UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION

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488 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 01–1375. Argued December 2, 2002—Decided March 4, 2003
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) provides that “[u]nallot-
ted lands within any Indian reservation,” or otherwise under federal
jurisdiction, “may, with the approval of the Secretary [of the Interior
(Secretary)] . . . , be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the
tribal council or other authorized spokesmen for such Indians.” 25
U. S. C. § 396a. The IMLA aims to provide Indian tribes with a profit-
able source of revenue and to foster tribal self-determination by giving
Indians a greater say in the use and disposition of the resources on
their lands.
In 1964, the Navajo Nation (Tribe) permitted the predecessor of Pea-
body Coal Company (Peabody) to mine coal on the Tribe’s lands pursu-
ant to Lease 8580 (Lease or Lease 8580). The Lease established a max-
imum royalty rate of 37.5 cents per ton of coal, but made that figure
subject to reasonable adjustment by the Secretary on the 20-year anni-
versary of the Lease and every ten years thereafter. As Lease 8580’s
20-year anniversary approached, its 37.5 cents per ton rate yielded for
the Tribe about 2 percent of gross proceeds. This return was higher
than the ten cents per ton minimum established by then-applicable regu-
lations implementing the IMLA. It was substantially lower, however,
than the rate Congress established in 1977 as the minimum permissible
royalty for coal mined on federal lands under the Mineral Leasing Act.
In June 1984, the Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, acting
pursuant to authority delegated by the Secretary and at the Tribe’s
request, sent Peabody an opinion letter raising the Lease 8580 rate to
20 percent of gross proceeds. While Peabody’s administrative appeal
was pending before Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs John
Fritz, Peabody wrote to Secretary Hodel, asking him either to postpone
decision on the appeal or to rule in Peabody’s favor. Peabody repre-
sentatives also met privately with Hodel during that period. In July
1985, Hodel sent a memorandum to Fritz “suggest[ing]” that he inform
the parties that his decision was not imminent and urging them to con-
tinue their efforts to resolve the matter in a mutually agreeable fashion.
The Tribe resumed negotiations with Peabody. In November 1985, the
parties agreed to amend the Lease to provide, among other things, for
a royalty rate of 121⁄ 2 percent of monthly gross proceeds, which was the

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then-customary rate for coal leases on federal and Indian lands. Pursu-
ant to 25 U. S. C. § 396a, Secretary Hodel approved the amended Lease
in December 1987.
In 1993, the Tribe brought this action for damages against the United
States, alleging, inter alia, that the Secretary’s approval of the Lease
amendments constituted a breach of trust. Although granting sum-
mary judgment for the United States, the Court of Federal Claims found
that the Secretary had flagrantly dishonored the Government’s general
fiduciary duties to the Tribe by acting in Peabody’s best interests rather
than those of the Tribe. The court nevertheless concluded that the
Tribe had entirely failed to link that breach of duty to any statutory or
regulatory obligation which could be fairly interpreted as mandating
compensation for the Government’s actions. The Federal Circuit re-
versed. Relying on 25 U. S. C. § 399 and regulations promulgated
thereunder, the appeals court determined that the measure of control
the Secretary exercised over the leasing of Indian lands for mineral
development sufficed to warrant a money judgment against the United
States. Agreeing with the Federal Claims Court that the Secretary’s
actions regarding Peabody’s administrative appeal violated the Govern-
ment’s fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, the Court of Appeals remanded
for further proceedings, including a determination of damages.
Held: United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (Mitchell I), and United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (Mitchell II), control this case. The
controversy here falls within Mitchell I’s domain, and the Tribe’s claim
for compensation from the Government fails, for it does not derive from
any liability-imposing provision of the IMLA or its implementing regu-
lations. Pp. 502–514.
(a) To state a litigable claim, a tribal plaintiff must invoke a rights-
creating source of substantive law that “can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages
sustained.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. Although the Indian Tucker
Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal
Claims in cases where this requirement is met, the Act is not itself
a source of substantive rights. E. g., Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 216.
Pp. 502–503.
(b) Mitchell I and Mitchell II are the pathmarking precedents on the
question whether a statute or regulation (or combination thereof) “can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Gov-
ernment.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. In Mitchell I, the Court held
that the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA)—which authorized
the President to allot agricultural or grazing land to individual tribal
members residing on a reservation, 25 U. S. C. § 331, and provided that

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the Government would hold land thus allotted in trust for the sole use
and benefit of the allottee, § 348—did not authorize an award of money
damages against the United States for alleged mismanagement of for-
ests located on allotted lands. The Court concluded that the GAA cre-
ated only a limited trust relationship that did not impose any duty upon
the Government to manage timber resources. Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at
542. In Mitchell II, however, the Court held that a network of other
statutes and regulations did impose judicially enforceable fiduciary du-
ties upon the United States in its management of forested allotted lands,
463 U. S., at 222–224, and that the relevant prescriptions could fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government
when it breached those duties, id., at 226–227. To state a claim cogniza-
ble under the Indian Tucker Act, Mitchell I and Mitchell II instruct, a
tribe must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific
fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed
faithfully to perform those duties. See Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 216–
217, 219. If that threshold is passed, the court must then determine
whether the relevant source of substantive law “can fairly be inter-
preted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result
of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].” Id., at 219.
Although “the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship be-
tween the United States and the Indian people” can “reinforc[e]” the
conclusion that the relevant statute or regulation imposes fiduciary du-
ties, id., at 225, that relationship alone is insufficient to support jurisdic-
tion under the Indian Tucker Act. Instead, the analysis must train on
specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory pre-
scriptions. Those prescriptions, however, need not expressly provide
for money damages; the availability of such damages may be inferred.
See id., at 217, n. 16. Pp. 503–506.
(c) The statutes and regulations at issue cannot fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation for the Government’s alleged breach of trust
in this case. Pp. 506–514.
(1) The IMLA and its regulations do not provide the requisite “sub-
stantive law” that “mandat[es] compensation by the Federal Govern-
ment.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. They impose no obligations re-
sembling the detailed fiduciary responsibilities that Mitchell II found
adequate to support a claim for money damages. The IMLA simply
requires Secretarial approval before coal mining leases negotiated be-
tween Tribes and third parties become effective, § 396a, and authorizes
the Secretary generally to promulgate regulations governing mining
operations, § 396d. Unlike the “elaborate” provisions before the Court
in Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 225, the IMLA and its regulations do not
“give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian

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resources . . . for the benefit of the Indians,” id., at 224. The Secretary
is neither assigned a comprehensive managerial role nor, at the time
relevant here, expressly invested with responsibility to secure “the
needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs.” Ibid. In-
stead, the Secretary’s involvement in coal leasing under the IMLA more
closely resembles the role provided for the Government by the GAA
regarding allotted forest lands. See Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 540–544.
Although the GAA required the Government to hold allotted land in
trust for allottees, that Act did not “authoriz[e], much less requir[e],
the Government to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian
allottees.” Id., at 545. Similarly here, the IMLA and its regulations
do not assign to the Secretary managerial control over coal leasing.
Nor do they even establish the “limited trust relationship,” id., at 542,
existing under the GAA; no provision of the IMLA or its regulations
contains any trust language with respect to coal leasing. Moreover, as
in Mitchell I, imposing fiduciary duties on the Government here would
be out of line with one of the statute’s principal purposes, enhancing
tribal self-determination. See id., at 543. Pp. 506–508.
(2) The Court rejects the Tribe’s arguments that the Secretary’s
actions in this case violated discrete statutory and regulatory provisions
whose breach is redressable in a damages action. The Tribe misplaces
reliance on 25 U. S. C. § 399, which is not part of the IMLA and does not
govern Lease 8580. Enacted almost 20 years before the IMLA, § 399
authorizes the Secretary to lease certain unallotted Indian lands for min-
ing purposes on terms she sets, and does not provide for input from the
Tribes concerned. That authorization does not bear on the Secretary’s
more limited approval role under the IMLA. Similarly unavailing is
the Tribe’s reliance on the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982
(IMDA), 25 U. S. C. § 2101 et seq. The IMDA governs the Secretary’s
approval of agreements for the development of certain Indian mineral
resources through exploration and like activities. It does not establish
standards governing her approval of mining leases negotiated by a
Tribe and a third party, such as Lease 8580. The Tribe’s vigorously
pressed arguments headlining § 396a, the IMLA’s general prescription,
fare no better. Asserting that Secretary Hodel violated a § 396a duty
to review and approve proposed coal leases only to the extent they are
in the Tribe’s best interests, the Tribe points to various Government
reports identifying 20 percent as the appropriate royalty, and to the
Secretary’s decision, made after receiving ex parte communications from
Peabody, to withhold departmental action. In the circumstances pre-
sented, the Tribe maintains, Hodel’s eventual approval of the 121⁄ 2 per-
cent royalty rate violated § 396a in two ways: (1) It was improvident
because it allowed conveyance of the Tribe’s coal for what Hodel knew

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to be about half of its value, and (2) it was unfair because Hodel’s inter-
vention into the Lease adjustment process skewed the bargaining by
depriving the Tribe of the 20 percent rate. These arguments fail, for
they assume substantive prescriptions not found in § 396a. As to the
first argument, because neither the IMLA nor any of its regulations
establishes anything more than a bare minimum royalty, there is no
textual basis for concluding that the Secretary’s approval function in-
cludes a duty, enforceable in an action for money damages, to ensure a
higher rate of return for the Tribe. Similarly, the Tribe’s second ar-
gument is not grounded in specific statutory or regulatory language.
Nothing in § 396a or the IMLA’s implementing regulations proscribed
the ex parte communications in this case, which occurred during an ad-
ministrative appeal process largely unconstrained by formal require-
ments. Moreover, even if Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz had ren-
dered an opinion affirming the 20 percent royalty approved by the Area
Director, the Secretary could have set aside or modified his sub-
ordinate’s decision in the exercise of his authority as head of the
Interior Department. Accordingly, rejection of Peabody’s appeal by
Fritz would not necessarily have yielded a higher royalty for the
Tribe. Pp. 509–514.
263 F. 3d 1325, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., joined,
post, p. 514.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clark, Gregory G.
Garre, Todd S. Aagaard, and R. Anthony Rogers.
Paul E. Frye argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Richard W. Hughes, David O. Stewart,
Samuel J. Buffone, Levon B. Henry, and Richard B.
Collins.*
*V. Thomas Lankford and Terrance G. Reed filed a brief for the Peabody
Coal Co. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Jicarilla
Apache Nation et al. by Jill Elise Grant; for the Mississippi Band of Choc-

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
(IMLA), 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. § 396a et seq., and the role
it assigns to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) with
respect to coal leases executed by an Indian Tribe and a pri-
vate lessee. The controversy centers on 1987 amendments
to a 1964 coal lease entered into by the predecessor of
Peabody Coal Company (Peabody) and the Navajo Nation
(Tribe), a federally recognized Indian Tribe. The Tribe
seeks to recover money damages from the United States for
an alleged breach of trust in connection with the Secretary’s
approval of coal lease amendments negotiated by the Tribe
and Peabody. This Court’s decisions in United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I), and United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II), control this
case. Concluding that the controversy here falls within
Mitchell I’s domain, we hold that the Tribe’s claim for com-
pensation from the Federal Government fails, for it does not
derive from any liability-imposing provision of the IMLA or
its implementing regulations.
I
A
The IMLA, which governs aspects of mineral leasing on
Indian tribal lands, states that “unallotted lands within any
Indian reservation,” or otherwise under federal jurisdiction,
“may, with the approval of the Secretary . . . , be leased for
mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council or other
authorized spokesmen for such Indians, for terms not to
exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are
produced in paying quantities.” § 396a. In addition “to
provid[ing] Indian tribes with a profitable source of rev-
enue,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S.
taw Indians by Charles A. Hobbs and Christopher T. Stearns; and for the
National Congress of American Indians by Jeffrey S. Sutton and John
E. Echohawk.

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163, 179 (1989), the IMLA aimed to foster tribal self-
determination by “giv[ing] Indians a greater say in the use
and disposition of the resources found on Indian lands,” BHP
Minerals Int’l Inc., 139 I. B. L. A. 269, 311 (1997).
Prior to enactment of the IMLA, decisions whether to
grant mineral leases on Indian land generally rested with
the Government. See, e. g., Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 26,
41 Stat. 31, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 399; see also infra, at
509 (describing § 399). Indian consent was not required, and
leases were sometimes granted over tribal objections. See
H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1938); S. Rep.
No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 230
(2000). The IMLA, designed to advance tribal independ-
ence, empowers Tribes to negotiate mining leases them-
selves, and, as to coal leasing, assigns primarily an approval
role to the Secretary.
Although the IMLA covers mineral leasing generally, in a
number of discrete provisions it deals particularly with oil
and gas leases. See 25 U. S. C. § 396b (requirements for
public auctions of oil and gas leases); § 396d (oil and gas
leases are “subject to the terms of any reasonable cooper-
ative unit or other plan approved or prescribed by [the] Sec-
retary”); § 396g (“[T]o avoid waste or to promote the conser-
vation of natural resources or the welfare of the Indians,”
the Secretary may approve leases of Indian lands “for the
subsurface storage of oil and gas.”). The IMLA contains
no similarly specific prescriptions for coal leases; it simply
remits coal leases, in common with all mineral leases, to
the governance of rules and regulations promulgated by the
Secretary. § 396d.
During all times relevant here, the IMLA regulations pro-
vided that “Indian tribes . . . may, with the approval of the
Secretary . . . or his authorized representative, lease their
land for mining purposes.” 25 CFR § 211.2 (1985). In line
with the IMLA itself, the regulations treated oil and gas
leases in more detail than coal leases. The regulations re-

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garding royalties, for example, specified procedures applica-
ble to oil and gas leases, including criteria for the Secretary
to employ in setting royalty rates. §§ 211.13, 211.16, 211.17.
As to coal royalties, in contrast, the regulations required
only that the rate be “not less than 10 cents per ton.”
§ 211.15(c). No other limitation was placed on the Tribe’s
negotiating capacity or the Secretary’s approval authority.1
B
The Tribe involved in this case occupies the largest Indian
reservation in the United States. Over the past century,
large deposits of coal have been discovered on the Tribe’s
reservation lands, which are held for it in trust by the United
States. Each year, the Tribe receives millions of dollars in
royalty payments pursuant to mineral leases with private
companies.
Peabody mines coal on the Tribe’s lands pursuant to leases
covered by the IMLA. This case principally concerns Lease
8580 (Lease or Lease 8580), which took effect upon approval
by the Secretary in 1964. App. 188–220. The Lease estab-
lished a maximum royalty rate of 37.5 cents per ton of coal,
id., at 191, but made that figure “subject to reasonable ad-
justment by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized
representative” on the 20-year anniversary of the Lease and
every ten years thereafter, id., at 194.
As the 20-year anniversary of Lease 8580 approached, its
royalty rate of 37.5 cents per ton yielded for the Tribe only
“about 2% of gross proceeds.” 263 F. 3d 1325, 1327 (CA Fed.
2001). This return was higher than the ten cents per ton
minimum established by the then-applicable IMLA regula-
1 In 1996, well after the events at issue here, the minimum rate on new
coal leases was increased to “121⁄ 2 percent of the value of production
produced and sold from the lease.” 61 Fed. Reg. 35658 (1996); 25 CFR
§ 211.43(a)(2) (1997). The amended regulations further state, however,
that “[a] lower royalty rate shall be allowed if it is determined to be in
the best interest of the Indian mineral owner.” § 211.43(b).

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tions. See 25 CFR § 211.15(c) (1985). It was substantially
lower, however, than the 121 ⁄ 2 percent of gross proceeds rate
Congress established in 1977 as the minimum permissible
royalty for coal mined on federal lands under the Mineral
Leasing Act. See Pub. L. 94–377, § 6, 90 Stat. 1087, as
amended, 30 U. S. C. § 207(a). For some years starting in
the 1970’s, to gain a more favorable return, the Tribe endeav-
ored to renegotiate existing mineral leases with private les-
sees, including Peabody. See App. 138–139, 143–144.
In March 1984, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council
wrote to the Secretary asking him to exercise his contractu-
ally conferred authority to adjust the royalty rate under
Lease 8580. On June 18, 1984, the Director of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, acting pursuant to
authority delegated by the Secretary, sent Peabody an opin-
ion letter raising the rate to 20 percent of gross proceeds.
Id., at 8–9.
Contesting the Area Director’s rate determination, Pea-
body filed an administrative appeal in July 1984, pursuant to
25 CFR § 2.3(a) (1985). 46 Fed. Cl., at 222.2 The appeal was
referred to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Af-
fairs, John Fritz, then acting as both Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, 263 F. 3d,
at 1328. In March 1985, Fritz permitted Peabody to supple-
ment its brief and requested additional cost, revenue, and
investment data. 46 Fed. Cl., at 222. He thereafter ap-
peared ready to reject Peabody’s appeal. Ibid.; App. 89–97
(undated draft letter). By June 1985, both Peabody and the
Tribe anticipated that an announcement favorable to the
Tribe was imminent. Id., at 98–99.3
2 As required by the regulations, see 25 CFR § 2.11 (1985), Peabody
served its notice of appeal on the Tribe, which exercised its right to file a
response, see § 2.12.
3 The regulations then in effect required the Deputy Assistant Secretary
to “[r]ender a written decision on the appeal” or “[r]efer the appeal to
the Board of Indian Appeals” (Board), “[w]ithin 30 days after all time for

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On July 5, 1985, a Peabody Vice President wrote to Inte-
rior Secretary Donald Hodel, asking him either to postpone
decision on Peabody’s appeal so the parties could seek a ne-
gotiated settlement, or to rule in Peabody’s favor. Id., at
98–100. A copy of Peabody’s letter was sent to the Tribe,
id., at 100, which then submitted its own letter urging the
Secretary to reject Peabody’s request and to secure the De-
partment’s prompt release of a decision in the Tribe’s favor,
id., at 119–121. Peabody representatives met privately
with Secretary Hodel in July 1985, 46 Fed. Cl., at 222; no
representative of the Tribe was present at, or received notice
of, that meeting, id., at 219.
On July 17, 1985, Secretary Hodel sent a memorandum
to Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz. App. 117–118. The
memorandum “suggest[ed]” that Fritz “inform the involved
parties that a decision on th[e] appeal is not imminent and
urge them to continue with efforts to resolve this matter in
a mutually agreeable fashion.” Id., at 117. “Any royalty
adjustment which is imposed on those parties without their
concurrence,” the memorandum stated, “will almost cer-
tainly be the subject of protracted and costly appeals,” and
“could well impair the future of the contractual relationship”
pleadings . . . has expired.” § 2.19(a). Because more than 30 days had
elapsed by June 1985, App. 12, either party would have been entitled to
have the matter transferred to the Board. 25 CFR § 2.19(b) (1985). Nei-
ther Peabody nor the Tribe chose to go that route, which would have
entailed a formalized (and possibly protracted) additional administrative
process. See § 2.3(c) (“Appeals to the Board of Indian Appeals shall be
made in the manner provided in Department Hearings and Appeals Proce-
dures in 43 CFR Part 4, Subpart D.”); 43 CFR §§ 4.310–4.317 (1985) (gen-
eral rules applicable to proceedings on appeal before the Board); §§ 4.330–
4.340 (special rules applicable to appeals from administrative actions of
officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs). At the conclusion of proceedings
before the Board, either side could have sought reconsideration, § 4.315(a),
or requested further review by the Director of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals, § 4.5(b), or by the Secretary of the Interior, § 4.5(a).

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between the parties. Ibid.4 Secretary Hodel added, how-
ever, that the memorandum was “not intended as a determi-
nation of the merits of the arguments of the parties with
respect to the issues which are subject to the appeal.” Id.,
at 118.
The Tribe was not told of the Secretary’s memorandum to
Fritz, but learned that “ ‘someone from Washington’ had
urged a return to the bargaining table.” 46 Fed. Cl., at 223;
see App. 342–344. Facing “severe economic pressure,” 263
F. 3d, at 1328; App. 355–356, the Tribe resumed negotiations
with Peabody in August 1985, 46 Fed. Cl., at 223.
On September 23, 1985, the parties reached a tentative
agreement on a package of amendments to Lease 8580.
Ibid.5 They agreed to raise the royalty rate to 121 ⁄ 2 percent
of monthly gross proceeds, and to make the new rate retroac-
tive to February 1, 1984. App. 287. The 121 ⁄ 2 percent rate
was at the time customary for leases to mine coal on federal
lands and on Indian lands.6 The amendments acknowledged
4 The Deputy Assistant Secretary’s draft opinion letter stated that the
ruling “is based on the exercise of my discretionary authority and is final
for the Department.” App. 97. Had the letter issued, Peabody would
not have been entitled to seek further review by the Board. See 25 CFR
§ 2.19(c)(2) (1985) (the Board may review decisions by the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs only if the decision states that it “is based on interpreta-
tion of law”); see also supra, at 496 (Deputy Assistant Secretary was act-
ing as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs). But even if the opinion letter
had issued as drafted, Peabody could have asked Secretary Hodel to exer-
cise his “authority to review any decision of any employee or employees of
the Department.” 43 CFR § 4.5(a)(2) (1985). The Secretary could have
“render[ed] the final decision” himself, § 4.5(a)(1), or “direct[ed the Deputy
Assistant Secretary] to reconsider [his] decision,” § 4.5(a)(2).
5 The parties also agreed to raise the royalty rate under another lease
not in issue here, which covered coal located within a former joint use
area shared by the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe. 46 Fed. Cl. 217,
224 (2000). Unlike Lease 8580, that lease did not contain a provision sub-
jecting its rate to reasonable adjustment by the Secretary. Id., at 233.
6 Twelve and one-half percent is the minimum royalty rate set by Con-
gress for leases to mine coal on federal lands, see 30 U. S. C. § 207(a), and
is also the customary rate found in most such leases issued or readjusted
after 1976, see Department of Interior, Minerals Management Serv., Min-

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the legitimacy of tribal taxation of coal production, but stipu-
lated that the tax rate would be capped at eight percent.
Id., at 295, 299.7 In addition, Peabody agreed to pay the
erals Revenue Management, General Federal and American Indian Min-
eral Lease Terms (Jan. 2, 2003), http://www.mrm.mms.gov/Stats/pdfdocs/
lse_term.pdf (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The Tribe identifies
a single federal coal lease with a royalty rate of 17.08 percent, see Brief
for Respondent 11, but, as the Government points out, that lease was “part
of an experimental leasing policy tried by the Department for a short
time,” Reply Brief 12, n. 7 (quoting Peabody Coal Co., 93 I. B. L. A. 317,
320 (1986)). Between 1984 and 1988, the Department of the Interior’s
practice was not to approve IMLA leases with royalties less than the mini-
mum rate for federal coal, i. e., 121⁄ 2 percent. See App. in No. 00–5086
(CA Fed.), p. A1872. As late as 1996 the customary royalty rate for
coal leases on Indian lands issued or readjusted after 1976 did not exceed
121⁄ 2 percent. See Department of Interior, Minerals Management Serv.,
Mineral Revenues 1996, Report on Receipts from Federal and Indian
Leases 128 (Table 47) (Jan. 2, 2003), http://www.mrm.mms.gov/stats/
pdfdocs/mrr96fin.pdf (available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
The Tribe argues, in its presentation to this Court, that the 121⁄ 2 percent
provided in amended Lease 8580 is only a “facial royalty rate,” Brief for
Respondent 11, and that the actual rate is lower, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
That assertion is based in part on the Tribe’s agreement under the
amended Lease to relinquish its claim for $33 million in back taxes and
$56 million in back royalties, see 46 Fed. Cl., at 224, and in part on pro-
posed findings of fact the Tribe submitted to the Court of Federal Claims,
which the Government did not specifically dispute. See App. in No.
00–5086 (CA Fed.), pp. A2703–A2727. The proposed findings stated that
a provision in the amended Lease “signifying a non-standard method of
calculating the royalty,” App. 180 (Proposed Findings ¶ 314), “resulted
in royalty payments lower than the minimum allowable for federal coal,”
id., at 181 (Proposed Findings ¶ 315). To the extent the Tribe here assails
the Secretary’s approval of Lease 8580 as inconsistent with the then-
prevailing federal policy not to approve rates below 121⁄ 2 percent, we do
not pursue the point, for the Tribe failed to rely on it below. See 46 Fed.
Cl., at 233 (“[T]here is no claim by the [Tribe] that the [Secretary’s] 1987
approval of Lease 8580 . . . ran afoul of th[e] [federal] policy” of not approv-
ing IMLA leases with royalty rates of less than 121⁄ 2 percent.).
7 Before this Court’s decision in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471
U. S. 195 (1985), it was unsettled whether the Tribe could levy taxes with-
out the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The imposition of
a severance tax, of course, augmented the amount payable by the lessee

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Tribe $1.5 million when the amendments became effective,
and $7.5 million more when Peabody began mining additional
coal, as authorized by the Lease amendments. Id., at 292–
293. The agreement “also addressed ancillary matters such
as provisions for future royalty adjustments, arbitration pro-
cedures, rights of way, the establishment of a tribal scholar-
ship fund, and the payment by Peabody of back royalties,
bonuses, and water payments.” 46 Fed. Cl., at 224. “In
consideration of the benefits associated with these lease
amendments,” the parties agreed to move jointly to vacate
the Area Director’s June 1984 decision, which had raised the
royalty to 20 percent. App. 286.
In August 1987, the Navajo Tribal Council approved the
amendments. 46 Fed. Cl., at 224. The parties signed a
final agreement in November 1987, App. 309, and Secretary
Hodel approved it on December 14, 1987, id., at 337–339.
Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the
Area Director’s decision was vacated. 46 Fed. Cl., at 224.
In 1993, the Tribe brought suit against the United States
in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging, inter alia, that the
Secretary’s approval of the amendments to the Lease consti-
tuted a breach of trust. The Tribe sought $600 million in
damages.8
to the Tribe. See 46 Fed. Cl., at 224 (royalties and taxes combined
“would . . . permit the tribe to realize as much as 20.5 percent”). But see
Tr. of Oral Arg. 43–44 (“[W]e can’t tax 60 percent of the coal because it
goes to the Navajo [G]enerating [S]tation which has a tax waiver in the
plant site lease.”).
8 The Tribe has filed a separate action against Peabody, claiming im-
proper influence over the Government’s actions with respect to the Lease.
See Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., Civ. Action No. 99–469 (D. C.,
June 24, 2002). The Tribe’s complaint in that action alleges violations of
the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., and related wrongdoing, inter alia, breach of con-
tract, interference with fiduciary relationship, conspiracy, and fraudulent
concealment. See Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp.
2d 269, 272 (DC 2002) (ruling on pretrial motions).

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The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment
for the United States. 46 Fed. Cl. 217 (2000). In no uncer-
tain terms, that court found that the Government owed gen-
eral fiduciary duties to the Tribe, which, in its view, the
Secretary had flagrantly dishonored by acting in the best
interests of Peabody rather than the Tribe. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the Tribe had entirely failed to link
that breach of duty to any statutory or regulatory obligation
which could “be fairly interpreted as mandating compensa-
tion for the government’s fiduciary wrongs.” Id., at 236.
Accordingly, the court held that the United States was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.9
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.
263 F. 3d 1325 (2001). The Government’s liability to the
Tribe, it said, turned on whether “the United States controls
the Indian resources.” Id., at 1329. Relying on 25 U. S. C.
§ 399 and regulations promulgated thereunder, the Court of
Appeals determined that the measure of control the Secre-
tary exercised over the leasing of Indian lands for mineral
development sufficed to warrant a money judgment against
the United States for breaches of fiduciary duties connected
to coal leasing. 263 F. 3d, at 1330–1332. But see infra,
at 509. The appeals court agreed with the Federal Claims
Court that the Secretary’s actions regarding Peabody’s ad-
ministrative appeal violated the Government’s fiduciary obli-
gations to the Tribe, in that those actions “suppress[ed] and
conceal[ed]” the decision of the Deputy Assistant Secretary,
and “thereby favor[ed] Peabody interests to the detriment
of Navajo interests.” 263 F. 3d, at 1332. Based on these
9 The Court of Federal Claims also rejected the Tribe’s claim for breach
of contract, determining that the Secretary was not a party to the Lease
and that his contractual authority to adjust the Lease-specified royalty
rate carried with it no obligation to do so. 46 Fed. Cl., at 234–236. The
Tribe did not appeal that ruling.

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determinations, the Court of Appeals remanded for further
proceedings, including a determination of damages. Id., at
1333.
Judge Schall concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.,
at 1333–1341. It was not enough, he maintained, for the
Tribe to show a violation of a general fiduciary relationship
stemming from federal involvement in a particular area of
Indian affairs. Rather, a Tribe “must show the breach of a
specific fiduciary obligation that falls within the contours of
the statutes and regulations that create the general fiduciary
relationship at issue.” Id., at 1341. In his view, “the only
government action in this case that implicated a specific
fiduciary responsibility” was the Secretary’s 1987 approval
of the Lease amendments. Id., at 1339. The Secretary
had been deficient, Judge Schall concluded, in approving
the amendments without first conducting an independent
economic analysis of the amended agreement. Id., at
1339–1341.
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing. We granted cer-
tiorari, 535 U. S. 1111 (2002), and now reverse.
II
A
“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 212.
The Tribe asserts federal subject-matter jurisdiction under
28 U. S. C. § 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. That
Act provides:
“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction of any claim against the United States ac-
cruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe . . .
whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive
orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would

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be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the
claimant were not an Indian tribe, band, or group.” 10
“If a claim falls within the terms of the [Indian] Tucker Act,
the United States has presumptively consented to suit.”
Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 216.
Although the Indian Tucker Act confers jurisdiction upon
the Court of Federal Claims, it is not itself a source of sub-
stantive rights. Ibid.; see Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 538. To
state a litigable claim, a tribal plaintiff must invoke a rights-
creating source of substantive law that “can fairly be inter-
preted as mandating compensation by the Federal Govern-
ment for the damages sustained.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S.,
at 218. Because “[t]he [Indian] Tucker Act itself provides
the necessary consent” to suit, ibid., however, the rights-
creating statute or regulation need not contain “a second
waiver of sovereign immunity,” id., at 218–219.
B
Mitchell I and Mitchell II are the pathmarking precedents
on the question whether a statute or regulation (or combina-
tion thereof) “can fairly be interpreted as mandating com-
pensation by the Federal Government.” Mitchell II, 463
U. S., at 218.
In Mitchell I, we considered whether the Indian General
Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA), 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25
U. S. C. § 331 et seq. (1976 ed.) (§§ 331–333 repealed 2000),
authorized an award of money damages against the United
10 The reference to claims “which otherwise would be cognizable in the
Court of Federal Claims” incorporates the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491.
See Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 212, n. 8; Mitchell I, 445 U. S. 535, 539 (1980).
The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims “jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1).

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States for alleged mismanagement of forests located on lands
allotted to tribal members. The GAA authorized the Presi-
dent of the United States to allot agricultural or grazing land
to individual tribal members residing on a reservation, § 331,
and provided that “the United States does and will hold the
land thus allotted . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of
the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made,”
§ 348.
We held that the GAA did not create private rights en-
forceable in a suit for money damages under the Indian
Tucker Act. After examining the GAA’s language, history,
and purpose, we concluded that it “created only a limited
trust relationship between the United States and the allottee
that does not impose any duty upon the Government to man-
age timber resources.” Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 542. In
particular, we stressed that §§ 1 and 2 of the GAA removed
a standard element of a trust relationship by making “the
Indian allottee, and not a representative of the United
States, . . . responsible for using the land for agricultural or
grazing purposes.” Id., at 542–543; see id., at 543 (“Under
this scheme, . . . the allottee, and not the United States, was
to manage the land.”). We also determined that Congress
decided to have “the United States ‘hold the land . . . in trust’
not because it wished the Government to control use of the
land . . . , but simply because it wished to prevent alienation
of the land and to ensure that allottees would be immune
from state taxation.” Id., at 544. Because “the Act [did]
not . . . authoriz[e], much less requir[e], the Government to
manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian allottees,”
id., at 545, we held that the GAA established no right to
recover money damages for mismanagement of such re-
sources. We left open, however, the possibility that other
sources of law might support the plaintiffs’ claims for dam-
ages. Id., at 546, and n. 7.
In Mitchell II, we held that a network of other statutes
and regulations did impose judicially enforceable fiduciary

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duties upon the United States in its management of forested
allotted lands. “In contrast to the bare trust created by the
[GAA],” we observed, “the statutes and regulations now be-
fore us clearly give the Federal Government full responsibil-
ity to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of
the Indians.” 463 U. S., at 224.
As to managing the forests and selling timber, we noted,
Congress instructed the Secretary to be mindful of “the
needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs,”
25 U. S. C. § 406(a), and specifically to take into account:
“(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for
maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the
benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and
best use of the land, including the advisability and prac-
ticality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of
the owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future
financial needs of the owner and his heirs.” Ibid.
Proceeds from timber sales were to be paid to landowners
“or disposed of for their benefit.” Ibid. Congress’ pre-
scriptions, Interior Department regulations, and “daily su-
pervision over the harvesting and management of tribal
timber” by the Department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, we
emphasized, combined to place under federal control “[v]irtu-
ally every stage of the process.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at
222 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 222–224
(describing comprehensive timber management statutes and
regulations promulgated thereunder).
Having determined that the statutes and regulations “es-
tablish[ed] fiduciary obligations of the Government in the
management and operation of Indian lands and resources,”
we concluded that the relevant legislative and executive pre-
scriptions could “fairly be interpreted as mandating compen-
sation by the Federal Government for damages sustained.”
Id., at 226. A damages remedy, we explained, would “fur-
the[r] the purposes of the statutes and regulations, which

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clearly require that the Secretary manage Indian resources
so as to generate proceeds for the Indians.” Id., at 226–227.
To state a claim cognizable under the Indian Tucker Act,
Mitchell I and Mitchell II thus instruct, a Tribe must iden-
tify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fidu-
ciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has
failed faithfully to perform those duties. See 463 U. S., at
216–217, 219. If that threshold is passed, the court must
then determine whether the relevant source of substantive
law “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for
damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the
governing law] impose[s].” Id., at 219. Although “the un-
disputed existence of a general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indian people” can “reinforc[e]”
the conclusion that the relevant statute or regulation im-
poses fiduciary duties, id., at 225, that relationship alone is
insufficient to support jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker
Act. Instead, the analysis must train on specific rights-
creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescrip-
tions. Those prescriptions need not, however, expressly
provide for money damages; the availability of such damages
may be inferred. See id., at 217, n. 16 (“[T]he substantive
source of law may grant the claimant a right to recover dam-
ages either expressly or by implication.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
C
We now consider whether the IMLA and its implementing
regulations can fairly be interpreted as mandating compen-
sation for the Government’s alleged breach of trust in this
case. We conclude that they cannot.
1
The Tribe’s principal contention is that the IMLA’s statu-
tory and regulatory scheme, viewed in its entirety, attaches

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fiduciary duties to each Government function under that
scheme, and that the Secretary acted in contravention of
those duties by approving the 121 ⁄ 2 percent royalty contained
in the amended Lease. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 20,
30–38. We read the IMLA differently. As we see it, the
statute and regulations at issue do not provide the requisite
“substantive law” that “mandat[es] compensation by the Fed-
eral Government.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218.
The IMLA and its implementing regulations impose no ob-
ligations resembling the detailed fiduciary responsibilities
that Mitchell II found adequate to support a claim for money
damages.11 The IMLA simply requires Secretarial approval
before coal mining leases negotiated between Tribes and
third parties become effective, 25 U. S. C. § 396a, and author-
izes the Secretary generally to promulgate regulations gov-
erning mining operations, § 396d. Yet the dissent concludes
that the IMLA imposes “one or more specific statutory obli-
gations, as in Mitchell II, at the level of fiduciary duty whose
breach is compensable in damages.” Post, at 521. The en-
deavor to align this case with Mitchell II rather than Mitch-
ell I, however valiant, falls short of the mark. Unlike the
“elaborate” provisions before the Court in Mitchell II, 463
U. S., at 225, the IMLA and its regulations do not “give the
Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian
resources . . . for the benefit of the Indians,” id., at 224. The
Secretary is neither assigned a comprehensive managerial
role nor, at the time relevant here, expressly invested with
responsibility to secure “the needs and best interests of the
11 We rule only on the Government’s role in the coal leasing process
under the IMLA. As earlier recounted, see supra, at 494, both the IMLA
and its implementing regulations address oil and gas leases in considerably
more detail than coal leases. Whether the Secretary has fiduciary or
other obligations, enforceable in an action for money damages, with re-
spect to oil and gas leases is not before us.

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Indian owner and his heirs.” Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting 25 U. S. C. § 406(a)).12
Instead, the Secretary’s involvement in coal leasing under
the IMLA more closely resembles the role provided for the
Government by the GAA regarding allotted forest lands.
See Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 540–544. Although the GAA
required the Government to hold allotted land “in trust for
the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment
shall have been made,” id., at 541 (quoting 25 U. S. C. § 348),
that Act did not “authoriz[e], much less requir[e], the Govern-
ment to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian
allottees,” Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 545. Similarly here, the
IMLA and its regulations do not assign to the Secretary
managerial control over coal leasing. Nor do they even es-
tablish the “limited trust relationship,” id., at 542, existing
under the GAA; no provision of the IMLA or its regulations
contains any trust language with respect to coal leasing.
Moreover, as in Mitchell I, imposing fiduciary duties on
the Government here would be out of line with one of the
statute’s principal purposes. The GAA was designed so
that “the allottee, and not the United States, . . . [would]
manage the land.” Id., at 543. Imposing upon the Govern-
ment a fiduciary duty to oversee the management of allotted
lands would not have served that purpose. So too here.
The IMLA aims to enhance tribal self-determination by giv-
ing Tribes, not the Government, the lead role in negotiating
mining leases with third parties. See supra, at 494. As the
Court of Federal Claims recognized, “[t]he ideal of Indian
self-determination is directly at odds with Secretarial control
over leasing.” 46 Fed. Cl., at 230.
12 Both the Tribe and the dissent refer to portions of 25 CFR pt. 211
that require administrative decisions affecting tribal mineral interests to
be made in the best interests of the tribal mineral owner. See Brief for
Respondent 27, 31; post, at 516–517. We note, however, that the refer-
enced regulatory provisions were adopted more than a decade after the
events at issue in this case. See 61 Fed. Reg. 35653 (1996).

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2
The Tribe nevertheless argues that the actions of the Sec-
retary targeted in this case violated discrete statutory and
regulatory provisions whose breach is redressable in an ac-
tion for damages. In this regard, the Tribe relies exten-
sively on 25 U. S. C. § 399, see, e. g., Brief for Respondent
22–23, 30–31, upon which the Court of Appeals placed consid-
erable weight as well, see 263 F. 3d, at 1330–1331; supra,
at 501. That provision, however, is not part of the IMLA
and does not govern Lease 8580. Enacted almost 20 years
before the IMLA, § 399 authorizes the Secretary to lease cer-
tain unallotted Indian lands for mining purposes on terms
she sets, and does not provide for input from the Tribes con-
cerned. See supra, at 494. In exercising that authority,
the Secretary is authorized to “perform any and all acts . . .
as may be necessary and proper for the protection of the
interests of the Indians and for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of this section into full force and effect.” § 399.
But that provision describes the Secretary’s leasing author-
ity under § 399; it does not bear on the Secretary’s more lim-
ited approval role under the IMLA.
Similarly unavailing is the Tribe’s reliance on the Indian
Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA), 25 U. S. C. § 2101
et seq. See Brief for Respondent 23–24, 30. The IMDA
governs the Secretary’s approval of agreements for the de-
velopment of certain Indian mineral resources through ex-
ploration and like activities. It does not establish standards
governing the Secretary’s approval of mining leases negoti-
ated by a Tribe and a third party. The Lease in this case,
in short, falls outside the IMDA’s domain. See Reply Brief
12–13.
Citing 25 U. S. C. § 396a, the IMLA’s general prescription,
see supra, at 493, the Tribe next asserts that the Secretary
violated his “duty to review and approve any proposed coal
lease with care to promote IMLA’s basic purpose and the
[Tribe’s] best interests.” Brief for Respondent 39. To sup-

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port that assertion, the Tribe points to various Government
reports identifying 20 percent as the appropriate royalty, see
id., at 5–7, 15, and to the Secretary’s decision, made after
receiving ex parte communications from Peabody, to with-
hold departmental action, see id., at 9–10, 15.
In the circumstances presented, the Tribe maintains, the
Secretary’s eventual approval of the 121 ⁄ 2 percent royalty vio-
lated his duties under § 396a in two ways. First, the Secre-
tary’s approval was “improvident,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48, be-
cause it allowed the Tribe’s coal “to be conveyed for what
[the Secretary] knew to be about half of its value,” id., at 49.
Second, Secretary Hodel’s intervention into the Lease ad-
justment process “skewed the bargaining” by depriving the
Tribe of the 20 percent rate, rendering the Secretary’s subse-
quent approval of the 121 ⁄ 2 percent rate “unfair.” Id., at 50.
The Tribe’s vigorously pressed arguments headlining
§ 396a fare no better than its arguments tied to § 399 and the
IMDA; the § 396a arguments fail, for they assume substan-
tive prescriptions not found in that provision.13 As to the
“improviden[ce]” of the Secretary’s approval, the Tribe can
point to no guides or standards circumscribing the Secre-
tary’s affirmation of coal mining leases negotiated between a
Tribe and a private lessee. Regulations under the IMLA in
effect in 1987 established a minimum royalty of ten cents per
ton. See 25 CFR § 211.15(c) (1985). But the royalty con-
tained in Lease 8580 well exceeded that regulatory floor.
13 The Lease itself authorized the Secretary to make “reasonable [roy-
alty] adjustment[s].” App. 194. As noted above, however, see supra, at
501, n. 9, the Court of Federal Claims determined, and the Tribe does not
here dispute, that the Secretary is not a signatory to the Lease and that
the Lease is not contractually binding on him. See 46 Fed. Cl., at 234–
236. We thus perceive no basis for infusing the Secretary’s approval
function under § 396a with substantive standards that might be derived
from his adjustment authority under the Lease, and certainly no basis for
concluding that an alleged “breach” of those standards is cognizable in an
action for money damages under the Indian Tucker Act.

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See supra, at 495–496.14 At the time the Secretary ap-
proved the amended Lease, it bears repetition, 121 ⁄ 2 percent
was the rate the United States itself customarily received
from leases to mine coal on federal lands. Similarly, the cus-
tomary rate for coal leases on Indian lands issued or re-
adjusted after 1976 did not exceed 121 ⁄ 2 percent. See supra,
at 498–499, n. 6.15
In sum, neither the IMLA nor any of its regulations estab-
lishes anything more than a bare minimum royalty. Hence,
there is no textual basis for concluding that the Secretary’s
approval function includes a duty, enforceable in an action
for money damages, to ensure a higher rate of return for
the Tribe concerned. Similarly, no pertinent statutory or
regulatory provision requires the Secretary, on pain of dam-
ages, to conduct an independent “economic analysis” of the
reasonableness of the royalty to which a Tribe and third
party have agreed. 263 F. 3d, at 1340 (concurring opinion
below, finding such a duty).16
14 Because the Tribe does not contend that the amended Lease failed to
meet the minimum royalty under the regulations then in effect, we need
not decide whether the Secretary’s approval of such a lease would trigger
money damages. See Reply Brief 15 (“The Court may . . . assume for
present purposes that a failure by the Secretary to ensure, prior to ap-
proving a proposed lease, that its terms (or amendments) comply with the
regulation specifying the minimum royalty rate to which the parties may
agree would support a claim under the Tucker Act.”).
15 Under 30 U. S. C. § 207(a), that customary rate was also a statutorily
defined minimum for federal coal leases. See supra, at 498–499, n. 6.
Section 207(a), which applies to federal lands in general, did not apply to
leases of Indian lands until 1996, when 25 CFR § 211.43(a)(2) was promul-
gated. See Reply Brief 13–14. At the pre-1996 times relevant here, the
sole specific provision governing Tribe-private lessee coal leases was the
ten cents per ton minimum prescribed in 25 CFR § 211.15(c) (1985).
16 Citing language from the legislative history, the dissent stresses that
the IMLA aimed in part to “give the Indians the greatest return from
their property,” post, at 516 (quoting S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 (1937)), and suggests that the Secretary’s approval role encompasses an
enforceable duty to further that objective, see post, at 517. We have cau-
tioned against according “talismanic effect” to the Senate Report’s “refer-
ence to ‘the greatest return from [Indian] property,’ ” and have observed

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The Tribe’s second argument under § 396a concentrates on
the “skew[ing]” effect of Secretary Hodel’s 1985 intervention,
i. e., his direction to Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz to
withhold action on Peabody’s appeal from the Area Direc-
tor’s decision setting a royalty rate of 20 percent. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 50; see supra, at 497–498. The Secretary’s ac-
tions, both in intervening in the administrative appeal proc-
ess, and in approving the amended Lease, the Tribe urges,
were not based upon an assessment of the merits of the roy-
alty issue; instead, the Tribe maintains, they were attribut-
able entirely to the undue influence Peabody exerted through
ex parte communications with the Secretary. See Brief for
Respondent 40–42. Underscoring that the Tribe had no
knowledge of those communications or of Secretary Hodel’s
direction to Fritz, see supra, at 498, the Tribe asserts that
its bargaining position was seriously compromised when it
resumed negotiations with Peabody in 1985. See, e. g., Tr. of
that it “overstates” Congress’ aim to attribute to the Legislature a pur-
pose “to guarantee Indian tribes the maximum profit available.” Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 179 (1989). Beyond doubt,
the IMLA was designed “to provide Indian tribes with a profitable source
of revenue.” Ibid., quoted supra, at 493. But Congress had as a concrete
objective in that regard the removal of certain impediments that had ap-
plied particularly to mineral leases on Indian land. See Cotton, 490 U. S.,
at 179 (“Congress was . . . concerned . . . with matters such as the unavail-
ability of extralateral mineral rights on Indian land.”); S. Rep. No. 985, at
2 (“[O]n the public domain the discoverer of a mineral deposit gets extra-
lateral rights and can follow the ore beyond the side lines indefinitely,
while on the Indian lands under the act of June 30, 1919, he is limited to
the confines of the survey markers not to exceed 600 feet by 1,500 feet in
any one claim. The draft of the bill herewith would permit the obtaining
of sufficient acreage to remove the necessity for extralateral rights with
all its attending controversies.”); H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.,
2 (1938) (same). That impediment-removing objective is discrete from the
Secretary’s lease approval role under the IMLA. Again, we find no solid
basis in the IMLA, its regulations, or lofty statements in legislative his-
tory for a legally enforceable command that the Secretary disapprove In-
dian coal leases unless they survive “an independent market study,” post,
at 519, or satisfy some other extratextual criterion of tribal profitability.

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513 Cite as: 537 U. S. 488 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Oral Arg. 50–52. The Secretary’s ultimate approval of the
121 ⁄ 2 percent royalty, the Tribe concludes, was thus an out-
come fundamentally unfair to the Tribe.
Here again, as the Court of Federal Claims ultimately de-
termined, see supra, at 501, the Tribe’s assertions are not
grounded in a specific statutory or regulatory provision that
can fairly be interpreted as mandating money damages.
Nothing in § 396a, the IMLA’s basic provision, or in the
IMLA’s implementing regulations proscribed the ex parte
communications in this case, which occurred during an ad-
ministrative appeal process largely unconstrained by formal
requirements. See 25 CFR § 2.20 (1985) (Commissioner may
rely on “any information available to [him] . . . whether for-
mally part of the record or not.”); supra, at 496–497, n. 3.
Either party could have effected a transfer of Peabody’s ap-
peal to the Board. See 25 CFR § 2.19(b) (1985); supra, at
496–497, n. 3. Exercise of that option would have triggered
review of a more formal character, in which ex parte communi-
cations would have been prohibited. See 43 CFR § 4.27(b)
(1985). But the Tribe did not elect to transfer the matter
to the Board, and the regulatory proscription on ex parte
contacts applicable in Board proceedings thus did not govern.
We note, moreover, that even if Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary Fritz had rendered an opinion affirming the 20 percent
royalty approved by the Area Director, it would have been
open to the Secretary to set aside or modify his subordinate’s
decision. See supra, at 498, n. 4. As head of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the Secretary had “authority to review
any decision of any employee or employees of the Depart-
ment.” 43 CFR § 4.5(a)(2) (1985); cf. Michigan Citizens for
Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F. 2d 1285 (CADC)
(upholding Attorney General’s approval, over the contrary
conclusions of an administrative law judge and the Justice
Department’s Antitrust Division, of a joint operating agree-
ment under the Newspaper Preservation Act), aff ’d by an
equally divided Court, 493 U. S. 38 (1989) (per curiam). Ac-

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514 UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION
Souter, J., dissenting
cordingly, rejection of Peabody’s appeal by the Deputy As-
sistant Secretary would not necessarily have yielded a
higher royalty for the Tribe.
* * *
However one might appraise the Secretary’s intervention
in this case, we have no warrant from any relevant statute
or regulation to conclude that his conduct implicated a duty
enforceable in an action for damages under the Indian
Tucker Act. The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is accordingly reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and
Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether the Indian Mineral Leas-
ing Act (IMLA) and its regulations imply a specific duty on
the Secretary of the Interior’s part, with a cause of action
for damages in case of breach. The Court and I recognize
that if IMLA indicates that a fiduciary duty was intended, it
need not provide a damages remedy explicitly; once a statu-
tory or regulatory provision is found to create a specific fi-
duciary obligation, the right to damages can be inferred from
general trust principles, and amenability to suit under the
Indian Tucker Act. See United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, ante, at 472–473; United States v. Mitchell,
463 U. S. 206, 226 (1983) (Mitchell II). I part from the ma-
jority because I take the Secretary’s obligation to approve
mineral leases under 25 U. S. C. § 396a as raising a substan-
tial fiduciary obligation to the Navajo Nation (Tribe), which
has pleaded and shown enough to survive the Government’s
motion for summary judgment. I would affirm the judg-
ment of the Federal Circuit.

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515 Cite as: 537 U. S. 488 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
IMLA requires the Secretary’s approval for the effective-
ness of any lease negotiated by the Tribe with a third party.
§ 396a; see also 25 CFR § 211.2 (1985). The Court accepts
the Government’s position, see Brief for United States 38,
that the IMLA approval responsibility places no substantive
obligation on the Secretary, save for a minimal duty to with-
hold assent from leases calling for less than the minimum
royalty rate set by IMLA regulations, whatever that may
be. Ante, at 511. Since that rate is merely a general stand-
ard, which may be a bargain rate when applied to extractable
material of high quality, the obligation to demand it may not
amount to much. The legislative history and purposes of
IMLA, however, illuminated by the Secretary’s historical
role in reviewing conveyances of Indian lands, point to a fi-
duciary responsibility to make a more ambitious assessment
of the best interest of the Tribe before signing off.
The protective purpose of the Secretary’s approval power
has appeared in our discussions of other statutes governing
Indian lands over the years. In Tiger v. Western Invest-
ment Co., 221 U. S. 286 (1911), for example, we upheld the
constitutionality of the Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 22, 34
Stat. 145, which made alienation of certain allotted lands by
citizen Indians “subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior.” Although allotment and conferral of citizen-
ship had given tribal members greater responsibility for
their own interest, see, e. g., Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691,
694 (1931), we nevertheless understood that the requirement
of prior approval was supposed to satisfy the National Gov-
ernment’s trust responsibility to the Indians, Tiger, supra,
at 310–311; accord, Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. S.
226, 233 (1924) (restraints on alienation of Indian property
are enacted “in fulfillment of [Congress’s] duty to protect the
Indians”). Shortly after Tiger, in Anicker v. Gunsburg, 246
U. S. 110 (1918), we held that the Secretary’s authority to
approve leases of allotted lands under the Act of May 27,

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516 UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION
Souter, J., dissenting
1908, ch. 199, § 2, 35 Stat. 312, was “unquestionably . . . given
to him for the protection of Indians against their own im-
providence and the designs of those who would obtain their
property for inadequate compensation.” 246 U. S., at 119.
The Secretary’s approval power was understood to be a sig-
nificant component of the Government’s general trust re-
sponsibility. See Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country:
A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and
Self-Government, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 979, 1002–1003 (1981);
Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Dis-
cretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 Stan. L. Rev.
1061, 1061–1068 (1974).
Congress’s decision in IMLA to give the Secretary an ap-
proval authority is well understood in terms of this back-
ground, for in the enactment of IMLA, Congress devised a
scheme of divided responsibility reminiscent of the old allot-
ment legislation. While it changed the prior law by trans-
ferring negotiating authority from the Government to the
tribes, it hedged that augmentation of tribal authority in
leaving the Secretary with certain powers of oversight, in-
cluding the authority to approve or reject leases once the
tribes negotiated them. 25 U. S. C. §§ 396a–g. The Secre-
tary’s signature was the final step in a scheme of “uniform
leasing procedures designed to protect the Indians,” Mon-
tana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 764 (1985), and im-
posed out of a concern that existing laws were not “adequate
to give the Indians the greatest return from their property,”
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); H. R. Rep.
No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1938). The “basic purpose”
of the Secretary’s powers under IMLA is thus to “maximize
tribal revenues from reservation lands.” Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U. S. 195, 200 (1985); see Blackfeet
Tribe, supra, at 767, n. 5. Consistent with this aim, the Sec-
retary’s own IMLA regulations (now in effect) provide that
administrative actions, including lease approvals, are to be
taken “[i]n the best interest of the Indian mineral owner.”

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517 Cite as: 537 U. S. 488 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
25 CFR § 211.3 (2002); see also § 211.1 (stating that the over-
arching purpose of IMLA regulations is to ensure that Indi-
ans’ mineral resources “will be developed in a manner that
maximizes their best economic interests”).1 Thus, viewed
in light of IMLA’s legislative history and the general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indians, see
Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 224–225, § 396a supports the exist-
ence of a fiduciary responsibility to review mineral leases for
substance to safeguard the Indians’ interest.2
I do not mean to suggest that devising a specific standard
of responsibility is any simple matter, for we cannot ignore
the tension between IMLA’s two objectives. If we thought
solely in terms of the aim to ensure that negotiated leases
“maximize tribal revenues,” Kerr-McGee, supra, at 200, we
would ignore the object of IMLA to provide greater tribal
responsibility, against which the Secretary’s oversight is act-
1 In addition, the Interior Department at all times relevant to this case
had in place an internal policy providing that mineral leases would be
approved only if “the terms and conditions of the lease are in the best
interest of the Indian landowner.” App. 2, 133–134.
2 The majority seeks to distinguish Mitchell II, saying that the timber
management statutes at issue there gave the Secretary a “comprehensive
managerial role” and stated explicitly that timber sales had to be made in
consideration of “ ‘the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and
his heirs.’ ” Ante, at 507–508. The comprehensiveness of the Secretary’s
role just described is what made Mitchell II an easy case. Mitchell II
did not say, however, that fiduciary duties can only be found where the
Government has “elaborate control.” 463 U. S., at 225. Nor does Mitch-
ell II’s reference to the statute’s explicit “best interests” language fore-
close the use of standard interpretive tools like legislative history to deter-
mine whether a statute establishes a fiduciary duty.
The majority proceeds to discount IMLA’s legislative history, suggesting
that Congress’s concern for Indian revenues was limited to the elimination
of certain constraints peculiar to Indian mineral leases. Ante, at 511–512,
n. 16. But the cited IMLA legislative reports do not indicate that Con-
gress’s aims were restricted to curing these specific deficiencies of prior
law, and they do nothing to detract from the consistent recognition in our
precedents that IMLA’s leasing procedures were designed to protect In-
dian interests in mineral resources.

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518 UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION
Souter, J., dissenting
ing as a hedge. See Royster, Mineral Development in In-
dian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral
Resources, 29 Tulsa L. Rev. 541, 558–580 (1994) (noting the
twin aims of IMLA). The more stringent the substantive
obligation of the Secretary, the less the scope of tribal re-
sponsibility. The Court, however, errs in the opposite direc-
tion, giving overriding weight to the interest of tribal auton-
omy to the point of concluding that the Secretary’s approval
obligation cannot be an onerous one, ante, at 508, thus losing
sight of the mixture of congressional objectives. The stand-
ard of responsibility simply cannot give the whole hog to the
one congressional policy or the other.
While this is not the case to essay any ultimate formula-
tion of a balanced standard, even a reticent formulation of
the fiduciary obligation would require the Secretary to with-
hold approval if he had good reason to doubt that the negoti-
ated rate was within the range of reasonable market rates
for the coal in question, or if he had reason to know that the
Tribe had been placed under an unfair disadvantage at the
negotiating table by his very own acts. See Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §§ 170, 173, 174, 176 (1957). And those
modest standards are enough to keep the present suit in
court, for the Tribe has pleaded a breach of trust in each
respect and has submitted evidence to get past summary
judgment on either alternative.
The record discloses serious indications that the 121 ⁄ 2 per-
cent royalty rate in the lease amendments was substantially
less than fair market value for the Tribe’s high quality coal.
In the course of deciding that 20 percent would be a reason-
able adjustment under the terms of the lease, the Area
Director of the Board of Indian Affairs (BIA) considered
several independent economic studies, each one of them
recommending rates around 20 percent, and one specifically
rejecting 121 ⁄ 2 percent as “inadequate.” App. 6–7 (internal

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519 Cite as: 537 U. S. 488 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
quotation marks omitted).3 These conclusions were con-
firmed by the expert from the BIA’s Energy and Mineral
Division, in a supplemental report submitted after Peabody
appealed the Area Director’s decision. That report not only
endorsed the 20 percent rate, but expressly found that the
royalty rate “should be much higher than the 12.5% that the
Federal Government receives for surface-mined coal” be-
cause the Navajo coal is “extremely valuable.” Id., at 22.
No federal study ever recommended a royalty rate under 20
percent, and yet the Secretary approved a rate little more
than half that. Id., at 134. When this case was before the
Federal Circuit, Judge Schall took the sensible position that
the Secretary was obligated to obtain an independent market
study to assess the rate in these circumstances, see 263 F. 3d
1325, 1340 (2001) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part), and the record as it stands shows the Secretary to
be clearly open to the claim of fiduciary breach for approving
the rate on the information he is said to have had. Of course
I recognize that the Secretary’s obligation is to approve
leases, not royalty rates in isolation, but an allegation that
he approved an otherwise unjustified rate apparently well
below market for the particular resource deposit certainly
raises a claim of breach.
3 The United States Bureau of Mines recommended an adjusted royalty
rate of 20 percent, while the BIA’s Division of Energy and Mineral Re-
sources recommended 24.44 percent in a separate report. Several private
studies also endorsed rates in the 20 percent range: one, conducted by the
Council of Energy Resource Tribes, concluded that the rate should be
between 15 and 20 percent, and another, prepared by a private manage-
ment consultant firm at the request of the Navajo, advocated a rate of
between 17.08 and 22.77 percent. The only report with a significantly
lower rate was the report submitted by Peabody, which recommended a
rate of 5.57 to 7.16 percent. This figure was based not on current fair
value but rather on what rate would “restore the benefits that were orig-
inally contemplated when the 1964 lease was signed by both parties.”
App. 16–18.

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520 UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION
Souter, J., dissenting
What is more, the Tribe has made a powerful showing that
the Secretary knew perfectly well how his own intervention
on behalf of Peabody had derailed the lease adjustment pro-
ceeding that would in all probability have yielded the 20 per-
cent rate. After his ex parte meeting with Peabody’s repre-
sentatives, the Secretary put his name on the memorandum,
drafted by Peabody, directing Deputy Assistant Secretary
Fritz to withhold his decision affirming the 20 percent rate;
directing him to mislead the Tribe by telling it that no deci-
sion on the merits of the adjustment was imminent, when in
fact the affirmance had been prepared for Fritz’s signature;
and directing him to encourage the Tribe to shift its atten-
tion from the Area Director’s appealed award of 20 percent
and return to the negotiating table, where 20 percent was
never even a possibility. App. 117–118. The purpose and
predictable effect of these actions was to induce the Tribe to
take a deep discount in the royalty rate in the face of what
the Tribe feared would otherwise be prolonged revenue loss
and uncertainty. The point of this evidence is not that the
Secretary violated some rule of procedure for administrative
appeals, ante, at 512–513, or some statutory duty regarding
royalty adjustments under the terms of the earlier lease.
What these facts support is the Tribe’s claim that the Secre-
tary defaulted on his fiduciary responsibility to withhold ap-
proval of an inadequate lease accepted by the Tribe while
under a disadvantage the Secretary himself had intention-
ally imposed.4
4 The possibility that the Secretary could have set aside Fritz’s rejection
of Peabody’s appeal does not, despite the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 513–
514, defeat the Tribe’s claim under § 396a. As an initial matter, whatever
formal authority the Secretary may have had, nothing cited by the parties
suggests that the Secretary was considering such action, which would
have painted him plainly as catering to Peabody. Hence the cautious
qualification in the memorandum to Fritz, emphasizing that his interven-
tion was “not intended as a determination of the merits” of the 20 percent
rate adjustment. App. 118. Given that the federal economic surveys
unanimously endorsed 20 percent, it is unclear what basis the Secretary

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521 Cite as: 537 U. S. 488 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
All of this is not to say that the Tribe would end up with
a recovery at the end of the day. Disputed facts have not
been tried; the negotiations affected not only the 1964 lease
that was subject to adjustment on demand, but also other
leases apparently not subject to the same option for the
Tribe’s benefit; and the renegotiated terms affected lease
provisions other than royalties (including tax terms). For
all we can say now, the net of all these changes may have
been an overall bargain in the Tribe’s interest, despite the
smaller royalty figure in the lease as approved. But the
only issue here is whether the Tribe’s claims address one or
more specific statutory obligations, as in Mitchell II, at the
level of fiduciary duty whose breach is compensable in dam-
ages. The Tribe has pleaded such duty, the record shows
that the Tribe has a case to try, and I respectfully dissent.
would have had to reject the rate on the merits. More importantly, the
gravamen of the Tribe’s claim is not that it is entitled to the 20 percent
rate adjustment under the lease. Rather, it is that the Secretary’s actions
in deceiving the Tribe about the status of Peabody’s appeal skewed the
subsequent bargaining process, and the resulting royalty rate, in Peabo-
dy’s favor. On that issue, whether the Secretary might have ultimately
favored Peabody’s appeal, while perhaps a subject of relevant evidence, is
not dispositive.