HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA

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HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina
No. 04–1327. Argued February 22, 2006—Decided May 1, 2006
At petitioner’s South Carolina trial for murder and related crimes, the
prosecution relied heavily on forensic evidence that strongly supported
petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner sought to undermine the State’s forensic
evidence by introducing expert testimony suggesting that the evidence
had been contaminated and that the police had engaged in a plot to
frame him. Petitioner also sought to introduce evidence that another
man, Jimmy McCaw White, had been in the victim’s neighborhood on
the morning of the assault and that White had either acknowledged
petitioner’s innocence or admitted to committing the crimes himself. In
White’s pretrial testimony, he denied making the incriminating state
ments and provided an alibi for the time of the assault.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence citing
the State Supreme Court’s Gregory decision, which held such evidence
admissible if it raises a reasonable inference as to the defendant’s own
innocence, but inadmissible if it merely casts a bare suspicion or raises
a conjectural inference as to another’s guilt. Affirming the trial court,
the State Supreme Court cited both Gregory and its later decision in
Gay, and held that where there is strong forensic evidence of an appel
lant’s guilt, proffered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt does
not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant’s own innocence.
Applying this standard, the court held that petitioner could not over
come the forensic evidence against him.
Held: A criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by
an evidence rule under which the defendant may not introduce evidence
of third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evidence
that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict. “[S]tate and fed
eral rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish
rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” United States v. Schef
fer, 523 U. S. 303, 308. This latitude, however, has limits. “Whether
rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a mean
ingful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Crane v. Ken
tucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690. This right is abridged by evidence rules that
“infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused” and are “ ‘arbitrary’

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or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ”
Scheffer, supra, at 308.
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evi
dence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are dispro
portionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well
established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if
its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. An
application of this principle is found in rules regulating the admission of
evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone else
committed the crime with which they are charged. Such rules are
widely accepted and are not challenged here.
In Gregory, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted and applied
a rule intended to be of this type. In Gay and this case, however, that
court radically changed and extended the Gregory rule by holding that,
where there is strong evidence of a defendant’s guilt, especially strong
forensic evidence, proffered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt
may (or perhaps must) be excluded. Under this rule, the trial judge
does not focus on the probative value or the potential adverse effects of
admitting the defense evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the criti
cal inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s case: If the prose
cution’s case is strong enough, the evidence of third-party guilt is ex
cluded even if that evidence, if viewed independently, would have great
probative value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harass
ment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues. Furthermore, as applied
below, the rule seems to call for little, if any, examination of the credibil
ity of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its evidence.
By evaluating the strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical
conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence
offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule ap
plied below did not heed this point, the rule is “arbitrary” in the sense
that it does not rationally serve the end that the Gregory rule and other
similar third-party guilt rules were designed to further. Nor has the
State identified any other legitimate end served by the rule. Thus,
the rule violates a criminal defendant’s right to have “ ‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Crane, supra, at 690.
Pp. 324–331.
361 S. C. 333, 605 S. E. 2d 19, vacated and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John H. Blume argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were William A. Norris, Edward P. Lazarus,

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Michael C. Small, Mark J. MacDougall, Jeffrey P. Kehne,
and Sheri L. Johnson.
Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General of
South Carolina, argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Henry D. McMaster, Attorney General,
and John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General.
Steffen N. Johnson argued the cause for the State of Kan
sas et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on
the brief were Phill Kline, Attorney General of Kansas,
Jared Maag, Deputy Attorney General, and Gene C. Schaerr,
and the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol
lows: Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona,
Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl
C. Danberg of Delaware, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Law
rence Wasden of Idaho, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Mi
chael A. Cox of Michigan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah
W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, George J. Chanos of Nevada,
W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Ore
gon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E.
Long of South Dakota, and Greg Abbott of Texas.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a criminal defend
ant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence
rule under which the defendant may not introduce proof of
third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic
evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict.
I
On the morning of December 31, 1989, 86-year-old Mary
Stewart was beaten, raped, and robbed in her home. She
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Forty Professors
of Evidence Law by Samuel R. Gross; and for the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jeffrey T. Green and Richard E. Young.
Elaine Metlin and Ann-Marie Luciano filed a brief of amicus curiae
for the Innocence Project, Inc.

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later died of complications stemming from her injuries.
Petitioner was convicted by a South Carolina jury of murder,
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree burglary,
and robbery, and he was sentenced to death. State v.
Holmes, 320 S. C. 259, 262, 464 S. E. 2d 334, 336 (1995). The
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and
sentence, and this Court denied certiorari. Ibid., cert. de
nied, 517 U. S. 1248 (1996). Upon state postconviction re
view, however, petitioner was granted a new trial. 361 S. C.
333, 335, n. 1, 605 S. E. 2d 19, 20, n. 1 (2004).
At the second trial, the prosecution relied heavily on the
following forensic evidence:
“(1) [Petitioner’s] palm print was found just above the
door knob on the interior side of the front door of the
victim’s house; (2) fibers consistent with a black sweat
shirt owned by [petitioner] were found on the victim’s
bed sheets; (3) matching blue fibers were found on the
victim’s pink nightgown and on [petitioner’s] blue jeans;
(4) microscopically consistent fibers were found on the
pink nightgown and on [petitioner’s] underwear; (5)
[petitioner’s] underwear contained a mixture of DNA
from two individuals, and 99.99% of the population other
than [petitioner] and the victim were excluded as con
tributors to that mixture; and (6) [petitioner’s] tank top
was found to contain a mixture of [petitioner’s] blood and
the victim’s blood.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24.
In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence that peti
tioner had been seen near Stewart’s home within an hour of
the time when, according to the prosecution’s evidence, the
attack took place. Id., at 337–338, 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 21, 24.
As a major part of his defense, petitioner attempted to
undermine the State’s forensic evidence by suggesting that
it had been contaminated and that certain law enforcement
officers had engaged in a plot to frame him. Id., at 339, 605
S. E. 2d, at 22. Petitioner’s expert witnesses criticized the

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procedures used by the police in handling the fiber and DNA
evidence and in collecting the fingerprint evidence. App.
299–311, 313–323. Another defense expert provided testi
mony that petitioner cited as supporting his claim that the
palm print had been planted by the police. Id., at 326–327.
Petitioner also sought to introduce proof that another man,
Jimmy McCaw White, had attacked Stewart. 361 S. C., at
340, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. At a pretrial hearing, petitioner
proffered several witnesses who placed White in the victim’s
neighborhood on the morning of the assault, as well as four
other witnesses who testified that White had either acknowl
edged that petitioner was “ ‘innocent’ ” or had actually ad
mitted to committing the crimes. Id., at 340–342, 605 S. E.
2d, at 22–23. One witness recounted that when he asked
White about the “word . . . on the street” that White was
responsible for Stewart’s murder, White “put his head down
and he raised his head back up and he said, well, you know
I like older women.” App. 119. According to this witness,
White added that “he did what they say he did” and that he
had “no regrets about it at all.” Id., at 120. Another wit
ness, who had been incarcerated with White, testified that
White had admitted to assaulting Stewart, that a police offi
cer had asked the witness to testify falsely against peti
tioner, and that employees of the prosecutor’s office, while
soliciting the witness’ cooperation, had spoken of manufac
turing evidence against petitioner. Id., at 38–50. White
testified at the pretrial hearing and denied making the in
criminating statements. 361 S. C., at 341–342, 605 S. E. 2d,
at 23. He also provided an alibi for the time of the crime,
but another witness refuted his alibi. Id., at 342, 605 S. E.
2d, at 23.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt evi
dence citing State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 16 S. E. 2d 532
(1941), which held that such evidence is admissible if it
“ ‘raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the
defendant’s] own innocence’ ” but is not admissible if it

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merely “ ‘cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another’ ” or “ ‘raise[s]
a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by
another.’ ” App. 133–134 (quoting Gregory, supra, at 104, 16
S. E. 2d, at 534). On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme
Court found no error in the exclusion of petitioner’s third
party guilt evidence. Citing both Gregory and its later deci
sion in State v. Gay, 343 S. C. 543, 541 S. E. 2d 541 (2001),
the State Supreme Court held that “where there is strong
evidence of an appellant’s guilt, especially where there is
strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a
third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable infer
ence as to the appellant’s own innocence.” 361 S. C., at 342–
343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. Applying this standard, the court
held that petitioner could not “overcome the forensic evi
dence against him to raise a reasonable inference of his own
innocence.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. We granted
certiorari. 545 U. S. 1164 (2005).
II
“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under
the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from
criminal trials.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 308
(1998); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 689–690
(1986); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1983);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302–303 (1973); Spen
cer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 564 (1967). This latitude,
however, has limits. “Whether rooted directly in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defend
ants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete de
fense.’ ” Crane, supra, at 690 (quoting California v. Trom
betta, 467 U. S. 479, 485 (1984); citations omitted). This
right is abridged by evidence rules that “infring[e] upon a
weighty interest of the accused” and are “ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘dis
proportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ”

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Scheffer, supra, at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S.
44, 58, 56 (1987)).
This Court’s cases contain several illustrations of “arbi
trary” rules, i. e., rules that excluded important defense evi
dence but that did not serve any legitimate interests. In
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967), state statutes
barred a person who had been charged as a participant in a
crime from testifying in defense of another alleged partici
pant unless the witness had been acquitted. As a result,
when the defendant in Washington was tried for murder, he
was precluded from calling as a witness a person who had
been charged and previously convicted of committing the
same murder. Holding that the defendant’s right to put on
a defense had been violated, we noted that the rule embodied
in the statutes could not “even be defended on the ground
that it rationally sets apart a group of persons who are par
ticularly likely to commit perjury” since the rule allowed an
alleged participant to testify if he or she had been acquitted
or was called by the prosecution. Id., at 22–23.
A similar constitutional violation occurred in Chambers v.
Mississippi, supra. A murder defendant called as a witness
a man named McDonald, who had previously confessed to the
murder. When McDonald repudiated the confession on the
stand, the defendant was denied permission to examine Mc-
Donald as an adverse witness based on the State’s “ ‘voucher’
rule,” which barred parties from impeaching their own wit
nesses. Id., at 294. In addition, because the state hearsay
rule did not include an exception for statements against
penal interest, the defendant was not permitted to introduce
evidence that McDonald had made self-incriminating state
ments to three other persons. Noting that the State had
not even attempted to “defend” or “explain [the] underlying
rationale” of the “voucher rule,” id., at 297, this Court held
that “the exclusion of [the evidence of McDonald’s out-of
court statements], coupled with the State’s refusal to permit
[the defendant] to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a

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trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of
due process,” id., at 302.
Another arbitrary rule was held unconstitutional in Crane
v. Kentucky, supra. There, the defendant was prevented
from attempting to show at trial that his confession was un
reliable because of the circumstances under which it was ob
tained, and neither the State Supreme Court nor the prose
cution “advanced any rational justification for the wholesale
exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory evidence.”
Id., at 691.
In Rock v. Arkansas, supra, this Court held that a rule
prohibiting hypnotically refreshed testimony was unconstitu
tional because “[w]holesale inadmissibility of a defendant’s
testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify
in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the
validity of all post-hypnosis recollections.” Id., at 61. By
contrast, in Scheffer, supra, we held that a rule excluding all
polygraph evidence did not abridge the right to present a
defense because the rule “serve[d] several legitimate inter
ests in the criminal trial process,” was “neither arbitrary
nor disproportionate in promoting these ends,” and did not
“implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant.”
Id., at 309.
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of de
fense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose
or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are as
serted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit
trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is out
weighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. See,
e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Uniform Rule of Evid. 45 (1953);
ALI, Model Code of Evidence Rule 303 (1942); 3 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 1863, 1904 (1904). Plainly referring to rules of
this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits
judges “to exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive . . . , only mar
ginally relevant’ or poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, prej

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udice, [or] confusion of the issues.’ ” Crane, 476 U. S., at
689–690 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 679
(1986); ellipsis and brackets in original). See also Montana
v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37, 42 (1996) (plurality opinion) (term
ing such rules “familiar and unquestionably constitutional”).
A specific application of this principle is found in rules reg
ulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal de
fendants to show that someone else committed the crime
with which they are charged. See, e. g., 41 C. J. S., Homicide
§ 216, pp. 56–58 (1991) (“Evidence tending to show the com
mission by another person of the crime charged may be in
troduced by accused when it is inconsistent with, and raises
a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but frequently matters
offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack
such connection with the crime that they are excluded”); 40A
Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide § 286, pp. 136–138 (1999) (“[T]he ac
cused may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that
another person may have committed the crime with which
the defendant is charged . . . . [Such evidence] may be ex
cluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person
to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is specula
tive or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a mate
rial fact in issue at the defendant’s trial” (footnotes omitted)).
Such rules are widely accepted,* and neither petitioner nor
his amici challenge them here.
*See, e. g., Smithart v. State, 988 P. 2d 583, 586–587 (Alaska 1999);
Shields v. State, 357 Ark. 283, 287–288, 166 S. W. 3d 28, 32 (2004); People
v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 718 P. 2d 99, 103–104 (1986) (en banc); People
v. Mulligan, 193 Colo. 509, 517–518, 568 P. 2d 449, 456–457 (1977) (en banc);
State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 624–627, 877 A. 2d 787, 802–803 (2005); Win
field v. United States, 676 A. 2d 1 (D. C. 1996) (en banc); Klinect v.
State, 269 Ga. 570, 573, 501 S. E. 2d 810, 813–814 (1998); State v. Rabellizsa,
79 Haw. 347, 350–351, 903 P. 2d 43, 46–47 (1995); People v. Fort, 248 Ill.
App. 3d 301, 314, 618 N. E. 2d 445, 455 (1993); State v. Adams, 280 Kan.
494, 504–507, 124 P. 3d 19, 27–29 (2005); Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S. W.
3d 196, 207–208 (Ky. 2003); State v. Dechaine, 572 A. 2d 130, 134 (Me. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 815–816, 564 N. E. 2d 370, 374–375

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In Gregory, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted
and applied a rule apparently intended to be of this type,
given the court’s references to the “applicable rule” from
Corpus Juris and American Jurisprudence:
“ ‘[E]vidence offered by accused as to the commission of
the crime by another person must be limited to such
facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such
facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as
to his own innocence; evidence which can have (no) other
effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to
raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the
crime by another, is not admissible. . . . [B]efore such
testimony can be received, there must be such proof of
connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances,
as tends clearly to point out such other person as the
guilty party.’ ” 198 S. C., at 104–105, 16 S. E. 2d, at
534–535 (quoting 16 C. J., Criminal Law § 1085, p. 560
(1918), and 20 Am. Jur., Evidence § 265, p. 254 (1939);
footnotes omitted).
In Gay and this case, however, the South Carolina Su
preme Court radically changed and extended the rule. In
Gay, after recognizing the standard applied in Gregory, the
court stated that “[i]n view of the strong evidence of appel
lant’s guilt—especially the forensic evidence— . . . the prof
fered evidence . . . did not raise ‘a reasonable inference’ as to
(1990); State v. Jones, 678 N. W. 2d 1, 16–17 (Minn. 2004) (en banc); Moore
v. State, 179 Miss. 268, 274–275, 175 So. 183, 184 (1937); State v. Chaney,
967 S. W. 2d 47, 55 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); State v. Cotto, 182 N. J. 316,
332–333, 865 A. 2d 660, 669–670 (2005); Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14,
¶¶ 13–24, 119 P. 3d 1268, 1272–1276; State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 104–105,
16 S. E. 2d 532, 534–535 (1941); Wiley v. State, 74 S. W. 3d 399, 405–408
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 375, 721 A. 2d 445, 454
(1998); State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 856–858, 83 P. 3d 970, 988 (2004)
(en banc); State v. Parr, 207 W. Va. 469, 475, 534 S. E. 2d 23, 29 (2000) (per
curiam); State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 622–625, 357 N. W. 2d 12, 16–17
(App. 1984).

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appellant’s own innocence.” 343 S. C., at 550, 541 S. E. 2d,
at 545 (quoting Gregory, supra, at 104, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534, in
turn quoting 16 C. J., § 1085, at 560). Similarly, in the pres
ent case, as noted, the State Supreme Court applied the rule
that “where there is strong evidence of [a defendant’s] guilt,
especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the prof
fered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt” may (or
perhaps must) be excluded. 361 S. C., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d,
at 24.
Under this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the pro
bative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the
defense evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical
inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s case: If
the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evidence of
third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence, if viewed
independently, would have great probative value and even if
it would not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or
confusion of the issues.
Furthermore, as applied in this case, the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s rule seems to call for little, if any, examina
tion of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the
reliability of its evidence. Here, for example, the defense
strenuously claimed that the prosecution’s forensic evidence
was so unreliable (due to mishandling and a deliberate plot
to frame petitioner) that the evidence should not have even
been admitted. The South Carolina Supreme Court re
sponded that these challenges did not entirely “eviscerate”
the forensic evidence and that the defense challenges went
to the weight and not to the admissibility of that evidence.
Id., at 343, n. 8, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24, n. 8. Yet, in evaluating
the prosecution’s forensic evidence and deeming it to be
“strong”—and thereby justifying exclusion of petitioner’s
third-party guilt evidence—the South Carolina Supreme
Court made no mention of the defense challenges to the
prosecution’s evidence.

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Interpreted in this way, the rule applied by the State Su
preme Court does not rationally serve the end that the Greg
ory rule and its analogues in other jurisdictions were de
signed to promote, i. e., to focus the trial on the central issues
by excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical con
nection to the central issues. The rule applied in this case
appears to be based on the following logic: Where (1) it is
clear that only one person was involved in the commission of
a particular crime and (2) there is strong evidence that the
defendant was the perpetrator, it follows that evidence of
third-party guilt must be weak. But this logic depends on
an accurate evaluation of the prosecution’s proof, and the
true strength of the prosecution’s proof cannot be assessed
without considering challenges to the reliability of the prose
cution’s evidence. Just because the prosecution’s evidence,
if credited, would provide strong support for a guilty verdict,
it does not follow that evidence of third-party guilt has only
a weak logical connection to the central issues in the case.
And where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or
the reliability of its evidence is not conceded, the strength of
the prosecution’s case cannot be assessed without making the
sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved
for the trier of fact and that the South Carolina courts did
not purport to make in this case.
The rule applied in this case is no more logical than its
converse would be, i. e., a rule barring the prosecution from
introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant
is able to proffer, at a pretrial hearing, evidence that, if be
lieved, strongly supports a verdict of not guilty. In the
present case, for example, petitioner proffered evidence that,
if believed, squarely proved that White, not petitioner, was
the perpetrator. It would make no sense, however, to hold
that this proffer precluded the prosecution from introducing
its evidence, including the forensic evidence that, if credited,
provided strong proof of petitioner’s guilt.

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The point is that, by evaluating the strength of only one
party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regard
ing the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other
side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule applied by the
State Supreme Court in this case did not heed this point, the
rule is “arbitrary” in the sense that it does not rationally
serve the end that the Gregory rule and other similar third
party guilt rules were designed to further. Nor has the
State identified any other legitimate end that the rule
serves. It follows that the rule applied in this case by the
State Supreme Court violates a criminal defendant’s right
to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.’ ” Crane, 476 U. S., at 690 (quoting Trombetta, 467
U. S., at 485).
III
For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remand the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.