West Street Farms, LLC v. City of Beaufort

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

West Street Farms, LLC and Mix Farms, LLC,
Appellants,

v.

City of Beaufort, Beaufort Inn, LLC, and 303 Associates,
LLC, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000953

Appeal From Beaufort County
R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-373
Heard September 24, 2024 – Filed October 30, 2024

AFFIRMED

W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., of Austen & Gowder, LLC, of
Charleston, for Appellants.

Lawrence Emile Flynn, III, Alexis Kaylor Lindsay, and
Virginia Patterson Bozeman, all of Pope Flynn, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent City of Beaufort.

Benjamin Edward Nicholson, V, of Burr & Forman,
LLP, of Columbia, for Respondents Beaufort Inn, LLC
and 303 Associates, LLC.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Med. Univ. of S.C. v. Taylor, 294 S.C. 99, 102–03, 362 S.E.2d 881, 883
(Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a decision on whether to grant or deny a declaratory
judgment "rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court" and "will not be
disturbed on appeal, absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion"); id. at 103,
362 S.E.2d at 883 ("The general rule followed by most jurisdictions is that a court
will not entertain a declaratory judgment action 'if there is pending, at the time of
the commencement of the declaratory action, another action or proceeding to which
the same persons are parties [and] in which are involved and may be adjudicated the
same identical issues that are involved in the declaratory judgment action.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Annot., 135 A.L.R. 934–35 (1941))); id. at 103, 362
S.E.2d at 883–84 ("The general rule is especially applicable 'where a special
statutory remedy has been provided, or where another remedy will be
more . . . appropriate under the circumstances.'" (quoting Williams Furniture Corp.
v. S. Coatings & Chem. Co., 216 S.C. 1, 7, 56 S.E.2d 576, 578–79 (1949))); id. at
103–04, 362 S.E.2d at 884 ("[W]here an administrative agency is vested with
primary jurisdiction of the question in issue, the courts ordinarily will not grant
injunctive relief prior to a decision by the agency [and] the availability of an
adequate administrative remedy precludes the granting of injunctive relief." (quoting
73 C.J.S. Pub. Admin. L. and Proc. § 45 at 481 (1983))); see also Fullbright v.
Spinnaker Resorts, Inc., 420 S.C. 265, 280 n.10, 802 S.E.2d 794, 802 n.10 (2017)
("Taylor stands for the proposition that courts should not interfere with proceedings
that are already underway in 'the administrative agency vested with primary
jurisdiction of the question in issue.' Simply put, the Taylor court held that parties
are required to follow the review procedures established by statute." (citation
omitted) (quoting Taylor, 294 S.C. at 105, 362 S.E.2d at 884–85)); Hyde v. S.C.
Dep't of Mental Health, 314 S.C. 207, 208, 442 S.E.2d 582, 582–83 (1994)
("Whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is a matter within the trial
judge's sound discretion and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse thereof."); id. at 208, 442 S.E.2d at 583 ("The general rule is that
administrative remedies must be exhausted absent circumstances supporting an
exception to application of the general rule."); id. at 209, 442 S.E.2d at 583 ("A trial
judge must have a sound basis for excusing the failure to exhaust administrative
relief."); Equivest Fin., LLC v. Ravenel, 422 S.C. 499, 505–06, 812 S.E.2d 438, 441
(Ct. App. 2018) ("[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority
are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review." (quoting
Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct.
App. 2001))); Kurschner v. City of Camden Plan. Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656
S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("The fundamental requirements of due process include
notice, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, and judicial review." (citing
S.C. Const. art. 1, § 22)); id. ("Due process does not require a trial-type hearing in
every conceivable case of government impairment of a private interest."); id. at 172,
656 S.E.2d at 350 ("Rather, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.