SMALL v. UNITED STATES

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385 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
SMALL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 03–750. Argued November 3, 2004—Decided April 26, 2005
Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese court of trying to smuggle
firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in
prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun.
Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(1), which forbids “any person . . . convicted in any court of,
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
to . . . possess . . . any firearm.” (Emphasis added.) Small pleaded
guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the
ground that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside § 922(g)(1)’s
scope. The Federal District Court and the Third Circuit rejected this
argument.
Held: Section 922(g)(1)’s phrase “convicted in any court” encompasses only
domestic, not foreign, convictions. Pp. 388–394.
(a) In considering the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” it
is appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic concerns in mind.
This assumption is similar to the legal presumption that Congress ordi-
narily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, applica-
tion, see, e. g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285. The
phrase “convicted in any court” describes one necessary portion of the
“gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a matter of domestic law.
Moreover, because foreign convictions may include convictions for con-
duct that domestic laws would permit, e. g., for engaging in economic
conduct that our society might encourage, convictions from a legal sys-
tem that are inconsistent with American understanding of fairness, and
convictions for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely, the
key statutory phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably
identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U. S. law where for-
eign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue. In ad-
dition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or prosecutors
to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at
issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that
meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the statute’s lan-
guage; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish;
and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say, of

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386 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. These consid-
erations provide a convincing basis for applying the ordinary assump-
tion about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here. Thus, the
Court assumes a congressional intent that the phrase “convicted in any
court” applies domestically, not extraterritorially, unless the statutory
language, context, history, or purpose shows the contrary. Pp. 388–391.
(b) There is no convincing indication to the contrary here. The stat-
ute’s language suggests no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.
To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute’s lan-
guage creates anomalies. For example, in creating an exception allow-
ing gun possession despite a conviction for an antitrust or business regu-
latory crime, § 921(a)(20)(A) speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or
regulatory offenses. If the phrase “convicted in any court” generally
refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no problem.
But if the phrase includes foreign convictions, the words “Federal or
State” prevent the exception from applying where a foreign antitrust
or regulatory conviction is at issue. Such illustrative examples suggest
that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase “convicted
in any court” applies to foreign convictions. Moreover, the statute’s
legislative history indicates no intent to reach beyond domestic convic-
tions. Although the statutory purpose of keeping guns from those
likely to become a threat to society does offer some support for reading
§ 922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions, the likelihood that Congress,
at best, paid no attention to the matter is reinforced by the empir-
ical fact that, according to the Government, since 1968, there have
been fewer than a dozen instances in which such a foreign convic-
tion has served as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution.
Pp. 391–394.
333 F. 3d 425, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 394.
Rehnquist, C. J., took no part in the decision of the case.
Paul D. Boas argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Stephen P. Halbrook.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United
States. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor Gen-
eral Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, Deputy So-
licitor General Dreeben, and John A. Drennan.

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387 Cite as: 544 U. S. 385 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States Criminal Code makes it
“unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . any
firearm.” 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added).
The question before us focuses upon the words “convicted in
any court.” Does this phrase apply only to convictions en-
tered in any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well?
We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not for-
eign, convictions.
I
In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japa-
nese court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle,
and ammunition into Japan. Small was sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment. 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757, n. 3 (WD Pa.
2002). After his release, Small returned to the United
States, where he bought a gun from a Pennsylvania gun
dealer. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small
under the “unlawful gun possession” statute here at issue.
333 F. 3d 425, 426 (CA3 2003). Small pleaded guilty while
reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground
that his earlier conviction, being a foreign conviction, fell
outside the scope of the illegal gun possession statute. The
Federal District Court rejected Small’s argument, as did the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 183 F. Supp. 2d, at
759; 333 F. 3d, at 427, n. 2. Because the Circuits disagree
about the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare United
States v. Atkins, 872 F. 2d 94, 96 (CA4 1989) (“convicted in
any court” includes foreign convictions); United States v.
Winson, 793 F. 2d 754, 757–759 (CA6 1986) (same), with
United States v. Gayle, 342 F. 3d 89, 95 (CA2 2003) (“con-
victed in any court” does not include foreign convictions);
United States v. Concha, 233 F. 3d 1249, 1256 (CA10 2000)
(same).

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388 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
II
A
The question before us is whether the statutory reference
“convicted in any court” includes a conviction entered in a
foreign court. The word “any” considered alone cannot an-
swer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says,
“I’ll see any film,” may or may not mean to include films
shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the
statutory phrase “ ‘any person’ ” may or may not mean to
include “ ‘persons’ ” outside “the jurisdiction of the state.”
See, e. g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818)
(Marshall, C. J.) (“[G]eneral words,” such as the word
“ ‘any,’ ” must “be limited” in their application “to those ob-
jects to which the legislature intended to apply them”);
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132
(2004) (“ ‘any’ ” means “different things depending upon the
setting”); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350,
357 (1994) (“[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight
on the broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement
officer or agency without considering the rest of the stat-
ute”); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 15–16 (1981) (it is doubtful
that the phrase “ ‘any statute’ ” includes the very statute in
which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S.
145, 149 (1960) (“ ‘[A]ny sum,’ ” while a “catchall” phrase,
does not “define what it catches”). Thus, even though the
word “any” demands a broad interpretation, see, e. g., United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond
that word itself.
In determining the scope of the statutory phrase we find
help in the “commonsense notion that Congress generally
legislates with domestic concerns in mind. ” Smi th v.
United States, 507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). This notion has
led the Court to adopt the legal presumption that Congress
ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extrater-

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Opinion of the Court
ritorial, application. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U. S. 281, 285 (1949); see also Palmer, supra, at 631 (“The
words ‘any person or persons,’ are broad enough to compre-
hend every human being” but are “limited to cases within
the jurisdiction of the state”); EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 249–251 (1991). That presumption
would apply, for example, were we to consider whether this
statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad as well as
domestically. And, although the presumption against extra-
territorial application does not apply directly to this case, we
believe a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider
the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” here.
For one thing, the phrase describes one necessary portion
of the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a matter
of domestic law. For another, considered as a group, foreign
convictions differ from domestic convictions in important
ways. Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by
more than one year’s imprisonment may include a conviction
for conduct that domestic laws would permit, for example,
for engaging in economic conduct that our society might en-
courage. See, e. g., Art. 153 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, in Soviet Crim-
inal Law and Procedure 171 (H. Berman & J. Spindler
transls. 2d ed. 1972) (criminalizing “Private Entrepreneurial
Activity”); Art. 153, id., at 172 (criminalizing “Speculation,”
which is defined as “the buying up and reselling of goods or
any other articles for the purpose of making a profit”); cf.,
e. g., Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Cuba, ch. II, Art. 103,
p. 68 (Dec. 30, 1987) (forbidding propaganda that incites
against the social order, international solidarity, or the Com-
munist state). They would include a conviction from a legal
system that is inconsistent with an American understanding
of fairness. See, e. g., U. S. Dept. of State, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 2003, Submitted to the House
Committee on International Relations and the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 702–705,

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390 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
1853, 2023 (Joint Comm. Print 2004) (describing failures of
“due process” and citing examples in which “the testimony
of one man equals that of two women”). And they would
include a conviction for conduct that domestic law punishes
far less severely. See, e. g., Singapore Vandalism Act,
ch. 108, §§ 2, 3, III Statutes of Republic of Singapore,
pp. 257–258 (imprisonment for up to three years for an act
of vandalism). Thus, the key statutory phrase “convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies dan-
gerous individuals for the purposes of U. S. law where for-
eign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at
issue.
In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking
judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions
where foreign convictions are at issue. To somehow weed
out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory
definition is not consistent with the statute’s language; it is
not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish;
and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign
court (say, of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal
obligations. Cf. 1 United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(h) (Nov. 2004) (“[S]entences re-
sulting from foreign convictions are not counted” as a “prior
sentence” for criminal history purposes).
These considerations, suggesting significant differences
between foreign and domestic convictions, do not dictate our
ultimate conclusion. Nor do they create a “clear statement”
rule, imposing upon Congress a special burden of specificity.
See post, at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They simply con-
vince us that we should apply an ordinary assumption about
the reach of domestically oriented statutes here—an assump-
tion that helps us determine Congress’ intent where Con-
gress likely did not consider the matter and where other indi-
cia of intent are in approximate balance. Cf. ibid. We
consequently assume a congressional intent that the phrase

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Opinion of the Court
“convicted in any court” applies domestically, not extraterri-
torially. But, at the same time, we stand ready to revise
this assumption should statutory language, context, history,
or purpose show the contrary.
B
We have found no convincing indication to the contrary
here. The statute’s language does not suggest any intent to
reach beyond domestic convictions. Neither does it mention
foreign convictions nor is its subject matter special, say, im-
migration or terrorism, where one could argue that foreign
convictions would seem especially relevant. To the con-
trary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute’s lan-
guage creates anomalies.
For example, the statute creates an exception that allows
gun possession despite a prior conviction for an antitrust or
business regulatory crime. 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20)(A). In
doing so, the exception speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust
or regulatory offenses. Ibid. If the phrase “convicted in
any court” generally refers only to domestic convictions, this
language causes no problem. But if “convicted in any court”
includes foreign convictions, the words “Federal or State”
prevent the exception from applying where a foreign anti-
trust or regulatory conviction is at issue. An individual con-
victed of, say, a Canadian antitrust offense could not lawfully
possess a gun, Combines Investigation Act, 2 R. S. C. 1985,
ch. C–34, §§ 61(6), (9), but a similar individual convicted of,
say, a New York antitrust offense, could lawfully possess
a gun.
For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes
include “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18
U. S. C. § 922(g)(9). Again, the language specifies that these
predicate crimes include only crimes that are “misdemean-
or[s] under Federal or State law.” § 921(a)(33)(A). If “con-
victed in any court” refers only to domestic convictions, this
language creates no problem. If the phrase also refers to

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392 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently
senseless distinction between (covered) domestic relations
misdemeanors committed within the United States and
(uncovered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed
abroad.
For example, the statute provides an enhanced penalty
where unlawful gun possession rests upon three predicate
convictions for a “serious drug offense.” § 924(e)(1) (2000
ed., Supp. II). Again the statute defines the relevant drug
crimes through reference to specific federal crimes and with
the words “offense under State law.” §§ 924(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii)
(2000 ed.). If “convicted in any court” refers only to do-
mestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But
if the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language
creates an apparently senseless distinction between drug
offenses committed within the United States (potentially
producing enhanced punishments) and similar offenses com-
mitted abroad (not producing enhanced punishments).
For example, the statute provides that offenses that are
punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years,
and characterized under state law as misdemeanors, are not
predicate crimes. § 921(20). This exception is presumably
based on the determination that such state crimes are not
sufficiently serious or dangerous so as to preclude an individ-
ual from possessing a firearm. If “convicted in any court”
refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no
problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign convic-
tions, the language creates another apparently senseless dis-
tinction between less serious crimes (misdemeanors punish-
able by more than one year’s imprisonment) committed
within the United States (not predicate crimes) and similar
offenses committed abroad (predicate crimes). These illus-
trative examples taken together suggest that Congress did
not consider whether the generic phrase “convicted in any
court” applies to domestic as well as foreign convictions.

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Opinion of the Court
The statute’s lengthy legislative history confirms the fact
that Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions
should or should not serve as a predicate to liability under
the provision here at issue. Congress did consider a Senate
bill containing language that would have restricted predicate
offenses to domestic offenses. See S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (1968) (defining predicate crimes in terms
of “Federal” crimes “punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year” and crimes “determined by the laws of
the State to be a felony”). And the Conference Committee
ultimately rejected this version in favor of language that
speaks of those “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,” § 928(g)(1).
See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28–29
(1968). But the history does not suggest that this language
change reflected a congressional view on the matter before
us. Rather, the enacted version is simpler and it avoids
potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may
define the term “felony” differently. And as far as the legis-
lative history is concerned, these latter virtues of the new
language fully explain the change. Thus, those who use
legislative history to help discern congressional intent will
see the history here as silent, hence a neutral factor, that
simply confirms the obvious, namely, that Congress did not
consider the issue. Others will not be tempted to use or
to discuss the history at all. But cf. post, at 406 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
The statute’s purpose does offer some support for a read-
ing of the phrase that includes foreign convictions. As the
Government points out, Congress sought to “ ‘keep guns out
of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may
not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a
threat to society.’ ” Brief for United States 16 (quoting
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 112
(1983)); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60–62,
66 (1980); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 824

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394 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
(1974). And, as the dissent properly notes, post, at 402–403,
one convicted of a serious crime abroad may well be as dan-
gerous as one convicted of a similar crime in the United
States.
The force of this argument is weakened significantly, how-
ever, by the empirical fact that, according to the Govern-
ment, since 1968, there have probably been no more than “10
to a dozen” instances in which such a foreign conviction has
served as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. This empirical fact reinforces the likeli-
hood that Congress, at best, paid no attention to the matter.
C
In sum, we have no reason to believe that Congress consid-
ered the added enforcement advantages flowing from inclu-
sion of foreign crimes, weighing them against, say, the po-
tential unfairness of preventing those with inapt foreign
convictions from possessing guns. See supra, at 389. The
statute itself and its history offer only congressional silence.
Given the reasons for disfavoring an inference of extraterri-
torial coverage from a statute’s total silence and our initial
assumption against such coverage, see supra, at 390–391, we
conclude that the phrase “convicted in any court” refers only
to domestic courts, not to foreign courts. Congress, of
course, remains free to change this conclusion through statu-
tory amendment.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Third Circuit is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this
case.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia and Jus-
tice Kennedy join, dissenting.
Gary Small, having recently emerged from three years in
Japanese prison for illegally importing weapons into that

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395 Cite as: 544 U. S. 385 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
country, bought a gun in the United States. This violated
18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any per-
son “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punish-
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to pos-
sess a firearm in or affecting commerce. Yet the majority
decides that Small’s gun possession did not violate the stat-
ute, because his prior convictions occurred in a Japanese
court rather than an American court. In concluding that
“any” means not what it says, but rather “a subset of any,”
the Court distorts the plain meaning of the statute and de-
parts from established principles of statutory construction.
I respectfully dissent.
I
In December 1992, Small shipped a 19-gallon electric
water heater from the United States to Okinawa, Japan, os-
tensibly as a present for someone in Okinawa. App. to Brief
for Appellant in No. 02–2785 (CA3), pp. 507a–510a, 530a–
531a, 534a, 598a (hereinafter Appellant’s App.). Small had
sent two other water heaters to Japan that same year. Id.,
at 523a–527a. Thinking it unusual for a person to ship a
water tank from overseas as a present, id., at 599a, Japanese
customs officials searched the heater and discovered 2 rifles,
8 semiautomatic pistols, and 410 rounds of ammunition, id.,
at 603a–604a; id., at 262a, 267a, 277a.
The Japanese Government indicted Small on multiple
counts of violating Japan’s weapons-control and customs
laws. Id., at 261a–262a. Each offense was punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 333 F. 3d 425,
426 (CA3 2003). Small was tried before a three-judge court
in Naha, Japan, Appellant’s App. 554a, convicted on all
counts on April 14, 1994, 333 F. 3d, at 426, and sentenced to
5 years’ imprisonment with credit for 320 days served, id.,
at 426, n. 1; Government’s Brief in Support of Detention in
Crim. No. 00–160 (WD Pa.), pp. 3–4. He was paroled on
November 22, 1996, and his parole terminated on May 26,
1998. 333 F. 3d, at 426, n. 1.

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396 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
A week after completing parole for his Japanese convic-
tions, on June 2, 1998, Small purchased a 9-millimeter SWD
Cobray pistol from a firearms dealer in Pennsylvania.
Appellant’s App. 48a, 98a. Some time later, a search of his
residence, business premises, and automobile revealed a
.380-caliber Browning pistol and more than 300 rounds of
ammunition. Id., at 47a–51a, 98a–99a. This prosecution
ensued.
II
The plain terms of § 922(g)(1) prohibit Small—a person
“convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year”—from possessing a
firearm in the United States. “Read naturally, the word
‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indis-
criminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales,
520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 97 (1976) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d)); see
also Department of Housing and Urban Development v.
Rucker, 535 U. S. 125, 130–131 (2002) (statute making “any”
drug-related criminal activity cause for termination of public
housing lease precludes requirement that tenant know of the
activity); Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398, 400–401
(1998) (statute criminalizing “any” false statement within the
jurisdiction of a federal agency allows no exception for the
mere denial of wrongdoing); United States v. Alvarez-
Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 356, 358 (1994) (statute referring to
“any” law enforcement officer includes all law enforcement
officers—federal, state, or local—capable of arresting for a
federal crime). No exceptions appear on the face of the
statute; “[n]o modifier is present, and nothing suggests any
restriction,” Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60 (1980),
on the scope of the term “court.” See Gonzales, supra, at
5 (statute referring to “ ‘any other term of imprisonment’ ”
includes no “language limiting the breadth of that word, and
so we must read [the statute] as referring to all ‘term[s] of

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Thomas, J., dissenting
imprisonment’ ”). The broad phrase “any court” unambigu-
ously includes all judicial bodies 1 with jurisdiction to impose
the requisite conviction—a conviction for a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term of more than a year. Indisput-
ably, Small was convicted in a Japanese court of crimes pun-
ishable by a prison term exceeding one year. The clear
terms of the statute prohibit him from possessing a gun in
the United States.
Of course, the phrase “any court,” like all other statutory
language, must be read in context. E. g., Deal v. United
States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993). The context of § 922(g)(1),
however, suggests that there is no geographic limit on the
scope of “any court.” 2 By contrast to other parts of the
firearms-control law that expressly mention only state or
federal law, “any court” is not qualified by jurisdiction. See
18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20) (excluding certain “Federal or State
offenses” from the definition of “crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year”); § 921(a)(33)(A)(i)
(defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” by
1 See, e. g., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 335
(1966) (defining “court” as “a place where justice is administered,”
“a judicial tribunal duly constituted for the hearing and determination of
cases,” “a session of a judicial assembly”); The Concise Oxford Dictionary
of Current English 282 (5th ed. 1964) (defining “court” as an “[a]ssembly
of judges or other persons acting as tribunal”); Webster’s 3d 522 (1961)
(defining “court” as “the persons duly assembled under authority of law
for the administration of justice,” “an official assembly legally met to-
gether for the transaction of judicial business,” “a judge or judges sitting
for the hearing or trial of cases”).
2 The Court’s observation that “a speaker who says, ‘I’ll see any film,’
may or may not mean to include films shown in another city,” ante, at 388,
therefore adds nothing to the analysis. The context of that statement
implies that such a speaker, despite saying “any,” often means only the
subset of films within an accessible distance. Unlike the context of the
film remark, the context of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) implies no geographic
restriction.

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398 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
reference to “Federal or State law”).3 Congress’ explicit use
of “Federal” and “State” in other provisions shows that it
specifies such restrictions when it wants to do so.
Counting foreign convictions, moreover, implicates no spe-
cial federalism concerns or other clear statement rules that
have justified construing “any” narrowly in the past.4 And
it is eminently practical to put foreign convictions to the
same use as domestic ones; foreign convictions indicate
dangerousness just as reliably as domestic convictions. See
Part III–B, infra. The expansive phrase “convicted in
any court” straightforwardly encompasses Small’s Japanese
convictions.
III
Faced with the inescapably broad text, the Court narrows
the statute by assuming that the text applies only to do-
mestic convictions, ante, at 388–389; criticizing the accuracy
of foreign convictions as a proxy for dangerousness, ante,
at 389–390; finding that the broad, natural reading of the
statute “creates anomalies,” ante, at 391; and suggesting
that Congress did not consider whether foreign convic-
tions counted, ante, at 393. None of these arguments is
persuasive.
3 See also § 921(a)(15) (defining a “fugitive from justice,” who is banned
from possessing firearms under § 922(g)(2), as “any person who has fled
from any State to avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testi-
mony”); § 924(e)(2) (defining a “serious drug offense,” which can trigger an
enhanced sentence, by reference to particular federal laws or “State law”).
4 Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125 (2004), considered
a federal statute authorizing pre-emption of state and local laws “prohibit-
ing the ability of any entity” to provide telecommunications services. Id.,
at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the stat-
ute did not provide the clear statement required for the Federal Govern-
ment to limit the States’ ability to restrict delivery of such services by
their own political subdivisions. Id., at 140–141; see also id., at 141
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
534 U. S. 533, 540–541 (2002) (“any” in federal statute insufficiently clear
statement to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hospi-
tal v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 245–246 (1985) (same). No such clear state-
ment rule is at work here.

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A
The Court first invents a canon of statutory interpreta-
tion—what it terms “an ordinary assumption about the reach
of domestically oriented statutes,” ante, at 390—to cabin the
statute’s reach. This new “assumption” imposes a clear
statement rule on Congress: Absent a clear statement, a
statute refers to nothing outside the United States. The
Court’s denial that it has created a clear statement rule is
implausible. Ibid. After today’s ruling, the only way for
Congress to ensure that courts will construe a law to refer to
foreign facts or entities is to describe those facts or entities
specifically as foreign. If this is not a “special burden of
specificity,” ibid., I am not sure what is.
The Court’s innovation is baseless. The Court derives its
assumption from the entirely different, and well-recognized,
canon against extraterritorial application of federal statutes:
“It is a longstanding principle of American law that legisla-
tion of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.” EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244,
248 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the ma-
jority rightly concedes that the canon against extraterritori-
ality itself “does not apply directly to this case.” Ante, at
389. Though foreign as well as domestic convictions trig-
ger § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition, the statute criminalizes gun pos-
session in this country, not abroad. In prosecuting Small,
the Government is enforcing a domestic criminal statute to
punish domestic criminal conduct. Pasquantino v. United
States, ante, at 371–372 (federal wire fraud statute covers a
domestic scheme aimed at defrauding a foreign government
of tax revenue).
The extraterritoriality cases cited by the Court, ante, at
389, do not support its new assumption. They restrict fed-
eral statutes from applying outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. See Smith v. United States, 507
U. S. 197, 203–204 (1993) (Federal Tort Claims Act does not
apply to claims arising in Antarctica); Arabian American

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400 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
Oil Co., supra, at 249–251 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 does not regulate the employment practices of Amer-
ican firms employing American citizens abroad); Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285–286 (1949) (federal labor
statute does not apply to a contract between the United
States and a private contractor for construction work done
in a foreign country); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610,
630–634 (1818) (statute punishing piracy on the high seas
does not apply to robbery committed on the high seas by a
noncitizen on board a ship belonging exclusively to subjects
of a foreign state). These straightforward applications of
the extraterritoriality canon, restricting federal statutes
from reaching conduct beyond U. S. borders, lend no support
to the Court’s unprecedented rule restricting a federal stat-
ute from reaching conduct within U. S. borders.
We have, it is true, recognized that the presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes is
rooted in part in the “commonsense notion that Congress
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind. ”
Smith, supra, at 204, n. 5. But my reading of § 922(g)(1) is
entirely true to that notion: Gun possession in this country
is surely a “domestic concern.” We have also consistently
grounded the canon in the risk that extraterritorially appli-
cable U. S. laws could conflict with foreign laws, for example,
by subjecting individuals to conflicting obligations. Ara-
bian American Oil Co., supra, at 248. That risk is com-
pletely absent in applying § 922(g)(1) to Small’s conduct.
Quite the opposite, § 922(g)(1) takes foreign law as it finds it.
Aside from the extraterritoriality canon, which the Court
properly concedes does not apply, I know of no principle
of statutory construction justifying the result the Court
reaches. Its concession that the canon is inapposite should
therefore end this case.
Rather than stopping there, the Court introduces its new
“assumption about the reach of domestically oriented stat-

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401 Cite as: 544 U. S. 385 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
utes” sua sponte, without briefing or argument on the point,5
and without providing guidance on what constitutes a “do-
mestically oriented statut[e].” Ante, at 390. The majority
suggests that it means all statutes except those dealing with
subjects like “immigration or terrorism,” ante, at 391, appar-
ently reversing our previous rule that the extraterritoriality
canon “has special force” in statutes “that may involve for-
eign and military affairs,” Sale v. Haitian Centers Coun-
cil, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 188 (1993) (provision of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act does not apply extraterritorially);
cf. Palmer, supra (statute criminalizing piracy on the high
seas does not apply to robbery by noncitizen on ship belong-
ing to foreign subjects). The Court’s creation threatens to
wreak havoc with the established rules for applying the
canon against extraterritoriality.6
B
In support of its narrow reading of the statute, the major-
ity opines that the natural reading has inappropriate results.
It points to differences between foreign and domestic con-
victions, primarily attacking the reliability of foreign con-
victions as a proxy for identifying dangerous individuals.
Ante, at 389–390. Citing various foreign laws, the Court
observes that, if interpreted to include foreign convictions,
§ 922(g) would include convictions for business and speech
activities “that [United States] laws would permit,” ante, at
389; convictions “from a legal system that is inconsistent
with an American understanding of fairness,” ibid.; and con-
5 Neither party mentions the quasi-extraterritoriality principle that the
Court fashions. The briefs barely discuss the extraterritoriality canon
itself. The only reference to that canon is a footnote in the Government’s
brief pointing out that it is inapposite. Brief for United States 44, n. 31.
6 The Court attempts to justify applying its new canon with the claim
that “other indicia of intent are in approximate balance.” Ante, at 390.
This claim is false. Other indicia of intent are not in balance, so long as
text counts as an indicium of intent. As I have explained, Part II, supra,
the text of § 922(g)(1) encompasses foreign convictions.

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402 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
victions “for conduct that [United States] law punishes far
less severely,” ante, at 390. The Court therefore concludes
that foreign convictions cannot trigger § 922(g)(1)’s prohibi-
tion on firearm possession.
The Court’s claim that foreign convictions punishable by
imprisonment for more than a year “somewhat less reliably
identif[y] dangerous individuals” than domestic convictions,
ibid., is untenable. In compiling examples of foreign convic-
tions that might trigger § 922(g)(1), ante, at 389–390, the
Court constructs a parade of horribles. Citing laws of the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Cuba, and Sin-
gapore, it cherry-picks a few egregious examples of convic-
tions unlikely to correlate with dangerousness, inconsistent
with American intuitions of fairness, or punishable more se-
verely than in this country. Ibid. This ignores countless
other foreign convictions punishable by more than a year
that serve as excellent proxies for dangerousness and culpa-
bility.7 Surely a “reasonable human being” drafting this
language would have considered whether foreign convictions
are, on average and as a whole, accurate at gauging danger-
ousness and culpability, not whether the worst-of-the-worst
are. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Inter-
preting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 854 (1992). The
Court also ignores the facts of this very case: A week after
7 Brottsbalk (Swedish Criminal Code), SFS 1962:700, ch. 3, § 1 (murder);
Criminal Code of Canada, 2 R. S. C. 1985, ch. C–46, § 244(b), as amended
(discharging firearm at a person with intent to endanger life); § 102(2)
(making an automatic weapon); Laws of the State of Israel, Penal Law
§ 345(b)(2) (rape by threat of firearm or cutting weapon); Penal Code of
Egypt Art. 143 (giving weapons to a detained person in order to help him
escape); Federal Penal Code of Mexico Art. 139 (terrorism by explosives,
toxic substances, firearms, fire, flooding, or other violent means); Art. 163
(kidnaping); Firearms Offenses Act 1968 (United Kingdom), ch. 27, § 18(1)
(carrying firearm with intent to commit an indictable offense or to resist
arrest); 7 Laws of the Republic of Zambia Cap. 87, ch. 19, §§ 200–201 (1995)
(murder); ch. 24, § 248 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm); ch. 25,
§§ 251–262 (kidnaping, abduction, and buying or selling slaves).

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403 Cite as: 544 U. S. 385 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
completing his sentence for shipping two rifles, eight semiau-
tomatic pistols, and hundreds of rounds of ammunition into
Japan, Small bought a gun in this country. It was eminently
reasonable for Congress to use convictions punishable by im-
prisonment for more than a year—foreign no less than do-
mestic—as a proxy for dangerousness.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, it makes sense to bar
people convicted overseas from possessing guns in the
United States. The Court casually dismisses this point with
the observation that only “ ‘10 to a dozen’ ” prosecutions
under the statute have involved foreign convictions as predi-
cate convictions. Ante, at 394 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 32).
The rarity of such prosecutions, however, only refutes the
Court’s simultaneous claim, ante, at 389–390, that a parade
of horribles will result if foreign convictions count. More-
over, the Court does not claim that any of these few prosecu-
tions has been based on a foreign conviction inconsistent
with American law. As far as anyone is aware, the handful
of prosecutions thus far rested on foreign convictions per-
fectly consonant with American law, like Small’s conviction
for international gunrunning. The Court has no answer
for why including foreign convictions is unwise, let alone
irrational.
C
The majority worries that reading § 922(g)(1) to include
foreign convictions “creates anomalies” under other
firearms-control provisions. Ante, at 391–392. It is true,
as the majority notes, that the natural reading of § 922(g)(1)
affords domestic offenders more lenient treatment than for-
eign ones in some respects: A domestic antitrust or business
regulatory offender could possess a gun, while a similar for-
eign offender could not; the perpetrator of a state misde-
meanor punishable by two years or less in prison could pos-
sess a gun, while an analogous foreign offender could not.
Ibid. In other respects, domestic offenders would receive
harsher treatment than their foreign counterparts: One who

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404 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
committed a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in the
United States could not possess a gun, while a similar for-
eign offender could; and a domestic drug offender could re-
ceive a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for unlawful
gun possession, while a foreign drug offender could not.
Ibid.
These outcomes cause the Court undue concern. They
certainly present no occasion to employ, nor does the Court
invoke, the canon against absurdities. We should employ
that canon only “where the result of applying the plain lan-
guage would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i. e., where it is
quite impossible that Congress could have intended the re-
sult . . . and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be
obvious to most anyone.” Public Citizen v. Department of
Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 470–471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541
U. S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(“avoidance of unhappy consequences” is inadequate basis for
interpreting a text); cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122, 203 (1819) (before disregarding the plain meaning of a
constitutional provision, the case “must be one in which the
absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case,
would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesi-
tation, unite in rejecting the application”).
Here, the “anomalies” to which the Court points are not
absurd. They are, at most, odd; they may even be rational.
For example, it is not senseless to bar a Canadian antitrust
offender from possessing a gun in this country, while ex-
empting a domestic antitrust offender from the ban. Con-
gress might have decided to proceed incrementally and ex-
empt only antitrust offenses with which it was familiar,
namely, domestic ones. In any event, the majority abandons
the statute’s plain meaning based on results that are at most
incongruous and certainly not absurd. As with the extra-
territoriality canon, the Court applies a mutant version of a
recognized canon when the recognized canon is itself inappo-

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site. Whatever the utility of canons as guides to congres-
sional intent, they are useless when modified in ways that
Congress could never have imagined in enacting § 922(g)(1).
Even assuming that my reading of the statute generates
anomalies, the majority’s reading creates ones even more
dangerous. As explained above, the majority’s interpreta-
tion permits those convicted overseas of murder, rape, as-
sault, kidnaping, terrorism, and other dangerous crimes to
possess firearms freely in the United States. Supra, at 402–
403, and n. 7. Meanwhile, a person convicted domestically
of tampering with a vehicle identification number, 18 U. S. C.
§ 511(a)(1), is barred from possessing firearms. The majori-
ty’s concern with anomalies provides no principled basis for
choosing its interpretation of the statute over mine.
D
The Court hypothesizes “that Congress did not consider
whether the generic phrase ‘convicted in any court’ applies
to domestic as well as foreign convictions,” ante, at 392, and
takes that as license to restrict the clear breadth of the text.
Whether the Court’s empirical assumption is correct is any-
one’s guess. Regardless, we have properly rejected this
method of guesswork-as-interpretation. In Beecham v.
United States, 511 U. S. 368 (1994), we interpreted other pro-
visions of the federal firearms laws to mean that a person
convicted of a federal crime is not relieved of the firearms
disability unless his civil rights have been restored under
federal (as opposed to state) law. We acknowledged the pos-
sibility “that the phrases on which our reading of the statute
turns . . . were accidents of statutory drafting,” id., at 374;
and we observed that some legislators might have read
the phrases differently from the Court’s reading, “or, more
likely, . . . never considered the matter at all,” ibid. We
nonetheless adhered to the unambiguous meaning of the
statute. Ibid.; cf. National Organization for Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 262 (1994) (“The fact that [the

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406 SMALL v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., dissenting
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] has
been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Con-
gress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
Here, as in Beecham, “our task is not the hopeless one of
ascertaining what the legislators who passed the law would
have decided had they reconvened to consider [this] particu-
lar cas[e],” 511 U. S., at 374, but the eminently more manage-
able one of following the ordinary meaning of the text they
enacted. That meaning includes foreign convictions.
The Court’s reliance on the absence of any discussion of
foreign convictions in the legislative history is equally uncon-
vincing. Ante, at 393. Reliance on explicit statements in
the history, if they existed, would be problematic enough.
Reliance on silence in the history is a new and even more
dangerous phenomenon. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the Court’s novel “Canon of Canine Silence”).
I do not even agree, moreover, that the legislative his-
tory is silent. As the Court describes, the Senate bill that
formed the basis for this legislation was amended in Con-
ference, to change the predicate offenses from “ ‘Federal’
crimes” punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment
and “crimes ‘determined by the laws of a State to be a fel-
ony’ ” to conviction “ ‘in any court of, a crime punishable by
a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.’ ” Ante, at 393.
The Court seeks to explain this change by saying that “the
enacted version is simpler and . . . avoids potential difficulties
arising out of the fact that States may define the term
‘felony’ differently.” Ibid. But that does not explain why
all limiting reference to “Federal” and “State” was elim-
inated. The revised provision would have been just as sim-
ple, and would just as well have avoided the potential diffi-
culties, if it read “convicted in any Federal or State court of
a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year.” Surely that would have been the natural change if

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expansion beyond federal and state convictions were not in-
tended. The elimination of the limiting references suggests
that not only federal and state convictions were meant to
be covered.
Some, of course, do not believe that any statement or text
that has not been approved by both Houses of Congress and
the President (if he signed the bill) is an appropriate source
of statutory interpretation. But for those who do, this
committee change ought to be strong confirmation of the fact
that “any” means not “any Federal or State,” but simply
“any.”
IV
The Court never convincingly explains its departure from
the natural meaning of § 922(g)(1). Instead, it institutes the
troubling rule that “any” does not really mean “any,” but
may mean “some subset of ‘any,’ ” even if nothing in the con-
text so indicates; it distorts the established canons against
extraterritoriality and absurdity; it faults without reason
Congress’ use of foreign convictions to gauge dangerousness
and culpability; and it employs discredited methods of deter-
mining congressional intent. I respectfully dissent.