HOUSE v. BELL, WARDEN

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HOUSE v. BELL, WARDEN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 04–8990. Argued January 11, 2006—Decided June 12, 2006
A Tennessee jury convicted petitioner House of Carolyn Muncey’s murder
and sentenced him to death. The State’s case included evidence that
FBI testing showed semen consistent (or so it seemed) with House’s on
Mrs. Muncey’s clothing and small bloodstains consistent with her blood
but not House’s on his jeans. In the sentencing phase, the jury found,
inter alia, the aggravating factor that the murder was committed while
House was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing from the com
mission of rape or kidnaping. In affirming, the State Supreme Court
described the evidence as circumstantial but strong. House was denied
state postconviction relief. Subsequently, the Federal District Court
denied habeas relief, deeming House’s claims procedurally defaulted and
granting the State summary judgment on most of his claims. It also
found, after an evidentiary hearing at which House attacked the blood
and semen evidence and presented other evidence, including a putative
confession, suggesting that Mr. Muncey committed the crime, that
House did not fall within the “actual innocence” exception to procedural
default recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, and Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U. S. 333. The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held:
1. Because House has made the stringent showing required by the
actual-innocence exception, his federal habeas action may proceed.
Pp. 536–554.
(a) To implement the general principle that “comity and finality . . .
‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incar
ceration,’ ” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 495, this Court has ruled
that prisoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims
must establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 327. Several features of
Schlup’s standard bear emphasis here. First, while the gateway claim
requires “new reliable evidence . . . not presented at trial,” id., at 324,
the habeas court must assess the likely impact of “ ‘all the evidence’ ”
on reasonable jurors, id., at 327–329. Second, rather than requiring ab
solute certainty about guilt or innocence, a petitioner’s burden at the

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gateway stage is to demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of
the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, this standard is “by no means equivalent
to the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307,” which governs
insufficient evidence claims, id., at 330. Rather, because a Schlup claim
involves evidence the trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry re
quires the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to
the overall, newly supplemented record. See ibid. Contrary to the
State’s arguments, the standard of review in two provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and 2254(e)(2), is inapplicable here. In addition, be
cause the standard does not address a “district court’s independent
judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists,” Schlup, supra, at 329,
a ruling in House’s favor does not require the showing of clear error as
to the District Court’s specific findings. It is with these principles in
mind that the evidence developed in House’s federal habeas proceedings
should be evaluated. Pp. 536–540.
(b) In direct contradiction of evidence presented at trial, DNA test
ing has established that semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing came from
her husband, not House. While the State claims that the evidence is
immaterial since neither sexual contact nor motive were elements of the
offense at the guilt phase, this Court considers the new disclosure of
central importance. This case is about who committed the crime, so
motive is key, and the prosecution at the guilt phase referred to evi
dence at the scene suggesting that House committed, or attempted to
commit, an indignity on Mrs. Muncey. Apart from proving motive, this
was the only forensic evidence at the scene that would link House to the
murder. Law and society demand accountability for a sexual offense,
so the evidence was also likely a factor in persuading the jury not to let
him go free. At sentencing, moreover, the jury concluded that the mur
der was committed in the course of a rape or kidnaping. A jury acting
without the assumption that the semen could have come from House
would have found it necessary to establish some different motive, or, if
the same motive, an intent far more speculative. Pp. 540–541.
(c) The evidentiary disarray surrounding the other forensic evi
dence, the bloodstains on House’s pants, taken together with the testi
mony of an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Tennes
see, would prevent reasonable jurors from placing significant reliance
on the blood evidence. The medical examiner who testified believes the
blood on the jeans must have come from the autopsy samples. In addi
tion, a vial and a quarter of autopsy blood is unaccounted for; the blood
was transported to the FBI together with the pants in conditions that

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could have caused the vials to spill; some blood did spill at least once
during the blood’s journey from Tennessee authorities through FBI
hands to a defense expert; the pants were stored in a plastic bag bearing
a large bloodstain and a label from a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
agent; and the box containing the blood samples may have been opened
before arriving at the FBI lab. None of this evidence was presented
to the trial jury. Whereas the bloodstains seemed strong evidence of
House’s guilt at trial, the record now raises substantial questions about
the blood’s origin. Pp. 541–548.
(d) In the post-trial proceedings, House presented troubling evi
dence that Mr. Muncey could have been the murderer. Two witnesses
described a confession by Mr. Muncey; two others described suspicious
behavior (a fight between the couple and Mr. Muncey’s attempt to con
struct a false alibi) around the time of the crime; and others described
a history of spousal abuse. Considered in isolation, a reasonable jury
might well disregard this evidence, but in combination with the chal
lenges to the blood evidence and lack of motive with respect to House,
evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey likely would reinforce other doubts as
to House’s guilt. Pp. 548–553.
(e) The Assistant Chief Medical Examiner further testified that
certain injuries discovered on House after the crime likely did not re
sult from involvement in the murder. Certain other evidence—
Mrs. Muncey’s daughter’s recollection of the night of the murder, and
the District Court’s finding at the habeas proceeding that House was
not a credible witness—may favor the State. P. 553.
(f) While this is not a case of conclusive exoneration, and the issue
is close, this is the rare case where—had the jury heard all the conflict
ing testimony—it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror view
ing the record as a whole would lack reasonable doubt. Pp. 553–554.
2. House has not shown freestanding innocence that would render his
imprisonment and planned execution unconstitutional under Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U. S. 390, in which the Court assumed without deciding that
“in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’
made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitu
tional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue
open to process such a claim,” id., at 417. The threshold showing for
such a right would be extraordinarily high, and House has not satisfied
whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would re
quire. He has cast doubt on his guilt sufficient to satisfy Schlup’s gate
way standard for obtaining federal review, but given the closeness of the
Schlup question here, his showing falls short of the threshold implied in
Herrera. Pp. 554–555.
386 F. 3d 668, reversed and remanded.

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Opinion of the Court
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which
Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 555. Alito, J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
Stephen Michael Kissinger argued the cause for peti
tioner. With him on the briefs were George H. Kendall,
Theodore M. Shaw, and Jacqueline A. Berrien.
Jennifer L. Smith, Associate Deputy Attorney General of
Tennessee, argued the cause for respondent. With her on
the brief were Paul G. Summers, Attorney General, Michael
E. Moore, Solicitor General, Gordon W. Smith, Associate So
licitor General, and Alice B. Lustre.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some 20 years ago in rural Tennessee, Carolyn Muncey
was murdered. A jury convicted petitioner Paul Gregory
House of the crime and sentenced him to death, but new
revelations cast doubt on the jury’s verdict. House, protest
ing his innocence, seeks access to federal court to pursue
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar
Association by Michael S. Greco, Rory K. Little, and Seth P. Waxman; for
Former Prosecutors et al. by Andrew H. Schapiro, Timothy C. Lambert,
George H. Kendall, and Miriam Gohara; and for the Innocence Project,
Inc., by David Goldberg.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel
M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Patrick J. Whalen, Deputy Attorney General, and Ward A. Campbell, Su
pervising Deputy Attorney General, by Christopher L. Morano, Chief
State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of
Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida,
Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, Charles C. Foti, Jr.,
of Louisiana, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Thomas
W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg
Abbott of Texas, and Rob McKenna of Washington.

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habeas corpus relief based on constitutional claims that are
procedurally barred under state law. Out of respect for the
finality of state-court judgments federal habeas courts, as a
general rule, are closed to claims that state courts would
consider defaulted. In certain exceptional cases involving
a compelling claim of actual innocence, however, the state
procedural default rule is not a bar to a federal habeas cor
pus petition. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 319–322
(1995). After careful review of the full record, we conclude
that House has made the stringent showing required by this
exception; and we hold that his federal habeas action may
proceed.
I
We begin with the facts surrounding Mrs. Muncey’s disap
pearance, the discovery of her body, and House’s arrest.
Around 3 p.m. on Sunday, July 14, 1985, two local residents
found her body concealed amid brush and tree branches on
an embankment roughly 100 yards up the road from her
driveway. Mrs. Muncey had been seen last on the evening
before, when, around 8 p.m., she and her two children—Lora
Muncey, aged 10, and Matthew Muncey, aged 8—visited their
neighbor, Pam Luttrell. According to Luttrell, Mrs. Mun
cey mentioned her husband, William Hubert Muncey, Jr.,
known in the community as “Little Hube” and to his family
as “Bubbie.” As Luttrell recounted Mrs. Muncey’s com
ment, Mr. Muncey “had gone to dig a grave, and he hadn’t
come back, but that was all right, because [Mrs. Muncey] was
going to make him take her fishing the next day,” App. 11–12.
Mrs. Muncey returned home, and some time later, before 11
p.m. at the latest, Luttrell “heard a car rev its motor as it
went down the road,” something Mr. Muncey customarily did
when he drove by on his way home. Record, Addendum 4,
5 Tr. of Evidence in No. 378 (Crim. Ct. Union Cty., Tenn.),
pp. 641–642 (hereinafter Tr.). Luttrell then went to bed.
Around 1 a.m., Lora and Matthew returned to Luttrell’s
home, this time with their father, Mr. Muncey, who said his

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wife was missing. Muncey asked Luttrell to watch the chil
dren while he searched for his wife. After he left, Luttrell
talked with Lora. According to Luttrell:
“[Lora] said she heard a horn blow, she thought she
heard a horn blow, and somebody asked if Bubbie was
home, and her mama, you know, told them—no. And
then she said she didn’t know if she went back to sleep
or not, but then she heard her mama going down the
steps crying and I am not sure if that is when that she
told me that she heard her mama say—oh God, no, not
me, or if she told me that the next day, but I do know
that she said she heard her mother going down the steps
crying.” App. 14–15.
While Lora was talking, Luttrell recalled, “Matt kept butt
ing in, you know, on us talking, and he said—sister they said
daddy had a wreck, they said daddy had a wreck.” Id.,
at 13.
At House’s trial, Lora repeated her account of the night’s
events, this time referring to the “wreck” her brother had
mentioned. To assist in understanding Lora’s account, it
should be noted that Mrs. Muncey’s father-in-law—Little
Hube’s father—was sometimes called “Big Hube.” Lora and
her brother called him “Paw Paw.” We refer to him as Mr.
Muncey, Sr. According to Lora, Mr. Muncey, Sr., had a deep
voice, as does petitioner House.
Lora testified that after leaving Luttrell’s house with her
mother, she and her brother “went to bed.” Id., at 18.
Later, she heard someone, or perhaps two different people,
ask for her mother. Lora’s account of the events after she
went to bed was as follows:
“Q Laura [sic], at some point after you got back home
and you went to bed, did anything happen that caused
your mother to be upset or did you hear anything?
“A Well, it sounded like PawPaw said—where’s daddy
at, and she said digging a grave.

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“Q Okay. Do you know if it was PawPaw or not, or
did it sound like PawPaw?
“A It just sounded like PawPaw.
“Q And your mother told him what?
“A That he was digging a grave.
“Q Had you ever heard that voice before that said
that?
“A I don’t remember.
“Q After that, at some point later, did you hear any
thing else that caused your mother to be upset?
“A Well, they said that daddy had a wreck down the
road and she started crying—next to the creek.
“Q Your mother started crying. What was it that
they said?
“A That daddy had a wreck.
“Q Did they say where?
“A Down there next to the creek.” Id., at 18–19.
Lora did not describe hearing any struggle. Some time
later, Lora and her brother left the house to look for their
mother, but no one answered when they knocked at the
Luttrells’ home, and another neighbor, Mike Clinton, said he
had not seen her. After the children returned home, accord
ing to Lora, her father came home and “fixed him a bologna
sandwich and he took a bit of it and he says—sissy, where is
mommy at, and I said—she ain’t been here for a little while.”
Id., at 20. Lora recalled that Mr. Muncey went outside and,
not seeing his wife, returned to take Lora and Matthew to
the Luttrells’ so that he could look further.
The next afternoon Billy Ray Hensley, the victim’s first
cousin, heard of Mrs. Muncey’s disappearance and went to
look for Mr. Muncey. As he approached the Munceys’ street,
Hensley allegedly “saw Mr. House come out from under a
bank, wiping his hands on a black rag.” Id., at 32. Just
when and where Hensley saw House, and how well he could

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have observed him, were disputed at House’s trial. Hensley
admitted on cross-examination that he could not have seen
House “walking up or climbing up” the embankment, id., at
39; rather, he saw House, in “[j]ust a glance,” id., at 40, “ap
pear out of nowhere,” “next to the embankment,” id., at 39.
On the Munceys’ street, opposite the area where Hensley
said he saw House, a white Plymouth was parked near a saw
mill. Another witness, Billy Hankins, whom the defense
called, claimed that around the same time he saw a “boy”
walking down the street away from the parked Plymouth
and toward the Munceys’ home. This witness, however, put
the “boy” on the side of the street with the parked car and
the Munceys’ driveway, not the side with the embankment.
Hensley, after turning onto the Munceys’ street, continued
down the road and turned into their driveway. “I pulled up
in the driveway where I could see up toward Little Hube’s
house,” Hensley testified, “and I seen Little Hube’s car
wasn’t there, and I backed out in the road, and come back
[the other way].” Id., at 32. As he traveled up the road,
Hensley saw House traveling in the opposite direction in the
white Plymouth. House “flagged [Hensley] down” through
his windshield, ibid., and the two cars met about 300 feet up
the road from the Munceys’ driveway. According to Hens
ley, House said he had heard Mrs. Muncey was missing and
was looking for her husband. Id., at 33. Though House had
only recently moved to the area, he was acquainted with the
Munceys, had attended a dance with them, and had visited
their home. He later told law enforcement officials he con
sidered both of the Munceys his friends. According to Hens
ley, House said he had heard that Mrs. Muncey’s husband,
who was an alcoholic, was elsewhere “getting drunk.” Ibid.
As Hensley drove off, he “got to thinking to [him]self—he’s
hunting Little Hube, and Little Hube drunk—what would he
be doing off that bank . . . .” Ibid. His suspicion aroused,
Hensley later returned to the Munceys’ street with a friend
named Jack Adkins. The two checked different spots on the

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embankment, and though Hensley saw nothing where he
looked, Adkins found Mrs. Muncey. Her body lay across
from the sawmill near the corner where House’s car had been
parked, dumped in the woods a short way down the bank
leading toward a creek.
Around midnight, Dr. Alex Carabia, a practicing patholo
gist and county medical examiner, performed an autopsy.
Dr. Carabia put the time of death between 9 and 11 p.m.
Mrs. Muncey had a black eye, both her hands were blood
stained up to the wrists, and she had bruises on her legs and
neck. Dr. Carabia described the bruises as consistent with
a “traumatic origin,” i. e., a fight or a fall on hard objects.
7 Tr. 985–986. Based on the neck bruises and other injuries,
he concluded Mrs. Muncey had been choked, but he ruled
this out as the cause of death. The cause of death, in
Dr. Carabia’s view, was a severe blow to the left forehead
that inflicted both a laceration penetrating to the bone and,
inside the skull, a severe right-side hemorrhage, likely
caused by Mrs. Muncey’s brain slamming into the skull oppo
site the impact. Dr. Carabia described this head injury as
consistent either with receiving a blow from a fist or other
instrument or with striking some object.
The county sheriff, informed about Hensley’s earlier en
counter with House, questioned House shortly after the body
was found. That evening, House answered further ques
tions during a voluntary interview at the local jail. Special
Agent Ray Presnell of the Tennessee Bureau of Investiga
tion (TBI) prepared a statement of House’s answers, which
House signed. Asked to describe his whereabouts on the
previous evening, House claimed—falsely, as it turned out—
that he spent the entire evening with his girlfriend, Donna
Turner, at her trailer. Asked whether he was wearing the
same pants he had worn the night before, House replied—
again, falsely—that he was. House was on probation at the
time, having recently been released on parole following a
sentence of five years to life for aggravated sexual assault in

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Utah. House had scratches on his arms and hands, and a
knuckle on his right ring finger was bruised. He attributed
the scratches to Turner’s cats and the finger injury to re
cent construction work tearing down a shed. The next day
House gave a similar statement to a different TBI agent,
Charles Scott.
In fact House had not been at Turner’s home. After ini
tially supporting House’s alibi, Turner informed authorities
that House left her trailer around 10:30 or 10:45 p.m. to go
for a walk. According to Turner’s trial testimony, House re
turned later—she was not sure when—hot and panting, miss
ing his shirt and his shoes. House, Turner testified, told her
that while he was walking on the road near her home, a vehi
cle pulled up beside him, and somebody inside “called him
some names and then they told him he didn’t belong here
anymore.” App. 89. House said he tried to ignore the
taunts and keep walking, but the vehicle pulled in behind
him, and “one of them got out and grabbed him by the shoul
der . . . and [House] swung around with his right hand” and
“hit something.” Ibid. According to Turner, House said
“he took off down the bank and started running and he said
that he—he said it seemed forever where he was running.
And he said they fired two shots at him while he took off
down the bank . . . .” Ibid. House claimed the assailants
“grabbed ahold of his shirt,” which Turner remembered as
“a blue tank top, trimmed in yellow,” and “they tore it to
where it wouldn’t stay on him and he said—I just throwed
it off when I was running.” Id., at 91. Turner, noticing
House’s bruised knuckle, asked how he hurt it, and House
told her “that’s where he hit.” Id., at 90. Turner testified
that she “thought maybe my ex-husband had something to
do with it.” Ibid.
Although the white Plymouth House drove the next day
belonged to Turner, Turner insisted House had not used the
car that night. No forensic evidence connected the car to
the crime; law enforcement officials inspected a white towel

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covering the driver seat and concluded it was clean. Tur
ner’s trailer was located just under two miles by road,
through hilly terrain, from the Muncey residence.
Law enforcement officers also questioned the victim’s hus
band. Though Mrs. Muncey’s comments to Luttrell gave no
indication she knew this, Mr. Muncey had spent the evening
at a weekly dance at a recreation center roughly a mile and a
half from his home. In his statement to law enforcement—a
statement House’s trial counsel claims he never saw—
Mr. Muncey admitted leaving the dance early, but said it was
only for a brief trip to the package store to buy beer. He
also stated that he and his wife had had sexual relations
Saturday morning.
Late in the evening on Monday, July 15—two days after
the murder—law enforcement officers visited Turner ’s
trailer. With Turner’s consent, Agent Scott seized the
pants House was wearing the night Mrs. Muncey disap
peared. The heavily soiled pants were sitting in a laundry
hamper; years later, Agent Scott recalled noticing “reddish
brown stains” he “suspected” were blood. Id., at 274–275.
Around 4 p.m. the next day, two local law enforcement offi
cers set out for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Wash
ington, D. C., with House’s pants, blood samples from the
autopsy, and other evidence packed together in a box. They
arrived at 2 a.m. the next morning. On July 17, after initial
FBI testing revealed human blood on the pants, House was
arrested.
II
The State of Tennessee charged House with capital mur
der. At House’s trial, the State presented testimony by
Luttrell, Hensley, Adkins, Lora Muncey, Dr. Carabia, the
sheriff, and other law enforcement officials. Through TBI
Agents Presnell and Scott, the jury learned of House’s false
statements. Central to the State’s case, however, was what
the FBI testing showed—that semen consistent (or so it
seemed) with House’s was present on Mrs. Muncey’s night

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gown and panties, and that small bloodstains consistent with
Mrs. Muncey’s blood but not House’s appeared on the jeans
belonging to House.
Regarding the semen, FBI Special Agent Paul Bigbee, a
serologist, testified that the source was a “secretor,” mean
ing someone who “secrete[s] the ABO blood group substances
in other body fluids, such as semen and saliva”—a character
istic shared by 80 percent of the population, including House.
Id., at 55. Agent Bigbee further testified that the source of
semen on the gown was blood-type A, House’s own blood
type. As to the semen on the panties, Agent Bigbee found
only the H blood-group substance, which A and B blood-type
secretors secrete along with substances A and B, and which
O-type secretors secrete exclusively. Agent Bigbee ex
plained, however—using science an amicus here sharply dis
putes, see Brief for Innocence Project, Inc., as Amicus Cu
riae 24–26—that House’s A antigens could have “degraded”
into H, App. 57–58. Agent Bigbee thus concluded that both
semen deposits could have come from House, though he
acknowledged that the H antigen could have come from
Mrs. Muncey herself if she was a secretor—something he
“was not able to determine,” id., at 58—and that, while
Mr. Muncey was himself blood-type A (as was his wife),
Agent Bigbee was again “not able to determine his secretor
status,” id., at 57. Agent Bigbee acknowledged on cross
examination that “a saliva sample” would have sufficed to
determine whether Mr. Muncey was a secretor; the State did
not provide such a sample, though it did provide samples of
Mr. Muncey’s blood. Id., at 62.
As for the blood, Agent Bigbee explained that “spots of
blood” appeared “on the left outside leg, the right bottom
cuff, on the left thigh and in the right inside pocket and on
the lower pocket on the outside.” Id., at 48. Agent Bigbee
determined that the blood’s source was type A (the type
shared by House, the victim, and Mr. Muncey). He also suc
cessfully tested for the enzyme phosphoglucomutase and the

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blood serum haptoglobin, both of which “are found in all hu
mans” and carry “slight chemical differences” that vary ge
netically and “can be grouped to differentiate between two
individuals if those types are different.” Id., at 49–50.
Based on these chemical traces and on the A blood type,
Agent Bigbee determined that only some 6.75 percent of the
population carry similar blood, that the blood was “consist
ent” with Mrs. Muncey’s (as determined by testing autopsy
samples), and that it was “impossible” that the blood came
from House. Id., at 48–52.
A different FBI expert, Special Agent Chester Blythe, tes
tified about fiber analysis performed on Mrs. Muncey’s
clothes and on House’s pants. Although Agent Blythe found
blue jean fibers on Mrs. Muncey’s nightgown, brassiere,
housecoat, and panties, and in fingernail scrapings taken
from her body (scrapings that also contained trace, unidenti
fiable amounts of blood), he acknowledged that, as the prose
cutor put it in questioning the witness, “blue jean material
is common material,” so “this doesn’t mean that the fibers
that were all over the victim’s clothing were necessarily from
[House’s] pair of blue jeans.” 6 Tr. 864–865. On House’s
pants, though cotton garments both transfer and retain fi
bers readily, Agent Blythe found neither hair nor fiber con
sistent with the victim’s hair or clothing.
In the defense case House called Hankins, Clinton, and
Turner, as well as House’s mother, who testified that House
had talked to her by telephone around 9:30 p.m. on the night
of the murder and that he had not used her car that evening.
House also called the victim’s brother, Ricky Green, as a wit
ness. Green testified that on July 2, roughly two weeks be
fore the murder, Mrs. Muncey called him and “said her and
Little Hube had been into it and she said she was wanting
to leave Little Hube, she said she was wanting to get out—
out of it, and she was scared.” 7 id., at 1088. Green re
called that at Christmastime in 1982 he had seen Mr. Muncey
strike Mrs. Muncey after returning home drunk.

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As Turner informed the jury, House’s shoes were found
several months after the crime in a field near her home.
Turner delivered them to authorities. Though the jury did
not learn of this fact (and House’s counsel claims he did not
either), the State tested the shoes for blood and found none.
House’s shirt was not found.
The State’s closing argument suggested that on the night
of her murder, Mrs. Muncey “was deceived . . . . She had
been told [her husband] had had an accident.” 9 id., at 1226.
The prosecutor emphasized the FBI’s blood analysis, noting
that “after running many, many, many tests,” Agent Bigbee
“was able to tell you that the blood on the defendant’s
blue jeans was not his own blood, could not be his own
blood. He told you that the blood on the blue jeans was
consistent with every characteristic in every respect of
the deceased’s, Carolyn Muncey’s, and that ninety-three
(93%) percent of the white population would not have
that blood type. . . . He can’t tell you one hundred (100%)
percent for certain that it was her blood. But folks, he
can sure give you a pretty good—a pretty good indica
tion.” Id., at 1235–1236.
In the State’s rebuttal, after defense counsel questioned
House’s motive “to go over and kill a woman that he barely
knew[,] [w]ho was still dressed, still clad in her clothes,” id.,
at 1274, the prosecutor referred obliquely to the semen
stains. While explaining that legally “it does not make any
difference under God’s heaven, what the motive was,” App.
106, the prosecutor told the jury, “you may have an idea why
he did it,” ibid.:
“The evidence at the scene which seemed to suggest
that he was subjecting this lady to some kind of indig
nity, why would you get a lady out of her house, late at
night, in her night clothes, under the trick that her hus
band has had a wreck down by the creek? . . . Well, it is
because either you don’t want her to tell what indigni

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ties you have subjected her to, or she is unwilling and
fights against you, against being subjected to those in
dignities. In other words, it is either to keep her from
telling what you have done to her, or it is that you are
trying to get her to do something that she nor any
mother on that road would want to do with Mr. House,
under those conditions, and you kill her because of her
resistance. That is what the evidence at the scene sug
gests about motive.” Id., at 106–107.
In addition the government suggested the black rag Hensley
said he saw in House’s hands was in fact the missing blue
tank top, retrieved by House from the crime scene. And the
prosecution reiterated the importance of the blood. “[D]e
fense counsel,” he said, “does not start out discussing the
fact that his client had blood on his jeans on the night that
Carolyn Muncey was killed. . . . He doesn’t start with the
fact that nothing that the defense has introduced in this case
explains what blood is doing on his jeans, all over his jeans,
that is scientifically, completely different from his blood.”
Id., at 104–105. The jury found House guilty of murder in
the first degree.
The trial advanced to the sentencing phase. As aggravat
ing factors to support a capital sentence, the State sought
to prove: (1) that House had previously been convicted of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) that the
homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it
involved torture or depravity of mind; and (3) that the mur
der was committed while House was committing, attempting
to commit, or fleeing from the commission of, rape or kid
naping. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39–2–203(i)(2), (5), (7)
(1982) (repealed 1989); cf. §§ 39–13–204(i)(2), (5), (7) (2003).
After presenting evidence of House’s parole status and ag
gravated sexual assault conviction, the State rested. As
mitigation, the defense offered testimony from House’s fa
ther and mother, as well as evidence, presented through
House’s mother, that House attempted suicide after the

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guilt-phase verdict. Before the attempt House wrote his
mother a letter professing his innocence.
In closing the State urged the jury to find all three aggra
vating factors and impose death. As to the kidnaping or
rape factor, the prosecution suggested Mrs. Muncey was “de
coy[ed] or entic[ed] . . . away from her family, and confin[ed]
against her will because you know that as she was being
beaten to death.” 10 Tr. 1410. “We also think,” the prose
cutor added, “the proof shows strong evidence of attempted
sexual molestation of the victim to accompany the taking
away and murdering her.” Id., at 1410–1411. Later the
prosecutor argued, “I think the proof shows in the record
that it is more likely than not that having been through the
process before and having been convicted of a crime involv
ing the threat of violence, or violence to another person, ag
gravated sexual assault, that the defendant cannot benefit
from the type of rehabilitation that correction departments
can provide.” Id., at 1413. The jury unanimously found all
three aggravating factors and concluded “there are no miti
gating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the
statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances.” Id.,
at 1454. The jury recommended a death sentence, which the
trial judge imposed.
III
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed House’s conviction
and sentence, describing the evidence against House as
“circumstantial” but “quite strong.” State v. House, 743
S. W. 2d 141, 143, 144 (1987). Two months later, in a state
trial court, House filed a pro se petition for postconviction
relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at trial. The court-appointed counsel amended the petition
to raise other issues, including a challenge to certain jury
instructions. At a hearing before the same judge who con
ducted the trial, House’s counsel offered no proof beyond
the trial transcript. The trial court dismissed the petition,
deeming House’s trial counsel adequate and overruling

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House’s other objections. On appeal House’s attorney re
newed only the jury-instructions argument. In an unpub
lished opinion the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals af
firmed, and both the Tennessee Supreme Court and this
Court, House v. Tennessee, 498 U. S. 912 (1990), denied
review.
House filed a second postconviction petition in state court
reasserting his ineffective-assistance claim and seeking in
vestigative and/or expert assistance. After extensive liti
gation regarding whether House’s claims were procedurally
defaulted the Tennessee Supreme Court held that House’s
claims were barred under a state statute providing that
claims not raised in prior postconviction proceedings are pre
sumptively waived, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–30–112 (1990) (re
pealed 1995), and that courts may not consider grounds for
relief “which the court finds should be excluded because they
have been waived or previously determined,” § 40–30–111
(repealed 1995). See House v. State, 911 S. W. 2d 705 (1995).
This Court denied certiorari. House v. Tennessee, 517 U. S.
1193 (1996).
House next sought federal habeas relief, asserting numer
ous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecuto
rial misconduct. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, though deeming House’s
claims procedurally defaulted and granting summary judg
ment to the State on the majority of House’s claims, held an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether House fell within
the “actual innocence” exception to procedural default that
this Court recognized as to substantive offenses in Schlup
and as to death sentences in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333
(1992). Presenting evidence we describe in greater detail
below, House attacked the semen and blood evidence used at
his trial and presented other evidence, including a putative
confession, suggesting that Mr. Muncey, not House, com
mitted the murder. The District Court nevertheless denied
relief, holding that House had neither demonstrated actual

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innocence of the murder under Schlup nor established that
he was ineligible for the death penalty under Sawyer.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a cer
tificate of appealability under 28 U. S. C. § 2253(c) as to all
claims in the habeas petition. On the merits a divided panel
affirmed, but its opinion was withdrawn and the case taken
en banc. A divided en banc court certified state-law ques
tions to the Tennessee Supreme Court. House v. Bell, 311
F. 3d 767 (CA6 2002). Concluding that House had made a
compelling showing of actual innocence, and recognizing that
in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993), this Court as
sumed without deciding that “in a capital case a truly per
suasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional,
and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state ave
nue open to process such a claim,” id., at 417, the six-judge
majority certified questions to the State Supreme Court,
311 F. 3d, at 777–778. The questions sought “to ascertain
whether there remains a ‘state avenue open to process such
a claim’ in this case.” Id., at 768. Four dissenting judges
argued the court should have reached the merits, rather than
certifying questions to the state court; these judges asserted
that House could not obtain relief under Schlup, let alone
Sawyer and Herrera. 311 F. 3d, at 780–781 (opinion of
Boggs, J.). A fifth dissenter explained that while he agreed
with the majority that House “presents a strong claim for
habeas relief, at least at the sentencing phase of the case,”
he objected to the certification of questions to the Tennessee
high court. Id., at 787 (opinion of Gilman, J.). This Court
denied certiorari. Bell v. House, 539 U. S. 937 (2003).
The State urged the Tennessee Supreme Court not to an
swer the Court of Appeals’ certified questions, and the state
court did not do so. The case returned to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This time an eight
judge majority affirmed the District Court’s denial of habeas

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relief. 386 F. 3d 668 (2004). Six dissenters argued that
House not only had met the actual-innocence standard for
overcoming procedural default but also was entitled to im
mediate release under Herrera. 386 F. 3d, at 708 (opinion
of Merritt, J.). A seventh dissenter (the same judge who
wrote separately in the previous en banc decision) described
the case as “a real-life murder mystery, an authentic ‘who
done-it’ where the wrong man may be executed.” Id., at 709
(opinion of Gilman, J.). He concluded such grave uncertainty
necessitated relief in the form of a new trial for House.
Id., at 710.
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. 1151 (2005), and now
reverse.
IV
As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law may
support federal habeas relief only if the prisoner demon
strates cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted
error. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 485 (1986);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 129 (1982); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87 (1977). The rule is based on the com
ity and respect that must be accorded to state-court judg
ments. See, e. g., Engle, supra, at 126–129; Wainwright,
supra, at 89–90. The bar is not, however, unqualified. In
an effort to “balance the societal interests in finality, comity,
and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the in
dividual interest in justice that arises in the extraordi
nary case,” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 324, the Court has recog
nized a miscarriage-of-justice exception. “ ‘[I]n appropriate
cases,’ ” the Court has said, “the principles of comity and
finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally un
just incarceration,’ ” Carrier, supra, at 495 (quoting Engle,
supra, at 135).
In Schlup, the Court adopted a specific rule to implement
this general principle. It held that prisoners asserting inno
cence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that,

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in light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” 513 U. S., at 327. This formulation,
Schlup explains, “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘ex
traordinary,’ while still providing petitioner a meaningful av
enue by which to avoid a manifest injustice.” Ibid. (quoting
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 494 (1991)). In the usual
case the presumed guilt of a prisoner convicted in state court
counsels against federal review of defaulted claims. Yet a
petition supported by a convincing Schlup gateway showing
“raise[s] sufficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to un
dermine confidence in the result of the trial without the
assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional
error”; hence, “a review of the merits of the constitutional
claims” is justified. 513 U. S., at 317.
For purposes of this case several features of the Schlup
standard bear emphasis. First, although “[t]o be credible”
a gateway claim requires “new reliable evidence—whether
it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness
accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not pre
sented at trial,” id., at 324, the habeas court’s analysis is not
limited to such evidence. There is no dispute in this case
that House has presented some new reliable evidence; the
State has conceded as much, see infra, at 540–541. In addi
tion, because the District Court held an evidentiary hearing
in this case, and because the State does not challenge the
court’s decision to do so, we have no occasion to elaborate
on Schlup’s observation that when considering an actual
innocence claim in the context of a request for an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court need not “test the new evidence
by a standard appropriate for deciding a motion for summary
judgment,” but rather may “consider how the timing of the
submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on
the probable reliability of that evidence.” 513 U. S., at 331–
332. Our review in this case addresses the merits of the
Schlup inquiry, based on a fully developed record, and with

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respect to that inquiry Schlup makes plain that the habeas
court must consider “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” old and new, incrim
inating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would
necessarily be admitted under “rules of admissibility that
would govern at trial. ” See id., at 327– 328 (quoting
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970)).
Based on this total record, the court must make “a probabi
listic determination about what reasonable, properly in
structed jurors would do.” 513 U. S., at 329. The court’s
function is not to make an independent factual determination
about what likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely
impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors. Ibid.
Second, it bears repeating that the Schlup standard is de
manding and permits review only in the “ ‘extraordinary’ ”
case. Id., at 327 (quoting Zant, supra, at 494); see also 513
U. S., at 324 (emphasizing that “in the vast majority of cases,
claims of actual innocence are rarely successful”). At the
same time, though, the Schlup standard does not require ab
solute certainty about the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. A
petitioner’s burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate
that more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no
reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt—or, to remove the double negative, that more likely
than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.
Finally, as the Schlup decision explains, the gateway
actual-innocence standard is “by no means equivalent to the
standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),” which
governs claims of insufficient evidence. Id., at 330. When
confronted with a challenge based on trial evidence, courts
presume the jury resolved evidentiary disputes reasonably
so long as sufficient evidence supports the verdict. Because
a Schlup claim involves evidence the trial jury did not have
before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to assess how
reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supple
mented record. See ibid. If new evidence so requires, this

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may include consideration of “the credibility of the witnesses
presented at trial.” Ibid.; see also ibid. (noting that “[i]n
such a case, the habeas court may have to make some credi
bility assessments”).
As an initial matter, the State argues that the Antiter
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
110 Stat. 1214, has replaced the Schlup standard with a
stricter test based on Sawyer, which permits consideration
of successive, abusive, or defaulted sentencing-related claims
only if the petitioner “show[s] by clear and convincing evi
dence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found the petitioner eligible for the death pen
alty under the applicable state law,” 505 U. S., at 336. One
AEDPA provision establishes a similar standard for second
or successive petitions involving no retroactively applicable
new law, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); another sets it as a
threshold for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on claims the
petitioner failed to develop in state court, § 2254(e)(2). Nei
ther provision addresses the type of petition at issue here—
a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of de
faulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence.
Thus, the standard of review in these provisions is inappli
cable. Cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 324 (1996)
(“Dismissal of a first federal habeas petition is a particularly
serious matter”).
The State also argues that the District Court’s findings in
this case tie our hands, precluding a ruling in House’s favor
absent a showing of clear error as to the District Court’s
specific determinations. This view overstates the effect of
the District Court’s ruling. Deference is given to a trial
court’s assessment of evidence presented to it in the first
instance. Yet the Schlup inquiry, we repeat, requires a ho
listic judgment about “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” 513 U. S., at 328
(quoting Friendly, supra, at 160), and its likely effect on rea
sonable jurors applying the reasonable-doubt standard. As
a general rule, the inquiry does not turn on discrete findings

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regarding disputed points of fact, and “[i]t is not the district
court’s independent judgment as to whether reasonable
doubt exists that the standard addresses,” 513 U. S., at 329.
Here, although the District Court attentively managed com
plex proceedings, carefully reviewed the extensive record,
and drew certain conclusions about the evidence, the court
did not clearly apply Schlup’s predictive standard regarding
whether reasonable jurors would have reasonable doubt.
As we shall explain, moreover, we are uncertain about the
basis for some of the District Court’s conclusions—a consid
eration that weakens our reliance on its determinations.
With this background in mind we turn to the evidence de
veloped in House’s federal habeas proceedings.
DNA Evidence
First, in direct contradiction of evidence presented at trial,
DNA testing has established that the semen on Mrs.
Muncey’s nightgown and panties came from her husband, Mr.
Muncey, not from House. The State, though conceding this
point, insists this new evidence is immaterial. At the guilt
phase at least, neither sexual contact nor motive were ele
ments of the offense, so in the State’s view the evidence, or
lack of evidence, of sexual assault or sexual advance is of
no consequence. We disagree. In fact we consider the new
disclosure of central importance.
From beginning to end the case is about who committed
the crime. When identity is in question, motive is key. The
point, indeed, was not lost on the prosecution, for it intro
duced the evidence and relied on it in the final guilt-phase
closing argument. Referring to “evidence at the scene,” the
prosecutor suggested that House committed, or attempted to
commit, some “indignity” on Mrs. Muncey that neither she
“nor any mother on that road would want to do with Mr.
House.” 9 Tr. 1302–1303. Particularly in a case like this
where the proof was, as the State Supreme Court observed,
circumstantial, State v. House, 743 S. W. 2d, at 143, 144, we

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think a jury would have given this evidence great weight.
Quite apart from providing proof of motive, it was the only
forensic evidence at the scene that would link House to the
murder.
Law and society, as they ought to do, demand accountabil
ity when a sexual offense has been committed, so not only
did this evidence link House to the crime; it likely was a
factor in persuading the jury not to let him go free. At sen
tencing, moreover, the jury came to the unanimous conclu
sion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder was com
mitted in the course of a rape or kidnaping. The alleged
sexual motivation relates to both those determinations.
This is particularly so given that, at the sentencing phase,
the jury was advised that House had a previous conviction
for sexual assault.
A jury informed that fluids on Mrs. Muncey’s garments
could have come from House might have found that House
trekked the nearly two miles to the victim’s home and lured
her away in order to commit a sexual offense. By contrast
a jury acting without the assumption that the semen could
have come from House would have found it necessary to es
tablish some different motive, or, if the same motive, an in
tent far more speculative. When the only direct evidence of
sexual assault drops out of the case, so, too, does a central
theme in the State’s narrative linking House to the crime.
In that light, furthermore, House’s odd evening walk and his
false statements to authorities, while still potentially incrim
inating, might appear less suspicious.
Bloodstains
The other relevant forensic evidence is the blood on
House’s pants, which appears in small, even minute, stains in
scattered places. As the prosecutor told the jury, they were
stains that, due to their small size, “you or I might not de
tect[,] [m]ight not see, but which the FBI lab was able to find
on [House’s] jeans.” App. 11. The stains appear inside the

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right pocket, outside that pocket, near the inside button, on
the left thigh and outside leg, on the seat of the pants, and
on the right bottom cuff, including inside the pants. Due to
testing by the FBI, cuttings now appear on the pants in sev
eral places where stains evidently were found. (The cut
tings were destroyed in the testing process, and defense ex
perts were unable to replicate the tests.) At trial, the
government argued “nothing that the defense has introduced
in this case explains what blood is doing on his jeans, all over
[House’s] jeans, that is scientifically, completely different
from his blood.” Id., at 105. House, though not disputing
at this point that the blood is Mrs. Muncey’s, now presents
an alternative explanation that, if credited, would undermine
the probative value of the blood evidence.
During House’s habeas proceedings, Dr. Cleland Blake, an
Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Tennessee
and a consultant in forensic pathology to the TBI for 22
years, testified that the blood on House’s pants was chemi
cally too degraded, and too similar to blood collected during
the autopsy, to have come from Mrs. Muncey’s body on the
night of the crime. The blood samples collected during the
autopsy were placed in test tubes without preservative.
Under such conditions, according to Dr. Blake, “you will have
enzyme degradation. You will have different blood group
degradation, blood marker degradation.” Record, Doc. 275,
p. 80 (hereinafter R275:80). The problem of decay, more
over, would have been compounded by the body’s long expo
sure to the elements, sitting outside for the better part of a
summer day. In contrast, if blood is preserved on cloth, “it
will stay there for years,” ibid.; indeed, Dr. Blake said he
deliberately places blood drops on gauze during autopsies to
preserve it for later testing. The blood on House’s pants,
judging by Agent Bigbee’s tests, showed “similar deterio
ration, breakdown of certain of the named numbered en
zymes” as in the autopsy samples. Id., at 110. “[I]f the
victim’s blood had spilled on the jeans while the victim was

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alive and this blood had dried,” Dr. Blake stated, “the deteri
oration would not have occurred,” ibid., and “you would ex
pect [the blood on the jeans] to be different than what was
in the tube,” id., at 113. Dr. Blake thus concluded the blood
on the jeans came from the autopsy samples, not from Mrs.
Muncey’s live (or recently killed) body.
Other evidence confirms that blood did in fact spill from
the vials. It appears the vials passed from Dr. Carabia, who
performed the autopsy, into the hands of two local law en
forcement officers, who transported it to the FBI, where
Agent Bigbee performed the enzyme tests. The blood was
contained in four vials, evidently with neither preservative
nor a proper seal. The vials, in turn, were stored in a styro
foam box, but nothing indicates the box was kept cool.
Rather, in what an evidence protocol expert at the habeas
hearing described as a violation of proper procedure, the sty
rofoam box was packed in the same cardboard box as other
evidence including House’s pants (apparently in a paper bag)
and other clothing (in separate bags). The cardboard box
was then carried in the officers’ car while they made the
10-hour journey from Tennessee to the FBI lab. Dr. Blake
stated that blood vials in hot conditions (such as a car trunk
in the summer) could blow open; and in fact, by the time the
blood reached the FBI it had hemolyzed, or spoiled, due to
heat exposure. By the time the blood passed from the FBI
to a defense expert, roughly a vial and a half were empty,
though Agent Bigbee testified he used at most a quarter of
one vial. Blood, moreover, had seeped onto one corner of
the styrofoam box and onto packing gauze inside the box
below the vials.
In addition, although the pants apparently were packaged
initially in a paper bag and FBI records suggest they arrived
at the FBI in one, the record does not contain the paper bag
but does contain a plastic bag with a label listing the pants
and Agent Scott’s name—and the plastic bag has blood on it.
The blood appears in a forked streak roughly five inches long

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and two inches wide running down the bag’s outside front.
Though testing by House’s expert confirmed the stain was
blood, the expert could not determine the blood’s source.
Speculations about when and how the blood got there add to
the confusion regarding the origins of the stains on House’s
pants.
Faced with these indications of, at best, poor evidence con
trol, the State attempted to establish at the habeas hearing
that all blood spillage occurred after Agent Bigbee examined
the pants. Were that the case, of course, then blood would
have been detected on the pants before any spill—which
would tend to undermine Dr. Blake’s analysis and support
using the bloodstains to infer House’s guilt. In support of
this theory the State put on testimony by a blood spatter
expert who believed the “majority” of the stains were
“transfer stains,” that is, stains resulting from “wip[ing]
across the surface of the pants” rather than seeping or spill
age. App. 293–294. Regarding the spillage in the styro
foam box, the expert noted that yellow “Tennessee Crime
Laboratory” tape running around the box and down all four
sides did not line up when the bloodstains on the box’s corner
were aligned. The inference was that the FBI received the
box from Tennessee authorities, opened it, and resealed it
before the spillage occurred. Reinforcing this theory, Agent
Bigbee testified that he observed no blood spillage in the
styrofoam box and that had he detected such signs of evi
dence contamination, FBI policy would have required imme
diate return of the evidence.
In response House argued that even assuming the tape
alignment showed spillage occurring after FBI testing, spill
age on one or more earlier occasions was likely. In fact even
the State’s spatter expert declined to suggest the blood in
the box and on the packing gauze accounted for the full
vial and a quarter missing. And when the defense expert
opened the box and discovered the spills, the bulk of the
blood-caked gauze was located around and underneath the

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half-full vial, which was also located near the stained corner.
No gauze immediately surrounding the completely empty
vial was stained. The tape, moreover, circled the box in two
layers, one underneath the other, and in one spot the under
lying layer stops cleanly at the lid’s edge, as if cut with a
razor, and does not continue onto the body of the box below.
In House’s view this clean cut suggests the double layers
could not have resulted simply from wrapping the tape
around twice, as the spatter expert claimed; rather, someone
possessing Tennessee Crime Lab tape—perhaps the officers
transporting the blood and pants—must have cut the box
open and resealed it, possibly creating an opportunity for
spillage. Supporting the same inference, a label on the box’s
lid lists both blood and vaginal secretions as the box’s con
tents, though Agent Bigbee’s records show the vaginal fluids
arrived at the FBI in a separate envelope. Finally, cross
examination revealed that Agent Bigbee’s practice did not
always match the letter of FBI policy. Although Mrs. Mun
cey’s bra and housecoat were packed together in a single
bag, creating, according to Agent Bigbee, a risk of “cross
contamination,” id., at 286, he did not return them; nor did
he note the discrepancy between the “[b]lood and vaginal
secretions” label and the styrofoam box’s actual contents,
though he insisted his customary practice was to match la
bels with contents immediately upon opening an evidence
box, id., at 287.
The State challenged Dr. Blake’s scientific conclusions, and
to do so it called Agent Bigbee as a witness. Agent Bigbee
defended the testimony he had given at the trial. To begin
with, he suggested Dr. Blake had misconstrued the term
“inc” in Agent Bigbee’s trial report, interpreting it to mean
“incomplete” when it in fact meant “inconclusive.” Id., at
254–256, 282. Dr. Blake, however, replied “[s]ame differ
ence” when asked whether his opinion would change if “inc”
meant “inconclusive.” Id., at 256; see also 6 Tr. 906 (Bigbee
trial testimony) (“You will notice I have INC written under

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the transparent, that is the symbol that I use to mean the
test was incomplete”). Agent Bigbee further asserted that,
whereas Dr. Blake (in Bigbee’s view) construed the results
to mean the enzyme was not present at all, in fact the results
indicated only that Bigbee could not identify the marker type
on whatever enzymes were present. App. 282. Yet the
State did not cross-examine Dr. Blake on this point, nor did
the District Court resolve the dispute one way or the other,
so on this record it seems possible that Dr. Blake meant only
to suggest the blood was too degraded to permit conclusive
typing. The State, moreover, does not ask us to question
Dr. Blake’s basic premise about the durability of blood chemi
cals deposited on cotton—a premise Agent Bigbee appeared
to accept as a general matter. Given the record as it stands,
then, we cannot say Dr. Blake’s conclusions have been dis
credited; if other objections might be adduced, they must
await further proceedings. At the least, the record before
us contains credible testimony suggesting that the missing
enzyme markers are generally better preserved on cloth
than in poorly kept test tubes, and that principle could sup
port House’s spillage theory for the blood’s origin.
In this Court, as a further attack on House’s showing, the
State suggests that, given the spatter expert’s testimony,
House’s theory would require a jury to surmise that Tennes
see officials donned the pants and deliberately spread blood
over them. We disagree. This should be a matter for the
trier of fact to consider in the first instance, but we can note
a line of argument that could refute the State’s position. It
is correct that the State’s spatter expert opined that the
stains resulted from wiping or smearing rather than direct
spillage; and she further stated that the distribution of stains
in some spots suggests the pants were “folded in some man
ner or creased in some manner” when the transfers occurred,
id., at 296. While the expert described this pattern, at least
with respect to stains on the lap of the pants, as “consistent”
with the pants being worn at the time of the staining, ibid.,

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her testimony, as we understand it, does not refute the hy
pothesis that the packaging of the pants for transport was
what caused them to be folded or creased. It seems permis
sible, moreover, to conclude that the small size and wide dis
tribution of stains—inside the right pocket, outside that
pocket, near the inside button, on the left thigh and outside
leg, on the seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff,
including inside the pants—fits as well with spillage in trans
port as with wiping and smearing from bloody objects at the
crime scene, as the State proposes. (As has been noted, no
blood was found on House’s shoes.)
The District Court discounted Dr. Blake’s opinion, not on
account of Blake’s substantive approach, but based on tes
timony from Agent Scott indicating he saw, as the District
Court put it, “what appeared to be bloodstains on Mr.
House’s blue jeans when the jeans were removed from the
laundry hamper at Ms. Turner’s trailer.” Id., at 348. This
inference seems at least open to question, however. Agent
Scott stated only that he “saw reddish brownish stains [he]
suspected to be blood”; he admitted that he “didn’t thor
oughly examine the blue jeans at that time.” R276:113–114.
The pants were in fact extensively soiled with mud and red
dish stains, only small portions of which are blood.
In sum, considering “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” Schlup, 513 U. S.,
at 328 (quoting Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 160), on this
issue, we think the evidentiary disarray surrounding the
blood, taken together with Dr. Blake’s testimony and the lim
ited rebuttal of it in the present record, would prevent rea
sonable jurors from placing significant reliance on the blood
evidence. We now know, though the trial jury did not, that
an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner believes the blood on
House’s jeans must have come from autopsy samples; that a
vial and a quarter of autopsy blood is unaccounted for; that
the blood was transported to the FBI together with the
pants in conditions that could have caused vials to spill; that
the blood did indeed spill at least once during its journey

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from Tennessee authorities through FBI hands to a defense
expert; that the pants were stored in a plastic bag bearing
both a large blood stain and a label with TBI Agent Scott’s
name; and that the styrofoam box containing the blood
samples may well have been opened before it arrived at
the FBI lab. Thus, whereas the bloodstains, emphasized by
the prosecution, seemed strong evidence of House’s guilt at
trial, the record now raises substantial questions about the
blood’s origin.
A Different Suspect
Were House’s challenge to the State’s case limited to the
questions he has raised about the blood and semen, the other
evidence favoring the prosecution might well suffice to bar
relief. There is, however, more; for in the post-trial pro
ceedings House presented troubling evidence that Mr.
Muncey, the victim’s husband, himself could have been the
murderer.
At trial, as has been noted, the jury heard that roughly
two weeks before the murder Mrs. Muncey’s brother re
ceived a frightened phone call from his sister indicating that
she and Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she was scared,
and that she wanted to leave him. The jury also learned
that the brother once saw Mr. Muncey “smac[k]” the victim.
7 Tr. 1087–1088. House now has produced evidence from
multiple sources suggesting that Mr. Muncey regularly
abused his wife. For example, one witness—Kathy Parker,
a lifelong area resident who denied any animosity toward
Mr. Muncey—recalled that Mrs. Muncey “was constantly
with black eyes and busted mouth.” App. 235. In addition
Hazel Miller, who is Kathy Parker’s mother and a lifelong
acquaintance of Mr. Muncey, testified at the habeas hearing
that two or three months before the victim’s death Mr. Mun
cey came to Miller’s home and “tried to get my daughter
[Parker] to go out with him,” R274:47. (Parker had dated
Mr. Muncey at age 14.) According to Miller, Muncey said
“[h]e was upset with his wife, that they had had an argument

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and he said he was going to get rid of that woman one way
or the other.” App. 236.
Another witness—Mary Atkins, also an area native who
“grew up” with Mr. Muncey and professed no hard feelings,
R274:10, 16—claims she saw Mr. Muncey “backhan[d]” Mrs.
Muncey on the very night of the murder. App. 226, 228.
Atkins recalled that during a break in the recreation center
dance, she saw Mr. Muncey and his wife arguing in the park
ing lot. Mr. Muncey “grabbed her and he just backhanded
her.” Id., at 228. After that, Mrs. Muncey “left walking.”
Id., at 229. There was also testimony from Atkins’ mother,
named Artie Lawson. A self-described “good friend” of Mr.
Muncey, id., at 231, Lawson said Mr. Muncey visited her the
morning after the murder, before the body was found. Ac
cording to Lawson, Mr. Muncey asked her to tell anyone who
inquired not only that she had been at the dance the evening
before and had seen him, but also that he had breakfasted at
her home at 6 o’clock that morning. Lawson had not in fact
been at the dance, nor had Mr. Muncey been with her so
early.
Of most importance is the testimony of Kathy Parker and
her sister Penny Letner. They testified at the habeas hear
ing that, around the time of House’s trial, Mr. Muncey had
confessed to the crime. Parker recalled that she and “some
family members and some friends [were] sitting around
drinking” at Parker’s trailer when Mr. Muncey “just walked
in and sit down.” R274:37. Muncey, who had evidently
been drinking heavily, began “rambling off . . . [t]alking about
what happened to his wife and how it happened and he didn’t
mean to do it.” Ibid. According to Parker, Mr. Muncey
“said they had been into [an] argument and he slapped her
and she fell and hit her head and it killed her and he didn’t
mean for it to happen.” Id., at 38. Parker said she
“freaked out and run him off.” Ibid.
Letner similarly recalled that at some point either “during
[House’s] trial or just before,” id., at 30, Mr. Muncey intruded

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on a gathering at Parker’s home. Appearing “pretty well
blistered,” Muncey “went to crying and was talking about
his wife and her death and he was saying that he didn’t mean
to do it.” App. 232. “[D]idn’t mean to do what[?],” Letner
asked, R274:33, at which point Mr. Muncey explained:
“[S]he was ‘bitching him out’ because he didn’t take her
fishing that night, that he went to the dance instead.
He said when he come home that she was still on him
pretty heavily ‘bitching him out’ again and that he
smacked her and that she fell and hit her head. He said
I didn’t mean to do it, but I had to get rid of her, because
I didn’t want to be charged with murder. ” App.
232–233.
Letner, who was then 19 years old with a small child, said
Mr. Muncey’s statement “scared [her] quite badly,” so she
“got out of there immediately.” Id., at 233. Asked whether
she reported the incident to the authorities, Letner stated,
“I was frightened, you know. . . . I figured me being 19 year
old they wouldn’t listen to anything I had to say.” R274:31.
Parker, on the other hand, claimed she (Parker) in fact went
to the Sheriff ’s Department, but no one would listen:
“I tried to speak to the Sheriff but he was real busy.
He sent me to a deputy. The deputy told me to go up
stairs to the courtroom and talk to this guy, I can’t
remember his name. I never did really get to talk to
anybody.” App. 234.
Parker said she did not discuss the matter further because
“[t]hey had it all signed, sealed and delivered. We didn’t
know anything to do until we heard that they reopened
[House’s] trial.” R274:45. Parker’s mother, Hazel Miller,
confirmed she had driven Parker to the courthouse, where
Parker “went to talk to some of the people about this
case.” App. 237.
Other testimony suggests Mr. Muncey had the opportunity
to commit the crime. According to Dennis Wallace, a local

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law enforcement official who provided security at the dance
on the night of the murder, Mr. Muncey left the dance
“around 10:00, 10:30, 9:30 to 10:30.” R274:56–57. Although
Mr. Muncey told law enforcement officials just after the mur
der that he left the dance only briefly and returned, Wallace
could not recall seeing him back there again. Later that
evening, Wallace responded to Mr. Muncey’s report that his
wife was missing. Muncey denied he and his wife had been
“a fussing or a fighting”; he claimed his wife had been “kid
napped.” Id., at 58. Wallace did not recall seeing any
blood, disarray, or knocked-over furniture, although he ad
mitted he “didn’t pay too much attention” to whether the
floor appeared especially clean. According to Wallace, Mr.
Muncey said “let’s search for her” and then led Wallace out
to search “in the weeds” around the home and the driveway
(not out on the road where the body was found). Id., at
58, 60, 63.
In the habeas proceedings, then, two different witnesses
(Parker and Letner) described a confession by Mr. Muncey;
two more (Atkins and Lawson) described suspicious behav
ior (a fight and an attempt to construct a false alibi) around
the time of the crime; and still other witnesses described a
history of abuse.
As to Parker and Letner, the District Court noted that it
was “not impressed with the allegations of individuals who
wait over ten years to come forward with their evidence,”
especially considering that “there was no physical evidence
in the Munceys’ kitchen to corroborate [Mr. Muncey’s] al
leged confession that he killed [his wife] there.” App. 348.
Parker and Letner, however, did attempt to explain their
delay coming forward, and the record indicates no reason
why these two women, both lifelong acquaintances of Mr.
Muncey, would have wanted either to frame him or to help
House. Furthermore, the record includes at least some in
dependent support for the statements Parker and Letner at
tributed to Mr. Muncey. The supposed explanation for the

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fatal fight—that his wife was complaining about going fish
ing—fits with Mrs. Muncey’s statement to Luttrell earlier
that evening that her husband’s absence was “all right, be
cause she was going to make him take her fishing the next
day,” id., at 11–12. And Dr. Blake testified, in only partial
contradiction of Dr. Carabia, that Mrs. Muncey’s head injury
resulted from “a surface with an edge” or “a hard surface
with a corner,” not from a fist. R275:72. (Dr. Carabia had
said either a fist or some other object could have been the
cause.)
Mr. Muncey testified at the habeas hearing, and the Dis
trict Court did not question his credibility. Though Mr.
Muncey said he seemed to remember visiting Lawson the
day after the murder, he denied either killing his wife or
confessing to doing so. Yet Mr. Muncey also claimed, con
trary to Constable Wallace’s testimony and to his own prior
statement, that he left the dance on the night of the crime
only when it ended at midnight. Mr. Muncey, moreover, de
nied ever hitting Mrs. Muncey; the State itself had to im
peach him with a prior statement on this point.
It bears emphasis, finally, that Parker’s and Letner’s testi
mony is not comparable to the sort of eleventh-hour affidavit
vouching for a defendant and incriminating a conveniently
absent suspect that Justice O’Connor described in her con
curring opinion in Herrera as “unfortunate” and “not uncom
mon” in capital cases, 506 U. S., at 423; nor was the confes
sion Parker and Letner described induced under pressure
of interrogation. The confession evidence here involves an
alleged spontaneous statement recounted by two eyewit
nesses with no evident motive to lie. For this reason it has
more probative value than, for example, incriminating testi
mony from inmates, suspects, or friends or relations of the
accused.
The evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey is by no means con
clusive. If considered in isolation, a reasonable jury might
well disregard it. In combination, however, with the chal

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lenges to the blood evidence and the lack of motive with re
spect to House, the evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey likely
would reinforce other doubts as to House’s guilt.
Other Evidence
Certain other details were presented at the habeas hear
ing. First, Dr. Blake, in addition to testifying about the
blood evidence and the victim’s head injury, examined photo
graphs of House’s bruises and scratches and concluded, based
on 35 years’ experience monitoring the development and
healing of bruises, that they were too old to have resulted
from the crime. In addition Dr. Blake claimed that the in
jury on House’s right knuckle was indicative of “[g]etting
mashed”; it was not consistent with striking someone.
R275:63. (That of course would also eliminate the explana
tion that the injury came from the blow House supposedly
told Turner he gave to his unidentified assailant.)
The victim’s daughter, Lora Muncey (now Lora Tharp),
also testified at the habeas hearing. She repeated her recol
lection of hearing a man with a deep voice like her grand
father’s and a statement that her father had had a wreck
down by the creek. She also denied seeing any signs of
struggle or hearing a fight between her parents, though she
also said she could not recall her parents ever fighting physi
cally. The District Court found her credible, and this testi
mony certainly cuts in favor of the State.
Finally, House himself testified at the habeas proceedings.
He essentially repeated the story he allegedly told Turner
about getting attacked on the road. The District Court
found, however, based on House’s demeanor, that he “was not
a credible witness.” App. 329.
Conclusion
This is not a case of conclusive exoneration. Some aspects
of the State’s evidence—Lora Muncey’s memory of a deep
voice, House’s bizarre evening walk, his lie to law enforce

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ment, his appearance near the body, and the blood on his
pants—still support an inference of guilt. Yet the central
forensic proof connecting House to the crime—the blood and
the semen—has been called into question, and House has put
forward substantial evidence pointing to a different suspect.
Accordingly, and although the issue is close, we conclude that
this is the rare case where—had the jury heard all the con
flicting testimony—it is more likely than not that no reason
able juror viewing the record as a whole would lack reason
able doubt.
V
In addition to his gateway claim under Schlup, House ar
gues that he has shown freestanding innocence and that as a
result his imprisonment and planned execution are unconsti
tutional. In Herrera, decided three years before Schlup,
the Court assumed without deciding that “in a capital case a
truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant uncon
stitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were
no state avenue open to process such a claim.” 506 U. S., at
417; see also id., at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I cannot
disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing
the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution”). “[T]he
threshold showing for such an assumed right would neces
sarily be extraordinarily high,” the Court explained, and
petitioner’s evidence there fell “far short of that which would
have to be made in order to trigger the sort of constitutional
claim which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist.” Id., at
417, 418–419; see also id., at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that because “[p]etitioner has failed to make a per
suasive showing of actual innocence,” “the Court has no rea
son to pass on, and appropriately reserves, the question
whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of
actual innocence”). House urges the Court to answer the
question left open in Herrera and hold not only that free

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standing innocence claims are possible but also that he has
established one.
We decline to resolve this issue. We conclude here, much
as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical free
standing innocence claim would require, this petitioner has
not satisfied it. To be sure, House has cast considerable
doubt on his guilt—doubt sufficient to satisfy Schlup’s gate
way standard for obtaining federal review despite a state
procedural default. In Herrera, however, the Court de
scribed the threshold for any hypothetical freestanding inno
cence claim as “extraordinarily high.” 506 U. S., at 417.
The sequence of the Court’s decisions in Herrera and
Schlup—first leaving unresolved the status of freestanding
claims and then establishing the gateway standard—implies
at the least that Herrera requires more convincing proof of
innocence than Schlup. It follows, given the closeness of the
Schlup question here, that House’s showing falls short of the
threshold implied in Herrera.
* * *
House has satisfied the gateway standard set forth in
Schlup and may proceed on remand with procedurally de
faulted constitutional claims. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas join, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.
To overcome the procedural hurdle that Paul House cre
ated by failing to properly present his constitutional claims
to a Tennessee court, he must demonstrate that the constitu
tional violations he alleges “ha[ve] probably resulted in the

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conviction of one who is actually innocent,” such that a fed
eral court’s refusal to hear the defaulted claims would be a
“miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 326,
327 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). To make the
requisite showing of actual innocence, House must produce
“new reliable evidence” and “must show that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him
in the light of the new evidence.” Id., at 324, 327 (emphasis
added). The question is not whether House was prejudiced
at his trial because the jurors were not aware of the new
evidence, but whether all the evidence, considered together,
proves that House was actually innocent, so that no reason
able juror would vote to convict him. Considering all the
evidence, and giving due regard to the District Court’s find
ings on whether House’s new evidence was reliable, I do not
find it probable that no reasonable juror would vote to con
vict him, and accordingly I dissent.
Because I do not think that House has satisfied the actual
innocence standard set forth in Schlup, I do not believe that
he has met the higher threshold for a freestanding innocence
claim, assuming such a claim exists. See Herrera v. Collins,
506 U. S. 390, 417 (1993). I therefore concur in the judgment
with respect to the Court’s disposition of that separate claim.
I
In Schlup, we stated that a habeas petitioner attempting
to present a defaulted claim to a federal court must present
“new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physi
cal evidence—that was not presented at trial.” 513 U. S., at
324 (emphasis added). Implicit in the requirement that a
habeas petitioner present reliable evidence is the expectation
that a factfinder will assess reliability. The new evidence at
issue in Schlup had not been subjected to such an assess
ment—the claim in Schlup was for an evidentiary hearing—

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and this Court specifically recognized that the “new state
ments may, of course, be unreliable.” Id., at 331. The
Court stated that the District Court, as the “reviewing tri
bunal,” was tasked with assessing the “probative force” of
the petitioner’s new evidence of innocence, and “may have to
make some credibility assessments.” Id., at 327–328, 330.
Indeed, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of remand
ing the case to the Court of Appeals “with instructions to
remand to the District Court,” so that the District Court
could consider how the “likely credibility of the affiants”
bears upon the “probable reliability” of the new evidence.
Id., at 332. In short, the new evidence is not simply taken
at face value; its reliability has to be tested.
Critical to the Court’s conclusion here that House has suf
ficiently demonstrated his innocence are three pieces of new
evidence presented to the District Court: DNA evidence
showing that the semen on Carolyn Muncey’s clothing was
from her husband, Hubert Muncey, not from House; testi
mony from new witnesses implicating Mr. Muncey in the
murder; and evidence indicating that Mrs. Muncey’s blood
spilled from test tubes containing autopsy samples in an evi
dence container. To determine whether it should open its
door to House’s defaulted constitutional claims, the District
Court considered this evidence in a comprehensive eviden
tiary hearing. As House presented his new evidence, and
as the State rebutted it, the District Court observed the wit
nesses’ demeanor, examined physical evidence, and made
findings about whether House’s new evidence was in fact reli
able. This factfinding role is familiar to a district court.
“The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact,
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.”
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574 (1985).
The State did not contest House’s new DNA evidence ex
cluding him as the source of the semen on Mrs. Muncey’s
clothing, but it strongly contested the new testimony impli

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cating Mr. Muncey, and it insisted that the blood spillage
occurred after the FBI tested House’s jeans and determined
that they were stained with Mrs. Muncey’s blood.
At the evidentiary hearing, sisters Kathy Parker and
Penny Letner testified that 14 years earlier, either during
or around the time of House’s trial, they heard Mr. Muncey
drunkenly confess to having accidentally killed his wife when
he struck her in their home during an argument, causing her
to fall and hit her head. Record, Doc. 274, pp. 28–29, 30,
37–38. Schlup provided guidance on how a district court
should assess this type of new evidence: The court “may con
sider how the timing of the submission and the likely credi
bility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that
evidence,” and it “must assess the probative force of the
newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of
guilt adduced at trial.” 513 U. S., at 332. Consistent with
this guidance, the District Court concluded that the sisters’
testimony was not credible. The court noted that it was
“not impressed with the allegations of individuals who wait
over ten years to come forward.” App. 348. It also con
sidered how the new testimony fit within the larger web of
evidence, observing that Mr. Muncey’s alleged confession
contradicted the testimony of the Munceys’ “very credible”
daughter, Lora Tharp, who consistently testified that she did
not hear a fight in the house that night, but instead heard a
man with a deep voice who lured her mother from the house
by saying that Mr. Muncey had been in a wreck near the
creek. Id., at 323, 348.
The District Court engaged in a similar reliability inquiry
with regard to House’s new evidence of blood spillage. At
the evidentiary hearing, House conceded that FBI testing
showed that his jeans were stained with Mrs. Muncey’s
blood, but he set out to prove that the blood spilled from test
tubes containing autopsy samples, and that it did so before
the jeans were tested by the FBI. The District Court sum
marized the testimony of the various witnesses who handled

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the evidence and their recollections about bloodstains and
spillage; it acknowledged that House’s expert, Dr. Cleland
Blake, disagreed with FBI Agent Paul Bigbee about how to
interpret the results of Agent Bigbee’s genetic marker analy
sis summary; and it summarized the testimony of the State’s
blood spatter expert, Paulette Sutton. Id., at 339–347.
After reviewing all the evidence, the District Court stated:
“Based upon the evidence introduced during the evidentiary
hearing . . . the court concludes that the spillage occurred
after the FBI crime laboratory received and tested the evi
dence.” Id., at 348 (emphasis added).
Normally, an appellate court reviews a district court’s fac
tual findings only for clear error. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documen
tary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses”); Bessemer
City, supra, at 574 (clearly-erroneous standard applies “even
when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility
determinations, but are based instead on physical or docu
mentary evidence or inferences from other facts”). The
Sixth Circuit deferred to the District Court’s factual find
ings, 386 F. 3d 668, 684 (2004), and Schlup did not purport to
alter—but instead reaffirmed and highlighted—the district
court’s critical role as factfinder. Yet the majority asserts
that the clear error standard “overstates the effect of the
District Court’s ruling,” and then dismisses the District
Court’s reliability findings because it is “uncertain about”
them, while stopping short of identifying clear error. Ante,
at 539–540. This is a sharp departure from the guidance
in Schlup.
In Schlup, we contrasted a district court’s role in assessing
the reliability of new evidence of innocence with a district
court’s role in deciding a summary judgment motion. 513
U. S., at 332. We explained that, in the latter situation, the
district court does not assess credibility or weigh the evi

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dence, but simply determines whether there is a genuine fac
tual issue for trial. Ibid. Assessing the reliability of new
evidence, on the other hand, is a typical factfinding role, re
quiring credibility determinations and a weighing of the
“probative force” of the new evidence in light of “the evi
dence of guilt adduced at trial.” Ibid. We found it “[o]bvi
ou[s]” that a habeas court conducting an actual innocence
inquiry must do more than simply check whether there are
genuine factual issues for trial. Ibid. The point of the ac
tual innocence inquiry is for the federal habeas court to
satisfy itself that it should suspend the normal procedural
default rule, disregard the important judicial interests of
finality and comity, and allow a state prisoner to present
his defaulted constitutional claims to a federal court. See
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 490–491 (1991).
The majority surprisingly states that this guidance is inap
plicable here because this case involves a “fully developed
record,” while the District Court in Schlup had declined to
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Ante, at 537–538. But the
guidance is clearly applicable: The point in Schlup was not
simply that a hearing was required, but why—because the
District Court had to assess the probative force of the peti
tioner’s newly presented evidence, by engaging in factfinding
rather than performing a summary-judgment-type inquiry.
513 U. S., at 331–332. That is precisely what the District
Court did here. In addition to a “fully developed record,”
we have the District Court’s factual findings about the relia
bility of the new evidence in that record, factual findings
which the majority disregards without finding clear error.
The majority essentially disregards the District Court’s
role in assessing the reliability of House’s new evidence.
With regard to the sisters’ testimony, the majority casts
aside the District Court’s determination that their state
ments came too late and were too inconsistent with credible
record evidence to be reliable, instead observing that the
women had no obvious reason to lie, that a few aspects of

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their testimony have record support, and that they re
counted an uncoerced confession. Ante, at 551–552. As for
the District Court’s express finding that the autopsy blood
spilled after the FBI tested House’s jeans, the majority
points to Dr. Blake’s testimony that blood enzymes “are gen
erally better preserved on cloth,” and even conjures up its
own theory in an attempt to refute Ms. Sutton’s expert testi
mony that the pattern of some bloodstains was consistent
with blood being transferred while the pants were being
worn. Ante, at 546–547 (“This should be a matter for the
trier of fact to consider in the first instance, but we can note
a line of argument that could refute the State’s position. . . .
[Ms. Sutton’s] testimony . . . does not refute the hypothesis
that the packaging of the pants for transport was what
caused them to be folded or creased”); see App. 296.
The majority’s assessment of House’s new evidence is pre
cisely the summary-judgment-type inquiry Schlup said was
inappropriate. 513 U. S., at 332. By casting aside the Dis
trict Court’s factual determinations made after a comprehen
sive evidentiary hearing, the majority has done little more
than reiterate the factual disputes presented below. Wit
nesses do not testify in our courtroom, and it is not our role
to make credibility findings and construct theories of the
possible ways in which Mrs. Muncey’s blood could have been
spattered and wiped on House’s jeans. The District Court
did not painstakingly conduct an evidentiary hearing to com
pile a record for us to sort through transcript by transcript
and photograph by photograph, assessing for ourselves the
reliability of what we see. Schlup made abundantly clear
that reliability determinations were essential, but were for
the district court to make. Id., at 331–332. We are to defer
to the better situated District Court on reliability, unless we
determine that its findings are clearly erroneous. We are
not concerned with “the district court’s independent judg
ment as to whether reasonable doubt exists,” id., at 329, but
the District Court here made basic factual findings about

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the reliability of House’s new evidence; it did not offer its
personal opinion about whether it doubted House’s guilt.
Schlup makes clear that those findings are controlling unless
clearly erroneous.
I have found no clear error in the District Court’s reliabil
ity findings. Not having observed Ms. Parker and Ms. Let
ner testify, I would defer to the District Court’s determina
tion that they are not credible, and the evidence in the record
undermining the tale of an accidental killing during a fight in
the Muncey home convinces me that this credibility finding is
not clearly erroneous. Dr. Alex Carabia, who performed the
autopsy, testified to injuries far more severe than a bump on
the head: Mrs. Muncey had bruises on the front and back of
her neck, on both thighs, on her lower right leg and left knee,
and her hands were bloodstained up to the wrists; her inju
ries were consistent with a struggle and traumatic strangu
lation. Record, Addendum 4, 7 Tr. of Evidence in No. 378
(Crim. Ct. Union County, Tenn.), pp. 984–987 (hereinafter
Tr.). And, of course, Lora Tharp has consistently recalled a
deep-voiced visitor arriving late at night to tell Mrs. Muncey
that her husband was in a wreck near the creek. App.
19, 270.
I also find abundant evidence in the record to support the
District Court’s finding that blood spilled within the evi
dence container after the FBI received and tested House’s
jeans. Agent Bigbee testified that there was no leakage in
the items submitted to him for testing. Id., at 277. The
majority’s entire analysis on this point assumes the agent
flatly lied, though there was no attack on his credibility
below. Moreover, Ms. Sutton determined, in her expert
opinion, that the wide distribution of stains “front and back,
top to bottom,” the fact that some bloodstains were mixed
with mud, and the presence of bloodstains inside the pocket
and inside the fly, showed that the blood was spattered and
wiped—not spilled—on House’s jeans. Id., at 291–293, 295;
id., at 293 (“[I]f a tube of blood had spilled on these pants,

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the stain should have been in a localized area”); id., at 294
(“The stains also . . . either originate on the inside and don’t
soak out or on the outside and are not soaking to the inside.
That, of course, would be what you would see with a spill”).
It is also worth noting that the blood evidently spilled in
side the evidence container when the jeans were protected
inside a plastic zip lock bag, as shown by the presence of a
bloodstain on the outside of that bag. See Record, Pl. Exh.
10–6. House’s expert tested the exterior and interior of
that plastic bag for bloodstains using an “extremely sensi
tive” test, and only the exterior of the bag tested positive for
blood. Id., Doc. 274, at 95–96. The evidence in the record
indicates that the jeans were placed in the plastic bag after
they arrived at the FBI: FBI records show that the jeans
arrived there in a paper bag, and the plastic bag has FBI
markings on it. Id., Addendum 2, Trial Exh. 31, at 36; id.,
Pl. Exh. 10–6. The bloodstain on the outside of the plastic
bag therefore further supports the District Court’s conclu
sion that the blood spilled after the evidence was received
and tested by the FBI, and not en route when the jeans were
in a paper bag. I suppose it is theoretically possible that
the jeans were contaminated by spillage before arriving at
the FBI, that Agent Bigbee either failed to note or lied about
such spillage, and that the FBI then transferred the jeans
into a plastic bag and put them back inside the evidence con
tainer with the spilled blood still sloshing around sufficiently
to contaminate the outside of the plastic bag as extensively
as it did. This sort of unbridled speculation can theoreti
cally defeat any inconvenient fact, but does not suffice to con
vince me that the District Court’s factual finding—that the
blood spilled after FBI testing—was clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the yellow “Tennessee Crime Lab” tape placed
around the container on all four sides does not line up when
the bloodstained corners of the container and its lid are
aligned, showing that the blood did not spill until sometime
after the container was received and opened at its first desti

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nation—the FBI. See id., Respondent’s Exh. 24; id., Doc.
276, at 190–191 (testimony of Paulette Sutton). The major
ity points out that on one side of the container, the first of
two layers of tape appears to begin cleanly at the lid’s edge,
and from this concludes that the container must have been
cut open and resealed by Tennessee authorities en route to
the FBI. Ante, at 545; see Record, Respondent’s Exh. 23d.
Even if the majority’s deduction from a photograph of the
container were true, it would show only that Tennessee au
thorities had reason to open the container once it was sealed
to take something out or put something in, perhaps back at
the crime lab in Union County. But even if the container
had been opened before its arrival at the FBI, the majority
recognizes that it was resealed with “Tennessee Crime Lab”
tape, and the second layer of tape aligns only when the
bloodstains on the container and its lid do not. Ante, at 544.
Of course, the District Court—which concluded that the
blood was spilled after testing at the FBI laboratory—had
before it the box itself with the tape as the witnesses testi
fied on the point, and not—like this Court—simply a photo
graph. See Bessemer City, 470 U. S., at 574 (district court’s
findings about physical evidence are reviewed for clear
error).
House’s theory that the blood on his jeans was transferred
there from the autopsy samples is based on Dr. Blake’s read
ing of Agent Bigbee’s enzyme marker analysis summary.
After reading the summary, Dr. Blake concluded that the
enzymes in the bloodstains on House’s jeans and the enzymes
in the autopsy samples had deteriorated to the same extent.
Record, Doc. 275, at 110. In particular, he noted that the
GLO1 enzyme showed “incomplete penetration” on both the
autopsy blood and the jeans, and because enzymes are better
preserved on cloth, the enzyme should have been present on
the jeans. Id., at 116. But Agent Bigbee disputed Dr.
Blake’s reading of what was, after all, Agent Bigbee’s own
study. He testified that “ ‘inc’ ” on his chart meant “incon

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clusive,” not “incomplete penetration,” and that the term
“inconclusive” meant that the enzyme was present, but could
not be grouped into an ABO bloodtype. Id., Doc. 276, at
140. While pointing out that his summary showed different
levels of enzymes in the two samples, Agent Bigbee also
noted that many different factors—such as heat, dirt, or bac
teria in a clothes hamper—could cause enzymes to degrade
on cloth. Id., at 139, 167–170. Considering how House’s
new blood spillage evidence fits within the record as a whole,
I can see no clear error in the District Court’s express find
ing that the blood spilled in the evidence container after the
FBI found Mrs. Muncey’s blood on House’s jeans.
The District Court attentively presided over a complex
evidentiary hearing, often questioning witnesses extensively
during the presentation of critical evidence. See, e. g., id.,
Doc. 275, at 110–115. The court concisely summarized the
evidence presented, then dutifully made findings about the
reliability of the testimony it heard and the evidence it ob
served. We are poorly equipped to second-guess the Dis
trict Court’s reliability findings and should defer to them,
consistent with the guidance we provided in Schlup.
II
With due regard to the District Court’s reliability findings,
this case invites a straightforward application of the legal
standard adopted in Schlup. A petitioner does not pass
through the Schlup gateway if it is “more likely than not
that there is any juror who, acting reasonably, would have
found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513
U. S., at 333 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The majority states that if House had presented just one
of his three key pieces of evidence—or even two of the
three—he would not pass through the Schlup gateway. See
ante, at 548 (“Were House’s challenge to the State’s case lim
ited to the questions he has raised about the blood and
semen, the other evidence favoring the prosecution might

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well suffice to bar relief ”); ante, at 552–553 (“If considered
in isolation, a reasonable jury might well disregard [the evi
dence pointing to Mr. Muncey]. In combination, however,
with the challenges to the blood evidence and the lack of
motive with respect to House, the evidence pointing to
Mr. Muncey likely would reinforce other doubts as to House’s
guilt”). According to the majority, House has picked the tri
fecta of evidence that places conviction outside the realm of
choices any juror, acting reasonably, would make. Because
the case against House remains substantially unaltered from
the case presented to the jury, I disagree.
At trial, the State presented its story about what hap
pened on the night of Mrs. Muncey’s murder. The Munceys’
daughter heard a deep-voiced perpetrator arrive at the Mun
cey home late at night and tell Mrs. Muncey that her husband
had been in a wreck near the creek. App. 19. Ms. Tharp
relayed her testimony again at the evidentiary hearing, and
the District Court determined that she was a “very credible
witness.” Id., at 270, 323.
When police questioned House after witnesses reported
seeing him emerge from the embankment near Mrs. Mun
cey’s body shortly before it was discovered, he told two dif
ferent officers that he never left Donna Turner’s trailer the
previous evening, even recounting the series of television
programs he watched before going to bed. 7 Tr. 963–965,
1031–1032. He had worked to concoct an alibi we now know
was a lie. On the day Mrs. Muncey’s body was found, Bill
Breeding, a criminal investigator at the Union County Sher
iff ’s Office, observed House at the local jail and noticed that
he had abrasions “across his knuckles and about his hands,”
two or three bruises on his right arm, scratches on his chest,
and his right ring finger was red and swollen. 6 id., at 801–
802. The interviewing officers noticed similar injuries.
App. 78–80; 7 Tr. 974–975. House told them that his finger
was swollen because he fell off a porch, and the scratches
and bruises were from tearing down a building, and from a

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cat. Ibid. Ms. Turner initially confirmed House’s alibi, but
she changed her story when police warned her that covering
up a homicide was a serious offense. Id., at 1063. Ms.
Turner then told police that House had in fact left her house
that night between 10:30 and 10:45 p.m. Id., at 1062–1063.
He came back some time later panting and sweating, shirt
less and shoeless, and with various injuries. App. 88–91;
8 Tr. 1154–1155.
Also on the day the body was found, Sheriff Earl Loy
asked House if he was wearing the same clothes he wore the
night before. 6 id., at 845. House “hesitated,” then stated
that he had changed his shirt, but not his jeans. Ibid. In
other words, he specifically tried to conceal from the police
that he had worn other jeans the night before, for reasons
that were to become clear. Ms. Turner revealed that
House’s statement that he had not changed his jeans was a
lie, and police retrieved House’s dirty jeans from Ms. Tur
ner’s hamper. Ibid. Of course, FBI testing revealed that
House’s jeans were stained with Mrs. Muncey’s blood, and
the District Court determined that House’s new evidence of
blood spillage did not undermine those test results. App.
348. If in fact Mrs. Muncey’s blood only got on House’s jeans
from later evidentiary spillage, House would have had no
reason to lie to try to keep the existence of the concealed
jeans from the police.
Through Ms. Turner’s testimony at trial, the jury also
heard House’s story about what happened that night. He
left Ms. Turner’s trailer late at night to go for a walk. Id.,
at 86. When he returned some time later—panting, sweat
ing, and missing his shirt and shoes—he told her that some
men in a truck tried to kill him. Id., at 88–91. When Ms.
Turner asked House about his injuries, he attributed them
to fighting with his assailants. Id., at 90; 8 Tr. 1154–1155.
House retold this story to the District Court, saying that he
initially lied to police because he was on parole and did not
want to draw attention to himself. Record, Doc. 276, at 99,

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108–109. In other words, having nothing to hide and facing
a murder charge, House lied—and when he was caught in the
lie, he said he lied not to escape the murder charge, but solely
to avoid unexplained difficulties with his parole officer. The
jury rejected House’s story about the night’s events, and the
District Court “considered Mr. House’s demeanor and found
that he was not a credible witness.” App. 329.
The jury also heard House’s attempt to implicate Mr. Mun
cey in his wife’s murder by calling Mrs. Muncey’s brother,
Ricky Green, as a witness. Mr. Green testified that two
weeks before the murder, his sister called him to say that
she and Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she wanted to
leave him, and that she was scared. 7 Tr. 1088. Mr. Green
also testified that the Munceys had marital problems, and
that he had previously seen Mr. Muncey hit his wife. Id.,
at 1087. The jury rejected House’s attempt to implicate
Mr. Muncey, and the District Court was not persuaded by
House’s attempt to supplement this evidence at the eviden
tiary hearing, finding that his new witnesses were not credi
ble. App. 348.
Noticeably absent from the State’s story about what hap
pened to Mrs. Muncey on the night of her death was much
mention of the semen found on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing.
House’s single victory at the evidentiary hearing was new
DNA evidence proving that the semen was deposited by
Mr. Muncey. The majority identifies the semen evidence as
“[c]entral to the State’s case” against House, ante, at 528,
but House’s jury would probably be quite surprised by this
characterization. At trial, Agent Bigbee testified that from
the semen stains on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing, he could deter
mine that the man who deposited the semen had type A
blood, and was a secretor. App. 54–56. Agent Bigbee also
testified that House and Mr. Muncey both have type A blood,
that House is a secretor, and that “[t]here is an eighty (80%)
percent chance that [Mr. Muncey] is a secretor.” Id., at
55–56; 6 Tr. 952 (emphasis added). Moreover, Agent Bigbee

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informed the jury that because 40 percent of people have
type A blood, and 80 percent of those people are secretors,
the semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing could have been depos
ited by roughly one out of every three males. Id., at 957.
The jury was also informed several times by the defense that
Mrs. Muncey’s body was found fully clothed. See, e. g., 4 id.,
at 628; 9 id., at 1274.
The majority describes House’s sexual motive as “a central
theme in the State’s narrative linking House to the crime,”
and states that without the semen evidence, “a jury . . .
would have found it necessary to establish some different
motive, or, if the same motive, an intent far more specu
lative.” Ante, at 541. The State, however, consistently
directed the jury’s attention away from motive, and sexual
motive was far from a “central theme” of the State’s case—
presumably because of the highly ambiguous nature of the
semen evidence recounted above. The Tennessee Supreme
Court did not mention that evidence in cataloging the “[p]ar
ticularly incriminating” or “[d]amaging” evidence against
House. App. 135. The State did not mention the semen ev
idence in its opening statement to the jury, instead focusing
on premeditation. 4 Tr. 613–615. The defense used its
opening statement to expose lack of motive as a weakness in
the State’s case. Id., at 628. After the State’s equivocal
presentation of the semen evidence through Agent Bigbee’s
testimony at trial, the State again made no reference to the
semen evidence or to a motive in its closing argument,
prompting the defense to again highlight this omission.
9 id., at 1274 (“[W]hy was Carolyn Muncey killed? We don’t
know. Is it important to have some motive? In your
minds? What motive did Paul Gregory House have to go
over and kill a woman that he barely knew? Who was still
dressed, still clad in her clothes”).
In rebuttal, the State disclaimed any responsibility
to prove motive, again shifting the jury’s focus to pre
meditation:

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“The law says that if you take another person’s life, you
beat them, you strangle them, and then you don’t suc
ceed, and then you kill them by giving them multiple
blows to the head, and one massive blow to the head,
and that that causes their brains to crash against the
other side of their skull, and caused such severe bleeding
inside the skull itself, that you die—that it does not
make any difference under God’s heaven, what the mo
tive was. That is what the law is. The law is that if
motive is shown, it can be considered by the jury as evi
dence of guilt. But the law is that if you prove that a
killing was done, beyond a reasonable doubt, by a per
son, and that he premeditated it, he planned it, it is not
necessary for the jury to conclude why he did it.”
App. 106.
As a followup to this explanation, when the trial was al
most over and only in response to the defense’s consistent
prodding, the State made its first and only reference to a
possible motive, followed immediately by another disclaimer:
“Now, you may have an idea why he did it. The evi
dence at the scene which seemed to suggest that he was
subjecting this lady to some kind of indignity, why
would you get a lady out of her house, late at night, in
her night clothes, under the trick that her husband has
had a wreck down by the creek? . . . Why is it that you
choke her? Why is it that you repeatedly beat her?
Why is it that she has scrapes all over her body? Well,
it is because either you don’t want her to tell what indig
nities you have subjected her to, or she is unwilling and
fights against you, against being subjected to those
indignities. . . . That is what the evidence at the scene
suggests about motive. But motive is not an element
of the crime. It is something that you can consider, or
ignore. Whatever you prefer. The issue is not motive.
The issue is premeditation.” Id., at 106–107.

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It is on this “obliqu[e]” reference to the semen evidence
during the State’s closing argument that the majority bases
its assertion that House’s sexual motive was a “central theme
in the State’s narrative.” Ante, at 531, 541. Although it is
possible that one or even some jurors might have entertained
doubt about House’s guilt absent the clearest evidence of mo
tive, I do not find it more likely than not that every juror
would have done so, and that is the legal standard under
Schlup. The majority aphoristically states that “[w]hen
identity is in question, motive is key.” Ante, at 540. Not
at all. Sometimes, when identity is in question, alibi is key.
Here, House came up with one—and it fell apart, later ad
mitted to be fabricated when his girlfriend would not lie to
protect him. Scratches from a cat, indeed. Surely a rea
sonable juror would give the fact that an alibi had been made
up and discredited significant weight. People facing a mur
der charge, who are innocent, do not make up a story out of
concern that the truth might somehow disturb their parole
officer. And people do not lie to the police about which jeans
they were wearing the night of a murder, if they have no
reason to believe the jeans would be stained with the blood
shed by the victim in her last desperate struggle to live.
In Schlup, we made clear that the standard we adopted
requires a “stronger showing than that needed to establish
prejudice.” 513 U. S., at 327. In other words, House must
show more than just a “reasonable probability that . . . the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (1984).
House must present such compelling evidence of innocence
that it becomes more likely than not that no single juror,
acting reasonably, would vote to convict him. Schlup,
supra, at 329. The majority’s conclusion is that given the
sisters’ testimony (if believed), and Dr. Blake’s rebutted tes
timony about how to interpret Agent Bigbee’s enzyme
marker analysis summary (if accepted), combined with the
revelation that the semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing was de

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posited by her husband (which the jurors knew was just as
likely as the semen having been deposited by House), no rea
sonable juror would vote to convict House. Ante, at 553–
554. Given the District Court’s reliability findings about the
first two pieces of evidence, the evidence before us now is
not substantially different from that considered by House’s
jury. I therefore find it more likely than not that in light of
this new evidence, at least one juror, acting reasonably,
would vote to convict House. The evidence as a whole cer
tainly does not establish that House is actually innocent of
the crime of murdering Carolyn Muncey, and accordingly I
dissent.