BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH v. STUART et al.

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
398 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH v. STUART et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of utah
No. 05–502. Argued April 24, 2006—Decided May 22, 2006
Responding to a 3 a.m. call about a loud party, police arrived at the house
in question, heard shouting inside, proceeded down the driveway, and
saw two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. Entering the yard,
they saw through a screen door and windows an altercation in the
kitchen between four adults and a juvenile, who punched one of the
adults, causing him to spit blood in a sink. An officer opened the screen
door and announced the officers’ presence. Unnoticed amid the tumult,
the officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, whereupon the al
tercation gradually subsided. The officers arrested respondents and
charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor and re
lated offenses. The trial court granted their motion to suppress all evi
dence obtained after the officers entered the home on the ground that
the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed. Affirming, the State Supreme Court held
that the injury caused by the juvenile’s punch was insufficient to trigger
the “emergency aid doctrine” because it did not give rise to an objec
tively reasonable belief that an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing
person feared injured or dead was in the home. Furthermore, the court
suggested the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers had not
sought to assist the injured adult but had acted exclusively in a law
enforcement capacity. The court also held that the entry did not fall
within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Held: Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an
objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously
injured or imminently threatened with such injury.
Because the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate touchstone is “reasonable
ness,” the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. For
example, one exigency obviating the requirement is the need to render
emergency assistance to occupants of private property who are seri
ously injured or threatened with such injury. Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U. S. 385, 392. This Court has repeatedly rejected respondents’ conten
tion that, in assessing the reasonableness of an entry, consideration
should be given to the subjective motivations of individual officers. Be
cause the officers’ subjective motivation is irrelevant, Bond v. United
States, 529 U. S. 334, 338, n. 2, it does not matter here whether they
entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence or to

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
399 Cite as: 547 U. S. 398 (2006)
Syllabus
assist the injured and prevent further violence. Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 46, and Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1, 4, distin
guished. Relying on this Court’s holding in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U. S. 740, 753, that “an important factor to be considered when deter
mining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying
offense for which the arrest is being made,” respondents further contend
that their conduct was not serious enough to justify the officers’ intru
sion into the home. This contention is misplaced. In Welsh, the “only
potential emergency” confronting the officers was the need to preserve
evidence of the suspect’s blood-alcohol level, an exigency the Court held
insufficient under the circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into
the suspect’s home. Ibid. Here, the officers were confronted with on
going violence occurring within the home, a situation Welsh did not
address.
The officers’ entry here was plainly reasonable under the circum
stances. Given the tumult at the house when they arrived, it was obvi
ous that knocking on the front door would have been futile. Moreover,
in light of the fracas they observed in the kitchen, the officers had an
objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult
might need help and that the violence was just beginning. Nothing in
the Fourth Amendment required them to wait until another blow ren
dered someone unconscious, semiconscious, or worse before entering.
The manner of their entry was also reasonable, since nobody heard the
first announcement of their presence, and it was only after the announc
ing officer stepped into the kitchen and announced himself again that
the tumult subsided. That announcement was at least equivalent to a
knock on the screen door and, under the circumstances, there was no
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule. Fur
thermore, once the announcement was made, the officers were free to
enter; it would serve no purpose to make them stand dumbly at the door
awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their
presence. Pp. 403–407.
2005 UT 13, 122 P. 3d 506, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ste
vens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 407.
Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, ar
gued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Kirk M. Torgensen,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, and J. Frederic Voros, Jr.

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
400 BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART
Opinion of the Court
Deputy Attorney General McNulty argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the
brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Pa
tricia A. Millett.
Michael P. Studebaker argued the cause and filed a brief
for respondents.*
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In this case we consider whether police may enter a home
without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or
imminently threatened with such injury. We conclude that
they may.
I
This case arises out of a melee that occurred in a Brigham
City, Utah, home in the early morning hours of July 23, 2000.
At about 3 a.m., four police officers responded to a call re
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Michi
gan et al. by Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas L.
Casey, Solicitor General, by Kym L. Worthy and Timothy Baughman, and
by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John W.
Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Mark J. Bennett of
Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Phill Kline of Kan
sas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon
Bruning of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Hardy Myers
of Oregon, Tom Corbett of Pennsylvania, William Sorrell of Vermont, Rob
McKenna of Washington, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for the Fra
ternal Order of Police by Larry H. James and Laura MacGregor Comek;
and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and Law
rence Rosenthal.
Jonathan D. Hacker and Pamela Harris filed a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus cur iae urging
affirmance.
Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard Weintraub, and Bernard
J. Farber filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.,
et al. as amici curiae.

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
401 Cite as: 547 U. S. 398 (2006)
Opinion of the Court
garding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the
house, they heard shouting from inside, and proceeded down
the driveway to investigate. There, they observed two ju
veniles drinking beer in the backyard. They entered the
backyard, and saw—through a screen door and windows—an
altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. Accord
ing to the testimony of one of the officers, four adults were
attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The
juvenile eventually “broke free, swung a fist and struck one
of the adults in the face.” 2005 UT 13, ¶ 2, 122 P. 3d 506,
508. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the
blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. App. 40. The other
adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him
up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigera
tor began moving across the floor. At this point, an officer
opened the screen door and announced the officers’ presence.
Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. The officer entered the
kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly be
came aware that the police were on the scene, the alterca
tion ceased.
The officers subsequently arrested respondents and
charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial
court, respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that
the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court granted the motion, and the Utah Court of Ap
peals affirmed.
Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued
that although the officers lacked a warrant, their entry was
nevertheless reasonable on either of two grounds. The
court rejected both contentions and, over two dissenters, af
firmed. First, the court held that the injury caused by the
juvenile’s punch was insufficient to trigger the so-called
“emergency aid doctrine” because it did not give rise to an
“objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious, semi

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
402 BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART
Opinion of the Court
conscious, or missing person feared injured or dead [was] in
the home.” 122 P. 3d, at 513 (internal quotation marks omit
ted). Furthermore, the court suggested that the doctrine
was inapplicable because the officers had not sought to assist
the injured adult, but instead had acted “exclusively in their
law enforcement capacity.” Ibid.
The court also held that the entry did not fall within the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
This exception applies, the court explained, where police
have probable cause and where “a reasonable person [would]
believe that the entry was necessary to prevent physical
harm to the officers or other persons.” Id., at 514 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the court
stated, the potential harm need not be as serious as that
required to invoke the emergency aid exception. Although
it found the case “a close and difficult call,” the court never
theless concluded that the officers’ entry was not justified by
exigent circumstances. Id., at 515.
We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. 1085 (2006), in light of
differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals
concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard
governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emer
gency situation. Compare In re Sealed Case 96–3167, 153
F. 3d 759, 766 (CADC 1998) (“[T]he standard for exigent cir
cumstances is an objective one”), and People v. Hebert, 46
P. 3d 473, 480 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (considering the circum
stances as they “would have been objectively examined by a
prudent and trained police officer”), with United States v.
Cervantes, 219 F. 3d 882, 890 (CA9 2000) (“[U]nder the emer
gency doctrine, ‘[a] search must not be primarily motivated
by intent to arrest and seize evidence’ ” (quoting People v.
Mitchell, 39 N. Y. 2d 173, 177, 347 N. E. 2d 607, 609 (1976)),
and State v. Mountford, 171 Vt. 487, 492, 769 A. 2d 639, 645
(2000) (Mitchell test “requir[es] courts to find that the pri
mary subjective motivation behind such searches was to pro
vide emergency aid”).

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
403 Cite as: 547 U. S. 398 (2006)
Opinion of the Court
II
It is a “ ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.’ ” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S.
551, 559 (2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,
586 (1980); some internal quotation marks omitted). Never
theless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is “reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is
subject to certain exceptions. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528
U. S. 11, 13 (1999) (per curiam); Katz v. United States, 389
U. S. 347, 357 (1967). We have held, for example, that law
enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto pri
vate property to fight a fire and investigate its cause, Michi
gan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978), to prevent the immi
nent destruction of evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,
40 (1963) (plurality opinion), or to engage in “ ‘hot pursuit’ ”
of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38,
42, 43 (1976). “[W]arrants are generally required to search
a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the
situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385,
393–394 (1978).
One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is
the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or
threatened with such injury. “ ‘The need to protect or pre
serve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what
would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emer
gency.’ ” Id., at 392 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318
F. 2d 205, 212 (CADC 1963) (Burger, J.)); see also Tyler,
supra, at 509. Accordingly, law enforcement officers may
enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assist
ance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury. Mincey, supra, at 392; see also Georgia v.
Randolph, ante, at 118 (“[I]t would be silly to suggest that
the police would commit a tort by entering . . . to determine

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
404 BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART
Opinion of the Court
whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or
is about to (or soon will) occur”).
Respondents do not take issue with these principles, but
instead advance two reasons why the officers’ entry here was
unreasonable. First, they argue that the officers were more
interested in making arrests than quelling violence. They
urge us to consider, in assessing the reasonableness of the
entry, whether the officers were “indeed motivated primarily
by a desire to save lives and property.” Brief for Respond
ents 3; see also Brief for National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 6 (entry to render emer
gency assistance justifies a search “only when the search
ing officer is acting outside his traditional law-enforcement
capacity”). The Utah Supreme Court also considered the
officers’ subjective motivations relevant. See 122 P. 3d, at
513 (search under the “emergency aid doctrine” may not be
“primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Our cases have repeatedly rejected this approach. An ac
tion is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, regard
less of the individual officer’s state of mind, “as long as
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.”
Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978) (emphasis
added). The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.
See Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334, 338, n. 2 (2000)
(“The parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the
law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether
that officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment . . . ; the
issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his
actions”); Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996)
(“[W]e have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment
challenges based on the actual motivations of individual offi
cers”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[O]ur
prior cases make clear” that “the subjective motivations of
the individual officers . . . ha[ve] no bearing on whether a
particular seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amend

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
405 Cite as: 547 U. S. 398 (2006)
Opinion of the Court
ment”). It therefore does not matter here—even if their
subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled—whether
the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and
gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and
prevent further violence.
As respondents note, we have held in the context of pro
grammatic searches conducted without individualized suspi
cion—such as checkpoints to combat drunk driving or drug
trafficking—that “an inquiry into programmatic purpose” is
sometimes appropriate. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S.
32, 46 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Florida v. Wells, 495
U. S. 1, 4 (1990) (an inventory search must be regulated by
“standardized criteria” or “established routine” so as not
to “be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence”). But this inquiry is directed at
ensuring that the purpose behind the program is not “ulti
mately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control.” Edmond, 531 U. S., at 44. It has nothing to do
with discerning what is in the mind of the individual officer
conducting the search. Id., at 48.
Respondents further contend that their conduct was not
serious enough to justify the officers’ intrusion into the
home. They rely on Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 753
(1984), in which we held that “an important factor to be con
sidered when determining whether any exigency exists is
the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest
is being made.” This contention, too, is misplaced. Welsh
involved a warrantless entry by officers to arrest a suspect
for driving while intoxicated. There, the “only potential
emergency” confronting the officers was the need to pre
serve evidence (i. e., the suspect’s blood-alcohol level)—an
exigency that we held insufficient under the circumstances
to justify entry into the suspect’s home. Ibid. Here, the
officers were confronted with ongoing violence occurring
within the home. Welsh did not address such a situation.

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
406 BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART
Opinion of the Court
We think the officers’ entry here was plainly reasonable
under the circumstances. The officers were responding, at
3 o’clock in the morning, to complaints about a loud party.
As they approached the house, they could hear from within
“an altercation occurring, some kind of a fight.” App. 29.
“It was loud and it was tumultuous.” Id., at 33. The offi
cers heard “thumping and crashing” and people yelling
“stop, stop” and “get off me.” Id., at 28, 29. As the trial
court found, “it was obvious that . . . knocking on the front
door” would have been futile. Id., at 92. The noise seemed
to be coming from the back of the house; after looking in
the front window and seeing nothing, the officers proceeded
around back to investigate further. They found two juve
niles drinking beer in the backyard. From there, they could
see that a fracas was taking place inside the kitchen. A ju
venile, fists clenched, was being held back by several adults.
As the officers watch, he breaks free and strikes one of the
adults in the face, sending the adult to the sink spitting
blood.
In these circumstances, the officers had an objectively rea
sonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might
need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just begin
ning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment required them to
wait until another blow rendered someone “unconscious” or
“semi-conscious” or worse before entering. The role of a
peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring
order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer
is not like a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout
only if it becomes too one-sided.
The manner of the officers’ entry was also reasonable.
After witnessing the punch, one of the officers opened the
screen door and “yelled in police.” Id., at 40. When no
body heard him, he stepped into the kitchen and announced
himself again. Only then did the tumult subside. The offi
cer’s announcement of his presence was at least equivalent
to a knock on the screen door. Indeed, it was probably the

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN
407 Cite as: 547 U. S. 398 (2006)
Stevens, J., concurring
only option that had even a chance of rising above the din.
Under these circumstances, there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule. Further
more, once the announcement was made, the officers were
free to enter; it would serve no purpose to require them to
stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those
within brawled on, oblivious to their presence.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Utah, and remand the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring.
This is an odd flyspeck of a case. The charges that have
been pending against respondents for the past six years
are minor offenses—intoxication, contributing to the delin
quency of a minor, and disorderly conduct—two of which
could have been proved by evidence that was gathered by
the responding officers before they entered the home. The
maximum punishment for these crimes ranges between 90
days and 6 months in jail. And the Court’s unanimous opin
ion restating well-settled rules of federal law is so clearly
persuasive that it is hard to imagine the outcome was ever
in doubt.
Under these circumstances, the only difficult question is
which of the following is the most peculiar: (1) that the Utah
trial judge, the intermediate state appellate court, and the
Utah Supreme Court all found a Fourth Amendment viola
tion on these facts; (2) that the prosecution chose to pursue
this matter all the way to the United States Supreme Court;
or (3) that this Court voted to grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari.
A possible explanation for the first is that the suppression
ruling was correct as a matter of Utah law, and neither trial
counsel nor the trial judge bothered to identify the Utah
Constitution as an independent basis for the decision because

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
408 BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART
Stevens, J., concurring
they did not expect the prosecution to appeal.* The most
plausible explanation for the latter two decisions is that they
were made so police officers in Utah may enter a home with
out a warrant when they see ongoing violence—we are,
of course, reversing the Utah Supreme Court’s conclusion
to the contrary. But that purpose, laudable though it may
be, cannot be achieved in this case. Our holding today
addresses only the limitations placed by the Federal Con
stitution on the search at issue; we have no authority to
decide whether the police in this case violated the Utah
Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has made clear that
the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to the pri
vacy of the home than does the Fourth Amendment. See
State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 12, 996 P. 2d 546, 549. And
it complained in this case of respondents’ failure to raise or
adequately brief a state constitutional challenge, thus pre
venting the state courts from deciding the case on anything
other than Fourth Amendment grounds. See 2005 UT 13,
¶ 12, 122 P. 3d 506, 510. “[S]urpris[ed]” by “[t]he reluctance
of litigants to take up and develop a state constitutional anal
ysis,” ibid., the court expressly invited future litigants to
bring challenges under the Utah Constitution to enable it to
fulfill its “responsibility as guardians of the individual liberty
of our citizens” and “undertak[e] a principled exploration of
the interplay between federal and state protections of indi
vidual rights,” id., at 511. The fact that this admonishment
and request came from the Utah Supreme Court in this very
case not only demonstrates that the prosecution selected the
wrong case for establishing the rule it wants, but also indi
cates that the Utah Supreme Court would probably adopt
the same rule as a matter of state constitutional law that we
reject today under the Federal Constitution.
*Indeed, it was the prosecution that prepared the trial court’s order
granting respondents’ motion to suppress. See 2002 UT App. 317, ¶ 4, 57
P. 3d 1111, 1112.

547US2 Unit: $U57 [03-16-09 15:06:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
409 Cite as: 547 U. S. 398 (2006)
Stevens, J., concurring
Whether or not that forecast is accurate, I can see no rea
son for this Court to cause the Utah courts to redecide the
question as a matter of state law. Federal interests are not
offended when a single State elects to provide greater pro
tection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution re
quires. Indeed, I continue to believe “that a policy of judi
cial restraint—one that allows other decisional bodies to
have the last word in legal interpretation until it is truly
necessary for this Court to intervene—enables this Court to
make its most effective contribution to our federal system of
government.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1067 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, while I join the Court’s
opinion, I remain persuaded that my vote to deny the State’s
petition for certiorari was correct.