Madison Bossert v. Joshua Knowles (2)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Madison Bossert, Respondent,

v.

Joshua Knowles, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001305

Appeal From Horry County
Melissa M. Frazier, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-084
Submitted February 18, 2026 – Filed February 25, 2026

AFFIRMED

Joshua Knowles, of Ontario, Canada, pro se.

Sandye Teague Hicks, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Joshua Knowles (Father) appeals the family court's order finding
Madison Bossert (Mother) not in contempt of the November 2022 order1 and the
July 2023 order, 2 finding Father in contempt of the November 2022 order, and
awarding Mother attorney's fees and costs and sanctions. On appeal, Father argues

1
This was an order approving a custody modification agreement.
2
This was a prior contempt order.
the family court erred in (1) finding Father did not present clear and convincing
evidence that Mother violated the November 2022 and July 2023 orders by making
major educational decisions regarding their minor daughter without consulting
him; (2) finding Father in contempt of the November 2022 order based on spelling
mistakes, speculation, and unverifiable evidence; (3) finding Father in contempt of
the November 2022 order based on a misunderstanding of jurisdiction and
healthcare laws of Canada; (4) finding Father in contempt of the November 2022
order based on requirements that violated federal privacy laws; and (5) awarding
Mother attorney's fees and costs and sanctions. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

First, as to issue one, we hold the family court did not err in finding Father failed to
present evidence that Mother violated the November 2022 or July 2023 orders
because the violations alleged by Father were not major decisions. See Simmons v.
Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the
family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Lewis v.
Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384-85, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011) (explaining the appellate
court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence in appeals from the family court); Stoney v. Stoney,
422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[D]e novo review allows an
appellate court to make its own findings of fact; however, this standard does not
abrogate two long-standing principles still recognized by our courts during the de
novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in a superior position to assess witness
credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden of showing the appellate court that
the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the trial [court].");3
Widman v. Widman, 348 S.C. 97, 119, 557 S.E.2d 693, 705 (Ct. App. 2001)
("Contempt results from the willful disobedience of a court order, and before a
court may find a person in contempt, the record must clearly and specifically
reflect the contemptuous conduct."); Brasington v. Shannon, 288 S.C. 183, 184,
341 S.E.2d 130, 131 (1986) ("In a proceeding for contempt for violation of a court
order, the moving party must show the existence of the order and the facts
establishing the respondent's noncompliance.").

3
We acknowledge Stoney did not address family court contempt actions or
overrule Means v. Means, 277 S.C. 428, 431, 288 S.E.2d 811, 812-13 (1982).
Nevertheless, we address this contempt question using the de novo standard of
review because it is broader than the abuse of discretion standard and demonstrates
the result would be the same no matter the standard used.
Second, as to issues two, three, and four, we hold the family court did not err in
finding Father in contempt of the November 2022 order. The November 2022
order required Father to submit an "exhaustive list" of medical providers to Mother
and the psychologist and to execute medical release forms for each provider.
Although Father argues execution of the release forms would have been futile,
Father's testimony established the failure to execute them was intentional as
Father's primary provider in Canada had previously provided his medical records
to Mother's attorney following an executed release by Father. Further, Father
provided two different lists to Mother and the psychologists. Though the family
court reasoned one discrepancy between the lists may have been a spelling
mistake, it noted there was at least one other provider who was listed multiple
times in the records provided to Mother's attorney that was not included in either of
Father's lists. See Simmons, 392 S.C. at 414, 709 S.E.2d at 667 ("In appeals from
the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Lewis,
392 S.C. at 384-85, 709 S.E.2d at 651 (explaining the appellate court has the
authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of
the evidence in appeals from the family court); Stoney, 422 S.C. at 595, 813 S.E.2d
at 487 ("[D]e novo review allows an appellate court to make its own findings of
fact; however, this standard does not abrogate two long-standing principles still
recognized by our courts during the de novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in
a superior position to assess witness credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden
of showing the appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
finding of the trial [court]."); Widman, 348 S.C. at 119, 557 S.E.2d at 705
("Contempt results from the willful disobedience of a court order, and before a
court may find a person in contempt, the record must clearly and specifically
reflect the contemptuous conduct."); Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 82-83, 370 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988) ("A willful act is defined
as one 'done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something
the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires
to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.'"
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979))); Brasington, 288 S.C. at 184,
341 S.E.2d at 131 ("In a proceeding for contempt for violation of a court order, the
moving party must show the existence of the order and the facts establishing the
respondent's noncompliance."); Widman, 348 S.C. at 120, 557 S.E.2d at 705
("Once the moving party has made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the respondent to establish his or her defense and inability to comply with the
order.").

Finally, as to issue five, we hold the family court did not err in awarding Mother
attorney's fees and costs and sanctions because they were awarded as
compensatory contempt to reimburse Mother for costs incurred from Father's
continued non-compliance with the November 2022 order. See Stone v.
Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate courts review
family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and procedural
rulings."); Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227, 235, 420 S.E.2d 877, 881 (Ct.
App. 1992) ("Compensatory contempt is money awarded to a party who is injured
by a contemnor's action to restore the party to his original position.");
Harris-Jenkins v. Nissan Car Mart, Inc., 348 S.C. 171, 178, 557 S.E.2d 708,
711-12 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Compensatory contempt seeks to reimburse the party for
the costs it incurs in forcing the non-complying party to obey the court's orders.");
Whetstone, 309 S.C. at 235, 420 S.E.2d at 881 ("The award should be limited to
the party's actual loss."); Poston v. Poston, 331 S.C. 106, 114, 502 S.E.2d 86, 90
(1998) ("[A] contemnor may be required to reimburse a complainant for the costs
he incurred in enforcing the court's prior order, including reasonable attorney's
fees.").

AFFIRMED.4

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.