7, of the United States Consitution, because the ACA’s revenue-
raising function was incidental to the ACA’s primary purpose of expanding
health care coverage for citizens of the United States); id. at 7-8 (noting more
recent trend across federal circuit courts), adh’d to on den of reh’g, No 13-5202,
2015 WL 6472205 (DC Cir Aug 7, 2015)); F.G. Madara, Annotation, Application
of Constitutional Requirement That Bills for Raising Revenue Originate in Lower
House, 4 ALR Fed 2d 973 (updated 2011) (listing state and federal cases).
Cases from Indiana, the source of Oregon’s Origination Clause, have consis-
tently held that the term “raising revenue” as it appears in Article IV, section 17,
of the Indiana Constitution, is “confined to acts to levy taxes, in the strict sense
of the word, and does not apply to bills for other purposes which may incidentally
create revenue.” Stith Petroleum Co. v. Dept. of Audit and Control of Indiana, 211
Ind 400, 404, 5 NE2d 517, 519 (1937). Most Indiana cases involve legislation that
the court ultimately deemed to only “incidentally raise revenue,” usually through
the imposition of a regulatory or punitive fee. See Andrews v. City of Marion, 221
Ind 422, 430, 47 NE2d 968, 971 (1943) (holding that the fact that an ordinance
imposes a charge for parking in the public street does not make it a revenue mea-
sure); Ennis v. State Highway Comm., 231 Ind 311, 323, 108 NE2d 687, 693 (1952)
(citing Northern Counties, 30 Or at 402) (act establishing toll roads was not “a bill
for raising revenue” but rather a fee constitutionally exercised under state police
power).
For surveys and articles on specific topics related to origination clauses
see generally J. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American
Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 Tulsa L Rev 165, 188 (1987) (“The state
courts have construed their respective origination clauses strictly[, determining
that] the following are not revenue bills: bills delegating taxing authority to local
institutions; bills which only incidentally raise revenue pursuant to an exercise
of the state’s police or regulatory power; and acts regulating or enforcing the
collection of taxes.” (Footnotes omitted.)); Thomas L. Jipping, Comment, TEFRA
and the Origination Clause: Taking the Oath Seriously, 35 Buff L Rev 633 (1986)
(discussing the history of the federal Origination Clause and its application to
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982); Rebecca M. Kysar, The
‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 Wash UL Rev 659
(2014) (discussing the Senate’s practice of striking House “shell bills” and replac-
ing the language of the bill passed by the House with the Senate’s own unrelated
revenue proposal—aka “a gut-and-stuff”); Paul Anthony Tortorici, Comment,
How to Raise Money: State Question 640, Revenue Bills, and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, 71 Okla L Rev 497 (2019) (discussing the impact of three recent
Oklahoma origination clause challenges on the legislative process in that
state).
Other states occasionally have invalidated laws on origination clause
grounds. E.g., H.A. Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth, 97 SW 366, 369, 123 Ky 740,
(1906) (senate bill imposing a sales tax on blended spirits struck down as viola-
tive of state’s origination clause); Dumas v. Bryan, 207 P 720, 721, 35 Idaho 557
(1922) (act providing for the removal of the state normal school to a new location

274 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
few exceptions,17 courts generally also have upheld bills
that change the tax base as not constituting bills for rais-
ing revenue. E.g., Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okla 761, 98
P 1002 (1908) (“omitted property” statute providing for the
discovery and assessment of property not previously listed
for taxation was not a bill for raising revenue), overruled on
other grounds by Fent v. Fallin, 2014 Okla 105, 345 P3d 1113
(2014); Cornelius v. State, 40 Okla 733, 140 P 1187 (1914)
(statute exempting certain real estate and imposing tax on
mortgages held not to be a revenue bill because the bill’s
principal purpose was not the raising of revenue); Leveridge
v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 Okla 77, 294 P2d 809 (1956) (stat-
ute removing a tax exemption for certain automobile models
owned by used car dealers held not to be a revenue bill);
Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n,
2017 Okla 64, 401 P3d 1152 (2017) (bill partially revoking
an exemption from sales tax on motor vehicles was not a bill
for raising revenue subject to the supermajority clause of the
Oklahoma constitution because it did not levy a new tax or
change an existing tax rate).
and levying a tax on all the taxable property within the state for specified years
to pay for the construction of new buildings made necessary by the removal held
to be an act to raise revenue); Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n,
2017 Okla 83, ¶ 24, 405 P3d 691, 700 (2017) (bill charging a fee for hybrid and
electric-drive vehicles was a revenue bill and not a “fee” because there was no
direct nexus between the fee and the government benefit being conferred on the
payor); Naifeh v. State ex rel Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 Okla 63, ¶ 48, 400 P3d 759,
774 (2017) (bill imposing a new $1.50-per-pack assessment on cigarettes was a
revenue bill subject to the origination clause because the measure both had the
“primary purpose of raising revenue for the support of state government and * * *
levied a new tax in the strict sense of the word”).
17 In reviewing cases holding that bills changing the tax base are bills for
raising revenue, the court observes that some of the cases arise in states whose
constitutions use the phrase in contexts that differ from, or that apply in addition
to, an origination requirement. See In re Opinions of the Justices, 190 So 824,
825, 238 Ala 289, 290 (1939) (interpreting Article IV, section 70, of the Alabama
Constitution, which prohibits “bills for raising revenue” from being passed during
the last five days of the session); Succession of Sala, 24 So 674, 678, 50 La Ann 1009,
1019 (1897) (interpreting Article III, section 16 (B), of the Louisiana Constitution,
which requires all bills for raising revenue or for appropriating money to originate
in the House of Representatives); see also Chadwick 99 Associates v. Dir, Div of
Taxation, 23 NJ Tax 390, 401 (2007) (interpreting state origination clause in case
brought under NJ Stat Ann section 1:7-1 to -7, which provides for citizen challenge
to a statute premised solely on its having been enacted contrary to the procedural
requirements of the New Jersey Constitution). For further discussion of origina-
tion clauses and their impact on the legislative process in these states see Medina,
23 Tulsa L Rev at 190 n 142, 203-04, 210 n 286.

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	275
C. 	Summary of Analytical Framework
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing 	authorities, 	the 	court
restates the analytical framework for determining whether
a bill is “for raising revenue” as follows: First, does the bill
collect or bring money into the treasury? Three examples
are bills that (a) “impose a new tax,” Bobo, 338 Or at 121;
(b) “increase an existing one,” id.; or (c) “eliminat[e] [an]
exemption,” City of Seattle, 357 Or at 732. If the bill does
not collect or bring money into the treasury, it is not a bill
for raising revenue, and there is no need to proceed with the
second part of the framework.
If the bill does bring money into the treasury, the
remaining question is whether the bill possesses the “essen-
tial features of a bill levying a tax.” This question must be
construed narrowly. Although no Oregon court has yet pro-
nounced a positive definition,18 Oregon case law clearly
excludes bills that (a) impose fees for governmental services,
Northern Counties, 30 Or at 403; (b) primarily regulate behav-
ior or legal relationships outside the area of taxation, impos-
ing fines, penalties, or other charges merely as an incident to
regulation, State v. Wright, 14 Or at 374; see also Barnum, 5
OTR at 523-24; or (c) “regulat[e]” a tax, as by the “assessment
or listing and valuation of the polls or property preliminary
thereto, * * * to secure what may be deemed a just or expe-
dient basis” for the tax, Northern Counties, 30 Or at 403. At
least when examining whether the bill “regulates” a tax or a
tax base, it is unnecessary to determine whether raising rev-
enue is the primary purpose or merely an incidental purpose
of the bill. City of Seattle, 357 Or at 735.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Does SB 1528 raise revenue?
The court’s task is to ascertain the intent of the leg-
islature by examining the text, context, and legislative his-
tory of SB 1528. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d
18 Justice Kistler, in his concurrence in City of Seattle, offered the following
affirmative definition: “[U]ntil today, this court has never adopted the specific
holding in Dundee [Mortgage]. * * * Under the federal district court’s reasoning in
Dundee [Mortgage], the only bill that would be a bill for raising revenue would be
the bill that set or changed the tax rate.” 357 Or at 740 (Kistler, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment in part).

276 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
1042 (2009). Using these tools within the analytical frame-
work of Bobo and City of Seattle, the court first examines the
text, context and legislative history to determine whether
SB 1528 collects or brings money into the treasury. Bobo,
338 Or at 122. The court readily concludes that it does. The
words that the legislature uses in a law are paramount to
understanding the legislature’s intention. State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (“[T]here is no more
persuasive evidence of the intent of the legislature than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression
to its wishes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). In the
case of SB 1528, the text of section 10 requires a taxpayer
to “add” an amount to federal taxable income that by law
the taxpayer otherwise would be allowed to “deduct.” See
Or Laws 2018, ch 108, § 10. Understood within its statutory
context, this “addition” increases “taxable income,” which
is the dollar amount by which Oregon’s income tax rate is
multiplied, resulting in the dollar amount of tax due. See
ORS 316.037(1) (imposing personal income tax on each res-
ident individual as a percentage of “taxable income”); ORS
316.022(6) (incorporating definition of “taxable income” in
IRC section 63 subject to Oregon-specific modifications);
ORS 316.037 (defining amount of tax as certain percentage of
“taxable income”); see generally ORS 316.007 (declaring leg-
islative intent). The legislative history is replete with projec-
tions of increases to the general fund that would result from
passage of SB 1528. See, e.g., SB 1528 -5, -7, -8, Estimated
Revenue Impacts Tables, Legislative Revenue Office (sub-
mitted to Senate Committee on Finance and Revenue on
Feb 9, 2018). The court views SB 1528 as analogous to the
bill at issue in City of Seattle that “eliminat[ed] the [prop-
erty tax] exemption.” In fact, SB 1528 even more clearly
brings money into the treasury because the tax involved is
the state income tax, which the state directly both imposes
and collects, as opposed to the property tax, which is regu-
lated by state law but imposed, collected, and spent solely
by local governments. See ORS 310.055(3) (authorizing each
taxing district to levy operating taxes on all taxable prop-
erty within its boundaries; see further discussion below).19
19 Taxpayers argue that SB 1528 brings revenue into the treasury because it
is analogous to a bill extending a tax that otherwise would “sunset,” i.e., expire

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	277
The department argues that SB 1528 does not bring
money into the treasury but merely preserves the revenue
“status quo.” According to the department, because SB 1528
became effective quickly, it prevented Section 199A(a) from
affecting Oregon taxpayers. The department’s interpre-
tation of “raising” revenue appears to require two things:
(1) that the bill increase revenue in comparison to a bench-
mark amount; and (2) that the benchmark amount be set
at the amount of revenue generated by the Oregon personal
income tax law without regard to both SB 1528 and Section
199A(a). 20 The court rejects these requirements as inconsis-
tent with Bobo and City of Seattle.
First, the dictionary definition of “raise” that the
Supreme Court cited in Bobo says nothing about an increase
in revenues relative to some other point in time or set of
circumstances. 338 Or at 120. It uses the synonyms “col-
lect,” “obtain,” and “bring.” Id. These words do not imply a
comparison. For example, they leave open the possibility
that a single bill that imposes a new kind of tax, while abol-
ishing an existing one, might “raise” revenue, even if the
amount collected by the new tax is projected to be less than
the amount that would have been collected by the tax being
repealed. 21 In other words, bills that provide for an overall
increase in revenue appear to be a subset of bills that “raise”
revenue in the sense of bringing it into the treasury. It seems
likely that this subset would readily satisfy the first test in
by a date specified in the law. Taxpayers point out examples of such exten-
sion bills (introduced before City of Seattle) that contain notations indicat-
ing that the legislature has determined that they are bills for raising reve-
nue. The court’s conclusion, that SB 1528 brings revenue into the treasury by
analogy to elimination of an exemption, makes it unnecessary to consider this
argument.
20 At various points, the department shortcuts the description of (2) by com-
paring to revenue generated under “2017” law, presumably because the amend-
ments to Section 199A(a) did not apply to tax years beginning before 2018.
21 Cf. Perry County v. Selma, M. & M. R. Co., 58 Ala 546, 557 (1877) (find-
ing a bill that decreased taxes to be a “bill for raising revenue” subject to
Alabama’s origination clause) (“It is clear to our minds that increase of revenue
is not implied in the language to ‘raise revenue.’ The transitive verb, ‘to raise,’
in this connection, means, ‘to bring together, to collect, to levy, to get together
for use or service; as to raise money, troops, and the like.’—Webst. Dictionary.
The precise meaning in this clause is, to levy a tax, as a means of collecting
revenue.”).

278 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
the court’s analytical framework, but other bills that do not
provide for an overall increase in revenue might as well.
Second, for a bill that does “increase” revenue over-
all, nothing in Bobo or City of Seattle sets the benchmark in
the manner the department asserts. City of Seattle strongly
suggests that the benchmark is the revenue that would have
been collected in the absence of the bill in question. It was
“by eliminating the 2005 tax exemption” that the bill in City
of Seattle brought money into the treasury. 357 Or at 732.
Thus, the court appeared to be comparing (a) projected rev-
enue after elimination of the exemption as required by the
bill to (b) projected revenue with the exemption as required
by prior law. To apply City of Seattle’s “but for” comparison
in this case, the court must determine what law would have
applied if the legislature had not adopted SB 1528.
The text of section 10 of SB 1528 makes this task
easy. Section 10 refers expressly to Section 199A(a), describ-
ing Section 199A(a) as “allow[ing] * * * a deduction” from
federal taxable income. Federal taxable income, as set forth
above, is the starting point in determining Oregon’s tax base,
subject to Oregon-specific modifications.22 The court readily
concludes that, if the legislature had not adopted SB 1528,
no addback would be required, and the deduction allowed by
Section 199A(a) would reduce the state’s tax receipts from
the group of affected taxpayers.
The department asks the court to apply the but-for
test in City of Seattle not to SB 1528 but instead to both
SB 1528 and Section 199A(a). The department points out
that the legislature acted quickly, which it undisputedly did,
passing SB 1528 shortly after Section 199A(a) became effec-
tive, and long before the April 15, 2019, due date for most
tax returns that would reflect a deduction under Section
199A(a). 23 But leaving aside the possibility that some tax-
payers might have acted on Oregon’s automatic connection
to Section 199A(a) during the first few months of 2018, before
22 “Federal taxable income,” as thus modified, is sometimes known as
“Oregon taxable income.” See, e.g., ORS 316.013.
23 The due date for a tax return filed by an individual or a trust or estate is
the 15th day of the 4th month after the end of the tax year. IRC § 6072(a); ORS
314.385(1)(a). Individuals generally are on a calendar year, hence April 15.

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	279
the Governor signed the bill on April 13, 24 SB 1528 does not
make Section 199A(a) simply disappear.
Section 199A(a), of course, remains part of federal
law. And because Section 199A(a) allows a deduction that
reduces federal “taxable income,” Oregon law continues to
incorporate Section 199A(a) into the definition of “taxable
income” for Oregon personal income tax purposes. See ORS
316.022(6) (defining “taxable income” by reference to IRC
section 63). This incorporation by reference of, or “connec-
tion” to, the federal definition of taxable income has been
an explicit policy goal of the legislature since 1969. ORS
316.007. The principle of connection is further strengthened
in a constitutional amendment, adopted in 1970 pursuant to
a legislative referral, that allows “rolling” reconnection to
the federal definition of taxable income. See Or Const, Art IV,
§ 32 (“Legislative Assembly * * * may define * * * income
* * * by reference to * * * laws of the United States, as the
same may be or become effective * * *.” (Emphasis added.)).
Rolling reconnection permits the legislature to define “tax-
able income” by automatically incorporating future changes
that Congress might make. 25 The legislature has done so
by incorporating the federal definition of “taxable income”
by reference to the Internal Revenue Code “as applicable to
the tax year of the taxpayer.” See ORS 316.012(2) (personal
income tax), ORS 317.010(7)(b) (corporate tax).
Rather than break this connection to federal tax-
able income, SB 1528 establishes an “addition” to federal tax-
able income. Additions, along with “subtractions” and other
“modifications” of federal taxable income, are a constitution-
ally contemplated workaround that the legislature has used
dozens of times to make its own policy decisions that are
24 For example, taxpayers might have adjusted their Oregon estimated tax
payments or withholdings, anticipating that they would owe less the following
April. Taxpayers on a “short” tax year (such as decedents or terminating partner-
ships or S corporations) might even have filed returns before the Governor signed
SB 1528. See IRS Pub 538 at 3.
25 Article IV, section 32, of the Oregon Constitution, proposed by the legisla-
ture in 1969 and adopted by the people in 1970, allows the legislature to do this
as an exception to the nondelegation doctrine. See Memorandum from Carlisle B.
Roberts on Constitutionality of Option Provision Contained in Legislative Draft
of ORS chapter 316 to Oregon Legislature (LS 2121) (Feb 8, 1967), on file with
Oregon State Archives.

280 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
different from those of Congress, or to reflect federal constitu-
tional limitations on Oregon’s taxing jurisdiction as a state. 26
But SB 1528 does not terminate the incorporation of federal
law, nor does it “freeze” the Internal Revenue Code at a date
prior to the enactment of the TCJA. 27 Instead, every year, for
as long as SB 1528 is in effect, every Oregon personal income
taxpayer eligible for the deduction under Section 199A(a) for
federal income tax purposes must (1) disclose to Oregon the
taxpayer’s federal taxable income, then (2) add the Section
199A(a) deduction amount back, in order to compute Oregon
taxable income. The court has no doubt that the legisla-
ture intended SB 1528 to completely undo the net economic
effect of Section 199A(a), and SB 1528 may well achieve that
result, but that does not mean that Section 199A(a) ceases to
exist for Oregon personal income taxpayers. Applying City
of Seattle, SB 1528 raises revenue because, under Oregon’s
“rolling reconnection” approach, in the absence of SB 1528
the deduction under Section 199A(a) would apply.
B. 	Does SB 1528 have the “essential features of a bill levying
a tax”?
The second issue in applying the Bobo framework is
whether SB 1528 has the “essential features of a bill levy-
ing a tax.” Here, the court need look no further than the
third category of exclusions identified in City of Seattle and
Northern Counties. It is clear to the court that SB 1528 is a
26 See Or Const, Art IV, § 32 (allowing “exceptions or modifications” to fed-
eral tax laws otherwise incorporated by reference into Oregon income tax law
to accommodate “state’s jurisdiction to tax and the revenue needs of the state”);
ORS 316.007(1) (expressing same policy); ORS 316.048 (Oregon resident taxed
on federal taxable income subject to “modifications” in ORS chapter 316); ORS
316.680 to 316.970 (compiling modifications).
27 SB 1528 stands in contrast to the legislature’s approach at the height of
the recent economic recession, when it passed a short-lived law that eliminated
“rolling reconnection” and instead incorporated the Internal Revenue Code as
it existed on a fixed date that safely preceded the enactment of major federal
tax-cutting economic stimulus provisions. See Or Laws 2009, ch 5, § 23 (defining
“taxable income” by reference to Internal Revenue Code “as * * * amended and
in effect * * * on December 31, 2008”); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, Pub L No 111-5, Div B, tit I §§ 1008, 1201-02, 1211, 123 Stat 115 (2009)
(among other changes, enlarging and accelerating deductions for purchases of
business equipment and other assets; generally applicable to tax years beginning
after December 31, 2008). The legislature reinstated rolling reconnection later in
the same legislative session, for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2011.
See Or Laws 2009, ch 909, §§ 25, 46.

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	281
tax base bill and therefore does not have the essential fea-
tures of a bill levying a tax. Like the law at issue in City of
Seattle, as well as the mortgage tax law that was at issue in
Dundee Mortgage and was discussed in Northern Counties,
SB 1528 “regulates” an existing tax by “secur[ing] * * * a
* * * basis” for that tax.28 30 Or at 403.
1. 	Text, context, and legislative history within the Bobo
framework
The text and context discussed above show that SB
1528 modifies the base of the Oregon personal income tax
by creating a new addition that modifies federal “taxable
income.” The statute imposing tax on the tax base is ORS
316.037, which plainly states: “A tax is imposed for each tax-
able year on the entire taxable income of every resident of
this state.” ORS 316.037(1)(a) (emphasis added) (defining tax
amount as graduated percentages of taxable income). 29 SB
1528 simply joins the ranks of numerous other addbacks, sub-
tractions, and other modifications to federal taxable income
that the legislature has created to modify the federal tax base
in order to enact the legislature’s own policy choices different
from those of Congress. See ORS 316.680 - 316.970.
Although there is ample legislative history concern-
ing the overall purposes of SB 1528, which taxpayers urge
the court to consider, 30 within the Bobo and City of Seattle
framework the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to
28 The court sees nothing supporting a conclusion that SB 1528 fits into the
fee-for-services exclusion or the exclusion for bills that primarily regulate behav-
ior or relationships. Neither party argues that it does.
29 Similarly, subsections (2) and (3) of ORS 316.037 explicitly impose tax on
part-year residents and nonresidents, respectively.
30 In post-oral argument submissions, the parties addressed the extent to
which this court, applying City of Seattle, should consider the primary purpose of
SB 1528. Taxpayers concluded, and the court agrees, that City of Seattle requires
the court to determine that the bill at issue levies a tax before the court can
examine whether the bill has the primary purpose of raising revenue. 357 Or at
735 (“However, under Bobo, our task is not to determine the primary legislative
purpose for enacting SB 495.”). Taxpayers apparently would add a “primary pur-
pose” analysis as a third step to Bobo’s two-part framework, if a court has decided
that a bill has the “essential features of a bill levying a tax.” This court does not
reach whether a third analytic step would be appropriate, because, as discussed
below, the court concludes that SB 1528 changes the existing personal income
tax base in a manner analogous to the change to the property tax base in City of
Seattle and thus lacks the essential features of a bill levying a tax.

282 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
discerning whether the legislative record is or is not con-
sistent with the court’s conclusion based on text and con-
text that the legislature intended to change the tax base.
The court finds the legislative history to be consistent with
that conclusion. Statements by legislators from both parties,
including vigorous floor debates, show that legislators were
aware that they were voting on whether Oregon law should
(a) incorporate the recently enacted federal deduction under
Section 199A(a); or (b) disconnect from that deduction. 31
2. 	Parties’ arguments
Taxpayers argue that SB 1528 does, in fact, impose
a tax. 32 (SB 1528 “impos[es] Oregon income tax on ‘the
amount allowable as a deduction under section 199A(a)’
* * *.”); (“SB 1528 created a legal obligation to pay a tax on
Section 199A(a) income at the rates set forth in statute the
instant it became law.”) These statements ignore the dis-
tinction that the Supreme Court has drawn between a bill
that levies or imposes a tax and one that changes the tax
base. Oregon does not impose its tax on the amount deducted
under Section 199A(a), the corresponding addback amount
under SB 1528, or even on “qualified business income” as
used in Section 199A(a). Rather, Oregon taxes federal “tax-
able income” as modified for Oregon purposes, which is
affected by a host of variables and thus may be dramatically
different from the amount a taxpayer deducts under Section
199A(a) and adds back under SB 1528. 33
31 The parties supplied the court with numerous exhibits from the legislative
record, as well as transcripts that they had prepared of the unusually extensive
floor debates in the Senate, (Transcript, Senate Floor Debate on SB 1528, Feb 23,
2018, 79th Legislative Assembly - 2018 Regular Session), as well as hearings from
the House Revenue Committee (Transcript, House Committee on Revenue, SB
1528, Feb 28, 2018, 79th Legislative Assembly - 2018 Regular Session), and debate
from the House (Transcript, House Floor Debate on SB 1528, Mar 2, 2018, 79th
Legislative Assembly - 2018 Regular Session).
32 As noted above, taxpayers’ argument is the predicate for their argument
that the court must determine the primary purpose of SB 1528.
33 For example, in the case of any particular taxpayer in any one year,
one or more of the Oregon subtractions or modifications might offset or exceed
the amount of the addback under SB 1528. An Oregon resident might claim a
$5,000 deduction under Section 199A(a), add it back to taxable income under
SB 1528, but have a total of $5,800 in Oregon-only subtractions for elderly med-
ical care expenses (see ORS 316.693) and contributions to Oregon’s college sav-
ings program or to an ABLE account (see ORS 316.699). Together, the latter two

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	283
Taxpayers’ assertion can be interpreted as making
the larger point that changing the tax base can increase
revenue as effectively as imposing a new tax or changing
a tax rate. This is certainly true as a matter of arithmetic.
For example, a bill that undoes widely used deductions such
as those for residential mortgage interest or charitable con-
tributions could increase state revenues significantly.34 On
an even larger scale, redefining “taxable income” to mean
gross receipts, without any deductions or exclusions, no
doubt would substantially expand the tax base, particularly
for individuals and other personal income taxpayers that
receive taxable income from a business, which presently is
measured net of business expenses. See IRC § 63 (“Except
[for individuals who do not itemize their deductions], ‘taxable
income’ means gross income minus the deductions allowed
by this chapter * * *.”); IRC § 162(a) (allowing as a deduction
for ordinary and necessary business expenses). Laws that
make these sorts of changes over a period of years might
incrementally transform a “traditional” net income tax
base into one that is not recognizable as such. All of these
changes, and more, 35 could occur without any amendment
to the “imposition” language and without altering the tax
rate percentages in ORS 316.037. However, the case before
the court does not involve the repeal of multiple deductions,
exemptions or exclusions, or a wholesale redefinition of the
tax base. Rather, the present case is a clear example of a
modification that adds back the amount of a single deduc-
tion, a change to the tax base that is well within the frame-
work of Bobo as applied in City of Seattle.
subtractions exceed the addback, making it logically impossible to attribute or
trace any tax liability to the addback amount. Other combinations of Oregon sub-
tractions might offset or exceed a taxpayer’s entire income, leaving no “taxable
income” and thus no tax, despite the addback.
34 See Oregon Department of Revenue, 2015-2017 Oregon Tax Expendi-
ture Report, at 10-11, 15, available at https://www.oregon.gov/DOR/programs/
gov-research/Pages/research-tax-expenditure.aspx (accessed Mar 14, 2019) (esti-
mating revenue impact of home mortgage and charitable contribution deductions
at, respectively, $970,300,000 and $651,000,000 for 2019-21 biennium).
35 Additional possible changes might include resetting the tax “brackets,”
i.e., the levels of taxable income at which personal income tax rates ranging from
5 percent to 9.9 percent apply, see ORS 316.037, or perhaps setting a minimum
level of personal income tax that is determined by some other measure, such as
gross receipts in the manner Oregon presently uses for C corporations. See ORS
317.090(2).

284 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
Taxpayers rely on Homebuilders Assoc. of Metro.
Portland v. Metro, 250 Or App 437, 444, 281 P3d 621 (2012).
That case involved a construction excise tax that the Metro
regional government adopted in 2006. Id. at 440. The 2007
Legislative Assembly enacted a law providing that a “local
government * * * may not impose a tax” on the privilege of
constructing real property improvements, but the 2007 law
excepted existing local taxes and allowed their extension or
continuation so long as the rate did not increase. Id. at 443
(quoting Or Laws 2007, ch 829, § 1(1)). Metro retained its
grandfathered tax and, in 2009, adopted amendments that,
among other things, “expanded the allowable uses of tax
proceeds [and] permitted payment of [Metro’s] administra-
tive expenses from those proceeds * * *.” Id. at 446. Plaintiffs
challenged the amendments, claiming that they were mate-
rial alterations that effectively imposed a new tax. Id. at
439. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge, holding
that the amendments did not “impose” a tax as prohibited
by the 2007 state law. Id. at 445. The court stated: “The
use of tax proceeds does not directly bear on the imposi-
tion of the charge, unlike, for instance, the class of persons
or things being taxed or the rate of the tax.” Id. (emphasis
added).
Taxpayers appear to rely on the view expressed in
the emphasized language in arguing that SB 1528’s change
to the tax base is equivalent to an increase in the rate, which
constitutes imposition of a tax, and thus bears the “essential
features of a bill levying a tax” for purposes of the second
test within the Bobo framework. This court disagrees. The
emphasized language, in the context of the larger opin-
ion, obviously is intended as an illustration, as no party in
Homebuilders appears to have asserted that Metro’s amend-
ments actually made any change to the “class of persons
or things being taxed.” More importantly, Homebuilders is
inapposite to this case. In Homebuilders, the issue involved
the scope of a prohibition that the legislature enacted and
that applied to local governments. Metro, not the legis-
lature, was the body imposing the tax. Therefore, neither
the Origination Clause nor the Supermajority Clause could
apply to Metro’s ordinance, as both clauses refer to chambers

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	285
of the Oregon Legislature. Accordingly, the Oregon Court
of Appeals had no reason to consider the Bobo framework
or any of the exclusions that the Oregon Supreme Court
has identified for state statutes being tested under either
clause.
Taxpayers also emphasize the amount of revenue
that SB 1528 is projected to raise—more than $1 billion over
a six-year period. This fact is well documented and is uncon-
tested. See, e.g., SB 1528 -B, Revenue Impact Statement,
Legislative Revenue Office (submitted to House Committee
on Revenue on Feb 28, 2018). However, City of Seattle fully
addresses this point: “As we stated in Bobo, the revenue
effect of a bill, in and of itself, does not determine if the
bill is a ‘bill[ ] for raising revenue.’ ” 357 Or at 736 (quoting
Bobo, 338 Or at 122). Taxpayers seek to distinguish City of
Seattle on the ground that the revenue projected from SB
1528 is orders of magnitude greater than in City of Seattle.
Taxpayers’ point may be factually correct, but taxpayers
point to no principle consistent with precedent that allows
such a distinction. Although the size of a revenue increase
may be useful as a factor in determining the legislature’s
primary purpose in enacting the law, this court, as dis-
cussed, has no occasion to examine the purpose or purposes
of SB 1528 because the act fits within the exclusion for tax
base bills, following City of Seattle.
Taxpayers argue that this court can distinguish
City of Seattle because SB 1528 involves a tax levied directly
by the state, while the taxes in City of Seattle were levied
locally, although pursuant to state law. (“[I]n City of Seattle,
the court * * * was able to readily conclude that a law repeal-
ing a property tax exemption, which did not create any legal
obligation to pay a charge without a subsequent local govern-
ment levy, was not a bill levying a tax.” (Emphasis added.))
(See Statement of Rietmann, Oral Argument, Oct 19, 2018,
10:15:30 (“The property tax system is different, you assess
the property and then the actual imposition, what creates
the obligation to pay the charge, is the levy.”)). The problem
with taxpayers’ argument is that the court in City of Seattle
was fully aware that Oregon property tax law functions as
an enabling act for localities—the department reminded

286 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
the court of that in its briefing36 —but the court declined to
base its holding on that feature of property tax law. Instead,
the court based its opinion on the fact that the bill at issue
merely “remove[d] a tax exemption” and thus only “collater-
ally provide[d] for assessment or regulation of levied taxes.”
357 Or at 735-36.
Taxpayers also ask the court to distinguish this
case from City of Seattle because that case did not involve
the Supermajority Clause. In Bobo, the court recounted that
the people added the Supermajority Clause in 1996, after
a legislative referral, and the court concluded that “noth-
ing in the text or context of [the Supermajority Clause] sug-
gests that the phrase ‘bills for raising revenue’ in Article IV,
section 25(2)[,] has a different meaning than it has in [the
Origination Clause].” 338 Or at 123. Taxpayers, citing the
more recent approach to constitutional interpretation set
forth in State v. Lane, 357 Or 619, 624, 355 P3d 914 (2015),
urge this court to examine the enactment history of the
Supermajority Clause, which the court in Bobo did not reach.
The court agrees with taxpayers that an examina-
tion of the enactment history of the Supermajority Clause is
appropriate. Under the Supreme Court’s current precedent,
this court must “interpret referred constitutional amend-
ments within the same basic framework [used for] statutes:
by looking to the text, context, and legislative history of the
amendment to determine the intent of the voters.” State v.
Sagdal, 356 Or 639, 642, 343 P3d 226 (2015). “The history
of a referred constitutional provision includes ‘sources of
information that were available to the voters at the time the
measure was adopted and that disclose the public’s under-
standing of the measure,’ such as the ballot title, arguments
included in the voters’ pamphlet, and contemporaneous news
reports and editorials.” Id. at 642-43 (quoting Ecumenical
Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559
36 In its Answering Brief in City of Seattle, the department argued that the
bill repealing the exemption did not levy a tax and contrasted that bill with ORS
310.055(3), which provides, in relevant part: “ ‘For tax years beginning on or after
July 1, 1998, each taxing district is authorized to levy the full amount of the oper-
ating taxes of the district on all taxable property within the boundaries of the
district.’ ” The department also made it clear that the property tax brings money
“into the treasury of counties around the state.”

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	287
n 8, 871 P2d 106 (1994)). The sources available to the public
may include any statements or documents introduced during
the legislative deliberation leading up to the referral to the
people, and the court should assign them whatever weight is
warranted in the circumstances, taking into account factors
such as their probative quality. See Lane, 357 Or at 634.
Taxpayers 	cite 	documents 	that 	the 	legislature
had before it when adopting and referring the proposed
Supermajority Clause in HJR 14 (1995), as well as excerpts
from the voters’ pamphlet on the referred measure, known as
“Measure 25,” which the people then approved in 1996. See
Exhibits H, I, Senate Committee on Rules and Elections, HJR
14, May 24, 1995 (submitted by Rep Ray Baum); Exhibits R,
S, Senate Committee on Rules and Elections, May 25, 1995
(submitted by Staff); Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Biennial
Primary Election, May 21, 1996. Before discussing those
documents, the court observes that neither party pointed
out that the text of HJR 14 underwent a significant amend-
ment that the court finds highly indicative of its mean-
ing. As originally introduced, the text of HJR 14 deviated
slightly from the wording of the Origination Clause: the text
originally referred to “bills raising revenue.” HJR 14 (1995)
(as introduced). In the latter part of the session, the House
Committee on Legislative Rules held a hearing on HJR 14
at which an attorney in the Office of Legislative Counsel
was invited to testify. The attorney stated: “If you want this
provision to apply whenever Article IV, section 18[,] applies,
the language here will do that, probably. If you want to be
certain of that, you’ll want to add the word ‘for’ at the end
of line 8.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Legislative
Rules, HJR 14, Apr 6, 1995, Tape 35, Side A (statement of
Dexter Johnson) (emphases added). The committee then did
exactly that. At the next hearing and work session three
weeks later, the committee approved an amendment insert-
ing the word “for,” rendering the phrase identical to that
in the Origination Clause. After HJR 14, as thus amended,
had passed the full House, the chair of the House commit-
tee, Representative Ray Baum, appeared before his counter-
part committee in the Senate, testifying that the bills cov-
ered by HJR 14 are “those that would have to [originate] in
the House under the constitutional provision that says that

288 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
bills involving revenue must originate in the House.” Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Rules and Elections, HJR
14, May 24, 1995, Tape 80, Side A (statement of Rep Ray
Baum). In response to a question whether HJR 14 would
apply to a fishing license fee increase, Representative Baum
answered no, because courts interpreting the same lan-
guage in the Origination Clause had reached that conclu-
sion. Id. The court finds that these statements and actions
strongly support the court’s conclusion in Bobo that the 1995
Legislative Assembly intended “bills for raising revenue” to
have the same meaning in the new Supermajority Clause as
in the existing Origination Clause. 37
Taxpayers refer to a 10-page memorandum dated
March 22, 1993, that was written by a law clerk within the
Office of Legislative Counsel and transmitted to the Senate
Rules and Elections Committee during the 1995 session for
consideration in connection with HJR 14. Memorandum
from Scott L. Shapiro to Jeannette K. Holman (Mar 22,
1993) (incorporated in Exhibit I, Senate Committee on
Rules and Elections, HJR 14, May 24, 1995 (submitted by
Rep Ray Baum)). The memorandum addresses the mean-
ing of “bills for raising revenue” in the Origination Clause,
surveying cases including Northern Counties and Mumford.
In the course of its exposition, the memorandum quotes the
discussion in Northern Counties of three types of bills that
are not “for raising revenue”: bills that impose fees for ser-
vices (referring to United States v. James), bills that reg-
ulate conduct (The Nashville), and bills that change a tax
base (Dundee Mortgage). Id. at 3-4. The memorandum goes
on to summarize numerous Oregon attorney general opin-
ions and non-Oregon cases involving the origination clauses
of the Indiana and federal constitutions, some of which also
involve bills setting fees for services, regulating conduct, or
37 The court notes that one senator (in the minority party) asked
Representative Baum whether HJR 14 would similarly restrict the legislature’s
ability to create or enhance “tax credits, exemptions, and deductions.” Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Rules and Elections, HJR 14, May 24, 1995,
Tape 80, Side B (statement of Sen Dick Springer). Representative Baum answered
in the negative, and the Senate committee later rejected an amendment proposed
by Senator Shirley Gold (also from the minority party) that would have amended
HJR 14 to that effect. Id. at May 25, 1995, Tape 82, Side A (statement of Sen
Shirley Gold).

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	289
establishing local port or school entities with tax-levying
authority. Id. at 5-10.
The memorandum concludes that the test for a bill
for raising revenue is whether raising revenue is the bill’s
“primary purpose” or merely an “incidental” purpose. Id. at
10. Oddly, however, the memorandum’s four-part test for
determining whether the purpose is incidental seems to
identify only whether the bill levies a fee for a specific gov-
ernment service. 38 Id. The test does not mention other types
of non-revenue-raising bills that the memorandum dis-
cusses. Although the memorandum poses the comprehen-
sive question of what constitutes a bill for raising revenue,
its conclusion lays out the elements only of the one exclusion
that had been squarely adjudicated in the Oregon Supreme
Court, namely the fee-for-service bill at issue in Northern
Counties.
The court assigns little weight to the 1993 mem-
orandum for purposes of this case. Assuming that legisla-
tors and the people accepted its description of the relevant
authorities and its conclusions, 39 the court finds nothing
in the memorandum that argues against the analysis in
Dundee Mortgage, or the remark in Mumford, both of which
were recounted favorably in Northern Counties, that a bill
changing the tax base is not one for raising revenue. The
conclusion in the memorandum is internally inconsistent,
or at least incomplete, in that it fails to identify a test (or
a set of tests) that applies to each of the kinds of bills it
discusses. Thus, while the legislators and the people may
have accepted the memorandum’s point that it is generally
necessary to identify the primary and incidental purposes
38 “The four-part test is: (1) Is there a fee that is paid; (2) Does the payer
receive something in return; (3) Is the thing received something other than ‘good
government’ enjoyed by everyone: and (4) May the payer choose not to pay the
fee and thus to give up the benefit afforded under law? If the answer to all four
questions is ‘yes’ then there is no requirement that the act under which authority
the fee is imposed must originate in the house of representatives.” Id.
39 Except for one brief mention by Representative Baum in a hearing, not-
ing that the memorandum existed, the court found no evidence in its review of
the legislative history of HJR 14 that the legislature debated its contents. Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Rules and Elections, HJR 14, May 24, 1995,
Tape 80, Side B (statement of Rep Baum). Neither party provided any evidence
that the memorandum was discussed during the referendum campaign.

290 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
of a bill, they would not necessarily have believed that it is
appropriate to do so in the case of a base-broadening bill.40
Excerpts 	from 	the 	voters’ 	pamphlet 	circulated
during the 1996 referendum campaigns for and against
Measure 25 make a wide range of statements. The offi-
cial explanatory statement submitted by the committee
appointed pursuant to ORS 251.215 (1995) states:
“Ballot Measure 25 would require that at least three-
fifths of the members of each house approve a bill for
raising revenue in order for it to pass. In the 30-member
Oregon Senate, this will increase from 16 to 18 the number
of Senators required to approve a bill which raises taxes.
In the 60-member Oregon House of Representatives, the
number of Representatives required will increase from 31
to 36.
“Ballot Measure 25 would apply only if a bill has a pri-
mary purpose of raising revenue. A bill that only inciden-
tally raises revenue and that has a primary purpose other
than raising revenue would not be subject to the three-
fifths vote requirement.”
40 Taxpayers also emphasize an excerpt from a staff measure summary dated
May 25, 1995: “ ‘This section[, i.e., the Origination Clause,] has been interpreted
to apply to bills whose primary purpose is to raise revenue, but not necessar-
ily all bills that result in revenue.’ ” Exhibit R, Senate Committee on Rules and
Elections, May 25, 1995 (submitted by Staff) (Taxpayers’ motion gives the date of
the staff measure summary as “April 25, 1995.”). That document, like the 1993
memorandum, is consistent with the Oregon Supreme Court’s conclusion in City
of Seattle that a “primary purpose” analysis is not required if the bill lacks the
essential features of a bill levying a tax because it merely changes the tax base.
Taxpayers later quote an excerpt from a revenue impact statement dated May 29,
1995, that contains a similar sentence and ends with: “ ‘For example, a tax rate
increase must start in the House, while a bill that creates a licensing board and
also imposes a fee can begin in either house.’ ” Revenue Impact Statement of HJR
14B (May 29, 1994). That passage adds only the unremarkable point that a rate
increase bill can be a bill for raising revenue.
In addition to citing specific documents, taxpayers also repeatedly charac-
terize the period in which the Supermajority Clause was enacted as a time of
“tax revolt.” Taxpayers do not explain or elaborate on this comment. The court
is aware that the voters adopted the constitutional change known as Measure
47 by initiative in 1996, and that the legislature revised it and referred it back
to the voters, who adopted it in 1997 as Measure 50. Or Const, Art XI, § 11. See
generally Flavorland Foods v. Washington County Assessor, 334 Or 562, 564-65,
54 P3d 582 (2002) (discussing background of Measures 47 and 50). Whatever
the contemporaneous passage of that property tax limitation measure might say
about voter sentiment toward taxes generally, it says nothing about the specific
issue here: whether the voters had any particular view about whether to treat a
tax base-broadening bill as a bill for raising revenue.

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	291
Voters’ Pamphlet at 23 (emphases added). This statement,
like the passage from the May 25, 1995, staff measure sum-
mary cited above, is unenlightening because it says nothing
about changes to the tax base and is otherwise consistent
with City of Seattle’s later conclusion that it is necessary
to analyze whether the bill has the essential features of a
bill levying a tax before undertaking a “primary purpose”
analysis.
The “Legislative Argument in Support,” submit-
ted by a legislative committee as required by a 1993 law,41
repeats the foregoing “primary purpose” statements nearly
word for word. Like the 1995 staff measure summary quoted
above, it also specifically emphasizes that bills imposing
higher tax rates or new taxes would be subject to the super-
majority requirement:
“Voting yes on Ballot Measure 25 will make it more
difficult for the Oregon legislature to increase tax rates or
to impose new taxes. Ballot Measure 25 would amend the
Oregon Constitution to require that three-fifths of the mem-
bers of both the Senate and the House of Representatives
vote for a bill for raising revenue, if the bill is to become
law. Ballot Measure 25 would thus ensure that higher tax
rates or new taxes could be passed by the legislature only
if there was broad consensus throughout the state on the
need for such measures.
“Voting yes on Ballot Measure 25 will not cause legis-
lative gridlock. The three-fifths vote requirement would
apply only to bills that have a principal purpose of raising
revenue. If a bill only incidentally raises revenue, the bill
would not be subject to the three-fifths vote requirement,
and would need only a simple majority of each house of
the legislature to pass. For example, a bill that increased
the penalty for being convicted of a particular crime from
$1,000 to $2,000 would raise revenue only incidentally to
the bill’s primary purpose of increasing a criminal sanction
and therefore would not be subject to the three-fifths vote
requirement. By contrast, a bill that raised income tax rates
from nine percent to ten percent would be a bill that had
as its principal purpose raising revenue; the bill would be
subject to the three-fifths vote requirement under Ballot
Measure 25.
41 See Or Laws 1993, ch 811, § 10.

292 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
“Adopting Ballot Measure 25 will result in a state gov-
ernment that is more responsive to the voters by limiting
the state’s ability to impose higher taxes or new taxes on
the public to only those cases where there is substantial
majority support for those taxes. We urge your support of
Ballot Measure 25.”
Id. at 24 (emphases added). The court finds nothing in the
Legislative Argument in Support that adds any insight as
to the people’s intentions with respect to a base-broadening
bill.
The 	voters’ 	pamphlet 	contains 	six 	additional
statements, all of which are in opposition to Measure 25.
Id. at 24-27. In addition to policy-based arguments, five of
these statements emphasize that the measure will apply
to a broad range of routine bills. A statement by Governor
Kitzhaber describes the measure as “vague” because “it is
unclear to which revenue issues Measure 25 would apply.”
Id. at 25. As an example, the Governor’s statement argues
that it is uncertain whether the measure would apply to a
bill that “lowers one tax, raises another but is revenue neu-
tral overall,” or whether the measure would “prevent Oregon
from keeping our tax code consistent with the federal code.”
Id. Other statements caution that the breadth of the mea-
sure would result in “government gridlock,” id. at 26 (state-
ment of Oregon Public Employees Union), and “minority
rule,” id. at 24 (statement of Oregon Education Association),
and that is “undemocratic,” id. at 26 (statement of Oregon
School Boards Association; Confederation of Oregon School
Administrators). Two statements warn that Measure 25
would subject bills imposing fees for government services to
the supermajority requirement, such as a hypothetical “fee”
imposed on “a large company [that is] a heavy user of water,”
id. at 24, or a charge imposed on teachers to pay for a crimi-
nal background check at the time of licensure, id., or “safety
and environmental inspection charges, and fees required to
operate many enforcement divisions of state government,”
id. at 25.
Three of the statements in opposition appear to
address base-broadening bills specifically, arguing that
Measure 25 would impair the legislature’s ability to “repeal
* * * an excessive corporate or special interest tax credit,”

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	293
id. at 25, “eliminat[e] a tax break,” or “revis[e] * * * the tax
credits and exemptions [that the state] grants to encourage
economic growth,” id. at 27 (statement of Human Services
Coalition of Oregon). One of these implies that courts might
require the legislature to apply a “primary purpose” test in
order to determine whether a bill changing a tax “break”
is a bill for raising revenue. Id. at 26 (statement argues
that attempts to apply that test would create confusion
and uncertainty for the legislature). The Human Services
Coalition of Oregon’s statement contains a similar implica-
tion, stating that “fairly common” “minor revenue revisions,”
such as “revisions to the tax credits and exemptions [that
the state] grants to encourage economic growth,” would
become “impossible” under Measure 25. Id. at 27.
Considering 	all 	of 	the 	enactment 	history, 	the
court first concludes that the people certainly intended to
require a supermajority for bills that “increase tax rates or
* * * impose new taxes,” a consequence that the proponents
expressly predicted and the opponents did not dispute. See
id. at 24. The court also concludes that the people intended
to incorporate into Measure 25 the courts’ then-existing
interpretations of “bills for raising revenue” as used in the
Origination Clause, and to cause the phrase to be inter-
preted identically for purposes of both clauses in the future.
The legislature’s one-word amendment of HJR 14 to conform
precisely to that phrase, based on the advice of counsel to
make the amendment “[i]f you want this provision to apply
whenever Article IV, section 18[,] applies,” leaves little room
for doubt. The court has found nothing in the enactment his-
tory at odds with these basic conclusions.
The court’s remaining task is to determine spe-
cifically whether the opponents’ arguments in the vot-
ers’ pamphlet evince an intention of the people that base-
broadening bills are bills for raising revenue and thus
require a supermajority vote. The court starts by not-
ing that the voters rejected the opponents’ position and
approved Measure 25. However, that fact gives the court no
evidence of the voters’ intention on the issues in this case,
as the record does not reveal whether the voters approved
Measure 25 because they (a) disbelieved the opponents’
arguments and viewed Measure 25 as applying only to bills

294 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
levying new taxes or increasing tax rates; (b) were skepti-
cal of, or indifferent to, the opponents’ arguments and were
willing to take the risk that Measure 25 might slow down
or prevent some base-broadening bills; or (c) enthusiastically
believed the opponents’ arguments and wanted to stop as
many base-broadening bills as possible. Possibly, the voters
who approved Measure 25 comprised persons holding a mix
of these and other views.
The court next weighs the “ ‘substance and proba-
tive quality’ ” of the opponents’ arguments against the other
information available to the people. See Lane, 357 Or at 634
(quoting Gaines, 346 Or at 172). The opponents’ arguments
contain little or no analysis or reasoning; indeed, the space
limitations in the voters’ pamphlet do not lend themselves
to extended analysis.42 Voters comparing the statements
to court decisions, or even to the summaries in the 1993
memorandum of the Office of Legislative Counsel, would
have found the voters’ pamphlet arguments to be insubstan-
tial at best. The warnings that Measure 25 would apply to
bills that broaden the tax base by repealing tax “breaks”
contain no reasoning, and they run counter to the holding
in Dundee Mortgage, recounted in Northern Counties, as
well as the Supreme Court’s own statement in Mumford.43
Similarly, the court assigns little weight to the implication
that a “primary purpose” analysis is necessary in the case of
a base-broadening bill, as the statement does not attempt to
deal with the question of whether such a bill has the essen-
tial features of a bill levying a tax. The opponents’ state-
ments do not persuade the court that the voters intended to
treat a base-broadening bill as one for raising revenue.
Finally, taxpayers urge the court to look to the leg-
islature’s “longstanding contemporaneous interpretation”
of the Origination and Supermajority Clauses to determine
42 Each statement was limited to 30 square inches or 325 words. Or Laws
1993, ch 811, § 11.
43 The warnings about base-broadening bills also suffer from bad company:
they appear adjacent to, or even in the same argument with, warnings that the
new Supermajority Clause would apply to fees for services. The latter warnings
plainly contradict the holding in Northern Counties, the conclusions of the 1993
Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, and the testimony of Representative
Baum on HJR 14 itself. Voters’ Pamphlet at 13-27.

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	295
whether SB 1528 is a bill for raising revenue. Taxpayers
make this point in both their opening brief and on reply,
seeking to rebut the department’s contentions that SB 1528
does not “raise revenue.” Taxpayers use the same phrase
when asserting that SB 1528 lacks the essential features
of a bill levying a tax. Taxpayers’ argument appears to con-
flate three concepts: (1) that the legislature’s “contempora-
neous” interpretation of a constitutional provision (i.e., an
interpretation adopted at about the same time as the con-
stitutional provision) offers insight as to the meaning of
the constitutional provision; (2) that the court should defer
to the legislature’s longstanding practical construction of
a statute, especially when rights have accrued in reliance
upon it;44 and (3) that the court should defer to the legisla-
ture’s interpretation of the constitution to the same extent
that courts defer to an administrative agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute. In this case, the court finds none of these
concepts persuasive, separately or in combination.
As to the first concept, when a constitutional pro-
vision’s meaning is unclear, a court may look to a contem-
poraneous construction of the provision by the legislature,
especially where the construction has prevailed for a long
period. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 US 898, 905,
117 S Ct 2365, 138 L Ed 2d 914 (1997) (“[C]ontemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution * * *, acquiesced in
for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its
provisions.” (Citation omitted; ellipsis in Printz.)). However, a
review of Oregon case law on this doctrine makes clear that
in order for a court to give weight to the legislature’s con-
temporaneous construction of a constitutional provision, the
legislature must first act with regard to the constitutional
44 In Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 78 Or 503, 521-22, 154 P 106
(1915), the Oregon Supreme Court quoted Judge Cooley on doctrines (1) and (2):
“[W]here a particular construction has been generally accepted as correct, and
especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of
the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong presumption exists that the
construction rightly interprets the intention. And where this has been given by
officers in the discharge of their official duty, and rights have accrued in reliance
upon it, which would be divested by a decision that the construction was erro-
neous, the argument ab inconvenienti is sometimes allowed to have very great
weight.” Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which
Rests Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 67 (1868).

296 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
provision at issue. Generally, the legislature acts for pur-
poses of this doctrine by enacting an implementing statute
meant to carry into effect the substantive right guaran-
teed by the preexisting constitutional provision or a statute
otherwise construing the constitutional provision. See, e.g.,
Thielke v. Albee, 79 Or 48, 52, 153 P 793 (1916) (passage of a
1907 act by the legislature providing for carrying into effect
the referendum powers reserved by the people in the state
constitution, as well as the operating charters of numerous
Oregon cities over the course of a nine-year period, are evi-
dence of long-standing contemporaneous construction on
which the people of Portland and numerous municipalities
could rely); State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or 163,
177-79, 269 P2d 491 (1954) (citing State v. Swain, 147 Or
207, 214, 31 P2d 745 (1934) (1864 act by legislature enacting
code of criminal procedure held to have constituted a legis-
lative construction or definition of a constitutional provision
adopted in 1857).
The court first notes that the Oregon Supreme
Court on multiple occasions has called into question the
utility of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction. See
State ex rel. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or 277, 284, 613
P2d 23 (1980) (“Contemporaneous legislative actions should
not necessarily be given much weight when construing con-
stitutional principles.”); State of Oregon v. Kuhnhausen, 201
Or 478, 517, 266 P2d 225 (1954) (determination of whether
a trial is “speedy” for purpose of the constitutional provi-
sion is a judicial question and not within the powers of the
legislature to contemporaneously define by statute); State v.
Harberts, 331 Or 72, 89-90, 11 P3d 641 (2000) (legislature
could not nullify through statutory construction the state’s
constitutional obligation under Article I, section 10, to bring
an accused to trial without delay).
Even if the court were to rely on the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction, its application is not appro-
priate to the facts of this case. In the 162 years since the
Origination Clause was adopted, the legislature has never
found occasion to pass a single statute implementing or
interpreting its meaning. There is simply nothing to which
the court could apply the doctrine. As to the Supermajority

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	297
Clause, the idea for the clause originated in the legislature.
The court finds the legislative history of the referred resolu-
tion, HJR 14, truly “contemporaneous” and more persuasive
than any later interpretation. See DISH Network Corp. v.
Dept. of Rev., 364 Or 254, 260 n 7, 434 P3d 379 (2019) (sug-
gesting that an implementing statute enacted by the same
legislature that drafted Measure 50 and referred it to voters
may provide context for understanding the constitutional
text of Article XI, section 11, but that “[t]he wording adopted
by the voters clearly controls any constitutional question”).
In any event, taxpayers offer as examples only bills enacted
more than 10 years after the Supermajority Clause. See
HB 2922 (2007); HB 2698 (2009); HB 3115 (2009); HB
3164 (2009); HB 3309 (2009); HB 3372 (2013). Taxpayers
correctly point out that each of these bills, like SB 1528,
would have added back various items otherwise excluded or
deducted from federal taxable income, and each includes a
statement in its title that it is subject to the Supermajority
Clause. E.g., HB 3372 (2013) (“Requires addition to taxable
income for Oregon tax purposes of amounts attributable
to controlled foreign corporations and excluded from fed-
eral taxable income because of operation of certain federal
law. * * * Relating to tax treatment of income attributable
to controlled foreign corporations; and providing for reve-
nue raising that requires approval by a three-fifths majority.”
(Emphases added.)). However, the court questions whether
bills introduced more than 10 years later reflect any partic-
ular insight into the people’s understanding of Measure 25
at the time of adoption in 1996 (much less their understand-
ing of the Origination Clause). The Oregon Supreme Court
has declined to consider the views of a later legislature as
to the people’s and the legislature’s intentions some seven
years earlier. See Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or
101, 134, 36 P3d 954 (2001), modified on recons, 334 Or 11, 45
P3d 107 (2002) (“The fact that the legislature that proposed
Measure 50 to the people and enacted its implementing leg-
islation might have held a different view does not inform our
analysis of Measure 5 and, therefore, cannot dictate deriv-
atively how we interpret Measure 50.”); see also Suzanne L.
Abram, Note, Problems of Contemporaneous Construction
in State Constitutional Interpretation, 38 Brandeis LJ 613,

298 	Boquist v. Dept. of Rev.
635 (2000) (“States sharply diverge, however, as to whether
courts should give prior interpretations or subsequent inter-
pretations weight if there is no interpretation of the consti-
tutional provision at the moment of its adoption.” (Emphases
omitted.)).
The second of taxpayers’ concepts relies on the
“longstanding” nature of the legislature’s interpretation
of the Supermajority Clause. Taxpayers point out that the
Office of Legislative Counsel advised Gary Wilhelms of the
House Republican Office in 2011 that a telecommunications
tax bill that would have broadened the base of the tax by
“impos[ing] the tax on services not currently subject to the
9-1-1 tax” must satisfy the Origination and Supermajority
Clauses. Letter from Dexter A. Johnson, Legislative Coun-
sel Committee, to Gary Wilhelms at 2 (March 16, 2011).
Taxpayers also cite the 2014 edition of the Office of Legislative
Counsel’s Drafting Manual, which stated that “[a] bill that
repeals a tax credit, exemption or other tax benefit may be a
bill for raising revenue if the primary purpose of the bill is
to raise revenue for general government use. If the repeal is
for another purpose, to eliminate an unused credit for exam-
ple, the bill is not a bill for raising revenue.” Legislative
Counsel Committee, Bill Drafting Manual 192 (17th ed 2014)
(internal footnote omitted). On the other hand, a memoran-
dum from the Office of Legislative Counsel to Senator Ted
Ferrioli dated February 1, 2016, describes the shift away
from that view in light of the court’s recent decision in City of
Seattle. Memorandum from Dexter A. Johnson, Legislative
Counsel Committee, to Sen Ted Ferrioli at 2-6 (Feb 1, 2016);
see also id. at 7-8. Taxpayers cite the 2016 memorandum as
an exhibit to the original complaint, and they cite no bills
introduced after the Supreme Court’s City of Seattle decision
that include the supermajority language.
Taxpayers’ examples clearly show that, before City
of Seattle, the legislature’s attorneys regularly advised that
“addback” bills like SB 1532 were bills for raising revenue
for purposes of the Supermajority Clause. The court finds
this unsurprising and unpersuasive. Given the limited num-
ber of cases and other authorities interpreting either clause
and the lack of an Oregon state court case determining
whether a base-broadening bill is a bill for raising revenue,

Cite as 23 OTR 263 (2019) 	299
the court presumes that the legislature’s attorneys crafted
their advice to help their client minimize the risk that a
court would declare that a bill had violated either clause.
The 2016 letter to Senator Ferroli changing this advice
in light of City of Seattle illustrates this point. While the
pre-City of Seattle advice may have been perfectly sound as a
guideline to future conduct, it does not inform the court how
to apply the law when a violation is alleged to have occurred.
Taxpayers’ last contention, that this court should
defer to the legislature’s interpretation of the constitution
to the same extent that courts defer to an administrative
agency’s interpretation of a statute, does not apply here.
Taxpayers cite no authority supporting the legal principle
for which taxpayers contend. Factually, in the case of the
Origination Clause, there is nothing to which the court
could defer because the legislature has not acted. In the
case of the Supermajority Clause, the evidence of a legisla-
tive interpretation that taxpayers offer—bill language and
legal advice—indicates that the legislature and its attor-
neys changed their interpretation after the Supreme Court
issued its decision in City of Seattle. Again, there is no con-
sistent legislative stance to which the court could defer.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Under the analytical framework that the Oregon
Supreme Court has established in Bobo and applied in City
of Seattle, SB 1528 is not “a bill for raising revenue” for pur-
poses of the Origination or Supermajority Clauses. SB 1528
brings money into the treasury but lacks the essential fea-
tures of a bill levying a tax because it changes the base of
the personal income tax.
Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied.