MUEHLER et al. v. MENA

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Syllabus
MUEHLER et al. v. MENA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 03–1423. Argued December 8, 2004—Decided March 22, 2005
Respondent Mena and others were detained in handcuffs during a search
of the premises they occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a po-
lice detachment executing a search warrant of these premises for, inter
alia, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued
the officers under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and the District Court found in her
favor. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the use of handcuffs to
detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that
the officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status during
the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation.
Held:
1. Mena’s detention in handcuffs for the length of the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. That detention is consistent with
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 705, in which the Court held that
officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority
“to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is con-
ducted.” The Court there noted that minimizing the risk of harm to
officers is a substantial justification for detaining an occupant during a
search, id., at 702–703, and ruled that an officer’s authority to detain
incident to a search is categorical and does not depend on the “quantum
of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed
by the seizure,” id., at 705, n. 19. Because a warrant existed to search
the premises and Mena was an occupant of the premises at the time of
the search, her detention for the duration of the search was reasonable
under Summers. Inherent in Summers’ authorization to detain is the
authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396. The use of force in the form
of handcuffs to detain Mena was reasonable because the governmental
interest in minimizing the risk of harm to both officers and occupants,
at its maximum when a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a
wanted gang member resides on the premises, outweighs the marginal
intrusion. See id., at 396–397. Moreover, the need to detain multiple
occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 414. Although the duration of a
detention can affect the balance of interests, the 2- to 3-hour detention

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94 MUEHLER v. MENA
Syllabus
in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the government’s continuing
safety interests. Pp. 98–100.
2. The officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status dur-
ing her detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights. The
Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary appears premised on the assump-
tion that the officers were required to have independent reasonable sus-
picion in order to so question Mena. However, this Court has “held
repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.”
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434. Because Mena’s initial detention
was lawful and the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the detention was
prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, no additional Fourth
Amendment justification for inquiring about Mena’s immigration status
was required. Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407–408. Pp. 100–
101.
3. Because the Ninth Circuit did not address Mena’s alternative argu-
ment that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed
the tasks incident to the search, this Court declines to address it. See,
e. g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, 148, n. 10. P. 102.
332 F. 3d 1255, vacated and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 102. Stevens, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 104.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Joseph R. Guerra and David H.
Hirsch.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben.
Paul L. Hoffman argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Benjamin Schonbrun, Michael S.
Morrison, and Erwin Chemerinsky.*
*Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley filed a brief for the National
League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Mark D. Rosenbaum, Ahilan T. Arulanan-

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Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a
search of the premises that she and several others occupied.
Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment exe-
cuting a search warrant of these premises. She sued the
officers under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and the
District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to
detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment and that the officers’ questioning of Mena about her
immigration status during the detention constituted an in-
dependent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena v. Simi
Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). We hold that Mena’s
detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was con-
sistent with our opinion in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S.
692 (1981), and that the officers’ questioning during that
detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
* * *
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a
gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill
had reason to believe at least one member of a gang—the
West Side Locos—lived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also
suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous,
since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting.
As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363
Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house
and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and
tham, Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, and Lee Gelernt; and for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Henk Brands and
Pamela Harris.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Latino Officers Associ-
ation et al. by Baher Azmy, Lawrence S. Lustberg, and Jonathan L. Ha-
fetz; and for the Police Officers Research Association of California Legal
Defense Fund et al. by Michael J. Hansen.

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evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree
of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at
least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Spe-
cial Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure
the residence and grounds before the search.
At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the
SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena
was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in hel-
mets and black vests adorned with badges and the word
“POLICE,” entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs
at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other
individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then
took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage,
which contained several beds and some other bedroom fur-
niture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers
guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move
around the garage but remained in handcuffs.
Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed pri-
marily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would
be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied
the officers executing the warrant. During their detention
in the garage, an officer asked for each detainee’s name, date
of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS
officer later asked the detainees for their immigration docu-
mentation. Mena’s status as a permanent resident was con-
firmed by her papers.
The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun
with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition,
several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional
gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the of-
ficers left the area, Mena was released.
In her § 1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she
was detained “for an unreasonable time and in an unreason-
able manner” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. App.

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Opinion of the Court
19. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execu-
tion were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with
the “knock and announce” rule, and that the officers had
needlessly destroyed property during the search. The offi-
cers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were
entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied
their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial,
except for Mena’s claim that the warrant was overbroad; on
this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity. Mena v. Simi Valley, 226
F. 3d 1031 (CA9 2000). After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a
special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill
violated Mena’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force
greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer pe-
riod than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded
Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive dam-
ages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two
grounds. 332 F. 3d 1255 (CA9 2003). Reviewing the denial
of qualified immunity de novo, id., at 1261, n. 2, it first held
that the officers’ detention of Mena violated the Fourth
Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to con-
fine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs
during the search, id., at 1263–1264. In the Court of Ap-
peals’ view, the officers should have released Mena as soon
as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. Id.,
at 1263. The court additionally held that the questioning of
Mena about her immigration status constituted an independ-
ent Fourth Amendment violation. Id., at 1264–1266. The
Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were
clearly established at the time of Mena’s questioning, and
thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.
Id., at 1266–1267. We granted certiorari, 542 U. S. 903
(2004), and now vacate and remand.

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* * *
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), we held
that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have
the authority “to detain the occupants of the premises while
a proper search is conducted.” Id., at 705. Such detentions
are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the
additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because
the justifications for detention are substantial. Id., at 701–
705. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is
“surely less intrusive than the search itself,” and the pres-
ence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has
determined that probable cause exists to search the home.
Id., at 701. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited
three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide sub-
stantial justification for detaining an occupant: “preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found”;
“minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; and facilitating
“the orderly completion of the search,” as detainees’ “self-
interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked con-
tainers to avoid the use of force.” Id., at 702–703.
Mena’s detention was, under Summers, plainly permissi-
ble.1 An officer’s authority to detain incident to a search
is categorical; it does not depend on the “quantum of proof
justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be im-
posed by the seizure.” Id., at 705, n. 19. Thus, Mena’s de-
tention for the duration of the search was reasonable under
Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia
Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time
of the search.
Inherent in Summers’ authorization to detain an occupant
of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable
1 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred we
draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury verdict, but as
we made clear in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697–699 (1996),
we do not defer to the jury’s legal conclusion that those facts violate the
Constitution.

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force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or inves-
tigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it”).
Indeed, Summers itself stressed that the risk of harm to
officers and occupants is minimized “if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation. ” 452
U. S., at 703.
The officers’ use of force in the form of handcuffs to effec-
tuate Mena’s detention in the garage, as well as the detention
of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the
governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion.
See Graham, supra, at 396–397. The imposition of correctly
applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully
detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a
separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted
garage.2 The detention was thus more intrusive than that
which we upheld in Summers. See 452 U. S., at 701–702
(concluding that the additional intrusion in the form of a de-
tention was less than that of the warrant-sanctioned search);
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413–414 (1997) (conclud-
2 In finding the officers should have released Mena from the handcuffs,
the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon the fact that the warrant did
not include Mena as a suspect. See Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255,
1263, n. 5 (CA9 2003). The warrant was concerned not with individuals
but with locations and property. In particular, the warrant in this case
authorized the search of 1363 Patricia Avenue and its surrounding grounds
for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of street gang mem-
bership. In this respect, the warrant here resembles that at issue in
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), which allowed the search of a
residence for drugs without mentioning any individual, including the
owner of the home whom police ultimately arrested. See People v.
Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 440–443, 286 N. W. 2d 226, 226–227 (1979), rev’d,
Michigan v. Summers, supra. Summers makes clear that when a neutral
magistrate has determined police have probable cause to believe contra-
band exists, “[t]he connection of an occupant to [a] home” alone “justifies
a detention of that occupant.” 452 U. S., at 703–704.

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ing that the additional intrusion from ordering passengers
out of a car, which was already stopped, was minimal).
But this was no ordinary search. The governmental in-
terests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their
maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for
weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises.
In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs
minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants.
Cf. Summers, supra, at 702–703 (recognizing the execution
of a warrant to search for drugs “may give rise to sudden
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence”).
Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search war-
rant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of hand-
cuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of
handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson,
supra, at 414 (noting that “danger to an officer from a traffic
stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in
addition to the driver in the stopped car”).
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain
her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the
duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unrea-
sonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect
the balance of interests under Graham. However, the 2- to
3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh
the government’s continuing safety interests. As we have
noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by
two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous
weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in hand-
cuffs during the search was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers vio-
lated Mena’s Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her
about her immigration status during the detention. 332
F. 3d, at 1264–1266. This holding, it appears, was premised
on the assumption that the officers were required to have
independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena
concerning her immigration status because the questioning

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constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the
premise is faulty. We have “held repeatedly that mere po-
lice questioning does not constitute a seizure.” Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991); see also INS v. Delgado,
466 U. S. 210, 212 (1984). “[E]ven when officers have no
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may gener-
ally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the
individual’s identification; and request consent to search his
or her luggage.” Bostick, supra, at 434–435 (citations omit-
ted). As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the deten-
tion was prolonged by the questioning, there was no addi-
tional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask
Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration
status.
Our recent opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405
(2005), is instructive. There, we held that a dog sniff per-
formed during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. We noted that a lawful seizure “can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re-
quired to complete that mission,” but accepted the state
court’s determination that the duration of the stop was not
extended by the dog sniff. Id., at 407. Because we held
that a dog sniff was not a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment, we rejected the notion that “the shift in pur-
pose” “from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation”
was unlawful because it “was not supported by any reason-
able suspicion.” Id., at 408. Likewise here, the initial
Summers detention was lawful; the Court of Appeals did
not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was
detained. Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justifica-
tion for inquiring about Mena’s immigration status was
required.3
3 The Court of Appeals’ reliance on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873 (1975), is misplaced. Brignoni-Ponce held that stops by roving
patrols near the border “may be justified on facts that do not amount to

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Kennedy, J., concurring
In summary, the officers’ detention of Mena in handcuffs
during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable
and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally,
the officers’ questioning of Mena did not constitute an inde-
pendent Fourth Amendment violation. Mena has advanced
in this Court, as she did before the Court of Appeals, an
alternative argument for affirming the judgment below.
She asserts that her detention extended beyond the time the
police completed the tasks incident to the search. Because
the Court of Appeals did not address this contention, we too
decline to address it. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537
U. S. 129, 148, n. 10 (2003); National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 469–470 (1999).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, concurring.
I concur in the judgment and in the opinion of the Court.
It does seem important to add this brief statement to help
ensure that police handcuffing during searches becomes nei-
ther routine nor unduly prolonged.
The safety of the officers and the efficacy of the search are
matters of first concern, but so too is it a matter of first
concern that excessive force is not used on the persons
detained, especially when these persons, though lawfully
detained under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981),
are not themselves suspected of any involvement in criminal
the probable cause require[ment] for an arrest.” Id., at 880. We consid-
ered only whether the patrols had the “authority to stop automobiles in
areas near the Mexican border,” id., at 874 (emphasis added), and ex-
pressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of questioning when an indi-
vidual was already seized. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U. S. 543, 556–562 (1976). We certainly did not, as the Court of Appeals
suggested, create a “requirement of particularized reasonable suspicion
for purposes of inquiry into citizenship status.” 332 F. 3d, at 1267.

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activity. The use of handcuffs is the use of force, and such
force must be objectively reasonable under the circum-
stances, Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989).
The reasonableness calculation under Graham is in part a
function of the expected and actual duration of the search.
If the search extends to the point when the handcuffs can
cause real pain or serious discomfort, provision must be
made to alter the conditions of detention at least long enough
to attend to the needs of the detainee. This is so even if
there is no question that the initial handcuffing was objec-
tively reasonable. The restraint should also be removed if,
at any point during the search, it would be readily apparent
to any objectively reasonable officer that removing the hand-
cuffs would not compromise the officers’ safety or risk inter-
ference or substantial delay in the execution of the search.
The time spent in the search here, some two to three hours,
certainly approaches, and may well exceed, the time beyond
which a detainee’s Fourth Amendment interests require re-
visiting the necessity of handcuffing in order to ensure the
restraint, even if permissible as an initial matter, has not
become excessive.
That said, under these circumstances I do not think hand-
cuffing the detainees for the duration of the search was ob-
jectively unreasonable. As I understand the record, during
much of this search 2 armed officers were available to watch
over the 4 unarmed detainees, while the other 16 officers on
the scene conducted an extensive search of a suspected gang
safe house. Even if we accept as true—as we must—the
factual assertions that these detainees posed no readily ap-
parent danger and that keeping them handcuffed deviated
from standard police procedure, it does not follow that the
handcuffs were unreasonable. Where the detainees out-
number those supervising them, and this situation could not
be remedied without diverting officers from an extensive,
complex, and time-consuming search, the continued use of
handcuffs after the initial sweep may be justified, subject to

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Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
adjustments or temporary release under supervision to avoid
pain or excessive physical discomfort. Because on this rec-
ord it does not appear the restraints were excessive, I join
the opinion of the Court.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the
judgment.
The jury in this case found that the two petitioners vio-
lated Iris Mena’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure by detaining her with greater force and
for a longer period of time than was reasonable under the
circumstances. In their post-trial motion in the District
Court, petitioners advanced three legal arguments: (1) They
were entitled to qualified immunity because the unconstitu-
tionality of their conduct was not clearly established; 1 (2) the
judge’s instruction to the jury was erroneous; 2 and (3) the
evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s award of
1 The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity was not challenged in the petition for certiorari and is
therefore waived. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 645–
646 (1992).
2 The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
“ ‘Generally, a police officer carrying out a search authorized by a war-
rant may detain occupants of the residence during the search, so long as
the detention is reasonable.
“ ‘In determining the reasonableness of a detention conducted in connec-
tion with a search, you may look to all the circumstances, including the
severity of the suspected crime, whether the person being detained is the
subject of the investigation, whether such person poses an immediate
threat to the security of the police or others or to the ability of the police
to conduct the search, and whether such person is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to flee. A detention may be unreasonable if it is unneces-
sarily painful, degrading, prolonged or if it involves an undue invasion of
privacy. A police officer is required to release an individual detained in
connection with a lawful search as soon as the officers’ right to conduct
the search ends or the search itself is concluded, whichever is sooner.’ ”
Mena v. Simi Valley, 332 F. 3d 1255, 1267–1268 (CA9 2003) (alterations
omitted; one paragraph break added).

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Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
punitive damages. The trial judge’s thoughtful explanation
of his reasons for denying the motion does not address either
of the issues the Court discusses today.
In its opinion affirming the judgment, the Court of Ap-
peals made two mistakes. First, as the Court explains,
ante, at 100–101, it erroneously held that the immigration
officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status
was an independent violation of the Fourth Amendment.3
Second, instead of merely deciding whether there was suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict, the
Court of Appeals appears to have ruled as a matter of law
that the officers should have released her from the handcuffs
sooner than they did. I agree that it is appropriate to re-
mand the case to enable the Court of Appeals to consider
whether the evidence supports Mena’s contention that she
was held longer than the search actually lasted. In doing
so, the Court of Appeals must of course accord appropriate
deference to the jury’s reasonable factual findings, while
applying the correct legal standard. See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U. S. 690, 699 (1996).
In my judgment, however, the Court’s discussion of the
amount of force used to detain Mena pursuant to Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), is analytically unsound.
Although the Court correctly purports to apply the “objec-
tive reasonableness” test announced in Graham v. Connor,
490 U. S. 386 (1989), it misapplies that test. Given the facts
of this case—and the presumption that a reviewing court
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of supporting
the verdict—I think it clear that the jury could properly
have found that this 5-foot-2-inch young lady posed no threat
to the officers at the scene, and that they used excessive
force in keeping her in handcuffs for up to three hours. Al-
though Summers authorizes the detention of any individual
3 While I agree with the Court’s discussion of this issue, I note that the
issue was not properly presented to the Ninth Circuit because it was not
raised by either petitioners or respondent.

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Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
who is present when a valid search warrant is being exe-
cuted, that case does not give officers carte blanche to keep
individuals who pose no threat in handcuffs throughout a
search, no matter how long it may last. On remand, I would
therefore instruct the Court of Appeals to consider whether
the evidence supports Mena’s contention that the petitioners
used excessive force in detaining her when it considers the
length of the Summers detention.
I
As the Court notes, the warrant in this case authorized
the police to enter the Mena home to search for a gun belong-
ing to Raymond Romero that may have been used in a gang-
related driveby shooting. Romero, a known member of the
West Side Locos gang, rented a room from the Mena family.
The house, described as a “ ‘poor house,’ ” was home to sev-
eral unrelated individuals who rented from the Menas.
Brief for Petitioners 4. Each resident had his or her own
bedroom, which could be locked with a padlock on the out-
side, and each had access to the living room and kitchen. In
addition, several individuals lived in trailers in the back yard
and also had access to the common spaces in the Mena home.
Id., at 5.
In addition to Romero, police had reason to believe that at
least one other West Side Locos gang member had lived at
the residence, although Romero’s brother told police that the
individual had returned to Mexico. The officers in charge of
the search, petitioners Muehler and Brill, had been at the
same residence a few months earlier on an unrelated do-
mestic violence call, but did not see any other individuals
they believed to be gang members inside the home on that
occasion.
In light of the fact that the police believed that Romero
possessed a gun and that there might be other gang mem-
bers at the residence, petitioner Muehler decided to use a
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team to execute the

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107 Cite as: 544 U. S. 93 (2005)
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warrant. As described in the majority opinion, eight mem-
bers of the SWAT team forcefully entered the home at 7 a.m.
In fact, Mena was the only occupant of the house, and she
was asleep in her bedroom. The police woke her up at gun-
point, and immediately handcuffed her. At the same time,
officers served another search warrant at the home of Rome-
ro’s mother, where Romero was known to stay several nights
each week. In part because Romero’s mother had pre-
viously cooperated with police officers, they did not use a
SWAT team to serve that warrant. Romero was found at
his mother’s house; after being cited for possession of a small
amount of marijuana, he was released.
Meanwhile, after the SWAT team secured the Mena resi-
dence and gave the “all clear,” police officers transferred
Mena and three other individuals (who had been in trailers
in the back yard) to a converted garage.4 To get to the ga-
rage, Mena, who was still in her bedclothes, was forced to
walk barefoot through the pouring rain. The officers kept
her and the other three individuals in the garage for up to
three hours while they searched the home. Although she
requested them to remove the handcuffs, they refused to do
so. For the duration of the search, two officers guarded
Mena and the other three detainees. A .22-caliber handgun,
ammunition, and gang-related paraphernalia were found in
Romero’s bedroom, and other gang-related paraphernalia
was found in the living room. Officers found nothing of sig-
nificance in Mena’s bedroom.5 Id., at 6–9.
4 The other individuals were a 55-year-old Latina female, a 40-year-old
Latino male who was removed from the scene by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and a white male who appears to be in his
early 30’s and who was cited for possession of a small amount of marijuana.
5 One of the justifications for our decision in Michigan v. Summers, 452
U. S. 692 (1981), was the fact that the occupants may be willing to “open
locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only
damaging to property but may also delay the completion of the task at
hand.” Id., at 703. Mena, however, was never asked to assist the offi-
cers, although she testified that she was willing to do so. See 3 Tr. 42

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108 MUEHLER v. MENA
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
II
In analyzing the quantum of force used to effectuate the
Summers detention, the Court rightly employs the “objec-
tive reasonableness” test of Graham. Under Graham, the
trier of fact must balance “ ‘the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
490 U. S., at 396. The District Court correctly instructed
the jury to take into consideration such factors as “ ‘the
severity of the suspected crime, whether the person being
detained is the subject of the investigation, whether such
person poses an immediate threat to the security of the po-
lice or others or to the ability of the police to conduct the
search, and whether such person is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to flee.’ ” See n. 2, supra. The District
Court also correctly instructed the jury to consider whether
the detention was prolonged and whether Mena was detained
in handcuffs after the search had ended. Ibid. Many of
these factors are taken from Graham itself, and the jury in-
struction reflects an entirely reasonable construction of the
objective reasonableness test in the Summers context.
Considering those factors, it is clear that the SWAT team’s
initial actions were reasonable. When officers undertake a
dangerous assignment to execute a warrant to search prop-
erty that is presumably occupied by violence-prone gang
members, it may well be appropriate to use both overwhelm-
ing force and surprise in order to secure the premises as
promptly as possible. In this case the decision to use a
SWAT team of eight heavily armed officers and to execute
the warrant at 7 a.m. gave the officers maximum protection
against the anticipated risk. As it turned out, there was
only one person in the house—Mena—and she was sound
asleep. Nevertheless, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular
(June 14, 2001). Instead, officers broke the locks on several cabinets and
dressers to which Mena possessed the keys.

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use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reason-
able officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. At the time they
first encountered Mena, the officers had no way of knowing
her relation to Romero, whether she was affiliated with the
West Side Locos, or whether she had any weapons on her
person. Further, the officers needed to use overwhelming
force to immediately take command of the situation; by hand-
cuffing Mena they could more quickly secure her room and
join the other officers. It would be unreasonable to expect
officers, who are entering what they believe to be a high risk
situation, to spend the time necessary to determine whether
Mena was a threat before they handcuffed her. To the ex-
tent that the Court of Appeals relied on the initial actions of
the SWAT team to find that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict, it was in error.
Whether the well-founded fears that justified the extraor-
dinary entry into the house should also justify a prolonged
interruption of the morning routine of a presumptively inno-
cent person, however, is a separate question and one that
depends on the specific facts of the case. This is true with
respect both to how the handcuffs were used, and to the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention, in-
cluding whether Mena was detained in handcuffs after the
search had concluded. With regard to the handcuffs, police
may use them in different ways.6 Here, the cuffs kept
Mena’s arms behind her for two to three hours. She testi-
fied that they were “ ‘real uncomfortable’ ” and that she had
asked the officers to remove them, but that they had refused.
App. 105. Moreover, she was continuously guarded by two
6 For instance, a suspect may be handcuffed to a fixed object, to a custo-
dian, or her hands may simply be linked to one another. The cuffs may
join the wrists either in the front or the back of the torso. They can be
so tight that they are painful, particularly when applied for prolonged
periods. While they restrict movement, they do not necessarily preclude
flight if the prisoner is not kept under constant surveillance.

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police officers who obviously made flight virtually impossible
even if the cuffs had been removed.
A jury could reasonably have found a number of facts sup-
porting a conclusion that the prolonged handcuffing was un-
reasonable. No contraband was found in Mena’s room or on
her person. There were no indications suggesting she was
or ever had been a gang member, which was consistent with
the fact that during the police officers’ last visit to the home,
no gang members were present. She fully cooperated with
the officers and the INS agent, answering all their questions.
She was unarmed, and given her small size, was clearly no
match for either of the two armed officers who were guard-
ing her. In sum, there was no evidence that Mena posed
any threat to the officers or anyone else.
The justifications offered by the officers are not persua-
sive. They have argued that at least six armed officers were
required to guard the four detainees, even though all of them
had been searched for weapons. Since there were 18 offi-
cers at the scene, and since at least 1 officer who at one point
guarded Mena and the other three residents was sent home
after offering to assist in the search, it seems unlikely that
lack of resources was really a problem. While a court
should not ordinarily question the allocation of police officers
or resources, a jury could have reasonably found that this is
a case where ample resources were available.
The jury may also have been skeptical of testimony that
the officers in fact feared for their safety given that the ac-
tual suspect of the shooting had been found at the other loca-
tion and promptly released. Additionally, while the officers
testified that as a general matter they would not release an
individual from handcuffs while searching a residence, the
SWAT team’s tactical plan for this particular search arguably
called for them to do just that, since it directed that “[a]ny
subjects encountered will be handcuffed and detained until
they can be patted down, their location noted, [field identi-

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fied], and released by Officer Muehler or Officer R. Brill.” 2
Record 53. The tactical plan suggests that they can, and
often do, release individuals who are not related to the
search. The SWAT team leader testified that handcuffs are
not always required when executing a search.
In short, under the factors listed in Graham and those
validly presented to the jury in the jury instructions, a jury
could have reasonably found from the evidence that there
was no apparent need to handcuff Mena for the entire dura-
tion of the search and that she was detained for an unreason-
ably prolonged period. She posed no threat whatsoever to
the officers at the scene. She was not suspected of any
crime and was not a person targeted by the search warrant.
She had no reason to flee the scene and gave no indication
that she desired to do so. Viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we are required to
do, there is certainly no obvious factual basis for rejecting
the jury’s verdict that the officers acted unreasonably, and
no obvious basis for rejecting the conclusion that, on these
facts, the quantum of force used was unreasonable as a mat-
ter of law.
III
Police officers’ legitimate concern for their own safety is
always a factor that should weigh heavily in balancing the
relevant Graham factors. But, as Officer Brill admitted at
trial, if that justification were always sufficient, it would au-
thorize the handcuffing of every occupant of the premises for
the duration of every Summers detention. Nothing in
either the Summers or the Graham opinion provides any
support for such a result. Rather, the decision of what force
to use must be made on a case-by-case basis. There is evi-
dence in this record that may well support the conclusion
that it was unreasonable to handcuff Mena throughout the
search. On remand, therefore, I would instruct the Ninth
Circuit to consider that evidence, as well as the possibility

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that Mena was detained after the search was completed,
when deciding whether the evidence in the record is suffi-
cient to support the jury’s verdict.