McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.

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McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al. v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.
appeal from the united states district court for the
district of columbia
No. 02–1674. Argued September 8, 2003—Decided December 10, 2003*
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, and other portions of the United States Code, is the
most recent of nearly a century of federal enactments designed “to
purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious influ-
ence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions.” United States v. Automo-
bile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 572. In enacting BCRA, Congress sought
to address three important developments in the years since this Court’s
landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curiam): the
increased importance of “soft money,” the proliferation of “issue ads,”
and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign prac-
tices related to the 1996 federal elections.
With regard to the first development, prior to BCRA, FECA’s disclo-
sure requirements and source and amount limitations extended only to
so-called “hard money” contributions made for the purpose of influenc-
ing an election for federal office. Political parties and candidates were
able to circumvent FECA’s limitations by contributing “soft money”—
money as yet unregulated under FECA—to be used for activities
*Together with No. 02–1675, National Rifle Association et al. v. Fed-
eral Election Commission et al., No. 02–1676, Federal Election Commis-
sion et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02–1702, Mc-
Cain, United States Senator, et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator,
et al., No. 02–1727, Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission et al., No. 02–1733, National Right to Life Committee,
Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02–1734, American
Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02–1740,
Adams et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02–1747, Paul,
United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.,
No. 02–1753, California Democratic Party et al. v. Federal Election Com-
mission et al., No. 02–1755, American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.,
and No. 02–1756, Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. v.
Federal Election Commission et al., also on appeal from the same court.

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94 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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intended to influence state or local elections; for mixed-purpose activi-
ties such as get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives and generic party advertis-
ing; and for legislative advocacy advertisements, even if they mentioned
a federal candidate’s name, so long as the ads did not expressly advocate
the candidate’s election or defeat. With regard to the second develop-
ment, parties and candidates circumvented FECA by using “issue ads”
that were specifically intended to affect election results, but did not
contain “magic words,” such as “Vote Against Jane Doe,” which would
have subjected the ads to FECA’s restrictions. Those developments
were detailed in a 1998 Senate Committee Report summarizing an in-
vestigation into the 1996 federal elections, which concluded that the
soft-money loophole had led to a meltdown of the campaign finance sys-
tem; and discussed potential reforms, including a soft-money ban and
restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.
Congress enacted many of the committee’s proposals in BCRA: Title
I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and
candidates; Title II primarily prohibits corporations and unions from
using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to,
or have the effect of, influencing federal election outcomes; and Titles
III, IV, and V set out other requirements. Eleven actions challenging
BCRA’s constitutionality were filed. A three-judge District Court held
some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. The parties
challenging the law are referred to here as plaintiffs, and those who
intervened in support of the law are intervenor-defendants.
Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948, affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor delivered the Court’s opin-
ion with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, concluding that the statute’s
two principal, complementary features—Congress’ effort to plug the
soft-money loophole and its regulation of electioneering communica-
tions—must be upheld in the main. Pp. 133–224.
1. New FECA § 323 survives plaintiffs’ facial First Amendment chal-
lenge. Pp. 133–189.
(a) In evaluating § 323, the Court applies the less rigorous standard
of review applicable to campaign contribution limits under Buckley and
its progeny. Such limits are subject only to “closely drawn” scrutiny,
see 424 U. S., at 25, rather than to strict scrutiny, because, unlike restric-
tions on campaign expenditures, contribution limits “entai[l] only a mar-
ginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free com-
munication,” e. g., id., at 20–21. Moreover, contribution limits are
grounded in the important governmental interests in preventing “both

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the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and
the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the
appearance of corruption.” E. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Na-
tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 208. The less rigorous
review standard shows proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh
competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys par-
ticular expertise, and provides it with sufficient room to anticipate
and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to
protect the political process’ integrity. Finally, because Congress, in
its lengthy deliberations leading to BCRA’s enactment, properly relied
on Buckley and its progeny, stare decisis considerations, buttressed
by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe one an-
other, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis
of contribution limits the Court has consistently followed since Buckley.
The Court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that the type of speech and
associational burdens that § 323 imposes are fundamentally differ-
ent from the burdens that accompanied Buckley’s contribution limits.
Pp. 134–142.
(b) New FECA § 323(a)—which forbids national party committees
and their agents to “solicit, receive, . . . direct . . . , or spend any funds,
that are not subject to [FECA’s] limitations, prohibitions, and report-
ing requirements,” 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a)(1)—does not violate the First
Amendment. Pp. 142–161.
(1) The governmental interest underlying § 323(a)—preventing
the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidates and officehold-
ers—constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify contribution
limits. That interest is not limited to the elimination of quid pro quo,
cash-for-votes exchanges, see Buckley, supra, at 28, but extends also to
“undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of
such influence,” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed-
eral Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (Colorado II). These inter-
ests are sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but
also laws preventing the circumvention of such limits. Id., at 456.
While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened
judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments varies with the novelty or
plausibility of the justification raised, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov-
ernment PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 391, the idea that large contributions to a
national party can corrupt or create the appearance of corruption of
federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible, see,
e. g., Buckley, supra, at 38. There is substantial evidence in these cases
to support Congress’ determination that such contributions of soft
money give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption. For
instance, the record is replete with examples of national party commit-

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96 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange
for large soft-money donations. Pp. 143–154.
(2) Section 323(a) is not impermissibly overbroad because it sub-
jects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA’s hard-
money source and amount limits, including, e. g., funds spent on purely
state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The rec-
ord demonstrates that the close relationship between federal officehold-
ers and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have
traded on that relationship, have made all large soft-money contribu-
tions to national parties suspect, regardless of how those funds are ulti-
mately used. The Government’s strong interests in preventing corrup-
tion, and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify
subjecting all donations to national parties to FECA’s source, amount,
and disclosure limitations. Pp. 154–156.
(3) Nor is § 323(a)’s prohibition on national parties’ soliciting or
directing soft-money contributions substantially overbroad. That pro-
hibition’s reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations
by national party committees and party officers acting in their official
capacities; the committees themselves remain free to solicit hard money
on their own behalf or that of state committees and state and local candi-
dates and to contribute hard money to state committees and candidates.
Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the solicitation ban’s overbreadth is
demonstrated by § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and office-
holders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors
under certain circumstances. The differences between §§ 323(a) and
323(e) are without constitutional significance, see National Right to
Work, supra, at 210, reflecting Congress’ reasonable and expert judg-
ments about national committees’ functions and their interactions with
officeholders. Pp. 157–158.
(4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad with respect to
the speech and associational rights of minor parties, even though the
latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. It is reasonable
to require that all parties and candidates follow the same rules designed
to protect the electoral process’ integrity. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 34–35.
A nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge
if § 323(a) prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage
in effective advocacy. Id., at 21. Pp. 158–159.
(5) Plaintiffs’ argument that § 323(a) unconstitutionally interferes
with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local
committees is unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad
reading of the statutory terms “spend,” “receive,” “direct,” and “solicit.”
Nothing on § 323(a)’s face prohibits national party officers from sit-
ting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan

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and advise how to raise and spend soft money, so long as the national
officers do not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money.
Pp. 159–161.
(c) On its face, new FECA § 323(b)—which prohibits state and local
party committees from using soft money for activities affecting federal
elections, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(b)—is closely drawn to match the important
governmental interest of preventing corruption and its appearance.
Pp. 161–173.
(1) Recognizing that the close ties between federal candidates
and state party committees would soon render § 323(a)’s anticorruption
measures ineffective if state and local committees remained available as
a conduit for soft-money donations, Congress designed § 323(b) to pre-
vent donors from contributing nonfederal funds to such committees to
help finance “Federal election activity,” which is defined to encompass
(1) voter registration activity during the 120 days before a federal elec-
tion; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity “con-
ducted in connection with an election in which a [federal] candidate . . .
appears on the ballot”; (3) any “public communication” that “refers to a
clearly identified [federal] candidate” and “promotes,” “supports,” “at-
tacks,” or “opposes” such a candidate; and (4) the services of a state
committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her compen-
sated time to “activities in connection with a Federal election,” 2
U. S. C. §§ 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv). All activities that fall within this def-
inition must be funded with hard money. § 441i(b)(1). The Levin
Amendment carves out an exception to this general rule, allowing state
and local party committees to pay for certain federal election activi-
ties—namely, activities falling within categories (1) and (2) above that
either do not refer to “a clearly identified candidate for Federal office,”
or, if they involve broadcast communications, refer “solely to a clearly
identified candidate for State or local office,” §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)—
with an allocated ratio of hard money and so-called “Levin funds.”
Levin funds are subject only to state regulation, but for two additional
restrictions. First, no contributor can donate more than $10,000 per
year to a single committee’s Levin account. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iii). Sec-
ond, both Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money to pay
for such activities must be raised by the state or local committee that
spends them, though the committee can team up with other national,
state, or local committees to solicit the hard-money portion.
§§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), 441i(b)(2)(C). Pp. 161–164.
(2) In addressing soft-money contributions to state committees,
Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. It concluded
from the record that soft money’s corrupting influence insinuates itself
into the political process not only through national party committees,

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but also through state committees, which function as an alternate ave-
nue for precisely the same corrupting forces. Indeed, the evidence
shows that both candidates and parties already ask donors who have
reached their direct contribution limit to donate to state committees.
Congress’ reasonable prediction, based on the history of campaign fi-
nance regulation, was that donors would react to § 323(a) by directing
soft-money contributions to state committees for the purpose of influ-
encing federal candidates and elections, and that federal candidates
would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to
those who had formerly contributed to the national parties. Preventing
corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and
thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important govern-
mental interest. Pp. 164–166.
(3) Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that, even if § 323(b) serves a
legitimate interest, its restrictions are so unjustifiably burdensome and
overbroad that they cannot be considered “closely drawn” to match the
Government’s objectives. P. 166.
(i) Section 323(b) is not substantially overbroad. Although
§ 323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfed-
eral offices, these are the same activities that were covered by the Fed-
eral Election Commission’s (FEC) pre-BCRA allocation rules, and so
had to be funded in part by hard money because they affected both
federal and state elections. As a practical matter, BCRA merely codi-
fies the FEC’s allocation regime principles while justifiably adjusting
the applicable formulas in order to restore the efficacy of FECA’s long-
standing restriction on contributions to state and local committees for
the purpose of influencing federal elections. By limiting its reach to
“Federal election activities,” § 323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating
contributions that directly benefit federal candidates and thus pose the
greatest risk of corruption or its appearance. The first two categories
of “Federal election activity”—voter registration efforts and voter iden-
tification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connec-
tion with a federal election—clearly capture activities that confer a sub-
stantial benefit on federal candidates by getting like-minded voters to
the polls. If a voter registration drive does not specifically mention a
federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin
Amendment’s higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions.
Moreover, because the record demonstrates abundantly that the third
category of “Federal election activity,” “public communication[s]” that
promote or attack a federal candidate, directly affects the election in
which that candidate is participating, application of § 323(b)’s contribu-
tion caps to such communications is closely drawn to the anticorruption
interest it is intended to address. Finally, Congress’ interest in pre-

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venting circumvention of § 323(b)’s other restrictions justifies the re-
quirement of the fourth category of “Federal election activity” that fed-
eral funds be used to pay any state or local party employee who spends
more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities connected
with a federal election. Pp. 166–171.
(ii) The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiably burden asso-
ciation among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds
among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable fed-
eral portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds
by state parties. While preserving parties’ associational freedom is im-
portant, not every minor restriction on parties’ otherwise unrestrained
ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533
U. S., at 450, n. 11. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory
scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin
Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent cir-
cumvention of the entire scheme. Pp. 171–173.
(iii) The evidence supporting the argument that the Levin
Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resources needed to
engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The history of campaign
finance regulation proves that political parties are extraordinarily flex-
ible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. More-
over, the mere fact that § 323(b) may reduce the money available to state
and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconse-
quential. The question is not whether the amount available over previ-
ous election cycles is reduced, but whether the reduction is so radical as
to drive the sound of the recipient’s voice below the level of notice.
Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If state or local parties can make
such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. P. 173.
(d) New FECA § 323(d)—which forbids national, state, and local
party committees and their agents to “solicit any funds for, or make or
direct any donations” to § 501(c) tax-exempt organizations that make
expenditures in connection with a federal election, and to § 527 political
organizations “other than a political committee, a State, district, or local
committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of
a candidate for State or local office,” 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d)—is not facially
invalid. Pp. 174–181.
(1) Section 323(d)’s restriction on solicitations is a valid anti-
circumvention measure. Absent this provision, national, state, and
local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize
their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of ac-
cess to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt
organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates. All of
the corruption and the appearance of corruption attendant on the opera-

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tion of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that § 323(d)’s solicitations ban cannot be squared with § 323(e),
which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited soft-
money donations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in federal elec-
tion activities, is not persuasive. If § 323(d)’s solicitation restriction is
otherwise valid, it is not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact
that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as
stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S.,
at 210. Furthermore, the difference between the two provisions is ex-
plained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candidates
and officeholders, remain free to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit
organizations in their individual capacities. Given § 323(e)’s tight con-
tent, source, and amount restrictions on soft-money solicitations by fed-
eral candidates and officeholders, as well as the less rigorous standard of
review, § 323(e)’s greater solicitation allowances do not render § 323(d)’s
solicitation restriction facially invalid. Pp. 174–178.
(2) Section 323(d)’s restriction on donations to qualifying § 501(c)
or § 527 organizations is a valid anticircumvention measure insofar as it
prohibits donations of funds not already raised in compliance with
FECA. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees
could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions prevent
them from doing indirectly—raising large sums of soft money to launder
through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activi-
ties. Although the ban raises overbreadth concerns if read to restrict
donations from a party’s federal account—i. e., funds already raised in
compliance with FECA’s source, amount, and disclosure limitations—
these concerns do not require that the facial challenge be sustained,
given this Court’s obligation to construe a statute, if possible, in such a
way as to avoid constitutional questions, see, e. g., Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22, 62. Because the record does not compel the conclusion
that Congress intended “donations” to include donations from a party’s
hard-money account, and because of the constitutional infirmities such
an interpretation would raise, the Court narrowly construes § 323(d)’s
ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with
FECA. Pp. 178–181.
(e) New FECA § 323(e)—which, with many exceptions, forbids fed-
eral candidates and officeholders to “solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or
spend” soft money in connection with federal elections, 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(e)(1)(A), and limits their ability to do so for state and local elec-
tions, § 441i(e)(1)(B)—does not violate the First Amendment. No party
seriously questions the constitutionality of the general ban on soft-
money donations directly to federal candidates and officeholders and
their agents. By severing the most direct link to the soft-money donor,

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the ban is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance
of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. The solicita-
tion restrictions are valid anticircumvention measures. Even before
BCRA’s passage, federal candidates and officeholders solicited donations
to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order
to help their own, as well as their party’s, electoral cause. See Colo-
rado II, supra, at 458. The incentives to do so will only increase with
Title I’s restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by na-
tional, state, and local parties. Section 323(e) addresses these concerns
while accommodating the individual speech and associational rights of
federal candidates and officeholders. Pp. 181–184.
(f) New FECA § 323(f)—which forbids state and local candidates
or officeholders to raise and spend soft money to fund ads and other
“public communications” that promote or attack federal candidates, 2
U. S. C. § 441i(f)—is a valid anticircumvention provision. The sec-
tion places no cap on the funds that such candidates can spend on any
activity, but, rather, limits only the source and amount of contributions
that they can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal
elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to fund “public
communications,” the section focuses narrowly on those soft-money do-
nations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appear-
ance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Plaintiffs’
principal arguments against the section—(1) that the definition of “pub-
lic communications” as communications that support or attack a clearly
identified federal candidate is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad;
and (2) that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for
“public communications” do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal
candidates—are rejected. Pp. 184–185.
2. Several plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that BCRA Title I exceeds
Congress’ Election Clause authority to “make or alter” rules governing
federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, and violates constitutional fed-
eralism principles by impairing the States’ authority to regulate their
own elections. In examining federal Acts for Tenth Amendment infir-
mity, the Court focuses on whether States and state officials are com-
mandeered to carry out federal regulatory schemes. See, e. g., Printz v.
United States, 521 U. S. 898. By contrast, Title I only regulates private
parties’ conduct, imposing no requirements upon States or state officials.
And, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, Title I
leaves States free to enforce their own restrictions on state electoral
campaign financing. Moreover, while this Court has policed the abso-
lute boundaries of Congress’ Article I power, see, e. g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Con-
gress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA.

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Indeed, as already found, Title I is closely drawn to match Congress’
important interest in preventing the corruption or the appearance of
corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. That interest is suf-
ficient to ground Congress’ exercise of its Elections Clause power.
Pp. 186–187.
3. Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I violates equal
protection by discriminating against political parties in favor of special
interest groups, which remain free to raise soft money to fund voter
registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising
(other than electioneering communications). First, BCRA actually fa-
vors political parties in many ways, e. g., by allowing party committees
to receive individual contributions substantially exceeding FECA limits
on contributions to nonparty political committees. More importantly,
Congress is fully entitled to consider the salient, real-world differences
between parties and interest groups when crafting a campaign finance
regulation system, see National Right to Work, supra, at 210, including
the fact that parties have influence and power in the legislature vastly
exceeding any interest group’s. Taken seriously, plaintiffs’ equal pro-
tection arguments would call into question not just BCRA Title I, but
much of FECA’s pre-existing structure. Pp. 187–188.
4. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofar as it upheld
§§ 323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalidated §§ 323(a),
323(b), and 323(d). Pp. 188–189.
5. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed to the extent that it up-
held the disclosure requirements in amended FECA § 304 and re-
jected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or
more, but reversed to the extent that it invalidated FECA § 304(f)(5).
Pp. 189–202.
(a) BCRA § 201 comprehensively amends FECA § 304, which re-
quires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with
the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in Buckley limited
FECA’s disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating
the election or defeat of particular candidates. BCRA adopts a new
term, “electioneering communication,” which encompasses any “broad-
cast, cable, or satellite communication” that clearly identifies a candidate
for federal office, airs within a specific time period (e. g., within 60 days
of a general election and 30 days of a primary), and is targeted to the
relevant electorate. 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). BCRA also amends
§ 304 to provide disclosure requirements for persons who fund election-
eering communications (and BCRA § 203 amends FECA § 316(b)(2) to
extend those requirements to corporations and labor unions).
Plaintiffs challenge the new term’s constitutionality as it applies to
both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily that Buckley drew

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a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called
issue advocacy, and that speakers have an inviolable First Amendment
right to engage in the latter category of speech. However, a plain read-
ing of Buckley and Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (MCFL), shows that the express advocacy
restriction is a product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional
command. Both the concept of express advocacy and the class of magic
words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional problems of vague-
ness and overbreadth in the statute before the Buckley Court. Con-
sistent with the principle that a constitutional rule should never be for-
mulated more broadly than required by the facts to which it is to be
applied, Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language
before the Court and in no way drew a constitutional boundary that
forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-
related speech. The notion that the First Amendment erects a rigid
barrier between express and issue advocacy also cannot be squared with
this Court’s longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of
magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech
from a true issue ad. Buckley’s express advocacy line has not aided
the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Con-
gress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found. Finally, because
the components of new FECA § 304(f)(3)’s definition of “electioneering
communication” are both easily understood and objectively determina-
ble, the vagueness objection that persuaded the Buckley Court to limit
FECA’s reach to express advocacy is inapposite here. Pp. 189–194.
(b) With regard to plaintiffs’ other concerns about the use of the
phrase “electioneering communication,” the District Court correctly re-
jected their submission that new FECA § 304 unnecessarily requires
disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the
individual or group paying for the communication, but erred in finding
§ 304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates disclosure of executory contracts
for communications that have not yet aired. Because the important
state interests identified in Buckley—providing the electorate with in-
formation, deterring actual corruption and avoiding its appearance, and
gathering data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering re-
strictions—apply in full to BCRA, Buckley amply supports application
of FECA § 304’s disclosure requirements to the entire range of “election-
eering communications.” Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the
new § 304 provision that requires disclosure of the names of persons who
contribute $1,000 or more to segregated funds or spend more than
$10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Under
Buckley’s standard of proof, the evidence here did not establish the req-
uisite reasonable probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its mem-

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bers resulting from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of
this facial challenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to par-
ticular applications of that disclosure requirement.
This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ challenge to new
FECA § 304(f)(5)’s requirement regarding the disclosure of executory
contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure only when a person
makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year
to pay for electioneering communications. Given the relatively short
timeframes in which such communications are made, the interest in as-
suring that disclosures are made in time to provide relevant information
to voters is significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure
statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed
$10,000 would open a significant loophole without the advance disclosure
requirement, for political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures
about ads slated to run during a campaign’s final weeks simply by mak-
ing a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance
payable after the election. The record contains little evidence of any
harm that might flow from the requirement’s enforcement, and the Dis-
trict Court’s speculation about such harm cannot outweigh the public
interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes
place. Pp. 194–202.
6. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed insofar as it held that
plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutional BCRA § 202,
which amends FECA § 315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for
electioneering communications that are coordinated with a candidate or
party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that can-
didate or party, 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(C). That provision clarifies the
scope of § 315(a)(7)(B), which provides that expenditures made by any
person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request
or suggestion of a candidate or party constitute contributions. BCRA
pre-empts a possible claim that the term “expenditure” in § 315(a)(7)(B)
is limited to spending for express advocacy. Because Buckley’s narrow
interpretation of that term was only a statutory limitation on Congress’
power to regulate federal elections, there is no reason why Congress
may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering commu-
nications in the same way it treats other coordinated expenditures.
Pp. 202–203.
7. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed to the extent that it up-
held the constitutionality of new FECA § 316(b)(2), and reversed to the
extent that it invalidated any part of that section. BCRA § 203 extends
to all “electioneering communications” FECA § 316(b)(2)’s restrictions
on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441b(b)(2). Because those entities may still organize and administer

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segregated funds, or PACs, for such communications, the provision is a
regulation of, not a ban on, expression. Federal Election Comm’n v.
Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 162. This Court’s consideration of plaintiffs’
claim that the expanded regulation is both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive is informed by the conclusion that the distinction between express
advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled.
Thus, the Court examines the degree to which BCRA burdens First
Amendment expression and evaluates whether a compelling govern-
mental interest justifies that burden. Plaintiffs have not carried their
burden of proving that new FECA § 316(b)(2) is overbroad. They
argue that the justifications that adequately support regulation of ex-
press advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encom-
passed by the electioneering communications definition. That argu-
ment fails to the extent that issue ads broadcast during the 30- and
60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the
functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for reg-
ulating express advocacy apply equally to those ads if they have an
electioneering purpose, which the vast majority do. Also rejected is
plaintiffs’ argument that new FECA § 316(b)(2)’s segregated-fund re-
quirement is underinclusive because it does not apply to print or In-
ternet advertising. The record here reflects that corporations and
unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-
related ads during the relevant period. Congress justifiably concluded
that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. Fi-
nally, § 304(f)(3)(B)(i), which excludes news items and commentary from
the electioneering communications definition, is wholly consistent with
First Amendment principles as applied to the media. Pp. 203–209.
8. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed to the extent that it up-
held new FECA § 316(c)(6), as limited to nonprofit entities that are not
so-called MCFL organizations. BCRA § 204, which adds § 316(c)(6), 2
U. S. C. § 441b(c)(2), extends to nonprofit corporations the prohibition
on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communi-
cations. This Court upheld a similar restriction in Beaumont, supra,
except as it applied to organizations that are formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas, have no shareholders, are not es-
tablished by a business corporation or labor union, and do not accept
contributions from those entities, MCFL, 479 U. S., at 264. The same
constitutional objection to applying the pre-BCRA restrictions to such
organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA § 316(c)(6).
That § 316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations is
not a sufficient reason to invalidate it. This Court presumes that the
legislators were fully aware that the provision could not apply to

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106 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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MCFL-type entities, and the Government concedes that it does not. As
so construed, the provision is plainly valid. Pp. 209–211.
9. Because this Court has already found BCRA § 201’s executory con-
tract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiffs’ challenge to a sim-
ilar disclosure requirement in BCRA § 212, which added FECA § 304(g),
2 U. S. C. § 434, is essentially moot. Pp. 211–212.
10. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed to the extent that it
invalidated BCRA § 213, which amends FECA § 315(d)(4) to require
political parties to choose between coordinated and independent ex-
penditures during the postnomination, preelection period. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a(d)(4). That provision places an unconstitutional burden on the
parties’ right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Although
the category of burdened speech is limited to independent expenditures
for express advocacy—and therefore is relatively small—it plainly is
entitled to First Amendment protection. The governmental interest in
requiring parties to avoid using magic words is not sufficient to support
the burden imposed by § 315(d)(4). The fact that the provision is cast
as a choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expendi-
tures does not make it constitutional. Pp. 213–219.
11. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed to the extent that
it rejected plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA § 214, which adds FECA
§ 315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(ii). FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(i)
long has provided that expenditures that are controlled by or coordi-
nated with a candidate will be treated as contributions to the candidate.
BCRA § 214(a) extends that rule to expenditures coordinated with polit-
ical parties; and §§ 214 (b) and (c) direct the FEC to promulgate new
regulations that do not “require agreement or formal collaboration to
establish coordination,” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a) note. FECA § 315(a)(7)
(B)(ii) is not overbroad simply because it permits a finding of coordina-
tion in the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Congress has always
treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor
does the absence of an agreement requirement render § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii)
unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required
under § 315(a)(7)(B)(i), which uses precisely the same language as the
new provision to address coordination with candidates, and which has
survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades.
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the definition has chilled politi-
cal speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an agreement
requirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in what they fear
will be intrusive and politically motivated investigations. Finally, in
this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffs’ challenge to §§ 214(b) and (c) is
not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional infirmities in the
FEC’s new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 219–224.

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The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, concluding that the
District Court’s judgment with respect to these provisions must be af-
firmed. Pp. 224–233.
1. The plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA § 305, § 307, and the millionaire
provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp. 224–230.
(a) The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA § 305,
which amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 requirement
that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election,
broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified candidate at their “lowest
unit charge,” 47 U. S. C. § 315(b). Section 305’s amendment, in turn,
denies a candidate the benefit of that charge in specified circumstances.
47 U. S. C. §§ 315(b)(2)(A), (C). Senator McConnell’s testimony that
he plans to run ads critical of his opponents and had run them in the
past is too remote temporally to satisfy the Article III standing require-
ment that a plaintiff demonstrate an “injury in fact” that is “actual or
imminent,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155, 158, given that
the lowest unit charge requirement is not available until 45 days before
a primary, that Senator McConnell’s current term does not expire until
2009, and that, therefore, the earliest day he could be affected by § 305
is 45 days before the 2008 Republican primary election. Pp. 224–226.
(b) The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA
§ 307, which amends FECA § 315(a)(1) to increase and index for inflation
certain contribution limits. Neither injury alleged by the Adams plain-
tiffs, a group of voters, voter organizations, and candidates, is sufficient
to confer standing. First, their assertion that § 307 deprives them of
an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their
economic status does not satisfy the standing requirement that a plain-
tiff ’s alleged injury be an invasion of a concrete and particularized le-
gally protected interest, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555,
560, since political “free trade” does not necessarily require that all who
participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal re-
sources, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 (MCFL). Second, the Adams plaintiffs-
candidates’ contention that § 307 puts them at a “fundraising disadvan-
tage” compared to their opponents because they do not wish to solicit
or accept the large campaign contributions BCRA permits does not
meet the standing requirement that their alleged injury be “fairly trace-
able” to § 307, see Lujan, supra, at 562, since their alleged inability to
compete stems not from § 307’s operation, but from their own personal
choice not to solicit or accept large contributions. Also inadequate for
standing purposes is the Paul plaintiffs’ contention that their congres-
sional campaigns and public interest advocacy involve traditional press

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activities, such that § 307’s contribution limits, together with FECA
§ 315’s individual and political action committee contribution limitations,
impose unconstitutional editorial control on them in violation of the
First Amendment’s Freedom of the Press Clause. These plaintiffs can-
not show the requisite substantial likelihood their requested relief will
remedy their alleged injury in fact, see Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 771, since, even
if the Court were to strike down BCRA § 307’s increases and indexes,
as they ask, both FECA’s contribution limits and an exemption for insti-
tutional news media would remain unchanged. Pp. 226–229.
(c) The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called
“millionaire provisions,” BCRA §§ 304, 316, and 319, which provide for
a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-
candidate limits if the candidate’s opponent spends a triggering amount
of his personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits
in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs allege the same in-
juries that they alleged with regard to BCRA § 307, they fail to state a
cognizable injury that is fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none
of them is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provi-
sions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that any of them
ever will be. Pp. 229–230.
2. The District Court’s decision upholding BCRA § 311’s expansion of
FECA § 318(a) to include mandatory electioneering-communications-
disbursements disclosure is affirmed because such inclusion bears a suf-
ficient relationship to the important governmental interest of “shed-
[ding] the light of publicity” on campaign financing, Buckley, 424 U. S.,
at 81. Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA § 318 is valid both to
begin with and as amended by BCRA § 311’s amendments other than
the electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion is not
itself unconstitutional. Pp. 230–231.
3. BCRA § 318—which forbids individuals “17 years old or younger”
to make contributions to candidates and political parties, 2 U. S. C.
§ 441k—violates the First Amendment rights of minors, see, e. g., Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511–
513. Because limitations on an individual’s political contributions im-
pinge on the freedoms of expression and association, see Buckley, supra,
at 20–22, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation,
asking whether it is justified by a “sufficiently important interest” and
“closely drawn” to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the First Amend-
ment, see, e. g., post, at 136 ( joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor,
JJ.). The Government offers scant evidence for its assertion that § 318
protects against corruption by conduit—i. e., donations by parents
through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits applica-

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109 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
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ble to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of the claimed evil,
this interest is simply too attenuated for § 318 to withstand heightened
scrutiny. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391. Even assuming, ar-
guendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision
is overinclusive, as shown by the States’ adoption of more tailored ap-
proaches. Pp. 231–232.
4. Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address
whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to
the FEC’s, were properly granted intervention pursuant to, inter alia,
BCRA § 403(b). See, e. g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417,
431–432, n. 19. P. 233.
Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s opinion with respect to BCRA
Title V—§ 504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934 to re-
quire broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically re-
lated broadcasting requests, 47 U. S. C. § 315(e)—concluding that the
portion of the judgment below invalidating § 504 as facially violative of
the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp. 233–245.
1. Section 504’s “candidate request” requirements—which call for
broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests “made by or on be-
half of a . . . candidate,” 47 U. S. C. § 315(e)(1)(A)—are upheld. They
are virtually identical to those contained in a longstanding Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs’
argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and inva-
sive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that its regula-
tion imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small additional adminis-
trative burden. Moreover, the § 504 requirement is supported by
significant governmental interests in verifying that licensees comply
with their obligations to allow political candidates “equal time,” 47
U. S. C. § 315(a), and to sell such time at the “lowest unit charge,”
§ 315(b); in evaluating whether they are processing candidate requests
in an evenhanded fashion to help assure broadcasting fairness, § 315(a);
in making the public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast
messages, 2 U. S. C. § 434; and in providing an independently com-
piled set of data for verifying candidates’ compliance with BCRA’s and
FECA’s disclosure requirements and source limitations, ibid. Because
the Court cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC
regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCRA § 504’s “candi-
date request” provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a stat-
ute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. Pp. 234–238.
2. Because § 504’s “candidate request” requirements are constitutional,
its “election message” requirements—which serve similar governmental
interests and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring
broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast

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110 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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“message[s]” that refer either to a “legally qualified candidate” or to
“any election to Federal office,” 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)—must
be constitutional as well. Pp. 238–240.
3. BCRA § 504’s “issue request” requirements—which call for broad-
casters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast “mes-
sage[s]” related to a “national legislative issue of public importance,” 47
U. S. C. § 315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a “political matter of national impor-
tance,” § 315(e)(1)(B)—survive the McConnell plaintiffs’ facial challenge.
These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help determine
whether broadcasters are fulfilling their obligations under the FCC’s
regulations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of con-
flicting views on important public issues or whether they too heavily
favor entertainment, discriminating against public affairs broadcasts.
The plaintiffs’ claim that the above-quoted statutory language is uncon-
stitutionally vague or overbroad is unpersuasive, given that it is no
more general than language Congress has used to impose other ob-
ligations upon broadcasters and is roughly comparable to other BCRA
language upheld in this litigation. Whether the “issue request” re-
quirements impose disproportionate administrative burdens will depend
on how the FCC interprets and applies them. The parties remain free
to challenge the provisions, as interpreted by the FCC’s regulations, or
as otherwise applied. Without the greater information any such chal-
lenge will likely provide, the Court cannot say that the provisions’ ad-
ministrative burdens are so great, or their justifications so minimal, as
to warrant finding them facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the argu-
ment that the “issue request” requirement will force the purchasers to
disclose information revealing their political strategies to opponents
does not show that BCRA § 504 is facially unconstitutional, but the
plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when § 504 is applied.
Pp. 240–246.
Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in which O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined except with respect to BCRA § 305, and in which
Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §§ 304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and
403(b), post, p. 224. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Title V, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 233. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring
with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA
Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

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111 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Syllabus
part with respect to BCRA Title II, post, p. 247. Thomas, J., filed an
opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for
BCRA §§ 311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA
§ 318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with re-
spect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V,
and § 311, in which opinion Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, II–A, and II–B,
post, p. 264. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., joined, in which Scalia, J., joined except to the extent
the opinion upholds new FECA § 323(e) and BCRA § 202, and in which
Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA § 213, post, p. 286. Rehnquist,
C. J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, in
which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 350. Stevens, J., filed
an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA § 305, in which Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 363.
Kenneth W. Starr and Floyd Abrams argued the cause for
plaintiffs below, Senator Mitch McConnell et al., appellants in
No. 02–1674 and cross-appellees in Nos. 02–1676 and 02–1702.
With them on the briefs were Edward W. Warren, Susan
Buckley, Brian Markley, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Valle
Simms Dutcher, L. Lynn Hogue, Jan Witold Baran, Lee E.
Goodman, G. Hunter Bates, Jack N. Goodman, and Jeri-
anne Timmerman.
Bobby R. Burchfield argued the cause for the political
party plaintiffs below. With him on the briefs for the
Republican National Committee et al., appellants in
No. 02–1727, the California Democratic Party et al., appel-
lants in No. 02–1753, and the Libertarian National Commit-
tee, Inc., one of the appellants in No. 02–1733, were Thomas
O. Barnett, Robert K. Kelner, Richard W. Smith, Lance H.
Olson, Deborah B. Caplan, Joseph E. Sandler, John Hardin
Young, Charles H. Bell, Jr., Jan Witold Baran, Lee E. Good-
man, Thomas J. Josefiak, Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Eric A.
Kuwana, Michael A. Carvin, James Bopp, Jr., Richard E.
Coleson, and Thomas J. Marzen.
Solicitor General Olson and Deputy Solicitor General
Clement argued the cause for federal defendants below, the
Federal Election Commission et al. With them on the briefs

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112 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Counsel
were Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Malcolm L. Stew-
art, Gregory G. Garre, Douglas N. Letter, Dana J. Martin,
Terry M. Henry, Lawrence H. Norton, Richard B. Bader,
and David Kolker.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for the intervenor-
defendants below, Senator John McCain et al. With him on
the briefs were Randolph D. Moss, Edward C. DuMont,
Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Roger M. Witten, Burt Neuborne, Fred-
erick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Charles G. Curtis, Jr., David J.
Harth, Bradley S. Phillips, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Alan B.
Morrison, Scott L. Nelson, Eric J. Mogilnicki, Michael D.
Leffel, Fred Wertheimer, Alexandra Edsall, and Trevor
Potter.
Laurence E. Gold argued the cause for plaintiffs below, the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations et al., appellants in No. 02–1755 and appellees
in Nos. 02–1676 and 02–1702. With him on the briefs were
Jonathan P. Hiatt, Michael B. Tr ister, and Lar ry P.
Weinberg.
Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for plaintiffs below,
Emily Echols et al. With him on the brief were James M.
Henderson, Sr., Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, Joel H.
Thornton, Walter M. Weber, James Bopp, Jr., Richard E.
Coleson, and Thomas J. Marzen.
Briefs in No. 02–1675 were filed for appellants National
Rifle Association et al. by Charles J. Cooper, David H.
Thompson, Hamish P. M. Hume, Brian S. Koukoutchos, and
Cleta Mitchell.
Briefs in No. 02–1733 were filed for plaintiffs-appellants/
cross-appellees National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al.
by James Bopp, Jr., Richard E. Coleson, and Thomas J.
Marzen.
Briefs in No. 02–1734 were filed for appellant American
Civil Liberties Union by Mark J. Lopez, Steven R. Shapiro,
and Joel M. Gora.

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113 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Counsel
Briefs in No. 02–1740 were filed for appellants Victoria
Jackson Gray Adams et al. by John C. Bonifaz, Bonita P.
Tenneriello, Lisa J. Danetz, Brenda Wright, and David A.
Wilson.
Briefs in No. 02–1747 were filed for appellants Congress-
man Ron Paul et al. by William J. Olson, John S. Miles,
Herbert W. Titus, and Gary G. Kreep.
Briefs in No. 02–1756 were filed for appellants Chamber of
Commerce of the United States et al. by Jan Witold Baran,
Lee E. Goodman, Stephen A. Bokat, and Jan Amundson.†
†A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the Common-
wealth of Virginia et al. by Jerry Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia,
and Craig Engle, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Phill Kline
of Kansas, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota,
Jim Petro of Ohio, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Larry Long of
South Dakota, and Mark Shurtleff of Utah.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Center for
Governmental Studies by Richard L. Hasen; and for Thomas D. Grant
et al. by Christopher J. Wright and Timothy J. Simeone.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Iowa et al. by Thomas
J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, and Thomas Andrews, Assistant At-
torney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and
Bridget C. Asay, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard Blumenthal,
Attorney General of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Ken Salazar
of Colorado, Albert B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of
Louisiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts,
Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Eliot Spitzer of New York,
W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Anabelle Rodrı´guez of Puerto Rico,
Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington,
Peggy Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Iver A. Stridiron of the Virgin
Islands; for the Allen Temple Baptist Church et al. by Martin R. Glick;
for the American Civil Rights Union by John C. Armor and Peter Ferrara;
for Bipartisan Former Members of the United States Congress by Randy
L. Dryer and J. Michael Bailey; for the California Student Public Interest
Research Group, Inc., et al. by Bonita Tenneriello, John C. Bonifaz,
Brenda Wright, Lisa J. Danetz, and David A. Wilson; for the Cato Insti-

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114 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.*
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116
Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act), 86 Stat. 11,
as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II),
the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended,
47 U. S. C. § 315 (2000 ed. and Supp. II), and other portions
of the United States Code, 18 U. S. C. § 607 (Supp. II), 36
U. S. C. §§ 510–511 (Supp. II), that are challenged in these
cases.1 In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA.
The opinion of the Court delivered by The Chief Justice,
post, p. 224, discusses Titles III and IV, and the opinion of
the Court delivered by Justice Breyer, post, p. 233, dis-
cusses Title V.
tute et al. by Erik S. Jaffe; for the Center for Responsive Politics by
Lawrence M. Noble and Paul Sanford; for the Committee for Economic
Development et al. by Steven Alan Reiss, R. Bruce Rich, and Jonathan
Bloom; for Common Cause et al. by Donald J. Simon, Daniel B. Kohr-
man, and Michael Schuster; for Former Leaders of the American Civil
Liberties Union by Norman Dorsen and Eric M. Lieberman; for the In-
terfaith Alliance Foundation et al. by Evan A. Davis; for the League of
Women Voters by Daniel R. Ortiz; for Delaware State Representative
Michael Castle et al. by Richard Briffault, Charles Tiefer, and Jonathan
W. Cuneo; for the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert by J. Randolph Evans and
Stefan C. Passantino; for Dr. David Moshman by Kevin H. Theriot; for
Norman J. Ornstein et al. by Teresa W. Roseborough and Judith A.
O’Brien; for Rodney A. Smith by Clark Bensen; and for the Honorable
Fred Thompson by David C. Frederick.
*Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this
opinion in its entirety.
1 The parties to the litigation are described in the findings of the District
Court. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 221–226 (DC 2003) (per curiam). For the
sake of clarity, we refer to the parties who challenged the law in the Dis-
trict Court as the “plaintiffs,” referring to specific plaintiffs by name
where necessary. We refer to the parties who intervened in defense of
the law as the “intervenor-defendants.”

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I
More than a century ago the “sober-minded Elihu Root”
advocated legislation that would prohibit political contribu-
tions by corporations in order to prevent “ ‘the great aggre-
gations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly
or indirectly,’ ” to elect legislators who would “ ‘vote for their
protection and the advancement of their interests as against
those of the public.’ ” United States v. Automobile Work-
ers, 352 U. S. 567, 571 (1957) (quoting E. Root, Addresses on
Government and Citizenship 143 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds.
1916)). In Root’s opinion, such legislation would “ ‘strik[e]
at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake
the confidence of the plain people of small means of this coun-
try in our political institutions than any other practice which
has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.’ ”
352 U. S., at 571. The Congress of the United States has
repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root’s judgment.
BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed “to
purge national politics of what was conceived to be the perni-
cious influence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions.” Id.,
at 572. As Justice Frankfurter explained in his opinion for
the Court in Automobile Workers, the first such enactment
responded to President Theodore Roosevelt’s call for legisla-
tion forbidding all contributions by corporations “ ‘to any po-
litical committee or for any political purpose.’ ” Ibid. (quot-
ing 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1905)). In his annual message to
Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt stated that
“ ‘directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’
money’ ” for political purposes, and he recommended that “ ‘a
prohibition’ ” on corporate political contributions “ ‘would be,
as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils
aimed at in corrupt practices acts.’ ” 352 U. S., at 572. The
resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contribu-
tions of “money . . . in connection with” any federal election.
Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. Congress soon amended

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116 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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the statute to require the public disclosure of certain con-
tributions and expenditures and to place “maximum limits
on the amounts that congressional candidates could spend
in seeking nomination and election.” Automobile Workers,
supra, at 575–576.
In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition of “contribu-
tions” “to include ‘anything of value,’ and made acceptance
of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of such a
contribution a crime.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Na-
tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (citing
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§ 301, 313, 43 Stat.
1070, 1074). During the debates preceding that amendment,
a leading Senator characterized “ ‘the apparent hold on polit-
ical parties which business interests and certain organiza-
tions seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal cam-
paign contributions’ ” as “ ‘one of the great political evils of
the time.’ ” Automobile Workers, supra, at 576 (quoting 65
Cong. Rec. 9507–9508 (1924)). We upheld the amended stat-
ute against a constitutional challenge, observing that “[t]he
power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of
means to that end presents a question primarily addressed
to the judgment of Congress.” Burroughs v. United States,
290 U. S. 534, 547 (1934).
Congress’ historical concern with the “political potentiali-
ties of wealth” and their “untoward consequences for the
democratic process,” Automobile Workers, supra, at 577–
578, has long reached beyond corporate money. During and
shortly after World War II, Congress reacted to the “enor-
mous financial outlays” made by some unions in connection
with national elections. 352 U. S., at 579. Congress first
restricted union contributions in the Hatch Act, 18 U. S. C.
§ 610,2 and it later prohibited “union contributions in connec-
2 The Hatch Act also limited both the amount political committees could
expend and the amount they could receive in contributions. Act of July

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tion with federal elections . . . altogether.” National Right
to Work, supra, at 209 (citing War Labor Disputes Act
(Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 167).
Congress subsequently extended that prohibition to cover
unions’ election-related expenditures as well as contribu-
tions, and it broadened the coverage of federal campaigns to
include both primary and general elections. Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136.
See Automobile Workers, supra, at 578–584. During the
consideration of those measures, legislators repeatedly
voiced their concerns regarding the pernicious influence of
large campaign contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522
(1947); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947);
S. Rep. No. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1947); H. R. Rep.
No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a
unanimous opinion recalling this history, Congress’ “careful
legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a ‘cau-
tious advance, step by step,’ to account for the particu-
lar legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor
organizations warrants considerable deference.” National
Right to Work, supra, at 209 (citations omitted).
In early 1972 Congress continued its steady improvement
of the national election laws by enacting FECA, 86 Stat. 3.
As first enacted, that statute required disclosure of all contri-
19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. Senator Bankhead, in offering the amend-
ment from the Senate floor, said:
“ ‘We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We all
know that large contributions to political campaigns not only put the politi-
cal party under obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in
the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums of money are
used for the purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through the
newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature,
true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of campaign-
ers sent out into the country to spread propaganda, both true and un-
true.’ ” United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 577–578
(1957) (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940)).

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118 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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butions exceeding $100 and of expenditures by candidates
and political committees that spent more than $1,000 per
year. Id., at 11–19. It also prohibited contributions made
in the name of another person, id., at 19, and by Government
contractors, id., at 10. The law ratified the earlier prohibi-
tion on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds
for political contributions and expenditures, but it expressly
permitted corporations and unions to establish and adminis-
ter separate segregated funds (commonly known as political
action committees, or PACs) for election-related contribu-
tions and expenditures. Id., at 12–13.3 See Pipefitters v.
United States, 407 U. S. 385, 409–410 (1972).
As the 1972 Presidential elections made clear, however,
FECA’s passage did not deter unseemly fundraising and
campaign practices. Evidence of those practices persuaded
Congress to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. Reviewing a constitu-
tional challenge to the amendments, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit described them as “by
far the most comprehensive . . . reform legislation [ever]
passed by Congress concerning the election of the President,
Vice-President and members of Congress.” Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 831 (1975) (en banc) (per curiam).
The 1974 amendments closed the loophole that had allowed
candidates to use an unlimited number of political commit-
tees for fundraising purposes and thereby to circumvent the
limits on individual committees’ receipts and disbursements.
They also limited individual political contributions to any
single candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual
limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; imposed ceilings on
spending by candidates and political parties for national con-
3 As a general rule, FECA permits corporations and unions to solicit
contributions to their PACs from their shareholders or members, but not
from outsiders. 2 U. S. C. §§ 441b(b)(4)(A), (C); see Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 198–199, and
n. 1 (1982).

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ventions; required reporting and public disclosure of con-
tributions and expenditures exceeding certain limits; and
established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to
administer and enforce the legislation. Id., at 831–834.
The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 amendments almost
in their entirety.4 It concluded that the clear and compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process
provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive pro-
visions of the Act. Id., at 841. The court’s opinion relied
heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated access
to public officials 5 and described methods of evading the con-
4 The court held that one disclosure provision was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 832 (CADC 1975)
(en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U. S. C. § 437a (1970 ed., Supp. V)).
No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 10,
n. 7 (1976) (per curiam).
5 The Court of Appeals found:
“Large contributions are intended to, and do, gain access to the elected
official after the campaign for consideration of the contributor’s particular
concerns. Senator Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary,
that the feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a
reaction that the average American has no significant role in the political
process.” Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 838 (footnotes omitted).
The court also noted:
“Congress found and the District Court confirmed that such contributions
were often made for the purpose of furthering business or private inter-
ests by facilitating access to government officials or influencing govern-
mental decisions, and that, conversely, elected officials have tended to af-
ford special treatment to large contributors. See S. Rep. No. 93–689, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4–5; Findings I, ¶¶ 108, 110, 118, 170.” Id., at 838, n. 32.
Citing further evidence of corruption, the court explained:
“The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the
testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that
this was necessary as a ‘calling card, something that would get us in the
door and make our point of view heard,’ Hearings before the Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5442
(1973) (Ashland Oil Co.—Orin Atkins, Chairman) or ‘in response to pres-
sure for fear of a competitive disadvantage that might result,’ id. at 5495,
5514 (American Airlines—George Spater, former chairman); see Findings
I, ¶ 105. The record before Congress was replete with specific examples

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120 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tribution limits that had enabled contributors of massive
sums to avoid disclosure. Id., at 837–841.6
The Court of Appeals upheld the provisions establishing
contribution and expenditure limitations on the theory that
they should be viewed as regulations of conduct rather than
speech. Id., at 840–841 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391
U. S. 367, 376–377 (1968)). This Court, however, concluded
that each set of limitations raised serious—though differ-
ent—concerns under the First Amendment. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14–23 (1976) (per curiam). We treated
the limitations on candidate and individual expenditures as
direct restraints on speech, but we observed that the contri-
bution limitations, in contrast, imposed only “a marginal
restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication.” Id., at 20–21. Considering the “deeply
disturbing examples” of corruption related to candidate con-
tributions discussed in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, we de-
termined that limiting contributions served an interest in
protecting “the integrity of our system of representative de-
mocracy.” Id., at 26–27. In the end, the Act’s primary pur-
pose—“to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions”—pro-
of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor in return for large
campaign contributions. See Findings I, ¶¶ 159–64.” Id., at 839, n. 37.
6 The court cited the intricate scheme of the American Milk Producers,
Inc., as an example of the lengths to which contributors went to avoid
their duty to disclose:
“Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2500 limit per
committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation in November 1970
with Nixon fund raisers, to break down [their $2 million donation] into
numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various
states which could then hold the money for the President’s reelection cam-
paign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting re-
quirements without disclosure.” Id., at 839, n. 36.
The milk producers contributed large sums to the Nixon campaign “in
order to gain a meeting with White House officials on price supports.”
Ibid.

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vided “a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation.” Id., at 26.
We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000 limitation on ex-
penditures by observing that it broadly encompassed every
expenditure “ ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate.’ ”
Id., at 39 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)).
To avoid vagueness concerns we construed that phrase to
apply only to “communications that in express terms advo-
cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
for federal office.” 424 U. S., at 42–44. We concluded, how-
ever, that as so narrowed, the provision would not provide
effective protection against the dangers of quid pro quo ar-
rangements, because persons and groups could eschew ex-
penditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate while remaining “free to spend
as much as they want to promote the candidate and his
views.” Id., at 45. We also rejected the argument that the
expenditure limits were necessary to prevent attempts to
circumvent the Act’s contribution limits, because FECA al-
ready treated expenditures controlled by or coordinated with
the candidate as contributions, and we were not persuaded
that independent expenditures posed the same risk of real
or apparent corruption as coordinated expenditures. Id., at
46–47. We therefore held that Congress’ interest in pre-
venting real or apparent corruption was inadequate to jus-
tify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of expression and
association that the expenditure limits imposed.
We upheld all of the disclosure and reporting requirements
in the Act that were challenged on appeal to this Court after
finding that they vindicated three important interests: pro-
viding the electorate with relevant information about the
candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption
and discouraging the use of money for improper purposes;
and facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions in the Act.
Id., at 66–68. In order to avoid an overbreadth problem,
however, we placed the same narrowing construction on the

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122 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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term “expenditure” in the disclosure context that we had
adopted in the context of the expenditure limitations. Thus,
we construed the reporting requirement for persons making
expenditures of more than $100 in a year “to reach only funds
used for communications that expressly advocate the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id., at 80 (foot-
note omitted).
Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily
related to contributions and expenditures by individuals,
since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contri-
butions by corporations and labor unions. We noted, how-
ever, that the statute authorized the use of corporate and
union resources to form and administer segregated funds
that could be used for political purposes. Id., at 28–29, n. 31;
see also n. 3, supra.
Three important developments in the years after our deci-
sion in Buckley persuaded Congress that further legislation
was necessary to regulate the role that corporations, unions,
and wealthy contributors play in the electoral process. As
a preface to our discussion of the specific provisions of
BCRA, we comment briefly on the increased importance of
“soft money,” the proliferation of “issue ads,” and the dis-
turbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign
practices related to the 1996 federal elections.
Soft Money
Under FECA, “contributions” must be made with funds
that are subject to the Act’s disclosure requirements and
source and amount limitations. Such funds are known as
“federal” or “hard” money. FECA defines the term “con-
tribution,” however, to include only the gift or advance of
anything of value “made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U. S. C.
§ 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations made solely for
the purpose of influencing state or local elections are there-
fore unaffected by FECA’s requirements and prohibitions.

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As a result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law
permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals
who had already made the maximum permissible contri-
butions to federal candidates, to contribute “nonfederal
money”—also known as “soft money”—to political parties for
activities intended to influence state or local elections.
Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose con-
cerning the treatment of contributions intended to influence
both federal and state elections. Although a literal reading
of FECA’s definition of “contribution” would have required
such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled
that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities—
including get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertis-
ing—in part with soft money.7 In 1995 the FEC concluded
that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs
of “legislative advocacy media advertisements,” even if the
ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long as
7 In 1977 the FEC promulgated a rule allowing parties to allocate their
administrative expenses “on a reasonable basis” between accounts con-
taining funds raised in compliance with FECA and accounts containing
nonfederal funds, including corporate and union donations. 11 CFR
§ 102.6(a)(2). In advisory opinions issued in 1978 and 1979, the FEC al-
lowed parties similarly to allocate the costs of voter registration and get-
out-the-vote drives between federal and nonfederal accounts. FEC Advi-
sory Op. 1978–10; FEC Advisory Op. 1979–17. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
195–197 (per curiam).
In 1990 the FEC clarified the phrase “on a reasonable basis” by promul-
gating fixed allocation rates. 11 CFR § 106.5 (1991). The regulations re-
quired the Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic Na-
tional Committee (DNC) to pay for at least 60% of mixed-purpose
activities (65% in Presidential election years) with funds from their federal
accounts. § 106.5(b)(2). By contrast, the regulations required state and
local committees to allocate similar expenditures based on the ratio of
federal to nonfederal offices on the State’s ballot, § 106.5(d)(1), which in
practice meant that they could expend a substantially greater proportion
of soft money than national parties to fund mixed-purpose activities affect-
ing both federal and state elections. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 198–199
(per curiam).

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124 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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they did not expressly advocate the candidate’s election or
defeat. FEC Advisory Op. 1995–25.
As the permissible uses of soft money expanded, the
amount of soft money raised and spent by the national politi-
cal parties increased exponentially. Of the two major par-
ties’ total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 mil-
lion) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in
1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in
2000. 8 The national parties transferred large amounts of
their soft money to the state parties, which were allowed to
use a larger percentage of soft money to finance mixed-
purpose activities under FEC rules.9 In the year 2000, for
example, the national parties diverted $280 million—more
than half of their soft money—to state parties.
Many contributions of soft money were dramatically larger
than the contributions of hard money permitted by FECA.
For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money do-
nors gave, in total, more than $9 million in nonfederal funds
to the two national party committees.10 In the most re-
cent election cycle the political parties raised almost $300
million—60% of their total soft-money fundraising—from
just 800 donors, each of which contributed a minimum of
$120,000.11 Moreover, the largest corporate donors often
made substantial contributions to both parties.12 Such prac-
tices corroborate evidence indicating that many corporate
contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candi-
8 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 1, Tbl. 2 (report of Thomas E. Mann, Chair & Sr.
Fellow, Brookings Institution (hereinafter Mann Expert Report)); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 197–201 (per curiam).
9 Mann Expert Report 26; 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 441 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
10 Id., at 494 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
11 Mann Expert Report 24.
12 In the 2000 election cycle, 35 of the 50 largest soft-money donors gave
to both parties; 28 of the 50 gave more than $100,000 to both parties.
Mann Expert Report Tbl. 6; see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.); id., at 785, n. 77 (Leon, J.).

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dates and a fear of being placed at a disadvantage in the
legislative process relative to other contributors, rather than
by ideological support for the candidates and parties.13
Not only were such soft-money contributions often de-
signed to gain access to federal candidates, but they were in
many cases solicited by the candidates themselves. Candi-
dates often directed potential donors to party committees
and tax-exempt organizations that could legally accept soft
money. For example, a federal legislator running for reelec-
tion solicited soft money from a supporter by advising him
that even though he had already “ ‘contributed the legal max-
imum’ ” to the campaign committee, he could still make an
additional contribution to a joint program supporting fed-
eral, state, and local candidates of his party.14 Such solicita-
tions were not uncommon.15
13 A former chief executive officer of a large corporation explained:
“Business and labor leaders believe, based on their experience, that dis-
appointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them
because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if
they refuse to contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute
generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and influencing key
Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or union.”
App. 283, ¶ 9 (declaration of Gerald Greenwald, United Airlines (herein-
after Greenwald Decl.)).
Amici Curiae Committee for Economic Development and various busi-
ness leaders attest that corporate soft-money contributions are “coerced
and, at bottom, wholly commercial” in nature, and that “[b]usiness leaders
increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which they fear
the adverse consequences of refusing to fill the coffers of the major par-
ties.” Brief for Committee for Economic Development et al. as Amici
Curiae 28.
14 See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842 (Leon, J.).
15 See id., at 479–480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842–843 (Leon, J.). One
former party official explained to the District Court:
“ ‘Once you’ve helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to
his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for the candidate
by making donations of hard and/or soft money to the national party com-
mittees, the relevant state party (assuming it can accept corporate contri-

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The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus en-
abled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA’s limita-
tions on the source and amount of contributions in connection
with federal elections.
Issue Advertising
In Buckley we construed FECA’s disclosure and reporting
requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, “to
reach only funds used for communications that expressly ad-
vocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date.” 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted). As a result of
that strict reading of the statute, the use or omission of
“magic words” such as “Elect John Smith” or “Vote Against
Jane Doe” marked a bright statutory line separating “ex-
press advocacy” from “issue advocacy.” See id., at 44, n. 52.
Express advocacy was subject to FECA’s limitations and
could be financed only using hard money. The political par-
ties, in other words, could not use soft money to sponsor ads
that used any magic words, and corporations and unions
could not fund such ads out of their general treasuries. So-
called issue ads, on the other hand, not only could be financed
with soft money, but could be aired without disclosing the
identity of, or any other information about, their sponsors.
While the distinction between “issue” and express advo-
cacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of advertise-
ments proved functionally identical in important respects.
Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly
identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue
ads eschewed the use of magic words.16 Little difference
butions), or an outside group that is planning on doing an independent
expenditure or issue advertisement to help the candidate’s campaign.’ ”
Id., at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
16 Id., at 532–537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875–879 (Leon, J.). As the
former chair of one major advocacy organization’s PAC put it: “ ‘It is foolish
to believe there is any practical difference between issue advocacy and
advocacy of a political candidate. What separates issue advocacy and po-
litical advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day.’ ” Id., at
536–537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Tanya K. Metaksa, Opening Remarks

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existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to
“vote against Jane Doe” and one that condemned Jane Doe’s
record on a particular issue before exhorting viewers to “call
Jane Doe and tell her what you think.” 17 Indeed, campaign
professionals testified that the most effective campaign ads,
like the most effective commercials for products such as
Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic
words.18 Moreover, the conclusion that such ads were spe-
cifically intended to affect election results was confirmed
by the fact that almost all of them aired in the 60 days im-
mediately preceding a federal election.19 Corporations and
unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of their general
funds to pay for these ads,20 and those expenditures, like
at the American Assn. of Political Consultants Fifth General Session on
“Issue Advocacy,” Jan. 17, 1997, p. 2); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 878–879 (Leon,
J.) (same).
17 Id., at 304 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875–879 (Leon, J.).
18 It is undisputed that very few ads—whether run by candidates, par-
ties, or interest groups—used words of express advocacy. Id., at 303
(Henderson, J.); id., at 529 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 874 (Leon, J.). In the
1998 election cycle, just 4% of candidate advertisements used magic words;
in 2000, that number was a mere 5%. App. 1334 (report of Jonathan S.
Krasno, Yale University, & Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota,
pp. 53–54 (hereinafter Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); see 1 Defs. Exhs.,
Tab 2, pp. 53–54).
19 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 564, and n. 96 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing report of
Kenneth M. Goldstein, University of Wisconsin-Madison, App. A, Tbl. 16;
see 3–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 7); Tr. of Oral Arg. 202–203; see also 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.).
20 The spending on electioneering communications climbed dramatically
during the last decade. In the 1996 election cycle, $135 to $150 million
was spent on multiple broadcasts of about 100 ads. In the next cycle
(1997–1998), 77 organizations aired 423 ads at a total cost between $270
and $340 million. By the 2000 election, 130 groups spent over an esti-
mated $500 million on more than 1,100 different ads. Two out of every
three dollars spent on issue ads in the 2000 cycle were attributable to the
two major parties and six major interest groups. Id., at 303–304 (Hender-
son, J.) (citing Annenberg Public Policy Center, Issue Advertising in the
1999–2000 Election Cycle 1–15 (2001) (hereinafter Annenberg Report); see

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128 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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soft-money donations to the political parties, were unregu-
lated under FECA. Indeed, the ads were attractive to or-
ganizations and candidates precisely because they were be-
yond FECA’s reach, enabling candidates and their parties to
work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-
called issue ads when the candidates themselves were run-
ning out of money.21
Because FECA’s disclosure requirements did not apply to
so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used mislead-
ing names to conceal their identity. “Citizens for Better
Medicare,” for instance, was not a grassroots organization of
citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a plat-
form for an association of drug manufacturers.22 And “Re-
publicans for Clean Air,” which ran ads in the 2000 Repub-
lican Presidential primary, was actually an organization
consisting of just two individuals—brothers who together
spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored candidate.23
While the public may not have been fully informed about
the sponsorship of so-called issue ads, the record indi-
38 Defs. Exhs., Tab 22); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same);
id., at 879 (Leon, J.) (same).
21 Id., at 540 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing internal AFL–CIO Memorandum
from Brian Weeks to Mike Klein, Electronic Buy for Illinois Senator (Oct.
9, 1996), AFL–CIO 005244); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 886 (Leon, J.) (same).
22 The association was known as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manu-
facturers of America (PhRMA). Id., at 232 (per curiam).
23 Id., at 232–233. Other examples of mysterious groups included “Vot-
ers for Campaign Truth,” “Aretino Industries,” “Montanans for Common
Sense Mining Laws,” “American Seniors, Inc.,” “American Family Voices,”
App. 1355 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report 71–77), and the “Coalition to
Make our Voices Heard,” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 538 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Some
of the actors behind these groups frankly acknowledged that “ ‘in some
places it’s much more effective to run an ad by the “Coalition to Make Our
Voices Heard” than it is to say paid for by “the men and women of the
AFL–CIO.” ’ ” Ibid. (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting report of David B. Ma-
gleby, Brigham Young University 18–19 (hereinafter Magleby Expert Re-
port), App. 1484–1485).

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cates that candidates and officeholders often were. A for-
mer Senator confirmed that candidates and officials knew
who their friends were and “ ‘sometimes suggest[ed] that cor-
porations or individuals make donations to interest groups
that run “issue ads.” ’ ” 24 As with soft-money contributions,
political parties and candidates used the availability of so-
called issue ads to circumvent FECA’s limitations, asking do-
nors who contributed their permitted quota of hard money
to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on “issue”
advocacy.25
Senate Committee Investigation
In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
issued a six-volume report summarizing the results of an ex-
tensive investigation into the campaign practices in the 1996
federal elections. The report gave particular attention to
the effect of soft money on the American political system,
including elected officials’ practice of granting special access
in return for political contributions.
The committee’s principal findings relating to Democratic
Party fundraising were set forth in the majority’s report,
while the minority report primarily described Republican
practices. The two reports reached consensus, however, on
certain central propositions. They agreed that the “soft
money loophole” had led to a “meltdown” of the campaign
finance system that had been intended “to keep corporate,
union and large individual contributions from influencing the
electoral process.” 26 One Senator stated that “the hearings
provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of
soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually de-
24 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 518–519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
25 Id., at 478–479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declaration of Robert Hick-
mott, Senior V. P., Smith-Free Group ¶ 8 (hereinafter Hickmott Decl.); see
6–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 19, ¶ 8).
26 S. Rep. No. 105–167, vol. 4, p. 4611 (1998) (hereinafter 1998 Senate
Report); 5 id., at 7515.

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130 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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stroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little
more than a pile of legal rubble.” 27
The report was critical of both parties’ methods of raising
soft money, as well as their use of those funds. It concluded
that both parties promised and provided special access to
candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for
large soft-money contributions. The committee majority
described the White House coffees that rewarded major do-
nors with access to President Clinton,28 and the courtesies
extended to an international businessman named Roger
Tamraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of
about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were moti-
vated by his interest in gaining the Federal Government’s
support for an oil-line project in the Caucasus.29 The minor-
ity described the promotional materials used by the RNC’s
two principal donor programs, “Team 100” and the “Republi-
can Eagles,” which promised “special access to high-ranking
Republican elected officials, including governors, senators,
and representatives.” 30 One fundraising letter recited that
the chairman of the RNC had personally escorted a donor on
27 3 id., at 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins).
28 1 id., at 41–42, 195–200. The report included a memorandum written
by the DNC finance chairman suggesting the use of White House coffees
and “overnights” to give major donors “quality time” with the President,
and noted that the guests accounted for $26.4 million in contributions.
Id., at 194, 196.
29 2 id., at 2913–2914, 2921. Despite concerns about Tamraz’s back-
ground and a possible conflict with United States foreign policy interests,
he was invited to six events attended by the President. Id., at 2920–2921.
Similarly, the minority noted that in exchange for Michael Kojima’s contri-
bution of $500,000 to the 1992 President’s Dinner, he and his wife had been
placed at the head table with President and Mrs. Bush. Moreover, Ko-
jima received several additional meetings with the President, other admin-
istration officials, and United States embassy officials. 4 id., at 5418,
5422, 5428.
30 The former requires an initial contribution of $100,000, and $25,000 for
each of the next three years; the latter requires annual contributions of
$15,000. 5 id., at 7968.

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appointments that “ ‘turned out to be very significant in the
legislation affecting public utility holding companies’ ” and
made the donor “ ‘a hero in his industry.’ ” 31
In 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft
money to pay for issue advertising designed to influence fed-
eral elections. The committee found such ads highly prob-
lematic for two reasons. Since they accomplished the same
purposes as express advocacy (which could lawfully be
funded only with hard money), the ads enabled unions, corpo-
rations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections
that FECA was intended to provide. Moreover, though os-
tensibly independent of the candidates, the ads were often
actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns.32
The ads thus provided a means for evading FECA’s candi-
date contribution limits.
The report also emphasized the role of state and local par-
ties. While the FEC’s allocation regime permitted national
parties to use soft money to pay for up to 40% of the costs
of both generic voter activities and issue advertising, they
allowed state and local parties to use larger percentages of
soft money for those purposes.33 For that reason, national
parties often made substantial transfers of soft money to
“state and local political parties for ‘generic voter activities’
that in fact ultimately benefit[ed] federal candidates because
the funds for all practical purposes remain[ed] under the con-
trol of the national committees.” The report concluded that
“[t]he use of such soft money thus allow[ed] more corporate,
union treasury, and large contributions from wealthy individ-
uals into the system.” 34
The report discussed potential reforms, including a ban on
soft money at the national and state party levels and restric-
31 Id., at 7971.
32 1 id., at 49; 3 id., at 3997–4006.
33 Id., at 4466.
34 Ibid.

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132 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.35 The
majority expressed the view that a ban on the raising of
soft money by national party committees would effectively
address the use of union and corporate general treasury
funds in the federal political process only if it required that
candidate-specific ads be funded with hard money.36 The mi-
nority similarly recommended the elimination of soft-money
contributions to political parties from individuals, corpora-
tions, and unions, as well as “reforms addressing candidate
advertisements masquerading as issue ads.” 37
II
In BCRA, Congress enacted many of the committee’s pro-
posed reforms. BCRA’s central provisions are designed to
address Congress’ concerns about the increasing use of soft
money and issue advertising to influence federal elections.
Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties,
officeholders, and candidates. Title II primarily prohibits
corporations and labor unions from using general treasury
funds for communications that are intended to, or have the
effect of, influencing the outcome of federal elections.
Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules for actions
challenging the constitutionality of any of the Act’s provi-
sions. 2 U. S. C. § 437h note (Supp. II). Eleven such ac-
tions were filed promptly after the statute went into effect
in March 2002. As required by § 403, those actions were
filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and
heard by a three-judge court. Section 403 directed the Dis-
trict Court to advance the cases on the docket and to expe-
dite their disposition “to the greatest possible extent.” The
court received a voluminous record compiled by the parties
and ultimately delivered a decision embodied in a two-judge
per curiam opinion and three separate, lengthy opinions,
35 Id., at 4468–4470, 4480–4481, 4491–4494.
36 Id., at 4492.
37 6 id., at 9394.

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each of which contained extensive commentary on the facts
and a careful analysis of the legal issues. 251 F. Supp. 2d
176 (2003). The three judges reached unanimity on certain
issues but differed on many. Their judgment, entered on
May 1, 2003, held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and
upheld others. 251 F. Supp. 2d 948.
As authorized by § 403, all of the losing parties filed direct
appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 U. S. C. § 437h
note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probable jurisdiction and
ordered the parties to comply with an expedited briefing
schedule and present their oral arguments at a special hear-
ing on September 8, 2003. 539 U. S. 911. To simplify the
presentation, we directed the parties challenging provisions
of BCRA to proceed first on all issues, whether or not they
prevailed on any issue in the District Court. Ibid. Mindful
of § 403’s instruction that we expedite our disposition of
these appeals to the greatest extent possible, we also con-
sider each of the issues in order. Accordingly, we first turn
our attention to Title I of BCRA.
III
Title I is Congress’ effort to plug the soft-money loophole.
The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA § 323(a), which
prohibits national party committees and their agents from
soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money.
2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) (Supp. II).38 In short, § 323(a) takes na-
tional parties out of the soft-money business.
The remaining provisions of new FECA § 323 largely re-
inforce the restrictions in § 323(a). New FECA § 323(b)
prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from
38 The national party committees of the two major political parties are:
the RNC; the DNC; the National Republican Senatorial Committee
(NRSC); the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC); the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC); and the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

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134 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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national to state party committees by prohibiting state and
local party committees from using such funds for activ-
ities that affect federal elections. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(b).
These “Federal election activit[ies],” defined in new FECA
§ 301(20)(A), are almost identical to the mixed-purpose activ-
ities that have long been regulated under the FEC’s pre-
BCRA allocation regime. 2 U. S. C. § 431(20)(A). New
FECA § 323(d) reinforces these soft-money restrictions by
prohibiting political parties from soliciting and donating
funds to tax-exempt organizations that engage in elec-
tioneering activities. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d). New FECA
§ 323(e) restricts federal candidates and officeholders from
receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection
with federal elections and limits their ability to do so in con-
nection with state and local elections. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e).
Finally, new FECA § 323(f) prevents circumvention of the
restrictions on national, state, and local party committees
by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and
spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public
communications that promote or attack federal candidates.
2 U. S. C. § 441i(f).
Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment challenge to
new FECA § 323, as well as challenges based on the Elec-
tions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, principles of federalism,
and the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause. We address these challenges in turn.
A
In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected re-
strictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than
limits on campaign contributions. See, e. g., Federal Elec-
tion Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 161 (2003); see also
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377,
387–388 (2000); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 19. In these cases we
have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on ex-
penditures, “entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the

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contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Id.,
at 20; see also, e. g., Beaumont, supra, at 161; Shrink Mis-
souri, supra, at 386–388. In Buckley we said:
“A contribution serves as a general expression of sup-
port for the candidate and his views, but does not com-
municate the underlying basis for the support. The
quantity of communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution,
since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the
contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity
of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limita-
tion on the amount of money a person may give to a
candidate or campaign organization thus involves little
direct restraint on his political communication, for it per-
mits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by
a contribution but does not in any way infringe the
contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
While contributions may result in political expression if
spent by a candidate or an association to present views
to the voters, the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor.” 424 U. S., at 21 (footnote omitted).
Because the communicative value of large contributions in-
heres mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their
recipients, we have said that contribution limits impose seri-
ous burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to “pre-
ven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the
resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Ibid.
We have recognized that contribution limits may bear
“more heavily on the associational right than on freedom to
speak,” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 388, since contributions
serve “to affiliate a person with a candidate” and “enabl[e]
like-minded persons to pool their resources,” Buckley, 424
U. S., at 22. Unlike expenditure limits, however, which

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136 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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“preclud[e] most associations from effectively amplifying the
voice of their adherents,” contribution limits both “leave the
contributor free to become a member of any political associa-
tion and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on
behalf of candidates,” and allow associations “to aggregate
large sums of money to promote effective advocacy.” Ibid.
The “overall effect” of dollar limits on contributions is
“merely to require candidates and political committees to
raise funds from a greater number of persons.” Id., at 21–
22. Thus, a contribution limit involving even “ ‘significant
interference’ ” with associational rights is nevertheless valid
if it satisfies the “lesser demand” of being “ ‘closely drawn’ ”
to match a “ ‘sufficiently important interest.’ ” Beaumont,
supra, at 162 (quoting Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387–388).39
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more
than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment
freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests
that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing
“both the actual corruption threatened by large financial con-
tributions and the eroding of public confidence in the elec-
toral process through the appearance of corruption.” Na-
tional Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208; see also Federal
Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 440–441 (2001) (Colorado II).
We have said that these interests directly implicate “ ‘the
integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsi-
bility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning
39 Justice Kennedy accuses us of engaging in a sleight of hand by
conflating “unseemly corporate speech” with the speech of political parties
and candidates, and then adverting to the “corporate speech rationale as
if it were the linchpin of the case.” Post, at 290–291 (opinion concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The prin-
ciples set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are the same
principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny that regulations of con-
tributions to candidates, parties, and political committees are subject to
less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on speech—including “un-
seemly corporate speech.”

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of that process.’ ” National Right to Work, supra, at 208
(quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 570). Because
the electoral process is the very “means through which a free
society democratically translates political speech into con-
crete governmental action,” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at
401 (Breyer, J., concurring), contribution limits, like other
measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process,
tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For
that reason, when reviewing Congress’ decision to enact con-
tribution limits, “there is no place for a strong presumption
against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accom-
pany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’ ” Id., at 400 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). The less rigorous standard of review we have
applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s “closely drawn”
scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’ ability to
weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which
it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress
with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns
about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the
integrity of the political process.
Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has
given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dis-
senting colleagues. See, e. g., Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at
405–410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id., at 410–420 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 635–644
(1996) (Colorado I) (Thomas, J., dissenting). We have re-
jected such criticism in previous cases for the reasons identi-
fied above. We are also mindful of the fact that in its
lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of BCRA,
Congress properly relied on the recognition of its authority
contained in Buckley and its progeny. Considerations of
stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative
and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide additional
powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution
limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley

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was decided. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rail-
ways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991).40
Like the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, § 323’s
restrictions have only a marginal impact on the ability of
contributors, candidates, officeholders, and parties to engage
in effective political speech. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161.
Complex as its provisions may be, § 323, in the main, does
little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals,
corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money
to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and fed-
eral officeholders.
Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict scrutiny to
§ 323 because many of its provisions restrict not only contri-
butions but also the spending and solicitation of funds raised
outside of FECA’s contribution limits. But for purposes of
determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrelevant that Con-
gress chose in § 323 to regulate contributions on the demand
rather than the supply side. See, e. g., National Right to
Work, supra, at 206–211 (upholding a provision restrict-
ing PACs’ ability to solicit funds). The relevant inquiry is
whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribu-
40 Since our decision in Buckley, we have consistently applied less rigor-
ous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption. See, e. g., 424 U. S., at 23–36
(applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $1,000 limit on individual con-
tributions to a candidate and FECA’s $5,000 limit on PAC contributions to
a candidate); id., at 38 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $25,000
aggregate yearly limit on contributions to candidates, political party com-
mittees, and political committees); California Medical Assn. v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 195–196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (apply-
ing less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $5,000 limit on contributions to multi-
candidate political committees); National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at
208–211 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to antisolicitation provision
buttressing an otherwise valid contribution limit); Colorado II, 533 U. S.
431, 456 (2001) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordi-
nated with a candidate); Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S.
146, 161–162 (2003) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to provisions intended
to prevent circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits).

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tion limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens
speech in a way that a direct restriction on the contribution
itself would not. That is not the case here.
For example, while § 323(a) prohibits national parties from
receiving or spending nonfederal money, and § 323(b) prohib-
its state party committees from spending nonfederal money
on federal election activities, neither provision in any way
limits the total amount of money parties can spend. 2
U. S. C. §§ 441i(a), (b) (Supp. II). Rather, they simply limit
the source and individual amount of donations. That they
do so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not
render them expenditure limitations.41
Similarly, the solicitation provisions of §§ 323(a) and 323(e),
which restrict the ability of national party committees, fed-
eral candidates, and federal officeholders to solicit nonfederal
funds, leave open ample opportunities for soliciting federal
funds on behalf of entities subject to FECA’s source and
amount restrictions. Even § 323(d), which on its face enacts
a blanket ban on party solicitations of funds to certain tax-
exempt organizations, nevertheless allows parties to solicit
funds to the organizations’ federal PACs. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(d). As for those organizations that cannot or do not
administer PACs, parties remain free to donate federal funds
directly to such organizations, and may solicit funds ex-
pressly for that purpose. See infra, at 180–181 (construing
§ 323(d)’s restriction on donations by parties to apply only to
donations from a party committee’s nonfederal or soft-money
account). And as with § 323(a), § 323(d) places no limits on
other means of endorsing tax-exempt organizations or any
restrictions on solicitations by party officers acting in their
individual capacities. 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(a), (d).
Section 323 thus shows “due regard for the reality that
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative
41 Indeed, Congress structured § 323(b) in such a way as to free individ-
ual, corporate, and union donations to state committees for nonfederal
elections from federal source and amount restrictions.

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and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particu-
lar causes or for particular views.” Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980). The
fact that party committees and federal candidates and of-
ficeholders must now ask only for limited dollar amounts
or request that a corporation or union contribute money
through its PAC in no way alters or impairs the political
message “intertwined” with the solicitation. Cf. Riley v.
National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781,
795 (1988) (treating solicitation restriction that required
fundraisers to disclose particular information as a content-
based regulation subject to strict scrutiny because it “neces-
sarily alter[ed] the content of the speech”). And rather than
chill such solicitations, as was the case in Schaumburg, the
restriction here tends to increase the dissemination of infor-
mation by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to
solicit from a wider array of potential donors. As with di-
rect limits on contributions, therefore, § 323’s spending and
solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on polit-
ical speech.42
42 Justice Kennedy’s contention that less rigorous scrutiny applies
only to regulations burdening political association, rather than political
speech, misreads Buckley. In Buckley, we recognized that contribution
limits burden both protected speech and association, though they gener-
ally have more significant impacts on the latter. 424 U. S., at 20–22. We
nevertheless applied less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s contribution limits
because neither burden was sufficiently weighty to overcome Congress’
countervailing interest in protecting the integrity of the political process.
See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 388 (2000)
(“While we did not [in Buckley] attempt to parse [the] distinctions be-
tween the speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution
limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions bore more heavily on
the associational right than on [the] freedom to speak. We consequently
proceeded on the understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a
claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as
well, and we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under
review” (citation omitted)). It is thus simply untrue in the campaign fi-
nance context that all “burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny re-
view.” Post, at 312.

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Finally, plaintiffs contend that the type of associational
burdens that § 323 imposes are fundamentally different from
the burdens that accompanied Buckley’s contribution limits,
and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have applied to at-
tempts to regulate the internal processes of political parties.
E. g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567,
573–574 (2000). In making this argument, plaintiffs greatly
exaggerate the effect of § 323, contending that it precludes
any collaboration among national, state, and local commit-
tees of the same party in fundraising and electioneering ac-
tivities. We do not read the provisions in that way. See
infra, at 161. Section 323 merely subjects a greater per-
centage of contributions to parties and candidates to FECA’s
source and amount limitations. Buckley has already ac-
knowledged that such limitations “leave the contributor free
to become a member of any political association and to assist
personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candi-
dates.” 424 U. S., at 22. The modest impact that § 323 has
on the ability of committees within a party to associate with
each other does not independently occasion strict scrutiny.
None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational bur-
dens imposed on parties by § 323 have no place in the First
Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for them in
the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate
level of scrutiny.43
With these principles in mind, we apply the less rigorous
scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to evaluate the
constitutionality of new FECA § 323. Because the five
43 Justice Kennedy is no doubt correct that the associational burdens
imposed by a particular piece of campaign-finance regulation may at times
be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny. Post, at 311. In light of our
interpretation of § 323(a), however, see infra, at 161, § 323 does not present
such a case. As Justice Kennedy himself acknowledges, even “signifi-
cant interference” with “protected rights of association” are subject to
less rigorous scrutiny. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 162; see post, at 311.
There is thus nothing inconsistent in our decision to account for the partic-
ular associational burdens imposed by § 323(a) when applying the appro-
priate level of scrutiny.

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challenged provisions of § 323 implicate different First
Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are
mindful, however, that Congress enacted § 323 as an in-
tegrated whole to vindicate the Government’s important
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption.
New FECA § 323(a)’s Restrictions on National
Party Committees
The core of Title I is new FECA § 323(a), which provides
that “national committee[s] of a political party . . . may not
solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution,
donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value,
or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations,
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.” 2
U. S. C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II). The prohibition extends to
“any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national
committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly estab-
lished, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national
committee.” § 441i(a)(2).
The main goal of § 323(a) is modest. In large part, it sim-
ply effects a return to the scheme that was approved in
Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC’s
allocation regime, which permitted the political parties to
fund federal electioneering efforts with a combination of
hard and soft money. See supra, at 123–125, and n. 7.
Under that allocation regime, national parties were able to
use vast amounts of soft money in their efforts to elect fed-
eral candidates. Consequently, as long as they directed the
money to the political parties, donors could contribute large
amounts of soft money for use in activities designed to influ-
ence federal elections.44 New § 323(a) is designed to put a
stop to that practice.
44 The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money spending on fed-
eral electioneering was accompanied by a series of efforts in Congress to
clamp down on such uses of soft money (culminating, of course, in BCRA)

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1. Governmental Interests Underlying New
FECA § 323(a)
The Government defends § 323(a)’s ban on national parties’
involvement with soft money as necessary to prevent the
actual and apparent corruption of federal candidates and of-
ficeholders. Our cases have made clear that the prevention
of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently im-
portant interest to justify political contribution limits. We
have not limited that interest to the elimination of cash-for-
votes exchanges. In Buckley, we expressly rejected the ar-
gument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive al-
ternative to FECA’s contribution limits, noting that such
laws “deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts
of those with money to influence governmental action.” 424
U. S., at 28. Thus, “[i]n speaking of ‘improper influence’ and
‘opportunities for abuse’ in addition to ‘quid pro quo arrange-
ments,’ we [have] recognized a concern not confined to brib-
ery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large con-
tributors.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389; see also Col-
orado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (acknowledging that corruption
extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes agreements to “undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment”).
Of “almost equal” importance has been the Government’s
interest in combating the appearance or perception of
corruption engendered by large campaign contributions.
underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than Con-
gress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. See J. Cantor, Congres-
sional Research Service Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legisla-
tion in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bills seeking to limit the influence of
soft money introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign
Finance Legislation in the 102d Congress (1991) (10 such bills intro-
duced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legisla-
tion in the 103d Congress (1993) (16 bills); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Con-
gress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 104th Congress (1996) (18
bills); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 201–206 (per curiam) (discussing legisla-
tive efforts to curb soft money in 105th and subsequent Congresses).

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Buckley, supra, at 27; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at
390; Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Po-
litical Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 496–497 (1985). Take
away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of
undue influence and “the cynical assumption that large do-
nors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters
to take part in democratic governance.” Shrink Missouri,
528 U. S., at 390; see also id., at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
And because the First Amendment does not require Con-
gress to ignore the fact that “candidates, donors, and par-
ties test the limits of the current law,” Colorado II, 533
U. S., at 457, these interests have been sufficient to justify
not only contribution limits themselves, but laws preventing
the circumvention of such limits, id., at 456 (“[A]ll Members
of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of
corruption”).
“The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will
vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the jus-
tification raised.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 391. The
idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt
or, at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of
federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor im-
plausible. For nearly 30 years, FECA has placed strict dol-
lar limits and source restrictions on contributions that indi-
viduals and other entities can give to national, state, and
local party committees for the purpose of influencing a fed-
eral election. The premise behind these restrictions has
been, and continues to be, that contributions to a federal can-
didate’s party in aid of that candidate’s campaign threaten
to create—no less than would a direct contribution to the
candidate—a sense of obligation. See Buckley, supra, at 38
(upholding FECA’s $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contri-
butions to a candidate, political committee, and political
party committee as a “quite modest restraint . . . to prevent
evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation” by, among

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other things, “huge contributions to the candidate’s political
party”). This is particularly true of contributions to na-
tional parties, with which federal candidates and officehold-
ers enjoy a special relationship and unity of interest. This
close affiliation has placed national parties in a unique posi-
tion, “whether they like it or not,” to serve as “agents for
spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated
officeholders.” Colorado II, supra, at 452; see also Shrink
Missouri, supra, at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[Re-
spondent] asks us to evaluate his speech claim in the context
of a system which favors candidates and officeholders whose
campaigns are supported by soft money, usually funneled
through political parties” (emphasis added)). As discussed
below, rather than resist that role, the national parties have
actively embraced it.
The question for present purposes is whether large soft-
money contributions to national party committees have a cor-
rupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption.
Both common sense and the ample record in these cases con-
firm Congress’ belief that they do. As set forth above,
supra, at 123–125, and n. 7, the FEC’s allocation regime
has invited widespread circumvention of FECA’s limits on
contributions to parties for the purpose of influencing federal
elections. Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy
individual donors have been free to contribute substantial
sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties
can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular
candidate’s federal election. It is not only plausible, but
likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations
and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.45
45 Justice Kennedy contends that the plurality’s observation in Colo-
rado I that large soft-money donations to a political party pose little threat
of corruption “establish[es] that” such contributions are not corrupting.
Post, at 301 (citing Colorado I, 518 U. S. 604, 616, 617–618 (1996)). The
cited dictum has no bearing on the present cases. Colorado I addressed
an entirely different question—namely, whether Congress could permissi-

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146 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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The evidence in the record shows that candidates and do-
nors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the
former to increase their prospects of election and the latter
to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national
parties serving as willing intermediaries. Thus, despite
FECA’s hard-money limits on direct contributions to candi-
dates, federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to
make soft-money donations to national and state committees
“ ‘solely in order to assist federal campaigns,’ ” including the
officeholder’s own. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.) (quoting declaration of Wade Randlett, CEO, Dashboard
Technology ¶¶ 6–9 (hereinafter Randlett Decl.), App. 713–
714); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 471–473, 478–479 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.); id., at 842–843 (Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of
the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and
“the amount of money a Member of Congress raise[d] for
the national political party committees often affect[ed] the
amount the committees g[a]ve to assist the Member’s cam-
paign.” Id., at 474–475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors often
asked that their contributions be credited to particular candi-
dates, and the parties obliged, irrespective of whether the
funds were hard or soft. Id., at 477–478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.);
id., at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party committees often
teamed with individual candidates’ campaign committees to
create joint fundraising committees, which enabled the candi-
dates to take advantage of the party’s higher contribution
limits while still allowing donors to give to their preferred
candidate. Id., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 847–848
(Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Re-
port (characterizing the joint fundraising committee as one
bly limit a party’s independent expenditures—and did so on an entirely
different set of facts. It also had before it an evidentiary record frozen
in 1990—well before the soft-money explosion of the 1990’s. See Federal
Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839
F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 1993).

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“in which Senate candidates in effect rais[e] soft money for
use in their own races”)). Even when not participating di-
rectly in the fundraising, federal officeholders were well
aware of the identities of the donors: National party commit-
tees would distribute lists of potential or actual donors, or
donors themselves would report their generosity to office-
holders. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 487–488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(“[F]or a Member not to know the identities of these donors,
he or she must actively avoid such knowledge as it is pro-
vided by the national political parties and the donors them-
selves”); id., at 853–855 (Leon, J.).
For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals
alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums
of soft money to national committees not on ideological
grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence
over federal officials. For example, a former lobbyist and
partner at a lobbying firm in Washington, D. C., stated in
his declaration:
“ ‘You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large
[soft money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordi-
narily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do
a bigger favor for someone—that is, write a larger
check—and they feel even more compelled to recipro-
cate. In my experience, overt words are rarely ex-
changed about contributions, but people do have under-
standings.’ ” Id., at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting
declaration of Robert Rozen, partner, Ernst & Young
¶ 14; see 8–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 33).46
46 Other business leaders agreed. For example, the chairman of the
board and CEO of a major toy company explained:
“ ‘Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a cost
of doing business . . . . I remain convinced that in some of the more
publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear to have sold them-
selves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money,
because of the potential importance of their decisions to the affected busi-

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Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more
than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial
sums to both major national parties, leaving room for no
other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influ-
ence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any par-
ticular ideology. See, e. g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 508–510
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert Report Tbls. 5–6);
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (“ ‘Giving soft money to both parties,
the Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense at all
unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access’ ” (quot-
ing declaration of former Sen. Dale Bumpers ¶ 15, App.
175)).47
ness.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of
Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., ¶ 16; see 6–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 17).
Similarly, the chairman emeritus of a major airline opined:
“ ‘Though a soft money check might be made out to a political party, labor
and business leaders know that those checks open the doors to the offices
of individual and important Members of Congress and the Administra-
tion . . . . Labor and business leaders believe—based on experience and
with good reason—that such access gives them an opportunity to shape
and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives
from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties.’ ”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 498 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶ 12,
App. 283–284); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858–859 (Leon, J.) (same).
47 Even more troubling is evidence in the record showing that national
parties have actively exploited the belief that contributions purchase in-
fluence or protection to pressure donors into making contributions. As
one CEO explained:
“ ‘[I]f you’re giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows.
For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only
one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have
staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests
before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side
noticed. They’ll get a message that basically asks: “Are you sure you
want to be giving only to one side? Don’t you want to have friends on
both sides of the aisle?” If your interests are subject to anger from the
other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if
you don’t give. . . . [D]uring the 1990’s, it became more and more acceptable
to call someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also

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The evidence from the federal officeholders’ perspective
is similar. For example, one former Senator described the
influence purchased by nonfederal donations as follows:
“ ‘Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is right
or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising.
Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 do-
nation does not alter the way one thinks about—and
quite possibly votes on—an issue? . . . When you don’t
pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will
never get any more money from that piper. Since
money is the mother’s milk of politics, you never want
to be in that situation.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen.
Alan Simpson ¶ 10 (hereinafter Simpson Decl.), App.
811); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 851 (Leon, J.) (same).
See also id., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘The majority of
those who contribute to political parties do so for business
reasons, to gain access to influential Members of Congress
and to get to know new Members’ ” (quoting Hickmott Decl.,
Exh. A, ¶ 46)). By bringing soft-money donors and federal
candidates and officeholders together, “[p]arties are thus nec-
essarily the instruments of some contributors whose object
is not to support the party’s message or to elect party candi-
dates across the board, but rather to support a specific candi-
date for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even
to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contribu-
tors.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 451–452.
Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an in-
stance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched
a vote (or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where
the public believes a vote was switched), Congress has not
shown that there exists real or apparent corruption. But
give to you or the person’s opponent.’ ” Id., at 510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(quoting Randlett Decl. ¶ 12, App. 715); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 868 (Leon,
J.) (same).

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the record is to the contrary. The evidence connects soft
money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading
to Congress’ failure to enact, among other things, generic
drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation. See,
e. g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 852
(Leon, J.); App. 390–394 (declaration of Sen. John McCain
¶¶ 5, 8–11 (hereinafter McCain Decl.)); App. 811 (Simpson
Decl. ¶ 10) (“Donations from the tobacco industry to Republi-
cans scuttled tobacco legislation, just as contributions from
the trial lawyers to Democrats stopped tort reform”); App.
805 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon ¶¶ 13–14). To
claim that such actions do not change legislative outcomes
surely misunderstands the legislative process.
More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too nar-
rowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ le-
gitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-
for-votes corruption to curbing “undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influ-
ence.” Colorado II, supra, at 441. Many of the “deeply
disturbing examples” of corruption cited by this Court in
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27, to justify FECA’s contribution lim-
its were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that vari-
ous corporate interests had given substantial donations to
gain access to high-level government officials. See Buckley,
519 F. 2d, at 839–840, n. 36; nn. 5–6, supra. Even if that
access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the
“appearance of such influence.” Colorado II, supra, at 441;
see also 519 F. 2d, at 838.
The record in the present cases is replete with similar
examples of national party committees peddling access to
federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large
soft-money donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 492–506
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). As one former Senator put it:
“ ‘Special interests who give large amounts of soft
money to political parties do in fact achieve their objec-
tives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators

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and House Members have limited amounts of time, but
they make time available in their schedules to meet with
representatives of business and unions and wealthy indi-
viduals who gave large sums to their parties. These
are not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of democ-
racy. . . . Senators are pressed by their benefactors to
introduce legislation, to amend legislation, to block legis-
lation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way.’ ” Id.,
at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former
Sen. Warren Rudman ¶ 7 (hereinafter Rudman Decl.),
App. 742); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858 (Leon, J.) (same).
So pervasive is this practice that the six national party com-
mittees actually furnish their own menus of opportunities for
access to would-be soft-money donors, with increased prices
reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the
DCCC offers a range of donor options, starting with the
$10,000-per-year Business Forum program, and going up
to the $100,000-per-year National Finance Board program.
The latter entitles the donor to bimonthly conference calls
with the Democratic House leadership and chair of the
DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC fundraising
events, two private dinners with the Democratic House lead-
ership and ranking Members, and two retreats with the
Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride, Col-
orado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts. Id., at 504–505
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); see also id., at 506 (describing records
indicating that DNC offered meetings with President in re-
turn for large donations); id., at 502–503 (describing RNC’s
various donor programs); id., at 503–504 (same for NRSC);
id., at 500–503 (same for DSCC); id., at 504 (same for NRCC).
Similarly, “the RNC’s donor programs offer greater access
to federal office holders as the donations grow larger, with
the highest level and most personal access offered to the
largest soft money donors.” Id., at 500–503 (finding, fur-
ther, that the RNC holds out the prospect of access to of-
ficeholders to attract soft-money donations and encourages

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officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors); accord,
id., at 860–861 (Leon, J.).
Despite this evidence and the close ties that candidates
and officeholders have with their parties, Justice Kennedy
would limit Congress’ regulatory interest only to the pre-
vention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption
“inherent in” contributions made directly to, contributions
made at the express behest of, and expenditures made in
coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Post,
at 292, 298. Regulation of any other donation or expendi-
ture—regardless of its size, the recipient’s relationship to the
candidate or officeholder, its potential impact on a candidate’s
election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed and ex-
plicit intent to purchase influence—would, according to Jus-
tice Kennedy, simply be out of bounds. This crabbed view
of corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corrup-
tion, ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of
political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.48
48 In addition to finding no support in our recent cases, see, e. g., Colo-
rado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (defining corruption more broadly than quid pro
quo arrangements); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389 (same), Justice
Kennedy’s contention that Buckley limits Congress to regulating contri-
butions to a candidate ignores Buckley itself. There, we upheld FECA’s
$25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contributions to candidates, political
committees, and party committees out of recognition that FECA’s $1,000
limit on candidate contributions would be meaningless if individuals could
instead make “huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.” 424
U. S., at 38. Likewise, in California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981), we upheld FECA’s $5,000 limit on contribu-
tions to multicandidate political committees. It is no answer to say that
such limits were justified as a means of preventing individuals from using
parties and political committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA’s
$1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates. Given FECA’s
definition of “contribution,” the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted not
only the source and amount of funds available to parties and political com-
mittees to make candidate contributions, but also the source and amount
of funds available to engage in express advocacy and numerous other non-
coordinated expenditures. If indeed the First Amendment prohibited
Congress from regulating contributions to fund the latter, the otherwise-
easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as pass-throughs (e. g., a strict limit

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Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the First Amend-
ment would render Congress powerless to address more sub-
tle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as trou-
bling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo
corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues
not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but
according to the wishes of those who have made large finan-
cial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it oc-
curs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence
is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transac-
tions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical
to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to identify
and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth
above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting
evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates
that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with
them just such temptation.
Justice Kennedy likewise takes too narrow a view of
the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those
transactions with “inherent corruption potential,” which he
again limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify
the inference “that regulating the conduct will stem the ap-
pearance of real corruption.” Post, at 297–298.49 In our
view, however, Congress is not required to ignore historical
evidence regarding a particular practice or to view conduct
in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere political
favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to
justify regulation. Ibid. As the record demonstrates, it is
the manner in which parties have sold access to federal
on donations that could be used to fund candidate contributions) would
have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad legislation.
49 At another point, describing our “flawed reasoning,” Justice Ken-
nedy seems to suggest that Congress’ interest in regulating the appear-
ance of corruption extends only to those contributions that actually “create
. . . corrupt donor favoritism among . . . officeholders.” Post, at 299–300.
This latter formulation would render Congress’ interest in stemming the
appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in preventing
actual corruption.

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candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the ap-
pearance of undue influence. Implicit (and, as the record
shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is the sugges-
tion that money buys influence. It is no surprise then that
purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are
seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not unwar-
ranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access
gives rise to the appearance of corruption.
In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Congress’
determination that large soft-money contributions to na-
tional political parties give rise to corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption.
2. New FECA § 323(a)’s Restriction on Spending
and Receiving Soft Money
Plaintiffs and The Chief Justice contend that § 323(a) is
impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised
and spent by national parties to FECA’s hard-money source
and amount limits, including, for example, funds spent on
purely state and local elections in which no federal office is
at stake.50 Post, at 353–354 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
Such activities, The Chief Justice asserts, pose “little or
no potential to corrupt . . . federal candidates and officehold-
ers.” Post, at 353 (dissenting opinion). This observation is
beside the point. Section 323(a), like the remainder of § 323,
regulates contributions, not activities. As the record dem-
onstrates, it is the close relationship between federal office-
holders and the national parties, as well as the means by
which parties have traded on that relationship, that have
50 In support of this claim, the political party plaintiffs assert that, in
2001, the RNC spent $15.6 million of nonfederal funds (30% of the nonfed-
eral amount raised that year) on purely state and local election activity,
including contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state
parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–103 (statement of
counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 336–337 (Henderson, J.);
id., at 464–465 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 830 (Leon, J.).

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made all large soft-money contributions to national parties
suspect.
As one expert noted, “ ‘[t]here is no meaningful separation
between the national party committees and the public of-
ficials who control them.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468–469
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann Expert Report 29). The
national committees of the two major parties are both run by,
and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates.
Indeed, of the six national committees of the two major par-
ties, four are composed entirely of federal officeholders.
Ibid. The nexus between national parties and federal of-
ficeholders prompted one of Title I’s framers to conclude:
“Because the national parties operate at the national
level, and are inextricably intertwined with federal of-
ficeholders and candidates, who raise the money for the
national party committees, there is a close connection
between the funding of the national parties and the cor-
rupting dangers of soft money on the federal political
process. The only effective way to address this [soft-
money] problem of corruption is to ban entirely all rais-
ing and spending of soft money by the national parties.”
148 Cong. Rec. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Shays).
Given this close connection and alignment of interests, large
soft-money contributions to national parties are likely to
create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of fed-
eral officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ulti-
mately used.
This close affiliation has also placed national parties in a
position to sell access to federal officeholders in exchange for
soft-money contributions that the party can then use for its
own purposes. Access to federal officeholders is the most
valuable favor the national party committees are able to give
in exchange for large donations. The fact that officeholders
comply by donating their valuable time indicates either that

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officeholders place substantial value on the soft-money con-
tribution themselves, without regard to their end use, or that
national committees are able to exert considerable control
over federal officeholders. See, e. g., App. 1196–1198 (Ex-
pert Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University) (herein-
after Green Expert Report) (“Once elected to legislative of-
fice, public officials enter an environment in which political
parties-in-government control the resources crucial to subse-
quent electoral success and legislative power. Political par-
ties organize the legislative caucuses that make committee
assignments”); App. 1298 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report)
(indicating that officeholders’ reelection prospects are sig-
nificantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership).
Either way, large soft-money donations to national party
committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to
federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their con-
tributions are eventually put. As discussed above, Con-
gress had sufficient grounds to regulate the appearance of
undue influence associated with this practice. The Govern-
ment’s strong interests in preventing corruption, and in par-
ticular the appearance of corruption, are thus sufficient to
justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the
source, amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.51
51 The close relationship of federal officeholders and candidates to their
parties answers not only The Chief Justice’s concerns about § 323(a),
but also his fear that our analysis of § 323’s remaining provisions bespeaks
no limiting principle. Post, at 355–356 (dissenting opinion). As set forth
in our discussion of those provisions, the record demonstrates close ties
between federal officeholders and the state and local committees of their
parties. That close relationship makes state and local parties effective
conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officehold-
ers. Thus, in upholding §§ 323(b), (d), and (f), we rely not only on the fact
that they regulate contributions used to fund activities influencing federal
elections, but also that they regulate contributions to, or at the behest of,
entities uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption. We agree
with The Chief Justice that Congress could not regulate financial con-
tributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on the sole

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3. New FECA § 323(a)’s Restriction on Soliciting
or Directing Soft Money
Plaintiffs also contend that § 323(a)’s prohibition on na-
tional parties’ soliciting or directing soft-money contri-
butions is substantially overbroad. The reach of the so-
licitation prohibition, however, is limited. It bars only
solicitations of soft money by national party committees and
by party officers in their official capacities. The committees
remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf, as well
as to solicit hard money on behalf of state committees and
state and local candidates.52 They also can contribute hard
money to state committees and to candidates. In accord-
ance with FEC regulations, furthermore, officers of national
parties are free to solicit soft money in their individual ca-
pacities, or, if they are also officials of state parties, in that
capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49083 (2002).
This limited restriction on solicitation follows sensibly
from the prohibition on national committees’ receiving soft
money. The same observations that led us to approve the
latter compel us to reach the same conclusion regarding the
former. A national committee is likely to respond favorably
to a donation made at its request regardless of whether the
basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate. Post, at
355 (dissenting opinion).
52 Plaintiffs claim that the option of soliciting hard money for state and
local candidates is an illusory one, since several States prohibit state and
local candidates from establishing multiple campaign accounts, which
would preclude them from establishing separate accounts for federal
funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Comm’n Advisory Op. A–91–448 (Dec.
16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, § 2(3); Iowa Code
§ 56.5A (2003); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.10(J) (Anderson Supp.
2002). Plaintiffs maintain that § 323(a) combines with these state laws to
make it impossible for state and local candidates to receive hard-money
donations. But the challenge we are considering is a facial one, and on
its face § 323(a) permits solicitations. The fact that a handful of States
might interfere with the mechanism Congress has chosen for such solicita-
tions is an argument that may be addressed in an as-applied challenge.

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recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This
principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere
in federal laws. E. g., 18 U. S. C. § 201(b)(2) (prohibition on
public officials “demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] . . . anything of
value personally or for any other person or entity . . .” (em-
phasis added)); 5 CFR § 2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on
gifts to federal employees encompasses gifts “[g]iven to any
other person, including any charitable organization, on the
basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification
by the employee”).
Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the over-
breadth of § 323(a)’s solicitation ban. They point in par-
ticular to § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and of-
ficeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from
individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2
U. S. C. § 441i(a) with § 441i(e) (Supp. II). The differences
between §§ 323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitu-
tional significance. We have recognized that “the ‘differing
structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may require
different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity
of the electoral process,’ ” National Right to Work, 459 U. S.,
at 210, and we respect Congress’ decision to proceed in incre-
mental steps in the area of campaign finance regulation, see
Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 258, n. 11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley,
424 U. S., at 105. The differences between the two provi-
sions reflect Congress’ reasonable judgments about the func-
tion played by national committees and the interactions be-
tween committees and officeholders, subjects about which
Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge.
4. New FECA § 323(a)’s Application to Minor Parties
The McConnell and political party plaintiffs contend that
§ 323(a) is substantially overbroad and must be stricken on
its face because it impermissibly infringes the speech and

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associational rights of minor parties such as the Libertarian
National Committee, which, owing to their slim prospects
for electoral success and the fact that they receive few large
soft-money contributions from corporate sources, pose no
threat of corruption comparable to that posed by the RNC
and DNC. In Buckley, we rejected a similar argument con-
cerning limits on contributions to minor-party candidates,
noting that “any attempt to exclude minor parties and inde-
pendents en masse from the Act’s contribution limitations
overlooks the fact that minor-party candidates may win elec-
tive office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an
election.” 424 U. S., at 34–35. We have thus recognized
that the relevance of the interest in avoiding actual or appar-
ent corruption is not a function of the number of legislators
a given party manages to elect. It applies as much to a
minor party that manages to elect only one of its members
to federal office as it does to a major party whose members
make up a majority of Congress. It is therefore reasonable
to require that all parties and all candidates follow the same
set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the elec-
toral process.
We add that nothing in § 323(a) prevents individuals from
pooling resources to start a new national party. Post, at 289
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Only when an organization has gained official sta-
tus, which carries with it significant benefits for its members,
will the proscriptions of § 323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent
or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge
if § 323(a) prevents it from “amassing the resources neces-
sary for effective advocacy.” Buckley, supra, at 21.
5. New FECA § 323(a)’s Associational Burdens
Finally, plaintiffs assert that § 323(a) is unconstitutional
because it impermissibly interferes with the ability of na-
tional committees to associate with state and local commit-
tees. By way of example, plaintiffs point to the Republican

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Victory Plans, whereby the RNC acts in concert with the
state and local committees of a given State to plan and imple-
ment joint, full-ticket fundraising and electioneering pro-
grams. See App. 693, 694–697 (declaration of John Pesch-
ong, RNC Western Reg. Political Dir. (describing the
Republican Victory Plans)). The political parties assert that
§ 323(a) outlaws any participation in Victory Plans by RNC
officers, including merely sitting down at a table and engag-
ing in collective decisionmaking about how soft money will
be solicited, received, and spent. Such associational bur-
dens, they argue, are too great for the First Amendment
to bear.
We are not persuaded by this argument because it hinges
on an unnaturally broad reading of the terms “spend,”
“receive,” “direct,” and “solicit.” 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) (Supp.
II). Nothing on the face of § 323(a) prohibits national
party officers, whether acting in their official or individual
capacities, from sitting down with state and local party com-
mittees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and
spend soft money. As long as the national party officer does
not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money,
§ 323(a) permits a wide range of joint planning and election-
eering activity. Intervenor-defendants, the principal draft-
ers and proponents of the legislation, concede as much.
Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Sen. John McCain et al. in
No. 02–1674 et al., p. 22 (“BCRA leaves parties and candi-
dates free to coordinate campaign plans and activities, politi-
cal messages, and fundraising goals with one another”).
The FEC’s current definitions of § 323(a)’s terms are consist-
ent with that view. See, e. g., 11 CFR § 300.2(m) (2002) (de-
fining “solicit” as “to ask . . . another person” (emphasis
added)); § 300.2(n) (defining “direct” as “to ask a person who
has expressed an intent to make a contribution . . . to make
that contribution . . . including through a conduit or interme-
diary” (emphasis added)); § 300.2(c) (laying out the factors

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that determine whether an entity will be considered to be
controlled by a national committee).
Given the straightforward meaning of this provision, Jus-
tice Kennedy is incorrect that “[a] national party’s mere
involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a
state ballot initiative” or its assistance in developing a state
party’s Levin-money fundraising efforts risks a finding that
the officers are in “ ‘indirect control’ ” of the state party and
subject to criminal penalties. Post, at 289. Moreover,
§ 323(a) leaves national party committee officers entirely free
to participate, in their official capacities, with state and local
parties and candidates in soliciting and spending hard
money; party officials may also solicit soft money in their
unofficial capacities.
Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs’ First Amendment
challenge to new FECA § 323(a).
New FECA § 323(b)’s Restrictions on State and
Local Party Committees
In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance
regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties
between federal candidates and state party committees,
BCRA’s restrictions on national committee activity would
rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees re-
mained available as a conduit for soft-money donations.53
Section 323(b) is designed to foreclose wholesale evasion of
§ 323(a)’s anticorruption measures by sharply curbing state
committees’ ability to use large soft-money contributions to
influence federal elections. The core of § 323(b) is a straight-
forward contribution regulation: It prevents donors from
53 Even opponents of campaign finance reform acknowledged that
“a prohibition of soft money donations to national party committees alone
would be wholly ineffective.” The Constitution and Campaign Reform:
Hearings on S. 522 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield,
Partner, Covington & Burling).

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contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party com-
mittees to help finance “Federal election activity. ” 2
U. S. C. § 441i(b)(1) (Supp. II). The term “Federal elec-
tion activity” encompasses four distinct categories of elec-
tioneering: (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days
preceding a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter
identification, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), and generic cam-
paign activity 54 that is “conducted in connection with an
election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on
the ballot”; (3) any “public communication” 55 that “refers to
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and “pro-
motes,” “supports,” “attacks,” or “opposes” a candidate for
that office; and (4) the services provided by a state commit-
tee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her
time to “activities in connection with a Federal election.”
§§ 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv). The Act explicitly excludes several
categories of activity from this definition: public communica-
tions that refer solely to nonfederal candidates; 56 contribu-
tions to nonfederal candidates; 57 state and local political
conventions; and the cost of grassroots campaign materials
like bumper stickers that refer only to state candidates.
§ 431(20)(B). All activities that fall within the statutory
definition must be funded with hard money. § 441i(b)(1).
Section 323(b)(2), the so-called Levin Amendment, carves
out an exception to this general rule. A refinement on the
pre-BCRA regime that permitted parties to pay for certain
activities with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds, the
54 Generic campaign activity promotes a political party rather than a
specific candidate. 2 U. S. C. § 431(21) (Supp. II).
55 A public communication is “a communication by means of any broad-
cast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor ad-
vertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or
any other form of general public political advertising.” § 431(22).
56 So long as the communication does not constitute voter registration,
voter identification, GOTV, or generic campaign activity. § 431(20)(B)(i).
57 Unless the contribution is earmarked for federal election activity.
§ 431(20)(B)(ii).

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Levin Amendment allows state and local party committees
to pay for certain types of federal election activity with an
allocated ratio of hard money and “Levin funds”—that is,
funds raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person. 2
U. S. C. § 441i(b)(2). Except for the $10,000 cap and cer-
tain related restrictions to prevent circumvention of that
limit, § 323(b)(2) leaves regulation of such contributions to
the States.58
The scope of the Levin Amendment is limited in two ways.
First, state and local parties can use Levin money to fund
only activities that fall within categories (1) and (2) of the
statute’s definition of federal election activity—namely, voter
registration activity, voter identification drives, GOTV
drives, and generic campaign activities. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of these activities qualify: Levin
funds cannot be used to pay for any activities that refer to
“a clearly identified candidate for Federal office”; they like-
wise cannot be used to fund broadcast communications unless
they refer “solely to a clearly identified candidate for State
or local office.” §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
Second, both the Levin funds and the allocated portion of
hard money used to pay for such activities must be raised
entirely by the state or local committee that spends them.
§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a state party committee
cannot use Levin funds transferred from other party commit-
tees to cover the Levin funds portion of a Levin Amendment
expenditure. It also means that a state party committee
cannot use hard money transferred from other party commit-
tees to cover the hard-money portion of a Levin Amendment
expenditure. Furthermore, national committees, federal
candidates, and federal officeholders generally may not so-
licit Levin funds on behalf of state committees, and state
committees may not team up to raise Levin funds.
58 The statute gives the FEC responsibility for setting the allocation
ratio. § 441i(b)(2)(A); see also 11 CFR § 300.33(b) (2003) (defining alloca-
tion ratios).

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§ 441i(b)(2)(C). They can, however, jointly raise the hard
money used to make Levin expenditures.
1. Governmental Interests Underlying New
FECA 323(b)
We begin by noting that, in addressing the problem of
soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both
drew a conclusion and made a prediction. Its conclusion,
based on the evidence before it, was that the corrupting
influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the
political process solely through national party committees.
Rather, state committees function as an alternative avenue
for precisely the same corrupting forces.59 Indeed, both can-
didates and parties already ask donors who have reached the
limit on their direct contributions to donate to state commit-
tees.60 There is at least as much evidence as there was in
59 One former Senator noted:
“ ‘The fact is that much of what state and local parties do helps to elect
federal candidates. The national parties know it; the candidates know it;
the state and local parties know it. If state and local parties can use soft
money for activities that affect federal elections, then the problem will not
be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the money will
exist; the same large contributions by corporations, unions, and wealthy
individuals will be made; the federal candidates who benefit from state
party use of these funds will know exactly whom their benefactors are;
the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will arise; the same distor-
tions on the legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism
will erode the foundations of our democracy—except it will all be worse
in the public’s mind because a perceived reform was undercut once again
by a loophole that allows big money into the system.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d,
at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶ 19, App. 746).
60 E.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘It is . . . not uncom-
mon for the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state
parties. This often occurs when a donor has reached his or her federal
dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make additional contributions to
the state party’ ” (quoting declaration of Thomas Josefiak, RNC Chief
Counsel ¶ 68, App. 308)); see also Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 458 (quoting
Congressman Wayne Allard’s Aug. 27, 1996, fundraising letter informing
the recipient that “ ‘you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute

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Buckley that such donations have been made with the in-
tent—and in at least some cases the effect—of gaining influ-
ence over federal officeholders.61 Section 323(b) thus pro-
motes an important governmental interest by confronting
the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to politi-
cal parties already have.
Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the
hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of cam-
paign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money do-
nors would react to § 323(a) by scrambling to find another
way to purchase influence. It was “neither novel nor im-
plausible,” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391, for Congress
to conclude that political parties would react to § 323(a) by
directing soft-money contributors to the state committees,
and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to
these contributors as they had been to those who had for-
merly contributed to the national parties. We “must accord
substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Con-
gress,” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S.
622, 665 (1994) (plurality opinion), particularly when, as here,
those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and
common sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shift-
to my campaign,’ ” but “ ‘you can further help my campaign by assisting
the Colorado Republican Party’ ”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.) (“ ‘Both political parties have found spending soft money with its accom-
panying hard money match through their state parties to work smoothly,
for the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply
“pass throughs” to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct
mail’ ” (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App. 1510–1511)).
61 The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for a substantial do-
nation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged
meetings for the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1
1998 Senate Report 43–44; 2 id., at 2907–2931; 5 id., at 7519. That same
Report also detailed how Native American tribes that operated casinos
made sizable soft-money contributions to state Democratic committees in
apparent exchange for access and influence. 1 id., at 44–46; 2 id., at 3167–
3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men,
Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40).

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ing wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerat-
ing FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental
interest.
2. New FECA § 323(b)’s Tailoring
Plaintiffs argue that even if some legitimate interest might
be served by § 323(b), the provision’s restrictions are un-
justifiably burdensome and therefore cannot be considered
“closely drawn” to match the Government’s objectives.
They advance three main contentions in support of this prop-
osition. First, they argue that the provision is substantially
overbroad because it federalizes activities that pose no con-
ceivable risk of corrupting or appearing to corrupt federal
officeholders. Second, they argue that the Levin Amend-
ment imposes an unconstitutional burden on the associational
rights of political parties. Finally, they argue that the pro-
vision prevents them from amassing the resources they need
to engage in effective advocacy. We address these points
in turn.
a. § 323(b)’s Application to Federal Election Activity
Plaintiffs assert that § 323(b) represents a new brand of
pervasive federal regulation of state-focused electioneering
activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appear to corrupt
federal officeholders and thus goes well beyond Congress’
concerns about the corruption of the federal electoral proc-
ess. We disagree.
It is true that § 323(b) captures some activities that affect
state campaigns for nonfederal offices. But these are the
same sorts of activities that already were covered by the
FEC’s pre-BCRA allocation rules, and thus had to be funded
in part by hard money, because they affect federal as well as
state elections. See 11 CFR § 106.5 (2002). As a practical
matter, BCRA merely codifies the principles of the FEC’s
allocation regime while at the same time justifiably adjusting
the formulas applicable to these activities in order to restore

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the efficacy of FECA’s longtime statutory restriction—ap-
proved by the Court and eroded by the FEC’s allocation re-
gime—on contributions to state and local party committees
for the purpose of influencing federal elections. See 2
U. S. C. §§ 431(8)(A), 441a(a)(1)(C); see also Buckley, 424
U. S., at 38 (upholding FECA’s $25,000 limit on aggregate
contributions to candidates and political committees); cf.
California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453
U. S. 182 (1981) (upholding FECA’s $5,000 limit on contribu-
tions to multicandidate political committees).
Like the rest of Title I, § 323(b) is premised on Congress’
judgment that if a large donation is capable of putting a fed-
eral candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat
of corruption or the appearance of corruption. As we ex-
plain below, § 323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contri-
butions that pose the greatest risk of this kind of corruption:
those contributions to state and local parties that can be used
to benefit federal candidates directly. Further, these regu-
lations all are reasonably tailored, with various temporal and
substantive limitations designed to focus the regulations on
the important anticorruption interests to be served. We
conclude that § 323(b) is a closely drawn means of countering
both corruption and the appearance of corruption.
The first two categories of “Federal election activity,”
voter registration efforts, § 301(20)(A)(i), and voter identifi-
cation, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in
connection with a federal election, § 301(20)(A)(ii), clearly
capture activity that benefits federal candidates. Common
sense dictates, and it was “undisputed” below, that a party’s
efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly
assist the party’s candidates for federal office. 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal
candidates reap substantial rewards from any efforts that
increase the number of like-minded registered voters who

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168 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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actually go to the polls.62 See, e. g., id., at 459 (“ ‘[The evi-
dence] shows quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes
residents of a highly Republican precinct will produce a
harvest of votes for Republican candidates for both state
and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal
candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a
candidate. . . . [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect
on federal elections’ ” (quoting Green Expert Report 14)).
Representatives of the four major congressional campaign
committees confirmed that they “ ‘transfe[r] federal and non-
federal funds to state and/or local party committees for’ ”
both voter registration and GOTV activities, and that
“ ‘[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election of
federal candidates.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 459, 461 (citations
omitted).
The record also makes quite clear that federal officeholders
are grateful for contributions to state and local parties that
can be converted into GOTV-type efforts. See id., at 459
(quoting a letter thanking a California Democratic Party
donor and noting that CDP’s voter registration and GOTV
efforts would help “ ‘increase the number of Californian
Democrats in the United States Congress’ ” and “ ‘deliver
California’s 54 electoral votes’ ” to the Democratic Presiden-
tial candidate).
Because voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, and
generic campaign activity all confer substantial benefits on
federal candidates, the funding of such activities creates a
significant risk of actual and apparent corruption. Section
323(b) is a reasonable response to that risk. Its contribution
limitations are focused on the subset of voter registration
activity that is most likely to affect the election prospects of
federal candidates: activity that occurs within 120 days be-
fore a federal election. And if the voter registration drive
62 Since voter identification is a necessary precondition of any GOTV
program, the findings regarding GOTV funding obviously apply with equal
force to the funding of voter identification efforts.

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does not specifically mention a federal candidate, state com-
mittees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment’s
higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2
U. S. C. §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (Supp. II). Similarly, the con-
tribution limits applicable to § 301(20)(A)(ii) activities tar-
get only those voter identification, GOTV, and generic cam-
paign efforts that occur “in connection with an election in
which a candidate for a Federal office appears on the ballot.”
2 U. S. C. § 431(20)(A)(ii). Appropriately, in implementing
this subsection, the FEC has categorically excluded all
activity that takes place during the runup to elections when
no federal office is at stake.63 Furthermore, state commit-
tees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment’s higher
contribution limits to fund any § 301(A)(20)(i) and
§ 301(A)(20)(ii) activities that do not specifically mention a
federal candidate. 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). The
prohibition on the use of soft money in connection with these
activities is therefore closely drawn to meet the sufficiently
important governmental interests of avoiding corruption and
its appearance.
“Public communications” that promote or attack a candi-
date for federal office—the third category of “Federal elec-
tion activity,” § 301(20)(A)(iii)—also undoubtedly have a dra-
matic effect on federal elections. Such ads were a prime
motivating force behind BCRA’s passage. See 3 1998 Sen-
ate Report 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins) (“[T]he
63 With respect to GOTV, voter identification, and other generic cam-
paign activity, the FEC has interpreted § 323(b) to apply only to those
activities conducted after the earliest filing deadline for access to the fed-
eral election ballot or, in States that do not conduct primaries, after Janu-
ary 1 of even-numbered years. 11 CFR § 100.24(a)(1) (2002). Any activi-
ties conducted outside of those periods are completely exempt from
regulation under § 323(b). Of course, this facial challenge does not pre-
sent the question of the FEC regulations’ constitutionality. But the fact
that the statute provides this basis for the FEC reasonably to narrow
§ 301(20)(A)(ii) further calls into question plaintiffs’ claims of facial over-
breadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973).

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hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin
loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have
virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us
with little more than a pile of legal rubble”). As explained
below, any public communication that promotes or attacks a
clearly identified federal candidate directly affects the elec-
tion in which he is participating. The record on this score
could scarcely be more abundant. Given the overwhelming
tendency of public communications, as carefully defined in
§ 301(20)(A)(iii), to benefit directly federal candidates, we
hold that application of § 323(b)’s contribution caps to such
communications is also closely drawn to the anticorruption
interest it is intended to address.64
As for the final category of “Federal election activity,”
§ 301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congress’ interest in preventing
circumvention of § 323(b)’s other restrictions justifies the re-
quirement that state and local parties spend federal funds to
pay the salary of any employee spending more than 25% of
his or her compensated time on activities in connection with
64 We likewise reject the argument that § 301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitu-
tionally vague. The words “promote,” “oppose,” “attack,” and “support”
clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must
act in order to avoid triggering the provision. These words “provide ex-
plicit standards for those who apply them” and “give the person of ordi-
nary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108–109 (1972). This is partic-
ularly the case here, since actions taken by political parties are presumed
to be in connection with election campaigns. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at
79 (noting that a general requirement that political committees disclose
their expenditures raised no vagueness problems because the term “politi-
cal committee” “need only encompass organizations that are under the
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate” and thus a political committee’s expenditures “are,
by definition, campaign related”). Furthermore, should plaintiffs feel that
they need further guidance, they are able to seek advisory opinions for
clarification, see 2 U. S. C. § 437f(a)(1), and thereby “remove any doubt
there may be as to the meaning of the law,” Civil Service Comm’n v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 580 (1973).

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a federal election. In the absence of this provision, a party
might use soft money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time
employee engaged in federal electioneering, by the simple
expedient of dividing the federal workload among multiple
employees. Plaintiffs have suggested no reason for us to
strike down this provision. Accordingly, we give “deference
to [the] congressional determination of the need for [this]
prophylactic rule.” National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Comm., 470 U. S., at 500.
b. Associational Burdens Imposed by the Levin
Amendment
Plaintiffs also contend that § 323(b) is unconstitutional be-
cause the Levin Amendment unjustifiably burdens associ-
ation among party committees by forbidding transfers of
Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to
fund the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and
joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. We recog-
nize, as we have in the past, the importance of preserving
the associational freedom of parties. See, e. g., California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 (2000); Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214
(1989). But not every minor restriction on parties’ other-
wise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional di-
mension. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11.
As an initial matter, we note that state and local parties
can avoid these associational burdens altogether by forgoing
the Levin Amendment option and electing to pay for federal
election activities entirely with hard money. But in any
event, the restrictions on the use, transfer, and raising of
Levin funds are justifiable anticircumvention measures.
Without the ban on transfers of Levin funds among state
committees, donors could readily circumvent the $10,000
limit on contributions to a committee’s Levin account by
making multiple $10,000 donations to various committees
that could then transfer the donations to the committee of

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choice.65 The same anticircumvention goal undergirds the
ban on joint solicitation of Levin funds. Without this re-
striction, state and local committees could organize “all
hands” fundraisers at which individual, corporate, or union
donors could make large soft-money donations to be divided
between the committees. In that case, the purpose, if not
the letter, of § 323(b)(2)’s $10,000 limit would be thwarted:
Donors could make large, visible contributions at fund-
raisers, which would provide ready means for corrupting fed-
eral officeholders. Given the delicate and interconnected
regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens
imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far out-
weighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire
scheme.
Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)’s apparent prohibition on the
transfer of hard money by a national, state, or local commit-
tee to help fund the allocable hard-money portion of a sepa-
rate state or local committee’s Levin expenditures presents
a closer question. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. II).
The Government defends the restriction as necessary to pre-
vent the donor committee, particularly a national committee,
from leveraging the transfer of federal money to wrest con-
trol over the spending of the recipient committee’s Levin
funds. This purported interest is weak, particularly given
the fact that § 323(a) already polices attempts by national
parties to engage in such behavior. See 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(a)(2) (extending § 323(a)’s restrictions to entities con-
trolled by national party committees). However, the associ-
ational burdens posed by the hard-money transfer restriction
are so insubstantial as to be de minimis. Party committees,
including national party committees, remain free to transfer
65 Any doubts that donors would engage in such a seemingly complex
scheme are put to rest by the record evidence in Buckley itself. See n. 6,
supra (setting forth the Court of Appeals’ findings regarding the efforts
of milk producers to obtain a meeting with White House officials).

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unlimited hard money so long as it is not used to fund Levin
expenditures. State and local party committees can thus
dedicate all “homegrown” hard money to their Levin activi-
ties while relying on outside transfers to defray the costs of
other hard-money expenditures. Given the strong anticir-
cumvention interest vindicated by § 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)’s restric-
tion on the transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down
the entire provision based upon such an attenuated claim of
associational infringement.
c. New FECA § 323(b)’s Impact on Parties’ Ability
to Engage in Effective Advocacy
Finally, plaintiffs contend that § 323(b) is unconstitutional
because its restrictions on soft-money contributions to state
and local party committees will prevent them from engaging
in effective advocacy. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted, the
political parties’ evidence regarding the impact of BCRA on
their revenues is “speculative and not based on any analy-
sis.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 524. If the history of campaign
finance regulation discussed above proves anything, it is that
political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to
new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover,
the mere fact that § 323(b) may reduce the relative amount
of money available to state and local parties to fund federal
election activities is largely inconsequential. The question
is not whether § 323(b) reduces the amount of funds available
over previous election cycles, but whether it is “so radical in
effect as to . . . drive the sound of [the recipient’s] voice below
the level of notice.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If
indeed state or local parties can make such a showing, as-
applied challenges remain available.
We accordingly conclude that § 323(b), on its face, is closely
drawn to match the important governmental interests of
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.

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New FECA § 323(d)’s Restrictions on Parties’ Solicitations
for, and Donations to, Tax-Exempt Organizations
Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and local party
committees, and their agents or subsidiaries, from “solicit-
[ing] any funds for, or mak[ing] or direct[ing] any donations”
to, any organization established under § 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code 66 that makes expenditures in connection with
an election for federal office, and any political organizations
established under § 527 “other than a political committee, a
State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the
authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or
local office.” 67 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d) (Supp. II). The District
Court struck down the provision on its face. We reverse
and uphold § 323(d), narrowly construing the section’s ban on
donations to apply only to the donation of funds not raised
in compliance with FECA.
1. New FECA § 323(d)’s Regulation of Solicitations
The Government defends § 323(d)’s ban on solicitations to
tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activity as pre-
venting circumvention of Title I’s limits on contributions of
soft money to national, state, and local party committees.
That justification is entirely reasonable. The history of Con-
gress’ efforts at campaign finance reform well demonstrates
that “candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the
66 Section 501(c) organizations are groups generally exempted from tax-
ation under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. § 501(a). These
include § 501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizations, as well as
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare groups.
67 Section 527 “political organizations” are, unlike § 501(c) groups, orga-
nized for the express purpose of engaging in partisan political activity.
They include any “party, committee, association, fund, or other organiza-
tion (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for
the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making
expenditures” for the purpose of “influencing or attempting to influence
the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
Federal, State, or local public office.” 26 U. S. C. § 527(e).

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current law.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 457. Absent the
solicitation provision, national, state, and local party commit-
tees would have significant incentives to mobilize their for-
midable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of
access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded
tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting
their candidates.68 All of the corruption and appearance of
corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising
apparatuses would follow. Donations made at the behest of
party committees would almost certainly be regarded by
party officials, donors, and federal officeholders alike as bene-
fiting the party as well as its candidates. Yet, by soliciting
the donations to third-party organizations, the parties would
avoid FECA’s source and amount limitations, as well as its
disclosure restrictions. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348 (Hender-
son, J.) (citing various declarations demonstrating that, prior
to BCRA, most tax-exempt organizations did not disclose
68 The record shows that many of the targeted tax-exempt organizations
engage in sophisticated and effective electioneering activities for the pur-
pose of influencing federal elections, including waging broadcast cam-
paigns promoting or attacking particular candidates and conducting
large-scale voter registration and GOTV drives. For instance, during the
final weeks of the 2000 Presidential campaign, the NAACP’s National
Voter Fund registered more than 200,000 people, promoted a GOTV hot-
line, ran three newspaper print ads, and made several direct mailings.
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348–349 (Henderson, J.). The NAACP reports that
the program turned out one million additional African-American voters
and increased turnout over 1996 among targeted groups by 22% in New
York, 50% in Florida, and 140% in Missouri. Ibid. The effort, which cost
$10 million, was funded primarily by a $7 million contribution from an
anonymous donor. Id., at 349 (citing cross-examination of Donald P.
Green, Yale University 15–20, Exh. 3; see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub.
Record); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 851
(Leon, J.) (same); see also id., at 349 (Henderson, J.) (stating that in 2000
the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL)
spent $7.5 million and mobilized 2.1 million pro-choice voters (citing decla-
ration of Mary Jane Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL 8, App. 271–272, ¶ 24));
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same).

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the source or amount of contributions); id., at 521 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.) (same).
Experience under the current law demonstrates that Con-
gress’ concerns about circumvention are not merely hypo-
thetical. Even without the added incentives created by
Title I, national, state, and local parties already solicit unreg-
ulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations for
the purpose of supporting federal electioneering activity.
See, e. g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 (“In addition to direct
contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior
leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the
coalition’s nonprofit organizations”); 4 id., at 5983 (minority
views) (“Tax-exempt ‘issue advocacy’ groups and other con-
duits were systematically used to circumvent the federal
campaign finance laws”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leon, J.). Parties and candidates
have also begun to take advantage of so-called “politician
527s,” which are little more than soft-money fronts for the
promotion of particular federal officeholders and their inter-
ests. See id., at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘Virtually every
member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his
or her own 527 group. . . . In all, Public Citizen found 63
current members of Congress who have their own 527s’ ”
(quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional
Leaders’ Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
849–850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful
at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate in-
terests, as well as from the national parties themselves.
See id., at 519–520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27 indus-
tries had each donated over $100,000 in a single year to the
top 25 politician 527 groups and that the DNC was the single
largest contributor to politician 527 groups (citing Public Cit-
izen Congress Watch, supra, at 10–11)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
850 (Leon, J.) (same). Given BCRA’s tighter restrictions on

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the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for
parties to exploit such organizations will only increase.
Section 323(d)’s solicitation restriction is closely drawn to
prevent political parties from using tax-exempt organiza-
tions as soft-money surrogates. Though phrased as an abso-
lute prohibition, the restriction does nothing more than sub-
ject contributions solicited by parties to FECA’s regulatory
regime, leaving open substantial opportunities for solicita-
tion and other expressive activity in support of these organi-
zations. First, and most obviously, § 323(d) restricts solicita-
tions only to those § 501(c) groups “mak[ing] expenditures
or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal
office,” 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d)(1) (Supp. II), and to § 527 organi-
zations, which by definition engage in partisan political
activity, § 441i(d)(2); 26 U. S. C. § 527(e). Second, parties re-
main free to solicit hard-money contributions to a § 501(c)’s
federal PAC, as well as to § 527 organizations that already
qualify as federal PACs.69 Third, § 323(d) allows parties to
endorse qualifying organizations in ways other than direct
solicitations of unregulated donations. For example, with
respect to § 501(c) organizations that are prohibited from ad-
ministering PACs, parties can solicit hard-money donations
to themselves for the express purpose of donating to these
organizations. See infra, at 180–181. Finally, as with
§ 323(a), § 323(d) in no way restricts solicitations by party
officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(d) (extending restrictions to solicitations and donations
69 Notably, the FEC has interpreted § 323(d)(2) to permit state, district,
and local party committees to solicit donations to § 527 organizations that
are state-registered PACs, that support only state or local candidates, and
that do not make expenditures or disbursements in connection with fed-
eral elections. 11 CFR § 300.37(a)(3)(iv) (2003). The agency determined
that this interpretation of “political committee”—at least with respect to
state, district, and local committees—was consistent with BCRA’s funda-
mental purpose of prohibiting soft money from being used in connection
with federal elections. 67 Fed. Reg. 49106 (2002).

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made by “an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such
party committee” (emphasis added)).
In challenging § 323(d)’s ban on solicitations, plaintiffs
renew the argument they made with respect to § 323(a)’s so-
licitation restrictions: that it cannot be squared with § 323(e),
which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit
limited donations of soft money to tax-exempt organiza-
tions that engage in federal election activities. Compare 2
U. S. C. § 441i(d) with § 441i(e)(4). But if § 323(d)’s restric-
tions on solicitations are otherwise valid, they are not ren-
dered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose
not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently
as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at
210; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 656–657
(1966). In any event, the difference between the two provi-
sions is fully explained by the fact that national party offi-
cers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, are able to
solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in
their individual capacities. Section 323(e), which is designed
to accommodate the individual associational and speech in-
terests of candidates and officeholders in lending personal
support to nonprofit organizations, also places tight content,
source, and amount restrictions on solicitations of soft money
by federal candidates and officeholders. Given those limits,
as well as the less rigorous standard of review, the greater
allowances of § 323(e) do not render § 323(d)’s solicitation re-
striction facially invalid.
2. New FECA § 323(d)’s Regulation of Donations
Section 323(d) also prohibits national, state, and local party
committees from making or directing “any donatio[n]”
to qualifying § 501(c) or § 527 organizations. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(d) (Supp. II). The Government again defends the
restriction as an anticircumvention measure. We agree in-
sofar as it prohibits the donation of soft money. Absent
such a restriction, state and local party committees could

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accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions pre-
vent them from doing indirectly—namely, raising large sums
of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations
engaging in federal election activities. Because the party
itself would be raising and collecting the funds, the potential
for corruption would be that much greater. We will not dis-
turb Congress’ reasonable decision to close that loophole,
particularly given a record demonstrating an already robust
practice of parties making such donations. See 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 517–518 (Kollar-Kotelly); id., at 848–849 (Leon, J.).
The prohibition does raise overbreadth concerns if read to
restrict donations from a party’s federal account—i. e., funds
that have already been raised in compliance with FECA’s
source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Parties have
many valid reasons for giving to tax-exempt organizations,
not the least of which is to associate themselves with certain
causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the values espoused
by the party. A complete ban on donations prevents parties
from making even the “general expression of support” that a
contribution represents. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. At the
same time, prohibiting parties from donating funds already
raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Con-
gress’ goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption of federal candidates and officeholders.
The Government asserts that the restriction is necessary
to prevent parties from leveraging their hard money to gain
control over a tax-exempt group’s soft money. Even if we
accepted that rationale, it would at most justify a dollar limit,
not a flat ban. Moreover, any legitimate concerns over cap-
ture are diminished by the fact that the restrictions set forth
in §§ 323(a) and (b) apply not only to party committees, but
to entities under their control. See 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a)(2)
(extending prohibitions on national party committees to “any
entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed,
maintained, or controlled by such a national committee” (em-

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phasis added)); § 441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party
committees).
These observations do not, however, require us to sustain
plaintiffs’ facial challenge to § 323(d)’s donation restriction.
“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and . . . a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first as-
certain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possi-
ble by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Ben-
son, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S.
312, 331 (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24
(1982). Given our obligation to avoid constitutional prob-
lems, we narrowly construe § 323(d)’s ban to apply only to
donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA.
This construction is consistent with the concerns animating
Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole.
Though there is little legislative history regarding BCRA
generally, and almost nothing on § 323(d) specifically, the
abuses identified in the 1998 Senate Report regarding cam-
paign finance practices involve the use of nonprofit organiza-
tions as conduits for large soft-money donations. See, e. g.,
3 1998 Senate Report 4565 (“The evidence indicates that the
soft-money loophole is fueling many of the campaign abuses
investigated by the Committee. . . . Soft money also supplied
the funds parties used to make contributions to tax-exempt
groups, which in turn used the funds to pay for election-
related activities”); id., at 4568–4569 (describing as an “egre-
gious exampl[e]” of misuse a $4.6 million donation of nonfed-
eral funds by the RNC to Americans for Tax Reform, which
the organization spent on “direct mail and phone bank opera-
tions to counter anti-Republican advertising”). We have
found no evidence that Congress was concerned about, much
less that it intended to prohibit, donations of money already
fully regulated by FECA. Given Title I’s exclusive focus on
abuses related to soft money, we would expect that if Con-
gress meant § 323(d)’s restriction to have this dramatic and

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constitutionally questionable effect, it would say so explicitly.
Because there is nothing that compels us to conclude that
Congress intended “donations” to include transfers of federal
money, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an
interpretation would raise, we decline to read § 323(d) in that
way. Thus, political parties remain free to make or direct
donations of money to any tax-exempt organization that has
otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA.
New FECA § 323(e)’s Restrictions on Federal
Candidates and Officeholders
New FECA § 323(e) regulates the raising and soliciting of
sof t money by federal candidates and officeholders. 2
U. S. C. § 441i(e) (Supp. II). It prohibits federal candidates
and officeholders from “solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing],
transfer[ing], or spend[ing]” any soft money in connection
with federal elections. § 441i(e)(1)(A). It also limits the
ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, re-
ceive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection
with state and local elections. § 441i(e)(1)(B).70
Section 323(e)’s general prohibition on solicitations admits
of a number of exceptions. For instance, federal candidates
and officeholders are permitted to “attend, speak, or be a
featured guest” at a state or local party fundraising event.
2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(3). Section 323(e) specifically provides
70 Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly constrains the ability of federal candidates
and officeholders to solicit or spend nonfederal money in connection with
state or local elections. Contributions cannot exceed FECA’s analogous
hard-money contribution limits or come from prohibited sources. In ef-
fect, § 323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on what individuals can contribute to
or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, while restricting
the use of the additional funds to activities not related to federal elections.
If the federal candidate or officeholder is also a candidate for state or local
office, he or she may solicit, receive, and spend an unlimited amount of
nonfederal money in connection with that election, subject only to state
regulation and the requirement that such solicitation or expenditures refer
only to the relevant state or local office. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(2).

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that federal candidates and officeholders may make solicita-
tions of soft money to § 501(c) organizations whose primary
purpose is not to engage in “Federal election activit[ies]” as
long as the solicitation does not specify how the funds will
be spent, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4)(A); to § 501(c) organizations
whose primary purpose is to engage in “Federal election ac-
tivit[ies]” as long as the solicitations are limited to individu-
als and the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year
per individual, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4)(B); and to § 501(c) or-
ganizations for the express purpose of carrying out such ac-
tivities, again so long as the amount solicited does not exceed
$20,000 per year per individual, 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4)(B).
No party seriously questions the constitutionality of
§ 323(e)’s general ban on donations of soft money made di-
rectly to federal candidates and officeholders, their agents,
or entities established or controlled by them. Even on the
narrowest reading of Buckley, a regulation restricting dona-
tions to a federal candidate, regardless of the ends to which
those funds are ultimately put, qualifies as a contribution
limit subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Such donations have
only marginal speech and associational value, but at the same
time pose a substantial threat of corruption. By severing
the most direct link between the soft-money donor and the
federal candidate, § 323(e)’s ban on donations of soft money
is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance
of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders.
Section 323(e)’s restrictions on solicitations are justified as
valid anticircumvention measures. Large soft-money dona-
tions at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give rise to all
of the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made
directly to the candidate or officeholder. Though the candi-
date may not ultimately control how the funds are spent, the
value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder is evi-
dent from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some
restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and office-
holders could easily avoid FECA’s contribution limits by so-

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liciting funds from large donors and restricted sources to
like-minded organizations engaging in federal election activi-
ties. As the record demonstrates, even before the passage
of BCRA, federal candidates and officeholders had already
begun soliciting donations to state and local parties, as well
as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as
well as their party’s, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533
U. S., at 458 (quoting fundraising letter from a Congressman
explaining to contributor that “ ‘you are at the limit of what
you can directly contribute to my campaign,’ but ‘you can
further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republi-
can Party’ ”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479–480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(surveying evidence of federal officeholders soliciting funds
to state and local parties); id., at 848 (Leon, J.) (same); id., at
518 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal office-
holders soliciting funds for nonprofits for electioneering pur-
poses); id., at 849 (Leon, J.) (same). The incentives to do so,
at least with respect to solicitations to tax-exempt organiza-
tions, will only increase with Title I’s restrictions on the rais-
ing and spending of soft money by national, state, and local
parties.
Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommo-
dating the individual speech and associational rights of
federal candidates and officeholders. Rather than place an
outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations,
§ 323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft money. 2
U. S. C. § 441i(e)(4). This allowance accommodates individ-
uals who have long served as active members of nonprofit
organizations in both their official and individual capacities.
Similarly, §§ 323(e)(1)(B) and 323(e)(3) preserve the tradi-
tional fundraising role of federal officeholders by providing
limited opportunities for federal candidates and officeholders
to associate with their state and local colleagues through
joint fundraising activities. 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(e)(1)(B),
441i(e)(3). Given these many exceptions, as well as the sub-
stantial threat of corruption or its appearance posed by dona-

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184 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tions to or at the behest of federal candidates and officehold-
ers, § 323(e) is clearly constitutional. We accordingly uphold
§ 323(e) against plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.
New FECA § 323(f)’s Restrictions on State
Candidates and Officeholders
The final provision of Title I is new FECA § 323(f). 2
U. S. C. § 441i(f) (Supp. II). Section 323(f) generally pro-
hibits candidates for state or local office, or state or local
officeholders, from spending soft money to fund “public com-
munications” as defined in § 301(20)(A)(iii)—i. e., a communi-
cation that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Fed-
eral office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for
that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office.”
2 U. S. C. § 441i(f)(1); § 431(20)(A)(iii). Exempted from this
restriction are communications made in connection with
an election for state or local office which refer only to the
state or local candidate or officeholder making the expendi-
ture or to any other candidate for the same state or local
office. § 441i(f)(2).
Section 323(f) places no cap on the amount of money that
state or local candidates can spend on any activity. Rather,
like §§ 323(a) and 323(b), it limits only the source and amount
of contributions that state and local candidates can draw on
to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections.
And, by regulating only contributions used to fund “public
communications,” § 323(f) focuses narrowly on those soft-
money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or
give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candi-
dates and officeholders.
Plaintiffs advance two principal arguments against
§ 323(f). We have already rejected the first argument, that
the definition of “public communications” in new FECA
§ 301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
See n. 64, supra. We add only that, plaintiffs’ and Justice
Kennedy’s contrary reading notwithstanding, post, at 316–

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317, this provision does not prohibit a state or local candidate
from advertising that he has received a federal officehold-
er’s endorsement.71
The second argument, that soft-money contributions to
state and local candidates for “public communications” do not
corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates, ignores both
the record in this litigation and Congress’ strong interest
in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution
limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the
soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every possi-
ble way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They
have labored to bring them under the FEC’s allocation re-
gime; they have raised and transferred soft money from na-
tional to state party committees to take advantage of favor-
able allocation ratios; and they have transferred and solicited
funds to tax-exempt organizations for production of such ads.
We will not upset Congress’ eminently reasonable prediction
that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and
local candidates and officeholders will become the next con-
duits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising.
We therefore uphold § 323(f) against plaintiffs’ First Amend-
ment challenge.72
71 See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(Section 323(f) does not prohibit “spending non-Federal money to run ad-
vertisements that mention that [state or local candidates] have been en-
dorsed by a Federal candidate or say that they identify with a position of
a named Federal candidate, so long as those advertisements do not sup-
port, attack, promote or oppose the Federal candidate”).
72 Justice Kennedy faults our “unwillingness” to confront that “Title
I’s entirety . . . look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan,”
citing § 323(e), which provides officeholders and candidates with greater
opportunities to solicit soft money than §§ 323(a) and (d) permit party offi-
cers. Post, at 306, 307. But, § 323(e) applies to both officeholders and
candidates and allows only minimally greater opportunities for solicita-
tion out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeholders, unlike
party officers, can never step out of their official roles. Supra, at 183;
2 U. S. C. § 441i(e). Any concern that Congress might opportunistically

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186 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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B
Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress’
Election Clause authority to “make or alter” rules governing
federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, and, by impairing
the authority of the States to regulate their own elections,
violates constitutional principles of federalism. In examin-
ing congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth
Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on laws
that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying
out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United
States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U. S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regu-
lates the conduct of private parties. It imposes no require-
ments whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because
it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the
States free to enforce their own restrictions on the financing
of state electoral campaigns. It is true that Title I, as
amended, prohibits some fundraising tactics that would oth-
erwise be permitted under the laws of various States, and
that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing
of state electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do
not render BCRA unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for
federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some
States. See, e. g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buy-
pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into ac-
count by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete
evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or
gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of
regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption.
It has done so here. At bottom, Justice Kennedy has long disagreed
with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous scru-
tiny—which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where
it enjoys particular expertise—applies to assess limits on campaign contri-
butions. Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 465 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ( joining
Justice Thomas for the proposition that “Buckley should be overruled”
(citation omitted)); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 405–410 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).

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ers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483 (2001). Indeed, such conflict
is inevitable in areas of law that involve both state and fed-
eral concerns. It is not in and of itself a marker of constitu-
tional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 392
(1880).
Of course, in maintaining the federal system envisioned by
the Founders, this Court has done more than just prevent
Congress from commandeering the States. We have also
policed the absolute boundaries of congressional power under
Article I. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995). But
plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has over-
stepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA.
Congress has a fully legitimate interest in maintaining the
integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption
of federal electoral processes through the means it has cho-
sen. Indeed, our above analysis turns on our finding that
those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment
scrutiny. Given that finding, we cannot conclude that those
interests are insufficient to ground Congress’ exercise of its
Elections Clause power. See Morrison, supra, at 607 (re-
spect owed to coordinate branches “demands that we invali-
date a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing
that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds”).
C
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violates the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it discriminates against political parties
in favor of special interest groups such as the National Rifle
Association, American Civil Liberties Union, and Sierra
Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes numerous re-
strictions on the fundraising abilities of political parties, of
which the soft-money ban is only the most prominent. In-
terest groups, however, remain free to raise soft money
to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and

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188 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communica-
tions). We conclude that this disparate treatment does not
offend the Constitution.
As an initial matter, we note that BCRA actually favors
political parties in many ways. Most obviously, party com-
mittees are entitled to receive individual contributions that
substantially exceed FECA’s limits on contributions to non-
party political committees; individuals can give $25,000 to
political party committees whereas they can give a maximum
of $5,000 to nonparty political committees. In addition,
party committees are entitled in effect to contribute to candi-
dates by making coordinated expenditures, and those ex-
penditures may greatly exceed the contribution limits that
apply to other donors. See 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d) (Supp. II).
More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to
consider the real-world differences between political parties
and interest groups when crafting a system of campaign fi-
nance regulation. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S.,
at 210. Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for
elections. Interest groups do not determine who will serve
on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or
organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influ-
ence and power in the Legislature that vastly exceeds that
of any interest group. As a result, it is hardly surprising
that party affiliation is the primary way by which voters
identify candidates, or that parties in turn have special ac-
cess to and relationships with federal officeholders. Con-
gress’ efforts at campaign finance regulation may account for
these salient differences. Taken seriously, plaintiffs’ equal
protection arguments would call into question not just Title
I of BCRA, but much of the pre-existing structure of FECA
as well. We therefore reject those arguments.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court
insofar as it upheld §§ 323(e) and 323(f). We reverse the

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judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidated
§§ 323(a), 323(b), and 323(d).
IV
Title II of BCRA, entitled “Noncandidate Campaign Ex-
penditures,” is divided into two subtitles: “Electioneering
Communications” and “Independent and Coordinated Ex-
penditures.” We consider each challenged section of these
subtitles in turn.
BCRA § 201’s Definition of “Electioneering
Communications”
The first section of Title II, § 201, comprehensively amends
FECA § 304, which requires political committees to file de-
tailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The amend-
ment coins a new term, “electioneering communications,” to
replace the narrowing construction of FECA’s disclosure
provisions adopted by this Court in Buckley. As discussed
further below, that construction limited the coverage of
FECA’s disclosure requirement to communications expressly
advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates.
By contrast, the term “electioneering communication” is not
so limited, but is defined to encompass any “broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication” that
“(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal
office;
“(II) is made within—
“(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff elec-
tion for the office sought by the candidate; or
“(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election,
or a convention or caucus of a political party that has
authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought
by the candidate; and
“(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a
candidate for an office other than President or Vice

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190 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.” 2
U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II).73
New FECA § 304(f)(3)(C) further provides that a commu-
nication is “ ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ ” if it
“can be received by 50,000 or more persons” in the dis-
trict or State the candidate seeks to represent. 2 U. S. C.
§ 434(f)(3)(C).
In addition to setting forth this definition, BCRA’s amend-
ments to FECA § 304 specify significant disclosure require-
ments for persons who fund electioneering communications.
BCRA’s use of this new term is not, however, limited to the
disclosure context: A later section of the Act (BCRA § 203,
which amends FECA § 316(b)(2)) restricts corporations’ and
labor unions’ funding of electioneering communications.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the new term
as it applies in both the disclosure and the expenditure
contexts.
The major premise of plaintiffs’ challenge to BCRA’s use
of the term “electioneering communication” is that Buckley
drew a constitutionally mandated line between express advo-
cacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers possess
an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter
category of speech. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, Congress can-
not constitutionally require disclosure of, or regulate expend-
itures for, “electioneering communications” without making
an exception for those “communications” that do not meet
Buckley’s definition of express advocacy.
That position misapprehends our prior decisions, for the
express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory
interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law. In
73 BCRA also provides a “backup” definition of “electioneering communi-
cation,” which would become effective if the primary definition were “held
to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support the
regulation provided herein.” 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii). We uphold
all applications of the primary definition and accordingly have no occasion
to discuss the backup definition.

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Buckley we began by examining then-18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV), which restricted expenditures “ ‘relative
to a clearly identified candidate,’ ” and we found that the
phrase “ ‘relative to’ ” was impermissibly vague. 424 U. S.,
at 40–42. We concluded that the vagueness deficiencies
could “be avoided only by reading § 608(e)(1) as limited to
communications that include explicit words of advocacy of
election or defeat of a candidate.” 74 Id., at 43. We pro-
vided examples of words of express advocacy, such as “ ‘vote
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ . . . ‘defeat,’ [and] ‘reject,’ ” id., at 44,
n. 52, and those examples eventually gave rise to what is
now known as the “magic words” requirement.
We then considered FECA’s disclosure provisions, includ-
ing 2 U. S. C. § 431(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which defined
“ ‘expenditur[e]’ ” to include the use of money or other assets
“ ‘for the purpose of . . . influencing’ ” a federal election.
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 77. Finding that the “ambiguity of
this phrase” posed “constitutional problems,” ibid., we noted
our “obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done
consistent with the legislature’s purpose, to avoid the shoals
of vagueness,” id., at 77–78 (citations omitted). “To insure
that the reach” of the disclosure requirement was “not im-
permissibly broad, we construe[d] ‘expenditure’ for purposes
of that section in the same way we construed the terms of
§ 608(e)—to reach only funds used for communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identi-
fied candidate.” Id., at 80 (footnote omitted).
Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the ex-
press advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure and the
74 We then held that, so construed, the expenditure restriction did not
advance a substantial government interest, because independent express
advocacy did not pose a danger of real or apparent corruption, and the line
between express advocacy and other electioneering activities was easily
circumvented. Concluding that § 608(e)(1)’s heavy First Amendment bur-
den was not justified, we invalidated the provision. Buckley, 424 U. S.,
at 45–48.

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disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory interpreta-
tion rather than a constitutional command.75 In narrowly
reading the FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid problems
of vagueness and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a
statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be re-
quired to toe the same express advocacy line. Nor did we
suggest as much in MCFL, 479 U. S. 238 (1986), in which we
addressed the scope of another FECA expenditure limitation
and confirmed the understanding that Buckley’s express ad-
vocacy category was a product of statutory construction.76
In short, the concept of express advocacy and the concomi-
tant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid
constitutional infirmities. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)). We have long
“ ‘rigidly adhered’ ” to the tenet “ ‘never to formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied,’ ” United States v. Raines,
362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960) (citation omitted), for “[t]he nature of
judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actu-
ally before us,” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U. S. 529, 547 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Consistent
with that principle, our decisions in Buckley and MCFL
were specific to the statutory language before us; they in no
way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the
75 Our adoption of a narrowing construction was consistent with our
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 613;
Grayned, 408 U. S., at 108–114.
76 The provision at issue in MCFL—2 U. S. C. § 441b (1982 ed.)—re-
quired corporations and unions to use separate segregated funds, rather
than general treasury moneys, on expenditures made “ ‘in connection
with’ ” a federal election. 479 U. S., at 241. We noted that Buckley had
limited the statutory term “ ‘expenditure’ ” to words of express advocacy
“in order to avoid problems of overbreadth.” 479 U. S., at 248. We held
that “a similar construction” must apply to the expenditure limitation
before us in MCFL and that the reach of 2 U. S. C. § 441b was therefore
constrained to express advocacy. 479 U. S., at 249 (emphasis added).

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permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related
speech.
Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that
the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express
advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That notion cannot
be squared with our longstanding recognition that the pres-
ence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distin-
guish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. See Buck-
ley, supra, at 45. Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the
record in this litigation, as all three judges on the District
Court agreed, is that Buckley’s magic-words requirement is
functionally meaningless. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 303–304 (Hen-
derson, J.); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875–879
(Leon, J.). Not only can advertisers easily evade the line by
eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom
choose to use such words even if permitted.77 And although
the resulting advertisements do not urge the viewer to vote
for or against a candidate in so many words, they are no
less clearly intended to influence the election.78 Buckley’s
77 As one major-party political consultant testified, “ ‘it is rarely advis-
able to use such clumsy words as “vote for” or “vote against.” ’ ” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.) (quoting declaration of Douglas L. Bai-
ley, founder, Bailey, Deardourff & Assoc. 1–2, App. 24, ¶ 3). He explained:
“ ‘All advertising professionals understand that the most effective adver-
tising leads the viewer to his or her own conclusion without forcing it
down their throat.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Other polit-
ical professionals and academics confirm that the use of magic words has
become an anachronism. See id., at 531 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declara-
tion of Raymond D. Strother, Pres., Strother/Duffy/Strother ¶ 4, 9 Defs.
Exhs., Tab 40); see Unsealed Pp. Vol., Tab 7; App. 1334–1335 (Krasno &
Sorauf Expert Report); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.);
id., at 532 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875–876 (Leon, J.).
78 One striking example is an ad that a group called “Citizens for Re-
form” sponsored during the 1996 Montana congressional race, in which
Bill Yellowtail was a candidate. The ad stated:
“ ‘Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing
at his wife. And Yellowtail’s response? He only slapped her. But “her
nose was not broken.” He talks law and order . . . but is himself a con-

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194 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative
effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress
enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found in the existing
system.
Finally we observe that new FECA § 304(f)(3)’s definition
of “electioneering communication” raises none of the vague-
ness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley. The term
“electioneering communication” applies only (1) to a broad-
cast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office,
(3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to
an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners.
These components are both easily understood and objectively
determinable. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S.
104, 108–114 (1972). Thus, the constitutional objection that
persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA’s reach to
express advocacy is simply inapposite here.
BCRA § 201’s Disclosure Requirements
Having rejected the notion that the First Amendment re-
quires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently
from express advocacy, we turn to plaintiffs’ other concerns
about the use of the term “electioneering communication” in
amended FECA § 304’s disclosure provisions. Under those
provisions, whenever any person makes disbursements total-
ing more than $10,000 during any calendar year for the direct
costs of producing and airing electioneering communications,
he must file a statement with the FEC identifying the
pertinent elections and all persons sharing the costs of the
disbursements. 2 U. S. C. §§ 434(f)(2)(A), (B), and (D) (Supp.
II). If the disbursements are made from a corporation’s
victed felon. And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail
failed to make his own child support payments—then voted against child
support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family
values.’ ” 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority views).
The notion that this advertisement was designed purely to discuss the
issue of family values strains credulity.

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or labor union’s segregated account,79 or by a single indi-
vidual who has collected contributions from others, the state-
ment must identify all persons who contributed $1,000 or
more to the account or the individual during the calendar
year. §§ 434(f)(2)(E), (F). The statement must be filed
within 24 hours of each “disclosure date”—a term defined
to include the first date and all subsequent dates on which
a person’s aggregate undisclosed expenses for electioneer-
ing communications exceed $10,000 for that calendar year.
§§ 434(f)(1), (2), and (4). Another subsection further pro-
vides that the execution of a contract to make a disburse-
ment is itself treated as a disbursement for purposes of
FECA’s disclosure requirements. § 434(f)(5).
In addition to the failed argument that BCRA’s amend-
ments to FECA § 304 improperly extend to both express and
issue advocacy, plaintiffs challenge amended FECA § 304’s
disclosure requirements as unnecessarily (1) requiring disclo-
sure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more
to the individual or group that paid for a communication, and
(2) mandating disclosure of executory contracts for communi-
cations that have not yet aired. The District Court rejected
the former submission but accepted the latter, finding invalid
new FECA § 304(f)(5), which governs executory contracts.
Relying on BCRA’s severability provision,80 the court held
that invalidation of the executory contracts subsection did
79 As discussed below, infra, at 203–209, BCRA § 203 bars corporations
and labor unions from funding electioneering communications with money
from their general treasuries, instead requiring them to establish a “sepa-
rate segregated fund” for such expenditures. 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(2).
80 Section 401 of BCRA provides:
“If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act . . . , or
the application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance,
is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments
made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and amendment to
any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.” 2
U. S. C. § 454 note.

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196 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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not render the balance of BCRA’s amendments to FECA
§ 304 unconstitutional. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 242 (per curiam).
We agree with the District Court that the important state
interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold
FECA’s disclosure requirements—providing the electorate
with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding
any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to
enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions—apply
in full to BCRA.81 Accordingly, Buckley amply supports ap-
plication of FECA § 304’s disclosure requirements to the en-
tire range of “electioneering communications.” As the au-
thors of the District Court’s per curiam opinion concluded
after reviewing evidence concerning the use of purported
“issue ads” to influence federal elections:
“The factual record demonstrates that the abuse of the
present law not only permits corporations and labor
unions to fund broadcast advertisements designed to
influence federal elections, but permits them to do
so while concealing their identities from the public.
BCRA’s disclosure provisions require these organiza-
tions to reveal their identities so that the public is able
to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast
advertisements influencing certain elections. Plaintiffs’
disdain for BCRA’s disclosure provisions is nothing
short of surprising. Plaintiffs challenge BCRA’s re-
strictions on electioneering communications on the
premise that they should be permitted to spend corpo-
rate and labor union general treasury funds in the sixty
81 The disclosure requirements that BCRA § 201 added to FECA § 304
are actually somewhat less intrusive than the comparable requirements
that have long applied to persons making independent expenditures. For
example, the previous version of § 304 required groups making inde-
pendent expenditures to identify donors who contributed more than $200.
2 U. S. C. § 434(c)(2)(C). The comparable requirement in the amendments
applies only to donors of $1,000 or more. §§ 434(f)(2)(E), (F) (Supp. II).

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days before the federal elections on broadcast advertise-
ments, which refer to federal candidates, because speech
needs to be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ Mc-
Connell Br. at 44 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964)). Curiously, Plaintiffs
want to preserve the ability to run these advertisements
while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like:
‘The Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change’
(funded by business organizations opposed to organized
labor), ‘Citizens for Better Medicare’ (funded by the
pharmaceutical industry), ‘Republicans for Clean Air’
(funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly). Findings
¶¶ 44, 51, 52. Given these tactics, Plaintiffs never satis-
factorily answer the question of how ‘uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open’ speech can occur when organiza-
tions hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting
public. McConnell Br. at 44. Plaintiffs’ argument for
striking down BCRA’s disclosure provisions does not re-
inforce the precious First Amendment values that Plain-
tiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignores the com-
peting First Amendment interests of individual citizens
seeking to make informed choices in the political mar-
ketplace.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 237.
The District Court was also correct that Buckley fore-
closes a facial attack on the new provision in § 304 that re-
quires disclosure of the names of persons contributing $1,000
or more to segregated funds or individuals that spend more
than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communica-
tions. Like our earlier decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958), 82 Buckley recognized
82 NAACP v. Alabama arose out of a judgment holding the NAACP in
contempt for refusing to produce the names and addresses of its members
and agents in Alabama. The NAACP “made an uncontroverted showing
that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file mem-
bers ha[d] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employ-
ment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostil-

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198 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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that compelled disclosures may impose an unconstitutional
burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular
cause. Nevertheless, Buckley rejected the contention that
FECA’s disclosure requirements could not constitutionally
be applied to minor parties and independent candidates be-
cause the Government’s interest in obtaining information
from such parties was minimal and the danger of infringing
their rights substantial. In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we
found no evidence that any party had been exposed to eco-
nomic reprisals or physical threats as a result of the com-
pelled disclosures. 424 U. S., at 69–70. We acknowledged
that such a case might arise in the future, however, and ad-
dressed the standard of proof that would then apply:
“We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof
could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that
a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary.
Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the
proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their
claim. The evidence offered need show only a reason-
able probability that the compelled disclosure of a par-
ty’s contributors’ names will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government offi-
cials or private parties.” Id., at 74.
A few years later we used that standard to resolve a minor
party’s challenge to the constitutionality of the State of
Ohio’s disclosure requirements. We held that the First
Amendment prohibits States from compelling disclosures
that would subject identified persons to “threats, harass-
ment, and reprisals,” and that the District Court’s findings
ity.” 357 U. S., at 462. We thought it apparent that the compelled
disclosure would “affect adversely” the NAACP and its members’ ability
“to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly
have the right to advocate.” Id., at 462–463. Under these circum-
stances, we concluded that Alabama’s interest in determining whether the
NAACP was doing business in the State was plainly insufficient to justify
its production order. Id., at 464–466.

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had established a “reasonable probability” of such a result.83
Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio),
459 U. S. 87, 100 (1982).
In this litigation the District Court applied Buckley’s evi-
dentiary standard and found—consistent with our conclusion
in Buckley, and in contrast to that in Brown—that the evi-
dence did not establish the requisite “reasonable probability”
of harm to any plaintiff group or its members. The District
Court noted that some parties had expressed such concerns,
but it found a “lack of specific evidence about the basis for
these concerns.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 247 (per curiam). We
agree, but we note that, like our refusal to recognize a blan-
ket exception for minor parties in Buckley, our rejection of
plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the requirement to disclose indi-
vidual donors does not foreclose possible future challenges
to particular applications of that requirement.
We also are unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ challenge to new
FECA § 304(f)(5), which requires disclosure of executory
contracts for electioneering communications:
83 We stated:
“The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of
this case. The District Court found ‘substantial evidence of both govern-
mental and private hostility toward and harassment of [Socialist Workers
Party (SWP)] members and supporters.’ Appellees introduced proof of
specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and
its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents,
many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threaten-
ing phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruc-
tion of SWP members’ property, police harassment of a party candidate,
and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in
the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio,
were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants con-
tend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evi-
dence amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that ‘private hostility
and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to main-
tain employment.’ The District Court also found a past history of Gov-
ernment harassment of the SWP.” Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Cam-
paign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87, 98–99 (1982) (paragraph break omitted).

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200 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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“Contracts to disburse
“For purposes of this subsection, a person shall be
treated as having made a disbursement if the person
has executed a contract to make the disbursement.” 2
U. S. C. § 434(f)(5) (Supp. II).
In our view, this provision serves an important purpose the
District Court did not advance. BCRA’s amendments to
FECA § 304 mandate disclosure only if and when a person
makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any cal-
endar year to pay for electioneering communications. Plain-
tiffs do not take issue with the use of a dollar amount, rather
than the number or dates of the ads, to identify the time
when a person paying for electioneering communications
must make disclosures to the FEC. Nor do they question
the need to make the contents of parties’ disclosure state-
ments available to curious voters in advance of elections.
Given the relatively short timeframes in which electioneer-
ing communications are made, the interest in assuring that
disclosures are made promptly and in time to provide rel-
evant information to voters is unquestionably significant.
Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based
on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000
would open a significant loophole if advertisers were not re-
quired to disclose executory contracts. In the absence of
that requirement, political supporters could avoid preelec-
tion disclosures concerning ads slated to run during the final
week of a campaign simply by making a preelection down-
payment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after
the election. Indeed, if the advertiser waited to pay that
balance until the next calendar year then, as long as the bal-
ance did not itself exceed $10,000, the advertiser might avoid
the disclosure requirements completely.
The record contains little evidence identifying any harm
that might flow from the enforcement of § 304(f)(5)’s “ad-
vance” disclosure requirement. The District Court specu-
lated that disclosing information about contracts “that have

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not been performed, and may never be performed, may lead
to confusion and an unclear record upon which the public will
evaluate the forces operating in the political marketplace.”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (per curiam). Without evidence re-
lating to the frequency of nonperformance of executed con-
tracts, such speculation cannot outweigh the public interest
in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes
place. It is no doubt true that § 304(f)(5) will sometimes re-
quire the filing of disclosure statements in advance of the
actual broadcast of an advertisement.84 But the same would
be true in the absence of an advance disclosure requirement,
if a television station insisted on advance payment for all of
the ads covered by a contract. Thus, the possibility that
amended § 304 may sometimes require disclosures prior to
the airing of an ad is as much a function of the use of dis-
bursements (rather than the date of an ad) to trigger the
disclosure requirement as it is a function of § 304(f)(5)’s treat-
ment of executory contracts.
As the District Court observed, amended FECA § 304’s
disclosure requirements are constitutional because they
“ ‘d[o] not prevent anyone from speaking.’ ” Ibid. (quoting
Brief for FEC in Opposition in No. 02–582 et al. (DC), p. 112).
Moreover, the required disclosures “ ‘would not have to re-
veal the specific content of the advertisements, yet they
would perform an important function in informing the public
about various candidates’ supporters before election day.’ ”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition,
supra, at 112) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld the
disclosure requirements in amended FECA § 304 and re-
jected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors
84 We cannot judge the likelihood that this will occur, as the record con-
tains little if any description of the contractual provisions that commonly
govern payments for electioneering communications. Nor does the rec-
ord contain any evidence relating to Justice Kennedy’s speculation, post,
at 321, that advance disclosure may disadvantage an advertiser.

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202 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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of $1,000 or more, and reverse that judgment insofar as it
invalidated FECA § 304(f)(5).
BCRA § 202’s Treatment of “Coordinated
Communications” as Contributions
Section 202 of BCRA amends FECA § 315(a)(7)(C) to pro-
vide that disbursements for “electioneering communica-
tion[s]” that are coordinated with a candidate or party will
be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that can-
didate or party. 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(C) (Supp. II).85 The
amendment clarifies the scope of the preceding subsection,
§ 315(a)(7)(B), which states more generally that “expend-
itures made by any person in cooperation, consultation,
or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of ” a can-
didate or party will constitute contributions. 2 U. S. C.
§§ 441a(a)(7)(B)(i)–(ii) (2000 ed. and Supp. II). In Buckley
we construed the statutory term “expenditure” to reach only
spending for express advocacy. 424 U. S., at 40–44, and n. 52
(addressing 18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which
placed a $1,000 cap on expenditures “ ‘relative to a clearly
identified candidate’ ”). BCRA § 202 pre-empts a possible
claim that § 315(a)(7)(B) is similarly limited, such that coordi-
nated expenditures for communications that avoid express
advocacy cannot be counted as contributions. As we ex-
85 New FECA § 315(a)(7)(C) reads as follows:
“[I]f—
“(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any disbursement for any
electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 434(f)(3) of
this title); and
“(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or an authorized
committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or
committee thereof, or an agent or official of any such candidate, party,
or committee;
“such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a contribution to the
candidate supported by the electioneering communication or that candi-
date’s party and as an expenditure by that candidate or that candidate’s
party . . . .” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(C).

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plained above, see supra, at 190–193, Buckley’s narrow inter-
pretation of the term “expenditure” was not a constitutional
limitation on Congress’ power to regulate federal elections.
Accordingly, there is no reason why Congress may not treat
coordinated disbursements for electioneering communica-
tions in the same way it treats all other coordinated expendi-
tures. We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar
as it held that plaintiffs had advanced “no basis for finding
Section 202 unconstitutional.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 250.
BCRA § 203’s Prohibition of Corporate and Labor
Disbursements for Electioneering
Communications
Since our decision in Buckley, Congress’ power to prohibit
corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries
to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election
or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly
embedded in our law. The ability to form and administer
separate segregated funds authorized by FECA § 316, 2
U. S. C. § 441b (2000 ed. and Supp. II), has provided corpora-
tions and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportu-
nity to engage in express advocacy. That has been this
Court’s unanimous view,86 and it is not challenged in this
litigation.
86 We have explained:
“The statutory purpose of § 441b . . . is to prohibit contributions or
expenditures by corporations or labor organizations in connection with
federal elections. 2 U. S. C. § 441b(a). The section, however, permits
some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral proc-
ess by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of
‘separate segregated fund[s],’ which may be ‘utilized for political purposes.’
2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). The Act restricts the operations of such segre-
gated funds, however, by making it unlawful for a corporation to solicit
contributions to a fund established by it from persons other than its ‘stock-
holders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel
and their families.’ 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(A).” National Right to Work,
459 U. S., at 201–202.

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Section 203 of BCRA amends FECA § 316(b)(2) to extend
this rule, which previously applied only to express advocacy,
to all “electioneering communications” covered by the defi-
nition of that term in amended FECA § 304(f)(3), discussed
above. 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. II).87 Thus, under
BCRA, corporations and unions may not use their general
treasury funds to finance electioneering communications, but
they remain free to organize and administer segregated
funds, or PACs, for that purpose. Because corporations can
still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it
is “simply wrong” to view the provision as a “complete ban”
on expression rather than a regulation. Beaumont, 539
U. S., at 162. As we explained in Beaumont:
“The PAC option allows corporate political participation
without the temptation to use corporate funds for politi-
cal influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments
of some shareholders or members, and it lets the govern-
ment regulate campaign activity through registration
and disclosure, see [2 U. S. C.] §§ 432–434, without jeop-
ardizing the associational rights of advocacy organiza-
tions’ members.” Id., at 163 (citation omitted).
See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U. S. 652, 658 (1990).
Rather than arguing that the prohibition on the use of gen-
eral treasury funds is a complete ban that operates as a prior
restraint, plaintiffs instead challenge the expanded regula-
tion on the grounds that it is both overbroad and underinclu-
sive. Our consideration of plaintiffs’ challenge is informed
by our earlier conclusion that the distinction between ex-
87 The amendment is straightforward. Prior to BCRA, FECA § 316(a)
made it “unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever, or any labor organiza-
tion, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain
federal elections. 2 U. S. C. § 441b(a) (2000 ed.). BCRA amends FECA
§ 316(b)(2)’s definition of the term “contribution or expenditure” to include
“any applicable electioneering communication.” § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. II).

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press advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitu-
tionally compelled. In that light, we must examine the de-
gree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression
and evaluate whether a compelling governmental interest
justifies that burden. Id., at 657. The latter question—
whether the state interest is compelling—is easily answered
by our prior decisions regarding campaign finance regula-
tion, which “represent respect for the ‘legislative judgment
that the special characteristics of the corporate structure re-
quire particularly careful regulation.’ ” Beaumont, supra,
at 155 (quoting National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 209–
210). We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Aus-
tin, supra, at 660; see Beaumont, supra, at 154–155; Na-
tional Right to Work, supra, at 209–210. Moreover, recent
cases have recognized that certain restrictions on corporate
electoral involvement permissibly hedge against “ ‘circum-
vention of [valid] contribution limits.’ ” Beaumont, supra,
at 155 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 456, and n. 18.)
In light of our precedents, plaintiffs do not contest that the
Government has a compelling interest in regulating adver-
tisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office. Nor do they contend that the
speech involved in so-called issue advocacy is any more core
political speech than are words of express advocacy. After
all, “the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most ur-
gent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office,” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265,
272 (1971), and “[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candi-
dates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under
the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy
generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation,”
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48. Rather, plaintiffs argue that

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the justifications that adequately support the regulation of
express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities
of speech encompassed by the definition of electioneering
communications.
This argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broad-
cast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal pri-
mary and general elections are the functional equivalent of
express advocacy. The justifications for the regulation of
express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those pe-
riods if the ads are intended to influence the voters’ decisions
and have that effect. The precise percentage of issue ads
that clearly identified a candidate and were aired during
those relatively brief preelection timespans but had no elec-
tioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties
and among the judges on the District Court. See 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 307–312 (Henderson, J.); id., at 583–587
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 796–798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless,
the vast majority of ads clearly had such a purpose. An-
nenberg Report 13–14; App. 1330–1348 (Krasno & Sorauf Ex-
pert Report); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 573–578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.);
id., at 826–827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise
percentage may have been in the past, in the future corpora-
tions and unions may finance genuine issue ads during those
timeframes by simply avoiding any specific reference to fed-
eral candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad
from a segregated fund.88
88 As Justice Kennedy emphasizes in dissent, post, at 326–328, we as-
sume that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech
might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads. The premise that
apparently underlies Justice Kennedy’s principal submission is a conclu-
sion that the two categories of speech are nevertheless entitled to the
same constitutional protection. If that is correct, Justice Kennedy
must take issue with the basic holding in Buckley and, indeed, with our
recognition in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978),
that unusually important interests underlie the regulation of corporations’
campaign-related speech. In Bellotti we cited Buckley, among other
cases, for the proposition that “[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral

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We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have car-
ried their heavy burden of proving that amended FECA
§ 316(b)(2) is overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U. S. 601, 613 (1973). Even if we assumed that BCRA will
inhibit some constitutionally protected corporate and union
speech, that assumption would not “justify prohibiting all
enforcement” of the law unless its application to protected
speech is substantial, “not only in an absolute sense, but also
relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate applica-
tions.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 120 (2003). Far
from establishing that BCRA’s application to pure issue ads
is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to
its application to election-related advertising, the record
strongly supports the contrary conclusion.
Plaintiffs also argue that FECA § 316(b)(2)’s segregated-
fund requirement for electioneering communications is un-
derinclusive because it does not apply to advertising in
the print media or on the Internet. 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)
(3)(A) (Supp. II). The records developed in this litiga-
tion and by the Senate Committee adequately explain the
reasons for this legislative choice. Congress found that
corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual
torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods
immediately preceding federal elections, and that remedial
legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 569–573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 799 (Leon,
J.); 3 1998 Senate Report 4465, 4474–4481; 5 id., at 7521–7525.
As we held in Buckley, “reform may take one step at a time,
process, preventing corruption, and ‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsi-
bility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the
government’ are interests of the highest importance.” 435 U. S., at 788–
789 (citations and footnote omitted). “Preservation of the individual citi-
zen’s confidence in government,” we added, “is equally important.” Id.,
at 789. BCRA’s fidelity to those imperatives sets it apart from the statute
in Bellotti—and, for that matter, from the Ohio statute banning the distri-
bution of anonymous campaign literature, struck down in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995).

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208 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind.” 424 U. S., at 105 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted). One might just
as well argue that the electioneering communication defini-
tion is underinclusive because it leaves advertising 61 days
in advance of an election entirely unregulated. The record
amply justifies Congress’ line-drawing.
In addition to arguing that § 316(b)(2)’s segregated-fund
requirement is underinclusive, some plaintiffs contend that it
unconstitutionally discriminates in favor of media companies.
FECA § 304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes from the definition of elec-
tioneering communications any “communication appearing in
a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through
the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facil-
ities are owned or controlled by any political party, po-
litical committee, or candidate.” 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i)
(Supp. II). Plaintiffs argue this provision gives free rein
to media companies to engage in speech without resort to
PAC money. Section 304(f)(3)(B)(i)’s effect, however, is
much narrower than plaintiffs suggest. The provision ex-
cepts news items and commentary only; it does not af-
ford carte blanche to media companies generally to ig-
nore FECA’s provisions. The statute’s narrow exception
is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles.
“A valid distinction . . . exists between corporations that are
part of the media industry and other corporations that are
not involved in the regular business of imparting news to
the public.” Austin, 494 U. S., at 668. Numerous federal
statutes have drawn this distinction to ensure that the law
“does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from re-
porting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy
events.” Ibid. (citations omitted); see, e. g., 2 U. S. C.
§ 431(9)(B)(i) (exempting news stories, commentaries, and ed-
itorials from FECA’s definition of “expenditure”); 15 U. S. C.
§§ 1801–1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption for
newspapers); 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) (excepting newscasts, news

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interviews, and news documentaries from the requirement
that broadcasters provide equal time to candidates for pub-
lic office).89
We affirm the District Court’s judgment to the extent that
it upheld the constitutionality of FECA § 316(b)(2); to the
extent that it invalidated any part of § 316(b)(2), we reverse
the judgment.
BCRA § 204’s Application to Nonprofit Corporations
Section 204 of BCRA, which adds FECA § 316(c)(6), ap-
plies the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to
pay for electioneering communications to not-for-profit cor-
porations.90 Prior to the enactment of BCRA, FECA re-
89 In a different but somewhat related argument, one set of plaintiffs
contends that political campaigns and issue advocacy involve press activi-
ties, and that BCRA therefore interferes with speakers’ rights under the
Freedom of the Press Clause. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. We affirm the Dis-
trict Court’s conclusion that this contention lacks merit.
90 The statutory scheme is somewhat complex. In its provision deal-
ing with “Rules Relating to Electioneering Communications,” BCRA
§ 203(c)(2) (adding FECA § 316(c)(2)) makes a blanket exception for desig-
nated nonprofit organizations, which reads as follows:
“Exception
“Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the term ‘applicable electioneering
communication’ does not include a communication by a section 501(c)(4)
organization or a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of
title 26) made under section 434(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this title if the communi-
cation is paid for exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who
are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent
residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of title 8). For purposes of the
preceding sentence, the term ‘provided directly by individuals’ does not
include funds the source of which is an entity described in subsection (a)
of this section.” 2 U. S. C. § 441b(c)(2) (Supp. II).
BCRA § 204, however, amends FECA § 316(c) to exclude “targeted
communications” from that exception. New FECA § 316(c)(6) states that
the § 316(c)(2) exception “shall not apply in the case of a targeted com-
munication that is made by an organization described” in § 316(b)(2). 2
U. S. C. § 441b(c)(6)(A). Subparagraph (B) then defines the term “tar-
geted communication” for the purpose of the provision as including all

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210 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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quired such corporations, like business corporations, to pay
for their express advocacy from segregated funds rather
than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in
Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 (2003),
confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as
it applied to a subcategory of corporations described as
“MCFL organizations,” as defined by our decision in MCFL,
479 U. S. 238 (1986).91 The constitutional objection to apply-
ing FECA’s segregated-fund requirement to so-called MCFL
organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA
§ 316(c)(6).
Our decision in MCFL related to a carefully defined cate-
gory of entities. We identified three features of the organi-
zation at issue in that case that were central to our holding:
“First, it was formed for the express purpose of promot-
ing political ideas, and cannot engage in business activi-
ties. If political fundraising events are expressly de-
nominated as requests for contributions that will be
used for political purposes, including direct expendi-
tures, these events cannot be considered business activi-
ties. This ensures that political resources reflect politi-
cal support. Second, it has no shareholders or other
persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or
earnings. This ensures that persons connected with
electioneering communications. The parties and the judges on the Dis-
trict Court have assumed that amended FECA § 316(c)(6) completely can-
celed the exemption for nonprofit corporations set forth in § 316(c)(2). 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) (“Section 204 completely cancels out the
exemption for all nonprofit corporations provided by Section 203”).
91 “[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the
regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to so-
licit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation’s
sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at 201–202.
There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any
greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here.” Beaumont, 539
U. S., at 163.

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the organization will have no economic disincentive for
disassociating with it if they disagree with its political
activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a busi-
ness corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not
to accept contributions from such entities. This pre-
vents such corporations from serving as conduits for the
type of direct spending that creates a threat to the polit-
ical marketplace.” Id., at 264.
That FECA § 316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL
organizations from its prohibition is not a sufficient reason
to invalidate the entire section. If a reasonable limiting con-
struction “has been or could be placed on the challenged stat-
ute” to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it.
Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 613; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44. Be-
cause our decision in the MCFL case was on the books for
many years before BCRA was enacted, we presume that the
legislators who drafted § 316(c)(6) were fully aware that the
provision could not validly apply to MCFL-type entities.
See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 896 (1988); Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696–697 (1979).
Indeed, the Government itself concedes that § 316(c)(6) does
not apply to MCFL organizations. As so construed, the pro-
vision is plainly valid. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 661–665
(holding that a segregated-fund requirement that did not ex-
plicitly carve out an MCFL exception could apply to a non-
profit corporation that did not qualify for MCFL status).
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court upholding
§ 316(c)(6) as so limited is affirmed.
BCRA § 212’s Reporting Requirement for
$1,000 Expenditures
Section 212 of BCRA amends FECA § 304 to add a new
disclosure requirement, FECA § 304(g), which applies to per-
sons making independent expenditures of $1,000 or more
during the 20-day period immediately preceding an election.

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Like FECA § 304(f)(5), discussed above, new § 304(g) treats
the execution of a contract to make a disbursement as the
functional equivalent of a payment for the goods or services
covered by the contract.92 In challenging this provision,
plaintiffs renew the argument we rejected in the context of
§ 304(f)(5): that they have a constitutional right to postpone
any disclosure until after the performance of the services
purchased by their expenditure.
The District Court held that the challenge to FECA
§ 304(g) was not ripe because the FEC has issued regulations
“provid[ing] Plaintiffs with the exact remedy they seek”—
that is, specifically declining to “require disclosure of inde-
pendent express advocacy expenditures prior to their ‘pub-
li[c] disseminat[ion].’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 251, and n. 85 (per
curiam) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (codified at
11 CFR §§ 109.10(c), (d) (2003))). We are not certain that
a regulation purporting to limit the range of circumstances
in which a speech-burdening statute will be enforced can
render nonjusticiable a facial challenge to the (concededly
broader) underlying statute. Nevertheless, we need not
separately address the constitutionality of § 304(g), for our
ruling as to BCRA § 201, see supra, at 194–202, renders the
issue essentially moot.
92 New FECA § 304(g) provides:
“Time for reporting certain expenditures
“(1) Expenditures aggregating $1,000
“(A) Initial report
“A person (including a political committee) that makes or contracts to
make independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th
day, but more than 24 hours, before the date of an election shall file a
report describing the expenditures within 24 hours.
“(B) Additional reports
“After a person files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall
file an additional report within 24 hours after each time the person makes
or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating an additional
$1,000 with respect to the same election as that to which the initial report
relates.” 2 U. S. C. § 434(g) (Supp. II).

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BCRA § 213’s Requirement that Political Parties
Choose Between Coordinated and Independent
Expenditures After Nominating a Candidate
Section 213 of BCRA amends FECA § 315(d)(4) to impose
certain limits on party spending during the postnomination,
preelection period.93 At first blush, the text of § 315(d)(4)(A)
appears to require political parties to make a straightfor-
ward choice between using limited coordinated expenditures
or unlimited independent expenditures to support their
nominees. All three judges on the District Court concluded
that the provision placed an unconstitutional burden on the
parties’ right to make unlimited independent expenditures.
93 New FECA § 315(d)(4) reads as follows:
“Independent versus coordinated expenditures by party
“(A) In general
“On or after the date on which a political party nominates a candidate,
no committee of the political party may make—
“(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to
the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any
independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with
respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or
“(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this
title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time
after it makes any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with
respect to the candidate during the election cycle.
“(B) Application
“For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and
maintained by a national political party (including all congressional cam-
paign committees) and all political committees established and maintained
by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State
committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee.
“(C) Transfers
“A committee of a political party that makes coordinated expenditures
under this subsection with respect to a candidate shall not, during an
election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated
expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of funds from,
a committee of the political party that has made or intends to make an
independent expenditure with respect to the candidate.” 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a(d)(4) (Supp. II).

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251 F. Supp. 2d, at 388 (Henderson, J.); id., at 650–651
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.), id., at 805–808 (Leon, J.). In the end, we
agree with that conclusion but believe it important to iden-
tify certain complexities in the text of § 315(d)(4) that affect
our analysis of the issue.
Section 315 of FECA sets forth various limitations on con-
tributions and expenditures by individuals, political parties,
and other groups. Section 315(a)(2) restricts “contributions”
by parties to $5,000 per candidate. 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(2).
Because § 315(a)(7) treats expenditures that are coordinated
with a candidate as contributions to that candidate, 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a(a)(7) (2000 ed. and Supp. II), the $5,000 limit also
operates as a cap on parties’ coordinated expenditures.
Section 315(d), however, provides that, “[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law with respect to limitations on ex-
penditures or limitations on contributions,” political parties
may make “expenditures” in support of their candidates
under a formula keyed to the voting-age population of the
candidate’s home State or, in the case of a candidate for
President, the voting-age population of the United States.
2 U. S. C. §§ 441a(d)(1)–(3) (2000 ed. and Supp. II).94 In
94 After exempting political parties from the general contribution and
expenditure limitations of the statute, 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(1) (Supp. II),
FECA § 315(d) imposes the following substitute limitations on party
spending:
“(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any ex-
penditure in connection with the general election campaign of any candi-
date for President of the United States who is affiliated with such party
which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age
population of the United States (as certified under subsection (e) of this
section). Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition to
any expenditure by a national committee of a political party serving as
the principal campaign committee of a candidate for the office of President
of the United States.
“(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of
a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State commit-
tee, may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election

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the year 2000, that formula permitted expenditures ranging
from $33,780 to $67,650 for House of Representatives races,
and from $67,650 to $1.6 million for Senate races. Colorado
II, 533 U. S., at 439, n. 3. We held in Colorado I that parties
have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent
expenditures, and we invalidated § 315(d) to the extent that
it restricted such expenditures. As a result of that decision,
§ 315(d) applies only to coordinated expenditures, replacing
the $5,000 cap on contributions set out in § 315(a)(2) with
the more generous limitations prescribed by §§ 315(d)(1)–(3).
We sustained that limited application in Colorado II, supra.
Section 213 of BCRA amends § 315(d) by adding a new
paragraph (4). New § 315(d)(4)(A) provides that, after a
party nominates a candidate for federal office, it must choose
between two spending options. Under the first option, a
party that “makes any independent expenditure (as de-
fined in section [301(17)])” is thereby barred from making
“any coordinated expenditure under this subsection.” 2
U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. II). The phrase “this sub-
section” is a reference to subsection (d) of § 315. Thus, the
consequence of making an independent expenditure is not a
complete prohibition of any coordinated expenditure: Al-
though the party cannot take advantage of the increased
spending limits under §§ 315(d)(1)–(3), it still may make up
to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures under § 315(a)(2). As
the difference between $5,000 and $1.6 million demonstrates,
campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with
such party which exceeds—
“(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of
Representative from a State which is entitled to only one Representative,
the greater of—
“(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as
certified under subsection (e) of this section); or
“(ii) $20,000; and
“(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Representa-
tive, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000.” 2
U. S. C. §§ 441a(d)(2)–(3).

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216 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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however, that is a significant cost to impose on the exercise
of a constitutional right.
The second option is the converse of the first. It provides
that a party that makes any coordinated expenditure “under
this subsection” (i. e., one that exceeds the ordinary $5,000
limit) cannot make “any independent expenditure (as defined
in section [301(17)]) with respect to the candidate.” 2
U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4)(A)(ii). Section 301(17) defines “ ‘inde-
pendent expenditure’ ” to mean a noncoordinated expendi-
ture “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate.” 2 U. S. C. § 431(17)(A).95 Therefore,
as was true of the first option, the party’s choice is not
as stark as it initially appears: The consequence of the larger
coordinated expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any
independent expenditure, but the forfeiture of the right to
make independent expenditures for express advocacy. As
we explained in our discussion of the provisions relating to
electioneering communications, supra, at 189–194, express
advocacy represents only a tiny fraction of the political com-
munications made for the purpose of electing or defeating
candidates during a campaign. Regardless of which option
parties choose, they remain free to make independent ex-
95 As amended by BCRA, § 301(17) provides:
“Independent expenditure
“The term ‘independent expenditure’ means an expenditure by a
person—
“(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate; and
“(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request
or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political com-
mittee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2
U. S. C. § 431(17) (Supp. II).
The version of the definition prior to its amendment by BCRA also
included the phrase “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate.” 2 U. S. C. § 431(17) (2000 ed.). That defini-
tion had been adopted in 1976, presumably to reflect the narrowing con-
struction that the Court adopted in Buckley. Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475.

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penditures for the vast majority of campaign ads that avoid
the use of a few magic words.
In sum, the coverage of new FECA § 315(d)(4) is much
more limited than it initially appears. A party that wishes
to spend more than $5,000 in coordination with its nominee
is forced to forgo only the narrow category of independent
expenditures that make use of magic words. But while the
category of burdened speech is relatively small, it plainly is
entitled to First Amendment protection. See Buckley, 424
U. S., at 44–45, 48. Under § 315(d)(4), a political party’s ex-
ercise of its constitutionally protected right to engage in
“core First Amendment expression,” id., at 48, results in the
loss of a valuable statutory benefit that has been available to
parties for many years. To survive constitutional scrutiny,
a provision that has such consequences must be supported
by a meaningful governmental interest.
The interest in requiring political parties to avoid the use
of magic words is not such an interest. We held in Buckley
that a $1,000 cap on expenditures that applied only to ex-
press advocacy could not be justified as a means of avoiding
circumvention of contribution limits or preventing corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption because its restrictions
could easily be evaded: “So long as persons and groups es-
chew expenditures that in express terms advocate the elec-
tion or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free
to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and
his views.” Id., at 45. The same is true in this litigation.
Any claim that a restriction on independent express advo-
cacy serves a strong Government interest is belied by the
overwhelming evidence that the line between express advo-
cacy and other types of election-influencing expression is, for
Congress’ purposes, functionally meaningless. Indeed, Con-
gress enacted the new “electioneering communication[s]”
provisions precisely because it recognized that the express
advocacy test was woefully inadequate at capturing commu-
nications designed to influence candidate elections. In light
of that recognition, we are hard pressed to conclude that any

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218 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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meaningful purpose is served by § 315(d)(4)’s burden on a
party’s right to engage independently in express advocacy.
The Government argues that § 315(d)(4) nevertheless is
constitutional because it is not an outright ban (or cap) on
independent expenditures, but rather offers parties a volun-
tary choice between a constitutional right and a statutory
benefit. Whatever merit that argument might have in the
abstract, it fails to account for new § 315(d)(4)(B), which
provides:
“For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees
established and maintained by a national political party
(including all congressional campaign committees) and
all political committees established and maintained by a
State political party (including any subordinate commit-
tee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a
single political committee.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4)(B)
(Supp. II).
Given that provision, it simply is not the case that each
party committee can make a voluntary and independent
choice between exercising its right to engage in independent
advocacy and taking advantage of the increased limits on
coordinated spending under §§ 315(d)(1)–(3). Instead, the
decision resides solely in the hands of the first mover, such
that a local party committee can bind both the state and na-
tional parties to its chosen spending option.96 It is one thing
to say that Congress may require a party committee to give
96 Although the District Court and all the parties to this litigation en-
dorse the interpretation set forth in the text, it is not clear that subpara-
graph (B) should be read so broadly: The reference to “a State” instead of
“the States” suggests that Congress meant to distinguish between com-
mittees associated with the party for each State (which would be grouped
together by State, with each grouping treated as a single committee for
purposes of the choice) and committees associated with a national party
(which would likewise be grouped together and treated as a separate polit-
ical committee). We need not resolve the interpretive puzzle, however,
because even under the more limited reading a local party committee
would be able to tie the hands of a state committee or other local commit-
tees in the same State.

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up its right to make independent expenditures if it believes
that it can accomplish more with coordinated expenditures.
It is quite another thing, however, to say that the RNC must
limit itself to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures in support
of its Presidential nominee if any state or local committee
first makes an independent expenditure for an ad that uses
magic words. That odd result undermines any claim that
new § 315(d)(4) can withstand constitutional scrutiny simply
because it is cast as a voluntary choice rather than an out-
right prohibition on independent expenditures.
The portion of the judgment of the District Court invali-
dating BCRA § 213 is affirmed.
BCRA § 214’s Changes in FECA’s Provisions Covering
Coordinated Expenditures
Ever since our decision in Buckley, it has been settled that
expenditures by a noncandidate that are “controlled by or
coordinated with the candidate and his campaign” may be
treated as indirect contributions subject to FECA’s source
and amount limitations. 424 U. S., at 46. Thus, FECA
§ 315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that “expenditures made
by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with,
or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized
political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to
be a contribution to such candidate.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)
(7)(B)(i). Section 214(a) of BCRA creates a new FECA
§ 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) that applies the same rule to expendi-
tures coordinated with “a national, State, or local commit-
tee of a political party.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp.
II).97 Sections 214(b) and (c) direct the FEC to repeal
97 The italicized portion of the following partial quotation of FECA
§ 315(a)(7) was added by § 214 of BCRA:
“For purposes of this subsection—
“(A) contributions to a named candidate made to any political committee
authorized by such candidate to accept contributions on his behalf shall be
considered to be contributions made to such candidate;
“(B)(i) expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation,
or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his author-

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220 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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its current regulations 98 and to promulgate new regulations
dealing with “coordinated communications” paid for by per-
sons other than candidates or their parties. Subsection
(c) provides that the new “regulations shall not require
agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination.”
Note following 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a) (Supp. II).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress may apply the same
coordination rules to parties as to candidates. They argue
instead that new FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) and its implement-
ing regulations are overbroad and unconstitutionally vague
because they permit a finding of coordination even in the
absence of an agreement. Plaintiffs point out that political
supporters may be subjected to criminal liability if they ex-
ceed the contribution limits with expenditures that ulti-
mately are deemed coordinated. Thus, they stress the im-
portance of a clear definition of “coordination” and argue any
definition that does not hinge on the presence of an agree-
ment cannot provide the “precise guidance” that the First
Amendment demands. Brief for Appellant Chamber of
Commerce of the United States et al. in No. 02–1756, p. 48.
As plaintiffs readily admit, that argument reaches beyond
BCRA, calling into question FECA’s pre-existing provisions
governing expenditures coordinated with candidates.
ized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a con-
tribution to such candidate;
“(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a candidate or can-
didate’s authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert
with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local commit-
tee of a political party, shall be considered to be contributions made to
such party committee . . . .” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7) (2000 ed. and Supp. II).
98 Pre-BCRA FEC regulations defined coordinated expenditures to in-
clude expenditures made “[a]t the request or suggestion of ” a candidate
or party; communications in which a candidate or party “exercised control
or decision-making authority over the content, timing, location, mode, in-
tended audience, volume of distribution, or frequency of placement”; and
communications produced “[a]fter substantial discussion or negotiation”
with a party or candidate, “the result of which is collaboration or agree-
ment.” 11 CFR § 100.23(c)(2) (2001).

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We are not persuaded that the presence of an agreement
marks the dividing line between expenditures that are coor-
dinated—and therefore may be regulated as indirect contri-
butions—and expenditures that truly are independent. We
repeatedly have struck down limitations on expenditures
“made totally independently of the candidate and his cam-
paign,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47, on the ground that such
limitations “impose far greater restraints on the freedom of
speech and association” than do limits on contributions and
coordinated expenditures, id., at 44, while “fail[ing] to serve
any substantial governmental interest in stemming the real-
ity or appearance of corruption in the electoral process,” id.,
at 47–48. See also Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 613–614 (strik-
ing down limit on expenditure made by party officials prior
to nomination of candidates and without any consultation
with potential nominees). We explained in Buckley:
“Unlike contributions, . . . independent expenditures
may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s cam-
paign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an ex-
penditure with the candidate or his agent not only un-
dermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate,
but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from
the candidate.” 424 U. S., at 47.
Thus, the rationale for affording special protection to
wholly independent expenditures has nothing to do with the
absence of an agreement and everything to do with the func-
tional consequences of different types of expenditures. In-
dependent expenditures “are poor sources of leverage for a
spender because they might be duplicative or counterproduc-
tive from a candidate’s point of view.” Colorado II, 533
U. S., at 446. By contrast, expenditures made after a “wink
or nod” often will be “as useful to the candidate as cash.”
Id., at 442, 446. For that reason, Congress has always

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treated expenditures made “at the request or suggestion of ”
a candidate as coordinated.99 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). A
supporter easily could comply with a candidate’s request or
suggestion without first agreeing to do so, and the resulting
expenditure would be “ ‘virtually indistinguishable from
[a] simple contributio[n],’ ” Colorado II, supra, at 444–445.
Therefore, we cannot agree with the submission that new
FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is overbroad because it permits a
finding of coordination or cooperation notwithstanding the
absence of a pre-existing agreement.
Nor are we persuaded that the absence of an agreement
requirement renders § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally
vague. An agreement has never been required to support a
finding of coordination with a candidate under § 315(a)(7)
(B)(i), which refers to expenditures made “in cooperation,
consultation, or concer[t] with, or at the request or sugges-
tion of ” a candidate. Congress used precisely the same lan-
guage in new § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) to address expenditures coor-
dinated with parties. FECA’s longstanding definition of
coordination “delineates its reach in words of common under-
standing.” Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 616 (1968).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the relevant statutory language
has survived without constitutional challenge for almost
three decades. Although that fact does not insulate the
definition from constitutional scrutiny, it does undermine
plaintiffs’ claim that the language of § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is intol-
erably vague. Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that
99 Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the statutory framework was not
significantly different at the time of our decision in Buckley. The rele-
vant provision, 18 U. S. C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), treated as coor-
dinated any expenditures “authorized or requested by the candidate.”
(Emphasis added.) And the legislative history, on which we relied for
“guidance in differentiating individual expenditures that are contributions
. . . from those treated as independent expenditures,” described as “inde-
pendent” an expenditure made by a supporter “ ‘completely on his own,
and not at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his agen[t].’ ” 424
U. S., at 46–47, n. 53 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93–689, p. 18 (1974)).

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the definition has chilled political speech, whether between
candidates and their supporters or by the supporters to the
general public. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U. S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting risk that vague stat-
utes may chill protected expression). And, although plain-
tiffs speculate that the FEC could engage in intrusive and
politically motivated investigations into alleged coordination,
they do not even attempt to explain why an agreement re-
quirement would solve that problem. Moreover, the only
evidence plaintiffs have adduced regarding the enforcement
of the coordination provision during its 27-year history con-
cerns three investigations in the late 1990’s into groups on
different sides of the political aisle. Such meager evidence
does not support the claim that § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) will “fos-
ter ‘arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ ” Buckley,
supra, at 41, n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U. S., at 108–109). We conclude that FECA’s definition of
coordination gives “fair notice to those to whom [it] is di-
rected,” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339
U. S. 382, 412 (1950), and is not unconstitutionally vague.
Finally, portions of plaintiffs’ challenge to BCRA § 214
focus on the regulations the FEC has promulgated under
§ 214(c). 11 CFR § 109.21 (2003). As the District Court ex-
plained, issues concerning the regulations are not appropri-
ately raised in this facial challenge to BCRA, but must be
pursued in a separate proceeding. Thus, we agree with the
District Court that plaintiffs’ challenge to §§ 214(b) and (c) is
not ripe to the extent that the alleged constitutional infirmi-
ties are found in the implementing regulations rather than
the statute itself.
The portions of the District Court judgment rejecting
plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA § 214 are affirmed.
V
Many years ago we observed that “[t]o say that Congress
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safe-

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224 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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guard . . . an election from the improper use of money to
influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particu-
lar the power of self protection.” Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U. S., at 545. We abide by that conviction in con-
sidering Congress’ most recent effort to confine the ill effects
of aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under
no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional state-
ment on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an
outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will
respond, are concerns for another day. In the main we
uphold BCRA’s two principal, complementary features: the
control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering
communications. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse
in part the District Court’s judgment with respect to Titles
I and II.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV.*
This opinion addresses issues involving miscellaneous Title
III and IV provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81. For the reasons discussed
below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court with
respect to these provisions.
BCRA § 305
BCRA § 305 amends the federal Communications Act of
1934 (Communications Act) § 315(b), 48 Stat. 1088, as
amended, 86 Stat. 4, which requires that, 45 days before a
primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast sta-
tions must sell a qualified candidate the “lowest unit charge
*Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Souter join this opinion in its entirety. Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this opinion, except with respect to
BCRA § 305. Justice Thomas joins this opinion with respect to BCRA
§§ 304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b).

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of the station for the same class and amount of time for the
same period,” 47 U. S. C. § 315(b)(1). Section 305’s amend-
ment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that lowest
unit charge unless the candidate “provides written certifica-
tion to the broadcast station that the candidate (and any au-
thorized committee of the candidate) shall not make any di-
rect reference to another candidate for the same office,” or
the candidate, in the manner prescribed in BCRA § 305(a)(3),
clearly identifies herself at the end of the broadcast and
states that she approves of the broadcast. 47 U. S. C.
§§ 315(b)(2)(A), (C) (Supp. II).
The McConnell plaintiffs challenge § 305. They argue
that Senator McConnell’s testimony that he plans to run ad-
vertisements critical of his opponents in the future and that
he had run them in the past is sufficient to establish standing.
We think not.
Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial power”
to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.” One ele-
ment of the “bedrock” case-or-controversy requirement is
that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997). On many occa-
sions, we have reiterated the three requirements that consti-
tute the “ ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ ” of standing.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 771 (2000). First, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an “injury in fact,” which is “concrete,” “dis-
tinct and palpable,” and “actual or imminent.” Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Second, a plaintiff must establish
“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result
[of] some third party not before the court.’ ” Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992) (quoting
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U. S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). Third, a plaintiff must show the

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“ ‘substantial likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy
the alleged injury in fact.” Stevens, supra, at 771.
As noted above, § 305 amended the Communications Act’s
requirements with respect to the lowest unit charge for
broadcasting time. But this price is not available to quali-
fied candidates until 45 days before a primary election or 60
days before a general election. Because Senator McCon-
nell’s current term does not expire until 2009, the earliest
day he could be affected by § 305 is 45 days before the Re-
publican primary election in 2008. This alleged injury in
fact is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III standing.
See Whitmore, supra, at 158 (“A threatened injury must be
certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983) (A plaintiff seeking injunc-
tive relief must show he is “ ‘immediately in danger of sus-
taining some direct injury’ as [a] result” of the challenged
conduct). Because we hold that the McConnell plaintiffs
lack standing to challenge § 305, we affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of the challenge to BCRA § 305.
BCRA § 307
BCRA § 307, which amends § 315(a)(1) of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as added, 90
Stat. 487, increases and indexes for inflation certain FECA
contribution limits. The Adams and Paul plaintiffs chal-
lenge § 307 in this Court. Both groups contend that they
have standing to sue. Again, we disagree.
The Adams plaintiffs, a group consisting of voters, organi-
zations representing voters, and candidates, allege two in-
juries, and argue each is legally cognizable, “as established
by case law outlawing electoral discrimination based on eco-
nomic status . . . and upholding the right to an equally mean-
ingful vote . . . .” Brief for Appellant Adams et al. in
No. 02–1740, p. 31.

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First, they assert that the increases in hard-money limits
enacted by § 307 deprive them of an equal ability to partici-
pate in the election process based on their economic status.
But, to satisfy our standing requirements, a plaintiff ’s al-
leged injury must be an invasion of a concrete and particular-
ized legally protected interest. Lujan, supra, at 560. We
have noted that “[a]lthough standing in no way depends on
the merits of the plaintiff ’s contention that particular con-
duct is illegal, . . . it often turns on the nature and source of
the claim asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500
(1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We
have never recognized a legal right comparable to the broad
and diffuse injury asserted by the Adams plaintiffs. Their
reliance on this Court’s voting rights cases is misplaced.
They rely on cases requiring nondiscriminatory access to the
ballot and a single, equal vote for each voter. See, e. g.,
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974) (invalidating a statute
requiring a ballot-access fee fixed at a percentage of the sal-
ary for the office sought because it unconstitutionally bur-
dened the right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U. S. 663, 666–668 (1966) (invalidating a state poll tax
because it effectively denied the right to vote).
None of these plaintiffs claims a denial of equal access to
the ballot or the right to vote. Instead, the plaintiffs allege
a curtailment of the scope of their participation in the elec-
toral process. But we have noted that “[p]olitical ‘free
trade’ does not necessarily require that all who participate in
the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.”
Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 (1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the asserted
government interest of “equalizing the relative ability of in-
dividuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections”
to justify the burden on speech presented by expenditure
limits). This claim of injury by the Adams plaintiffs is,
therefore, not to a legally cognizable right.

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Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates contend that they
have suffered a competitive injury. Their candidates “do
not wish to solicit or accept large campaign contributions as
permitted by BCRA” because “[t]hey believe such contribu-
tions create the appearance of unequal access and influence.”
Adams Complaint ¶ 53. As a result, they claim that BCRA
§ 307 puts them at a “fundraising disadvantage,” making it
more difficult for them to compete in elections. See id., ¶ 56.
The second claimed injury is based on the same premise
as the first: BCRA § 307’s increased hard-money limits allow
plaintiffs-candidates’ opponents to raise more money, and,
consequently, the plaintiffs-candidates’ ability to compete or
participate in the electoral process is diminished. But they
cannot show that their alleged injury is “fairly traceable” to
BCRA § 307. See Lujan, 504 U. S. at 562. Their alleged
inability to compete stems not from the operation of § 307,
but from their own personal “wish” not to solicit or accept
large contributions, i.e., their personal choice. Accordingly,
the Adams plaintiffs fail here to allege an injury in fact that
is “fairly traceable” to BCRA.
The Paul plaintiffs maintain that BCRA § 307 violates the
Freedom of Press Clause of the First Amendment. They
contend that their political campaigns and public interest ad-
vocacy involve traditional press activities and that, there-
fore, they are protected by the First Amendment’s guaran-
tee of the freedom of press. The Paul plaintiffs argue that
the contribution limits imposed by BCRA § 307, together
with the individual and political action committee contribu-
tion limitations of FECA § 315, impose unconstitutional edi-
torial control upon candidates and their campaigns. The
Paul plaintiffs argue that by imposing economic burdens
upon them, but not upon the institutional media, see 2
U. S. C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (exempting “any news story, commen-
tary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any
broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodi-
cal publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled

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by any political party, political committee, or candidate” from
the definition of expenditure), BCRA § 307 and FECA § 315
violate the freedom of the press.
The Paul plaintiffs cannot show the “ ‘substantial likeli-
hood’ that the requested relief will remedy [their] alleged
injury in fact,” Stevens, 529 U. S., at 771. The relief the
Paul plaintiffs seek is for this Court to strike down the con-
tribution limits, removing the alleged disparate editorial con-
trols and economic burdens imposed on them. But § 307
merely increased and indexed for inflation certain FECA
contribution limits. This Court has no power to adjudicate
a challenge to the FECA limits in this litigation because
challenges to the constitutionality of FECA provisions are
subject to direct review before an appropriate en banc court
of appeals, as provided in 2 U. S. C. § 437h, not in the three-
judge District Court convened pursuant to BCRA § 403(a).
Although the Court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to
§ 307, if the Court were to strike down the increases and
indexes established by BCRA § 307, it would not remedy the
Paul plaintiffs’ alleged injury because both the limitations
imposed by FECA and the exemption for news media would
remain unchanged. A ruling in the Paul plaintiffs’ favor,
therefore, would not redress their alleged injury, and they
accordingly lack standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Bet-
ter Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 105–110 (1998).
For the reasons above, we affirm the District Court’s dis-
missal of the Adams and Paul plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA
§ 307 for lack of standing.
BCRA §§ 304, 316, and 319
BCRA §§ 304 and 316, which amend FECA § 315, and
BCRA § 319, which adds FECA § 315A, collectively known as
the “millionaire provisions,” provide for a series of staggered
increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate
limits if the candidate’s opponent spends a triggering amount

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230 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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of his personal funds.1 The provisions also eliminate the co-
ordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances.2
In their challenge to the millionaire provisions, the Adams
plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with re-
gard to BCRA § 307. For the reasons discussed above, they
fail to allege a cognizable injury that is “fairly traceable” to
BCRA. Additionally, as the District Court noted, “none of
the Adams plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by
the millionaire provisions—i. e., one in which an opponent
chooses to spend the triggering amount in his own funds—
and it would be purely ‘conjectural’ for the court to assume
that any plaintiff ever will be.” 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 431
(DC 2003) (case below) (Henderson, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lujan, 504
U. S., at 560). We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
the Adams plaintiffs’ challenge to the millionaire provisions
for lack of standing.
BCRA § 311
FECA § 318 requires that certain communications “au-
thorized” by a candidate or his political committee clearly
identify the candidate or committee or, if not so author-
ized, identify the payor and announce the lack of authoriza-
tion. 2 U. S. C. § 441d (2000 ed. and Supp. II). BCRA § 311
makes several amendments to FECA § 318, among them the
expansion of this identification regime to include disburse-
ments for “electioneering communications” as defined in
BCRA § 201.
1 To qualify for increased candidate contribution limits, the “opposition
personal funds amount,” which depends on expenditures by a candidate
and her self-financed opponent, must exceed a “threshold amount.” 2
U. S. C. §§ 441a(i)(1)(D), 441a–1(a)(2)(A) (Supp. II).
2 If the “opposition personal funds amount” is at least 10 times the
“threshold amount” in a Senate race, or exceeds $350,000 in a House of
Representatives race, the coordinated party expenditure limits do not
apply. §§ 441a(i)(1)(C)(iii), 441a–1(a)(1)(C).

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The McConnell and Chamber of Commerce plaintiffs chal-
lenge BCRA § 311 by simply noting that § 311, along with all
of the “electioneering communications” provisions of BCRA,
is unconstitutional. We disagree. We think BCRA § 311’s
inclusion of electioneering communications in the FECA
§ 318 disclosure regime bears a sufficient relationship to the
important governmental interest of “shed[ding] the light of
publicity” on campaign financing. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81.
Assuming as we must that FECA § 318 is valid to begin
with, and that FECA § 318 is valid as amended by BCRA
§ 311’s amendments other than the inclusion of electioneering
communications, the challenged inclusion of electioneering
communications is not itself unconstitutional. We affirm the
District Court’s decision upholding § 311’s expansion of
FECA § 318(a) to include disclosure of disbursements for
electioneering communications.
BCRA § 318
BCRA § 318, which adds FECA § 324, prohibits individuals
“17 years old or younger” from making contributions to can-
didates and contributions or donations to political parties. 2
U. S. C. § 441k (Supp. II). The McConnell and Echols plain-
tiffs challenge the provision; they argue that § 318 violates
the First Amendment rights of minors. We agree.
Minors enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.
See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511–513 (1969). Limitations on
the amount that an individual may contribute to a candidate
or political committee impinge on the protected freedoms of
expression and association. See Buckley, supra, at 20–22.
When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we
apply heightened scrutiny. See ante, at 136 ( joint opinion
of Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.) (“[A] contribution limit in-
volving even ‘ “significant interference” ’ with associational
rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the ‘lesser demand’
of being ‘ “closely drawn” ’ to match a ‘ “sufficiently important

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232 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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interest” ’ ” (quoting Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont,
539 U. S. 146, 162 (2003))). We ask whether there is a “suf-
ficiently important interest” and whether the statute is
“closely drawn” to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First
Amendment freedoms. Ante, at 136; Buckley, supra, at 25.
The Government asserts that the provision protects against
corruption by conduit; that is, donations by parents through
their minor children to circumvent contribution limits appli-
cable to the parents. But the Government offers scant evi-
dence of this form of evasion.3 Perhaps the Government’s
slim evidence results from sufficient deterrence of such activ-
ities by § 320 of FECA, which prohibits any person from
“mak[ing] a contribution in the name of another person” or
“knowingly accept[ing] a contribution made by one person
in the name of another,” 2 U. S. C. § 441f. Absent a more
convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest is simply too
attenuated for § 318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377,
391 (2000) (“The quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments
will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the
justification raised”).
Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an
important interest, the provision is overinclusive. The
States have adopted a variety of more tailored approaches—
e. g., counting contributions by minors against the total
permitted for a parent or family unit, imposing a lower
cap on contributions by minors, and prohibiting contribu-
tions by very young children. Without deciding whether
any of these alternatives is sufficiently tailored, we hold
that the provision here sweeps too broadly. We therefore
affirm the District Court’s decision striking down § 318 as
unconstitutional.
3 Although some examples were presented to the District Court, 251
F. Supp. 2d 176, 588–590 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), none were offered
to this Court.

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BCRA § 403(b)
The National Right to Life plaintiffs argue that the Dis-
trict Court’s grant of intervention to the intervenor-
defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a) and BCRA § 403(b), must be reversed because the
intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing. It is clear,
however, that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has
standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of
the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical
to the FEC’s. See, e. g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U. S. 417, 431–432, n. 19 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S.
714, 721 (1986). Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 68–69,
n. 21 (1986) (reserving the question for another day).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
judgment finding the plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA § 305,
§ 307, and the millionaire provisions nonjusticiable, striking
down as unconstitutional BCRA § 318, and upholding BCRA
§ 311. The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to BCRA Title V.*
We consider here the constitutionality of § 504 of the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), amending
the Communications Act of 1934. That section requires
broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically
related broadcasting requests. 47 U. S. C. § 315(e) (Supp.
II). The McConnell plaintiffs, who include the National
Association of Broadcasters, argue that § 504 imposes oner-
ous administrative burdens, lacks any offsetting justification,
and consequently violates the First Amendment. For simi-
lar reasons, the three judges on the District Court found
BCRA § 504 unconstitutional on its face. 251 F. Supp. 2d
*Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice
Ginsburg join this opinion in its entirety.

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176, 186 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (case below). We disagree,
and we reverse that determination.
I
BCRA § 504’s key requirements are the following:
(1) A “candidate request” requirement calls for broadcast-
ers to keep records of broadcast requests “made by or on
behalf of ” any “legally qualified candidate for public office.”
47 U. S. C. § 315(e)(1)(A) (Supp. II).
(2) An “election message request” requirement calls for
broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone)
to broadcast “message[s]” that refer either to a “legally qual-
ified candidate” or to “any election to Federal office.”
§§ 315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
(3) An “issue request” requirement calls for broadcasters
to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast
“message[s]” related to a “national legislative issue of public
importance,” § 315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or otherwise relating to a
“political matter of national importance,” § 315(e)(1)(B).
We shall consider each provision in turn.
II
BCRA § 504’s “candidate request” requirements are virtu-
ally identical to those contained in a regulation that the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated as
early as 1938 and which with slight modifications the FCC
has maintained in effect ever since. 47 CFR § 73.1943
(2002); compare 3 Fed. Reg. 1692 (1938) (47 CFR § 36a4); 13
Fed. Reg. 7486 (1948) (47 CFR §§ 3.190(d), 3.290(d), 3.690(d));
17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (47 CFR § 3.590(d)); 19 Fed. Reg.
5949 (1954); 23 Fed. Reg. 7817 (1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 13593
(1963) (47 CFR § 73.120(d)); 43 Fed. Reg. 32796 (1978) (47
CFR § 73.1940(d)); 57 Fed. Reg. 210 (1992) (47 CFR
§ 73.1943). See generally Brief in Opposition to Motion of
Appellee National Association of Broadcasters for Summary

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235 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
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Affirmance in No. 02–1676, pp. 9–10 (hereinafter Brief Op-
posing Summary Affirmance).
In its current form the FCC regulation requires broadcast
licensees to “keep” a publicly available file “of all requests
for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for
public office,” along with a notation showing whether the
request was granted, and (if granted) a history that includes
“classes of time,” “rates charged,” and when the “spots actu-
ally aired.” 47 CFR § 73.1943(a) (2002); § 76.1701(a) (same
for cable systems). These regulation-imposed requirements
mirror the statutory requirements imposed by BCRA § 504
with minor differences which no one here challenges. Com-
pare 47 CFR § 73.1943 with 47 U. S. C. § 315(e)(2) (Supp. II)
(see Appendix, infra).
The McConnell plaintiffs argue that these requirements
are “intolerabl[y]” “burdensome and invasive.” Brief for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Sen. Mitch McConnell et al. in
No. 02–1674 et al., p. 74 (hereinafter Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs). But we do not see how that could be so. The
FCC has consistently estimated that its “candidate request”
regulation imposes upon each licensee an additional adminis-
trative burden of six to seven hours of work per year. See
66 Fed. Reg. 37468 (2001); id., at 18090; 63 Fed. Reg. 26593
(1998); id., at 10379; 57 Fed. Reg. 18492 (1992); see also 66
Fed. Reg. 29963 (2001) (total annual burden of one hour per
cable system). That burden means annual costs of a few
hundred dollars at most, a microscopic amount compared to
the many millions of dollars of revenue broadcasters receive
from candidates who wish to advertise.
Perhaps for this reason, broadcasters in the past did not
strongly oppose the regulation or its extension. Cf., e. g., 17
Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (“No comments adverse to the adoption
of the proposed rule have been received”); 43 Fed. Reg. 32794
(1978) (no adverse comments). Indeed in 1992, “CBS” itself
“suggest[ed]” that the candidate file “include a record of all
requests for time.” 57 Fed. Reg. 206 (1992); cf. 63 Fed. Reg.

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236 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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49493 (1998) (FCC “not persuaded that the current retention
period [two years] is overly burdensome to licensees”).
In any event, as the FCC wrote in an analogous context,
broadcaster recordkeeping requirements “ ‘simply run with
the territory.’ ” 40 Fed. Reg. 18398 (1975). Broadcasters
must keep and make publicly available numerous records.
See 47 CFR § 73.3526 (2002) (general description of select
recordkeeping requirements for commercial stations); see
also §§ 73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9)(i) (retention of all “written com-
ments and suggestions [including letters and e-mail] received
from the public regarding operation of the station” for three
years); § 73.1212(e) (sponsorship identification records, in-
cluding the identification of a sponsoring entity’s executive
officers and board-level members when sponsoring “political
matter or matter involving the discussion of a controversial
issue of public importance”); § 73.1840 (retention of station
logs); § 73.1942 (candidate broadcast records); § 73.2080 (equal
employment opportunities records); §§ 73.3526(e)(11)(i),
(e)(12) (“list of programs that have provided the station’s
most significant treatment of community issues during
the preceding three month period,” including “brief narra-
tive describing [the issues, and] time, date, duration, and
title”); §§ 73.3526(e)(11)(ii), (iii) (reports of children’s pro-
gram, and retention of records sufficient to substantiate
“compliance with the commercial limits on children’s
programming”); § 73.3613(a) (network affiliation contracts);
§§ 73.3613(b), 73.3615, 73.3526(e)(5) (ownership-related re-
ports); § 73.3613(c) (“[m]anagement consultant agreements”);
§ 73.3613(d) (“[t]ime brokerage agreements”). Compared
to these longstanding recordkeeping requirements, an ad-
ditional six to seven hours is a small drop in a very large
bucket.
The McConnell plaintiffs also claim that the “candidate re-
quests” requirement fails significantly to further any impor-
tant governmental interest. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs
74. But, again, we cannot agree. The FCC has pointed out

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that “[t]hese records are necessary to permit political candi-
dates and others to verify that licensees have complied with
their obligations relating to use of their facilities by candi-
dates for political office” pursuant to the “equal time” provi-
sion of 47 U. S. C. § 315(a). 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998). They
also help the FCC determine whether broadcasters have vio-
lated their obligation to sell candidates time at the “lowest
unit charge.” 47 U. S. C. § 315(b). As reinforced by BCRA,
the “candidate request” requirements will help the FCC, the
Federal Election Commission, and “the public to evaluate
whether broadcasters are processing [candidate] requests in
an evenhanded fashion,” Brief Opposing Summary Affirm-
ance 10, thereby helping to assure broadcasting fairness. 47
U. S. C. § 315(a); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S.
367, 390 (1969). They will help make the public aware of
how much money candidates may be prepared to spend on
broadcast messages. 2 U. S. C. § 434 (2000 ed. and Supp.
II); see ante, at 194–199 ( joint opinion of Stevens and
O’Connor, JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion). And they will
provide an independently compiled set of data for purposes
of verifying candidates’ compliance with the disclosure re-
quirements and source limitations of BCRA and the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U. S. C. § 434; cf.
Adventure Communications, Inc. v. Kentucky Registry of
Election Finance, 191 F. 3d 429, 433 (CA4 1999) (candidate
compliance verification); 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC
finding record retention provision provides public with “nec-
essary and adequate access”).
We note, too, that the FCC’s regulatory authority is broad.
Red Lion, supra, at 380 (“broad” mandate to assure broad-
casters operate in public interest); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219 (1943) (same). And
we have previously found broad governmental authority for
agency information demands from regulated entities. Com-
pare United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642–643
(1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S.

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238 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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186, 209 (1946); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U. S. 408,
414–415 (1984).
The Chief Justice suggests that the Government has
not made these particular claims. But it has—though suc-
cinctly—for it has cross-referenced the relevant regulatory
rules. Compare post, at 359–361 (Rehnquist, C. J., dis-
senting), with Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance; Brief
for McConnell Plaintiffs 73–74; Brief for FEC et al. in
No. 02–1674 et al., pp. 132–133. And succinctness through
cross-reference was necessary given our procedural require-
ment that the Government set forth in a 140-page brief all
its arguments concerning each of the 20 BCRA provisions
here under contest. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 186–188.
In sum, given the Government’s reference to the 65-year-
old FCC regulation and the related considerations we have
mentioned, we cannot accept the argument that the constitu-
tionality of the “candidate request” provision lacks eviden-
tiary support. The challengers have made no attempt to ex-
plain away the FCC’s own contrary conclusions and the mass
of evidence in related FCC records and proceedings. E. g.,
57 Fed. Reg. 189 (1992); cf. supra, at 235–236; ante, at 222–
223 ( joint opinion) (upholding BCRA’s coordination provision
based, in part, on prior experience under similar provision).
Because we cannot, on the present record, find the long-
standing FCC regulation unconstitutional, we likewise can-
not strike down the “candidate request” provision in BCRA
§ 504; for the latter simply embodies the regulation in a stat-
ute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it.
III
BCRA § 504’s “election message request” requirements
call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by
any member of the public) to broadcast a “message” about
“a legally qualified candidate” or “any election to Fed-
eral office.” 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (Supp. II). Al-
though these requirements are somewhat broader than the

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“candidate request” requirement, they serve much the same
purposes. A candidate’s supporters or opponents account
for many of the requests to broadcast “message[s]” about
a “candidate.” Requests to broadcast messages about an
“election” may include messages that favor one candidate
or another, along with other messages that may be more
neutral.
Given the nature of many of the messages, recordkeeping
can help both the regulatory agencies and the public evaluate
broadcasting fairness, and determine the amount of money
that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents, intend
to spend to help elect a particular candidate. Cf. ante, at
206–207 ( joint opinion) (upholding stringent restrictions on
all election-time advertising that refers to a candidate be-
cause such advertising will often convey message of support
or opposition). Insofar as the request is to broadcast neu-
tral material about a candidate or election, the disclosure can
help the FCC carry out other statutory functions, for exam-
ple, determining whether a broadcasting station is fulfilling
its licensing obligation to broadcast material important to
the community and the public. 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) (“obliga-
tion . . . to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance”); 47 CFR
§ 73.1910 (2002); §§ 73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping re-
quirements for issues important to the community).
For reasons previously discussed, supra, at 235–236, and
on the basis of the material presented, we cannot say that
these requirements will impose disproportionate administra-
tive burdens. They ask the broadcaster to keep information
about the disposition of the request, and information identi-
fying the individual or company requesting the broadcast
time (name, address, contact information, or, if the requester
is not an individual, the names of company officials). 47
U. S. C. § 315(e)(2) (Supp. II). Insofar as the “request”
is made by a candidate’s “supporters,” the “candidate re-
quest” regulation apparently already requires broadcasters

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240 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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to keep such records. 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978). Regard-
less, the information should prove readily available, for the
individual requesting a broadcast must provide it to the
broadcaster should the broadcaster accept the request. 47
CFR § 73.1212(e) (2002). And as we have previously pointed
out, the recordkeeping requirements do not reach signifi-
cantly beyond other FCC recordkeeping rules, for example,
those requiring broadcasting licensees to keep material
showing compliance with their license-related promises to
broadcast material on issues of public importance. See, e. g.,
§§ 73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping requirements for
issues important to the community); supra, at 236 (collecting
regulations); Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F. 2d 1413, 1421–1422 (CADC 1983) (de-
scribing FCC rules, in force during 1960–1981, that required
nonentertainment programming in 14 specific areas and man-
dated publicly available records detailing date, time, source,
and description to substantiate compliance). If, as we have
held, the “candidate request” requirements are constitu-
tional, supra, at 238, the “election message” requirements,
which serve similar governmental interests and impose only
a small incremental burden, must be constitutional as well.
IV
The “issue request” requirements call for broadcasters to
keep records of requests (made by any member of the public)
to broadcast “message[s]” about “a national legislative issue
of public importance” or “any political matter of national
importance.” 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(e)(1)(B), (e)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp.
II). These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help
the FCC determine whether broadcasters are carrying out
their “obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public impor-
tance,” 47 CFR § 73.1910 (2002), and whether broadcasters
are too heavily favoring entertainment, and discriminating

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against broadcasts devoted to public affairs, see ibid.; 47
U. S. C. § 315(a); Red Lion, 395 U. S., at 380.
The McConnell plaintiffs claim that the statutory lan-
guage—“political matter of national importance” or “na-
tional legislative issue of public importance”—is uncon-
stitutionally vague or overbroad. Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs 74–75. But that language is no more gen-
eral than the language that Congress has used to impose
other obligations upon broadcasters. Compare 47 U. S. C.
§ 315(e)(1)(B) (Supp. II) (“political matter of national im-
portance”) and § 315(e)(1)(B)(iii) (“national legislative issue
of public importance”) (both added by BCRA § 504), with
47 U. S. C. § 315(a) (“obligation . . . to operate in the public
interest” and to afford reasonable opportunity for discussion
of “issues of public importance”); § 317(a)(2) (FCC disclosure
requirements relating to any “political program” or “discus-
sion of any controversial issue”); cf. 47 CFR § 73.1212(e)
(2002) (“political matter or . . . a controversial issue of public
importance”) and 9 Fed. Reg. 14734 (1944) (“public contro-
versial issues”); ante, at 222–223 ( joint opinion) (noting that
the experience under longstanding regulations undermines
claims of chilling effect). And that language is also roughly
comparable to other language in BCRA that we uphold
today. E. g., ante, at 169–170, and n. 64 ( joint opinion)
(upholding 2 U. S. C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. II) (“public
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports a
candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate
for that office”)); ante, at 222–223 (upholding 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. II) (counting as coordinated dis-
bursements that are made “in cooperation, consultation, or
concert with, or at the request or suggestion of [a political
party]”) against challenge and noting that an “agreement” is
not necessary for precision).
Whether these requirements impose disproportionate ad-
ministrative burdens is more difficult to say. On the one

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242 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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hand, the burdens are likely less heavy than many that other
FCC regulations have imposed, for example, the burden of
keeping and disclosing “[a]ll written comments and sugges-
tions” received from the public, including every e-mail. 47
CFR §§ 73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9) (2002); see also supra, at
236. On the other hand, the burdens are likely heavier than
those imposed by BCRA § 504’s other provisions, previously
discussed.
The regulatory burden, in practice, will depend on how the
FCC interprets and applies this provision. The FCC has
adequate legal authority to write regulations that may limit,
and make more specific, the provision’s potential linguistic
reach. 47 U. S. C. § 315(d). It has often ameliorated regu-
latory burdens by interpretation in the past, and there is no
reason to believe it will not do so here. See 14 FCC Rcd.
4653, 4665, ¶ 25 (1999) (relaxing the recordkeeping require-
ments in respect to cable systems that serve fewer than 5,000
subscribers); 14 FCC Rcd. 11113, 11121–11122, ¶¶ 20–22
(1999) (requiring candidates to inspect the political file at a
station rather than requiring licensees to send out photocop-
ies of the files to candidates upon telephone request). The
parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as inter-
preted by the FCC in regulations, or as otherwise applied.
Any such challenge will likely provide greater information
about the provisions’ justifications and administrative bur-
dens. Without that additional information, we cannot now
say that the burdens are so great, or the justifications so
minimal, as to warrant finding the provisions unconstitu-
tional on their face.
The McConnell plaintiffs and The Chief Justice make
one final claim. They say that the “issue request” require-
ment will force them to disclose information that will reveal
their political strategies to opponents, perhaps prior to a
broadcast. See post, at 362 (dissenting opinion). We are
willing to assume that the Constitution includes some form
of protection against premature disclosure of campaign strat-

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egy—though, given the First Amendment interest in free
and open discussion of campaign issues, we make this as-
sumption purely for argument’s sake. Nonetheless, even on
that assumption we do not see how BCRA § 504 can be un-
constitutional on its face.
For one thing, the statute requires disclosure of names,
addresses, and the fact of a request; it does not require dis-
closure of substantive campaign content. See 47 U. S. C.
§ 315(e)(2) (Supp. II). For another, the statutory words
“as soon as possible,” § 315(e)(3), would seem to permit FCC
disclosure-timing rules that would avoid any premature dis-
closure that the Constitution itself would forbid. Further,
the plaintiffs do not point to—and our own research cannot
find—any specific indication of such a “strategy-disclosure”
problem arising during the past 65 years in respect to the
existing FCC “candidate request” requirement, where the
strategic problem might be expected to be more acute. Fi-
nally, we today reject an analogous facial attack—premised
on speculations of “advance disclosure”—on a similar BCRA
provision. See ante, at 200–201 ( joint opinion). Thus, the
“strategy disclosure” argument does not show that BCRA
§ 504 is unconstitutional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain
free to raise this argument when § 504 is applied.
V
The Chief Justice makes two important arguments in
response to those we have set forth. First, he says that we
“approac[h] § 504 almost exclusively from the perspective of
the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates
and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights
are affected. ” Post, at 359 (dissenting opinion). The
Chief Justice is certainly correct in emphasizing the im-
portance of the speech interests of candidates and other po-
tential speakers, but we have not ignored their First Amend-
ment “perspective.”

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244 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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To the contrary, we have discussed the speakers’ interests
together with the broadcasters’ interests because the two
sets of interests substantially overlap. For example, the
speakers’ vagueness argument is no different from the
broadcasters’, and it fails for the same reasons, e. g., the fact
that BCRA § 504’s language is just as definite and precise as
other language that we today uphold. See supra, at 241.
We have separately discussed the one and only speech-
related claim advanced on behalf of candidates (or other
speakers) that differs from the claims set forth by the broad-
casters. See supra, at 242–243. This is the claim that the
statute’s disclosure requirements will require candidates to
reveal their political strategies to opponents. We just said,
and we now repeat, that BCRA § 504 can be applied, in a
significant number of cases, without requiring any such
political-strategy disclosure—either because disclosure in
many cases will not create any such risk or because the FCC
may promulgate rules requiring disclosure only after any
such risk disappears, or both.
Moreover, candidates (or other speakers) whom § 504 af-
fects adversely in this way (or in other ways) remain free to
challenge the lawfulness of FCC implementing regulations
and to challenge the constitutionality of § 504 as applied. To
find that the speech-related interests of candidates and oth-
ers may be vindicated in an as-applied challenge is not to
“ignor[e]” those interests.
Second, The Chief Justice says that “the Government,
in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support § 504 as
a whole,” adding that the existence of “pre-existing unchal-
lenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure re-
quirements” cannot “compel the conclusion that § 504 is con-
stitutional,” nor somehow “relieve the Government of its
burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification
for § 504.” Post, at 359–360, 361 (dissenting opinion).
Again The Chief Justice is correct in saying that the
mere existence of similar FCC regulation-imposed require-

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245 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
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ments—even if unchallenged for at least 65 years—cannot
prove that those requirements are constitutional. But the
existence of those regulations means that we must read be-
yond the briefs in these cases before holding those require-
ments unconstitutional. Before evaluating the relevant bur-
dens and justifications, we must at least become acquainted
with the FCC’s own view of the matter. We must follow the
Government’s regulation-related references to the relevant
regulatory records, related FCC regulatory conclusions, and
the FCC’s enforcement experience. We must take into ac-
count, for example, the likelihood that the reason there is
“nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated
purchasers unfairly,” post, at 361 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissent-
ing), is that for many decades similar FCC regulations have
made that unfair treatment unlawful. And, if we are to
avoid disrupting related agency law, we must evaluate what
we find in agency records and related experience before hold-
ing this similar statutory provision unconstitutional on its
face.
Even a superficial examination of those relevant agency
materials reveals strong supporting justifications, and a lack
of significant administrative burdens. And any additional
burden that the statute, viewed facially, imposes upon inter-
ests protected by the First Amendment seems slight com-
pared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it
serves. Given the FCC regulations and their history, the
statutory requirements must survive a facial attack under
any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, in-
cluding that of heightened scrutiny.
That is why the regulations are relevant. That is why
the brevity of the Government’s discussion here cannot be
determinative. That is why we fear that The Chief Jus-
tice’s contrary view would lead us into an unfortunate—and
at present unjustified—revolution in communications law.
And that is why we disagree with his dissent.

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246 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Appendix to opinion of the Court
The portion of the judgment of the District Court invali-
dating BCRA § 504 is reversed.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Title 47 U. S. C. § 315(e) (Supp. II), as amended by BCRA
§ 504, provides:
“Political record
“(1) In general
“A licensee shall maintain, and make available for pub-
lic inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase
broadcast time that—
“(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified can-
didate for public office; or
“(B) communicates a message relating to any political
matter of national importance, including—
“(i) a legally qualified candidate;
“(ii) any election to Federal office; or
“(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance.
“(2) Contents of record
“A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall con-
tain information regarding—
“(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time
is accepted or rejected by the licensee;
“(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time;
“(C) the date and time on which the communication
is aired;
“(D) the class of time that is purchased;
“(E) the name of the candidate to which the communi-
cation refers and the office to which the candidate is
seeking election, the election to which the communica-
tion refers, or the issue to which the communication re-
fers (as applicable);
“(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of,
a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized

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247 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such
committee; and
“(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the
person purchasing the time, the name, address, and
phone number of a contact person for such person, and
a list of the chief executive officers or members of the
executive committee or of the board of directors of
such person.
“(3) Time to maintain file
“The information required under this subsection shall
be placed in a political file as soon as possible and shall
be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than
2 years.”
Title 47 CFR § 73.1943 (2002) provides:
“Political file.
“(a) Every licensee shall keep and permit public in-
spection of a complete and orderly record (political file)
of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf
of a candidate for public office, together with an appro-
priate notation showing the disposition made by the li-
censee of such requests, and the charges made, if any, if
the request is granted. The ‘disposition’ includes the
schedule of time purchased, when spots actually aired,
the rates charged, and the classes of time purchased.
“(b) When free time is provided for use by or on behalf
of candidates, a record of the free time provided shall be
placed in the political file.
“(c) All records required by this paragraph shall be
placed in the political file as soon as possible and shall
be retained for a period of two years. As soon as possi-
ble means immediately absent unusual circumstances.”
Justice Scalia, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles
III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V,

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248 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of Scalia, J.
and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part with respect to BCRA Title II.
With respect to Titles I, II, and V: I join in full the dissent
of The Chief Justice; I join the opinion of Justice Ken-
nedy, except to the extent it upholds new § 323(e) of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and § 202 of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in
part; and because I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), was wrongly decided, I also
join Parts I, II–A, and II–B of the opinion of Justice
Thomas. With respect to Titles III and IV, I join The
Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court. Because these
cases are of such extraordinary importance, I cannot avoid
adding to the many writings a few words of my own.
This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could
have imagined that the same Court which, within the past
four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such
inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornog-
raphy, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234
(2002), tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U. S. 525 (2001), dissemination of illegally intercepted
communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514 (2001),
and sexually explicit cable programming, United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803 (2000),
would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of
what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to
criticize the government. For that is what the most offen-
sive provisions of this legislation are all about. We are gov-
erned by Congress, and this legislation prohibits the criti-
cism of Members of Congress by those entities most capable
of giving such criticism loud voice: national political parties
and corporations, both of the commercial and the not-for-
profit sort. It forbids pre-election criticism of incumbents
by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by use of
their general funds; and forbids national-party use of “soft”
money to fund “issue ads” that incumbents find so offensive.

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To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly pro-
hibits criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of
Congress in their reelection bids. But as everyone knows,
this is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. If
all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents
would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incum-
bents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of
electioneering, incumbents are favored. In other words,
any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is
equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to
favor incumbents.
Beyond that, however, the present legislation targets for
prohibition certain categories of campaign speech that are
particularly harmful to incumbents. Is it accidental, do you
think, that incumbents raise about three times as much “hard
money”—the sort of funding generally not restricted by this
legislation—as do their challengers? See FEC, 1999–2000
Financial Activity of All Senate and House Campaigns (Jan.
1, 1999–Dec. 31, 2000) (last modified on May 15, 2001), http://
www.fec.gov/press/051501congfinact/tables/allcong2000.xls
(all Internet materials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and avail-
able in Clerk of Court’s case file). Or that lobbyists (who
seek the favor of incumbents) give 92 percent of their
money in “hard” contributions? See U. S. Public Inter-
est Research Group, The Lobbyist’s Last Laugh: How K
Street Lobbyists Would Benefit from the McCain-Feingold
Campaign Finance Bill 3 (July 5, 2001), http://www.pirg.org/
democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068. Is it an oversight, do
you suppose, that the so-called “millionaire provisions” raise
the contribution limit for a candidate running against an indi-
vidual who devotes to the campaign (as challengers often do)
great personal wealth, but do not raise the limit for a candi-
date running against an individual who devotes to the cam-
paign (as incumbents often do) a massive election “war
chest”? See BCRA §§ 304, 316, and 319. And is it mere
happenstance, do you estimate, that national-party funding,

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250 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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which is severely limited by the Act, is more likely to assist
cash-strapped challengers than flush-with-hard-money in-
cumbents? See A. Gierzynski & D. Breaux, The Financing
Role of Parties, in Campaign Finance in State Legislative
Elections 195–200 (J. Thompson & S. Moncrief eds. 1998).
Was it unintended, by any chance, that incumbents are free
personally to receive some soft money and even to solicit it
for other organizations, while national parties are not? See
new FECA §§ 323(a) and (e).
I wish to address three fallacious propositions that might
be thought to justify some or all of the provisions of this
legislation—only the last of which is explicitly embraced by
the principal opinion for the Court, but all of which underlie,
I think, its approach to these cases.
(a) Money is Not Speech
It was said by congressional proponents of this legislation,
see 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer); 145
Cong. Rec. S12612 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Cleland);
147 Cong. Rec. S2436 (Mar. 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Dodd),
with support from the law reviews, see, e. g., Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 Yale L. J. 1001
(1976), that since this legislation regulates nothing but the
expenditure of money for speech, as opposed to speech itself,
the burden it imposes is not subject to full First Amendment
scrutiny; the government may regulate the raising and
spending of campaign funds just as it regulates other forms
of conduct, such as burning draft cards, see United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), or camping out on the National
Mall, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U. S. 288 (1984). That proposition has been endorsed by
one of the two authors of today’s principal opinion: “The
right to use one’s own money to hire gladiators, [and] to fund
‘speech by proxy,’ . . . [are] property rights . . . not entitled
to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases.”
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377,

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399 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). Until today, however,
that view has been categorically rejected by our jurispru-
dence. As we said in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 16, “this Court
has never suggested that the dependence of a communication
on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny re-
quired by the First Amendment.”
Our traditional view was correct, and today’s cavalier atti-
tude toward regulating the financing of speech (the “exacting
scrutiny” test of Buckley, see ibid., is not uttered in any
majority opinion, and is not observed in the ones from which
I dissent) frustrates the fundamental purpose of the First
Amendment. In any economy operated on even the most
rudimentary principles of division of labor, effective public
communication requires the speaker to make use of the serv-
ices of others. An author may write a novel, but he will
seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance re-
porter may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and
deliver it to subscribers. To a government bent on sup-
pressing speech, this mode of organization presents opportu-
nities: Control any cog in the machine, and you can halt the
whole apparatus. License printers, and it matters little
whether authors are still free to write. Restrict the sale of
books, and it matters little who prints them. Predictably,
repressive regimes have exploited these principles by at-
tacking all levels of the production and dissemination of
ideas. See, e. g., Printing Act of 1662, 14 Car. II, ch. 33, §§ 1,
4, 7 (punishing printers, importers, and booksellers); Print-
ing Act of 1649, 2 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum
245, 246, 250 (punishing authors, printers, booksellers, im-
porters, and buyers). In response to this threat, we have
interpreted the First Amendment broadly. See, e. g., Ban-
tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 65, n. 6 (1963) (“The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces
the circulation of books as well as their publication . . .”).

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Division of labor requires a means of mediating exchange,
and in a commercial society, that means is supplied by money.
The publisher pays the author for the right to sell his book;
it pays its staff who print and assemble the book; it demands
payments from booksellers who bring the book to market.
This, too, presents opportunities for repression: Instead of
regulating the various parties to the enterprise individually,
the government can suppress their ability to coordinate by
regulating their use of money. What good is the right to
print books without a right to buy works from authors? Or
the right to publish newspapers without the right to pay
deliverymen? The right to speak would be largely inef-
fective if it did not include the right to engage in financial
transactions that are the incidents of its exercise.
This is not to say that any regulation of money is a regula-
tion of speech. The government may apply general com-
mercial regulations to those who use money for speech if it
applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for other
purposes. But where the government singles out money
used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting
against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the
paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver
it to the bookstore.
History and jurisprudence bear this out. The best early
examples derive from the British efforts to tax the press
after the lapse of licensing statutes by which the press was
first regulated. The Stamp Act of 1712 imposed levies on
all newspapers, including an additional tax for each adver-
tisement. 10 Anne, ch. 18, § 113. It was a response to unfa-
vorable war coverage, “obvious[ly] . . . designed to check
the publication of those newspapers and pamphlets which
depended for their sale on their cheapness and sensational-
ism.” F. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476–
1776, pp. 309–310 (1952). It succeeded in killing off approxi-
mately half the newspapers in England in its first year. Id.,
at 312. In 1765, Parliament applied a similar Act to the Col-

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onies. 5 Geo. III, ch. 12, § 1. The colonial Act likewise
placed exactions on sales and advertising revenue, the latter
at 2s. per advertisement, which was “by any standard . . .
excessive, since the publisher himself received only from 3
to 5s. and still less for repeated insertions.” A. Schlesinger,
Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain,
1764–1776, p. 68 (1958). The founding generation saw these
taxes as grievous incursions on the freedom of the press.
See, e. g., 1 D. Ramsay, History of the American Revolution
61–62 (L. Cohen ed. 1990); J. Adams, A Dissertation on the
Canon and Feudal Law (1765), reprinted in 3 Life and Works
of John Adams 445, 464 (C. Adams ed. 1851). See generally
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245–249
(1936); Schlesinger, supra, at 67–84.
We have kept faith with the Founders’ tradition by pro-
hibiting the selective taxation of the press. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U. S. 575 (1983) (ink and paper tax); Grosjean, supra (adver-
tisement tax). And we have done so whether the tax was
the product of illicit motive or not. See Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., supra, at 592. These press-taxation cases belie
the claim that regulation of money used to fund speech is not
regulation of speech itself. A tax on a newspaper’s adver-
tising revenue does not prohibit anyone from saying any-
thing; it merely appropriates part of the revenue that a
speaker would otherwise obtain. That is even a step short
of totally prohibiting advertising revenue—which would be
analogous to the total prohibition of certain campaign-speech
contributions in the present cases. Yet it is unquestionably
a violation of the First Amendment.
Many other cases exemplify the same principle that an
attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech
itself. In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), we struck down an ordinance lim-
iting the amount charities could pay their solicitors. In
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Vic-

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254 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tims Bd., 502 U. S. 105 (1991), we held unconstitutional a
state statute that appropriated the proceeds of criminals’
biographies for payment to the victims. And in Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819
(1995), we held unconstitutional a university’s discrimination
in the disbursement of funds to speakers on the basis of
viewpoint. Most notable, perhaps, is our famous opinion in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), holding
that paid advertisements in a newspaper were entitled to full
First Amendment protection:
“Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers
from carrying ‘editorial advertisements’ of this type, and
so might shut off an important outlet for the promulga-
tion of information and ideas by persons who do not
themselves have access to publishing facilities—who
wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though
they are not members of the press. The effect would
be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to
secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources.’ ” Id., at 266 (ci-
tations omitted).
This passage was relied on in Buckley for the point that re-
strictions on the expenditure of money for speech are equiva-
lent to restrictions on speech itself. 424 U. S., at 16–17.
That reliance was appropriate. If denying protection to
paid-for speech would “shackle the First Amendment,” so
also does forbidding or limiting the right to pay for speech.
It should be obvious, then, that a law limiting the amount
a person can spend to broadcast his political views is a direct
restriction on speech. That is no different from a law limit-
ing the amount a newspaper can pay its editorial staff or the
amount a charity can pay its leafletters. It is equally clear
that a limit on the amount a candidate can raise from any
one individual for the purpose of speaking is also a direct
limitation on speech. That is no different from a law limit-

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ing the amount a publisher can accept from any one share-
holder or lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any
one advertiser or customer.
(b) Pooling Money is Not Speech
Another proposition which could explain at least some of
the results of today’s opinion is that the First Amendment
right to spend money for speech does not include the right
to combine with others in spending money for speech. Such
a proposition fits uncomfortably with the concluding words
of our Declaration of Independence: “And for the support of
this Declaration, . . . we mutually pledge to each other our
Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.” (Emphasis
added.) The freedom to associate with others for the dis-
semination of ideas—not just by singing or speaking in uni-
son, but by pooling financial resources for expressive pur-
poses—is part of the freedom of speech.
“Our form of government is built on the premise that
every citizen shall have the right to engage in political
expression and association. This right was enshrined
in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise
of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally
been through the media of political associations. Any
interference with the freedom of a party is simultane-
ously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.”
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“The First Amendment protects political association as
well as political expression. The constitutional right of
association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S.
449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition
that ‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeni-
ably enhanced by group association.’ Subsequent deci-
sions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee ‘ “freedom to associate with oth-

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256 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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ers for the common advancement of political beliefs and
ideas,” ’ . . . .” Buckley, supra, at 15.
We have said that “implicit in the right to engage in activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment” is “a corresponding
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622
(1984). That “right to associate . . . in pursuit” includes the
right to pool financial resources.
If it were otherwise, Congress would be empowered to
enact legislation requiring newspapers to be sole proprietor-
ships, banning their use of partnership or corporate form.
That sort of restriction would be an obvious violation of the
First Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the con-
clusion should change when what is at issue is the pooling of
funds for the most important (and most perennially threat-
ened) category of speech: electoral speech. The principle
that such financial association does not enjoy full First
Amendment protection threatens the existence of all politi-
cal parties.
(c) Speech by Corporations Can Be Abridged
The last proposition that might explain at least some of
today’s casual abridgment of free-speech rights is this: that
the particular form of association known as a corporation
does not enjoy full First Amendment protection. Of course
the text of the First Amendment does not limit its applica-
tion in this fashion, even though “[b]y the end of the eight-
eenth century the corporation was a familiar figure in Amer-
ican economic life. ” C. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and
Company 92 (1951). Nor is there any basis in reason why
First Amendment rights should not attach to corporate asso-
ciations—and we have said so. In First Nat. Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), we held unconstitutional
a state prohibition of corporate speech designed to influence
the vote on referendum proposals. We said:

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“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the
speakers here were not corporations, no one would sug-
gest that the State could silence their proposed speech.
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking
in a democracy, and this is no less true because the
speech comes from a corporation rather than an individ-
ual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, associa-
tion, union, or individual.” Id., at 776–777 (internal
quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).
In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428–429, 431, we held that
the NAACP could assert First Amendment rights “on its
own behalf, . . . though a corporation,” and that the activities
of the corporation were “modes of expression and association
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” In
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475
U. S. 1, 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to
compel corporate speech. “The identity of the speaker,” we
said, “is not decisive in determining whether speech is pro-
tected. Corporations and other associations, like individu-
als, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemina-
tion of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment
seeks to foster.” And in Buckley, 424 U. S. 1, we held un-
constitutional FECA’s limitation upon independent corpo-
rate expenditures.
The Court changed course in Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), upholding a state prohibi-
tion of an independent corporate expenditure in support of a
candidate for state office. I dissented in that case, see id.,
at 679, and remain of the view that it was error. In the
modern world, giving the government power to exclude cor-
porations from the political debate enables it effectively to
muffle the voices that best represent the most significant

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258 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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segments of the economy and the most passionately held so-
cial and political views. People who associate—who pool
their financial resources—for purposes of economic enter-
prise overwhelmingly do so in the corporate form; and with
increasing frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who
associate to defend and promote particular ideas—such as
the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle
Association, parties to these cases. Imagine, then, a gov-
ernment that wished to suppress nuclear power—or oil and
gas exploration, or automobile manufacturing, or gun owner-
ship, or civil liberties—and that had the power to prohibit
corporate advertising against its proposals. To be sure, the
individuals involved in, or benefited by, those industries, or
interested in those causes, could (given enough time) form
political action committees or other associations to make
their case. But the organizational form in which those en-
terprises already exist, and in which they can most quickly
and most effectively get their message across, is the corpo-
rate form. The First Amendment does not in my view per-
mit the restriction of that political speech. And the same
holds true for corporate electoral speech: A candidate should
not be insulated from the most effective speech that the
major participants in the economy and major incorporated
interest groups can generate.
But what about the danger to the political system posed by
“amassed wealth”? The most direct threat from that source
comes in the form of undisclosed favors and payoffs to
elected officials—which have already been criminalized, and
will be rendered no more discoverable by the legislation at
issue here. The use of corporate wealth (like individual
wealth) to speak to the electorate is unlikely to “distort”
elections—especially if disclosure requirements tell the peo-
ple where the speech is coming from. The premise of the
First Amendment is that the American people are neither
sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both
the substance of the speech presented to them and its proxi-

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mate and ultimate source. If that premise is wrong, our de-
mocracy has a much greater problem to overcome than
merely the influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises
of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech.
But, it is argued, quite apart from its effect upon the elec-
torate, corporate speech in the form of contributions to the
candidate’s campaign, or even in the form of independent ex-
penditures supporting the candidate, engenders an obligation
which is later paid in the form of greater access to the of-
ficeholder, or indeed in the form of votes on particular bills.
Any quid-pro-quo agreement for votes would of course vio-
late criminal law, see 18 U. S. C. § 201, and actual payoff votes
have not even been claimed by those favoring the restric-
tions on corporate speech. It cannot be denied, however,
that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater
access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the
same causes as those who support him (which is usually why
they supported him). That is the nature of politics—if not
indeed human nature—and how this can properly be consid-
ered “corruption” (or “the appearance of corruption”) with
regard to corporate allies and not with regard to other allies
is beyond me. If the Bill of Rights had intended an excep-
tion to the freedom of speech in order to combat this malign
proclivity of the officeholder to agree with those who agree
with him, and to speak more with his supporters than his
opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so,
I think, because the juice is not worth the squeeze. Evil
corporate (and private affluent) influences are well enough
checked (so long as adequate campaign-expenditure disclo-
sure rules exist) by the politician’s fear of being portrayed
as “in the pocket” of so-called moneyed interests. The in-
cremental benefit obtained by muzzling corporate speech is
more than offset by loss of the information and persuasion
that corporate speech can contain. That, at least, is the as-
sumption of a constitutional guarantee which prescribes that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.

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But let us not be deceived. While the Government’s
briefs and arguments before this Court focused on the horri-
ble “appearance of corruption,” the most passionate floor
statements during the debates on this legislation pertained
to so-called attack ads, which the Constitution surely pro-
tects, but which Members of Congress analogized to “crack
cocaine,” 144 Cong. Rec. 1601 (1998) (remarks of Sen.
Daschle), “drive-by shooting[s],” id., at 1613 (remarks of Sen.
Durbin), and “air pollution,” 143 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (re-
marks of Sen. Dorgan). There is good reason to believe that
the ending of negative campaign ads was the principal at-
traction of the legislation. A Senate sponsor said, “I hope
that we will not allow our attention to be distracted from
the real issues at hand—how to raise the tenor of the debate
in our elections and give people real choices. No one bene-
fits from negative ads. They don’t aid our Nation’s political
dialog.” Id., at 20521–20522 (remarks of Sen. McCain). He
assured the body that “[y]ou cut off the soft money, you are
going to see a lot less of that [attack ads]. Prohibit unions
and corporations, and you will see a lot less of that. If you
demand full disclosure for those who pay for those ads, you
are going to see a lot less of that. . . .” 147 Cong. Rec. S3116
(Mar. 29, 2001). See also, e. g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (Mar.
20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Cantwell) (“This bill is about slow-
ing the ad war. . . . It is about slowing political advertising
and making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest
groups does not continue to permeate the airwaves”); 143
Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) (“These so-
called issues ads are not regulated at all and mention candi-
dates by name. They directly attack candidates without any
accountability. It is brutal. . . . We have an opportunity in
the McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . .”); 145 Cong. Rec.
S12606–S12607 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Wellstone)
(“I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare. I think
all of us should hate them. . . . [By passing the legislation],
[w]e could get some of this poison politics off television”).

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Another theme prominent in the legislative debates was
the notion that there is too much money spent on elections.
The first principle of “reform” was that “there should be less
money in politics.” 147 Cong. Rec. S3236 (Apr. 2, 2001) (re-
marks of Sen. Murray). “The enormous amounts of special
interest money that flood our political system have become
a cancer in our democracy.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2151 (Mar. 20,
2002) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). “[L]arge sums of money
drown out the voice of the average voter.” Id., at H373
(Feb. 13, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Langevin). The system of
campaign finance is “drowning in money.” Id., at H404
(remarks of Rep. Menendez). And most expansively:
“Despite the ever-increasing sums spent on campaigns,
we have not seen an improvement in campaign dis-
course, issue discussion or voter education. More
money does not mean more ideas, more substance
or more depth. Instead, it means more of what
voters complain about most. More 30-second spots,
more negativity and an increasingly longer campaign
period.” Id., at S2150 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen.
Kerry).
Perhaps voters do detest these 30-second spots—though I
suspect they detest even more hour-long campaign-debate
interruptions of their favorite entertainment programming.
Evidently, however, these ads do persuade voters, or else
they would not be so routinely used by sophisticated politi-
cians of all parties. The point, in any event, is that it is not
the proper role of those who govern us to judge which cam-
paign speech has “substance” and “depth” (do you think it
might be that which is least damaging to incumbents?) and
to abridge the rest.
And what exactly are these outrageous sums frittered
away in determining who will govern us? A report pre-
pared for Congress concluded that the total amount, in hard
and soft money, spent on the 2000 federal elections was be-

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262 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tween $2.4 and $2.5 billion. J. Cantor, CRS Report for Con-
gress, Campaign Finance in the 2000 Federal Elections:
Overview and Estimates of the Flow of Money (2001). All
campaign spending in the United States, including state elec-
tions, ballot initiatives, and judicial elections, has been esti-
mated at $3.9 billion for 2000, Nelson, Spending in the 2000
Elections, in Financing the 2000 Election 24, Tbl. 2–1 (D.
Magleby ed. 2002), which was a year that “shattered spend-
ing and contribution records,” id., at 22. Even taking this
last, larger figure as the benchmark, it means that Americans
spent about half as much electing all their Nation’s officials,
state and federal, as they spent on movie tickets ($7.8
billion); about a fifth as much as they spent on cosmetics
and perfume ($18.8 billion); and about a sixth as much as
they spent on pork (the nongovernmental sort) ($22.8
billion). See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures, Tbl. 2.6U
(col. AS; rows 356, 214, and 139). If our democracy is drown-
ing from this much spending, it cannot swim.
* * *
Which brings me back to where I began: This litigation is
about preventing criticism of the government. I cannot say
for certain that many, or some, or even any, of the Members
of Congress who voted for this legislation did so not to
produce “fairer” campaigns, but to mute criticism of their
records and facilitate reelection. Indeed, I will stipulate
that all those who voted for BCRA believed they were acting
for the good of the country. There remains the problem of
the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, named after Charles Wil-
son, former president of General Motors, who is supposed to
have said during the Senate hearing on his nomination as
Secretary of Defense that “what’s good for General Motors

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is good for the country.”* Those in power, even giving them
the benefit of the greatest good will, are inclined to believe
that what is good for them is good for the country. Whether
in prescient recognition of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon,
or out of fear of good old-fashioned, malicious, self-interested
manipulation, “[t]he fundamental approach of the First
Amendment . . . was to assume the worst, and to rule the
regulation of political speech ‘for fairness’ sake’ simply out of
bounds.” Austin, 494 U. S., at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Having abandoned that approach to a limited extent in Buck-
ley, we abandon it much further today.
We will unquestionably be called upon to abandon it fur-
ther still in the future. The most frightening passage in the
lengthy floor debates on this legislation is the following as-
surance given by one of the cosponsoring Senators to his
colleagues:
“This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential
step, but it does not even begin to address, in some
ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard
money aspect of the system.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2101
(Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
The system indeed. The first instinct of power is the reten-
tion of power, and, under a Constitution that requires peri-
odic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of
election-time speech. We have witnessed merely the second
scene of Act I of what promises to be a lengthy tragedy.
In scene 3 the Court, having abandoned most of the First
Amendment weaponry that Buckley left intact, will be even
less equipped to resist the incumbents’ writing of the rules
*It is disillusioning to learn that the fabled quote is inaccurate. Wilson
actually said: “[F]or years I thought what was good for our country was
good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist.”
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., 26 (1953).

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264 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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of political debate. The federal election campaign laws,
which are already (as today’s opinions show) so voluminous,
so detailed, so complex, that no ordinary citizen dare run for
office, or even contribute a significant sum, without hiring an
expert adviser in the field, can be expected to grow more
voluminous, more detailed, and more complex in the years to
come—and always, always, with the objective of reducing
the excessive amount of speech.
Justice Thomas, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles
III and IV, except for BCRA §§ 311 and 318, concurring in
the result with respect to BCRA § 318, concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to
BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles
I, V, and § 311.*
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Nevertheless,
the Court today upholds what can only be described as the
most significant abridgment of the freedoms of speech and
association since the Civil War. With breathtaking scope,
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), di-
rectly targets and constricts core political speech, the “pri-
mary object of First Amendment protection.” Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–411
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because “the First Amend-
ment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office,” Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214,
223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S.
265, 272 (1971)), our duty is to approach these restrictions
“with the utmost skepticism” and subject them to the “strict-
est scrutiny.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
* Justice Scalia joins Parts I, II–A, and II–B of this opinion.

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In response to this assault on the free exchange of ideas
and with only the slightest consideration of the appropriate
standard of review or of the Court’s traditional role of pro-
tecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its
imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very
“purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S.
367, 390 (1969). Yet today the fundamental principle that
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,” Abrams v.
United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing), is cast aside in the purported service of preventing “cor-
ruption,” or the mere “appearance of corruption.” Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam). Apparently,
the marketplace of ideas is to be fully open only to defamers,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); nude
dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991)
(plurality opinion); pornographers, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002); flag burners, United States v.
Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990); and cross burners, Virginia
v. Black, 538 U. S. 343 (2003).
Because I cannot agree with the treatment given by Jus-
tice Stevens’ and Justice O’Connor’s opinion (herein-
after joint opinion) to speech that is “indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular gov-
ernment to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,”
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103 (1940), I respectfully
dissent. I also dissent from Justice Breyer’s opinion up-
holding BCRA § 504. I join The Chief Justice’s opinion
in regards to BCRA §§ 304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b);
concur in the result as to § 318; and dissent from the opinion
as to § 311. I also fully agree with Justice Kennedy’s dis-
cussion of § 213 and join that portion of his opinion. Post,
at 320.

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I
A
“[C]ampaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny,”
Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 164
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and thus Title I must satisfy
that demanding standard even if it were (incorrectly) con-
ceived of as nothing more than a contribution limitation.
The defendants do not even attempt to defend Title I under
this standard, and for good reason: The various restrictions
imposed by Title I are much less narrowly tailored to target
only corrupting or problematic donations than even the con-
tribution limits in Shrink Missouri. See 528 U. S., at 427–
430 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518
U. S. 604, 641–644 (1996) (Colorado I) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in judgment and dissenting in part). And, as I have
previously noted, it is unclear why “[b]ribery laws [that] bar
precisely the quid pro quo arrangements that are targeted
here” and “disclosure laws” are not “less restrictive means
of addressing [the Government’s] interest in curtailing cor-
ruption.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 428.
The joint opinion not only continues the errors of Buckley
v. Valeo, by applying a low level of scrutiny to contribution
ceilings, but also builds upon these errors by expanding the
anticircumvention rationale beyond reason. Admittedly, ex-
ploitation of an anticircumvention concept has a long pedi-
gree, going back at least to Buckley itself. Buckley upheld
a $1,000 contribution ceiling as a way to combat both the
“actuality and appearance of corruption.” 424 U. S., at 26.
The challengers in Buckley contended both that bribery laws
represented “a less restrictive means of dealing with ‘proven
and suspected quid pro quo arrangements,’ ” id., at 27, and
that the $1,000 contribution ceiling was overbroad as “most
large contributors do not seek improper influence over a can-
didate’s position or an officeholder’s action,” id., at 29. The

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Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that “laws
making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with
only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence governmental action,” id., at 27–28, and
rejected the second on the grounds that “it [is] difficult to
isolate suspect contributions,” id., at 30.1 But a broadly
drawn bribery law 2 would cover even subtle and general at-
tempts to influence government officials corruptly, eliminat-
ing the Court’s first concern. And, an effective bribery law
would deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all likelihood,
eliminate any appearance of corruption in the system.
Hence, at root, the Buckley Court was concerned that
bribery laws could not be effectively enforced to prevent
quid pro quos between donors and officeholders, and the only
rational reading of Buckley is that it approved the $1,000
contribution ceiling on this ground. The Court then, how-
ever, having at least in part concluded that individual contri-
bution ceilings were necessary to prevent easy evasion of
bribery laws, proceeded to uphold a separate contribution
limitation, using, as the only justification, the “prevent[ion]
[of] evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation.” Id., at 38.
The need to prevent circumvention of a limitation that was
itself an anticircumvention measure led to the upholding of
1 The Court also rejected an overbreadth challenge, reasoning that
“Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding
against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for
abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be
eliminated.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 30. But this justification was inextri-
cably intertwined with the Court’s concern over the difficulty of isolating
suspect contributions. If it were easy to isolate suspect contributions,
and if bribery laws could be quickly and effectively enforced, then there
would be no “opportunity for abuse inherent in the process,” ibid., and
hence no need for an otherwise overbroad contribution ceiling.
2 Arguably, the current antibribery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 201, is broad
enough to cover the unspecified other “attempts . . . to influence govern-
mental action” that the Buckley Court seemed worried about. 424 U. S.,
at 28.

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another significant restriction on individuals’ freedom of
speech.
The joint opinion now repeats this process. New Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) § 323(a), 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(a) (Supp. II), is intended to prevent easy circumvention
of the (now) $2,000 contribution ceiling. The joint opinion
even recognizes this, relying heavily on evidence that, for
instance, “candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited
the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their pros-
pects of election and the latter to create debt on the
part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as
willing intermediaries.” Ante, at 146. The joint opinion
upholds § 323(a), in part, on the grounds that it had become
too easy to circumvent the $2,000 cap by using the national
parties as go-betweens.
And the remaining provisions of new FECA § 323 are
upheld mostly as measures preventing circumvention of
other contribution limits, including § 323(a), ante, at 164–166
(§ 323(b)); ante, at 174–177 (§ 323(d)); ante, at 182–183
(§ 323(e)); ante, at 184–185 (§ 323(f)), which, as I have already
explained, is a second-order anticircumvention measure.
The joint opinion’s handling of § 323(f) is perhaps most tell-
ing, as it upholds § 323(f) only because of “Congress’ emi-
nently reasonable prediction that . . . state and local candi-
dates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the
soft-money funding of sham issue advertising.” Ante, at 185
(emphasis added). That is, this Court upholds a third-order
anticircumvention measure based on Congress’ anticipation
of circumvention of these second-order anticircumvention
measures that might possibly, at some point in the future,
pose some problem.
It is not difficult to see where this leads. Every law has
limits, and there will always be behavior not covered by the
law but at its edges; behavior easily characterized as “cir-
cumventing” the law’s prohibition. Hence, speech regula-
tion will again expand to cover new forms of “circumven-
tion,” only to spur supposed circumvention of the new

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regulations, and so forth. Rather than permit this never-
ending and self-justifying process, I would require that the
Government explain why proposed speech restrictions are
needed in light of actual Government interests, and, in par-
ticular, why the bribery laws are not sufficient.
B
But Title I falls even on the joint opinion’s terms. This
Court has held that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plau-
sibility of the justification raised.” Shrink Missouri, 528
U. S., at 391. And three Members of today’s majority have
observed that “the opportunity for corruption” presented by
“[u]nregulated ‘soft money’ contributions” is, “at best, atten-
uated.” Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 616 (opinion of Breyer, J.,
joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ.). Such an observation
is quite clearly correct. A donation to a political party is a
clumsy method by which to influence a candidate, as the
party is free to spend the donation however it sees fit, and
could easily spend the money as to provide no help to the
candidate. And, a soft-money donation to a party will be of
even less benefit to a candidate, “because of legal restrictions
on how the money may be spent.” Brief for FEC et al. in
No. 02–1674 et al., p. 43. It follows that the defendants bear
an especially heavy empirical burden in justifying Title I.
The evidence cited by the joint opinion does not meet this
standard and would barely suffice for anything more than
rational-basis review. The first category of the joint opin-
ion’s evidence is evidence that “federal officeholders have
commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to na-
tional and state committees solely in order to assist federal
campaigns, including the officeholder’s own.” Ante, at 146
(internal quotation marks omitted). But to the extent that
donors and federal officeholders have collaborated so that do-
nors could give donations to a national party committee “for

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270 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,”
the alleged soft-money donation is in actuality a regular
“contribution” as already defined and regulated by FECA.
See 2 U. S. C. § 431(8)(A)(i). Neither the joint opinion nor
the defendants present evidence that enforcement of pre-
BCRA law has proved to be impossible, ineffective, or even
particularly difficult.
The second category is evidence that “lobbyists, CEOs,
and wealthy individuals” have “donat[ed] substantial sums
of soft money to national committees not on ideological
grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence
over federal officials.” Ante, at 147. Even if true (and the
cited evidence consists of nothing more than vague allega-
tions of wrongdoing), it is unclear why existing bribery laws
could not address this problem. Again, neither the joint
opinion nor the defendants point to evidence that the en-
forcement of bribery laws has been or would be ineffective.
If the problem has been clear and widespread, as the joint
opinion suggests, I would expect that convictions, or at least
prosecutions, would be more frequent.
The third category is evidence characterized by the joint
opinion as “connect[ing] soft money to manipulations of the
legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact,
among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform,
and tobacco legislation.” Ante, at 150. But the evidence
for this is no stronger than the evidence that there has been
actual vote buying or vote switching for soft money. The
joint opinion’s citations to the record do not stand for the
propositions that they claim. For instance, the McCain dec-
laration does not provide any evidence of any exchange of
legislative action for donations of any kind (hard or soft).3
3 Indeed, the principal contents of Senator McCain’s declaration are his
complaints that several bills he supported were defeated. The Senator
also suggests, without evidence, that there had been some connection be-
tween the defeat of his favored policy outcomes and certain soft-money
donors. See, e. g., App. 393–394, ¶10 (declaration of Sen. John McCain

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Neither do the Simpson or Simon declarations, with perhaps
one exception effectively addressed by Justice Kennedy’s
opinion.4 See post, at 301–303. In fact, the findings by two
of the District Court’s judges confirm that the evidence of
any quid pro quo corruption is exceedingly weak, if not non-
existent. See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 349–352 (DC 2003) (Hen-
derson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id., at 851–853 (Leon, J.). The evidence cited by the
joint opinion is properly described as, “at best, [the Members
of Congress’] personal conjecture regarding the impact of
soft money donations on the voting practices of their present
and former colleagues.” Id., at 852 (Leon, J.).
The joint opinion also places a substantial amount of
weight on the fact that “in 1996 and 2000, more than half of
the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both
major national parties,” and suggests that this fact “leav[es]
room for no other conclusion but that these donors were
seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than pro-
moting any particular ideology.” Ante, at 148 (emphasis in
original). But that is not necessarily the case. The two
major parties are not perfect ideological opposites, and sup-
porters or opponents of certain policies or ideas might find
substantial overlap between the two parties. If donors feel
that both major parties are in general agreement over an
issue of importance to them, it is unremarkable that such
¶10) (noting Democratic “parliamentary procedural device” used to block
one of Senator McCain’s proposed amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley cor-
porate governance bill). The possibility that his favored policy outcomes
lost due to lack of public support, or because the opponents of the amend-
ment honestly believed it would do harm to the public, does not appear to
be addressed.
4 Former Senators Simpson and Simon both seem to have the same re-
sponse as Senator McCain, see n. 3, supra, in having their favored inter-
ests voted down, and similarly do not consider alternative explanations
for the failure of their proposals. See App. 811, ¶ 11 (declaration of former
Sen. Alan Simpson ¶11); id., at 805, ¶14 (declaration of former Sen. Paul
Simon ¶14).

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donors show support for both parties. This commonsense
explanation surely belies the joint opinion’s too-hasty conclu-
sion drawn from a relatively innocent fact.
The Court today finds such sparse evidence sufficient.
This cannot be held to satisfy even the “relatively complai-
sant review” of Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161, unless, as it
appears, the Court intends to abdicate entirely its role.5
II
The Court is not content with “balanc[ing] away First
Amendment freedoms,” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410
(Thomas, J., dissenting), in the context of the restrictions
imposed by Title I, which could arguably (if wrongly) be
thought to be mere contribution limits. The Court also, in
upholding virtually all of Title II, proceeds to do the same
for limitations on expenditures, which constitute “political
expression ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms,’ ” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39
(quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968)). To-
day’s holding continues a disturbing trend: the steady de-
crease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core
political speech. See Buckley, supra, at 16 (First Amend-
ment requires “exacting scrutiny”); Shrink Missouri, supra,
at 387 (applying “Buckley’s standard of scrutiny”); Beau-
mont, supra, at 161 (referencing “relatively complaisant re-
view”).6 Although this trend is most obvious in the review
of contribution limits, it has now reached what even this
Court today would presumably recognize as a direct restric-
tion on core political speech: limitations on independent
expenditures.
5 Because there is not an iota of evidence supporting the Government’s
asserted interests in BCRA § 318, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that
this provision is unconstitutional.
6 The joint opinion continues yet another disturbing trend: the applica-
tion of a complaisant level of scrutiny under the guise of “strict scrutiny.”
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003).

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A
Of course, by accepting Congress’ expansion of what con-
stitutes “coordination” for purposes of treating expenditures
as limitations, the Court can pretend that it is, in fact, still
only restricting primarily “contributions.” I need not say
much about this illusion. I have already discussed how the
language used in new FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is, even under
Buckley’s framework, overly broad and restricts fully pro-
tected speech. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 467–
468 (2001) (Colorado II) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The par-
ticular language used, “expenditures made by any person . . .
in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the re-
quest or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee
of a political party,” BCRA § 214(a)(2), captures expenditures
with “no constitutional difference” from “a purely independ-
ent one.” Id., at 468 (Thomas, J., dissenting).7 And new
FECA § 315(a)(7)(C), although using the neutral term “coor-
dinated,” certainly has the purpose of “clarif[ying] the scope
of the preceding subsection, § 315(a)(7)(B),” ante, at 202
( joint opinion), and thus should be read to be as expansive
as the overly broad language in § 315(a)(7)(B). Hence, it too
is unconstitutional.
B
As for §§ 203 and 204, the Court rests its decision on an-
other vast expansion of the First Amendment framework de-
scribed in Buckley, this time of the Court’s, rather than Con-
gress’, own making. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 659–660 (1990), the Court recog-
nized a “different type of corruption” from the “ ‘financial
quid pro quo’ ”: the “corrosive and distorting effects of im-
7 This is doubly so now that the Court has decided that there is no consti-
tutional need for the showing even of an “agreement” in order to trans-
form an expenditure into a “coordinated expenditur[e]” and hence into a
contribution for FECA purposes. Ante, at 220–223 ( joint opinion).

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mense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correla-
tion to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas.” The only effect, however, that the “immense aggre-
gations” of wealth will have (in the context of independent
expenditures) on an election is that they might be used to
fund communications to convince voters to select certain can-
didates over others. In other words, the “corrosive and dis-
torting effects” described in Austin are that corporations, on
behalf of their shareholders, will be able to convince voters
of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently, winning in the
marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that “the ultimate
good” has been “reached by free trade in ideas,” or that the
speaker has survived “the best test of truth” by having “the
thought . . . get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket.” Abrams, 250 U. S., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). It
is now evidence of “corruption.” This conclusion is antithet-
ical to everything for which the First Amendment stands.
See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S.
765, 790 (1978) (“[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the
electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it”); Kingsley Int’l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684, 689
(1959) (“[I]n the realm of ideas [the Constitution] protects
expression which is eloquent no less than that which is
unconvincing”).
Because Austin’s definition of “corruption” is incompatible
with the First Amendment, I would overturn Austin and
hold that the potential for corporations and unions to influ-
ence voters, via independent expenditures aimed at convinc-
ing these voters to adopt particular views, is not a form of
corruption justifying any state regulation or suppression.
Without Austin’s peculiar variation of “corruption,” §§ 203
and 204 are supported by no compelling government inter-
est. The joint opinion does not even argue that these provi-

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sions address quid pro quo corruption.8 And the share-
holder protection rationale is equally unavailing. The
“shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and
is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any
reason,” Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 794, n. 34. Hence, no compel-
ling interest can be found in protecting minority sharehold-
ers from the corporation’s use of its general treasury, es-
pecially where, in other contexts, “equally important and
controversial corporate decisions are made by management
or by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders.”
Ibid.
C
I must now address an issue on which I differ from all of
my colleagues: the disclosure provisions in BCRA § 201, now
contained in new FECA § 304(f). The “historical evidence
indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to
require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the
ground that forced disclosure violated the ‘freedom of the
press.’ ” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334,
361 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).9 Indeed,
this Court has explicitly recognized that “the interest in hav-
ing anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unques-
tionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclo-
8 The National Rifle Association (NRA) plaintiffs compellingly state that
“[a]s a measure designed to prevent official corruption, of either the quid
pro quo or the ‘gratitude’ variety, Title II . . . makes no more sense than
a bribery statute requiring corporations to pay for their bribes using funds
from PACs.” Brief for Appellant NRA et al. in No. 02–1675, pp. 24–25.
And, regarding the appearance of corruption: “Defendants’ own witnesses
concede that the public’s perceptions of ads is not affected in the slightest
by whether they are purchased with general treasury funds or with PAC
money.” Id., at 25.
9 The fact that the Founders located the right to anonymous speech in
the “freedom of the press” is of no moment, as “it makes little difference
in terms of our analysis, which seeks to determine only whether the First
Amendment, as originally understood, protects anonymous writing.” Mc-
Intyre, 514 U. S., at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).

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sure as a condition of entry,” and thus that “an author’s
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom
of speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id., at 342.
The Court now backs away from this principle, allowing the
established right to anonymous speech to be stripped away
based on the flimsiest of justifications.
The only plausible interest asserted by the defendants to
justify the disclosure provisions is the interest in providing
“information” about the speaker to the public. But we have
already held that “[t]he simple interest in providing voters
with additional relevant information does not justify a state
requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures
she would otherwise omit.” Id., at 348. Of course, Buckley
upheld the disclosure requirement on expenditures for com-
munications using words of express advocacy based on this
informational interest. 424 U. S., at 81. And admittedly,
McIntyre purported to distinguish Buckley. McIntyre,
supra, at 355–356. But the two ways McIntyre distin-
guished Buckley—one, that the disclosure of “an expenditure
and its use, without more, reveals far less information [than
a forced identification of the author of a pamphlet,]” 514
U. S., at 355; and two, that in candidate elections, the “Gov-
ernment can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding
the corruption that might result from campaign expendi-
tures,” id., at 356—are inherently implausible. The first is
simply wrong. The revelation of one’s political expenditures
for independent communications about candidates can be just
as revealing as the revelation of one’s name on a pamphlet
for a noncandidate election. See also id., at 384 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The second was outright rejected in Buckley
itself, where the Court concluded that independent expendi-
tures did not create any substantial risk of real or apparent
corruption. 424 U. S., at 47. Hence, the only reading of
McIntyre that remains consistent with the principles it con-
tains is that it overturned Buckley to the extent that Buck-
ley upheld a disclosure requirement solely based on the gov-
ernmental interest in providing information to the voters.

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The right to anonymous speech cannot be abridged based
on the interests asserted by the defendants. I would thus
hold that the disclosure requirements of BCRA § 201 are
unconstitutional. Because of this conclusion, the so-called
advance disclosure requirement of § 201 necessarily falls as
well.10
D
I have long maintained that Buckley was incorrectly de-
cided and should be overturned. See Colorado II, 533 U. S.,
at 465; Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410; Colorado I, 518
U. S., at 640. But, most of Title II should still be held un-
constitutional even under the Buckley framework. Under
Buckley and Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), it is, or
at least was, clear that any regulation of political speech be-
yond communications using words of express advocacy is un-
constitutional. Hence, even under the joint opinion’s frame-
work, most of Title II is unconstitutional, as both the
“primary definition” and “backup definition” of “electioneer-
10 BCRA § 212(a) is also unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs only
challenge the advance disclosure requirement of § 212(a), by requiring dis-
closure of communications using express advocacy, the entire reporting
requirement is unconstitutional for the same reasons that § 201 is unconsti-
tutional. Consequently, it follows that the advance disclosure provision
is unconstitutional.
BCRA §§ 311 and 504 also violate the First Amendment. By requiring
any television or radio advertisement that satisfies the definition of “elec-
tioneering communication” to include the identity of the sponsor, and even
a “full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or other
person making the statement” in the case of a television advertisement,
new FECA § 318, § 311 is a virtual carbon copy of the law at issue in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995) (the only differ-
ence being the irrelevant distinction between a printed pamphlet and a
television or radio advertisement). And § 504 not only has the precise
flaws of § 201, but also sweeps broadly as well, covering any “message
relating to any political matter of national importance, including . . . a
national legislative issue of public importance.” Hence, both §§ 311 and
504 should be struck down.

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ing communications” cover a significant number of commu-
nications that do not use words of express advocacy. 2
U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. II).11
In Buckley, the Court was presented with the ambiguous
language “ ‘any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified
candidate.’ ” 424 U. S., at 41. The Court noted that the
“use of so indefinite a phrase as ‘relative to’ a candidate fails
to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and im-
permissible speech.” Ibid. Hence, the Court read the
phrase to mean “advocating the election or defeat of a candi-
date.” Id., at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). But
this construction did not complete the vagueness inquiry.
As the Court observed:
“[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and can-
didates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates
may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates,
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public is-
sues involving legislative proposals and governmental
actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis
of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns
themselves generate issues of public interest.” Ibid.
The Court then recognized that the constitutional issues
raised by the provision “can be avoided only by reading
11 The Court, in upholding most of its provisions by concluding that the
“express advocacy” limitation derived by Buckley is not a constitutionally
mandated line, has, in one blow, overturned every Court of Appeals that
has addressed this question (except, perhaps, one). See Clifton v. FEC,
114 F. 3d 1309, 1312 (CA1 1997); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.
Sorrell, 221 F. 3d 376, 387 (CA2 2000); FEC v. Christian Action Network,
Inc., 110 F. 3d 1049, 1064 (CA4 1997); Chamber of Commerce v. Moore,
288 F. 3d 187, 193 (CA5 2000); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams,
187 F. 3d 963, 968–970 (CA8 1999); Citizens for Responsible Govt. State
Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F. 3d 1174, 1187 (CA10 2000).
The one possible exception is the Ninth Circuit. See FEC v. Furgatch,
807 F. 2d 857, 862–863 (1987).

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§ 608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit
words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate.” Id.,
at 43.
The joint opinion argues that Buckley adopted this narrow
reading only to avoid addressing a constitutional question.
“[T]he concept of express advocacy and the concomitant class
of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional
infirmities,” concludes the joint opinion after examining the
language of Buckley. Ante, at 192. This ignores the fact
that the Court then struck down the expenditure limitation
precisely because it was too narrow:
“The exacting interpretation of the statutory language
necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus un-
dermines the limitation’s effectiveness as a loophole-
closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those
seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or
officeholder. It would naively underestimate the inge-
nuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desir-
ing to buy influence to believe that they would have
much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the
restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but
nevertheless benefited the candidate’s campaign. Yet
no substantial societal interest would be served by a
loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption
that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations
to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain
improper influence over candidates for elective office.”
424 U. S., at 45.
Far from saving the provision from constitutional doubt, the
Court read the provision in such a way as to guarantee its
unconstitutionality. If there were some possibility that reg-
ulation of communications without words of express advo-
cacy were constitutional, the provision would have to have
been read to include these communications, and the constitu-

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tional question addressed head on.12 Indeed, the exceed-
ingly narrow reading of the relevant language in Buckley is
far from mandated by the text; it is, in fact, a highly strained
reading. “ ‘[A]ny expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identi-
fied candidate,’ ” id., at 41, would be better read to cover, for
instance, any expenditure for an advertisement aired close
to an election that is “intended to influence the voters’ deci-
sions and ha[s] that effect,” a standard apparently endorsed
by the joint opinion as being sufficiently “equivalent” to ex-
press advocacy to justify its regulation. Ante, at 206. By
deliberately adopting a strained and narrow reading of the
statutory text and then striking down the provision in ques-
tion for being too narrow, the Court made clear that regula-
tion of nonexpress advocacy was strictly forbidden.
This reading is confirmed by other portions of Buckley and
by other cases. For instance, in limiting FECA’s disclosure
provisions to expenditures involving express advocacy, the
Court noted that it gave such a narrowing interpretation
“[t]o insure that the reach of [the disclosure provision] is not
impermissibly broad.” 424 U. S., at 80 (emphasis added).
If overbreadth were a concern in limiting the scope of a dis-
closure provision, it surely was equally a concern in the lim-
itation of an actual cap on expenditures. And, in MCFL,
the Court arguably eliminated any ambiguity remaining in
Buckley when it explicitly stated that the narrowing inter-
pretations taken in Buckley were necessary “in order to
avoid problems of overbreadth.” MCFL, 479 U. S., at 248.
The joint opinion’s attempt to explain away MCFL’s uncom-
fortable language is unpersuasive. The joint opinion em-
phasizes that the MCFL Court “held that a ‘similar con-
12 After all, the constitutional avoidance doctrine counsels us to adopt
constructions of statutes to “avoid decision of constitutional questions,”
not to deliberately create constitutional questions. United States v.
Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 373 (1971); see also United States
ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408
(1909).

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struction’ must apply to the expenditure limitation,” as if
that somehow proved its point. Ante, at 192, n. 76 (emphasis
in original). The fact that the MCFL Court said this does
not establish anything, of course; adopting a narrow con-
struction of a statute “in order to avoid problems of over-
breadth,” 479 U. S., at 248, is perfectly consistent with a
holding that, lacking the narrowing construction, the statute
would be overly broad, i. e., unconstitutional.
The defendants’ principal argument in response is that
“it would be bizarre to conclude that the Constitution
permits Congress to prohibit the use of corporate or
union general treasury funds for electioneering adver-
tisements, but that the only standard that it can con-
stitutionally use (express advocacy) is one that misses
the vast majority (88.6 percent) of advertisements that
candidates themselves use for electioneering.” Brief
for FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., p. 103 (emphasis
in original).
The joint opinion echoes this, stating that the express advo-
cacy line “cannot be squared with our longstanding recogni-
tion that the presence or absence of magic words cannot
meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true
issue ad.” Ante, at 193. First, the presence of the “magic
words” does differentiate in a meaningful way between cate-
gories of speech. Speech containing the “magic words” is
“unambiguously campaign related,” Buckley, supra, at 81,
while speech without these words is not. Second, it is far
from bizarre to suggest that (potentially regulable) speech
that is in practice impossible to differentiate from fully pro-
tected speech must be fully protected. It is, rather, part
and parcel of First Amendment first principles. See, e. g.,
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S., at 255 (“The Government
may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress
unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become unpro-
tected merely because it resembles the latter. The Consti-

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tution requires the reverse”). In fact, First Amendment
protection was extended to that fundamental category of ar-
tistic and entertaining speech not for its own sake, but only
because it was indistinguishable, practically, from speech in-
tended to inform. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U. S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510
(1948) (rejecting suggestion that “the constitutional protec-
tion for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas”
as the “line between the informing and the entertaining is
too elusive for the protection of that basic right,” noting that
“[w]hat is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doc-
trine”). This principle clearly played a significant role in
Buckley itself, see 424 U. S., at 42 (after noting that “the
distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dis-
solve in practical application,” holding that the “express ad-
vocacy” standard must be adopted as the interpretation of
the relevant language in FECA). The express-advocacy
line was drawn to ensure the protection of the “discussion of
issues and candidates,” not out of some strange obsession of
the Court to create meaningless lines. And the joint opin-
ion misses the point when it notes that “Buckley’s express
advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort
to combat real or apparent corruption.” Ante, at 193–194.
Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in combating
real or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the
protection of speech unrelated to election campaigns.13
Nor is this to say that speech with words of express advo-
cacy is somehow less protected, as the joint opinion implies.
13 These cases are an excellent example of why such a bright-line rule is
necessary. The Court, having “rejected the notion that the First Amend-
ment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from
express advocacy,” ante, at 194, proceeds to uphold significant new restric-
tions on speech that is, in every sense of the word, pure issue-related
speech. The Court abandons the bright-line rule, and now subjects politi-
cal speech of virtually any kind to the risk of regulation by Congress.

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Ante, at 205–206. The Court in Buckley recognized an in-
formational interest that justified the imposition of a dis-
closure requirement on campaign-related speech. See 424
U. S., at 81. This interest is not implicated with regard to
speech that is unrelated to an election campaign. Hence, it
would be unconstitutional to impose such a disclosure re-
quirement on non-election-related speech. And, as “the dis-
tinction between discussion of issues and candidates . . . may
often dissolve in practical application,” id., at 42, the only
way to prevent the unjustified burdening of nonelection
speech is to impose the regulation only on speech that is
“unambiguously campaign related,” id., at 81, i. e., speech
using words of express advocacy. Hence, speech that uses
words of express advocacy is protected under the same
standard, strict scrutiny, as all other forms of speech. The
only difference is that, under Buckley, there is a governmen-
tal interest supporting some regulation of those using words
of express advocacy not present in other forms of speech.
* * *
The chilling endpoint of the Court’s reasoning is not diffi-
cult to foresee: outright regulation of the press. None of
the rationales offered by the defendants, and none of the rea-
soning employed by the Court, exempts the press. “This
is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of
distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional
law, media corporations from [nonmedia] corporations.”
Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 796 (Burger, C. J., concurring). Media
companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as non-
media corporations can pay for advertisements. Candidates
can be just as grateful to media companies as they can be
to corporations and unions. In terms of “the corrosive and
distorting effects” of wealth accumulated by corporations
that has “little or no correlation to the public’s support for
the corporation’s political ideas,” Austin, 494 U. S., at
660, there is no distinction between a media corporation and

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284 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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a nonmedia corporation.14 Media corporations are influen-
tial. There is little doubt that the editorials and commen-
tary they run can affect elections. Nor is there any doubt
that media companies often wish to influence elections. One
would think that the New York Times fervently hopes that
its endorsement of Presidential candidates will actually in-
fluence people. What is to stop a future Congress from de-
termining that the press is “too influential,” and that the
“appearance of corruption” is significant when media organi-
zations endorse candidates or run “slanted” or “biased” news
stories in favor of candidates or parties? Or, even easier,
what is to stop a future Congress from concluding that the
availability of unregulated media corporations creates a loop-
hole that allows for easy “circumvention” of the limitations
of the current campaign finance laws?15
Indeed, I believe that longstanding and heretofore unchal-
lenged opinions such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tor-
nillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), are in peril. There, the Court
noted that “[c]hains of newspapers, national newspapers, na-
tional wire and news services, and one-newspaper towns, are
14 Chief Justice Burger presciently commented on precisely this point in
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 796–797 (1978) (concur-
ring opinion) (citations omitted):
“In terms of ‘unfair advantage in the political process’ and ‘corporate
domination of the electoral process,’ it could be argued that such media
conglomerates as I describe pose a much more realistic threat to valid
interests than do appellants and similar entities not regularly concerned
with shaping popular opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, [418 U. S. 241 (1974)]. In Tornillo, for example,
we noted the serious contentions advanced that a result of the growth of
modern media empires ‘has been to place in a few hands the power to
inform the American people and shape public opinion.’ 418 U. S., at 250.”
15 It appears that “circumvention” of the campaign finance laws by ex-
ploiting media exemptions is already being planned by one of the plain-
tiffs in this litigation. See Theimer, NRA Seeks Status as News Outlet,
Washington Post, Dec. 7, 2003, p. A09 (reporting that the NRA is look-
ing to acquire a broadcast outlet and seeking to be classified as a news
organization).

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the dominant features of a press that has become noncompet-
itive and enormously powerful and influential in its capacity
to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of
events.” Id., at 249. Despite expressing some sympathy
for those arguing for a legally created “right of access” to
encourage diversity in viewpoints in the media, the Court
struck down such laws, noting that these laws acted both to
suppress speech and to “intru[de] into the function of edi-
tors” by interfering with “the exercise of editorial control
and judgment.” Id., at 257–258. Now, supporters of such
laws need only argue that the press’ “capacity to manipulate
popular opinion” gives rise to an “appearance of corruption,”
especially when this capacity is used to promote a particular
candidate or party. After drumming up some evidence,16
laws regulating media outlets in their issuance of editorials
would be upheld under the joint opinion’s reasoning (a result
considered so beyond the pale in Miami Herald Publishing
that the Court there used it as a reductio ad absurdum
against the right-of-access law being addressed, see id., at
256). Nor is there anything in the joint opinion that would
prevent Congress from imposing the Fairness Doctrine, not
just on radio and television broadcasters, but on the entire
media. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U. S., at 369 (defin-
ing the “fairness doctrine” as a “requirement that discussion
of public issues be presented . . . and that each side of those
issues must be given fair coverage”).
16 Given the quality of the evidence the Court relies upon to uphold Title
I, the evidence should not be hard to come by. See Kane & Preston, Fox
Chief on Hot Seat, Roll Call, June 12, 2003 (“GOP leaders such as House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) have labeled CNN as the ‘Commu-
nist News Network’ and the ‘Clinton News Network’—suggesting they
only presented the liberal viewpoint and that of former President Clin-
ton”); Jones, Fox News Moves from the Margins to the Mainstream, Shor-
enstein Center, Harvard, Dec. 1, 2002 (quoting Al Gore as describing Fox
News and the Washington Times as “part and parcel of the Republican
Party”).

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Hence, “the freedom of the press,” described as “one of
the greatest bulwarks of liberty,” 1 J. Elliot, Debates on the
Federal Constitution 335 (2d ed. 1876) (declaration of Rhode
Island upon the ratification of the Constitution),17 could be
next on the chopping block. Although today’s opinion does
not expressly strip the press of First Amendment protection,
there is no principle of law or logic that would prevent the
application of the Court’s reasoning in that setting. The
press now operates at the whim of Congress.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.*
The First Amendment guarantees our citizens the right to
judge for themselves the most effective means for the ex-
pression of political views and to decide for themselves which
entities to trust as reliable speakers. Significant portions
of Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA or Act) constrain that freedom. These new
laws force speakers to abandon their own preference for
speaking through parties and organizations. And they pro-
vide safe harbor to the mainstream press, suggesting that
the corporate media alone suffice to alleviate the burdens the
Act places on the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens.
Today’s decision upholding these laws purports simply to
follow Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and
to abide by stare decisis, see ante, at 137–138 ( joint opinion
of Stevens and O’Connor, JJ. (hereinafter Court or ma-
jority)); but the majority, to make its decision work, must
abridge free speech where Buckley did not. Buckley did
17 See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 151
(1769) (“The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state”).
*The Chief Justice joins this opinion in its entirety. Justice Scalia
joins this opinion except to the extent it upholds new FECA § 323(e) and
BCRA § 202. Justice Thomas joins this opinion with respect to BCRA
§ 213.

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not authorize Congress to decide what shapes and forms the
national political dialogue is to take. To reach today’s deci-
sion, the Court surpasses Buckley’s limits and expands Con-
gress’ regulatory power. In so doing, it replaces discrete
and respected First Amendment principles with new, amor-
phous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic pro-
tections for speech.
A few examples show how BCRA reorders speech rights
and codifies the Government’s own preferences for certain
speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony punishment on
Ross Perot’s 1996 efforts to build the Reform Party. Com-
pare Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)
§§ 309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and 323(a)(1) (prohibiting, by up
to five years’ imprisonment, any individual from giving over
$25,000 annually to a national party), with Spending By
Perot, The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 13, 1996, p. 43, 1996 WL
11581440 (reporting Perot’s $8 million founding contribution
to the Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for an envi-
ronmental group to broadcast an ad, within 60 days of an
election, exhorting the public to protest a Congressman’s im-
pending vote to permit logging in national forests. See
BCRA § 203. BCRA escalates Congress’ discrimination in
favor of the speech rights of giant media corporations and
against the speech rights of other corporations, both profit
and nonprofit. Compare BCRA § 203 with Austin v. Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 659–660 (1990)
(first sanctioning this type of discrimination).
To the majority, all this is not only valid under the First
Amendment but also is part of Congress’ “steady improve-
ment of the national election laws.” Ante, at 117. We
should make no mistake. It is neither. It is the codification
of an assumption that the mainstream media alone can pro-
tect freedom of speech. It is an effort by Congress to en-
sure that civic discourse takes place only through the modes
of its choosing. And BCRA is only the beginning, as its con-
gressional proponents freely admit:

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“This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential
step, but it does not even begin to address, in some
ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard
money aspect of the system.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2101
(Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
Id., at S2097 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (“[P]assing this
legislation . . . will whet people’s appetite for more”); id., at
S2101 (statement of Sen. Boxer) (“[T]his bill is not the be-all
or the end-all, but it is a strong start”); id., at S2152 (state-
ment of Sen. Corzine) (“[T]his should not and will not be the
last time campaign finance reform is debated on the Senate
floor. We have many more important campaign finance is-
sues to explore”); id., at S2157 (statement of Sen. Torricelli)
(“Make [BCRA] the beginning of a reform, not the end of
reform”); id., at H442 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Dog-
gett) (“Mr. Chairman, if [BCRA] has any defect, it is that it
does too little, not too much”).
Our precedents teach, above all, that Government cannot
be trusted to moderate its own rules for suppression of
speech. The dangers posed by speech regulations have led
the Court to insist upon principled constitutional lines and a
rigorous standard of review. The majority now abandons
these distinctions and limitations.
With respect, I dissent from the majority opinion uphold-
ing BCRA Titles I and II. I concur in the judgment as to
BCRA § 213 and new FECA § 323(e) and concur in the judg-
ment in part and dissent in part as to BCRA §§ 201, 202,
and 214.
I. TITLE I AND COORDINATION PROVISIONS
Title I principally bans the solicitation, receipt, transfer,
and spending of soft money by the national parties (new
FECA § 323(a), 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) (Supp. II)). It also bans
certain uses of soft money by state parties (new FECA
§ 323(b)); the transfer of soft money from national parties to
nonprofit groups (new FECA § 323(d)); the solicitation, re-

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ceipt, transfer, and spending of soft money by federal candi-
dates and officeholders (new FECA § 323(e)); and certain
uses of soft money by state candidates (new FECA § 323(f)).
These provisions, and the other provisions with which this
opinion is principally concerned, are set out in full, see
Appendix, infra. Even a cursory review of the speech and
association burdens these laws create makes their First
Amendment infirmities obvious:
Title I bars individuals with shared beliefs from pool-
ing their money above limits set by Congress to form a
new third party. See new FECA § 323(a).
Title I bars national party officials from soliciting or
directing soft money to state parties for use on a state
ballot initiative. This is true even if no federal office
appears on the same ballot as the state initiative. See
ibid.
A national party’s mere involvement in the strategic
planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative risks
a determination that the national party is exercising “in-
direct control” of the state party. If that determination
is made, the state party must abide by federal regula-
tions. And this is so even if the federal candidate on
the ballot, if there is one, runs unopposed or is so certain
of election that the only voter interest is in the state
and local campaigns. See ibid.
Title I compels speech. Party officials who want to
engage in activity such as fundraising must now speak
magic words to ensure the solicitation cannot be inter-
preted as anything other than a solicitation for hard, not
soft, money. See ibid.
Title I prohibits the national parties from giving any
sort of funds to nonprofit entities, even federally regu-
lated hard money, and even if the party hoped to sponsor
the interest group’s exploration of a particular issue in
advance of the party’s addition of it to their platform.
See new FECA § 323(d).

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By express terms, Title I imposes multiple different
forms of spending caps on parties, candidates, and their
agents. See new FECA §§ 323(a), (e), and (f).
Title I allows state parties to raise quasi-soft-money
Levin funds for use in activities that might affect a fed-
eral election; but the Act prohibits national parties from
assisting state parties in developing and executing these
fundraising plans, even when the parties seek only
to advance state election interests. See new FECA
§ 323(b).
Until today’s consolidated cases, the Court has accepted
but two principles to use in determining the validity of cam-
paign finance restrictions. First is the anticorruption ra-
tionale. The principal concern, of course, is the agreement
for a quid pro quo between officeholders (or candidates) and
those who would seek to influence them. The Court has said
the interest in preventing corruption allows limitations on
receipt of the quid by a candidate or officeholder, regardless
of who gives it or of the intent of the donor or officeholder.
See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 26–27, 45–48; infra, at 291–294.
Second, the Court has analyzed laws that classify on the
basis of the speaker’s corporate or union identity under the
corporate speech rationale. The Court has said that the
willing adoption of the entity form by corporations and
unions justifies regulating them differently: Their ability to
give candidates quids may be subject not only to limits but
also to outright bans; their electoral speech may likewise be
curtailed. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 659–660; Federal Elec-
tion Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S.
197, 201–211 (1982).
The majority today opens with rhetoric that suggests a
conflation of the anticorruption rationale with the corporate
speech rationale. See ante, at 115–118 (hearkening back to,
among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy against the use
of corporate funds in political campaigning). The conflation
appears designed to cast the speech regulated here as un-

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seemly corporate speech. The effort, however, is unwar-
ranted, and not just because money is not per se the evil the
majority thinks. Most of the regulations at issue, notably
all of the Title I soft-money bans and the Title II coordina-
tion provisions, do not draw distinctions based on corporate
or union status. Referring to the corporate speech rationale
as if it were the linchpin of the case, when corporate speech
is not primarily at issue, adds no force to the Court’s analy-
sis. Instead, the focus must be on Buckley’s anticorrup-
tion rationale and the First Amendment rights of individual
citizens.
A. Constitutionally Sufficient Interest
In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only one, interest
justified the significant burden on the right of association
involved there: eliminating, or preventing, actual corruption
or the appearance of corruption stemming from contributions
to candidates.
“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary pur-
pose—to limit the actuality and appearance of corrup-
tion resulting from large individual financial contribu-
tions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.” 424
U. S., at 26.
See also ibid. (concluding this corruption interest was suffi-
ciently “significant” to sustain “closely drawn” interference
with protected First Amendment rights).
In parallel, Buckley concluded the expenditure limitations
in question were invalid because they did not advance that
same interest. See id., at 47–48 (“[T]he independent ex-
penditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial govern-
mental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-
ruption in the electoral process”); see also id., at 45, 46.
Thus, though Buckley subjected expenditure limits to
strict scrutiny and contribution limits to less exacting re-
view, it held neither could withstand constitutional challenge

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unless it was shown to advance the anticorruption interest.
In these consolidated cases, unless Buckley is to be repudi-
ated, we must conclude that the regulations further that in-
terest before considering whether they are closely drawn or
narrowly tailored. If the interest is not advanced, the reg-
ulations cannot comport with the Constitution, quite apart
from the standard of review.
Buckley made clear, by its express language and its con-
text, that the corruption interest only justifies regulating
candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of what we can call the
“quids” in the quid pro quo formulation. The Court rested
its decision on the principle that campaign finance regulation
that restricts speech without requiring proof of particular
corrupt action withstands constitutional challenge only if
it regulates conduct posing a demonstrable quid pro quo
danger:
“To the extent that large contributions are given to se-
cure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representa-
tive democracy is undermined.” Id., at 26–27.
See also id., at 45 (“[A]ssuming, arguendo, that large inde-
pendent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or ap-
parent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions
. . .”). That Buckley rested its decision on this quid pro quo
standard is not a novel observation. We have held this was
the case:
“The exception [of contribution limits being justified
under the First Amendment] relates to the perception
of undue influence of large contributions to a candidate:
‘To the extent that large contributions are given to se-
cure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of represent-
ative democracy is undermined.’ ” Citizens Against
Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley,

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454 U. S. 290, 297 (1981) (quoting Buckley, supra, at
26–27).
See also Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S.
146 (2003) (furthering this anticorruption rationale by up-
holding limits on contributions given directly to candidates);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377
(2000) (same).
Despite the Court’s attempt to rely on language from cases
like Shrink Missouri to establish that the standard defining
corruption is broader than conduct that presents a quid pro
quo danger, see ante, at 152–153, n. 48, in those cases the
Court in fact upheld limits on conduct possessing quid pro
quo dangers, and nothing more. See also infra, at 296. For
example, the Shrink Missouri Court’s distinguishing of what
was at issue there and quid pro quo, in fact, shows only that
it used the term quid pro quo to refer to actual corrupt,
vote-buying exchanges, as opposed to interactions that pos-
sessed quid pro quo potential even if innocently undertaken.
Thus, the Court said:
“[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of corruption
‘inherent in a regime of large individual financial contri-
butions’ to candidates for public office . . . as a source of
concern ‘almost equal’ to quid pro quo improbity.” 528
U. S., at 390 (citations omitted).
Thus, the perception of corruption that the majority now as-
serts is somehow different from the quid pro quo potential
discussed in this opinion was created by an exchange fea-
turing quid pro quo potential—contributions directly to a
candidate.
In determining whether conduct poses a quid pro quo dan-
ger the analysis is functional. In Buckley, the Court con-
fronted an expenditure limitation provision that capped the
amount of money individuals could spend on any activity in-
tended to influence a federal election (i. e., it reached to both
independent and coordinated expenditures). See 424 U. S.,

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at 46–47. The Court concluded that though the limitation
reached both coordinated and independent expenditures,
there were other valid FECA provisions that barred coordi-
nated expenditures. Hence, the limit at issue only added
regulation to independent expenditures. On that basis it
concluded the provision was unsupported by any valid cor-
ruption interest. The conduct to which it added regulation
(independent expenditures) posed no quid pro quo danger.
See ibid.
Placing Buckley’s anticorruption rationale in the context
of the federal legislative power yields the following rule:
Congress’ interest in preventing corruption provides a basis
for regulating federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of
quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly
received them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to
strike down campaign finance regulations when they do not
add regulation to “actual or apparent quid pro quo arrange-
ments.” Id., at 45.
The Court ignores these constitutional bounds and in
effect interprets the anticorruption rationale to allow regula-
tion not just of “actual or apparent quid pro quo arrange-
ments,” ibid., but of any conduct that wins goodwill from
or influences a Member of Congress. It is not that there is
any quarrel between this opinion and the majority that the
inquiry since Buckley has been whether certain conduct
creates “undue influence.” See ante, at 154. On that we
agree. The very aim of Buckley’s standard, however, was
to define undue influence by reference to the presence of
quid pro quo involving the officeholder. The Court, in con-
trast, concludes that access, without more, proves influence
is undue. Access, in the Court’s view, has the same legal
ramifications as actual or apparent corruption of officehold-
ers. This new definition of corruption sweeps away all pro-
tections for speech that lie in its path.
The majority says it is not abandoning our cases in this
way, but its reasoning shows otherwise:

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“More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption
too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that
Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond prevent-
ing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appear-
ance of such influence.’ [Federal Election Comm’n v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533
U. S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II)]. Many of the
‘deeply disturbing examples’ of corruption cited by this
Court in Buckley to justify FECA’s contribution limits
were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that vari-
ous corporate interests had given substantial donations
to gain access to high-level government officials. Even
if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly
gave the ‘appearance of such influence.’ Colorado II,
supra, at 441; see also [Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821,
838 (CADC 1975)].
“The record in the present case is replete with similar
examples of national party committees peddling access
to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for
large soft-money donations. See [251 F. Supp. 2d 176,
492–506 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)].” Ante, at 150
(some internal citations omitted).
The majority notes that access flowed from the regulated
conduct at issue in Buckley and its progeny, then uses that
fact as the basis for concluding that access peddling by the
parties equals corruption by the candidates. That conclu-
sion, however, is tenable only by a quick and subtle shift,
and one that breaks new ground: The majority ignores the
quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to our
earlier decisions. It relies instead solely on the fact that
access flowed from the conduct.
To ignore the fact that in Buckley the money at issue was
given to candidates, creating an obvious quid pro quo danger
as much as it led to the candidates also providing access to
the donors, is to ignore the Court’s comments in Buckley

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that show quid pro quo was of central importance to the
analysis. See 424 U. S., at 26–27, 45. The majority also ig-
nores that in Buckley, and ever since, those party contribu-
tions that have been subject to congressional limit were not
general party-building contributions but were only contribu-
tions used to influence particular elections. That is, they
were contributions that flowed to a particular candidate’s
benefit, again posing a quid pro quo danger. And it ignores
that in Colorado II, the party spending was that which was
coordinated with a particular candidate, thereby implicating
quid pro quo dangers. In all of these ways the majority
breaks the necessary tether between quid and access and
assumes that access, all by itself, demonstrates corruption
and so can support regulation. See also ante, at 156
(“[L]arge soft-money donations to national party committees
are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal office-
holders no matter the ends to which their contributions are
eventually put”).
Access in itself, however, shows only that in a general
sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has
influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in law or in
fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as
corrupt favoritism or influence in particular. By equating
vague and generic claims of favoritism or influence with ac-
tual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a definition
of corruption that dismantles basic First Amendment rules,
permits Congress to suppress speech in the absence of a quid
pro quo threat, and moves beyond the rationale that is Buck-
ley’s very foundation.
The generic favoritism or influence theory articulated by
the Court is at odds with standard First Amendment analy-
ses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting
principle. Any given action might be favored by any given
person, so by the Court’s reasoning political loyalty of
the purest sort can be prohibited. There is no remaining
principled method for inquiring whether a campaign finance

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regulation does in fact regulate corruption in a serious and
meaningful way. We are left to defer to a congressional con-
clusion that certain conduct creates favoritism or influence.
Though the majority cites common sense as the foundation
for its definition of corruption, see ante, at 145, 152, in the
context of the real world only a single definition of corrup-
tion has been found to identify political corruption success-
fully and to distinguish good political responsiveness from
bad—that is quid pro quo. Favoritism and influence are not,
as the Government’s theory suggests, avoidable in repre-
sentative politics. It is in the nature of an elected repre-
sentative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corol-
lary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those
policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legiti-
mate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to
make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that
the candidate will respond by producing those political out-
comes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on re-
sponsiveness. Quid pro quo corruption has been, until now,
the only agreed upon conduct that represents the bad form
of responsiveness and presents a justiciable standard with a
relatively clear limiting principle: Bad responsiveness may
be demonstrated by pointing to a relationship between an
official and a quid.
The majority attempts to mask its extension of Buckley
under claims that BCRA prevents the appearance of corrup-
tion, even if it does not prevent actual corruption, since some
assert that any donation of money to a political party is sus-
pect. See ante, at 149–152. Under Buckley’s holding that
Congress has a valid “interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption,” 424 U. S., at 47–48, however, the
inquiry does not turn on whether some persons assert that
an appearance of corruption exists. Rather, the inquiry
turns on whether the Legislature has established that the
regulated conduct has inherent corruption potential, thus
justifying the inference that regulating the conduct will stem

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the appearance of real corruption. Buckley was guided and
constrained by this analysis. In striking down expenditure
limits the Court in Buckley did not ask whether people
thought large election expenditures corrupt, because clearly
at that time many persons, including a majority of Congress
and the President, did. See id., at 25 (“According to the par-
ties and amici, the primary interest served . . . by the Act
as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption”). Instead, the Court asked whether the
Government had proved that the regulated conduct, the ex-
penditures, posed inherent quid pro quo corruption poten-
tial. See id., at 46.
The Buckley decision made this analysis even clearer in
upholding contribution limitations. It stated that even if ac-
tual corrupt contribution practices had not been proved,
Congress had an interest in regulating the appearance of cor-
ruption that is “inherent in a regime of large individual fi-
nancial contributions.” Id., at 27 (discussing contributions
to candidates). See also id., at 28, 30. The quid pro quo
nature of candidate contributions justified the conclusion
that the contributions pose inherent corruption potential;
and this in turn justified the conclusion that their regulation
would stem the appearance of real corruption.
From that it follows that the Court today should not ask,
as it does, whether some persons, even Members of Con-
gress, conclusorily assert that the regulated conduct appears
corrupt to them. Following Buckley, it should instead in-
quire whether the conduct now prohibited inherently poses
a real or substantive quid pro quo danger, so that its regula-
tion will stem the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.
1. New FECA §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f)
Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(a), (b),
(d), and (f) (Supp. II), cannot stand because they do not
add regulation to conduct that poses a demonstrable quid
pro quo danger. They do not further Buckley’s corruption
interest.

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The majority, with a broad brush, paints § 323(a) as aimed
at limiting contributions possessing federal officeholder cor-
ruption potential. From there it would justify § 323’s re-
maining provisions as necessary complements to ensure the
national parties cannot circumvent § 323(a)’s prohibitions.
The broad brush approach fails, however, when the provi-
sions are reviewed under Buckley’s proper definition of cor-
ruption potential.
On its face § 323(a) does not regulate federal candidates’
or officeholders’ receipt of quids because it does not regulate
contributions to, or conduct by, candidates or officeholders.
See BCRA § 101(a) (setting out new FECA § 323(a): National
parties may not “solicit, receive, or direct to another person
. . . or spend any [soft money]”).
The realities that underlie the statute, furthermore, do not
support the majority’s interpretation. Before BCRA’s en-
actment, parties could only use soft money for a candidate’s
“benefit” (e. g., through issue ads, which all parties now
admit may influence elections) independent of that candidate.
And, as discussed later, § 323(e) validly prohibits federal can-
didate and officeholder solicitation of soft-money party do-
nations. See infra, at 314. Section 323(a), therefore, only
adds regulation to soft-money party donations not solicited
by, or spent in coordination with, a candidate or officeholder.
These donations (noncandidate or officeholder solicited
soft-money party donations that are independently spent) do
not pose the quid pro quo dangers that provide the basis
for restricting protected speech. Though the Government
argues § 323(a) does regulate federal candidates’ and office-
holders’ receipt of quids, it bases its argument on this
flawed reasoning:
(1) “[F]ederal elected officeholders are inextricably
linked to their political parties,” Brief for Appellee/
Cross Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., p. 21;
cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 626 (1996) (Col-

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300 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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orado I) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dis-
senting in part).
(2) All party receipts must be connected to, and
must create, corrupt donor favoritism among these
officeholders.
(3) Therefore, regulation of party receipts equals reg-
ulation of quids to the party’s officeholders.
The reasoning is flawed because the Government’s reliance
on reasoning parallel to the Colorado I concurrence only es-
tablishes the first step in its chain of logic: that a party is a
proxy for its candidates generally. It does not establish the
second step: that as a proxy for its candidates generally, all
moneys the party receives (not just candidate solicited, soft-
money donations, or donations used in coordinated activity)
represent quids for all the party’s candidates and officehold-
ers. The Government’s analysis is inconsistent with what a
majority of the Justices, in different opinions, have said.
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Federal Election Comm’n v.
Colorado Republican Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 476–
477 (2001) (Colorado II), taken together with Justice
Breyer’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in
Colorado I, rebuts the second step of the Government’s ar-
gument. Justice Thomas demonstrated that a general
party-candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As he
pointed out:
“The dearth of evidence [of such corruption] is unsur-
prising in light of the unique relationship between a
political party and its candidates: ‘The very aim of a
political party is to influence its candidate’s stance on
issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected,
his votes.’ If coordinated expenditures help achieve
this aim, the achievement ‘does not . . . constitute
“a subversion of the political process.” ’ ” Colorado II,
supra, at 476–477 (citations omitted).

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Justice Breyer reached the same conclusion about the
corrupting effect general party receipts could have on partic-
ular candidates, though on narrower grounds. He concluded
that independent party conduct lacks quid pro quo corrup-
tion potential. See Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 617–618; id., at
617 (“If anything, an independent [party] expenditure made
possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed
by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to
corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent ex-
penditure made directly by that donor”); id., at 616 (“[T]he
opportunity for corruption posed by [soft-money] contribu-
tions is, at best, attenuated” because they may not be used
for the purposes of influencing a federal election under
FECA).
These opinions establish that independent party activity,
which by definition includes independent receipt and spend-
ing of soft money, lacks a possibility for quid pro quo corrup-
tion of federal officeholders. This must be all the more true
of a party’s independent receipt and spending of soft-money
donations neither directed to nor solicited by a candidate.
The Government’s premise is also unsupported by the rec-
ord before us. The record confirms that soft-money party
contributions, without more, do not create quid pro quo cor-
ruption potential. As a conceptual matter, generic party
contributions may engender good will from a candidate or
officeholder because, as the Government says: “[A] Member
of Congress can be expected to feel a natural temptation to
favor those persons who have helped the ‘team,’ ” Brief for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al.,
p. 33. Still, no Member of Congress testified this favoritism
changed voting behavior.
The piece of record evidence the Government puts forward
on this score comes by way of deposition testimony from for-
mer Senator Simon and Senator Feingold. See 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Senator Simon reported an
unidentified colleague indicated frustration with Simon’s op-

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position to legislation that would benefit a party contributor
on the grounds that “ ‘we’ve got to pay attention to who is
buttering our bread’ ” and testified he did not think there
was any question “ ‘this’ ” (i. e., “donors getting their way”)
was why the legislation passed. See App. 805. Senator
Feingold, too, testified an unidentified colleague suggested
he support the legislation because “ ‘they [i. e., the donor]
just gave us [i. e., the party] $100,000.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
That evidence in fact works against the Government.
These two testifying Senators expressed disgust toward the
favoring of a soft-money giver, and not the good will one
would have expected under the Government’s theory. That
necessarily undercuts the inference of corruption the Gov-
ernment would have us draw from the evidence.
Even more damaging to the Government’s argument from
the testimony is the absence of testimony that the Senator
who allegedly succumbed to corrupt influence had himself
solicited soft money from the donor in question. Equally,
there is no indication he simply favored the company with
his vote because it had, without any involvement from him,
given funds to the party to which he belonged. This fact is
crucial. If the Senator himself had been the solicitor of the
soft-money funds in question, the incident does nothing more
than confirm that Congress’ efforts at campaign finance re-
form ought to be directed to conduct that implicates quid
pro quo relationships. Only if there was some evidence that
the officeholder had not solicited funds from the donor could
the Court extrapolate from this episode that general party
contributions function as quids, inspiring corrupt favoritism
among party members. The episode is the single one of its
type reported in the record and does not seem sufficient
basis for major incursions into settled practice. Given the
Government’s claim that the corrupt favoritism problem is
widespread, its inability to produce more than a single in-
stance purporting to illustrate the point demonstrates the

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Government has not fairly characterized the general atti-
tudes of Members toward soft-money donors from whom
they have not solicited.
Other aspects of the record confirm the Government has
not produced evidence that Members corruptly favor soft-
money donors to their party as a per se matter. Most testi-
mony from which the Government would have the Court
infer corruption is testimony that Members are rewarded by
their parties for soliciting soft money. See id., at 438–521
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This says nothing about how Members
feel about a party’s soft-money donors from whom they have
not solicited. Indeed, record evidence on this point again
cuts against the Government:
“ ‘As a Member of the Senate Finance Committee, I
experienced the pressure first hand. On several occa-
sions when we were debating important tax bills,
I needed a police escort to get into the Finance Com-
mittee hearing room because so many lobbyists were
crowding the halls, trying to get one last chance to make
their pitch to each Senator. Senators generally knew
which lobbyist represented the interests of which large
donor. I was often glad that I limited the amount of
soft money fundraising I did and did not take PAC con-
tributions, because it would be extremely difficult not to
feel beholden to these donors otherwise.’ ” Id., at 482
(testimony of former Senator Boren; see 6–R Defs.
Exhs., Tab 8, ¶ 8).
Thus, one of the handful of Senators on whom the Govern-
ment relies to make its case candidly admits the pressure
of appeasing soft-money donors derives from the Members’
solicitation of donors, not from those donors’ otherwise giv-
ing to their party.
In light of all this, § 323(a) has no valid anticorruption in-
terest. The anticircumvention interests the Government of-
fers in defense of §§ 323(b), (d), and (f) must also fall with the

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interests asserted to justify § 323(a). Any anticircumven-
tion interest can be only as compelling as the interest justify-
ing the underlying regulation.
None of these other sections has an independent justifying
interest. Section 323(b), for example, adds regulation only
to activity undertaken by a state party. In the District
Court two of the three judges found as fact that particular
state and local parties exist primarily to participate in state
and local elections, that they spend the majority of their re-
sources on those elections, and that their voter registration
and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activities, in particular, are
directed primarily at state and local elections. See 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 301–302 (Henderson, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 837–840 (Leon,
J.). These findings, taken together with BCRA’s other, valid
prohibitions barring coordination with federal candidates or
officeholders and their soft-money solicitation, demonstrate
that § 323(b) does not add regulation to conduct that poses a
danger of a federal candidate’s or officeholder’s receipt of
quids.
Even § 323(b)’s narrowest regulation, which bans state
party soft-money funded ads that (1) refer to a clearly identi-
fied federal candidate, and (2) either support or attack any
candidate for the office of the clearly mentioned federal can-
didate, see new FECA § 301(20)(A)(iii), fails the constitu-
tional test. The ban on conduct that by the statute’s own
definition may serve the interest of a federal candidate sug-
gests to the majority that it is conduct that poses quid pro
quo danger for federal candidates or officeholders. Yet,
even this effect—considered after excising the coordination
and candidate-solicited funding aspects elsewhere prohibited
by BCRA §§ 202 and 214(a) and new FECA § 323(a)—poses
no danger of a federal candidate’s or officeholder’s receipt
of a quid. That conduct is no different from an individ-
ual’s independent expenditure referring to and supporting

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a clearly identified candidate—and this poses no regulable
danger.
Section 323(d), which governs relationships between the
national parties and nonprofit groups, fails for similar rea-
sons. It is worth noting that neither the record nor our own
experience tells us how significant these funds transfers are
at this time. It is plain, however, that the First Amendment
ought not to be manipulated to permit Congress to forbid a
political party from aiding other speakers whom the party
deems more effective in addressing discrete issues. One of
the central flaws in BCRA is that Congress is determining
what future course the creation of ideas and the expression
of views must follow. Its attempt to foreclose new and cre-
ative partnerships for speech, as illustrated here, is consist-
ent with neither the traditions nor principles of our free
speech guarantee, which insists that the people, and not the
Congress, decide what modes of expression are the most le-
gitimate and effective.
The majority’s upholding § 323(d) is all the more unsettling
because of the way it ignores the Act as Congress wrote it.
Congress said national parties “shall not solicit any funds
for, or make or direct any donations to,” § 501(c) nonprofit
organizations that engage in federal election activity or to
§ 527 political committees. The Court, however, reads out
the word “any” and construes the words “funds” and “dona-
tions” to mean “soft-money funds” and “soft-money dona-
tions.” See ante, at 180 (“This construction is consistent
with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug
the soft-money loophole”). The Court’s statutory amend-
ment may be consistent with its anti-soft-money rationale; it
is not, however, consistent with the plain and unavoidable
statutory text Congress has given us. Even as construed
by the Court, moreover, it is invalid.
The majority strains to save the provision from what must
seem to it an unduly harsh First Amendment. It does so
by making a legislative determination Congress chose not to

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306 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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make: to prefer hard money to soft money within the con-
struct of national party relationships with nonprofit groups.
Congress gave no indication of a preference to regulate
either hard money or soft in this context. Rather, it simply
proscribed all transfers of money between the two organiza-
tions and all efforts by the national parties to raise any
money on the nonprofit groups’ behalf. The question the
Court faces is not which part of a text to sever and strike,
but whether Congress can prohibit such transfers altogether.
The answer, as the majority recognizes, is no. See ante, at
179 (“[P]rohibiting parties from donating funds already
raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Con-
gress’ goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption of federal candidates and officeholders”).
Though § 323(f) in effect imposes limits on candidate con-
tributions, it does not address federal candidate and of-
ficeholder contributions. Yet it is the possibility of federal
officeholder quid pro quo corruption potential that animates
Buckley’s rule as it relates to Acts of Congress (as opposed
to Acts of state legislatures). See 424 U. S., at 13 (“The con-
stitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is
well established”).
When one recognizes that §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f) do not
serve the interest the anticorruption rationale contemplates,
Title I’s entirety begins to look very much like an in-
cumbency protection plan. See J. Miller, Monopoly Politics
84–101 (1999) (concluding that regulations limiting election
fundraising and spending constrain challengers more than
incumbents). That impression is worsened by the fact that
Congress exempted its officeholders from the more strin-
gent prohibitions imposed on party officials. Compare new
FECA § 323(a) with new FECA § 323(e). Section 323(a)
raises an inflexible bar against soft-money solicitation, in any
way, by parties or party officials. Section 323(e), in contrast,
enacts exceptions to the rule for federal officeholders (the

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very centerpiece of possible corruption), and allows them to
solicit soft money for various uses and organizations.
The law in some respects even weakens the regulation of
federal candidates and officeholders. Under former law, of-
ficeholders were understood to be limited to receipt of hard
money by their campaign committees. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 431,
441a (2000 ed. and Supp. II) (setting out the pre-BCRA FECA
regime). BCRA, however, now allows them and their cam-
paign committees to receive soft money that fits the hard-
money source-and-amount restrictions, so long as the office-
holders direct that money on to other nonfederal candidates.
See new FECA § 323(e)(1)(B). The majority’s characteriza-
tion of this weakening of the regime as “tightly constrain[ing]”
candidates, ante, at 181, n. 70, is a prime example of its unwill-
ingness to confront Congress’ own interest or the persisting
fact that the regulations violate First Amendment freedoms.
The more lenient treatment accorded to incumbency-driven
politicians than to party officials who represent broad national
constituencies must render all the more suspect Congress’
claim that the Act’s sole purpose is to stop corruption.
The majority answers this charge by stating the obvious,
that “§ 323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates.”
Ante, at 185, n. 72. The controlling point, of course, is the
practical burden on challengers. That the prohibition ap-
plies to both incumbents and challengers in no way estab-
lishes that it burdens them equally in that regard. Name
recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure
that as a general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the
legislation the Court today upholds.
The Government identifies no valid anticorruption interest
justifying §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f). The very nature of
the restrictions imposed by these provisions makes one all
the more skeptical of the Court’s explanation of the interests
at stake. These provisions cannot stand under the First
Amendment.

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2. New FECA § 323(e)
Ultimately, only one of the challenged Title I provisions
satisfies Buckley’s anticorruption rationale and the First
Amendment’s guarantee. It is § 323(e). This provision is
the sole aspect of Title I that is a direct and necessary reg-
ulation of federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of
quids. Section 323(e) governs “candidate[s], individual[s]
holding Federal office, agent[s] of a candidate or an individual
holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly es-
tablished, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting
on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Fed-
eral office.” 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e) (Supp. II). These provi-
sions, and the regulations that follow, limit candidates’ and
their agents’ solicitation of soft money. The regulation of a
candidate’s receipt of funds furthers a constitutionally suf-
ficient interest. More difficult, however, is the question
whether regulation of a candidate’s solicitation of funds also
furthers this interest if the funds are given to another.
I agree with the Court that the broader solicitation regula-
tion does further a sufficient interest. The making of a so-
licited gift is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to
the one who solicits the payment (by granting his request).
Rules governing candidates’ or officeholders’ solicitation of
contributions are, therefore, regulations governing their re-
ceipt of quids. This regulation fits under Buckley’s anticor-
ruption rationale.
B. Standard of Review
It is common ground between the majority and this opin-
ion that a speech-suppressing campaign finance regulation,
even if supported by a sufficient Government interest, is un-
lawful if it cannot satisfy our designated standard of review.
See ante, at 134–137. In Buckley, we applied “closely
drawn” scrutiny to contribution limitations and strict scru-
tiny to expenditure limitations. Compare 424 U. S., at 25,
with id., at 44–45. Against that backdrop, the majority as-

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sumes that because Buckley applied the rationale in the con-
text of contribution and expenditure limits, its application
gives Congress and the Court the capacity to classify any
challenged campaign finance regulation as either a contribu-
tion or an expenditure limit. Thus, it first concludes Title
I’s regulations are contribution limits and then proceeds to
apply the lesser scrutiny.
“Complex as its provisions may be, § 323, in the main,
does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy indi-
viduals, corporations, and unions to contribute large
sums of money to influence federal elections, federal can-
didates, and federal officeholders.” Ante, at 138.
Though the majority’s analysis denies it, Title I’s dynamics
defy this facile, initial classification.
Title I’s provisions prohibit the receipt of funds; and in
most instances, but not all, this can be defined as a contribu-
tion limit. They prohibit the spending of funds; and in most
instances this can be defined as an expenditure limit. They
prohibit the giving of funds to nonprofit groups; and this falls
within neither definition as we have ever defined it. Finally,
they prohibit fundraising activity; and the parties dispute
the classification of this regulation (the challengers say it
is core political association, while the Government says it
ultimately results only in a limit on contribution receipts).
The majority’s classification overlooks these competing
characteristics and exchanges Buckley’s substance for a for-
mulaic caricature of it. Despite the parties’ and the majori-
ty’s best efforts on both sides of the question, it ignores real-
ity to force these regulations into one of the two legal
categories as either contribution or expenditure limitations.
Instead, these characteristics seem to indicate Congress has
enacted regulations that are neither contribution nor ex-
penditure limits, or are perhaps both at once.
Even if the laws could be classified in broad terms as only
contribution limits, as the majority is inclined to do, that still

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leaves the question what “contribution limits” can include if
they are to be upheld under Buckley. Buckley’s application
of a less exacting review to contribution limits must be con-
fined to the narrow category of money gifts that are directed,
in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder. Any broader
definition of the category contradicts Buckley’s quid pro quo
rationale and overlooks Buckley’s language, which contem-
plates limits on contributions to a candidate or campaign
committee in explicit terms. See 424 U. S., at 13 (applying
less exacting review to “contribution . . . limitations in the
Act prohibit[ing] individuals from contributing more than
$25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single
candidate for an election campaign”); id., at 45 (“[T]he contri-
bution limitation[s] [apply a] total ban on the giving of large
amounts of money to candidates”). See also id., at 20, 25, 28.
The Court, it must be acknowledged, both in Buckley and
on other occasions, has described contribution limits due
some more deferential review in less than precise terms. At
times it implied that donations to political parties would also
qualify as contributions whose limitation too would be sub-
ject to less exacting review. See id., at 23–24, n. 24 (“[T]he
general understanding of what constitutes a political contri-
bution[:] Funds provided to a candidate or political party or
campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an
intermediary constitute a contribution”). See also Federal
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161 (“ ‘[C]ontri-
butions may result in political expression if spent by a candi-
date or an association’ ” (quoting Buckley, supra, at 21)).
These seemingly conflicting statements are best reconciled
by reference to Buckley’s underlying rationale for applying
less exacting review. In a similar, but more imperative,
sense proper application of the standard of review to regula-
tions that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits (or
which are both at once) can only be determined by reference
to that rationale.

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Buckley’s underlying rationale is this: Less exacting re-
view applies to Government regulations that “significantly
interfere” with First Amendment rights of association. But
any regulation of speech or associational rights creating
“markedly greater interference” than such significant inter-
ference receives strict scrutiny. Unworkable and ill advised
though it may be, Buckley unavoidably sets forth this test:
“Even a ‘ “significant interference” with protected rights
of political association’ may be sustained if the State
demonstrates [1] a sufficiently important interest and
[2] employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wi-
goda, [419 U. S. 477, 488 (1975)]; NAACP v. Button, [371
U. S. 415, 438 (1963)]; Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U. S. 479,
488 (1960)].” 424 U. S., at 25.
“The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms [refer-
ring to ‘the freedom of speech and association’] caused
by [expenditure limits] thus cannot be sustained simply
by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness
of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather,
the constitutionality of [the expenditure limits] turns on
whether the governmental interests advanced in its sup-
port satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limita-
tions on core First Amendment rights of political ex-
pression.” Id., at 44–45.*
The majority, oddly enough, first states this standard with
relative accuracy, but then denies it. Compare:
* See also Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 161
(2003) (“[T]he basic premise we have followed in setting First Amendment
standards for reviewing political financial restrictions [is that] the level of
scrutiny is based on the importance of the ‘political activity at issue’ to
effective speech or political association”); California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 582 (2000) (“We can think of no heavier burden on a
political party’s associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore un-
constitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest”).

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“The relevant inquiry [in determining the level of scru-
tiny] is whether the mechanism adopted to implement
the contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of
that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restric-
tion on the contribution itself would not,” ante, at 138–
139, with:
“None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational
burdens imposed on parties by § 323 have no place in the
First Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for
them in the application, rather than the choice, of the
appropriate level of scrutiny,” ante, at 141.
The majority’s attempt to separate out how burdens on
speech rights and burdens on associational rights affect the
standard of review is misguided. It is not even true to
Buckley’s unconventional test. Buckley, as shown in the
quotations above, explained the lower standard of review by
reference to the level of burden on associational rights, and
it explained the need for a higher standard of review by ref-
erence to the higher burdens on both associational and
speech rights. In light of Buckley’s rationale, and in light
of this Court’s ample precedent affirming that burdens on
speech necessitate strict scrutiny review, see 424 U. S., at
44–45 (“[E]xacting scrutiny [applies] to limitations on core
First Amendment rights of political expression”), “closely
drawn” scrutiny should be employed only in review of a law
that burdens rights of association, and only where that bur-
den is significant, not markedly greater. Since the Court
professes not to repudiate Buckley, it was right first to say
we must determine how significant a burden BCRA’s regula-
tions place on First Amendment rights, though it should
have specified that the rights implicated are those of asso-
ciation. Its later denial of that analysis flatly contradicts
Buckley.
The majority makes Buckley’s already awkward and im-
precise test all but meaningless in its application. If one

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is viewing BCRA through Buckley’s lens, as the majority
purports to do, one must conclude the Act creates markedly
greater associational burdens than the significant burden
created by contribution limitations and, unlike contribution
limitations, also creates significant burdens on speech itself.
While BCRA contains federal contribution limitations, which
significantly burden association, it goes even further. The
Act entirely reorders the nature of relations between na-
tional political parties and their candidates, between national
political parties and state and local parties, and between na-
tional political parties and nonprofit organizations.
The many and varied aspects of Title I’s regulations im-
pose far greater burdens on the associational rights of the
parties, their officials, candidates, and citizens than do regu-
lations that do no more than cap the amount of money per-
sons can contribute to a political candidate or committee.
The evidence shows that national parties have a long tradi-
tion of engaging in essential associational activities, such as
planning and coordinating fundraising with state and local
parties, often with respect to elections that are not federal
in nature. This strengthens the conclusion that the regula-
tions now before us have unprecedented impact. It makes
impossible, moreover, the contrary conclusion—which the
Court’s standard of review determination necessarily im-
plies—that BCRA’s soft-money regulations will not much
change the nature of association between parties, candidates,
nonprofit groups, and the like. Similarly, Title I now com-
pels speech by party officials. These officials must be sure
their words are not mistaken for words uttered in their offi-
cial capacity or mistaken for soliciting prohibited soft, and
not hard, money. Few interferences with the speech, asso-
ciation, and free expression of our people are greater than
attempts by Congress to say which groups can or cannot ad-
vocate a cause, or how they must do it.
Congress has undertaken this comprehensive reordering
of association and speech rights in the name of enforcing con-

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314 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tribution limitations. Here, however, as in Buckley, “[t]he
markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by
[BCRA’s pervasive regulation] cannot be sustained simply by
invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the
less intrusive contribution limitations.” Ibid. BCRA fun-
damentally alters, and thereby burdens, protected speech
and association throughout our society. Strict scrutiny
ought apply to review of its constitutionality. Under strict
scrutiny, the congressional scheme, for the most part, cannot
survive. This is all but acknowledged by the Government,
which fails even to argue that strict scrutiny could be met.
1. New FECA § 323(e)
Because most of the Title I provisions discussed so far do
not serve a compelling or sufficient interest, the standard
of review analysis is only dispositive with respect to new
FECA § 323(e). As to § 323(e), 2 U. S. C. § 441i(e) (Supp.
II), I agree with the Court that this provision withstands
constitutional scrutiny.
Section 323(e) is directed solely to federal candidates and
their agents; it does not ban all solicitation by candidates,
but only their solicitation of soft-money contributions; and it
incorporates important exceptions to its limits (candidates
may receive, solicit, or direct funds that comply with hard-
money standards; candidates may speak at fundraising
events; candidates may solicit or direct unlimited funds to
organizations not involved with federal election activity; and
candidates may solicit or direct up to $20,000 per individual
per year for organizations involved with certain federal elec-
tion activity (e. g., GOTV, voter registration)). These provi-
sions help ensure that the law is narrowly tailored to satisfy
First Amendment requirements. For these reasons, I agree
§ 323(e) is valid.
2. New FECA §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f)
Though these sections do not survive even the first test of
serving a constitutionally valid interest, it is necessary as

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well to examine the vast overbreadth of the remainder
of Title I, so the import of the majority’s holding today
is understood. Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U. S. C.
§§ 441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. II), are not narrowly tai-
lored, cannot survive strict scrutiny, and cannot even be con-
sidered closely drawn, unless that phrase is emptied of all
meaning.
First, the sections all possess fatal overbreadth. By reg-
ulating conduct that does not pose quid pro quo dangers,
they are incursions on important categories of protected
speech by voters and party officials.
At the next level of analytical detail, § 323(a) is overly
broad as well because it regulates all national parties,
whether or not they present candidates in federal elections.
It also regulates the national parties’ solicitation and direc-
tion of funds in odd-numbered years when only state and
local elections are at stake.
Likewise, while § 323(b) might prohibit some state party
conduct that would otherwise be undertaken in conjunction
with a federal candidate, it reaches beyond that to a consid-
erable range of campaign speech by the state parties on non-
federal issues. A state or local party might want to say:
“The Democratic slate for state assembly opposes President
Bush’s tax policy . . . . Elect the Republican slate to tell
Washington, D. C. we don’t want higher taxes.” Section
323(b) encompasses this essential speech and prohibits it
equally with speech that poses a federal officeholder quid
quo pro danger.
Other predictable political circumstances further demon-
strate § 323(b)’s overbreadth. It proscribes the use of soft
money for all state party voter registration efforts occurring
within 120 days of a federal election. So, the vagaries of
election timing, not any real interest related to corruption,
will control whether state parties can spend nonfederally
regulated funds on ballot efforts. This overreaching contra-
dicts important precedents that recognize the need to pro-

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tect political speech for campaigns related to ballot meas-
ures. See generally Ci tizens Against Rent Control/
Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981);
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978).
Section 323(b) also fails the narrow tailoring requirement
because less burdensome regulatory options were available.
The Government justifies the provision as an attempt to stop
national parties from circumventing the soft-money alloca-
tion constraints they faced under the prior FECA regime.
We are told that otherwise the national parties would let the
state parties spend money on their behalf. If, however, the
problem were avoidance of allocation rates, Congress could
have made any soft money transferred by a national party
to a state party subject to the allocation rates that governed
the national parties’ similar use of the money.
Nor is § 323(d) narrowly tailored. The provision, proscrib-
ing any solicitation or direction of funds, prohibits the par-
ties from even distributing or soliciting regulated money
(i. e., hard money). It is a complete ban on this category of
speech. To prevent circumvention of contribution limits by
imposing a complete ban on contributions is to burden the
circumventing conduct more severely than the underlying
suspect conduct could be burdened.
By its own terms, the statute prohibits speech that does
not implicate federal elections. The provision prohibits any
transfer to a § 527 organization, irrespective of whether the
organization engages in federal election activity. This is un-
necessary, as well, since Congress enacted a much narrower
provision in § 323(a)(2) to prevent circumvention by the par-
ties via control of other organizations. Section 323(a)(2)
makes “any entity that is directly or indirectly . . . controlled
by” the national parties subject to the same § 323(a) pro-
hibitions as the parties themselves. 2 U. S. C. § 441i (Supp.
II).
Section 323(f), too, is not narrowly tailored or even close
to it. It burdens a substantial body of speech and expres-

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sion made entirely independent of any federal candidate.
The record, for example, contains evidence of Alabama At-
torney General Pryor’s reelection flyers showing a picture of
Pryor shaking hands with President Bush and stating: “Bush
appointed Pryor to be Alabama co-chairman of the George
W. Bush for President campaign.” A host of circumstances
could make such statements advisable for state candidates to
use without any coordination with a federal candidate. Sec-
tion 323(f) incorporates no distinguishing feature, such as an
element of coordination, to ensure First Amendment pro-
tected speech is not swept up within its bounds.
Compared to the narrowly tailored effort of § 323(e), which
addresses in direct and specific terms federal candidates’ and
officeholders’ quest for dollars, these sections cast a wide net
not confined to the critical categories of federal candidate or
officeholder involvement. They are not narrowly tailored;
they are not closely drawn; they flatly violate the First
Amendment; and even if they do encompass some speech
that poses a regulable quid pro quo danger, that little assur-
ance does not justify or permit a regime which silences so
many legitimate voices in this protected sphere.
C. Coordination Provisions
Other BCRA Title II sections require analysis alongside
the provisions of Title I, for they, too, are regulations that
principally operate within the ambit of Buckley’s anticorrup-
tion principle. BCRA §§ 202 and 214 are two of these provi-
sions. They involve the Act’s new definition of coordination.
BCRA § 213 is another. It institutes a new system in which
the parties are forced to choose between two different types
of relationships with their candidates.
1.
I agree with the majority that §§ 214(b) and (c) do not
merit our review because they are not now justiciable. See
ante, at 223. I disagree, however, with the majority’s view

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that § 214(a), § 214’s sole justiciable provision, is valid. Nor
can I agree that § 202 is valid in its entirety.
Section 214(a) amends FECA to define, as hard-money
contributions to a political party, expenditures an individual
makes in concert with the party. See ante, at 219. This
provision, in my view, must fall. As the earlier discussion
of Title I explains, individual contributions to the political
parties cannot be capped in the soft-money context. Since
an individual’s soft-money contributions to a party may not
be limited, it follows with even greater force that an individ-
ual’s expenditure of money, coordinated with the party for
activities on which the party could spend unlimited soft
money, cannot be capped.
This conclusion emerges not only from an analysis of Title
I but also from Colorado I. There, Justice Breyer’s opin-
ion announcing the judgment of the Court concluded political
parties had a constitutional right to engage in independent
advocacy on behalf of a candidate. 518 U. S. 604 (1996).
That parties can spend unlimited soft money on this activity
follows by necessary implication. A political party’s consti-
tutional right to spend money on advocacy independent of a
candidate is burdened by § 214(a) in a direct and substantial
way. The statute commands the party to refrain from coor-
dinating with an individual engaging in advocacy even if the
individual is acting independently of the candidate.
Section 202 functions in a manner similar to the operation
of § 214(a). It directs that when persons make “electioneer-
ing communication,” see new FECA § 304(f)(3), 2 U. S. C.
§ 434(f)(3) (Supp. II), in a coordinated fashion with a candi-
date or a party, the coordinated communication expense must
be treated as a hard-money contribution by the person to
that candidate or party. The trial court erroneously be-
lieved it needed to determine whether § 304’s definition of
electioneering communications was itself unconstitutional to
assess this provision. While a statutory definition may lead

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to an unconstitutional result under one application, it may
lead to a constitutional result under another. Compare
infra this page and 321–322 with infra, at 333–337. It is
unhelpful to talk in terms of the definition being unconsti-
tutional or constitutional when the only relevant question is
whether, as animated by a substantive prohibition, here
§ 202, the definition leads to unconstitutional results. The
other Title II provisions that employ § 304’s electioneering
communication definition are analyzed below, within the con-
text of the corporate speech rationale and the disclosure pro-
visions. Section 202, however, must be judged under the
anticorruption rationale because it does not distinguish ac-
cording to corporate or union status, and it does not in-
volve disclosure requirements. Section 202 simply limits
the speech of all “persons.”
Section 202 does satisfy Buckley’s anticorruption rationale
in one respect: It treats electioneering communications ex-
penditures made by a person in coordination with a candi-
date as hard-money contributions to that candidate. For
many of the same reasons that § 323(e) is valid, § 202, in this
single way, is valid: It regulates conduct that poses a quid
pro quo danger—satisfaction of a candidate’s request.
Insofar as § 202 regulates coordination with a political
party, however, it suffers from the same flaws as § 214(a).
Congress has instructed us, as much as possible, to sever
any infirm portions of statutory text from the valid parts,
see BCRA § 401. Following that instruction, I would up-
hold § 202’s text as to its candidate coordination regulation
(the first clause of new FECA § 315(a)(7)(C)(ii), 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a(a)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. II), but rule invalid its text that
applies the coordination provision to political parties.
This provision includes an “advance contracts” aspect as
well. That aspect of the provision, on its own, would be in-
valid, for many of the reasons discussed below with respect
to the advance disclosure requirements embodied in BCRA
§§ 201 and 212. See infra, at 321–322.

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320 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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2.
The final aspect of BCRA that implicates Buckley’s anti-
corruption rationale is § 213, the forced choice provision.
The majority concludes § 213 violates the Constitution.
I agree and write on this aspect of the case to point out that
the section’s unlawfulness flows not from the unique contours
of the statute that settle how much political parties may
spend on their candidate’s campaign, see ante, at 215–219,
but from its raw suppression of constitutionally protected
speech.
Section 213 unconstitutionally forces the parties to surren-
der one of two First Amendment rights. We affirmed that
parties have a constitutionally protected right to make inde-
pendent expenditures in Colorado I. I continue to believe,
moreover, that even under Buckley a political party has
a protected right to make coordinated expenditures with
its candidates. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 466–482
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Our well-established constitu-
tional tradition respects the role parties play in the electoral
process and in stabilizing our representative democracy.
“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong
and stable two-party system in this country has contributed
enormously to sound and effective government.” Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 144–145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment). This role would be undermined in the
absence of a party’s ability to coordinate with candidates.
Cf. Colorado I, supra, at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part) (parties can “give effect to
their views only by selecting and supporting candidates”).
Section 213’s command that the parties abandon one First
Amendment right or the other offends the Constitution even
more than a command that a person choose between a First
Amendment right and a statutory right.

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II. TITLE II PROVISIONS
A. Disclosure Provisions
BCRA § 201, which requires disclosure of electioneering
communications, including those coordinated with the party
but independent of the candidate, does not substantially re-
late to a valid interest in gathering data about compliance
with contribution limits or in deterring corruption. Contra,
ante, at 196. As the above analysis of Title I demonstrates,
Congress has no valid interest in regulating soft-money con-
tributions that do not pose quid pro quo corruption potential.
In the absence of a valid basis for imposing such limits the
effort here to ensure compliance with them and to deter their
allegedly corrupting effects cannot justify disclosure. The
regulation does substantially relate to the other interest the
majority details, however. See ibid. This assures its con-
stitutionality. For that reason, I agree with the Court’s
judgment upholding the disclosure provisions contained in
§ 201 of Title II, with one exception.
Section 201’s advance disclosure requirement—the aspect
of the provision requiring those who have contracted to
speak to disclose their speech in advance—is, in my view,
unconstitutional. Advance disclosure imposes real burdens
on political speech that post hoc disclosure does not. It
forces disclosure of political strategy by revealing where ads
are to be run and what their content is likely to be (based
on who is running the ad). It also provides an opportu-
nity for the ad buyer’s opponents to dissuade broadcasters
from running ads. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. in
No. 02–1733 et al., pp. 44–46, and nn. 42–43. Against those
tangible additional burdens, the Government identifies no
additional interest uniquely served by advance disclosure.
If Congress intended to ensure that advertisers could not
flout these disclosure laws by running an ad before the elec-

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tion, but paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 200, then
Congress should simply have required the disclosure upon
the running of the ad. Burdening the First Amendment fur-
ther by requiring advance disclosure is not a constitutionally
acceptable alternative. To the extent § 201 requires ad-
vance disclosure, it finds no justification in its subordinat-
ing interests and imposes greater burdens than the First
Amendment permits.
Section 212, another disclosure provision, likewise incor-
porates an advance disclosure requirement. The plaintiffs
challenge only this advance disclosure requirement, and not
the broader substance of this section. The majority con-
cludes this challenge is not ripe. I disagree.
The statute commands advance disclosure. The Federal
Election Commission has issued a regulation under § 212
that, by its terms, does not implement this particular re-
quirement. See 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified
at 11 CFR § 109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation that does
not implement the statute to its full extent does not erase
the statutory requirement. This is not a case in which a
statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation can be
relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation that is uncertain
or arguable. The failure of the regulation at this point to
require advance disclosure is of no moment. Contra, 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). The validity of § 212 is an
issue presented for our determination; it is ripe; and the ad-
vance disclosure requirement, for the reasons given when
discussing the parallel provision under § 201, is unconstitu-
tional. Contra, ante, at 212 (declining to address the ripe-
ness question in light of the majority’s rejection of the chal-
lenge to advance notice in § 201).
B. BCRA § 203
The majority permits a new and serious intrusion on
speech when it upholds § 203, the key provision in Title II
that prohibits corporations and labor unions from using
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communications. The majority compounds the error made
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652
(1990), and silences political speech central to the civic dis-
course that sustains and informs our democratic processes.
Unions and corporations, including nonprofit corporations,
now face severe criminal penalties for broadcasting advocacy
messages that “refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate,”
2 U. S. C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. II), in an election sea-
son. Instead of extending Austin to suppress new and vi-
brant voices, I would overrule it and return our campaign
finance jurisprudence to principles consistent with the First
Amendment.
1.
The Government and the majority are right about one
thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of
magic words, is easy to circumvent. The Government seizes
on this observation to defend BCRA § 203, arguing it will
prevent what it calls “sham issue ads” that are really to the
same effect as their more express counterparts. Ante, at
185, 193–194. What the Court and the Government call
sham, however, are the ads speakers find most effective.
Unlike express ads that leave nothing to the imagination,
the record shows that issue ads are preferred by almost all
candidates, even though politicians, unlike corporations, can
lawfully broadcast express ads if they so choose. It is a
measure of the Government’s disdain for protected speech
that it would label as a sham the mode of communica-
tion sophisticated speakers choose because it is the most
powerful.
The Government’s use of the pejorative label should not
obscure § 203’s practical effect: It prohibits a mass communi-
cation technique favored in the modern political process for
the very reason that it is the most potent. That the Govern-
ment would regulate it for this reason goes only to prove the
illegitimacy of the Government’s purpose. The majority’s
validation of it is not sustainable under accepted First
Amendment principles. The problem is that the majority

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uses Austin, a decision itself unfaithful to our First Amend-
ment precedents, to justify banning a far greater range of
speech. This has it all backwards. If protected speech is
being suppressed, that must be the end of the inquiry.
The majority’s holding cannot be reconciled with First
Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), which
invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting banks and busi-
ness corporations from making expenditures “for the pur-
pose of ” influencing referendum votes on issues that do not
“materially affect” their business interests. Id., at 767.
Bellotti was decided in the face of the same arguments on
which the majority now relies. Corporate participation, the
Government argued in Bellotti, “would exert an undue in-
fluence on the outcome of a referendum vote.” Id., at 789.
The influence, presumably, was undue because “immense ag-
gregations of wealth” were facilitated by the “unique state-
conferred corporate structure.” Austin, 494 U. S., at 660.
With these “state-created advantages,” id., at 659, corpora-
tions would “drown out other points of view” and “destroy
the confidence of the people in the democratic process,” Bel-
lotti, 435 U. S., at 789. Bellotti rejected these arguments in
emphatic terms:
“To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the
outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the
fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly
a reason to suppress it: The Constitution ‘protects ex-
pression which is eloquent no less than that which is
unconvincing.’ Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents, 360 U. S., at 689. . . . ‘[T]he concept that govern-
ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .’ Buck-
ley, 424 U. S., at 48–49.” Id., at 790–791.
Bellotti similarly dismissed the argument that the pro-
hibition was necessary to “protec[t] corporate shareholders”

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“by preventing the use of corporate resources in further-
ance of views with which some shareholders may disagree.”
Id., at 792–793. Among other problems, the statute was
overinclusive:
“[It] would prohibit a corporation from supporting
or opposing a referendum proposal even if its share-
holders unanimously authorized the contribution or ex-
penditure. . . . Acting through their power to elect the
board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions
in the corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are
presumed competent to protect their own interests. . . .
[M]inority shareholders generally have access to the ju-
dicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate
disbursements . . . . Assuming, arguendo, that protec-
tion of shareholders is a ‘compelling’ interest under the
circumstances of this case, we find ‘no substantially rele-
vant correlation between the governmental interest as-
serted and the State’s effort’ to prohibit appellants from
speaking.” Id., at 794–795 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U. S. 479, 485 (1960)).
See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977)
(providing analogous protections to union members).
Austin turned its back on this holding, not because the
Bellotti Court had overlooked the Government’s interest in
combating quid pro quo corruption, but because a new ma-
jority decided to recognize “a different type of corruption,”
Austin, 494 U. S., at 660, i. e., the same “corrosive and dis-
torting effects of immense aggregations of wealth,” ibid.,
found insufficient to sustain a similar prohibition just a dec-
ade earlier. Unless certain narrow exceptions apply, see
Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), the prohibition ex-
tends even to nonprofit corporations organized to promote a
point of view. Aside from its disregard of precedents, the
majority’s ready willingness to equate corruption with all

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organizations adopting the corporate form is a grave insult
to nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, entities that
have long enriched our civic dialogue.
Austin was the first and, until now, the only time our
Court had allowed the Government to exercise the power
to censor political speech based on the speaker’s corporate
identity. The majority’s contrary contention is simply incor-
rect. Contra, ante, at 203 (“Since our decision in Buckley,
Congress’ power to prohibit corporations and unions from
using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements ex-
pressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in fed-
eral elections has been firmly embedded in our law”).
I dissented in Austin, 494 U. S., at 695, and continue to be-
lieve that the case represents an indefensible departure from
our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my col-
leagues joined the dissent, including a Member of today’s ma-
jority. Ibid. (O’Connor and Scalia, JJ.). See also id., at
679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
To be sure, Bellotti concerns issue advocacy, whereas Aus-
tin is about express advocacy. This distinction appears to
have accounted for the position of at least two Members of
the Court. See 494 U. S., at 675–676 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (“The Michigan law . . . prohibits corporations from
using treasury funds only for making independent expendi-
tures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in state
elections. A corporation remains free . . . to use general
treasury funds to support an initiative proposal in a state
referendum” (citations omitted)); id., at 678 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here is a vast difference between lobbying
and debating public issues on the one hand, and political cam-
paigns for election to public office on the other”). The dis-
tinction, however, between independent expenditures for
commenting on issues, on the one hand, and supporting or
opposing a candidate, on the other, has no First Amendment
significance apart from Austin’s arbitrary line.

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Austin was based on a faulty assumption. Contrary to
Justice Stevens’ proposal that there is “vast difference be-
tween lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand,
and political campaigns for election to public office on the
other,” ibid., there is a general recognition now that discus-
sions of candidates and issues are quite often intertwined in
practical terms. See, e. g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendant
Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., p. 42 (“ ‘[The]
legal . . . wall between issue advocacy and political advocacy
. . . is built of the same sturdy material as the emperor’s
clothing. Everyone sees it. No one believes it’ ” (quoting
the chair of the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the Na-
tional Rifle Association (NRA))). To abide by Austin’s re-
pudiation of Bellotti on the ground that Bellotti did not in-
volve express advocacy is to adopt a fiction. Far from
providing a rationale for expanding Austin, the evidence in
these consolidated cases calls for its reexamination. Just as
arguments about immense aggregations of corporate wealth
and concerns about protecting shareholders and union mem-
bers do not justify a ban on issue ads, they cannot sustain a
ban on independent expenditures for express ads. In hold-
ing otherwise, Austin “forced a substantial amount of politi-
cal speech underground” and created a species of covert
speech incompatible with our free and open society. Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S., at 406 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
The majority not only refuses to heed the lessons of expe-
rience but also perpetuates the conflict Austin created with
fundamental First Amendment principles. Buckley foresaw
that “the distinction between discussion of issues and candi-
dates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application,” 424 U. S., at 42; see
also id., at 45. It recognized that “ ‘[p]ublic discussion of
public issues which also are campaign issues readily and
often unavoidably draws in candidates and their positions,
their voting records and other official conduct.’ ” Id., at 42,

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n. 50. Hence, “ ‘[d]iscussions of those issues, and as well
more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them,
tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on vot-
ing at elections.’ ” Ibid. In glossing over Austin’s oppo-
site—and false—assumption that express advocacy is differ-
ent, the majority ignores reality and elevates a distinction
rejected by Buckley in clear terms.
Even after Buckley construed the statute then before the
Court to reach only express advocacy, it invalidated limits
on independent expenditures, observing that “[a]dvocacy of
the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than
the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the
passage or defeat of legislation.” 424 U. S., at 48. Austin
defied this principle. It made the impermissible content-
based judgment that commentary on candidates is less de-
serving of First Amendment protection than discussions of
policy. In its haste to reaffirm Austin today, the majority
refuses to confront this basic conflict between Austin and
Buckley. It once more diminishes the First Amendment by
ignoring its command that the Government has no power to
dictate what topics its citizens may discuss. See Consoli-
dated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y.,
447 U. S. 530 (1980).
Continued adherence to Austin, of course, cannot be justi-
fied by the corporate identity of the speaker. Not only does
this argument fail to account for Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 777
(“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or indi-
vidual”), but Buckley itself warned that “[t]he First Amend-
ment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free
expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s
financial ability to engage in public discussion.” 424 U. S.,
at 49; see also id., at 48–49; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mos-
ley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). The exemption for broadcast media

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companies, moreover, makes the First Amendment problems
worse, not better. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 712 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“An independent ground for invalidating this
statute is the blanket exemption for media corporations. . . .
All corporations communicate with the public to some de-
gree, whether it is their business or not; and communication
is of particular importance for nonprofit corporations”); see
also id., at 690–691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Amassed corpo-
rate wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary channels
of information is much more likely to produce the New Cor-
ruption (too much of one point of view) than amassed cor-
porate wealth that is generally busy making money else-
where”). In the end the majority can supply no principled
basis to reason away Austin’s anomaly. Austin’s errors
stand exposed, and it is our duty to say so.
I surmise that even the majority, along with the Govern-
ment, appreciates these problems with Austin. That is why
it invents a new justification. We are now told that “the
government also has a compelling interest in insulating fed-
eral elections from the type of corruption arising from the
real or apparent creation of political debts.” Brief for Ap-
pellee/Cross-Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., p. 88.
“[E]lectioneering communications paid for with the general
treasury funds of labor unions and corporations,” the Gov-
ernment warns, “endea[r] those entities to elected officials in
a way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting.”
See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 622–623 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (stating
the Government’s position).
This rationale has no limiting principle. Were we to ac-
cept it, Congress would have the authority to outlaw even
pure issue ads, because they, too, could endear their sponsors
to candidates who adopt the favored positions. Taken to its
logical conclusion, the alleged Government interest “in insu-
lating federal elections from . . . the real or apparent creation
of political debts” also conflicts with Buckley. If a candidate
feels grateful to a faceless, impersonal corporation for mak-

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330 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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ing independent expenditures, the gratitude cannot be any
less when the money came from the CEO’s own pocket.
Buckley, however, struck down limitations on independent
expenditures and rejected the Government’s corruption ar-
gument absent evidence of coordination. See 424 U. S.,
at 51. The Government’s position would eviscerate the line
between expenditures and contributions and subject both to
the same “complaisant review under the First Amendment.”
Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161.
Complaisant or otherwise, we cannot cede authority to the
Legislature to do with the First Amendment as it pleases.
Since Austin is inconsistent with the First Amendment, its
extension diminishes the First Amendment even further.
For this reason § 203 should be held unconstitutional.
2.
Even under Austin, BCRA § 203 could not stand. All par-
ties agree strict scrutiny applies; § 203, however, is far from
narrowly tailored.
The Government is unwilling to characterize § 203 as a
ban, citing the possibility of funding electioneering commu-
nications out of a separate segregated fund. This option,
though, does not alter the categorical nature of the prohibi-
tion on the corporation. “[T]he corporation as a corpora-
tion is prohibited from speaking.” Austin, 494 U. S., at 681,
n. (Scalia, J., dissenting). What the law allows—permit-
ting the corporation “to serve as the founder and treasurer
of a different association of individuals that can endorse or
oppose political candidates”—“is not speech by the corpora-
tion.” Ibid.
Our cases recognize the practical difficulties corporations
face when they are limited to communicating through PACs.
The majority need look no further than MCFL, 479 U. S. 238,
for an extensive list of hurdles PACs have to confront:
“Under [2 U. S. C.] § 432 [(1982 ed.)], [MCFL] must ap-
point a treasurer, § 432(a); ensure that contributions are

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forwarded to the treasurer within 10 or 30 days of
receipt, depending on the amount of contribution,
§ 432(b)(2); see that its treasurer keeps an account of
every contribution regardless of amount, the name and
address of any person who makes a contribution in ex-
cess of $50, all contributions received from political com-
mittees, and the name and address of any person to
whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount,
§ 432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over
$200 and all records for three years, §§ 432(c), (d).
Under § 433, MCFL must file a statement of organiza-
tion containing its name, address, the name of its custo-
dian of records, and its banks, safety deposit boxes, or
other depositories, §§ 433(a), (b); must report any change
in the above information within 10 days, § 433(c); and
may dissolve only upon filing a written statement that
it will no longer receive any contributions nor make dis-
bursements, and that it has no outstanding debts or obli-
gations, § 433(d)(1).
“Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports
with the FEC or reports on the following schedule:
quarterly reports during election years, a pre-election
report no later than the 12th day before an election,
a postelection report within 30 days after an election,
and reports every 6 months during nonelection years.
§§ 434(a)(4)(A), (B). These reports must contain infor-
mation regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total
amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories;
the identification of each political committee and candi-
date’s authorized or affiliated committee making contri-
butions, and any persons making loans, providing re-
bates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset
to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over
$200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by
12 different categories; the names of all authorized or
affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating

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332 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repay-
ments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all
contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts
and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retire-
ment of any debt or obligation. § 434(b). In addition,
MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segre-
gated fund only from its ‘members,’ §§ 441b(b)(4)(A), (C),
which does not include those persons who have merely
contributed to or indicated support for the organization
in the past.” Id., at 253–254.
These regulations are more than minor clerical require-
ments. Rather, they create major disincentives for speech,
with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that
often have the most difficulty bearing the costs of compli-
ance. Even worse, for an organization that has not yet set
up a PAC, spontaneous speech that “refers to a clearly identi-
fied candidate for Federal office” becomes impossible, even if
the group’s vital interests are threatened by a piece of legis-
lation pending before Congress on the eve of a federal elec-
tion. See Brief for Appellant Chamber of Commerce of the
United States et al. in No. 02–1756 et al., p. 37. Couple the
litany of administrative burdens with the categorical restric-
tion limiting PACs’ solicitation activities to “members,” and
it is apparent that PACs are inadequate substitutes for cor-
porations in their ability to engage in unfettered expression.
Even if the newly formed PACs manage to attract mem-
bers and disseminate their messages against these heavy
odds, they have been forced to assume a false identity while
doing so. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
points out, political committees are regulated in minute de-
tail because their primary purpose is to influence federal
elections. “The ACLU and thousands of other organizations
like it,” however, “are not created for this purpose and there-
fore should not be required to operate as if they were.”
Reply Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 02–1734 et al., p. 15.
A requirement that coerces corporations to adopt alter egos

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in communicating with the public is, by itself, sufficient to
make the PAC option a false choice for many civic organiza-
tions. Forcing speech through an artificial “secondhand en-
dorsement structure . . . debases the value of the voice of
nonprofit corporate speakers . . . [because] PAC’s are interim,
ad hoc organizations with little continuity or responsibility.”
Austin, 494 U. S., at 708–709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In
contrast, their sponsoring organizations “have a continuity,
a stability, and an influence” that allows “their members and
the public at large to evaluate their . . . credibility.” Id.,
at 709.
The majority can articulate no compelling justification for
imposing this scheme of compulsory ventriloquism. If the
majority is concerned about corruption and distortion of
the political process, it makes no sense to diffuse the cor-
porate message and, under threat of criminal penalties, to
compel the corporation to spread the blame to its ad hoc
intermediary.
For all these reasons, the PAC option cannot advance the
Government’s argument that the provision meets the test of
strict scrutiny. See, e. g., id., at 657–660; MCFL, 479 U. S.
238; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 826 (2000) (“When the purpose
and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its
content, special consideration or latitude is not accorded to
the Government merely because the law can somehow be
described as a burden rather than outright suppression”).
Once we turn away from the distraction of the PAC option,
the provision cannot survive strict scrutiny. Under the pri-
mary definition, § 203 prohibits unions and corporations from
funding from their general treasury any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which—
“(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal
office;
“(II) is made within—

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“(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff elec-
tion for the office sought by the candidate; or
“(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election,
or a convention or caucus of a political party that has
authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought
by the candidate; and
“(III) in the case of a communication which refers to
a candidate for an office other than President or Vice
President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.” 2
U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II).
The prohibition, with its crude temporal and geographic
proxies, is a severe and unprecedented ban on protected
speech. As discussed at the outset, suppose a few Senators
want to show their constituents in the logging industry how
much they care about working families and propose a law, 60
days before the election, that would harm the environment
by allowing logging in national forests. Under § 203, a non-
profit environmental group would be unable to run an ad
referring to these Senators in their districts. The sugges-
tion that the group could form and fund a PAC in the short
time required for effective participation in the political de-
bate is fanciful. For reasons already discussed, moreover,
an ad hoc PAC would not be as effective as the environmen-
tal group itself in gaining credibility with the public. Never
before in our history has the Court upheld a law that sup-
presses speech to this extent.
The group would want to refer to these Senators, either
by name or by photograph, not necessarily because an elec-
tion is at stake. It might be supposed the hypothetical Sen-
ators have had an impeccable environmental record, so the
environmental group might have no previous or present in-
terest in expressing an opinion on their candidacies. Or, the
election might not be hotly contested in some of the districts,
so whatever the group says would have no practical effect
on the electoral outcome. The ability to refer to candidates

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and officeholders is important because it allows the public to
communicate with them on issues of common concern. Sec-
tion 203’s sweeping approach fails to take into account this
significant free speech interest. Under any conventional
definition of overbreadth, it fails to meet strict scrutiny
standards. It forces electioneering communications spon-
sored by an environmental group to contend with faceless
and nameless opponents and consign their broadcast, as the
NRA well puts it, to a world where politicians who threaten
the environment must be referred to as “ ‘He Whose Name
Cannot Be Spoken.’ ” Reply Brief for Appellant NRA et al.
in No. 02–1675 et al., p. 19.
In the example above, it makes no difference to § 203 or to
the Court that the bill sponsors may have such well-known
ideological biases that revealing their identity would provide
essential instruction to citizens on whether the policy bene-
fits them or their community. Nor does it make any differ-
ence that the names of the bill sponsors, perhaps through
repetition in the news media, have become so synonymous
with the proposal that referring to these politicians by name
in an ad is the most effective way to communicate with the
public. Section 203 is a comprehensive censor: On the pain
of a felony offense, the ad must not refer to a candidate for
federal office during the crucial weeks before an election.
We are supposed to find comfort in the knowledge that
the ad is banned under § 203 only if it “is targeted to the
relevant electorate,” defined as communications that can be
received by 50,000 or more persons in the candidate’s dis-
trict. See 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(C) (Supp. II). This Orwell-
ian criterion, however, is analogous to a law, unconstitutional
under any known First Amendment theory, that would allow
a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long as his intended
audience could not hear him. See Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U. S. 753, 762–765 (1972) (discussing the “First Amend-
ment right to receive information and ideas” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). A central purpose of issue ads is to

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urge the public to pay close attention to the candidate’s plat-
form on the featured issues. By banning broadcast in the
very district where the candidate is standing for election,
§ 203 shields information at the heart of the First Amend-
ment from precisely those citizens who most value the right
to make a responsible judgment at the voting booth.
In defending against a facial attack on a statute with sub-
stantial overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations
and unions may bring as-applied challenges on a case-by-case
basis. When a statute is as out of bounds as § 203, our law
simply does not force speakers to “undertake the consider-
able burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights
through case-by-case litigation.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539
U. S. 113, 119 (2003). If they instead “abstain from pro-
tected speech,” they “har[m] not only themselves but society
as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas.” Ibid. Not the least of the ill effects of today’s
decision is that our overbreadth doctrine, once a bulwark of
protection for free speech, has now been manipulated by the
Court to become but a shadow of its former self.
In the end the Government and intervenor-defendants
cannot dispute the looseness of the connection between § 203
and the Government’s proffered interest in stemming cor-
ruption. At various points in their briefs, they drop all pre-
tense that the electioneering ban bears a close relation to
anticorruption purposes. Instead, they defend § 203 on the
ground that the targeted ads “may influence,” are “likely to
influence,” or “will in all likelihood have the effect of influ-
encing” a federal election. See Brief for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., pp. 14, 24, 84,
92–93, 94; Brief for Intervenor-Defendant Sen. John McCain
et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., pp. 42–43. The mere fact that
an ad may, in one fashion or another, influence an election
is an insufficient reason for outlawing it. I should have
thought influencing elections to be the whole point of politi-
cal speech. Neither strict scrutiny nor any other standard

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the Court has adopted to date permits outlawing speech on
the ground that it might influence an election, which might
lead to greater access to politicians by the sponsoring organi-
zation, which might lead to actual corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption. Settled law requires a real and close
connection between end and means. The attenuated causa-
tion the majority endorses today is antithetical to the con-
cept of narrow tailoring.
3.
As I would invalidate § 203 under the primary definition,
it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provi-
sion. As applied in § 203, the backup definition prohibits
corporations and unions from financing from their general
treasury funds
“any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which
promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or at-
tacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless
of whether the communication expressly advocates a
vote for or against a candidate) and which also is sugges-
tive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation
to vote for or against a specific candidate.” 2 U. S. C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. II).
The prohibition under the backup has much of the same
imprecision as the ban under the primary definition, though
here there is even more overbreadth. Unlike the primary
definition, the backup contains no temporal or geographic
limitation. Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communica-
tions—not just those aired within a certain blackout period
and received by a certain segment of the population—are
prohibited, provided they “promote,” “support,” “attack,” or
“oppose” a candidate. There is no showing that such a per-
manent and ubiquitous restriction meets First Amendment
standards for the relationship between means and ends.
The backup definition is flawed for the further reason that
it is vague. The crucial words—“promote,” “support,” “at-

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tack,” “oppose”—are nowhere defined. In this respect the
backup is similar to the provision in the Federal Election
Campaign Act that Buckley held to be unconstitutionally
vague. Cf. 424 U. S., at 39–44 (“ ‘No person may make any
expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate dur-
ing a calendar year which, when added to all other expendi-
tures made by such person during the year advocating the
election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000’ ”).
The statutory phrase “suggestive of no plausible meaning
other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate” cannot cure the overbreadth or vagueness of the
backup definition. Like other key terms in the provision,
these words are not defined. The lack of guidance presents
serious problems of uncertainty. If “plausible” means some-
thing close to “reasonable in light of the totality of the cir-
cumstances,” speakers will be provided with an insufficient
degree of protection and will, as a result, engage in wide-
spread self-censorship to avoid severe criminal penalties.
Given the statute’s vagueness, even defendants’ own ex-
perts disagree among themselves about whether specific ads
fall within the prohibition. Hence, people “of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at [the backup definition’s]
meaning and differ as to its application,” Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926). For these rea-
sons, I would also invalidate the ban on electioneering com-
munication under the backup definition.
4.
Before concluding the analysis on Title II, it is necessary
to add a few words about the majority’s analysis of § 204.
The majority attempts to minimize the damage done under
§ 203 by construing § 204 (the Wellstone Amendment) to in-
corporate an exception for MCFL-type corporations. See
MCFL, 479 U. S. 238. Section 204, however, does no such
thing. As even the majority concedes, the provision “does
not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohi-

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bition.” Ante, at 211. Although we normally presume that
legislators would not deliberately enact an unconstitutional
statute, that presumption is inapplicable here. There is no
ambiguity regarding what § 204 is intended to accomplish.
Enacted to supersede the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that
would have carved out precisely this exception for MCFL
corporations, § 204 was written to broaden BCRA’s scope
to include issue-advocacy groups. See, e. g., App. to Brief
for Appellant NRA et al. in No. 02–1675 et al., pp. 65a, 67a
(Sen. Wellstone) (“[I]ndividuals with all this wealth” will
“make their soft money contributions to these sham issue
ads run by all these . . . organizations, which under this loop-
hole can operate with impunity” to run “poisonous ads.” I
have an amendment that . . . make[s] sure . . . this big money
doesn’t get [through]”). Instead of deleting the Snowe-
Jeffords Amendment from the bill, however, the Wellstone
Amendment was inserted in a separate section to preserve
severability.
Were we to indulge the presumption that Congress under-
stood the law when it legislated, the Wellstone Amendment
could be understood only as a frontal challenge to MCFL.
Even were I to agree with the majority’s interpretation of
§ 204, however, my analysis of Title II remains unaffected.
The First Amendment protects the right of all organizations,
not just a subset of them, to engage in political speech. See
Austin, 494 U. S., at 700–701 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The
First Amendment does not permit courts to exercise speech
suppression authority denied to legislatures”).
5.
Title II’s vagueness and overbreadth demonstrate Con-
gress’ fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amend-
ment. The Court, it must be said, succumbs to the same
mistake. The majority begins with a denunciation of direct
campaign contributions by corporations and unions. It then
uses this rhetorical momentum as its leverage to uphold the

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Act. The problem, however, is that Title II’s ban on elec-
tioneering communications covers general commentaries on
political issues and is far removed from laws prohibiting di-
rect contributions from corporate and union treasuries. The
severe First Amendment burden of this ban on independent
expenditures requires much stronger justifications than the
majority offers. See Buckley, supra, at 23.
The hostility toward corporations and unions that infuses
the majority opinion is inconsistent with the viewpoint neu-
trality the First Amendment demands of all Government
actors, including the Members of this Court. Corporations,
after all, are the engines of our modern economy. They fa-
cilitate complex operations on which the Nation’s prosperity
depends. To say these entities cannot alert the public to
pending political issues that may threaten the country’s eco-
nomic interests is unprecedented. Unions are also an estab-
lished part of the national economic system. They, too, have
their own unique insights to contribute to the political de-
bate, but the law’s impact on them is just as severe. The
costs of the majority’s misplaced concerns about the “cor-
rosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth,” Austin, supra, at 660, moreover, will weigh most
heavily on budget-strapped nonprofit entities upon which
many of our citizens rely for political commentary and advo-
cacy. These groups must now choose between staying on
the sidelines in the next election or establishing a PAC
against their institutional identities. PACs are a legal con-
struct sanctioned by Congress. They are not necessarily
the means of communication chosen and preferred by the
citizenry.
In the same vein the Court is quite incorrect to suggest
that the mainstream press is a sufficient palliative for the
novel and severe constraints this law imposes on the political
process. The Court should appreciate the dynamic contri-
bution diverse groups and associations make to the intellec-
tual and cultural life of the Nation. It should not permit

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Congress to foreclose or restrict those groups from partici-
pating in the political process by constraints not applicable
to the established press.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experi-
ment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citi-
zens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for
the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the
people, and the Government may not prescribe the means
used to conduct it.
The First Amendment commands that Congress “shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The
command cannot be read to allow Congress to provide for the
imprisonment of those who attempt to establish new political
parties and alter the civic discourse. Our pluralistic society
is filled with voices expressing new and different viewpoints,
speaking through modes and mechanisms that must be al-
lowed to change in response to the demands of an interested
public. As communities have grown and technology has
evolved, concerted speech not only has become more ef-
fective than a single voice but also has become the natural
preference and efficacious choice for many Americans. The
Court, upholding multiple laws that suppress both spontane-
ous and concerted speech, leaves us less free than before.
Today’s decision breaks faith with our tradition of robust and
unfettered debate.
For the foregoing reasons, with respect, I dissent from the
Court’s decision upholding the main features of Titles I
and II.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF KENNEDY, J.
BCRA § 101(a), 116 Stat. 81, which sets forth new FECA
§ 323, 2 U. S. C. § 441i (Supp. II), provides:
“SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.
“(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES.—

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“(1) IN GENERAL.—A national committee of a polit-
ical party (including a national congressional campaign
committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive,
or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or
transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend
any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohi-
bitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.
“(2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibition established
by paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee,
any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national
committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly
established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such
a national committee.
“(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMIT-
TEES.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
graph (2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for
Federal election activity by a State, district, or local
committee of a political party (including an entity that
is directly or indirectly established, financed, main-
tained, or controlled by a State, district, or local commit-
tee of a political party and an officer or agent acting on
behalf of such committee or entity), or by an association
or similar group of candidates for State or local office or
of individuals holding State or local office, shall be made
from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and
reporting requirements of this Act.
“(2) APPLICABILITY.—
“(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding clause (i) or
(ii) of section 301(20)(A), and subject to subparagraph
(B), paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount ex-
pended or disbursed by a State, district, or local commit-
tee of a political party for an activity described in either
such clause to the extent the amounts expended or dis-
bursed for such activity are allocated (under regulations
prescribed by the Commission) among amounts—

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“(i) which consist solely of contributions subject
to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting require-
ments of this Act (other than amounts described in sub-
paragraph (B)(iii)); and
“(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements
of this Act (other than any requirements of this
subsection).
“(B) CONDITIONS.—Subparagraph (A) shall only
apply if—
“(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identi-
fied candidate for Federal office;
“(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not
for the costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite com-
munication, other than a communication which refers
solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local
office;
“(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which
are described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from
amounts which are donated in accordance with State law
and which meet the requirements of subparagraph (C),
except that no person (including any person established,
financed, maintained, or controlled by such person) may
donate more than $10,000 to a State, district, or local
committee of a political party in a calendar year for such
expenditures or disbursements; and
“(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are
made solely from funds raised by the State, local, or dis-
trict committee which makes such expenditure or dis-
bursement, and do not include any funds provided to
such committee from—
“(I) any other State, local, or district committee
of any State party,
“(II) the national committee of a political party
(including a national congressional campaign committee
of a political party),

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“(III) any officer or agent acting on behalf of
any committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or
“(IV) any entity directly or indirectly estab-
lished, financed, maintained, or controlled by any com-
mittee described in subclause (I) or (II).
“(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF NA-
TIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND
OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING
JOINTLY.—Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than
subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be
spent under subparagraph (B)(iii) meet the require-
ments of this subparagraph only if the amounts—
“(i) are not solicited, received, directed, trans-
ferred, or spent by or in the name of any person de-
scribed in subsection (a) or (e); and
“(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed
through fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or
more State, local, or district committees of any political
party or their agents, or by a State, local, or district
committee of a political party on behalf of the State,
local, or district committee of a political party or its
agent in one or more other States.
“(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS.—An amount spent by a
person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds
that are used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and
disbursements for a Federal election activity shall be
made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions,
and reporting requirements of this Act.
“(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.—A national,
State, district, or local committee of a political party (in-
cluding a national congressional campaign committee of
a political party), an entity that is directly or indirectly
established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any
such national, State, district, or local committee or its
agent, and an officer or agent acting on behalf of any

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such party committee or entity, shall not solicit any
funds for, or make or direct any donations to—
“(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from
taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has sub-
mitted an application for determination of tax exempt
status under such section) and that makes expenditures
or disbursements in connection with an election for Fed-
eral office (including expenditures or disbursements for
Federal election activity); or
“(2) an organization described in section 527 of such
Code (other than a political committee, a State, district,
or local committee of a political party, or the authorized
campaign committee of a candidate for State or local
office).
“(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—A candidate, individual holding
Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual hold-
ing Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly es-
tablished, financed, maintained or controlled by or act-
ing on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals
holding Federal office, shall not—
“(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds
in connection with an election for Federal office, includ-
ing funds for any Federal election activity, unless the
funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and
reporting requirements of this Act; or
“(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds
in connection with any election other than an election
for Federal office or disburse funds in connection with
such an election unless the funds—
“(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted
with respect to contributions to candidates and political
committees under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section
315(a); and

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“(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act
from making contributions in connection with an elec-
tion for Federal office.
“(2) STATE LAW.—Paragraph (1) does not apply to
the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an indi-
vidual described in such paragraph who is or was also a
candidate for a State or local office solely in connection
with such election for State or local office if the solicita-
tion, receipt, or spending of funds is permitted under
State law and refers only to such State or local candi-
date, or to any other candidate for the State or local
office sought by such candidate, or both.
“(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS.—Notwithstanding
paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an
individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or
be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State,
district, or local committee of a political party.
“(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS.—
“(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of this subsection, an indi-
vidual described in paragraph (1) may make a general
solicitation of funds on behalf of any organization that is
described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a)
of such Code (or has submitted an application for deter-
mination of tax exempt status under such section) (other
than an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct
activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section
301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how
the funds will or should be spent.
“(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS.—In
addition to the general solicitations permitted under
subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph
(1) may make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for

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carrying out the activities described in clauses (i) and
(ii) of section 301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal
purpose is to conduct such activities, if—
“(i) the solicitation is made only to individuals;
and
“(ii) the amount solicited from any individual dur-
ing any calendar year does not exceed $20,000.
“(f) STATE CANDIDATES.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—A candidate for State or local
office, individual holding State or local office, or an agent
of such a candidate or individual may not spend any
funds for a communication described in section
301(20)(A)(iii) unless the funds are subject to the limi-
tations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of
this Act.
“(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICA-
TIONS.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual
described in such paragraph if the communication in-
volved is in connection with an election for such State
or local office and refers only to such individual or to any
other candidate for the State or local office held or
sought by such individual, or both.”
BCRA § 101(b) adds a definition of “federal election activ-
ity” to FECA § 301, 2 U. S. C. § 431(20) (Supp. II), which pro-
vides as follows:
“(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY.—
“(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘Federal election ac-
tivity’ means—
“(i) voter registration activity during the period
that begins on the date that is 120 days before the date
a regularly scheduled Federal election is held and ends
on the date of the election;
“(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or
generic campaign activity conducted in connection with

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an election in which a candidate for Federal office ap-
pears on the ballot (regardless of whether a candidate
for State or local office also appears on the ballot);
“(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of
whether a candidate for State or local office is also men-
tioned or identified) and that promotes or supports a
candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candi-
date for that office (regardless of whether the communi-
cation expressly advocates a vote for or against a candi-
date); or
“(iv) services provided during any month by an
employee of a State, district, or local committee of a po-
litical party who spends more than 25 percent of that
individual’s compensated time during that month on ac-
tivities in connection with a Federal election.
“(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY.—The term ‘Federal
election activity’ does not include an amount expended
or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a
political party for—
“(i) a public communication that refers solely to a
clearly identified candidate for State or local office, if
the communication is not a Federal election activity
described in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii);
“(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local
office, provided the contribution is not designated to
pay for a Federal election activity described in sub-
paragraph (A);
“(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political
convention; and
“(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, in-
cluding buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that
name or depict only a candidate for State or local office.”
Title 2 U. S. C. §§ 441b(a) and (b)(1)–(2) (2000 ed. and Supp.
II), as amended by BCRA § 203, provide:

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Appendix to opinion of Kennedy, J.
“(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corpo-
ration organized by authority of any law of Congress, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election to any political office, or in connection with
any primary election or political convention or caucus
held to select candidates for any political office, or for
any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election at which presidential and vice presidential
electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate
or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted
for, or in connection with any primary election or politi-
cal convention or caucus held to select candidates for any
of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political
committee, or other person knowingly to accept or re-
ceive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any
officer or any director of any corporation or any national
bank or any officer of any labor organization to consent
to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation,
national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be,
prohibited by this section.
“(b)(1) For the purposes of this section the term ‘labor
organization’ means any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
“(2) For purposes of this section and section 79l(h) of
title 15, the term ‘contribution or expenditure’ includes
a contribution or expenditure, as those terms are defined
in section 431 of this title, and also includes any direct
or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit,
or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value
(except a loan of money by a national or State bank made
in accordance with the applicable banking laws and reg-

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350 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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ulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any
candidate, campaign committee, or political party or or-
ganization, in connection with any election to any of the
offices referred to in this section or for any applicable
electioneering communication, but shall not include
(A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders
and executive or administrative personnel and their fam-
ilies or by a labor organization to its members and their
families on any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and
get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its
stockholders and executive or administrative personnel
and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its
members and their families; and (C) the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions to a sep-
arate segregated fund to be utilized for political pur-
poses by a corporation, labor organization, membership
organization, cooperative, or corporation without capi-
tal stock.”
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with respect to
BCRA Titles I and V.*
Although I join Justice Kennedy’s opinion in full, I write
separately to highlight my disagreement with the Court on
Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, and to dissent from the Court’s opinion
upholding § 504 of Title V.
I
The issue presented by Title I is not, as the Court implies,
whether Congress can permissibly regulate campaign contri-
butions to candidates, de facto or otherwise, or seek to elimi-
nate corruption in the political process. Rather, the issue is
whether Congress can permissibly regulate much speech
that has no plausible connection to candidate contributions
or corruption to achieve those goals. Under our precedent,
*Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join this opinion in its entirety.

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351 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
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restrictions on political contributions implicate important
First Amendment values and are constitutional only if they
are “closely drawn” to reduce the corruption of federal candi-
dates or the appearance of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1, 25–27 (1976) (per curiam). Yet, the Court
glosses over the breadth of the restrictions, characterizing
Title I of BCRA as “do[ing] little more than regulat[ing] the
ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to
contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections,
federal candidates, and federal officeholders.” Ante, at 138
( joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.). Because, in
reality, Title I is much broader than the Court allows, regu-
lating a good deal of speech that does not have the potential
to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders, I dissent.
The linchpin of Title I, new FECA § 323(a), prohibits na-
tional political party committees from “solicit[ing],” “receiv-
[ing],” “direct[ing] to another person,” and “spend[ing]” any
funds not subject to federal regulation, even if those funds
are used for non-election-related activities. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II). The Court concludes that such a re-
striction is justified because under FECA, “donors have been
free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the na-
tional parties, which the parties can spend for the specific
purpose of influencing a particular candidate’s federal elec-
tion.” Ante, at 145. Accordingly, “[i]t is not only plausible,
but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such dona-
tions and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.”
Ibid. But the Court misses the point. Certainly “infusions
of money into [candidates’] campaigns,” Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985), can be regulated, but § 323(a) does
not regulate only donations given to influence a particular
federal election; it regulates all donations to national politi-
cal committees, no matter the use to which the funds are put.
The Court attempts to sidestep the unprecedented breadth
of this regulation by stating that the “close relationship be-

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352 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tween federal officeholders and the national parties” makes
all donations to the national parties “suspect.” Ante, at
154–155. But a close association with others, especially in
the realm of political speech, is not a surrogate for corrup-
tion; it is one of our most treasured First Amendment rights.
See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 574
(2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 225 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 214 (1986). The Court’s will-
ingness to impute corruption on the basis of a relationship
greatly infringes associational rights and expands Congress’
ability to regulate political speech. And there is nothing in
the Court’s analysis that limits congressional regulation to
national political parties. In fact, the Court relies in part on
this closeness rationale to regulate nonprofit organizations.
Ante, at 156–157, n. 51. Who knows what association will
be deemed too close to federal officeholders next. When a
donation to an organization has no potential to corrupt a fed-
eral officeholder, the relationship between the officeholder
and the organization is simply irrelevant.
The Court fails to recognize that the national political par-
ties are exemplars of political speech at all levels of govern-
ment, in addition to effective fundraisers for federal candi-
dates and officeholders. For sure, national political party
committees exist in large part to elect federal candidates, but
as a majority of the District Court found, they also promote
coordinated political messages and participate in public pol-
icy debates unrelated to federal elections, promote, even in
off-year elections, state and local candidates and seek to in-
fluence policy at those levels, and increase public participa-
tion in the electoral process. See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 334–
337 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part); id., at 820–821 (Leon, J.). Indeed,
some national political parties exist primarily for the pur-
pose of expressing ideas and generating debate. App. 185–

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353 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
186 (declaration of Stephen L. Dasbach et al. ¶11 (describing
Libertarian Party)).
As these activities illustrate, political parties often foster
speech crucial to a healthy democracy, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
820 (Leon, J.), and fulfill the need for like-minded individuals
to band together and promote a political philosophy, see
Jones, supra, at 574; Eu, supra, at 225. When political par-
ties engage in pure political speech that has little or no po-
tential to corrupt their federal candidates and officeholders,
the Government cannot constitutionally burden their speech
any more than it could burden the speech of individuals en-
gaging in these same activities. E. g., National Conserva-
tive Political Action Comm., supra, at 496–497; Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berke-
ley, 454 U. S. 290, 297–298 (1981); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27.
Notwithstanding the Court’s citation to the numerous abuses
of FECA, under any definition of “exacting scrutiny,” the
means chosen by Congress, restricting all donations to na-
tional parties no matter the purpose for which they are given
or are used, are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms,” id., at 25.
BCRA’s overinclusiveness is not limited to national politi-
cal parties. To prevent the circumvention of the ban on the
national parties’ use of nonfederal funds, BCRA extensively
regulates state parties, primarily state elections, and state
candidates. For example, new FECA § 323(b), by reference
to new FECA §§ 301(20)(A)(i)–(ii), prohibits state parties
from using nonfederal funds 1 for general partybuilding ac-
tivities such as voter registration, voter identification, and
get out the vote for state candidates even if federal can-
didates are not mentioned. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(b),
431(20)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. II). New FECA § 323(d) prohib-
1 The Court points out that state parties may use Levin funds for certain
activities. Levin funds, however, are still federal restrictions on speech,
even if they are less onerous than the restrictions placed on national
parties.

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354 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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its state and local political party committees, like their na-
tional counterparts, from soliciting and donating “any funds”
to nonprofit organizations such as the National Rifle Associa-
tion or the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP). See 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d). And, new
FECA § 323(f) requires a state gubernatorial candidate to
abide by federal funding restrictions when airing a television
ad that tells voters that, if elected, he would oppose the Pres-
ident’s policy of increased oil and gas exploration within
the State because it would harm the environment. See 2
U. S. C. §§ 441i(f), 431(20)(A)(iii) (regulating “public commu-
nication[s] that refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State
or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that . . .
attacks or opposes a candidate for that office”).
Although these provisions are more focused on activities
that may affect federal elections, there is scant evidence in
the record to indicate that federal candidates or officeholders
are corrupted or would appear corrupted by donations for
these activities. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 403, 407, 416, 422
(Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part); id., at 779–780, 791 (Leon, J.); see also Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 616 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting
that “the opportunity for corruption posed by [nonfederal
contributions for state elections, get-out-the-vote, and voter
registration activities] is, at best, attenuated”). Nonethe-
less, the Court concludes that because these activities benefit
federal candidates and officeholders, see ante, at 167, or pre-
vent the circumvention of pre-existing or contemporaneously
enacted restrictions,2 see ante, at 165–166, 174–177, 178–179,
2 Ironically, in the Court’s view, Congress cannot be trusted to exercise
judgment independent of its parties’ large donors in its usual voting deci-
sions because donations may be used to further its members’ reelection
campaigns, but yet must be deferred to when it passes a comprehensive
regulatory regime that restricts election-related speech. It seems to me

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185, it must defer to the “ ‘predictive judgments of Con-
gress,’ ” ante, at 165 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
Yet the Court cannot truly mean what it says. Newspa-
per editorials and political talk shows benefit federal candi-
dates and officeholders every bit as much as a generic voter
registration drive conducted by a state party; there is little
doubt that the endorsement of a major newspaper affects
federal elections, and federal candidates and officeholders are
surely “grateful,” ante, at 168, for positive media coverage.
I doubt, however, the Court would seriously contend that we
must defer to Congress’ judgment if it chose to reduce the
influence of political endorsements in federal elections.3 See
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 247,
250 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state law that required
newspapers to provide “right to reply” to any candidate who
was personally or professionally assailed in order to elimi-
nate the “abuses of bias and manipulative reportage” by
the press).
It is also true that any circumvention rationale ultimately
must rest on the circumvention itself leading to the corrup-
tion of federal candidates and officeholders. See Buckley,
supra, at 38 (upholding restrictions on funds donated to na-
no less likely that Congress would create rules that favor its Members’
reelection chances, than be corrupted by the influx of money to its political
parties, which may in turn be used to fund a portion of the Members’
reelection campaigns.
3 The Court’s suggestion that the “close relationship” between federal
officeholders and state and local political parties in some way excludes the
media from its rationale is unconvincing, see ante, at 285, n. 16 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in part),
particularly because such a relationship may be proved with minimal evi-
dence. Indeed, although the Court concludes that local political parties
have a “close relationship” with federal candidates, thus warranting
greater congressional regulation, I am unaware of any evidence in the
record that indicates that local political parties have any relationship with
federal candidates.

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356 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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tional political parties “for the purpose of influencing any
election for a Federal office” because they were prophylactic
measures designed “to prevent evasion” of the contribution
limit on candidates). All political speech that is not sifted
through federal regulation circumvents the regulatory
scheme to some degree or another, and thus by the Court’s
standard would be a “loophole” in the current system.4 Un-
less the Court would uphold federal regulation of all funding
of political speech, a rationale dependent on circumvention
alone will not do. By untethering its inquiry from corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption, the Court has removed
the touchstone of our campaign finance precedent and has
failed to replace it with any logical limiting principle.
But such an untethering is necessary to the Court’s analy-
sis. Only by using amorphous language to conclude a fed-
eral interest, however vaguely defined, exists can the Court
avoid the obvious fact that new FECA §§ 323(a), (b), (d),
and (f) are vastly overinclusive. Any campaign finance law
aimed at reducing corruption will almost surely affect fed-
eral elections or prohibit the circumvention of federal law,
and if broad enough, most laws will generally reduce some
appearance of corruption. Indeed, it is precisely because
4 BCRA does not even close all of the “loopholes” that currently exist.
Nonprofit organizations are currently able to accept, without disclosing,
unlimited donations for voter registration, voter identification, and get-
out-the-vote activities, and the record indicates that such organizations
already receive large donations, sometimes in the millions of dollars, for
these activities, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 323 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the NAACP
Voter Fund received a single, anonymous $7 million donation for get-out-
the-vote activities). There is little reason why all donations to these non-
profit organizations, no matter the purpose for which the money is used,
will deserve any more protection than the Court provides state parties
if Congress decides to regulate them. And who knows what the next
“loophole” will be.

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broad laws are likely to nominally further a legitimate inter-
est that we require Congress to tailor its restrictions; requir-
ing all federal candidates to self-finance their campaigns
would surely reduce the appearance of donor corruption, but
it would hardly be constitutional. In allowing Congress to
rely on general principles such as affecting a federal election
or prohibiting the circumvention of existing law, the Court
all but eliminates the “closely drawn” tailoring requirement
and meaningful judicial review.
No doubt Congress was convinced by the many abuses of
the current system that something in this area must be done.
Its response, however, was too blunt. Many of the abuses
described by the Court involve donations that were made
for the “purpose of influencing a federal election,” and thus
are already regulated. See Buckley, supra. Congress
could have sought to have the existing restrictions enforced
or to enact other restrictions that are “closely drawn” to its
legitimate concerns. But it should not be able to broadly
restrict political speech in the fashion it has chosen. Today’s
decision, by not requiring tailored restrictions, has signifi-
cantly reduced the protection for political speech having lit-
tle or nothing to do with corruption or the appearance of
corruption.
II
BCRA § 504 amends § 315 of the Communications Act of
1934 to require broadcast licensees to maintain and disclose
records of any request to purchase broadcast time that “is
made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for pub-
lic office” or that “communicates a message relating to any
political matter of national importance,” including commu-
nications relating to “a legally qualified candidate,” “any
election to Federal office,” and “a national legislative issue
of public importance.” BCRA § 504; 47 U. S. C. § 315(e)(1)

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358 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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(Supp. II).5 This section differs from other BCRA disclo-
sure sections because it requires broadcast licensees to dis-
close requests to purchase broadcast time rather than requir-
ing purchasers to disclose their disbursements for broadcast
time. See, e. g., BCRA § 201. The Court concludes that
§ 504 “must survive a facial attack under any potentially ap-
5 Section 315(e), as amended by BCRA § 504, provides:
“Political record
“(1) In general
“A licensee shall maintain, and make available for public inspection, a
complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time that—
“(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public
office; or
“(B) communicates a message relating to any political matter of national
importance, including—
“(i) a legally qualified candidate;
“(ii) any election to Federal office; or
“(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance.
“(2) Contents of record
“A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contain information
regarding—
“(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time is accepted or re-
jected by the licensee;
“(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time;
“(C) the date and time on which the communication is aired;
“(D) the class of time that is purchased;
“(E) the name of the candidate to which the communication refers and
the office to which the candidate is seeking election, the election to which
the communication refers, or the issue to which the communication refers
(as applicable);
“(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a candidate, the
name of the candidate, the authorized committee of the candidate, and the
treasurer of such committee; and
“(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the person purchasing
the time, the name, address, and phone number of a contact person for
such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or members of the
executive committee or of the board of directors of such person.
“(3) Time to maintain file
“The information required under this subsection shall be placed in a
political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a
period of not less than 2 years.”

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359 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
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plicable First Amendment standard, including that of height-
ened scrutiny.” Ante, at 285 (opinion of Breyer, J.). I
disagree.
This section is deficient because of the absence of a suffi-
cient governmental interest to justify disclosure of mere re-
quests to purchase broadcast time, as well as purchases
themselves. The Court approaches § 504 almost exclusively
from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the
interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech
and association rights are affected by § 504. See, e. g., ante,
at 236 (noting that broadcasters are subject to numerous rec-
ordkeeping requirements); ante, at 237 (opining that this
Court has recognized “broad governmental authority for
agency information demands from regulated entities”); ante,
at 239 (“[W]e cannot say that these requirements will impose
disproportionate administrative burdens”). An approach
that simply focuses on whether the administrative burden
is justifiable is untenable. Because § 504 impinges on core
First Amendment rights, it is subject to a more demanding
test than mere rational-basis review. The Court applies the
latter by asking essentially whether there is any conceivable
reason to support § 504. See ibid. (discussing the ways
in which the disclosure “can help” the FCC and the pub-
lic); ante, at 240 (noting that the “recordkeeping require-
ments seem likely to help the FCC” enforce the fairness
doctrine).
Required disclosure provisions that deter constitutionally
protected association and speech rights are subject to height-
ened scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64. When ap-
plying heightened scrutiny, we first ask whether the Gov-
ernment has asserted an interest sufficient to justify the
disclosure of requests to purchase broadcast time. Ibid.; see
ante, at 196 ( joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.)
(concluding that the important state interests the Buckley
Court held justified FECA’s disclosure requirements apply
to BCRA § 201’s disclosure requirement). But the Govern-

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360 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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ment, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support
§ 504 as a whole.
Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 238 (opinion
of Breyer, J.), the Government’s brief does not succinctly
present interests sufficient to support § 504. The two para-
graphs that the Court relies on provide the following:
“As explained in the government’s brief in opposition
to the motion for summary affirmance on this issue filed
by plaintiff National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),
longstanding FCC regulations impose disclosure re-
quirements with respect to the sponsorship of broadcast
matter ‘involving the discussion of a controversial issue
of public importance.’ 47 C. F. R. 73.1212(d) and (e)
(2002); see 47 C. F. R. 76.1701(d) (2002) (same stand-
ard used in disclosure regulation governing cablecast-
ing). By enabling viewers and listeners to identify the
persons actually responsible for communications aimed
at a mass audience, those regulations assist the public in
evaluating the message transmitted. See Bellotti, 435
U. S. at 792 n. 32 (‘Identification of the source of adver-
tising may be required . . . so that the people will be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being
subjected.’).
“The range of information required to be disclosed
under BCRA § 504 is comparable to the disclosures man-
dated by pre-existing FCC rules. Compare 47 U. S. C.
315(e)(2)(G) (added by BCRA § 504), with 47 C. F. R.
73.1212(e) and 76.1701(d) (2002). Plaintiffs do not at-
tempt to show that BCRA § 504’s requirements are more
onerous than the FCC’s longstanding rules, nor do they
contend that the pre-existing agency regulations are
themselves unconstitutional. See generally 02–1676
Gov’t Br. in Opp. to Mot. of NAB for Summ. Aff. 4–9.
Because BCRA § 504 is essentially a codification of es-
tablished and unchallenged regulatory requirements,

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plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim should be rejected.”
Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al., pp. 132–133.
While these paragraphs attempt to set forth a justification
for the new Communications Act § 315(e)(1)(B), discussed
below, I fail to see any justification for BCRA § 504 in its
entirety. Nor do I find persuasive the Court’s and the Gov-
ernment’s argument that pre-existing unchallenged agency
regulations imposing similar disclosure requirements compel
the conclusion that § 504 is constitutional and somehow re-
lieve the Government of its burden of advancing a constitu-
tionally sufficient justification for § 504.
At oral argument, the Government counsel indicated that
one of the interests supporting § 504 in its entirety stems
from the fairness doctrine, Tr. of Oral Arg. 192, which in
general imposes an obligation on licensees to devote a “rea-
sonable percentage” of broadcast time to issues of public im-
portance in a way that reflects opposing views. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). Assum-
ing, arguendo, this latter-day assertion should be considered,
I think the District Court correctly noted that there is noth-
ing in the record that indicates licensees have treated pur-
chasers unfairly. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 812 (Leon, J.). In addi-
tion, this interest seems wholly unconnected to the central
purpose of BCRA, and it is not at all similar to the govern-
mental interests in Buckley that we found to be “sufficiently
important to outweigh the possibility of infringement,” 424
U. S., at 66.
As to the disclosure requirements involving “any political
matter of national importance” under the new Communica-
tions Act § 315(e)(1)(B), the Government suggests that the
disclosure enables viewers to evaluate the message transmit-
ted.6 First, insofar as BCRA § 504 requires reporting of
6 Communications relating to candidates will be covered by the new
Communications Act § 315(e)(1)(A), so, in this context, we must consider,
for example, the plaintiff-organizations, which may attempt to use the
broadcast medium to convey a message espoused by the organizations.

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362 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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“request[s for] broadcast time” as well as actual broadcasts,
it is not supported by this goal. Requests that do not ma-
ture into actual purchases will have no viewers, but the in-
formation may allow competitors or adversaries to obtain
information regarding organizational or political strategies
of purchasers. Second, even as to broadcasts themselves, in
this noncandidate-related context, this goal is a far cry from
the Government interests endorsed in Buckley, which were
limited to evaluating and preventing corruption of federal
candidates. Ibid.; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334, 354 (1995).
As to disclosure requirements with respect to candidates
under the new Communications Act § 315(e)(1)(A), BCRA
§ 504 significantly overlaps with § 201, which is today also
upheld by this Court, ante, at 194–202 ( joint opinion of Ste-
vens and O’Connor, JJ.), and requires purchasers of “elec-
tioneering communications” to disclose a wide array of infor-
mation, including the amount of each disbursement and the
elections to which electioneering communications pertain.
While I recognize that there is this overlap, § 504 imposes a
different burden on the purchaser’s First Amendment rights:
as noted above, § 201 is limited to purchasers’ disclosure of
disbursements for electioneering communications, whereas
§ 504 requires broadcast licensees’ disclosure of requests for
broadcast time by purchasers. Not only are the purchasers’
requests, which may never result in an actual advertisement,
subject to the disclosure requirements, but § 504 will un-
doubtedly result in increased costs of communication because
the licensees will shift the costs of the onerous disclosure
and recordkeeping requirements to purchasers. The Gov-
ernment fails to offer a reason for the separate burden and
apparent overlap.
The Government cannot justify, and for that matter, has
not attempted to justify, its requirement that “request[s for]
broadcast” time be publicized. On the record before this
Court, I cannot even speculate as to a governmental interest

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363 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
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that would allow me to conclude that the disclosure of “re-
quests” should be upheld. Such disclosure risks, inter alia,
allowing candidates and political groups the opportunity to
ferret out a purchaser’s political strategy and, ultimately, un-
duly burdens the First Amendment freedoms of purchasers.
Absent some showing of a Government interest served by
§ 504 and in light of the breadth of disclosure of “requests,”
I must conclude that § 504 fails to satisfy First Amendment
scrutiny.
Justice Stevens, dissenting with respect to § 305.*
The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, concludes that
the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 305 of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) be-
cause Senator McConnell cannot be affected by the provision
until “45 days before the Republican primary election in
2008.” Ante, at 226. I am not persuaded that Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement imposes such a strict tem-
poral limit on our jurisdiction. By asserting that he has run
attack ads in the past, that he plans to run such ads in his
next campaign, and that § 305 will adversely affect his cam-
paign strategy, Senator McConnell has identified a “con-
crete,” “ ‘distinct,’ ” and “actual” injury, Whitmore v. Arkan-
sas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). That the injury is distant in
time does not make it illusory.
The second prong of the standing inquiry—whether the
alleged injury is fairly traceable to the defendants’ chal-
lenged action and not the result of a third party’s independ-
ent choices†—poses a closer question. Section 305 does not
require broadcast stations to charge a candidate higher rates
for unsigned ads that mention the candidate’s opponent.
Rather, the provision simply permits stations to charge their
normal rates for such ads. Some stations may take advan-
*Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its
entirety.
† Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992).

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364 McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Stevens, J., dissenting
tage of this regulatory gap and adopt pricing schemes that
discriminate between the kind of ads that Senator McConnell
has run in the past and those that strictly comply with § 305.
It is also possible, however, that instead of incurring the
transaction costs of policing candidates’ compliance with
§ 305, stations will continue to charge the same rates for at-
tack ads as for all other campaign ads. In the absence of
any record evidence that stations will uniformly choose to
charge Senator McConnell higher rates for the attack ads he
proposes to run in 2008, it is at least arguable that his alleged
injury is not traceable to BCRA § 305.
Nevertheless, I would entertain plaintiffs’ challenge to
§ 305 on the merits and uphold the section. Like BCRA
§§ 201, 212, and 311, § 305 serves an important—and con-
stitutionally sufficient—informational purpose. Moreover,
§ 305’s disclosure requirements largely overlap those of § 311,
and plaintiffs identify no reason why any candidate already
in compliance with § 311 will be harmed by the marginal
additional burden of complying with § 305. Indeed, I am
convinced that “the important governmental interest of
‘shed[ding] the light of publicity’ on campaign financing,” in-
voked above in connection with § 311, ante, at 231 (opinion
of Rehnquist, C. J.), would suffice to support a legislative
provision expressly requiring all sponsors of attack ads to
identify themselves in their ads. That § 305 seeks to achieve
the same purpose indirectly, by withdrawing a statutory
benefit, does not render the provision any less sound.
Finally, I do not regard § 305 as a constitutionally suspect
“viewpoint-based regulation.” Brief for Appellant/Cross-
Appellee Sen. Mitch McConnell et al. in No. 02–1674 et al.,
p. 67. Like BCRA’s other disclosure requirements, § 305
evenhandedly regulates speech based on its electioneering
content. Although the section reaches only ads that men-
tion opposing candidates, it applies equally to all such ads.
Disagreement with one’s opponent obviously expresses a

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365 Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Stevens, J., dissenting
“viewpoint,” but § 305 treats that expression exactly like the
opponent’s response.
In sum, I would uphold § 305.