Stephen Mattatall v. State of Rhode Island

Supreme Court
No. 2005-318-Appeal.
(KM01-1022)
Stephen Mattatall 	:
v.
State of Rhode Island. 	:
NOTICE: 	This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

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Supreme Court
No. 2005-318-Appeal.
(KM01-1022)
Stephen Mattatall 	:
v.
State of Rhode Island. 	:
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Robinson for the Court. The applicant, Stephen Mattatall, appeals to this Court
from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 	On appeal, the applicant contends:
(1) that the hearing justice erred in declining to recuse himself with respect to Mr. Mattatall’s
application for postconviction relief; and (2) that the Alford1 plea made by applicant in 1979
when faced with a reckless driving charge was not made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, and therefore should not have been used as a predicate for sentencing the applicant
under the habitual offender statute when, several years later, he was convicted of second-degree
murder.
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on April 8, 2008, pursuant to
an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal
should not be summarily decided. After considering the record, the memoranda submitted by the
parties, and the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown
and that the case should be decided at this time.
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); see also note 4, infra.

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For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
In 1983, applicant was charged with the murder of one John Scanlon, whose body had
been found in applicant’s home on the morning of September 24, 1982. 	Following a jury trial,
applicant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he was sentenced to a term of forty
years imprisonment, with thirty years to serve and the balance suspended with probation. 	The
trial justice also imposed an additional ten-year sentence pursuant to the habitual offender
statute.2 The applicant appealed his conviction to this Court, which reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial. State v. Mattatall, 510 A.2d 947 (R.I. 1986).3
A second jury trial, which began in September of 1987, ended in a mistrial due to
applicant’s behavior in the courtroom, for which he was held in contempt of court.
Finally, following a third jury trial in 1988, applicant was found guilty of second-degree
murder and was sentenced to a term of sixty years imprisonment, with fifty years to serve and the
2 General Laws 1956 § 12-19-21 (commonly referred to as the “habitual offender statute”)
provides in pertinent part:
“(a) If any person who has been previously convicted in this or
any other state of two (2) or more felony offenses arising from
separate and distinct incidents and sentenced on two (2) or more
occasions to serve a term in prison is, after the convictions and
sentences, convicted in this state of any offense punished by
imprisonment for more than one year, that person shall be deemed
a ‘habitual criminal.’ 	Upon conviction, the person deemed a
habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult
correctional institutions for a term not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years, in addition to any sentence imposed for the offense of which
he or she was last convicted.”
3 After granting the state’s petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court directed
this Court to reconsider one aspect of its decision (viz., the right to counsel issue) in light of the
decision in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). Rhode Island v. Mattatall, 479 U.S. 879
(1986) (mem.). 	Upon reconsideration, this Court reaffirmed its initial ruling and remanded the
case to the Superior Court for a new trial. State v. Mattatall, 525 A.2d 49 (R.I. 1987).

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balance suspended with probation. 	The trial justice also sentenced applicant to an additional
twenty-year term pursuant to his status as an habitual offender. 	This Court affirmed his
conviction in State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 1992); that opinion contains a thorough
recitation of the facts and procedural history with respect to applicant’s trial and eventual
conviction of second-degree murder.
After this Court’s affirmance of his conviction, applicant filed a pro se application for
postconviction relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1, alleging over thirty separate grounds for
relief, including prosecutorial misconduct and “[c]onspiracy and [i]neffectiveness.” 	A hearing
was held on September 28, 2004, at the conclusion of which the hearing justice found that the
application was “wholly meritless, groundless, and must be denied.” 	An order reflecting that
determination was entered on October 7, 2004.
Before his first application was denied by the Superior Court, applicant filed a second pro
se application for postconviction relief on November 29, 2001. 	In that second application, he
contended that the enhancement of his second-degree murder sentence pursuant to the habitual
offender statute was improperly predicated in part on his prior felony conviction for reckless
driving, death resulting. 	That conviction resulted from applicant’s Alford plea,4 but his second
4 Two previous convictions triggered applicant’s classification as an habitual offender
pursuant to § 12-19-21.
Although it is not entirely clear from the record before us, it appears that the first
conviction relied on by the trial justice was for assault with a dangerous weapon; that conviction
is not at issue in the instant case. See State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1116 (R.I. 1992).
The second conviction was for reckless driving, death resulting, pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
31-27-1. 	In 1979, the applicant was found guilty by a jury of reckless driving, death resulting;
however, the trial justice vacated the jury’s verdict and granted applicant’s motion for a new
trial. 	In so doing, the trial justice stated that it was his belief that there was contradictory
evidence as to whether or not applicant had been the operator of the motor vehicle that was
involved in the accident. 	Following the grant of the motion for a new trial, applicant

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application contended that that plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The
applicant also argued that, because he “didn’t commit” the offense of reckless driving, death
resulting, “he should not and cannot be deemed a repeat offender” for purposes of sentencing
pursuant to the habitual offender statute.
Although applicant filed his second application for postconviction relief in Kent County,
the matter was subsequently transferred to Providence County to the justice of the Superior Court
who had presided over the third murder trial. The applicant then moved to recuse that justice and
to have his application assigned for hearing by another judicial officer, whom he specifically
identified. In support of that two-pronged motion, applicant alleged: (1) that the justice to whom
the case was assigned was biased against him and (2) that the trial justice who accepted
applicant’s Alford plea in the 1979 reckless driving case should rule on any challenge to that
immediately informed the trial justice that he wished to enter an Alford plea, which the court
accepted.
The United States Supreme Court in Alford upheld a procedure whereby a court may
accept a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty from a defendant, even though the defendant
maintains his or her innocence, provided that the trial justice determines that the state has
presented a factual foundation for the plea on the basis of evidence other than the defendant’s
own admission. Alford, 400 U.S. at 36-38; State v. Fontaine, 559 A.2d 622, 624 (R.I. 1989); see
also Azevedo v. State, 945 A.2d 335, 338-39 (R.I. 2008); Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 242
(R.I. 2003); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1118 n.6 (R.I. 1992). 	As this Court has made
clear on numerous occasions:
“[A]lthough 	a 	criminal 	defendant 	may 	be 	relieved 	of 	the
embarrassment of admitting participation in the crime or comforted
by the fact that he or she has maintained his innocence and the
victim sometimes is left in a quandary about what occurred during
the plea proceeding, the result is abundantly clear: the defendant
stands convicted of the crime.” 	Armenakes, 821 A.2d at 242; see
also Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1118.
A conviction based on an Alford plea may later be used “for any legitimate purpose, including
sentencing factors and enhancement, impeachment, and in collateral proceedings, such as
deportation.” Armenakes, 821 A.2d at 242.

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plea. On May 9, 2002, the hearing justice entered an order denying applicant’s motion to recuse
and to reassign.5
Thereafter, on October 26, 2005, the hearing justice denied Mr. Mattatall’s second
application for postconviction relief. 	The hearing justice noted that applicant had previously
challenged the use of his 1979 conviction as a predicate for the imposition of an additional
sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute, which argument had been rejected by both the
Superior Court and subsequently by this Court in State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 1992).
Accordingly, the hearing justice concluded that consideration of the second application was
precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. 	The hearing justice also stated that he had heard and
denied applicant’s previous application for postconviction relief and that he could “conceive of
no grounds nor any compelling interests of justice that entitle [applicant] to another post-
conviction entreaty.”6 It is from this denial of his second application for postconviction relief
that applicant timely appealed.
On appeal, applicant contends that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion to
recuse and his motion to have his application for postconviction relief reassigned. 	The
5 The applicant sought interlocutory review by this Court of the denial of his motion to
recuse and to reassign; his petition for certiorari was denied on May 27, 2004.
6 In rejecting applicant’s second postconviction relief application, the court also observed
“that the offense that [applicant] has targeted was committed some twenty-four years ago.”
Citing and quoting from this Court’s decision in Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391, 394 (R.I. 2005),
the hearing justice went on to state in dictum that the “ ‘venerable defense of laches’ may well be
an appropriate vehicle that would, in any event, preclude the defendant’s latest imprecation.”
We agree with the hearing justice’s assessment concerning the defense of laches. In our
estimation, it would have been entirely appropriate for the state to have raised the affirmative
defense of laches in an instance such as this where an applicant is challenging an event that took
place so many years ago. There comes a time when the “prejudice” precondition to a finding of
laches can be presumed. Northern Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Review of Westerly, 899 A.2d
517, 520 (R.I. 2006) (mem.) (“Given the egregious nature of the delay * * *, presuming
prejudice to [the adverse party] gives us no pause.”).

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applicant’s specific contentions are: (1) that “it is neither appropriate nor the normal procedure
for someone other than the judge who took the plea that is being challenged on post-conviction
relief to consider a defendant’s application, unless the original judge is unavailable for reasons
such as death or retirement;” (2) that assignment of an application for postconviction relief to the
original trial justice is mandatory; and (3) that the justice who denied his second application for
postconviction relief should have recused himself because, in applicant’s estimation, he was
biased against applicant.
The applicant also contends that his 1979 Alford plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily and that his claim at to this issue is not precluded by the doctrine of
res judicata.
Standard of Review
Section 10-9.1-1 provides that the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any
person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction
violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material
facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.7 Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d
850, 855 (R.I. 2007). 	In reviewing a hearing justice’s determination with respect to an
application for postconviction relief, this Court will not disturb the findings of the hearing justice
“absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material
evidence.” State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 993 (R.I. 2002); see also Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d
7 An applicant who files an application for postconviction relief bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted. See, e.g., Gonder v.
State, 935 A.2d 82, 84 n.1 (R.I. 2007); Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I. 2007); see also
Estrada v. Walker, 743 A.2d 1026, 1029 (R.I. 1999); Jacques v. State, 669 A.2d 1124, 1129 (R.I.
1995).

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82, 84-85 (R.I. 2007); Doctor v. State, 865 A.2d 1064, 1067 (R.I. 2005); Ouimette v. State, 785
A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I. 2001).
At the same time, however, “questions of fact concerning whether a defendant’s
constitutional rights have been infringed, and mixed question of law and fact with constitutional
implications, are reviewed de novo.” 	Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Gonder, 935 A.2d at 85. 	Nevertheless, as we have emphasized on numerous
occasions, in conducting our review, we still accord great deference to a hearing justice’s
findings of historical fact and to inferences drawn from those facts, even when the de novo
standard is applied with respect to issues of constitutional dimension. See Gonder, 935 A.2d at
85; Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993; Ouimette, 785 A.2d at 1135.
Analysis
I
The Motion to Recuse and Reassign
Before we address applicant’s contentions, we pause to note that he has not provided a
transcript of the hearing on his motion to recuse and reassign.8 This Court has declared on
numerous occasions that it is “ ‘risky business’ for a party to appeal without providing the Court
with a transcript of the Superior Court proceedings.” 	West v. Town of Narragansett, 926 A.2d
1021, 1023 (R.I. 2007) (mem.); see also Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228
(R.I. 2007); Sentas v. Sentas, 911 A.2d 266, 270 (R.I. 2006); 731 Airport Associates, LP v. H &
M Realty Associates, LLC, ex rel. Leef, 799 A.2d 279, 282 (R.I. 2002). 	Nevertheless, in this
instance, 	the 	Superior 	Court’s 	order 	denying 	applicant’s 	motion 	to 	recuse 	and 	reassign
sufficiently sets forth the hearing justice’s reasoning to permit us to review same.
8 The applicant also failed to provide this Court with the transcript of the sentencing
hearing during which the trial justice made the statements that applicant alleges were biased and
that were the basis for his motion to recuse.

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A
Recusal
The applicant contends that the hearing justice should have recused himself because his
impartiality was uncertain given the fact that, when sentencing him in the underlying murder
case, the hearing justice had made a number of unfavorable comments with respect to applicant’s
character and credibility. In support of his claim, applicant points to Article VI, Canon 3E of the
Supreme Court Rules of Judicial Conduct, which states that a judicial officer is required to
“disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the [judicial officer’s] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where * * * (a) the [judicial
officer] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party * * *.”
This Court has stated on several occasions that judicial officers are obligated to recuse if
they are “unable to render a fair or an impartial decision in a particular case.” 	Kelly v. Rhode
Island Public Transit Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999); see also Ryan v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I. 2008); In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653
(R.I. 1992). 	“At the same time, however, justices have an equally great obligation not to
disqualify themselves when there is no sound reason to do so.” Ryan, 941 A.2d at 185; see also
Kelly, 740 A.2d at 1246; State v. Clark, 423 A.2d 1151, 1158 (R.I. 1980). The burden is on the
party seeking recusal to establish that the judicial officer possesses a “personal bias or prejudice
by reason of a preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his [or her]
impartiality seriously and to sway his [or her] judgment.” Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608,
621, 375 A.2d 911, 917 (1977); see also Ryan, 941 A.2d at 185; Kelly, 740 A.2d at 1246.
In support of his contention that the hearing justice was biased against him, applicant
points to two statements made by the hearing justice when he sentenced applicant in 1988
pursuant to the habitual offender statute. 	First, after citing fourteen separate instances of

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misconduct committed by applicant between August of 1985 and May of 1987, the trial justice
stated:
“[W]hat clearly surfaces from the various reports of misconduct is
an individual who reflects an attitude of hostility and a propensity
for violent and volatile behavior, with numerous instances of
abusive and threatening conduct.”
The applicant also points to the trial justice’s observations with respect to applicant’s conduct
during the murder trial:
“[T]he defendant lied under oath at trial. 	It’s clearly implied by
the jury’s verdict. If it wasn’t clearly implied, then you need only
look further to the Defendant’s spurious motions to take a sodium
pentothal test to somehow support a new story that he has as to
how the victim was killed.”
In his order denying applicant’s motion to recuse in the instant case, the hearing justice
made the following observation:
“Every sentencing judge is affirmatively obliged to set forth
reasons for imposing a sentence, particularly where, as here, the
habitual offender statute mandates that an additional incarceration
penalty be imposed.
“When a defendant is convicted of murder and is subject to
increased incarceration, it may be expected that the sentencing
judge’s remarks will, perforce, be somewhat less than flattering in
fashioning an appropriate sentence.”9
9 Although this Court has held that a sentencing justice is not affirmatively required to
articulate his or her reasons for imposing a particular sentence, we have stated that “a statement
of reasons by the trial justice in justification of his departure from the sentence that would
normally be expected in response to a given offense might well be of assistance in explaining to
an appellate court why no abuse of discretion has taken place.” State v. Small, 122 R.I. 634, 639
n.5, 410 A.2d 1336, 1339 n.5 (1980).
In addition, this Court has often stated that sentencing justices must take into account a
variety of factors in fashioning an appropriate sentence. 	See, e.g., State v. Brigham, 666 A.2d
405, 406 (R.I. 1995) (“In determining a fair sentence, a trial justice considers various factors
including the severity of the crime, the defendant’s personal, educational, and employment
background, the potential for rehabilitation, societal deterrence, and the appropriateness of the
punishment.”).

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We are in complete agreement with the hearing justice’s statement that “[r]ecusal does
not thereafter lie simply because the court has carried out its judicial responsibility of explaining
the reasons for that sentence.” 	Rather than making biased or prejudicial statements about
applicant,10 the hearing justice, in accordance with what this Court has encouraged judicial
officers to do, was simply articulating his reasons for enhancing applicant’s sentence in
accordance with the habitual offender statute.
Upon our review of the record, it is utterly clear to us that the statements made by the
hearing justice during the 1988 sentencing proceeding reflect neither prejudice nor a personal
bias against applicant; accordingly, we conclude that the hearing justice’s decision not to recuse
with respect to the second application for postconviction relief was proper.
B
Reassignment
The applicant contends that his second application for postconviction relief should have
been considered by the trial justice who accepted his Alford plea in 1979. We disagree.
Rule 2.3(d)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Practice provides as follows:
“Applications for post-conviction relief shall be assigned by
the clerk to the formal and special cause calendar. 	The justice
assigned to the calendar shall submit the application, as the case
may be, for disposition by the justice who presided at the trial of
the applicant. 	In any case where the trial justice is no longer a
member of the court, the justice assigned to the calendar shall
submit the application for disposition, on a rotational basis, to the
justices assigned to the trial calendar.”
We construe the Rule’s reference to “the justice who presided at the trial of the applicant” to
mean the justice who presided at the trial concerning which the applicant is aggrieved—which in
10 As an example of such an instance, see State v. Nordstrom, 122 R.I. 412, 413-14, 408
A.2d 601, 602 (1979), where this Court granted the defendants a new trial because the trial
justice’s disparaging statements uttered outside of the courtroom concerning the defendants were
inconsistent with the impartiality required of judicial officers.

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this case would be the 1988 trial that resulted in applicant’s sentencing as an habitual offender.
That is exactly what happened in this case: both of Mr. Mattatall’s postconviction relief
applications were, in fact, assigned to the justice who presided over the murder trial and who
sentenced applicant pursuant to his conviction for second-degree murder at that trial, from which
sentence (specifically the additional sentence imposed in view of applicant’s status as an habitual
offender) applicant currently seeks relief.
Even if, as applicant contends, his second application for postconviction relief should
have been heard by the trial justice who accepted his Alford plea in 1979, Rule 2.3(d)(4) clearly
and unambiguously states that, if a trial justice “is no longer a member of the court,” then the
application should be assigned to another justice of the Superior Court. 	That is precisely the
situation with which we are now confronted. 	Having thereafter assumed a different judicial
office, the Superior Court justice who presided at the time of the 1979 Alford plea was no longer
a member of that court at the time when applicant’s second application was filed.
Accordingly, we reject applicant’s contention as it is wholly meritless.
II
The Alford Plea
We now turn to applicant’s final claim of error—that his 1979 Alford plea11 was not
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that the hearing justice in the instant case
erred in determining that applicant’s claim was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.
The applicant argues that he “could not have raised his claim that his [Alford] plea to
reckless driving was involuntary on direct appeal of his murder conviction, nor could he have
raised it in connection with his [first] post-conviction application that sought to vacate his
11 We pause to express our continuing doubt about the wisdom of allowing defendants to
enter an Alford plea. This is an issue that we may revisit at a later time. See Azevedo, 945 A.2d
at 338 (noting that “we question the wisdom and utility of this procedural vehicle”).

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murder conviction.” 	The applicant further contends that he was required to raise this issue by
filing a postconviction relief application “directed at the plea itself.” It is applicant’s contention
that he “has not yet had his day in court to which he is entitled on this claim.”
In the postconviction relief context, the doctrine of res judicata is codified in § 10-9.1-8.
See Miguel v. State, 924 A.2d 3, 4 (R.I. 2007) (mem.); Figueroa v. State, 897 A.2d 55, 56 (R.I.
2006) (mem.) (stating that § 10-9.1-8 “codifies the doctrine of res judicata as applied to petitions
for post-conviction relief”); Taylor v. Wall, 821 A.2d 685, 688 (R.I. 2003); State v. DeCiantis,
813 A.2d 986, 993 (R.I. 2003).
Section 10-9.1-8, which is entitled “Waiver of or failure to assert claims,” provides:
“All grounds for relief available to an applicant at the time he
or she commences a proceeding under this chapter must be raised
in his or her original, or a supplemental or amended, application.
Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted
in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds that in the interest of
justice the applicant should be permitted to assert such a ground
for relief.” (Emphasis added.)
The res judicata doctrine “operates as an absolute bar to relitigation of the same issues
between the same parties when a final judgment has been rendered.” Carillo v. Moran, 463 A.2d
178, 182 (R.I. 1983); see also Miguel, 924 A.2d at 4; Taylor, 821 A.2d at 688. Furthermore, “[a]
judgment on the merits in the first case not only is conclusive with regard to the issues that were
actually determined but also precludes reconsideration of all other issues that might have been
raised in the prior proceeding.” 	Carillo, 463 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added);12 see also Miguel,
924 A.2d at 4; Taylor, 821 A.2d at 688.
12 The quoted formulaic summary of the res judicata principle brings to mind the following
poignant passage from John Greenleaf Whittier’s famous poem, Maud Muller (1854):

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Section 10-9.1-8 contains a very limited and narrow exception to this otherwise absolute
bar; that exception provides that issues which were “finally adjudicated or not so raised” may
nonetheless be the basis for a subsequent application for postconviction relief if the court finds it
to be “in the interest of justice.” See Ramirez v. State, 933 A.2d 1110, 1112 (R.I. 2007) (“Under
§ 10-9.1-8, parties cannot bring forth new claims in subsequent applications that could have
been, but were not, raised in the first postconviction-relief application—absent an ‘interest of
justice’ showing.”); Miguel, 924 A.2d at 4.
In his supplemental memorandum filed with this Court in accordance with Article VI,
Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, applicant contends that the
doctrine of res judicata does not preclude his arguments with respect to his 1979 Alford plea.
The applicant contends that, because he sought to obtain a reversal of his conviction for second-
degree murder in his first postconviction relief application, his second application “concerned a
different case and a different conviction.” 	In other words, it is applicant’s contention that his
first application dealt with his conviction for murder while his second application dealt with his
1979 Alford plea. The applicant also contends that he “could not have raised his claim that his
plea to reckless driving was involuntary * * * in connection with his [first] post-conviction
application * * *.”
In our judgment, these arguments are meritless and unavailing. The applicant could have,
and certainly should have, raised his arguments with respect to his Alford plea in his first
application for postconviction relief. He did not do so, and we consider the contentions set forth
in the second application for postconviction relief to be barred by virtue of the res judicata
“For of all sad words of tongue or pen,
“The saddest are these: ‘It might have been.’”

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doctrine. Moreover, after considering the record, we are satisfied, as was the hearing justice, that
there is no sufficient reason for us to analyze said contentions pursuant to the limited statutory
“interest of justice” exception to the bar against successive applications for postconviction
relief.13 See Miguel, 924 A.2d at 4.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, and
the papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
13 Even if we were persuaded (and we are not) that the “interest of justice” exception
referred to in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-8 required us in this case to address applicant’s arguments with
respect to his 1979 Alford plea, we would still conclude that his contentions are meritless. The
transcript of the proceedings relative to the Alford plea indicates that applicant understood the
significance of his entering an Alford plea and that he was doing so for reasons that he perceived
as being beneficial to him. Moreover, in his memorandum in support of his second application
for postconviction relief, applicant reiterates the reasons that motivated him to enter an Alford
plea.
It seems that applicant is not protesting the voluntariness of his 1979 Alford plea, but
rather the fact that it was used several years later as a basis for sentencing him to additional
incarceration pursuant to the habitual offender statute. This argument is similarly barred by the
doctrine of res judicata in view of the fact that applicant raised such an argument on direct appeal
from his second-degree murder conviction. In denying that appeal, this Court concluded that:
“When a defendant enters an Alford plea, which is accepted by the
court, then such plea in a later judicial proceeding constitutes a
conviction, irrespective of the fact that the defendant maintains his
innocence and does not stand up and confess guilt * * *. Because
Mattatall’s Alford plea was accepted in an earlier proceeding and
judgment entered, the trial justice had every right to consider this
conviction 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	habitual-offender 	statute.”
Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1118.

15
COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE: 	Stephen Mattatall v. State of Rhode Island
DOCKET SHEET NO.: 	2005-318-A
COURT: 	Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED: 	May 29, 2008
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 	Superior 	County: Kent
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: 	Judge Robert D. Krause
JUSTICES: 	Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: 	Justice William P. Robinson, III, for the Court
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: 	Paula Rosin, Esq.
ATTORNEYS:
For Defendant: 	Virginia M. McGinn, Esq.