FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al.

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Syllabus
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v.
NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
INC. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 01–653. Argued October 8, 2002—Decided January 27, 2003*
Pursuant to provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 authorizing the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to award spectrum licenses
to small businesses through competitive bidding, and to allow them to
pay for the licenses in installments, the FCC auctioned off certain
broadband personal communications services licenses to respondents
(hereinafter NextWave). NextWave made a down payment on the pur-
chase price, signed promissory notes for the balance, and executed
agreements giving the FCC a first lien on, and security interest in,
NextWave’s rights and interest in the licenses, which recited that they
were conditioned upon the full and timely payment of all monies due the
FCC, and that failure to comply with this condition would result in their
automatic cancellation. NextWave eventually filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, includ-
ing the FCC, pending confirmation of its reorganization plan. The FCC
objected to the plan, asserting that NextWave’s licenses had been can-
celed automatically when the company missed its first payment deadline,
and announced that NextWave’s licenses were available for auction.
The Bankruptcy Court invalidated the cancellation of the licenses as a
violation of various Bankruptcy Code provisions, but the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that exclusive jurisdiction to review the FCC’s regula-
tory action lay in the courts of appeals. After the FCC denied Next-
Wave’s petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 U. S. C.
§ 525(a), which provides: “[A] governmental unit may not . . . revoke . . .
a license . . . to . . . a debtor . . . solely because such . . . debtor . . . has
not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case.”
Held: Section 525 prohibits the FCC from revoking licenses held by a
bankruptcy debtor upon the debtor’s failure to make timely payments
to the FCC for purchase of the licenses. It is undisputed that the FCC
*Together with No. 01–657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. Next-
Wave Personal Communications Inc. et al., also on certiorari to the
same court.

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Syllabus
is a “governmental unit” that has “revoke[d]” a “license,” and that Next-
Wave is a “debtor” under the Bankruptcy Act. Pp. 301–308.
(a) The Court rejects petitioners’ argument that the FCC did not
revoke NextWave’s licenses “solely because” of nonpayment under
§ 525(a). The fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its
action is irrelevant. Section 525 means nothing more or less than that
the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate
cause of the cancellation, whatever the agency’s ultimate motive may
be. Pp. 301–302.
(b) The FCC’s contention that regulatory conditions like full and
timely payment are not properly classified as “debts” under § 525(a)
fails. Under the Bankruptcy Code, “debt” means “liability on a claim,”
§ 101(12), and “claim,” in turn, includes any “right to payment,”
§ 101(5)(A). The plain meaning of a “right to payment” is nothing more
nor less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the Government’s
objectives in imposing the obligation. E. g., Pennsylvania Dept. of
Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 559. Also rejected is peti-
tioners’ argument that NextWave’s obligations are not “dischargeable”
under § 525(a) because it is beyond the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional
authority to alter or modify regulatory obligations. Dischargeability is
not tied to the existence of such authority. The Bankruptcy Code
states that confirmation of a reorganization plan discharges the debtor
from any debt that arose before the confirmation date, 11 U. S. C.
§ 1141(d)(1)(A), and the only debts it excepts from that prescription are
those described in § 523, see § 1141(d)(2). Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. 274,
278. Petitioners’ contention that the D. C. Circuit has no power to mod-
ify or discharge a debt is irrelevant to whether that court can set aside
agency action that violates § 525, which is all that it did when it pre-
vented the FCC from canceling licenses because of failure to pay debts
dischargeable by bankruptcy courts. Pp. 302–304.
(c) Finally, this Court’s interpretation of § 525 does not, as petitioners
contend, create a conflict with the Communications Act by obstructing
the functioning of that Act’s auction provisions. Nothing in those pro-
visions demands that cancellation be the sanction for failure to make
agreed-upon periodic payments or even requires the FCC to permit pay-
ment to be made over time. What petitioners describe as a conflict
boils down to nothing more than a policy preference on the FCC’s part
for (1) selling licenses on credit and (2) canceling licenses rather than
asserting security interests when there is a default. Such administra-
tive preferences cannot be the basis for denying NextWave rights pro-
vided by a law’s plain terms. P. 304.
254 F. 3d 130, affirmed.

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Opinion of the Court
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Stevens,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post,
p. 308. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 310.
Acting Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for
petitioner Federal Communications Commission in No. 01–
653. With him on the briefs were Deputy Solicitor General
Wallace, Jeffrey A. Lamken, William Kanter, Jacob M.
Lewis, John A. Rogovin, Daniel M. Armstrong, and Joel
Marcus. Jonathan S. Franklin argued the cause for peti-
tioners Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. in No. 01–657.
With him on the briefs was Lorane F. Hebert.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., argued the cause for respondents
in both cases. With him on the briefs were Ian Heath
Gershengorn, William M. Hohengarten, Thomas G. Hungar,
Douglas R. Cox, Miguel A. Estrada, G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.,
and Deborah L. Schrier-Rape.
Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause and filed a brief for
Creditors NextWave Communications, Inc., as amici curiae
urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Charles
Fried and Elizabeth Warren.†
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In these cases, we decide whether § 525 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U. S. C. § 525, prohibits the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC or Commission) from revoking li-
censes held by a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor’s fail-
ure to make timely payments owed to the Commission for
purchase of the licenses.
†Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Airadigm Com-
munications, Inc., by Richard P. Bress and James F. Rogers; for Urban
Comm-North Carolina, Inc., et al. by Charles J. Cooper, David H. Thomp-
son, Preben Jensen, and Charles E. Simpson; for Professor Kathryn R.
Heidt, pro se; and for Senator Patrick Leahy et al. by Walter Dellinger
and Jonathan D. Hacker.

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296 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Opinion of the Court
I
In 1993, Congress amended the Communications Act of
1934 to authorize the FCC to award spectrum licenses
“through a system of competitive bidding.” 48 Stat. 1085,
as amended, 107 Stat. 387, 47 U. S. C. § 309( j)(1). It directed
the Commission to “promot[e] economic opportunity and
competition” and “avoi[d] excessive concentration of li-
censes” by “disseminating licenses among a wide variety of
applications, including small businesses [and] rural telephone
companies.” § 309( j)(3)(B). In order to achieve this goal,
Congress directed the FCC to “consider alternative payment
schedules and methods of calculation, including lump sums
or guaranteed installment payments . . . or other schedules
or methods . . . .” § 309( j)(4)(A).
The FCC decided to award licenses for broadband personal
communications services through simultaneous, multiple-
round auctions. In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of
the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 FCC
Rcd. 2348, ¶¶ 54, 68 (1994). In accordance with §§ 309( j)
(3)(B) and (4)(A), it restricted participation in two of the six
auction blocks (Blocks “C” and “F”) to small businesses and
other designated entities with total assets and revenues
below certain levels, and it allowed the successful bidders in
these two blocks to pay in installments over the term of the
license. 47 CFR § 24.709(a)(1) (1997).
Respondents NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.,
and NextWave Power Partners, Inc. (both wholly owned
subsidiaries of NextWave Telecom, Inc., and hereinafter
jointly referred to as respondent NextWave), participated,
respectively, in the FCC’s “C-Block” and “F-Block” auctions.
NextWave was awarded 63 C-Block licenses on winning bids
totaling approximately $4.74 billion, and 27 F-Block licenses
on winning bids of approximately $123 million. In accord-
ance with FCC regulations, NextWave made a downpayment
on the purchase price, signed promissory notes for the bal-
ance, and executed security agreements that the FCC per-

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fected by filing under the Uniform Commercial Code. The
security agreements gave the Commission a first “lien on
and continuing security interest in all of the Debtor’s rights
and interest in [each] License.” Security Agreement be-
tween NextWave and FCC ¶ 1 (Jan. 3, 1997), 2 App. to Pet.
for Cert. 402a. In addition, the licenses recited that they
were “conditioned upon the full and timely payment of all
monies due pursuant to . . . the terms of the Commission’s
installment plan as set forth in the Note and Security Agree-
ment executed by the licensee,” and that “[f]ailure to comply
with this condition will result in the automatic cancellation
of this authorization.” Radio Station Authorization for
Broadband PCS (issued to NextWave Jan. 3, 1997), 2 App. to
Pet. for Cert. 388a.
After the C-Block and F-Block licenses were awarded,
several successful bidders, including NextWave, experienced
difficulty obtaining financing for their operations and peti-
tioned the Commission to restructure their installment-
payment obligations. See 12 FCC Rcd. 16436, ¶ 11 (1997).
The Commission suspended the installment payments, 12
FCC Rcd. 17325 (1997); 13 FCC Rcd. 1286 (1997), and
adopted several options that allowed C-Block licensees to
surrender some or all of their licenses for full or partial for-
giveness of their outstanding debt. See 12 FCC Rcd. 16436,
¶ 6; 13 FCC Rcd. 8345 (1998). It set a deadline of June 8,
1998, for licensees to elect a restructuring option, and of
October 29, 1998, as the last date to resume installment
payments. 13 FCC Rcd. 7413 (1998).
On June 8, 1998, after failing to obtain stays of the election
deadline from the Commission or the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, NextWave filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection in New York. See In re Next-
Wave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B. R. 263, 267
(Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 1998). It suspended payments to all
creditors, including the FCC, pending confirmation of a reor-
ganization plan. NextWave initiated an adversary proceed-

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ing in the Bankruptcy Court, alleging that its $4.74 billion
indebtedness on the C-Block licenses was avoidable as a
“fraudulent conveyance” under § 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U. S. C. § 544, because, by the time the Commission
actually conveyed the licenses, their value had declined from
approximately $4.74 billion to less than $1 billion. The
Bankruptcy Court agreed 1 —ruling in effect that the com-
pany could keep its C-Block licenses for the reduced price of
$1.02 billion—and the District Court affirmed. NextWave
Personal Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 241 B. R. 311, 318–
319 (SDNY 1999). The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that, although the Bankruptcy Court
might have jurisdiction over NextWave’s underlying debts
to the FCC, it could not change the conditions attached to
NextWave’s licenses. In re NextWave Personal Communi-
cations, Inc., 200 F. 3d 43, 55–56 (1999) (per curiam). The
Second Circuit also held that since, under FCC regulations,
“NextWave’s obligation attached upon the close of the auc-
tion,” there had been no fraudulent conveyance by the FCC
acting in its capacity as creditor. Id., at 58.
Following the Second Circuit’s decision, NextWave pre-
pared a plan of reorganization that envisioned payment of a
single lump sum to satisfy the entire remaining $4.3 billion
obligation for purchase of the C-Block licenses, including in-
terest and late fees. The FCC objected to the plan, assert-
ing that NextWave’s licenses had been canceled automati-
cally when the company missed its first payment deadline in
October 1998. The Commission simultaneously announced
that NextWave’s licenses were “available for auction under
the automatic cancellation provisions” of the FCC’s regula-
tions. Public Notice, Auction of C and F Block Broadband
PCS Licenses, 15 FCC Rcd. 693 (2000). NextWave sought
1 We do not reach the merits of the determination that the licenses
should be valued as of the time they were conveyed, rather than as of the
time NextWave won the auction entitling it to conveyance.

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emergency relief in the Bankruptcy Court, which declared
the FCC’s cancellation of respondent’s licenses “null and
void” as a violation of various provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.,
244 B. R. 253, 257–258 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 2000). Once
again, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
In re Federal Communications Commission, 217 F. 3d 125
(2000). Granting the FCC’s petition for a writ of mandamus,
the Second Circuit held that “[e]xclusive jurisdiction to re-
view the FCC’s regulatory action lies in the courts of ap-
peals” under 47 U. S. C. § 402, and that since the reauction
decision was regulatory, proclaiming it to be arbitrary was
“outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.” 217
F. 3d, at 139, 136. The Second Circuit noted, however, that
“NextWave remains free to pursue its challenge to the FCC’s
regulatory acts.” Id., at 140.
NextWave filed a petition with the FCC seeking reconsid-
eration of the license cancellation, denial of which is the gra-
vamen of the cases at bar. In the Matter of Public Notice
DA 00–49 Auction of C and F Block Broadband PCS
Licenses, Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Rcd. 17500
(2000). NextWave appealed that denial to the Court of Ap-
peals for the D. C. Circuit pursuant to 47 U. S. C. § 402(b),
asserting that the cancellation was arbitrary and capricious,
and contrary to law, in violation of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706, and the Bankruptcy Code. The
Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the FCC’s cancellation
of NextWave’s licenses violated 11 U. S. C. § 525: “Applying
the fundamental principle that federal agencies must obey
all federal laws, not just those they administer, we conclude
that the Commission violated the provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that prohibits governmental entities from re-
voking debtors’ licenses solely for failure to pay debts dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy.” 254 F. 3d 130, 133 (2001). We
granted certiorari. 535 U. S. 904 (2002).

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Opinion of the Court
II
The Administrative Procedure Act requires federal courts
to set aside federal agency action that is “not in accordance
with law,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A)—which means, of course, any
law, and not merely those laws that the agency itself is
charged with administering. See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 413–414 (1971)
(“In all cases agency action must be set aside if the action
was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law’ or if the action failed to
meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements”).
Respondent contends, and the Court of Appeals for the D. C.
Circuit held, that the FCC’s revocation of its licenses was
not in accordance with § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 525(a) provides, in relevant part:
“[A] governmental unit may not . . . revoke . . . a license
. . . to . . . a person that is . . . a debtor under this title
. . . solely because such . . . debtor . . . has not paid a debt
that is dischargeable in the case under this title . . . .” 2
2 The full text of 11 U. S. C. § 525(a) reads as follows:
“Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,
1930, the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, and section 1 of the Act enti-
tled ‘An Act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, and for other purposes,’ approved July
12, 1943, a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to
renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condi-
tion such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against,
deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, a person that is or has been a debtor under
this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another
person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been associated, solely
because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title
or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent
before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case
but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a
debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was dis-
charged under the Bankruptcy Act.”

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Opinion of the Court
No one disputes that the Commission is a “governmental
unit” that has “revoke[d]” a “license,” nor that NextWave is
a “debtor” under the Bankruptcy Act. Petitioners argue,
however, that the FCC did not revoke respondent’s licenses
“solely because” of nonpayment, and that, in any event,
NextWave’s obligations are not “dischargeable” “debt[s]”
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. They also
argue that a contrary interpretation would unnecessarily
bring § 525 into conflict with the Communications Act. We
find none of these contentions persuasive, and discuss them
in turn.
A
The FCC has not denied that the proximate cause for its
cancellation of the licenses was NextWave’s failure to make
the payments that were due. It contends, however, that
§ 525 does not apply because the FCC had a “valid regulatory
motive” for the cancellation. Brief for Petitioners Arctic
Slope Regional Corp. et al. 19; see Brief for Petitioner FCC
17. In our view, that factor is irrelevant. When the statute
refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of cancellation
(“solely because”), it cannot reasonably be understood to in-
clude, among the other causes whose presence can preclude
application of the prohibition, the governmental unit’s mo-
tive in effecting the cancellation. Such a reading would de-
prive § 525 of all force. It is hard to imagine a situation in
which a governmental unit would not have some further mo-
tive behind the cancellation—assuring the financial solvency
of the licensed entity, e. g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637
(1971); In re The Bible Speaks, 69 B. R. 368, 374 (Bkrtcy. Ct.
Mass. 1987), or punishing lawlessness, e. g., In re Adams, 106
B. R. 811, 827 (Bkrtcy. Ct. NJ 1989); In re Colon, 102 B. R.
421, 428 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1989), or even (quite simply)
making itself financially whole. Section 525 means nothing
more or less than that the failure to pay a dischargeable debt
must alone be the proximate cause of the cancellation—the
act or event that triggers the agency’s decision to cancel,

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whatever the agency’s ultimate motive in pulling the trig-
ger may be.
Some may think (and the opponents of § 525 undoubtedly
thought) that there ought to be an exception for cancellations
that have a valid regulatory purpose. Besides the fact that
such an exception would consume the rule, it flies in the face
of the fact that, where Congress has intended to provide reg-
ulatory exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it
has done so clearly and expressly, rather than by a device
so subtle as denominating a motive a cause. There are, for
example, regulatory exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code’s
automatic stay provisions. 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4). And
even § 525(a) itself contains explicit exemptions for certain
Agriculture Department programs, see n. 2, supra. These
latter exceptions would be entirely superfluous if we were
to read § 525 as the Commission proposes—which means, of
course, that such a reading must be rejected. See United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 35–36 (1992).
B
Petitioners contend that NextWave’s license obligations to
the Commission are not “debt[s] that [are] dischargeable”
in bankruptcy. 11 U. S. C. § 525(a). First, the FCC argues
that “regulatory conditions like the full and timely payment
condition are not properly classified as ‘debts’ ” under the
Bankruptcy Code. Brief for Petitioner FCC 33. In its
view, the “financial nature of a condition” on a license “does
not convert that condition into a debt.” Ibid. This is noth-
ing more than a retooling of petitioners’ recurrent theme
that “regulatory conditions” should be exempt from § 525.
No matter how the Commission casts it, the argument loses.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, “debt” means “liability on a
claim,” 11 U. S. C. § 101(12), and “claim,” in turn, includes any
“right to payment,” § 101(5)(A). We have said that “[c]laim”
has “the broadest available definition,” Johnson v. Home
State Bank, 501 U. S. 78, 83 (1991), and have held that the

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“plain meaning of a ‘right to payment’ is nothing more nor
less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objec-
tives the State seeks to serve in imposing the obligation,”
Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U. S. 552, 559 (1990). See also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. 274
(1985). In short, a debt is a debt, even when the obligation
to pay it is also a regulatory condition.
Petitioners argue that respondent’s obligations are not
“dischargeable” in bankruptcy because it is beyond the juris-
dictional authority of bankruptcy courts to alter or modify
regulatory obligations. Brief for Petitioners Arctic Slope
Regional Corp. et al. 28–29; Brief for Petitioner FCC 30–31.
Dischargeability, however, is not tied to the existence of such
authority. A preconfirmation debt is dischargeable unless it
falls within an express exception to discharge. Subsection
1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code states that, except as other-
wise provided therein, the “confirmation of a plan [of re-
organization] . . . discharges the debtor from any debt that
arose before the date of such confirmation,” 11 U. S. C.
§ 1141(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added), and the only debts it ex-
cepts from that prescription are those described in § 523, see
§ 1141(d)(2). Thus, “[e]xcept for the nine kinds of debts
saved from discharge by 11 U. S. C. § 523(a), a discharge in
bankruptcy discharges the debtor from all debts that arose
before bankruptcy. § 727(b).” Kovacs, supra, at 278 (em-
phasis added).
Artistically symmetrical with petitioners’ contention that
the Bankruptcy Court has no power to alter regulatory obli-
gations is their contention that the D. C. Circuit has no power
to modify or discharge a debt. See Brief for Petitioner FCC
31–32; Brief for Petitioner Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al.
32, n. 9. Just as the former is irrelevant to whether the
Bankruptcy Court can discharge a debt, so also the latter is
irrelevant to whether the D. C. Circuit can set aside agency
action that violates § 525. That court did not seek to modify
or discharge the debt, but merely prevented the FCC from

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violating § 525 by canceling licenses because of failure to pay
debts dischargeable by bankruptcy courts.
C
Finally, our interpretation of § 525 does not create any con-
flict with the Communications Act. It does not, as petition-
ers contend, obstruct the functioning of the auction provi-
sions of 47 U. S. C. § 309( j), since nothing in those provisions
demands that cancellation be the sanction for failure to make
agreed-upon periodic payments. Indeed, nothing in those
provisions even requires the Commission to permit payment
to be made over time, rather than leaving it to impecunious
bidders to finance the full purchase price with private lend-
ers. What petitioners describe as a conflict boils down to
nothing more than a policy preference on the FCC’s part for
(1) selling licenses on credit and (2) canceling licenses rather
than asserting security interests in licenses when there is
a default. Such administrative preferences cannot be the
basis for denying respondent rights provided by the plain
terms of a law. “ ‘[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly ex-
pressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
each as effective.’ ” J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred International, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 143–144 (2001) (quot-
ing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974)). There
being no inherent conflict between § 525 and the Communica-
tions Act, “we can plainly regard each statute as effective.”
J. E. M., supra, at 144. And since § 525 circumscribes the
Commission’s permissible action, the revocation of Next-
Wave’s licenses is not in accordance with law. See 5
U. S. C. § 706.
III*
The dissent finds it “dangerous . . . to rely exclusively upon
the literal meaning of a statute’s words,” post, at 311 (opinion
*Justice Stevens does not join this Part.

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of Breyer, J.). Instead, it determines, in splendid isolation
from that language,3 the purpose of the statute, which it
takes to be “to forbid discrimination against those who
are, or were, in bankruptcy and, more generally, to prohibit
governmental action that would undercut the ‘fresh start’
that is bankruptcy’s promise,” post, at 313. It deduces
these language-trumping “purposes” from the most inconclu-
sive of indications. First, the ambiguous title of § 525(a),
“Protection against discriminatory treatment,” ibid. This,
of course, could as well refer to discrimination against im-
pending bankruptcy, aka insolvency. Second, its perception
that the other prohibitions of § 525(a) apply only to acts
“done solely for bankruptcy-related reasons.” Ibid. We do
not share that perception. For example, the prohibition im-
mediately preceding the one at issue here forbids adverse
government action taken because the debtor “has been insol-
vent before the commencement of the case under this title,
or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied
a discharge.” That seems to us clearly tied to insolvency
alone (plus the mere fact of subsequent or contemporaneous
bankruptcy), and does not require some additional motiva-
tion based on bankruptcy. The dissent’s third indication of
“purpose” consists of the ever-available snippets of legisla-
tive history, post, at 314–315.
The dissent does eventually get to the statutory text at
issue here: Step two of its analysis is to ask what interpreta-
tion of that text could possibly fulfill its posited “purposes.” 4
3 The portion of the dissenting opinion that deduces the statute’s pur-
poses, Part II, post, at 313–315, contains no discussion of the portion of
§ 525(a) at issue here.
4 The second of the purposes, by the way—prohibiting government ac-
tion that “would undercut the ‘fresh start’ that is bankruptcy’s promise,”
post, at 313—plays no real role in the dissent’s analysis, if indeed such a
circular criterion could ever play a role in any analysis. The whole issue
before us can be described as asking what the Bankruptcy Code’s promise
of a “fresh start” consists of. Rather than reframing the question, our
interpretation concretely accords a “fresh start” where the dissent would

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306 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Opinion of the Court
“One obvious way,” the dissent concludes, “is to interpret
the relevant phrase, ‘solely because’ of nonpayment of ‘a debt
that is dischargeable,’ as requiring something more than a
purely factual connection . . . . The statute’s words are open
to the interpretation that they require a certain relationship
between (1) the dischargeability of the debt and (2) the deci-
sion to revoke the license.” Post, at 316. To demonstrate
that “openness,” the dissent gives the example of a “rule
telling apartment owners that they cannot refuse to rent
‘solely because a family has children who are adopted.’ ”
Post, at 319. Such a rule, it says quite correctly, is most
reasonably read as making the adoptive nature of the chil-
dren part of the prohibited motivation. But the example
differs radically from the cases before us in two respects: (1)
because an adopted child is the exception rather than the
rule, and (2) because the class of children other than adopted
children is surely not a disfavored one. In the cases before
us, by contrast, the descriptive clause describes the rule
rather than the exception. (As the dissent acknowledges,
“virtually all debts” are dischargeable, post, at 310.) And
the debts that do not fall within the rule (nondischarge-
able debts) are clearly disfavored by the Bankruptcy Code.
To posit a text similar to the one before us, the dissent
should have envisioned a rule that prohibited refusal to rent
“solely because a family has children who are no more than
normally destructive.” Would the “no-more-than-normal-
destructiveness” of the children be a necessary part of the
apartment owner’s motivation before he is in violation of the
rule? That is to say, must he refuse to rent specifically be-
cause the children are no more than normally destructive?
Of course not. The provision is most reasonably read as es-
tablishing an exception to the prohibition, rather than add-
ing a motivation requirement: The owner may refuse to rent
to families with destructive children. And the same is obvi-
not—where there is revocation of a license solely because of a bankrupt’s
failure to pay dischargeable debts.

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Opinion of the Court
ously true here: The government may take action that is
otherwise forbidden when the debt in question is one of the
disfavored class that is nondischargeable.
In addition to distorting the text of the provision, the
dissent’s interpretation renders the provision superfluous.
The purpose of “forbid[ding] discrimination against those
who are, or were, in bankruptcy,” post, at 313, is already
explicitly achieved by another portion of § 525(a), which pro-
hibits termination of a license “solely because [the] bankrupt
or debtor is or has been . . . a bankrupt or debtor under
the Bankruptcy Act.” 11 U. S. C. § 525(a) (emphasis added).
The dissent would have us believe that the language “solely
because [the] bankrupt or debtor . . . has not paid a debt that
is dischargeable” merely achieves the very same objec-
tive through inappropriate language. We think Congress
meant what it said: The government is not to revoke a bank-
ruptcy debtor’s license solely because of a failure to pay his
debts.
The dissent makes much of the “serious anomaly” that
would arise from permitting “every car salesman, every
residential home developer, every appliance company [to]
threaten repossession of its product if a buyer does not pay,”
but denying that power to the government alone, post, at
312. It is by no means clear than any anomaly exists. The
car salesman, residential home developer, etc., can obtain re-
possession of his product only (as the dissent acknowledges)
“if [he] has taken a security interest in the product,” ibid.
It is neither clear that a private party can take and enforce
a security interest in an FCC license, see, e. g., In re Cheskey,
9 FCC Rcd. 986, ¶ 8 (1994), nor that the FCC cannot. (As
we described in our statement of facts, the FCC purported
to take such a security interest in the present cases. What
is at issue, however, is not the enforcement of that interest
in the bankruptcy process,5 but rather elimination of the li-
5 The FCC initially participated in the bankruptcy proceedings as a
creditor. See, e. g., In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235

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308 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Opinion of Stevens, J.
censes through the regulatory step of “revoking” them—
action that the statute specifically forbids.) In any event, if
there is an anomaly it is one that has been created by Con-
gress—a state of affairs the dissent does not think intolera-
ble, since its own disposition creates the anomaly of allowing
the government to reclaim its property by means other than
the enforcement of a security interest, but not permitting
private individuals to do so.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
Because these are such close cases, it seems appropriate
to identify the considerations that have persuaded me to join
the majority. When I first read 11 U. S. C. § 525(a), I
thought it was not intended to apply to cases in which the
licensor was also a creditor, but rather, as Justice Breyer
persuasively argues, was merely intended to protect the
debtor from discriminatory license terminations. I remain
persuaded that that is the principal purpose of the provision.
It is significant, however, that the first words in the section
describe three exceptions for statutes, one of which contains
language remarkably similar to the language in the security
B. R. 314 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 1999). However, after NextWave prepared
a plan of reorganization the FCC asserted that the licenses had been auto-
matically canceled and gave notice of its intent to reauction them. The
Second Circuit treated this decision as “regulatory,” and thus outside the
scope of the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction. See In re Federal Commu-
nications Commission, 217 F. 3d 125, 139, 136 (2000). The decision by
the D. C. Circuit recognized and seemingly approved that distinction.
See 254 F. 3d 130, 143 (2001).

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Opinion of Stevens, J.
agreements executed by respondents in these cases.1 Those
exceptions introduce an ambiguity.
On the one hand, they indicate that Congress did not in-
tend § 525(a) to limit the Executive’s right to condition the
retaining of a federal license on considerations similar to
those on which a creditor relies. The reasons for making
an exception for licenses to deal in perishable commodities
would seem equally applicable to licenses to exploit the pub-
lic airwaves. Indeed, there is probably a greater public in-
terest in allowing prompt cancellation of spectrum licenses
than of commodities dealers’ licenses because of the impor-
tance of facilitating development of the broadcast spectrum.
On the other hand, the exceptions demonstrate that Con-
gress realized the breadth of the language in § 525(a).
Rather than make a categorical exception that would have
accommodated not only the three cases expressly covered by
the text, but also cases like the ones before the Court today,
the drafters retained the broad language that the Court finds
decisive. That language endorses a general rule that gives
priority to the debtor’s interest in preserving control of
an important asset of the estate pending the completion of
bankruptcy proceedings.
I do not believe that the application of that general rule
to these cases will be unfair to the Federal Communications
Commission either as a regulator or as a creditor. If the
1 The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, provides, in part:
“Whenever an applicant has paid the prescribed fee the Secretary . . .
shall issue to such applicant a license, which shall entitle the licensee to
do business as a commission merchant . . . , but said license shall automat-
ically terminate . . . unless the licensee . . . pays the applicable renewal
fee[:] [T]he license of any licensee shall terminate upon said licensee . . .
being discharged as a bankrupt, unless the Secretary finds upon examina-
tion of the circumstances of such bankruptcy . . . that such circumstances
do not warrant termination.” 7 U. S. C. § 499d(a) (emphases added).
The security agreements between NextWave and the Government pro-
vided that “the License shall be automatically canceled” upon NextWave’s
defaulting on an installment payment. 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 409a.

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310 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
bankrupt licensee is unable to fulfill other conditions of its
license, the regulator may cancel the licenses for reasons that
are not covered by § 525(a).2 Moreover, given the fact that
the Commission has a secured interest in the license, if the
licensee can obtain the financing that will enable it to per-
form its obligations in full, the debt will ultimately be paid.
In sum, even though I agree with Justice Breyer’s view
that the literal text of a statute is not always a sufficient
basis for determining the actual intent of Congress, in these
cases I believe it does produce the correct answer.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
The statute before us says that the Government may not
revoke a license it has granted to a person who has entered
bankruptcy “solely because [the bankruptcy debtor] . . . has
not paid a debt that is dischargeable in [bankruptcy].” 11
U. S. C. § 525(a) (emphasis added). The question is whether
the italicized words apply when a government creditor, hav-
ing taken a security interest in a license sold on an install-
ment plan, revokes the license not because the debtor has
gone bankrupt, but simply because the debtor has failed to
pay an installment as promised. The majority answers this
question in the affirmative. It says that the italicized
words mean
“nothing more or less than that the failure to pay a dis-
chargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause of
the cancellation—the act or event that triggers the
agency’s decision to cancel, whatever the agency’s ulti-
mate motive . . . may be.” Ante, at 301–302 (emphasis
added).
Hence, if the debt is a dischargeable debt (as virtually all
debts are), then once a debtor enters bankruptcy, the Gov-
2 The Senate Report explained that § 525(a) “does not prohibit consider-
ation of other factors, such as future financial responsibility or ability, and
does not prohibit imposition of requirements such as net capital rules, if
applied nondiscriminatorily.” S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 81 (1978).

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Breyer, J., dissenting
ernment cannot revoke the license—irrespective of the Gov-
ernment’s motive. That, the majority writes, is what the
statute says. Just read it. End of the matter.
It is dangerous, however, in any actual case of interpretive
difficulty to rely exclusively upon the literal meaning of a
statute’s words divorced from consideration of the statute’s
purpose. That is so for a linguistic reason. General terms
as used on particular occasions often carry with them implied
restrictions as to scope. “Tell all customers that . . .” does
not refer to every customer of every business in the world.
That is also so for a legal reason. Law as expressed in stat-
utes seeks to regulate human activities in particular ways.
Law is tied to life. And a failure to understand how a statu-
tory rule is so tied can undermine the very human activity
that the law seeks to benefit. “No vehicles in the park” does
not refer to baby strollers or even to tanks used as part of
a war memorial. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 663
(1958).
I
In my view this statute’s language is similarly restricted.
A restriction implicitly limits its scope to instances in which
a government’s license revocation is related to the fact that
the debt was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Where the fact
of bankruptcy is totally irrelevant, where the government’s
action has no relation either through purpose or effect to
bankruptcy or to dischargeability, where consequently the
revocation cannot threaten the bankruptcy-related concerns
that underlie the statute, then the revocation falls outside
the statute’s scope. Congress intended this kind of excep-
tion to its general language in order to avoid consequences
which, if not “absurd,” are at least at odds with the statute’s
basic objectives. Cf. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486
(1869) (“All laws should receive a sensible construction.
General terms should be so limited in their application as not
to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence”).

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312 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
The Court’s literal interpretation of the statute threatens
to create a serious anomaly. It seems to say that a govern-
ment cannot ever enforce a lien on property that it has sold
on the installment plan as long as (1) the property is a li-
cense, (2) the buyer has gone bankrupt, and (3) the govern-
ment wants the license back solely because the buyer did not
pay for it. After all, in such circumstances, it is virtually
always the case that the buyer will not have paid a debt that
is in fact “dischargeable,” and that “event” alone will have
“trigger[ed]” the government’s “decision” to revoke the li-
cense. See supra, at 310.
Yet every private commercial seller, every car salesman,
every residential home developer, every appliance company
can threaten repossession of its product if a buyer does not
pay—at least if the seller has taken a security interest in the
product. E. g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U. S. 291, 297
(1991). Why should the government (state or federal), and
the government alone, find it impossible to repossess a prod-
uct, namely, a license, when the buyer fails to make install-
ment payments?
The facts of these cases illustrate the problem. Next-
Wave bought broadcasting licenses from the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) for just under $5 billion. It
promised to pay the money under an installment plan. It
agreed that its possession of the licenses was “conditioned
upon full and timely payment,” that failure to pay would
result in the licenses’ “automatic cancellation,” that the
Government would maintain a “fi[r]st lien on and continu-
ing security interest” in the licenses, and that it would
“not dispute” the Government’s “rights as a secured party.”
2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 388a, 392a–393a, 402a–404a. Next-
Wave never made its installment payments. It entered
bankruptcy. And the FCC declared the licenses void for
nonpayment. In a word, the FCC sought to repossess the
licenses so that it could auction the related spectrum space
to other users. As I have said, the law ordinarily permits a

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313 Cite as: 537 U. S. 293 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
private creditor who has taken an appropriate security inter-
est to repossess property for nonpayment—even after bank-
ruptcy. See, e. g., Farrey, supra, at 297. Would Congress
want to say that the Government cannot ever do the same?
II
To read the statute in light of its purpose makes clear that
Congress did not want always to prohibit the Government
from enforcing a sales contract through repossession. Nor
did it intend an interpretation so broad that it would
threaten unnecessarily to deprive the American public of the
full value of public assets that it owns. Cf. 47 U. S. C.
§§ 309( j)(1)–(4) (authorization of spectrum auctions with re-
strictions “to protect the public interest”). Congress in-
stead intended the statute’s language to implement a less
far-reaching, but more understandable, objective. It sought
to forbid discrimination against those who are, or were, in
bankruptcy and, more generally, to prohibit governmental
action that would undercut the “fresh start” that is bank-
ruptcy’s promise, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 286
(1991). Where that kind of government activity is at issue,
the statute forbids revocation. But where that kind of ac-
tivity is not at issue, there is no reason to apply the stat-
ute’s prohibition.
The statute’s title, its language, and its history all support
this description of its purpose. The title says, “Protection
against discriminatory treatment.” 11 U. S. C. § 525(a).
The statute’s text, read as a whole, see Appendix, infra,
strongly suggests that bankruptcy-related discrimination is
the evil at which the statute aims. A phrase is sometimes
best known by the statutory company it keeps. See, e. g.,
Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 255 (2000). And here the
relevant phrase is immersed within language that describes
a host of acts, including discharges from employment and
refusals to hire, and forbids them only where done solely for
bankruptcy-related reasons, i. e., a person’s being a bank-

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314 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
ruptcy debtor, having been a bankruptcy debtor, or having
become insolvent before or during a bankruptcy case. See
Appendix, infra.
The statute’s history demonstrates an antidiscriminatory
objective. House and Senate Reports describe the relevant
section, § 525(a), as “the anti-discrimination provision.”
S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 81 (1978) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R.
Rep. No. 95–595, p. 367 (1977) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). The
House Report says that its “purpose . . . is to prevent an
automatic reaction against an individual for availing himself
of the protection of the bankruptcy laws.” Id., at 165. In
describing related provisions, the House Report refers to an
intent to prevent the Government from punishing “bank-
ruptcy per se” by denying “a license, grant, or entitlement”
on the premise “that bankruptcy itself is sufficiently repre-
[h]ensible behavior to warrant . . . a sanction.” Id., at 286.
It adds that the overriding goal was “to eliminate any special
treatment of bankruptcy” in laws of the United States.
Id., at 285.
In addition, the House and Senate Reports describe
§ 525(a) as an effort to codify this Court’s holding in Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U. S. 637 (1971). S. Rep., at 81; H. R. Rep.,
at 165, 366. The Court there held that the federal Bank-
ruptcy Act pre-empted a state statute that suspended the
driver’s license of any person who had not paid a motor acci-
dent judgment (explicitly including a judgment discharged
by bankruptcy). 402 U. S., at 652. The Court rested its
holding on the theory that the state statute’s failure to ex-
empt discharged debts “frustrate[d] the full effectiveness” of
the Bankruptcy Act’s promise of a “fresh start.” Ibid.
Further, the House Report, along with House floor state-
ments, assured the enacting Congress that the statute would
allow “governmental units to pursue appropriate regulatory
policies.” E. g., H. R. Rep., at 165. It was not meant “to
interfere with legitimate regulatory objectives,” 123 Cong.

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Rec. 35673 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Butler); see also H. R.
Rep., at 286. It might seem fair to count as one such objec-
tive the receipt by the public of payment for a partially regu-
lated public asset that the public, through the Government,
has sold. Cf. 47 U. S. C. § 309( j)(3)(C).
Finally, nothing in the statute’s history suggests any con-
gressional effort to prevent Government repossession where
bankruptcy-related concerns, such as “fresh start” concerns,
have no relevance. The statute does contain exemptions,
but those exemptions, for agriculture-related licenses, are
not to the contrary. 11 U. S. C. § 525(a). As I read the stat-
ute, the exemptions simply excuse, say, meatpacking licens-
ing agencies from a rule that would otherwise forbid taking
negative account of, say, a prior bankruptcy (say, by provid-
ing that a license “shall terminate upon [the] licensee . . .
being discharged as a bankrupt,” 7 U. S. C. § 499d(a); see
ante, at 308–309, and n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)). To read them as permitting
consideration of former bankruptcies where the food supply
is at issue makes them understandable. To read them as
support for the majority’s view—as authorizing the Govern-
ment to revoke meatpacking, but only meatpacking, licenses
upon nonpayment—makes little sense to me.
The statute’s purposes, then, are to stop bankruptcy-
related discrimination and to prevent government licensors
from interfering with the “fresh start” that bankruptcy
promises, but not to prevent government debt-collection ef-
forts where these concerns are not present. Unlike the ma-
jority, I believe it possible to interpret the statute’s language
in a manner consistent with these purposes.
III
The provision’s congressional authors expected courts to
look for interpretations that would conform the statute’s lan-
guage to its purposes. They conceded that the provision’s

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316 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
“ultimate contours” were “not yet clear.” H. R. Rep., at 165.
But they said that the courts would determine “the extent
of the discrimination that is contrary to bankruptcy policy.”
Ibid. And they thought the courts would do so “in pursuit
of sound bankruptcy policy.” S. Rep., at 81; H. R. Rep.,
at 367.
One obvious way to carry out this interpretive mandate is
to interpret the relevant phrase, “solely because” of nonpay-
ment of “a debt that is dischargeable,” as requiring some-
thing more than a purely factual connection, i. e., something
more than a causal connection between a government’s revo-
cation of a license and nonpayment of a debt that is, merely
in fact, dischargeable. The statute’s words are open to the
interpretation that they require a certain relationship be-
tween (1) the dischargeability of the debt and (2) the de-
cision to revoke the license. That necessary relationship
would exist if the debt’s dischargeability played a role in the
government’s decisionmaking through motivation—if, for ex-
ample, the fact that the debt was dischargeable (or the fact
of bankruptcy, etc.) mattered to the FCC. The necessary
relationship would also exist if the government’s revocation
interfered in some significant way with bankruptcy’s effort
to provide a “fresh start.” But otherwise, where the fact of
dischargeability is irrelevant, where it has nothing to do with
the government’s decision either by way of purpose or effect,
the government’s license revocation would fall outside the
scope of the provision.
This interpretation is consistent with the statute’s lan-
guage. It simply takes account not only of the statutory
language’s factual content—i. e., its reference to a debt that
is in fact dischargeable—but also its intended significance.
A debt’s dischargeability cannot simply be a coincidence but
must bear a meaningful relation to the prohibited govern-
ment action. Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600,
619–620 (1994) (statute forbidding possession of a machine-
gun requires not simply that the gun, in fact, discharge auto-

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317 Cite as: 537 U. S. 293 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
matically, but also that the defendant know that the gun
meets the statute’s description).
This interpretation is consistent with several lower court
efforts to interpret the statute. See, e. g., Toth v. Michigan
State Housing Development Authority, 136 F. 3d 477, 480
(CA6), cert. denied, 524 U. S. 954 (1998); In re Exquisito
Services, Inc., 823 F. 2d 151, 153 (CA5 1987); In re Smith,
259 B. R. 901, 906 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA8 2001). But see
In re Stoltz, 315 F. 3d 80 (CA2 2002). It would avoid handi-
capping government debt collection efforts in ways that Con-
gress did not intend. It would further the statute’s basic
purpose—preventing discrimination and preserving bank-
ruptcy’s “fresh start.” And it would avoid interfering with
legitimate public debt collection efforts. An individual
could not generally promise to pay for a public asset, go into
bankruptcy, avoid the payment obligation, and keep the
asset—even in the absence of the evils at which this statute
is aimed.
This statutory approach is far from novel. Well over a
century ago, the Court interpreted a statute that forbade
knowing and willful obstruction of the mail as containing an
implicit exception permitting a local sheriff to arrest a mail
carrier. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall., at 485–487. Jus-
tice Field, writing for the Court, pointed out that centuries
earlier the British courts had interpreted a statute making
it a felony to break out of prison not to extend to a breakout
when the prison is on fire. Id., at 487. And, similarly, the
courts of Bologna had interpreted a statute punishing se-
verely “ ‘whoever drew blood in the streets’ ” not to extend
to a surgeon faced with an emergency. Ibid. “[C]ommon
sense,” wrote Justice Field, “accepts” these rulings. Ibid.
So too does common sense suggest that we should interpret
the present statute not to extend to revocation efforts that
are no more closely related to the statute’s objectives than
are baby strollers to the “vehicles” forbidden entry into the
park. See supra, at 311.

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318 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
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IV
The majority responds to my concerns in several ways.
First, it characterizes the dissent in a slightly exaggerated
manner, stating, for example, that I have “determine[d]” the
statute’s “purpose” in “splendid isolation from [its] lan-
guage,” that bankruptcy’s “fresh start” objective “plays no
real role in [my] analysis,” and that that “criterion” is, in any
event, “circular.” Ante, at 305, and n. 4. I would refer the
reader to Parts II and III above (which contain considerable
discussion of statutory language and statutory history) and,
in particular, to the discussion of Perez, a decision that relied
upon the “fresh start” objective in a way that the statute
seeks to codify and that my own suggested interpretation of
the statute incorporates. In my view, the language of the
statute taken as a whole—including its “insolvency” lan-
guage, ante, at 305—strongly suggests that Congress in-
tended bankruptcy to have something to do with the forbid-
den government action. See Appendix, infra.
Second, the majority argues that my interpretation makes
the statute’s “dischargeable debt” provision “superfluous,”
given language forbidding revocation because a person “ ‘is
. . . a [bankruptcy] debtor.’ ” Ante, at 307 (emphasis de-
leted). I do not see how that is so. A refusal to issue, say,
a new dry cleaner’s license “solely because” a bankruptcy
debtor once failed to pay for other dry cleaner’s licenses (now
discharged debts) is not necessarily the same as a refusal to
issue a new license “solely because” the debtor “has been . . .
a bankrupt,” 11 U. S. C. § 525(a). And the statute’s separ-
ate provisions simply cover this differentiated bankruptcy-
related waterfront.
Third, the majority returns to the statutory language pro-
hibiting a government from revoking a license “solely be-
cause [the bankrupt debtor] . . . has not paid a debt that
is dischargeable,” ibid. Ante, at 306–307. To my ear, this
language suggests a possible connection between discharge-
ability and revocation. I have tried to test my linguistic

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319 Cite as: 537 U. S. 293 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
sense through analogy, imagining, for example, a regulatory
rule telling apartment owners that they cannot refuse to rent
“solely because a family has children who are adopted”
(which, notwithstanding the majority’s complex discussion of
“destructive children,” ante, at 306, seems linguistically com-
parable). This language suggests the need for a connection
between (1) the fact of adoption and (2) the refusal (thereby
exempting an owner who accepts no children at all). Is it
not, like the statute’s language, at least open to such an inter-
pretation? That is the linguistic point. It opens the door
to a consideration of context and purpose—which, in any
event, are relevant to determine whether the statute con-
tains an implicit exemption, see supra, at 317.
Finally, the majority points out that, in the wake of a com-
plicated procedural history, these cases are now not about
“enforcement of [a security] interest in” the Bankruptcy
Court. Ante, at 307, and n. 5. But the majority’s interpre-
tation certainly seems to cover that circumstance, and more.
Under the majority’s understanding, a government creditor
who seeks to enforce a security interest in a broadcasting
license (after the bankruptcy stay has been lifted or after
bankruptcy proceedings terminate) would be seeking to re-
possess, and thereby to revoke, that license “solely because”
of the debtor’s failure to pay a “dischargeable” debt. After
all, under such circumstances, “failure to pay” the debt that
is in fact dischargeable would “alone be the proximate cause”
of the government’s action. Ante, at 301. It is “the act or
event that triggers the agency’s decision to cancel, whatever
the agency’s ultimate motive.” Ante, at 301–302.
If I am right about this, the majority’s interpretation
means that private creditors, say, car dealers, can enforce
security interests in the goods that they sell, namely, cars,
but governments cannot enforce security interests in items
that they sell, namely, licenses. (Whether a private party
can “take and enforce a security interest in an FCC license,”
ante, at 307, is beside this particular point.)

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320 FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
The matter is important. In these very cases, the Govern-
ment sought to retake its licenses through enforcement of
its security interest. See, e. g., In re NextWave Personal
Communications, Inc., 241 B. R. 311, 321 (SDNY) (affirming
denial of the Government’s motion for relief from the auto-
matic stay under 11 U. S. C. § 362(d)(1)), rev’d, 200 F. 3d 43,
45–46, 62, and n. 1 (CA2 1999) (reversing that affirmance).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
indicated that the FCC’s revocation of the licenses, see ante,
at 307–308, is properly characterized as foreclosure on collat-
eral—i. e., as an attempt to enforce liens. See 254 F. 3d 130,
151 (CADC 2001); cf. In re Kingsport Ventures, L. P., 251
B. R. 841, 844 (ED Tenn. 2000) (private party’s power to use
“revocation” to enforce interest in a license). But because
the Court of Appeals rested its decision on § 525(a) grounds,
it did not determine whether bankruptcy’s automatic stay
blocked such foreclosure. 254 F. 3d, at 148–149, 156. See
generally 11 U. S. C. §§ 362(a)(4)–(5) (staying enforcement of
liens). Consequently, if the majority believes that § 525(a)
permits the Government to enforce security interests in its
license collateral, it should remand these cases, permitting
the Court of Appeals to decide whether other bankruptcy
provisions (such as § 362) block the Government’s efforts to
do so.
I emphasize the point because the majority is right in
thinking that lien-enforcement difficulties create much of the
anomaly I fear—in effect divorcing the majority’s reading
from the statute’s basic purpose. Is it not reasonable to ask
for reassurance on this point, to ask what future interpretive
corollary might rescue government lien-enforcement efforts
from the difficulties the majority’s statutory interpretation
seems to create? Unless there is an answer to this question,
the majority’s opinion holds out no more than a slim possibil-
ity of ad hoc adjustment based upon future need. And such
an adjustment, if it comes at all, may amount to mere judicial

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321 Cite as: 537 U. S. 293 (2003)
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
fiat—used to rescue an interpretation that rests too heavily
upon linguistic deduction and too little upon human purpose.
V
Because the Government, asserting its security interest,
may be able to show that revocation here bears no relation-
ship to the debt’s “dischargeability” and would not otherwise
improperly interfere with the Code’s “fresh start” objective,
I would vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand
for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.
The full text of 11 U. S. C. § 525(a) states:
“Protection against discriminatory treatment
“(a) Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act, 1930, the Packers and Stockyards Act,
1921, and section 1 of the Act entitled ‘An Act making
appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, and for other pur-
poses,’ approved July 12, 1943, a governmental unit may
not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license,
permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, con-
dition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such
a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the em-
ployment of, or discriminate with respect to employment
against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this
title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy
Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or
debtor has been associated, solely because such bank-
rupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or
a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has
been insolvent before the commencement of the case
under this title, or during the case but before the debtor
is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt
that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that
was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.”