CLAY v. UNITED STATES

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522 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
CLAY v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 01–1500. Argued January 13, 2003—Decided March 4, 2003
Petitioner Clay was convicted of arson and a drug offense in Federal Dis-
trict Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions on November
23, 1998, and that court’s mandate issued on December 15, 1998. Clay
did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time in which he
could have done so expired 90 days after entry of the Court of Appeals’
judgment and 69 days after issuance of its mandate. One year and 69
days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one
year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion
for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Such motions are sub-
ject to a one-year time limitation that generally runs from “the date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” § 2255, ¶ 6(1). Rely-
ing on Circuit precedent, the District Court stated that when a federal
prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes
final for § 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals’ mandate.
Because Clay filed his § 2255 motion more than one year after that date,
the court denied it as time barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: For the purpose of starting the clock on § 2255’s one-year limitation
period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires
for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court’s affir-
mation of the conviction. Pp. 527–532.
(a) Finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning in the postconviction
relief context: Finality attaches in that setting when this Court affirms
a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a
writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition ex-
pires. See, e. g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390. Because the
Court presumes “that Congress expects its statutes to be read in con-
formity with this Court’s precedents,” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S.
482, 495, the Court’s unvarying understanding of finality for collateral
review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of “becomes
final” in § 2255. Pp. 527–528.
(b) Supporting the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, the Court’s invited
amicus curiae urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differ-
ences between § 2255 and § 2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus by state prisoners. Where § 2255, ¶ 6(1), refers sim-
ply to “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final,”

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Syllabus
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of “the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seek-
ing such review.” When “Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464
U. S. 16, 23. Invoking the maxim recited in Russello, amicus asserts
that “becomes final” in § 2255, ¶ 6(1), cannot mean the same thing as
“became final” in § 2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, ami-
cus maintains, would render superfluous the words “by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”—
words found only in the latter provision. If § 2255, ¶ 6(1), explicitly in-
corporated the first of § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s finality formulations, one might
indeed question the soundness of interpreting § 2255 implicitly to incor-
porate § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s second trigger as well. As written, however,
§ 2255 leaves “becomes final” undefined. Russello hardly warrants a
decision that would hold the § 2255 petitioner to a tighter time con-
straint than the petitioner governed by § 2244(d)(1)(A). An unqualified
term, Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a
pinpointed one. Moreover, one can readily comprehend why Congress
might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of “final” in
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) but not in § 2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions
by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to “became final”
might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by refer-
ence to state-law rules. Those rules may differ from the general fed-
eral rule and vary from State to State. The qualifying words in
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) make it clear that finality is to be determined by refer-
ence to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only
petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no
comparable risk of varying rules to guard against. Pp. 528–531.
(c) Section 2263—which prescribes a limitation period for certain ha-
beas petitions filed by death-sentenced state prisoners—does not alter
the Court’s reading of § 2255. First, amicus’ reliance on § 2263 encoun-
ters essentially the same problem as does his reliance on § 2244(d)(1)(A):
Section 2255, ¶ 6(1), refers to neither of the two events that § 2263(a)
identifies as possible starting points for the limitation period—“affirm-
ance of the conviction and sentence on direct review” and “the expira-
tion of the time for seeking such review.” Thus, reasoning by negative
implication from § 2263 does not justify the conclusion that § 2255,
¶ 6(1)’s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than
the other. Second, § 2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to “af-
firmance of the conviction and sentence,” while § 2255, ¶ 6(1), ties the
limitation period to the date when “the judgment of conviction becomes

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524 CLAY v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
final.” “The Russello presumption . . . grows weaker with each dif-
ference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection.” Colum-
bus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435–436.
Pp. 531–532.
30 Fed. Appx. 607, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Thomas C. Goldstein, by appointment of the Court, 537
U. S. 808, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs was Amy Howe.
Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, and Deputy
Solicitor General Dreeben.
David W. DeBruin, by invitation of the Court, 536 U. S.
974, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in
support of the judgment below. With him on the brief was
Elaine J. Goldenberg.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion by a federal prisoner for postconviction relief
under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 is subject to a one-year time limita-
tion that generally runs from “the date on which the judg-
ment of conviction becomes final.” § 2255, ¶ 6(1). This case
concerns the starting date for the one-year limitation. It
presents a narrow but recurring question on which courts of
appeals have divided: When a defendant in a federal prosecu-
tion takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of
conviction, but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari
from this Court, does the judgment become “final” for post-
conviction relief purposes (1) when the appellate court issues
its mandate affirming the conviction, or, instead, (2) on the
date, ordinarily 69 days later, when the time for filing a peti-
tion for certiorari expires?
In accord with this Court’s consistent understanding of fi-
nality in the context of collateral review, and the weight of
lower court authority, we reject the issuance of the appellate

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court mandate as the triggering date. For the purpose of
starting the clock on § 2255’s one-year limitation period, we
hold, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time
expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the ap-
pellate court’s affirmation of the conviction.
I
In 1997, petitioner Erick Cornell Clay was convicted of
arson and distribution of cocaine base in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On No-
vember 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed his convictions. That court’s mandate issued
on December 15, 1998. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 40(a)(1)
and 41(b) (when no petition for rehearing is filed, a court of
appeals’ mandate issues 21 days after entry of judgment).
Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The time
in which he could have petitioned for certiorari expired on
February 22, 1999, 90 days after entry of the Court of Ap-
peals’ judgment, see this Court’s Rule 13(1), and 69 days
after the issuance of the appellate court’s mandate.
On February 22, 2000—one year and 69 days after the
Court of Appeals issued its mandate and exactly one year
after the time for seeking certiorari expired—Clay filed a
motion in the District Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255,
to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Congress has
prescribed “[a] 1-year period of limitation” for such motions
“run[ning] from the latest of ” four specified dates. § 2255,
¶ 6. Of the four dates, the only one relevant in this case, as
in the generality of cases, is the first: “the date on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final.” § 2255, ¶ 6(1).
Relying on Gendron v. United States, 154 F. 3d 672, 674
(CA7 1998) (per curiam), the District Court stated that
“when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek
certiorari . . . , the conviction becomes ‘final’ on the date
the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. Because Clay filed his § 2255 mo-

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526 CLAY v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
tion more than one year after that date, the court denied the
motion as time barred.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That court declined Clay’s
“invitation to reconsider our holding in Gendron,” although
it acknowledged that Gendron’s “construction of section 2255
represents the minority view.” 30 Fed. Appx. 607, 609
(2002). “Bowing to stare decisis,” the court expressed “re-
luctan[ce] to overrule [its own] recently-reaffirmed precedent
without guidance from the Supreme Court.” Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit has agreed with Gendron’s interpreta-
tion of § 2255. See United States v. Torres, 211 F. 3d 836,
838–842 (2000) (when a federal prisoner does not file a peti-
tion for certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final
for § 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals’
mandate). Six Courts of Appeals have parted ways with
the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These courts hold that,
for federal prisoners like Clay who do not file petitions for
certiorari following affirmance of their convictions, § 2255’s
one-year limitation period begins to run when the defend-
ant’s time for seeking review by this Court expires.1 To se-
cure uniformity in the application of § 2255’s time constraint,
we granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 957 (2002), and now reverse
the Seventh Circuit’s judgment.2
1 See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d 34, 39–42 (CA1 2002); Kapral
v. United States, 166 F. 3d 565, 567–577 (CA3 1999); United States v. Gam-
ble, 208 F. 3d 536, 537 (CA5 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia,
210 F. 3d 1058, 1059–1061 (CA9 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F. 3d
1274, 1275–1279 (CA10 2000); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F. 3d 1336,
1337–1339 (CA11 2002).
2 Agreeing with the position advanced by the majority of the courts of
appeals that have ruled on the question, the United States joins petitioner
Clay in urging that Clay’s § 2255 motion was timely filed. We therefore
invited David W. DeBruin to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae,
in support of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment. Mr. DeBruin’s able advo-
cacy permits us to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have
been fully aired.

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II
Finality is variously defined; like many legal terms, its
precise meaning depends on context. Typically, a federal
judgment becomes final for appellate review and claim pre-
clusion purposes when the district court disassociates itself
from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first
instance save execution of the judgment. See, e. g., Quack-
enbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712 (1996); Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments § 13, Comment b (1980). For
other purposes, finality attaches at a different stage. For
example, for certain determinations under the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq., and under a now-
repealed version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,
several lower courts have held that finality attends issuance
of the appellate court’s mandate. See Brief for Amicus Cu-
riae by Invitation of the Court 22–28 (hereinafter DeBruin
Brief) (citing cases). For the purpose of seeking review by
this Court, in contrast, “[t]he time to file a petition for a writ
of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment or
order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date
of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice).”
This Court’s Rule 13(3).
Here, the relevant context is postconviction relief, a con-
text in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning:
Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the
merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of
certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition
expires. See, e. g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390
(1994); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987);
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983); United States
v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 542, n. 8 (1982); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965). Because “we pre-
sume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in con-
formity with this Court’s precedents,” United States v.
Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997), our unvarying understanding

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528 CLAY v. UNITED STATES
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of finality for collateral review purposes would ordinarily de-
termine the meaning of “becomes final” in § 2255.
Amicus urges a different determinant, relying on verbal
differences between § 2255 and a parallel statutory provision,
28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal
habeas corpus by state prisoners. See DeBruin Brief 8–20.
Sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), as now formulated, were re-
shaped by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. See §§ 101, 105, 110 Stat. 1217, 1220. Prior to
that Act, no statute of limitations governed requests for fed-
eral habeas corpus or § 2255 habeas-like relief. See Vasquez
v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986); United States v. Nahodil,
36 F. 3d 323, 328 (CA3 1994). Like § 2255, § 2244(d)(1) estab-
lishes a one-year limitation period, running from the latest of
four specified dates. Three of the four time triggers under
§ 2244(d)(1) closely track corresponding portions of § 2255.
Compare §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D) with § 2255, ¶¶ 6(2)–(4). But
where § 2255, ¶ 6(1), refers simply to “the date on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final,” § 2244(d)(1)(A) speaks
of “the date on which the judgment became final by the con-
clusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seek-
ing such review.” 3
When “Congress includes particular language in one sec-
tion of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act,” we have recognized, “it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S.
3 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted “direct review” in
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court.
See Derman v. United States, 298 F. 3d, at 40–41; Williams v. Artuz, 237
F. 3d 147, 151 (CA2 2001); Kapral v. United States, 166 F. 3d, at 575; Hill
v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA4 2002); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F. 3d 510, 513
(CA5 1999); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F. 3d 280, 283 (CA6 2000); Anderson v.
Litscher, 281 F. 3d 672, 674–675 (CA7 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F. 3d
345, 347–348 (CA8 1998); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F. 3d 1157, 1159 (CA9 1999);
Locke v. Saffle, 237 F. 3d 1269, 1273 (CA10 2001); Bond v. Moore, 309 F. 3d
770, 774 (CA11 2002).

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16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472
F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). Invoking the maxim recited in
Russello, amicus asserts that “becomes final” in § 2255,
¶ 6(1), cannot mean the same thing as “became final” in
§ 2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus
maintains, would render superfluous the words “by the con-
clusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seek-
ing such review”—words found only in the latter provision.
DeBruin Brief 8–20. We can give effect to the discrete
wording of the two prescriptions, amicus urges, if we adopt
the following rule: When a convicted defendant does not seek
certiorari on direct review, § 2255’s limitation period starts
to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate.
Id., at 36.4
Amicus would have a stronger argument if § 2255, ¶ 6(1),
explicitly incorporated the first of § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s finality
formulations but not the second, so that the § 2255 text read
“becomes final by the conclusion of direct review.” Had
§ 2255 explicitly provided for the first of the two finality trig-
gers set forth in § 2244(d)(1)(A), one might indeed question
the soundness of interpreting § 2255 implicitly to incorporate
§ 2244(d)(1)(A)’s second trigger as well. As written, how-
ever, § 2255 does not qualify “becomes final” at all. Using
neither of the disjunctive phrases that follow the words “be-
came final” in § 2244(d)(1)(A), § 2255 simply leaves “becomes
final” undefined.
Russello, we think it plain, hardly warrants the decision
amicus urges, one that would hold the § 2255 petitioner to
4 Although recognizing that “the question is not presented in this case,”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, amicus suggests that § 2255’s limitation period starts
to run upon issuance of the court of appeals’ mandate even in cases in
which the defendant does petition for certiorari. Id., at 27–28, 36–38, 41–
42. As amicus also recognizes, however, id., at 41, courts of appeals
“have uniformly concluded that, if a prisoner petitions for certiorari, the
contested conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies
the writ or issues a decision on the merits,” United States v. Hicks, 283
F. 3d 380, 387 (CADC 2002).

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530 CLAY v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Russello concerned the meaning of a provi-
sion in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., that directed forfeiture
to the United States of “any interest [a convicted defendant]
has acquired . . . in violation of [the Act].” § 1963(a)(1). The
petitioner in Russello urged a narrow construction of the
unqualified words “any interest . . . acquired.” Rejecting
that argument, we observed that a succeeding subsec-
tion, § 1963(a)(2), reached “any interest in . . . any enterprise”
the defendant conducted in violation of RICO’s proscrip-
tions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) At that point,
we referred to the maxim invoked by amicus. See supra,
at 528. The qualifying words “in . . . any enterprise” nar-
rowed § 1963(a)(2), but in no way affected § 1963(a)(1). The
comparison of the two subsections, we said, “fortified” the
broad construction we approved for the unmodified words
“any interest . . . acquired.” Russello, 464 U. S., at 22–23
(internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 23 (“Had Con-
gress intended to restrict § 1963(a)(1) to an interest in an
enterprise, it presumably would have done so expressly as it
did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).”).
Far from supporting the Seventh Circuit’s constricted
reading of § 2255, ¶ 6(1), Russello’s reasoning tends in Clay’s
favor. An unqualified term—here “becomes final”—Rus-
sello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a
pinpointed one—here, § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s specification “became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review.”
Moreover, as Clay and the Government urge, see Brief for
Petitioner 22; Reply Brief for United States 7–8, one can
readily comprehend why Congress might have found it ap-
propriate to spell out the meaning of “final” in § 2244(d)(1)(A)
but not in § 2255. Section 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by
state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to “be-
came final” might have suggested that finality assessments

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should be made by reference to state-law rules that may dif-
fer from the general federal rule and vary from State to
State. Cf. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (an applica-
tion for state postconviction relief is “properly filed” for pur-
poses of 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) “when its delivery and accept-
ance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and
rules governing filings”). The words “by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review” make it clear that finality for the purpose of
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference to a uniform
federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions
by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no
comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.
Amicus also submits that 28 U. S. C. § 2263 “reinforces”
the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of § 2255. DeBruin
Brief 20; accord, Torres, 211 F. 3d, at 840. Chapter 154 of
Title 28 governs certain habeas petitions filed by death-
sentenced state prisoners. Section 2263(a) prescribes a
180-day limitation period for such petitions running from
“final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence
on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review.” That period is tolled, however, “from the date
that a petition for certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court
until the date of final disposition of the petition if a State
prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme
Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review
by the court of last resort of the State or other final State
court decision on direct review.” § 2263(b)(1).
We do not find in § 2263 cause to alter our reading of § 2255.
First, amicus’ reliance on § 2263 encounters essentially the
same problem as does his reliance on § 2244(d)(1)(A): Section
2255, ¶ 6(1), refers to neither of the two events that § 2263(a)
identifies as possible starting points for the limitation pe-
riod—“affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct
review” and “the expiration of the time for seeking such re-
view.” Thus, reasoning by negative implication from § 2263

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does not justify the conclusion that § 2255, ¶ 6(1)’s limitation
period begins to run at one of those times rather than the
other. Cf. supra, at 529–531. Second, § 2263(a) ties the ap-
plicable limitation period to “affirmance of the conviction and
sentence,” while § 2255, ¶ 6(1), ties the limitation period to
the date when “the judgment of conviction becomes final.”
See Torres, 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). “The
Russello presumption—that the presence of a phrase in one
provision and its absence in another reveals Congress’ de-
sign—grows weaker with each difference in the formulation
of the provisions under inspection.” Columbus v. Ours Ga-
rage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435–436 (2002).
* * *
We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not
file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review,
§ 2255’s one-year limitation period starts to run when the
time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule,
Clay’s § 2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 532
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.