Paul Payette v. Jennifer Payett

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Paul Eugene Payette, Respondent,

v.

Jennifer Ritchie Payette, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000211

Appeal From Charleston County
Randall E. McGee, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-228
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed May 13, 2026

AFFIRMED

Lindsay F. McGee, of McGee Family Law, LLC, of
Mount Pleasant, for Appellant.

Thomas C. Nelson, of Futeral & Nelson, LLC, of Mount
Pleasant, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jennifer Ritchie Payette (Wife) appeals the family court's
divorce decree finding Paul Eugene Payette (Husband) was entitled to a divorce on
the statutory ground of one-year of separation, dividing the marital estate, ordering
the marital home to be sold, declining to award Wife alimony, and awarding
Husband attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, Wife argues the family court erred
in (1) failing to properly consider an award of alimony, (2) failing to consider an
in-kind distribution of the marital home in apportioning the marital estate, and (3)
awarding Husband attorney's fees and costs. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

1. We hold the family court did not err by declining to award Wife alimony. See
Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate
courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and
procedural rulings."); Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487
(2018) ("[D]e novo review allows an appellate court to make its own findings of
fact . . . ."); Stone, 428 S.C. at 91-92, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Even under de novo
review, the longstanding principles that trial judges are in superior positions to
assess witness credibility and that appellants must show the trial judge erred by
ruling against the preponderance of the evidence remain applicable."). Although
Wife asserted a financial need for alimony in her answer, she failed to present
evidentiary support for her claim. See Bojilov v. Bojilov, 425 S.C. 161, 174, 819
S.E.2d 791, 798 (Ct. App. 2018) ("Alimony should ordinarily place the supported
spouse, as nearly as is practical, in the same position he or she enjoyed during the
marriage." (quoting Hinson v. Hinson, 341 S.C. 574, 577, 535 S.E.2d 143, 144 (Ct.
App. 2000))); id. at 174-75, 819 S.E.2d at 798-99 ("In making an alimony award,
the family court must consider the following statutory factors: (1) the duration of
the marriage; (2) physical and emotional health of the parties; (3) educational
background of the parties; (4) employment history and earning potential of the
parties; (5) standard of living established during the marriage; (6) current and
reasonably anticipated earnings of the parties; (7) current and reasonably
anticipated expenses of the parties; (8) marital and nonmarital properties of the
parties; (9) custody of children; (10) marital misconduct or fault; (11) tax
consequences; (12) prior support obligations; and (13) any other factors the court
considers relevant."); Scherba v. Scherba, Op. No. 6128 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar.
18, 2026) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 50) ("Alimony is based on both the
supporting spouse's ability to pay and the supported spouse's demonstrated need.").

2. We hold the family court did not err in failing to consider an in-kind
distribution of the marital home to Wife. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 91, 833 S.E.2d at
272 ("Appellate courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of
evidentiary and procedural rulings."); id. at 91-92, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Even under
de novo review, the longstanding principles that trial judges are in superior
positions to assess witness credibility and that appellants must show the trial judge
erred by ruling against the preponderance of the evidence remain applicable.").
The uncontroverted evidence at trial demonstrated that a substantial portion of the
marital estate consisted of retirement accounts and other non-liquid assets;
therefore, an in-kind distribution of the home was not financially feasible. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B) (2014) (enumerating fifteen factors the family court
must consider when apportioning the marital property); Widman v. Widman, 348
S.C. 97, 111, 557 S.E.2d 693, 700 (Ct. App. 2001) ("On review, this court looks to
the fairness of the overall apportionment, and if the end result is equitable, the fact
that this court might have weighed specific factors differently than the family court
is irrelevant."); Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 542, 615 S.E.2d 98, 103 (2005)
("In order to effect an equitable apportionment, the family court may require the
sale of marital property and a division of the proceeds."); Nasser-Moghaddassi v.
Moghaddassi, 364 S.C. 182, 202-03, 612 S.E.2d 707, 718 (Ct. App. 2005)
("Although the court is generally required to attempt an in-kind distribution of
assets, an in-kind distribution of the marital home is not feasible."); id. at 203, 612
S.E.2d at 718 ("[T]he court may either award the home to one of the parties, or
order the home sold and the proceeds distributed.").

3. Wife argued this court should reverse or modify Husband's attorney's fees
award in the event it reverses the substantive result of the family court's order.
Because we affirm the determinations of the family court, we also affirm the award
of attorney's fees to Husband. See E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415
S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992) ("In determining whether an attorney's fee should be
awarded, the following factors should be considered: (1) the party's ability to pay
his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the
parties' respective financial conditions; (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each
party's standard of living."); Weller v. Weller, 434 S.C. 530, 543, 863 S.E.2d 835,
841-42 (Ct. App. 2021) (affirming the award of attorney's fees and costs when the
appellant's challenge to the award was dependent on reversal of the underlying
order, and the appellate court affirmed on all grounds).

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.