ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP v. UNITED STATES

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Syllabus
ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 04–368. Argued April 27, 2005—Decided May 31, 2005
As Enron Corporation’s financial difficulties became public, petitioner, En-
ron’s auditor, instructed its employees to destroy documents pursuant to
its document retention policy. Petitioner was indicted under 18 U. S. C.
§§ 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), which make it a crime to “knowingly . . . cor-
ruptly persuad[e] another person . . . with intent to . . . cause” that
person to “withhold” documents from, or “alter” documents for use in,
an “official proceeding.” The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court’s jury instruc-
tions properly conveyed the meaning of “corruptly persuades” and
“official proceeding” in § 1512(b); that the jury need not find any con-
sciousness of wrongdoing in order to convict; and that there was no
reversible error.
Held: The jury instructions failed to convey properly the elements of a
“corrup[t] persua[sion]” conviction under § 1512(b). Pp. 703–708.
(a) This Court’s traditional restraint in assessing federal criminal
statutes’ reach, see, e. g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600, is
particularly appropriate here, where the act underlying the conviction—
“persua[sion]”—is by itself innocuous. Even “persuad[ing]” a person
“with intent to . . . cause” that person to “withhold” testimony or docu-
ments from the Government is not inherently malign. Under ordinary
circumstances, it is not wrongful for a manager to instruct his employ-
ees to comply with a valid document retention policy, even though the
policy, in part, is created to keep certain information from others, includ-
ing the Government. Thus, § 1512(b)’s “knowingly . . . corruptly per-
suades” phrase is key to what may or may not lawfully be done in the
situation presented here. The Government suggests that “knowingly”
does not modify “corruptly persuades,” but that is not how the statute
most naturally reads. “[K]nowledge” and “knowingly” are normally as-
sociated with awareness, understanding, or consciousness, and “corrupt”
and “corruptly” with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil. Joining
these meanings together makes sense both linguistically and in the stat-
utory scheme. Only persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to
“knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[e].” And limiting criminality to per-
suaders conscious of their wrongdoing sensibly allows § 1512(b) to reach

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Syllabus
only those with the level of culpability usually required to impose crimi-
nal liability. See Aguilar, supra, at 602. Pp. 703–706.
(b) The jury instructions failed to convey the requisite consciousness
of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is striking how little culpability the instruc-
tions required. For example, the jury was told that, even if petitioner
honestly and sincerely believed its conduct was lawful, the jury could
convict. The instructions also diluted the meaning of “corruptly” such
that it covered innocent conduct. The District Court based its instruc-
tion on the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction for § 1503, which de-
fined “corruptly” as “knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent
to subvert or undermine the integrity” of a proceeding. However, the
court agreed with the Government’s insistence on excluding “dishon-
estly” and adding the term “impede” to the phrase “subvert or under-
mine,” so the jury was told to convict if it found petitioner intended to
“subvert, undermine, or impede” governmental factfinding by suggest-
ing to its employees that they enforce the document retention policy.
These changes were significant. “[D]ishonest[y]” was no longer neces-
sary to a finding of guilt, and it was enough for petitioner to have sim-
ply “impede[d]” the Government’s factfinding ability. “Impede” has
broader connotations than “subvert” or even “undermine,” and many of
these connotations do not incorporate any “corrupt[ness]” at all. Under
the dictionary definition of “impede,” anyone who innocently persuades
another to withhold information from the Government “get[s] in the way
of the progress of ” the Government. With regard to such innocent con-
duct, the “corruptly” instructions did no limiting work whatsoever.
The instructions also led the jury to believe that it did not have to find
any nexus between the “persua[sion]” to destroy documents and any
particular proceeding. In resisting any nexus element, the Government
relies on § 1512(e)(1), which states that an official proceeding “need not
be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” It is,
however, quite another thing to say a proceeding need not even be fore-
seen. A “knowingly . . . corrup[t] persaude[r]” cannot be someone who
persuades others to shred documents under a document retention policy
when he does not have in contemplation any particular official proceed-
ing in which those documents might be material. Cf. Aguilar, supra,
at 599–600. Pp. 706–708.
374 F. 3d 281, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Alexandra A. E. Shapiro,
J. Scott Ballenger, and Charles A. Rothfeld.

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Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief were Acting So-
licitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Keeney, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Sangita K. Rao, Andrew
Weissmann, and Matthew W. Friedrich.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
As Enron Corporation’s financial difficulties became public
in 2001, petitioner Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron’s auditor,
instructed its employees to destroy documents pursuant to
its document retention policy. A jury found that this action
made petitioner guilty of violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 1512(b)
(2)(A) and (B). These sections make it a crime to “know-
ingly us[e] intimidation or physical force, threate[n], or cor-
ruptly persuad[e] another person . . . with intent to . . . cause”
that person to “withhold” documents from, or “alter” docu-
ments for use in, an “official proceeding.” 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. We hold that the
jury instructions failed to convey properly the elements of a
“corrup[t] persua[sion]” conviction under § 1512(b), and there-
fore reverse.
Enron Corporation, during the 1990’s, switched its busi-
ness from operation of natural gas pipelines to an energy
conglomerate, a move that was accompanied by aggressive
accounting practices and rapid growth. Petitioner audited
Enron’s publicly filed financial statements and provided in-
ternal audit and consulting services to it. Petitioner’s “en-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants by Kelly M. Hnatt and Richard
I. Miller; for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers by Lewis J.
Liman; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Carter G. Phil-
lips, Virginia A. Seitz, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.
Robert N. Weiner and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae.
1 We refer to the 2000 version of the statute, which has since been
amended by Congress.

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gagement team” for Enron was headed by David Duncan.
Beginning in 2000, Enron’s financial performance began to
suffer, and, as 2001 wore on, worsened.2 On August 14,
2001, Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), unexpectedly resigned. Within days, Sherron Wat-
kins, a senior accountant at Enron, warned Kenneth Lay,
Enron’s newly reappointed CEO, that Enron could “implode
in a wave of accounting scandals.” Brief for United States
2. She likewise informed Duncan and Michael Odom, one of
petitioner’s partners who had supervisory responsibility
over Duncan, of the looming problems.
On August 28, an article in the Wall Street Journal sug-
gested improprieties at Enron, and the SEC opened an in-
formal investigation. By early September, petitioner had
formed an Enron “crisis-response” team, which included
Nancy Temple, an in-house counsel.3 On October 8, peti-
tioner retained outside counsel to represent it in any litiga-
tion that might arise from the Enron matter. The next day,
Temple discussed Enron with other in-house counsel. Her
notes from that meeting reflect that “some SEC investiga-
tion” is “highly probable.” Id., at 3.
On October 10, Odom spoke at a general training meeting
attended by 89 employees, including 10 from the Enron en-
2 During this time, petitioner faced problems of its own. In June 2001,
petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) related to its audit work of Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. As part of the settlement, petitioner paid a massive fine. It
also was censured and enjoined from committing further violations of the
securities laws. In July 2001, the SEC filed an amended complaint alleg-
ing improprieties by Sunbeam Corporation, and petitioner’s lead partner
on the Sunbeam audit was named.
3 A key accounting problem involved Enron’s use of “Raptors,” which
were special purpose entities used to engage in “off-balance-sheet” activi-
ties. Petitioner’s engagement team had allowed Enron to “aggregate” the
Raptors for accounting purposes so that they reflected a positive return.
This was, in the words of petitioner’s experts, a “black-and-white” vio-
lation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Brief for United
States 2.

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gagement team. Odom urged everyone to comply with the
firm’s document retention policy.4 He added: “ ‘[I]f it’s de-
stroyed in the course of [the] normal policy and litigation is
filed the next day, that’s great. . . . [W]e’ve followed our own
policy, and whatever there was that might have been of in-
terest to somebody is gone and irretrievable.’ ” 374 F. 3d
281, 286 (CA5 2004). On October 12, Temple entered the
Enron matter into her computer, designating the “Type of
Potential Claim” as “Professional Practice—Government/
Regulatory Inv[estigation].” App. JA–127. Temple also
e-mailed Odom, suggesting that he “ ‘remin[d] the engage-
ment team of our documentation and retention policy.’ ”
Brief for United States 6.
On October 16, Enron announced its third quarter results.
That release disclosed a $1.01 billion charge to earnings.5
The following day, the SEC notified Enron by letter that it
had opened an investigation in August and requested certain
information and documents. On October 19, Enron for-
warded a copy of that letter to petitioner.
4 The firm’s policy called for a single central engagement file, which
“should contain only that information which is relevant to supporting our
work.” App. JA–45. The policy stated that, “[i]n cases of threatened
litigation, . . . no related information will be destroyed.” Id., at JA–44.
It also separately provided that, if petitioner is “advised of litigation or
subpoenas regarding a particular engagement, the related information
should not be destroyed. See Policy Statement No. 780—Notification of
Litigation.” Id., at JA–65 (emphasis deleted). Policy Statement No. 780
set forth “notification” procedures for whenever “professional practice liti-
gation against [petitioner] or any of its personnel has been commenced,
has been threatened or is judged likely to occur, or when governmental or
professional investigations that may involve [petitioner] or any of its per-
sonnel have been commenced or are judged likely.” Id., at JA–29 to
JA–30.
5 The release characterized the charge to earnings as “non-recurring.”
Brief for United States 6, n. 4. Petitioner had expressed doubts about
this characterization to Enron, but Enron refused to alter the release.
Temple wrote an e-mail to Duncan that “suggested deleting some language
that might suggest we have concluded the release is misleading.” App.
JA–95.

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On the same day, Temple also sent an e-mail to a member
of petitioner’s internal team of accounting experts and
attached a copy of the document policy. On October 20, the
Enron crisis-response team held a conference call, during
which Temple instructed everyone to “[m]ake sure to follow
the [document] policy.” Brief for United States 7 (brackets
in original). On October 23, Enron CEO Lay declined to
answer questions during a call with analysts because of “po-
tential lawsuits, as well as the SEC inquiry.” Ibid. After
the call, Duncan met with other Andersen partners on the
Enron engagement team and told them that they should en-
sure team members were complying with the document
policy. Another meeting for all team members followed,
during which Duncan distributed the policy and told every-
one to comply. These, and other smaller meetings, were fol-
lowed by substantial destruction of paper and electronic
documents.
On October 26, one of petitioner’s senior partners circu-
lated a New York Times article discussing the SEC’s re-
sponse to Enron. His e-mail commented that “the problems
are just beginning and we will be in the cross hairs. The
marketplace is going to keep the pressure on this and is
going to force the SEC to be tough.” Id., at 8. On October
30, the SEC opened a formal investigation and sent Enron a
letter that requested accounting documents.
Throughout this time period, the document destruction
continued, despite reservations by some of petitioner’s man-
agers.6 On November 8, Enron announced that it would
6 For example, on October 26, John Riley, another partner with peti-
tioner, saw Duncan shredding documents and told him “this wouldn’t be
the best time in the world for you guys to be shredding a bunch of stuff.”
Brief for United States 9. On October 31, David Stulb, a forensics investi-
gator for petitioner, met with Duncan. During the meeting, Duncan
picked up a document with the words “smoking gun” written on it and
began to destroy it, adding “we don’t need this.” Ibid. Stulb cautioned
Duncan on the need to maintain documents and later informed Temple
that Duncan needed advice on the document retention policy.

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issue a comprehensive restatement of its earnings and
assets. Also on November 8, the SEC served Enron and
petitioner with subpoenas for records. On November 9,
Duncan’s secretary sent an e-mail that stated: “Per Dave—
No more shredding. . . . We have been officially served for
our documents.” Id., at 10. Enron filed for bankruptcy less
than a month later. Duncan was fired and later pleaded
guilty to witness tampering.
In March 2002, petitioner was indicted in the Southern
District of Texas on one count of violating §§ 1512(b)(2)(A)
and (B). The indictment alleged that, between October 10
and November 9, 2001, petitioner “did knowingly, inten-
tionally and corruptly persuade . . . other persons, to wit:
[petitioner’s] employees, with intent to cause” them to with-
hold documents from, and alter documents for use in, “official
proceedings, namely: regulatory and criminal proceedings
and investigations.” App. JA–139. A jury trial followed.
When the case went to the jury, that body deliberated for
seven days and then declared that it was deadlocked. The
District Court delivered an “Allen charge,” Allen v. United
States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896), and, after three more days of
deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Dis-
trict Court denied petitioner’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 374
F. 3d, at 284. It held that the jury instructions properly
conveyed the meaning of “corruptly persuades” and “official
proceeding”; that the jury need not find any consciousness
of wrongdoing; and that there was no reversible error. Be-
cause of a split of authority regarding the meaning of
§ 1512(b), we granted certiorari.7 543 U. S. 1042 (2005).
7 Compare, e. g., United States v. Shotts, 145 F. 3d 1289, 1301 (CA11
1998), with United States v. Farrell, 126 F. 3d 484, 489–490 (CA3 1997).

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Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides
criminal sanctions for those who obstruct justice. Sections
1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), part of the witness tampering provi-
sions, provide in relevant part:
“Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force,
threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or at-
tempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct to-
ward another person, with intent to . . . cause or induce
any person to . . . withhold testimony, or withhold a rec-
ord, document, or other object, from an official proceed-
ing [or] alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for
use in an official proceeding . . . shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”
In this case, our attention is focused on what it means to
“knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[e]” another person “with
intent to . . . cause” that person to “withhold” docu-
ments from, or “alter” documents for use in, an “official
proceeding.”
“We have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the
reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to
the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473
U. S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that ‘a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed,’ McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S.
25, 27 (1931).” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600
(1995).
Such restraint is particularly appropriate here, where the
act underlying the conviction—“persua[sion]”—is by itself
innocuous. Indeed, “persuad[ing]” a person “with intent
to . . . cause” that person to “withhold” testimony or docu-
ments from a Government proceeding or Government official

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is not inherently malign.8 Consider, for instance, a mother
who suggests to her son that he invoke his right against com-
pelled self-incrimination, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, or a wife
who persuades her husband not to disclose marital confi-
dences, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U. S. 40 (1980).
Nor is it necessarily corrupt for an attorney to “per-
suad[e]” a client “with intent to . . . cause” that client to
“withhold” documents from the Government. In Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383 (1981), for example, we
held that Upjohn was justified in withholding documents that
were covered by the attorney-client privilege from the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS). See id., at 395. No one would
suggest that an attorney who “persuade[d]” Upjohn to take
that step acted wrongfully, even though he surely intended
that his client keep those documents out of the IRS’ hands.
“Document retention policies,” which are created in part
to keep certain information from getting into the hands of
others, including the Government, are common in business.
See generally Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document
Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Stat-
utes, 8 Ford. J. Corp. & Fin. L. 721 (2003). It is, of course,
not wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to com-
ply with a valid document retention policy under ordinary
circumstances.
Acknowledging this point, the parties have largely focused
their attention on the word “corruptly” as the key to what
may or may not lawfully be done in the situation presented
here. Section 1512(b) punishes not just “corruptly per-
suad[ing]” another, but “knowingly . . . corruptly per-
suad[ing]” another. (Emphasis added.) The Government
suggests that “knowingly” does not modify “corruptly per-
8 Section 1512(b)(2) addresses testimony, as well as documents. Section
1512(b)(1) also addresses testimony. Section 1512(b)(3) addresses “per-
suade[rs]” who intend to prevent “the communication to a law enforcement
officer or judge of the United States of information” relating to a federal
crime.

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suades,” but that is not how the statute most naturally reads.
It provides the mens rea—“knowingly”—and then a list of
acts—“uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or cor-
ruptly persuades.” We have recognized with regard to sim-
ilar statutory language that the mens rea at least applies
to the acts that immediately follow, if not to other ele-
ments down the statutory chain. See United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68 (1994) (recognizing
that the “most natural grammatical reading” of 18 U. S. C.
§§ 2252(a)(1) and (2) “suggests that the term ‘knowingly’
modifies only the surrounding verbs: transports, ships, re-
ceives, distributes, or reproduces”); see also Liparota v.
United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985). The Government sug-
gests that it is “questionable whether Congress would
employ such an inelegant formulation as ‘knowingly . . .
corruptly persuades.’ ” Brief for United States 35, n. 18.
Long experience has not taught us to share the Govern-
ment’s doubts on this score, and we must simply interpret
the statute as written.
The parties have not pointed us to another interpretation
of “knowingly . . . corruptly” to guide us here.9 In any
event, the natural meaning of these terms provides a clear
answer. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144–145
(1995). “[K]nowledge” and “knowingly” are normally as-
sociated with awareness, understanding, or consciousness.
See Black’s Law Dictionary 888 (8th ed. 2004) (hereinafter
Black’s); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
1252–1253 (1993) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d); American Heri-
tage Dictionary of the English Language 725 (1981) (herein-
after Am. Hert.). “Corrupt” and “corruptly” are normally
associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil. See
Black’s 371; Webster’s 3d 512; Am. Hert. 299–300. Joining
these meanings together here makes sense both linguisti-
9 The parties have pointed us to two other obstruction provisions, 18
U. S. C. §§ 1503 and 1505, which contain the word “corruptly.” But these
provisions lack the modifier “knowingly,” making any analogy inexact.

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cally and in the statutory scheme. Only persons conscious
of wrongdoing can be said to “knowingly . . . corruptly per-
suad[e].” And limiting criminality to persuaders conscious
of their wrongdoing sensibly allows § 1512(b) to reach only
those with the level of “culpability . . . we usually require
in order to impose criminal liability.” United States v.
Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 602; see also Liparota v. United States,
supra, at 426.
The outer limits of this element need not be explored here
because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey
the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is
striking how little culpability the instructions required.
For example, the jury was told that, “even if [petitioner] hon-
estly and sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful, you
may find [petitioner] guilty.” App. JA–213. The instruc-
tions also diluted the meaning of “corruptly” so that it cov-
ered innocent conduct. Id., at JA–212.
The parties vigorously disputed how the jury would be
instructed on “corruptly.” The District Court based its in-
struction on the definition of that term found in the Fifth
Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction for § 1503. This pattern in-
struction defined “corruptly” as “ ‘knowingly and dishonestly,
with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the integ-
rity’ ” of a proceeding. Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 3 (emphasis
deleted). The Government, however, insisted on excluding
“dishonestly” and adding the term “impede” to the phrase
“subvert or undermine.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The District Court agreed over petitioner’s objec-
tions, and the jury was told to convict if it found petitioner
intended to “subvert, undermine, or impede” governmental
factfinding by suggesting to its employees that they enforce
the document retention policy. App. JA–212.
These changes were significant. No longer was any type
of “dishonest[y]” necessary to a finding of guilt, and it was
enough for petitioner to have simply “impede[d]” the Gov-
ernment’s factfinding ability. As the Government conceded

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at oral argument, “ ‘[i]mpede’ ” has broader connotations
than “ ‘subvert’ ” or even “ ‘[u]ndermine,’ ” see Tr. of Oral
Arg. 38, and many of these connotations do not incorporate
any “corrupt[ness]” at all. The dictionary defines “impede”
as “to interfere with or get in the way of the progress of ”
or “hold up” or “detract from.” Webster’s 3d 1132. By
definition, anyone who innocently persuades another to with-
hold information from the Government “get[s] in the way of
the progress of ” the Government. With regard to such in-
nocent conduct, the “corruptly” instructions did no limiting
work whatsoever.
The instructions also were infirm for another reason.
They led the jury to believe that it did not have to find any
nexus between the “persua[sion]” to destroy documents and
any particular proceeding.10 In resisting any type of nexus
element, the Government relies heavily on § 1512(e)(1), which
states that an official proceeding “need not be pending or
about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” It is, how-
ever, one thing to say that a proceeding “need not be pending
or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,” and
10 We disagree with the Government’s suggestion that petitioner’s
“nexus” argument is not preserved or that it is only subject to plain-error
review for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
30(d). Petitioner plainly argued for, and objected to the instructions’ lack
of, a nexus requirement. See, e. g., Record 425 (arguing for a “nexus” and
explaining that “it is insufficient for the government to show that the
defendant intended to affect some hypothetical future federal proceed-
ing”); id., at 931–932, 938; Tr. 4339–4345 (May 25, 2002). In so doing, it
reasonably relied on language in United States v. Shively, 927 F. 2d 804,
812–813 (CA5 1991). Although the instruction petitioner proposed, based
on Shively, does not mirror the nexus requirement it now proposes, its
actions were sufficient to satisfy Rule 30(d). This argument also was pre-
served in the Court of Appeals, which recognized that petitioner was chal-
lenging “the concreteness of the defendant’s expectation[s] of a proceed-
ing.” 374 F. 3d 281, 298 (CA5 2004); see United States v. Williams, 504
U. S. 36, 41–42 (1992). However, the Court of Appeals did not address,
and petitioner did not preserve, its argument that informal inquiries are
not covered by the statute. See ibid.

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quite another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.
A “knowingly . . . corrup[t] persaude[r]” cannot be someone
who persuades others to shred documents under a document
retention policy when he does not have in contemplation
any particular official proceeding in which those documents
might be material.
We faced a similar situation in Aguilar, supra. Respond-
ent Aguilar lied to a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent
in the course of an investigation and was convicted of “ ‘cor-
ruptly endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, and impede [a] . . .
grand jury investigation’ ” under § 1503. 515 U. S., at 599.
All the Government had shown was that Aguilar had uttered
false statements to an investigating agent “who might or
might not testify before a grand jury.” Id., at 600. We held
that § 1503 required something more—specifically, a “nexus”
between the obstructive act and the proceeding. Id., at
599–600. “[I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his ac-
tions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding,” we ex-
plained, “he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.” Id.,
at 599.
For these reasons, the jury instructions here were flawed
in important respects. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.