Braun v. The Ben Arnold Sunbelt Beverage Company of South Carolina, L.P.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Caitlin Elisabeth Braun, Appellant,

v.

The Ben Arnold Sunbelt Beverage Company of South
Carolina, L.P., Two Heels, Inc. d/b/a State Street Pub,
and Sunbelt Golf Development, Inc. d/b/a Indian River
Golf Course, Defendants,

Of whom The Ben Arnold Sunbelt Beverage Company of
South Carolina, L.P. is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001567

Appeal From Fairfield County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-156
Submitted January 1, 2016 – Filed March 30, 2016

AFFIRMED

Jerry Leo Finney, of The Finney Law Firm, Inc., and
Henry Ronald Stanley, both of Columbia, for Appellant.
John Edward Cuttino and Jessica Ann Waller, both of
Gallivan, White & Boyd, PA, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Caitlin Braun appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of The Ben Arnold Sunbelt Beverage Company of South
Carolina, L.P. (Ben Arnold). Braun argues the trial court erred in (1) holding her
sole remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act, (2) relying on South
Carolina's prohibition against first-party claims by intoxicated adults against
commercial and social hosts, and (3) holding the additional grounds raised by Ben
Arnold supported the granting of summary judgment. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in holding Braun's sole remedy was a cause
of action under the Workers' Compensation Act: Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488,
493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) ("When reviewing the grant of summary
judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard applied by the trial court
pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); id. ("Summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as
a matter of law."); Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc., 378 S.C. 210, 223, 661
S.E.2d 395, 402 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The General Assembly has vested the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission with exclusive original jurisdiction
over employees' work-related injuries."); id. at 224, 661 S.E.2d at 403 ("The
exclusivity provision of the Act precludes an employee from maintaining a tort
action against an employer where the employee sustains a work-related injury.");
id. ("Under the exclusivity provision, a Workers' Compensation action is the
exclusive means to determine claims against an individual's employer for work-
related accidents and injuries."); Doe v. S.C. State Hosp., 285 S.C. 183, 191, 328
S.E.2d 652, 657 (Ct. App. 1985) ("A tort action may not be brought against the
employer regardless of whether the particular injury suffered is subject to actual
compensation.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in relying on South Carolina's prohibition
against first-party claims by intoxicated adults against commercial hosts and social
hosts when it granted summary judgment in favor of Ben Arnold: Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
(1999) (holding when an appellate court's ruling on a particular issue is dispositive
of an appeal, rulings on the remaining issues are unnecessary).

3. As to whether the trial court erred in finding the additional grounds raised by
Ben Arnold supported the granting of summary judgment: Id. (holding when an
appellate court's ruling on a particular issue is dispositive of an appeal, rulings on
the remaining issues are unnecessary).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.