NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINIS- TRATION v. FAVISH et al.

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
157 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINIS-
TRATION v. FAVISH et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–954. Argued December 3, 2003—Decided March 30, 2004
Skeptical about five Government investigations’ conclusions that Vincent
Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton, committed suicide, re-
spondent Favish filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for,
among other things, 10 death-scene photographs of Foster’s body. The
Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) refused the request, invoking
FOIA Exemption 7(C), which excuses from disclosure “records or infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes” if their production
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy,” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Favish sued to compel
production. In upholding OIC’s exemption claim, the District Court
balanced the Foster family’s privacy interest against any public interest
in disclosure, holding that the former could be infringed by disclosure
and that Favish had not shown how disclosure would advance his inves-
tigation, especially in light of the exhaustive investigation that had al-
ready occurred. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Favish need
not show knowledge of agency misfeasance to support his request, and
remanded the case for the interests to be balanced consistent with its
opinion. On remand, the District Court ordered the release of five of
the photographs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the release of four.
Held:
1. FOIA recognizes surviving family members’ right to personal pri-
vacy with respect to their close relative’s death-scene images. Favish’s
contention that Exemption 7(C)’s personal privacy right is confined to
the right to control information about oneself is too narrow an interpre-
tation of Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
Press, 489 U. S. 749, which held that the personal privacy concept must
encompass an individual’s control of information about himself, but had
no occasion to consider whether those whose personal data are not in
the requested materials also have a recognized privacy interest under
the exemption. It did explain, however, that Exemption 7(C)’s concept
of privacy is not a limited or cramped notion. The exemption is in
marked contrast to Exemption 6, which requires withholding of person-
nel and medical files only if disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.” Exemption 7(C)’s comparative

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
158 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Syllabus
breadth—it does not include “clearly” and uses “could reasonably be
expected to constitute” instead of “would constitute”—is no drafting
accident, but is the result of specific amendments to an existing statute.
Because law enforcement documents often have information about per-
sons whose link to the official inquiry may be the result of mere happen-
stance, there is special reason to protect intimate personal data, to
which the public does not have a general right of access in the ordinary
course. The modifier “personal” before “privacy” does not bolster
Favish’s view that the family has no privacy interest in a decedent’s
pictures. Foster’s relatives invoke that interest to secure their own
refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and
tranquility, not for the sake of Foster’s reputation or some other interest
personal to him. It is proper to conclude that Congress intended to
permit family members to assert their own privacy rights against public
intrusions long deemed impermissible under the common law and cul-
tural traditions. This does not mean that the family is in the same
position as the individual who is the disclosure’s subject. However, this
Court has little difficulty in finding in case law and traditions the right
of family members to direct and control disposition of a deceased’s body
and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased’s remains for
public purposes. The well-established cultural tradition of acknowledg-
ing a family’s control over the body and the deceased’s death images has
long been recognized at common law. In enacting FOIA and amending
Exemption 7(C) to extend its terms, Congress legislated against this
background and the Attorney General’s consistent interpretation of the
exemption. The exemption protects a statutory privacy right that goes
beyond the common law and the Constitution, see id., at 762, n. 13. It
would be anomalous to hold in this case that the statute provides less
protection than does the common law. The statute must also be under-
stood in light of the consequences that would follow from Favish’s posi-
tion. Since FOIA withholding cannot be predicated on the requester’s
identity, violent criminals, who often make FOIA requests, would be
able to obtain autopsies, photographs, and records of their deceased vic-
tims at the expense of surviving family members’ personal privacy.
Pp. 164–171.
2. The Foster family’s privacy interest outweighs the public interest
in disclosure. As a general rule, citizens seeking documents subject to
FOIA disclosure are not required to explain why they seek the informa-
tion. However, when Exemption 7(C)’s privacy concerns are present,
the requester must show that the public interest sought to be advanced
is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information
for its own sake, and that the information is likely to advance that inter-
est. The Court does not in this single decision attempt to define the

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
159 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Syllabus
reasons that will suffice, or the necessary nexus between the requested
information and the public interest served by disclosure, but there must
be some stability with respect to both the specific category of privacy
interests protected and the specific category of public interests that
could outweigh the privacy claim. Here, the Ninth Circuit correctly
ruled that the family has a privacy interest protected by the statute
and recognized as significant the asserted public interest in uncovering
deficiencies or misfeasance in the Government’s investigations into Fos-
ter’s death, but it erred in defining the showing Favish must make to
establish his public interest claim. By requiring no particular evidence
of some actual misfeasance or other impropriety, that court’s holding
leaves Exemption 7(C) with little force or content. Under its rationale,
the invasion of privacy would be extensive, since once disclosed, in-
formation belongs to the general public. Thus, where there is a pri-
vacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) and the public interest
asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or other-
wise improperly in performing their duties, the requester must produce
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the
alleged Government impropriety might have occurred. When the pre-
sumption of legitimacy accorded to the Government’s official conduct is
applicable, clear evidence is usually required to displace it. Given
FOIA’s prodisclosure purpose, however, a less stringent standard is
more faithful to the statutory scheme. Only when the FOIA requester
has produced evidence sufficient to warrant a belief by a reasonable
person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred
will there be a counterweight on the FOIA scale for a court to balance
against the cognizable privacy interests in the requested documents.
Favish has produced no evidence to put that balance into play. The
District Court’s first order—before it was set aside by the Ninth Circuit
and superseded by the District Court’s remand order—followed the cor-
rect approach. Pp. 171–175.
37 Fed. Appx. 863, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant
Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneed-
ler, Leonard Schaitman, and Robert M. Loeb. James Ham-
ilton argued the cause for Anthony et al., respondents under
this Court’s Rule 12.6 in support of petitioner. With him on
the briefs was Robert V. Zener.

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
160 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
Respondent Allan J. Favish argued the cause and filed a
brief pro se.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to interpret the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552. FOIA does not apply if
the requested data fall within one or more exemptions. Ex-
emption 7(C) excuses from disclosure “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes” if their production
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.” § 552(b)(7)(C).
In Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989), we considered the scope
of Exemption 7(C) and held that release of the document at
issue would be a prohibited invasion of the personal privacy
of the person to whom the document referred. The princi-
pal document involved was the criminal record, or rap sheet,
of the person who himself objected to the disclosure. Here,
the information pertains to an official investigation into the
circumstances surrounding an apparent suicide. The initial
question is whether the exemption extends to the decedent’s
family when the family objects to the release of photographs
showing the condition of the body at the scene of death. If
we find the decedent’s family does have a personal privacy
interest recognized by the statute, we must then consider
whether that privacy claim is outweighed by the public inter-
est in disclosure.
I
Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton,
was found dead in Fort Marcy Park, located just outside
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Deanne E. Maynard, Elaine
J. Goldenberg, Lucy A. Dalglish, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Bruce W. San-
ford, David B. Smallman, and Alice Neff Lucan; and for the Silha Center
for the Study of Media Ethics and Law by Jane E. Kirtley.
Karen B. Tripp filed a brief for the Association of American Physi-
cians & Surgeons, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
161 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
Washington, D. C. The United States Park Police con-
ducted the initial investigation and took color photographs of
the death scene, including 10 pictures of Foster’s body. The
investigation concluded that Foster committed suicide by
shooting himself with a revolver. Subsequent investiga-
tions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, committees of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, and independ-
ent counsels Robert Fiske and Kenneth Starr reached the
same conclusion. Despite the unanimous finding of these
five investigations, a citizen interested in the matter, Allan
Favish, remained skeptical. Favish is now a respondent in
this proceeding. In an earlier proceeding, Favish was the
associate counsel for Accuracy in Media (AIM), which applied
under FOIA for Foster’s death-scene photographs. After
the National Park Service, which then maintained custody
of the pictures, resisted disclosure, Favish filed suit on be-
half of AIM in the District Court for the District of Columbia
to compel production. The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment against AIM. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia unanimously affirmed. Accuracy in
Media, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 194 F. 3d 120 (1999).
Still convinced that the Government’s investigations were
“ ‘grossly incomplete and untrustworthy,’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 57a, Favish filed the present FOIA request in his own
name, seeking, among other things, 11 pictures, 1 showing
Foster’s eyeglasses and 10 depicting various parts of Foster’s
body. Like the National Park Service, the Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel (OIC) refused the request under Exemp-
tion 7(C).
Again, Favish sued to compel production, this time in the
United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia. As a preliminary matter, the District Court held
that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia did not have collateral estoppel effect on Favish’s
California lawsuit brought in his personal capacity. On the
merits, the court granted partial summary judgment to OIC.
With the exception of the picture showing Foster’s eye-

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
162 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
glasses, the court upheld OIC’s claim of exemption. Relying
on the so-called Vaughn index provided by the Govern-
ment—a narrative description of the withheld photos, see
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F. 2d 820 (CADC 1973)—the court held,
first, that Foster’s surviving family members enjoy personal
privacy interests that could be infringed by disclosure of the
photographs. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a. It then found,
with respect to the asserted public interest, that “[Favish]
has not sufficiently explained how disclosure of these photo-
graphs will advance his investigation into Foster’s death.”
Id., at 59a. Any purported public interest in disclosure,
moreover, “is lessened because of the exhaustive investiga-
tion that has already occurred regarding Foster’s death.”
Id., at 58a. Balancing the competing interests, the court
concluded that “the privacy interests of the Foster family
members outweigh the public interest in disclosure.” Id.,
at 59a.
On the first appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the majority reversed and remanded, over Judge
Pregerson’s dissent. 217 F. 3d 1168 (2000). In the majori-
ty’s view, although evidence or knowledge of misfeasance by
the investigative agency may “enhanc[e] the urgency of the
[FOIA] request,” “[n]othing in the statutory command condi-
tions [disclosure] on the requesting party showing that he
has knowledge of misfeasance by the agency.” Id., at 1172–
1173. Furthermore, because “Favish, in fact, tenders evi-
dence and argument which, if believed, would justify his
doubts,” the FOIA request “is in complete conformity with
the statutory purpose that the public know what its govern-
ment is up to.” Ibid. This was so, the Court of Appeals
held, even in the face of five previous investigations into Fos-
ter’s death: “Nothing in the statutory command shields an
agency from disclosing its records because other agencies
have engaged in similar investigations. . . . [I]t is a feature
of famous cases that they generate controversy, suspicion,
and the desire to second guess the authorities.” Id., at 1173.
As the majority read the statute, there is “a right to look, a

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
163 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
right to speculate and argue again, a right of public scru-
tiny.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the District
Court that the exemption recognizes the Foster family mem-
bers’ right to personal privacy. Although the pictures con-
tain no information about Foster’s relatives, the statute’s
protection “extends to the memory of the deceased held by
those tied closely to the deceased by blood or love.” Ibid.
Nevertheless, the majority held that the District Court erred
in balancing the relevant interests based only on the Vaughn
index. While “the [D]istrict [C]ourt has discretion to decide
a FOIA case on the basis of affidavits, and affidavits are in
some cases sufficient,” “the agency affidavits are insuffi-
ciently detailed.” 217 F. 3d, at 1174. It remanded the case
to the District Court to examine the photos in camera and,
“consistent with [the Court of Appeals’] opinion,” “balance
the effect of their release on the privacy of the Foster family
against the public benefit to be obtained by their release.”
Ibid.
On remand, the District Court ordered release of the fol-
lowing five photographs:
“• The photograph identified as ‘3—VF’s [Vincent Fos-
ter’s] body looking down from top of berm’ must be
released, as the photograph is not so explicit as to
overcome the public interest.
. . . . .
“• The photograph entitled ‘5—VF’s body—focusing on
Rt. side of shoulder/arm’ is again of such a nature as
to be discoverable in that it is not focused in such a
manner as to unnecessarily impact the privacy inter-
ests of the family.
. . . . .
“• The photograph entitled ‘1—Right hand showing
gun & thumb in guard’ is discoverable as it may be
probative of the public’s right to know.
. . . . .

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
164 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
“• The photograph entitled ‘4—VF’s body focusing on
right side and arm’ is discoverable.
“• The photograph entitled ‘5—VF’s body—focus on top
of head thru heavy foliage’ is discoverable.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 45a.
On the second appeal to the same panel, the majority,
again over Judge Pregerson’s dissent, affirmed in part. 37
Fed. Appx. 863 (2002). Without providing any explanation,
it upheld the release of all the pictures, “except that photo
3—VF’s body looking down from top of berm is to be with-
held.” Id., at 864.
We granted OIC’s petition for a writ of certiorari to re-
solve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the proper
interpretation of Exemption 7(C). 538 U. S. 1012 (2003).
The only documents at issue in this case are the four photo-
graphs the Court of Appeals ordered released in its 2002
unpublished opinion. We reverse.
The OIC terminated its operations on March 23, 2004, see
28 U. S. C. § 596(b)(2), and transferred all records—including
the photographs that are the subject of Favish’s FOIA re-
quest—to the National Archives and Records Administra-
tion, see § 594(k)(1). The National Archives and Records
Administration has been substituted as petitioner in the cap-
tion of this case. As all the actions relevant to our disposi-
tion of the case took place before March 23, 2004, we continue
to refer to petitioner as OIC in this opinion.
II
It is common ground among the parties that the death-
scene photographs in OIC’s possession are records or infor-
mation “compiled for law enforcement purposes” as that
phrase is used in Exemption 7(C). App. 87. This leads to
the question whether disclosure of the four photographs
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
165 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
Favish contends the family has no personal privacy inter-
est covered by Exemption 7(C). His argument rests on the
proposition that the information is only about the decedent,
not his family. FOIA’s right to personal privacy, in his view,
means only “the right to control information about oneself.”
Brief for Respondent Favish 4. He quotes from our decision
in Reporters Committee, where, in holding that a person has
a privacy interest sufficient to prevent disclosure of his own
rap sheet, we said “the common law and the literal under-
standings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of in-
formation concerning his or her person.” 489 U. S., at 763.
This means, Favish says, that the individual who is the sub-
ject of the information is the only one with a privacy interest.
We disagree. The right to personal privacy is not con-
fined, as Favish argues, to the “right to control information
about oneself.” Brief for Respondent Favish 4. Favish
misreads the quoted sentence in Reporters Committee and
adopts too narrow an interpretation of the case’s holding.
To say that the concept of personal privacy must “encom-
pass” the individual’s control of information about himself
does not mean it cannot encompass other personal privacy
interests as well. Reporters Committee had no occasion to
consider whether individuals whose personal data are not
contained in the requested materials also have a recognized
privacy interest under Exemption 7(C).
Reporters Committee explained, however, that the concept
of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) is not some lim-
ited or “cramped notion” of that idea. 489 U. S., at 763.
Records or information are not to be released under FOIA
if disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C.
§ 552(b)(7). This provision is in marked contrast to the lan-
guage in Exemption 6, pertaining to “personnel and medical
files,” where withholding is required only if disclosure
“would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” § 552(b)(6). The adverb “clearly,” found in Ex-

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
166 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
emption 6, is not used in Exemption 7(C). In addition,
“whereas Exemption 6 refers to disclosures that ‘would con-
stitute’ an invasion of privacy, Exemption 7(C) encompasses
any disclosure that ‘could reasonably be expected to consti-
tute’ such an invasion.” Reporters Committee, 489 U. S., at
756. Exemption 7(C)’s comparative breadth is no mere acci-
dent in drafting. We know Congress gave special consider-
ation to the language in Exemption 7(C) because it was the
result of specific amendments to an existing statute. See
id., at 756, n. 9, 777, n. 22.
Law enforcement documents obtained by Government in-
vestigators often contain information about persons inter-
viewed as witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the
official inquiry may be the result of mere happenstance.
There is special reason, therefore, to give protection to this
intimate personal data, to which the public does not have a
general right of access in the ordinary course. Id., at 773.
In this class of cases where the subject of the documents “is
a private citizen,” “the privacy interest . . . is at its apex.”
Id., at 780.
Certain amici in support of Favish rely on the modifier
“personal” before the word “privacy” to bolster their view
that the family has no privacy interest in the pictures of
the decedent. This, too, misapprehends the family’s posi-
tion and the scope of protection the exemption provides.
The family does not invoke Exemption 7(C) on behalf of Vin-
cent Foster in its capacity as his next friend for fear that
the pictures may reveal private information about Foster to
the detriment of his own posthumous reputation or some
other interest personal to him. If that were the case, a dif-
ferent set of considerations would control. Foster’s rela-
tives instead invoke their own right and interest to personal
privacy. They seek to be shielded by the exemption to se-
cure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for
their own peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake of
the deceased.

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
167 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
In a sworn declaration filed with the District Court, Fos-
ter’s sister, Sheila Foster Anthony, stated that the family had
been harassed by, and deluged with requests from, “[p]oliti-
cal and commercial opportunists” who sought to profit from
Foster’s suicide. App. 94. In particular, she was “horrified
and devastated by [a] photograph [already] leaked to the
press.” Ibid. “[E]very time I see it,” Sheila Foster An-
thony wrote, “I have nightmares and heart-pounding in-
somnia as I visualize how he must have spent his last few
minutes and seconds of his life.” Ibid. She opposed the
disclosure of the disputed pictures because “I fear that the
release of [additional] photographs certainly would set off
another round of intense scrutiny by the media. Undoubt-
edly, the photographs would be placed on the Internet for
world consumption. Once again my family would be the
focus of conceivably unsavory and distasteful media cover-
age.” Id., at 95. “[R]eleasing any photographs,” Sheila
Foster Anthony continued, “would constitute a painful un-
warranted invasion of my privacy, my mother’s privacy, my
sister’s privacy, and the privacy of Lisa Foster Moody
(Vince’s widow), her three children, and other members of
the Foster family.” Id., at 93.
As we shall explain below, we think it proper to conclude
from Congress’ use of the term “personal privacy” that it
intended to permit family members to assert their own pri-
vacy rights against public intrusions long deemed impermis-
sible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.
This does not mean that the family is in the same position as
the individual who is the subject of the disclosure. We have
little difficulty, however, in finding in our case law and tradi-
tions the right of family members to direct and control dispo-
sition of the body of the deceased and to limit attempts to
exploit pictures of the deceased family member’s remains for
public purposes.
Burial rites or their counterparts have been respected in
almost all civilizations from time immemorial. See gener-

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
168 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
ally 26 Encyclopaedia Britannica 851 (15th ed. 1985) (noting
that “[t]he ritual burial of the dead” has been practiced “from
the very dawn of human culture and . . . in most parts of the
world”); 5 Encyclopedia of Religion 450 (1987) (“[F]uneral
rites . . . are the conscious cultural forms of one of our most
ancient, universal, and unconscious impulses”). They are a
sign of the respect a society shows for the deceased and for
the surviving family members. The power of Sophocles’
story in Antigone maintains its hold to this day because of
the universal acceptance of the heroine’s right to insist on
respect for the body of her brother. See Antigone of Sopho-
cles, 8 Harvard Classics: Nine Greek Dramas 255 (C. Eliot
ed. 1909). The outrage at seeing the bodies of American
soldiers mutilated and dragged through the streets is but a
modern instance of the same understanding of the interests
decent people have for those whom they have lost. Family
members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation
that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the
rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased person
who was once their own.
In addition this well-established cultural tradition ac-
knowledging a family’s control over the body and death im-
ages of the deceased has long been recognized at common
law. Indeed, this right to privacy has much deeper roots in
the common law than the rap sheets held to be protected
from disclosure in Reporters Committee. An early decision
by the New York Court of Appeals is typical:
“It is the right of privacy of the living which it is sought
to enforce here. That right may in some cases be itself
violated by improperly interfering with the character or
memory of a deceased relative, but it is the right of the
living, and not that of the dead, which is recognized. A
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a de-
ceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege
exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feel-

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
169 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
ings, and to prevent a violation of their own rights in
the character and memory of the deceased.” Schuyler
v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 447, 42 N. E. 22, 25 (1895).
See also Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash. 2d 195, 212, 961
P. 2d 333, 342 (1998) (“[T]he immediate relatives of a dece-
dent have a protectable privacy interest in the autopsy rec-
ords of the decedent”); McCambridge v. Little Rock, 298
Ark. 219, 231–232, 766 S. W. 2d 909, 915 (1989) (recognizing
the privacy interest of the murder victim’s mother in crime
scene photographs); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171
Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930) (per curiam) (recognizing par-
ents’ right of privacy in photographs of their deceased child’s
body); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, p. 387 (1977)
(recognizing that publication of a photograph of a deceased
infant—a hypothetical “child with two heads”—over the ob-
jection of the mother would result in an “inva[sion]” of the
mother’s “privacy”).
We can assume Congress legislated against this back-
ground of law, scholarship, and history when it enacted
FOIA and when it amended Exemption 7(C) to extend its
terms. Those enactments were also against the background
of the Attorney General’s consistent interpretation of the ex-
emption to protect “members of the family of the person to
whom the information pertains,” U. S. Dept. of Justice, At-
torney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information
Section of the Administrative Procedure Act 36 (June 1967),
and to require consideration of the privacy of “relatives or
descendants” and the “possible adverse effects [from disclo-
sure] upon [the individual] or his family,” U. S. Dept. of Jus-
tice Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom
of Information Act 9–10 (Feb. 1975), reprinted in House Com-
mittee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments
of 1974 (Pub. L. 93–502), Source Book, App. 5, pp. 519–520,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Joint Comm. Print 1975).

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
170 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
We have observed that the statutory privacy right pro-
tected by Exemption 7(C) goes beyond the common law and
the Constitution. See Reporters Committee, 489 U. S., at
762, n. 13 (contrasting the scope of the privacy protection
under FOIA with the analogous protection under the com-
mon law and the Constitution); see also Marzen v. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Servs., 825 F. 2d 1148, 1152 (CA7
1987) (“[T]he privacy interest protected under FOIA extends
beyond the common law”). It would be anomalous to hold
in the instant case that the statute provides even less protec-
tion than does the common law.
The statutory scheme must be understood, moreover, in
light of the consequences that would follow were we to adopt
Favish’s position. As a general rule, withholding informa-
tion under FOIA cannot be predicated on the identity of the
requester. See Reporters Committee, supra, at 771. We
are advised by the Government that child molesters, rapists,
murderers, and other violent criminals often make FOIA
requests for autopsies, photographs, and records of their
deceased victims. Our holding ensures that the privacy in-
terests of surviving family members would allow the Gov-
ernment to deny these gruesome requests in appropriate
cases. We find it inconceivable that Congress could have
intended a definition of “personal privacy” so narrow that it
would allow convicted felons to obtain these materials with-
out limitations at the expense of surviving family members’
personal privacy.
For these reasons, in agreement with the Courts of Ap-
peals for both the District of Columbia and the Ninth Circuit,
see Accuracy in Media v. National Park Serv., 194 F. 3d 120
(CADC 1999); 217 F. 3d 1168 (CA9 2000), we hold that FOIA
recognizes surviving family members’ right to personal pri-
vacy with respect to their close relative’s death-scene im-
ages. Our holding is consistent with the unanimous view
of the Courts of Appeals and other lower courts that have
addressed the question. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v.

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
171 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
National Aeronautics and Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628,
631, 632 (CADC 1991) (sustaining a privacy claim under the
narrower Exemption 6 with respect to an audiotape of the
Space Shuttle Challenger astronauts’ last words, because
“[e]xposure to the voice of a beloved family member immedi-
ately prior to that family member’s death . . . would cause
the Challenger families pain” and inflict “a disruption [to]
their peace of mind every time a portion of the tape is played
within their hearing”), on remand from 920 F. 2d 1002
(CADC 1990); Katz v. National Archives and Records
Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 485 (DC 1994) (exempting from
FOIA disclosure autopsy X-rays and photographs of Presi-
dent Kennedy on the ground that their release would cause
“additional anguish” to the surviving family), aff ’d on other
grounds, 68 F. 3d 1438 (CADC 1995); Lesar v. Department of
Justice, 636 F. 2d 472, 487 (CADC 1980) (recognizing, with
respect to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
his survivors’ privacy interests in avoiding “annoyance or
harassment”). Neither the deceased’s former status as a
public official, nor the fact that other pictures had been made
public, detracts from the weighty privacy interests involved.
III
Our ruling that the personal privacy protected by Exemp-
tion 7(C) extends to family members who object to the disclo-
sure of graphic details surrounding their relative’s death
does not end the case. Although this privacy interest is
within the terms of the exemption, the statute directs non-
disclosure only where the information “could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion” of the fami-
ly’s personal privacy. The term “unwarranted” requires us
to balance the family’s privacy interest against the public
interest in disclosure. See Reporters Committee, 489 U. S.,
at 762.
FOIA is often explained as a means for citizens to know
“ ‘what their Government is up to.’ ” Id., at 773. This

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
172 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism.
It defines a structural necessity in a real democracy. The
statement confirms that, as a general rule, when documents
are within FOIA’s disclosure provisions, citizens should not
be required to explain why they seek the information. A
person requesting the information needs no preconceived
idea of the uses the data might serve. The information be-
longs to citizens to do with as they choose. Furthermore,
as we have noted, the disclosure does not depend on the iden-
tity of the requester. As a general rule, if the information
is subject to disclosure, it belongs to all.
When disclosure touches upon certain areas defined in the
exemptions, however, the statute recognizes limitations that
compete with the general interest in disclosure, and that, in
appropriate cases, can overcome it. In the case of Exemp-
tion 7(C), the statute requires us to protect, in the proper
degree, the personal privacy of citizens against the uncon-
trolled release of information compiled through the power of
the State. The statutory direction that the information not
be released if the invasion of personal privacy could reason-
ably be expected to be unwarranted requires the courts to
balance the competing interests in privacy and disclosure.
To effect this balance and to give practical meaning to the
exemption, the usual rule that the citizen need not offer
a reason for requesting the information must be inapplicable.
Where the privacy concerns addressed by Exemption 7(C)
are present, the exemption requires the person requesting
the information to establish a sufficient reason for the dis-
closure. First, the citizen must show that the public inter-
est sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest
more specific than having the information for its own sake.
Second, the citizen must show the information is likely to
advance that interest. Otherwise, the invasion of privacy
is unwarranted.
We do not in this single decision attempt to define the
reasons that will suffice, or the necessary nexus between the

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
173 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
requested information and the asserted public interest that
would be advanced by disclosure. On the other hand, there
must be some stability with respect to both the specific cate-
gory of personal privacy interests protected by the statute
and the specific category of public interests that could out-
weigh the privacy claim. Otherwise, courts will be left to
balance in an ad hoc manner with little or no real guidance.
Id., at 776. In the case of photographic images and other
data pertaining to an individual who died under mysterious
circumstances, the justification most likely to satisfy Exemp-
tion 7(C)’s public interest requirement is that the information
is necessary to show the investigative agency or other re-
sponsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly
in the performance of their duties.
The Court of Appeals was correct to rule that the family
has a privacy interest protected by the statute and to recog-
nize as significant the asserted public interest in uncovering
deficiencies or misfeasance in the Government’s investi-
gations into Foster’s death. It erred, however, in defining
the showing Favish must make to substantiate his public
interest claim. It stated that “[n]othing in the statutory
command conditions [disclosure] on the requesting party
showing that he has knowledge of misfeasance by the
agency” and that “[n]othing in the statutory command shields
an agency from disclosing its records because other agencies
have engaged in similar investigations.” 217 F. 3d, at 1172–
1173. The court went on to hold that, because Favish has
“tender[ed] evidence and argument which, if believed, would
justify his doubts,” the FOIA request “is in complete con-
formity with the statutory purpose that the public know
what its government is up to.” Id., at 1173. This was in-
sufficient. The Court of Appeals required no particular
showing that any evidence points with credibility to some
actual misfeasance or other impropriety. The court’s hold-
ing leaves Exemption 7(C) with little force or content. By
requiring courts to engage in a state of suspended disbelief

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
174 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. v. FAVISH
Opinion of the Court
with regard to even the most incredible allegations, the panel
transformed Exemption 7(C) into nothing more than a rule
of pleading. The invasion of privacy under its rationale
would be extensive. It must be remembered that once
there is disclosure, the information belongs to the general
public. There is no mechanism under FOIA for a protective
order allowing only the requester to see whether the infor-
mation bears out his theory, or for proscribing its general
dissemination.
We hold that, where there is a privacy interest protected
by Exemption 7(C) and the public interest being asserted is
to show that responsible officials acted negligently or other-
wise improperly in the performance of their duties, the re-
quester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order
to obtain disclosure. Rather, the requester must produce
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person
that the alleged Government impropriety might have oc-
curred. In Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164 (1991),
we held there is a presumption of legitimacy accorded to the
Government’s official conduct. Id., at 178–179. The pre-
sumption perhaps is less a rule of evidence than a general
working principle. However the rule is characterized,
where the presumption is applicable, clear evidence is usu-
ally required to displace it. Cf. United States v. Armstrong,
517 U. S. 456, 464 (1996) (“ ‘[I]n the absence of clear evidence
to the contrary, courts presume that [Government agents]
have properly discharged their official duties’ ”); United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14–15 (1926)
(“The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of
public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged
their official duties”). Given FOIA’s prodisclosure purpose,
however, the less stringent standard we adopt today is more
faithful to the statutory scheme. Only when the FOIA re-
quester has produced evidence sufficient to satisfy this
standard will there exist a counterweight on the FOIA scale

541US1 Unit: $U35 [05-08-06 20:44:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
175 Cite as: 541 U. S. 157 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
for the court to balance against the cognizable privacy inter-
ests in the requested records. Allegations of government
misconduct are “ ‘easy to allege and hard to disprove,’ ”
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 585 (1998), so courts
must insist on a meaningful evidentiary showing. It would
be quite extraordinary to say we must ignore the fact that
five different inquiries into the Foster matter reached the
same conclusion. As we have noted, the balancing exercise
in some other case might require us to make a somewhat
more precise determination regarding the significance of the
public interest and the historical importance of the events
in question. We might need to consider the nexus required
between the requested documents and the purported public
interest served by disclosure. We need not do so here, how-
ever. Favish has not produced any evidence that would
warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Gov-
ernment impropriety might have occurred to put the balance
into play.
The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of Exemp-
tion 7(C). The District Court’s first order in March 1998—
before its decision was set aside by the Court of Appeals and
superseded by the District Court’s own order on remand—
followed the correct approach. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with in-
structions to grant OIC’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to the four photographs in dispute.
It is so ordered.