ILLINOIS v. FISHER

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
544 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
ILLINOIS v. FISHER
on petition for writ of certiorari to the appellate
court of illinois, first district
No. 03–374. Decided February 23, 2004
After Chicago police conducted four tests on a white powdery substance
seized during respondent’s arrest, he was charged with possession of
cocaine and filed a discovery motion for all physical evidence the State
intended to use at trial. He then fled while released on bail, and the
court issued an arrest warrant. When that warrant was finally exe-
cuted 10 years later, the State reinstated the possession charge, inform-
ing respondent that the police, acting under established procedures, had
destroyed the substance seized during his arrest. Respondent formally
requested production of the substance and moved to dismiss the charge
based on the destruction of evidence. The trial court denied his motion,
and he was convicted. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the
Due Process Clause required dismissal of the charge and finding that
such a result was not foreclosed by Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51,
58, in which this Court held that “unless a criminal defendant can show
bad faith on the part of police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”
Held: Respondent has failed to establish a due process violation. While
the prosecution’s good or bad faith is irrelevant when a State suppresses
or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, Youngblood recog-
nizes that bad faith is relevant when dealing with the State’s failure to
preserve “potentially useful evidence.” The substance seized here was
plainly the latter sort of evidence. At most, respondent could hope that
a fifth test of the substance would have exonerated him. He did not
allege, nor did the Appellate Court find, that the police acted in bad faith
in destroying the substance. To the contrary, police testing inculpated
respondent, and the police acted in good faith and in accord with their
normal practice. This Court has never held or suggested that the exist-
ence of a pending discovery request eliminates the necessity of a bad-
faith showing. Nor does the Court agree that Youngblood does not
apply when the contested evidence is a defendant’s only hope for exoner-
ation and is essential to the case’s outcome. The Youngblood bad-faith
requirement’s applicability depends not on the contested evidence’s cen-
trality to the case, but on the distinction between “material exculpa-
tory” evidence and “potentially useful” evidence. 488 U. S., at 57–58.
Certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
545 Cite as: 540 U. S. 544 (2004)
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
The Appellate Court of Illinois held here that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required the dis-
missal of criminal charges because the police, acting in good
faith and according to normal police procedures, destroyed
evidence that respondent had requested more than 10 years
earlier in a discovery motion. Petitioner, the State of Illi-
nois, contends that such a result is foreclosed by our decision
in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51 (1988). There we
held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on
the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”
Id., at 58. We agree with petitioner, grant the petition for
certiorari and respondent’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Court.
In September 1988, Chicago police arrested respondent in
the course of a traffic stop during which police observed him
furtively attempting to conceal a plastic bag containing a
white powdery substance. Four tests conducted by the Chi-
cago Police Crime Lab and the Illinois State Police Crime
Lab confirmed that the bag seized from respondent con-
tained cocaine.
Respondent was charged with possession of cocaine in the
Circuit Court of Cook County in October 1988. He filed a
motion for discovery eight days later requesting all physical
evidence the State intended to use at trial. The State re-
sponded that all evidence would be made available at a rea-
sonable time and date upon request. Respondent was re-
leased on bond pending trial. In July 1989, however, he
failed to appear in court, and the court issued an arrest
warrant to secure his presence. Respondent remained a
fugitive for over 10 years, apparently settling in Tennes-
see. The outstanding arrest warrant was finally executed
in November 1999, after respondent was detained on an
unrelated matter. The State then reinstated the 1988
cocaine-possession charge.

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
546 ILLINOIS v. FISHER
Per Curiam
Before trial, the State informed respondent that in Sep-
tember 1999, the police, acting in accord with established
procedures, had destroyed the substance seized from him
during his arrest. Respondent thereupon formally re-
quested production of the substance and filed a motion to
dismiss the cocaine-possession charge based on the State’s
destruction of evidence. The trial court denied the motion,
and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The State introduced
evidence tending to prove the facts recounted above. Re-
spondent’s case in chief consisted solely of his own testimony,
in which he denied that he ever possessed cocaine and insinu-
ated that the police had “framed” him for the crime. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty, and respondent was sen-
tenced to one year of imprisonment.
The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, holding that
the Due Process Clause required dismissal of the charge.
Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois
v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 652 N. E. 2d 288 (1995), the
Appellate Court reasoned:
“ ‘Where evidence is requested by the defense in a dis-
covery motion, the State is on notice that the evidence
must be preserved, and the defense is not required
to make an independent showing that the evidence has
exculpatory value in order to establish a due process
violation. If the State proceeds to destroy the evi-
dence, appropriate sanctions may be imposed even if the
destruction is inadvertent. No showing of bad faith is
necessary.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12 (quoting New-
berry, supra, at 317, 652 N. E. 2d, at 292) (citation omit-
ted in original).
The Appellate Court observed that Newberry distinguished
our decision in Youngblood on the ground that the police in
Youngblood did not destroy evidence subsequent to a discov-
ery motion by the defendant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13.
While acknowledging that “there is nothing in the record to

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
547 Cite as: 540 U. S. 544 (2004)
Per Curiam
indicate that the alleged cocaine was destroyed in bad faith,”
id., at 15, the court further determined that Newberry dic-
tated dismissal because, unlike in Youngblood, the destroyed
evidence provided respondent’s “only hope for exoneration,”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 15, and was “ ‘essential to and determi-
native of the outcome of the case,’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert.
16 (quoting Newberry, supra, at 315, 652 N. E. 2d, at 291).
Consequently, the court concluded that respondent “was de-
nied due process when he was tried subsequent to the de-
struction of the alleged cocaine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.*
We have held that when the State suppresses or fails to
disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith
of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation oc-
curs whenever such evidence is withheld. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427
U. S. 97 (1976). In Youngblood, by contrast, we recognized
that the Due Process Clause “requires a different result
when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evi-
dentiary material of which no more can be said than that it
could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant.” 488 U. S., at 57.
We concluded that the failure to preserve this “potentially
*Respondent suggests that we lack jurisdiction because the Appellate
Court relied on Newberry, which in turn relied on an adequate and inde-
pendent state ground. See, e. g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040–
1042 (1983). Respondent is correct that Newberry relied on both the Due
Process Clause, and in the alternative, Illinois Supreme Court Rule
415(g)(i) (1990). 166 Ill. 2d, at 314–317, 652 N. E. 2d, at 290–292. The
Appellate Court, however, relied only on the portion of Newberry that
addressed due process, and the Appellate Court based its decision solely
on the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review
that decision. See, e. g., Long, supra, at 1038, n. 4 (“We may review a
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly
have relied” (citing Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967) (per
curiam))).

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
548 ILLINOIS v. FISHER
Per Curiam
useful evidence” does not violate due process “unless a crim-
inal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.”
Id., at 58 (emphasis added).
The substance seized from respondent was plainly the sort
of “potentially useful evidence” referred to in Youngblood,
not the material exculpatory evidence addressed in Brady
and Agurs. At most, respondent could hope that, had the
evidence been preserved, a fifth test conducted on the sub-
stance would have exonerated him. See Youngblood, 488
U. S., at 57. But respondent did not allege, nor did the Ap-
pellate Court find, that the Chicago police acted in bad faith
when they destroyed the substance. Quite the contrary, po-
lice testing indicated that the chemical makeup of the sub-
stance inculpated, not exculpated, respondent, see id., at 57,
n., and it is undisputed that police acted in “good faith and
in accord with their normal practice,” id., at 56 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting California v. Trombetta,
467 U. S. 479, 488 (1984), in turn quoting Killian v. United
States, 368 U. S. 231, 242 (1961)). Under Youngblood, then,
respondent has failed to establish a due process violation.
We have never held or suggested that the existence of
a pending discovery request eliminates the necessity of
showing bad faith on the part of police. Indeed, the result
reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule
would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith re-
quirement in the first place: to “limi[t] the extent of the po-
lice’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds
and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of
justice most clearly require it.” 488 U. S., at 58.
We also disagree that Youngblood does not apply when-
ever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s “only
hope for exoneration” and is “ ‘essential to and determinative
of the outcome of the case.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 15–16
(citing Newberry, supra, at 315, 652 N. E. 2d, at 291). In
Youngblood, the Arizona Court of Appeals said that the de-
stroyed evidence “could [have] eliminate[d] the defendant

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
549 Cite as: 540 U. S. 544 (2004)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
as the perpetrator.” 488 U. S., at 54 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Similarly here, an additional test might
have provided the defendant with an opportunity to show
that the police tests were mistaken. It is thus difficult to
distinguish the two cases on this basis. But in any event,
the applicability of the bad-faith requirement in Youngblood
depended not on the centrality of the contested evidence to
the prosecution’s case or the defendant’s defense, but on the
distinction between “material exculpatory” evidence and
“potentially useful” evidence. 488 U. S., at 57–58. As we
have held, supra, at 548, the substance destroyed here was,
at best, “potentially useful” evidence, and therefore Young-
blood’s bad-faith requirement applies.
The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
While I did not join the three Justices who dissented in
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51 (1988), I also declined
to join the majority opinion because I was convinced then,
and remain convinced today, that “there may well be cases
in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State
acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of
evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make
a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.” Id., at 61 (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment).* This, like Youngblood, is not
such a case.
*Youngblood’s focus on the subjective motivation of the police repre-
sents a break with our usual understanding that the presence or absence
of constitutional error in suppression of evidence cases depends on the
character of the evidence, not the character of the person who withholds
it. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 110 (1976). Since Youngblood
was decided, a number of state courts have held as a matter of state consti-
tutional law that the loss or destruction of evidence critical to the defense
does violate due process, even in the absence of bad faith. As the Con-

540US2 Unit: $U18 [11-15-05 21:00:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
550 ILLINOIS v. FISHER
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
Neither is it a case that merited review in this Court, how-
ever. The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court has
limited precedential value, and may well be reinstated on
remand because the result is supported by the state-law
holding in People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 652 N. E. 2d
288 (1995). See ante, at 547, n. In my judgment the State’s
petition for a writ of certiorari should have been denied.
necticut Supreme Court has explained, “[f]airness dictates that when a
person’s liberty is at stake, the sole fact of whether the police or another
state official acted in good or bad faith in failing to preserve evidence
cannot be determinative of whether the criminal defendant received due
process of law.” State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 723, 657 A. 2d 585, 593
(1995) (footnote omitted). See also State v. Ferguson, 2 S. W. 3d 912,
916–917 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Osakalumi, 194 W. Va. 758, 765–767, 461
S. E. 2d 504, 511–512 (1995); State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 309, 648 A. 2d
632, 642 (1994); Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992); Com-
monwealth v. Henderson, 411 Mass. 309, 310–311, 582 N. E. 2d 496, 497
(1991); State v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 186–187, 787 P. 2d 671, 673 (1990);
Hammond v. State, 569 A. 2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989); Thorne v. Department of
Public Safety, 774 P. 2d 1326, 1330, n. 9 (Alaska 1989).