Dick Dyer & Associates v. Moore's Cars, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Dick Dyer & Associates, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Moore's Cars, LLC, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002466

Appeal From Richland County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-452
Submitted October 1, 2017 – Filed December 6, 2017

REMANDED

Joseph Gregory Studemeyer, of J. Gregory Studemeyer
Professional Corporation, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Charlie James Blake, Jr., of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dick Dyer & Associates, Inc. appeals the circuit court's award of
$8,000 in attorney's fees in its favor against Moore's Cars, LLC. On appeal, Dick
Dyer argues the circuit court erred by failing to apply a lodestar analysis in
determining a reasonable award of attorney's fees. We remand1 this case to the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
circuit court to make specific factual findings setting forth the basis for its award of
reasonable attorney's fees.

"A statutory award of attorney['s] fees is typically authorized under what is known
as a fee-shifting statute, which permits a prevailing party to recover attorney['s]
fees from the losing party." Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 452, 658 S.E.2d 320,
329 (2008). The Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act
(Dealers Act) allows a successful plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees and
costs. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-110(1) (2017) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in this chapter may sue
therefor in the court of common pleas and shall recover double the actual damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
"The decision to award or deny attorney['s] fees under a state statute will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of
Greenville Cty., 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009). "An abuse of
discretion occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court are either controlled
by an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions." Layman, 376
S.C. at 444, 658 S.E.2d at 325.

"[C]ourts generally hold that a 'lodestar' approach reflecting the amount of attorney
time reasonably expended on the litigation results in a reasonable fee under a fee-
shifting statute." Id. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 330; see also Maybank v. BB&T Corp.,
416 S.C. 541, 580-81, 787 S.E.2d 498, 518-19 (2016) (affirming the circuit court's
use of a lodestar analysis to calculate a reasonable attorney's fee awarded under the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act). "A lodestar figure is designed to
reflect the reasonable time and effort involved in litigating a case, and is calculated
by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable time expended."
Layman, 376 S.C. at 457, 658 S.E.2d at 332. "In determining the reasonable time
and hourly rate for attorney['s] fees, the [c]ourt looks to the factors set forth in
Jackson v. Speed, which include the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; the
time necessarily devoted to the case; the professional standing of counsel; the
contingency of compensation; the beneficial results obtained; and the customary
legal fees for similar services." Maybank, 416 S.C. at 581, 787 S.E.2d at 518-19
(citing Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E.2d 750, 760 (1997)). "Our
case law and court rules make clear that when a contract or statute authorizes an
award of attorney's fees, the [circuit] court must make specific findings of fact on
the record for each of the required factors to be considered." Griffith v. Griffith,
332 S.C. 630, 646, 506 S.E.2d 526, 534-35 (Ct. App. 1998).
In this case, Dick Dyer submitted an affidavit for $30,882.50 in attorney's fees and
$843.65 in costs under the Dealers Act. In its order, the circuit court found that
despite a limited number of witnesses and a relatively brief bench trial, the case
was difficult, and involved the doctrine of apparent authority, the Dealers Act, and
U.S. Customs laws and regulations. The circuit court also determined the time
spent by counsel was necessarily devoted to the case. The circuit court stated
counsel for Dick Dyer enjoyed excellent professional standing. Finally, the circuit
court found Dick Dyer obtained beneficial results in the dispute and the rate
charged by its counsel of $275 was reasonable and customary. However, despite
these favorable findings, the circuit court reduced the requested award of
$30,882.50 to $8,000. The circuit court's order does not set forth any findings
explaining the decreased award of $8,000 in attorney's fees. Thus, we remand this
case to the circuit court to make specific factual findings setting forth the basis for
its award of reasonable attorney's fees.

REMANDED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.