Sterling Hills Homeowners' Association, Inc v. Hayes

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Sterling Hills Homeowners' Association, Inc.,
Respondent,

v.

Elliot Hayes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000056

Appeal From Richland County
Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-256
Submitted May 1, 2022 – Filed June 8, 2022

AFFIRMED

Andrew Sims Radeker, of Harrison, Radeker & Smith,
P.A., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Christian Saville, of McCabe, Trotter & Beverly, P.C., of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Elliot Hayes appeals a circuit court order, arguing the circuit
court erred by (1) referring this case to the master-in-equity, (2) granting Sterling
Hills Homeowners' Association's motions to dismiss two of his counterclaims, and
(3) granting Sterling Hills's motion for summary judgment on his third
counterclaim. We affirm.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err by referring this case to the
master-in-equity because Sterling Hills's causes of action and requested remedies
were equitable, and therefore, Hayes was not entitled to a jury trial. See Carolina
First Bank v. BADD, LLC, 414 S.C. 289, 292, 778 S.E.2d 106, 108 (2015)
("Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law, which [an appellate
court] reviews de novo . . . ."); Lester v. Dawson, 327 S.C. 263, 267, 491 S.E.2d
240, 242 (1997) ("[T]here is no right to trial by jury for equitable actions."); Cedar
Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 258, 628 S.E.2d 284, 286
(Ct. App. 2006) ("The character of an action as legal or equitable depends on the
relief sought."); Ins. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 289, 293, 247
S.E.2d 315, 318 (1978) ("[A]n action sounding in law may be transformed to one
in equity because equitable relief is sought."); Crewe v. Blackmon, 289 S.C. 229,
232-33, 345 S.E.2d 754, 756-57 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding an action was
equitable because most of the relief sought was equitable); S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res.
v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 622, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2001) (stating
an action to enforce restrictive covenants is equitable).

2. We hold the circuit court did not err by granting Sterling Hills's motion to
dismiss Hayes's counterclaim for breach of contract because Hayes did not identify
in his pleading any contract or the nature of the alleged breach. See Spence v.
Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 116, 628 S.E.2d 869, 874 (2006) ("Under Rule 12(b)(6),
SCRCP, a [party] may move to dismiss a [claim against it] based on a failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."); id. ("In deciding whether the
trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss, the appellate court must consider
whether the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving
party], states any valid claim for relief."); S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399
S.C. 483, 491, 732 S.E.2d 205, 209 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The elements for a breach of
contract are the existence of the contract, its breach, and the damages caused by
such breach.").

We also hold the circuit court did not err by granting Sterling Hills's motion to
dismiss Hayes's counterclaim for violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act. Hayes's pleading failed to allege how Sterling Hills was engaged in
"trade or commerce" constituting a "large scale use of unfair and deceptive trade
practices" carried out "for sustenance or profit." See Spence, 368 S.C. at 116, 628
S.E.2d at 874 ("Under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a [party] may move to dismiss a
[claim against it] based on a failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action."); id. ("In deciding whether the trial court properly granted the motion to
dismiss, the appellate court must consider whether the complaint, viewed in the
light most favorable to the [nonmoving party], states any valid claim for relief.");
Health Promotion Specialists, LLC v. S.C. Bd. of Dentistry, 403 S.C. 623, 639, 743
S.E.2d 808, 816 (2013) ("'[T]rade or commerce' involves '[e]very business
occupation carried on for subsistence or profit . . . .'" (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009))); Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of
Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 477, 351 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Ct. App. 1986)
("The legislature intended in enacting the [South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act] to control and eliminate 'the large scale use of unfair and deceptive trade
practices . . . .'" (quoting Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed "South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act," 22 S.C. L. REV. 767, 787 (1970))).

Additionally, whether the circuit court erred by failing to grant leave for Hayes to
amend his pleading is not preserved for review by the court. See Kitchen Planners,
LLC v. Friedman, 432 S.C. 267, 279-80, 851 S.E.2d 724, 731 (Ct. App. 2020)
(finding the appellant's argument that it was entitled to amend its complaint was
not preserved because "it never requested leave of the circuit court to amend its
pleadings" and instead "it raise[d] th[e] argument for the first time on appeal").

3. We hold the circuit court did not err by granting Sterling Hills's motion for
summary judgment on Hayes's counterclaim requesting a declaratory judgment that
Sterling Hills had acted ultra vires. Hayes failed to present any evidence from
which a factfinder could reasonably find that Sterling Hills failed to hold elections
for its board of directors, despite the existence of a quorum at an annual meeting,
or that any of the existing directors were improperly appointed. See Bluestein v.
Town of Sullivan's Island, 429 S.C. 458, 462, 839 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2020) ("When
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts apply the same standard
applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP." (quoting Turner v.
Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 121-22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011))); Rule 56(c), SCRCP
(providing that a grant of summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law"); Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 423, 529 S.E.2d 710, 713 (2000)
("Nonetheless, a court 'cannot ignore facts unfavorable to [the non-moving] party
and [it] must determine whether a verdict for the party opposing the motion would
be reasonably possible under the facts.'" (quoting Hopson v. Clary, 321 S.C. 312,
314, 468 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1996))); id. at 425, 529 S.E.2d at 714
("[W]here a verdict is not reasonably possible under the facts presented, summary
judgment is proper.").
AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.