Thomas Ford, III v. Town of Hardeeville

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Thomas Ford, III, Appellant,

v.

Town of Hardeeville, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001107

Appeal From Jasper County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-102
Submitted February 1, 2022 – Filed March 9, 2022

AFFIRMED

Dayne C. Phillips, of Price Benowitz LLP, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Justin D. Maines, of The Nye Law Group, P.C., and
Prina Chandrakant Maines, both of Savannah, GA, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Thomas Ford, III, appeals his conviction for driving under the
influence (DUI). On appeal, Ford argues the circuit court erred in affirming the
municipal court's denial of his motions to dismiss the DUI charge and suppress the
video recordings from the incident site and breath test site. We affirm.
1. We hold the circuit court did not err in affirming the municipal court's denial of
Ford's motions to dismiss the DUI charge and suppress the video recording based
on the allegedly deficient video recording from the incident site. See City of Cayce
v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 391 S.C. 395, 399, 706 S.E.2d 6, 8 (2011) ("In criminal
appeals from a municipal court, the circuit court does not conduct a de novo
review; rather, it reviews the case for preserved errors raised to it by an appropriate
exception."); City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 374 S.C. 12, 15, 646 S.E.2d 879, 880
(2007) (stating an appellate court's "scope of review is limited to correcting the
circuit court's order for errors of law"); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2953(A) (2018)
(stating a "person who violates [s]ection 56-5-2930[ or] 56-5-2933 must have his
conduct at the incident site and the breath test site video recorded");
§ 56-5-2953(A)(1)(a) (providing the incident site video recording must "(i) not
begin later than the activation of the officer's blue lights; (ii) include any field
sobriety tests administered; and (iii) include the arrest of the person for a violation
of [s]ection 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2933 . . . and show the person being advised of his
Miranda[1] rights"); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2953(B) (2018) (stating "[n]othing in
this section prohibits the court from considering any other valid reason for the
failure to produce the video recording based upon the totality of the
circumstances"); State v. Henkel, 413 S.C. 9, 14, 774 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2015)
("Subsection (A) was intended to capture the interactions and field sobriety testing
between the subject and the officer in a typical DUI traffic stop where there are no
other witnesses.").

2. We hold the circuit court did not err in affirming the municipal court's denial of
Ford's motions to dismiss the DUI charge and suppress the video recording based
on the allegedly deficient video recording from the breath test site. See City of
Cayce, 391 S.C. at 399, 706 S.E.2d at 8 ("In criminal appeals from a municipal
court, the circuit court does not conduct a de novo review; rather, it reviews the
case for preserved errors raised to it by an appropriate exception."); City of Rock
Hill, 374 S.C. at 15, 646 S.E.2d at 880 (stating an appellate court's "scope of
review is limited to correcting the circuit court's order for errors of law");
§ 56-5-2953(A) (stating a "person who violates [s]ection 56-5-2930[ or] 56-5-2933
must have his conduct at the incident site and the breath test site video recorded");
§ 56-5-2953(A)(2) (stating the recording from the breath test site must "(a) include
the entire breath test procedure, the person being informed that he is being video
recorded, and that he has the right to refuse the test; (b) include the person taking
or refusing the breath test and the actions of the breath test operator while

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
conducting the test; and (c) also include the person's conduct during the required
twenty-minute pre-test waiting period, unless the officer submits a sworn affidavit
certifying that it was physically impossible to video record this waiting period"); §
56-5-2953(B) (stating "[n]othing in this section prohibits the court from
considering any other valid reason for the failure to produce the video recording
based upon the totality of the circumstances").

AFFIRMED.2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.