DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

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813 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
DAVIS v. WASHINGTON
certiorari to the supreme court of washington
No. 05–5224. Argued March 20, 2006—Decided June 19, 2006*
In No. 05–5224, a 911 operator ascertained from Michelle McCottry that
she had been assaulted by her former boyfriend, petitioner Davis, who
had just fled the scene. McCottry did not testify at Davis’s trial for
felony violation of a domestic no-contact order, but the court admitted
the 911 recording despite Davis’s objection, which he based on the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. He was convicted. The Washing
ton Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the State Supreme Court, which
concluded that, inter alia, the portion of the 911 conversation in which
McCottry identified Davis as her assailant was not testimonial.
In No. 05–5705, when police responded to a reported domestic disturb
ance at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon, Amy told them that
nothing was wrong, but gave them permission to enter. Once inside,
one officer kept petitioner Hershel in the kitchen while the other inter
viewed Amy elsewhere and had her complete and sign a battery affida
vit. Amy did not appear at Hershel’s bench trial for, inter alia, domes
tic battery, but her affidavit and testimony from the officer who
questioned her were admitted over Hershel’s objection that he had no
opportunity to cross-examine her. Hershel was convicted, and the Indi
ana Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part. The State Supreme
Court also affirmed, concluding that, although Amy’s affidavit was testi
monial and wrongly admitted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Held:
1. The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial state
ments of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable
to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross
examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53–54. These
cases require the Court to determine which police “interrogations”
produce statements that fall within this prohibition. Without attempt
ing to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements
as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present
cases to hold that statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
*Together with No. 05–5705, Hammon v. Indiana, on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Indiana.

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that the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circum
stances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Pp. 821–822.
2. McCottry’s statements identifying Davis as her assailant were not
testimonial. Pp. 823–829.
(a) This case requires the Court to decide whether the Confronta
tion Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay, and, if so, whether the
911 recording qualifies. Crawford suggested the answer to the first
question, noting that “the Confrontation Clause . . . applies to ‘witnesses’
against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’ ” 541
U. S., at 51. Only “testimonial statements” cause a declarant to be a
witness. The Court is unaware of any early American case invoking
the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation that
did not involve testimony as thus defined. Well into the 20th century,
this Court’s jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimo
nial context, and its later cases never in practice dispensed with the
Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross
examination in cases involving testimonial hearsay. Pp. 823–826.
(b) The question in Davis, therefore, is whether, objectively consid
ered, the interrogation during the 911 call produced testimonial state
ments. In contrast to Crawford, where the interrogation took place at
a police station and was directed solely at establishing a past crime, a
911 call is ordinarily designed primarily to describe current circum
stances requiring police assistance. The difference is apparent here.
McCottry was speaking of events as they were actually happening,
while Crawford’s interrogation took place hours after the events oc
curred. Moreover, McCottry was facing an ongoing emergency. Fur
ther, the statements elicited were necessary to enable the police to re
solve the present emergency rather than simply to learn what had
happened in the past. Finally, the difference in the level of formality
is striking. Crawford calmly answered questions at a station house,
with an officer-interrogator taping and taking notes, while McCottry’s
frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that
was not tranquil, or even safe. Thus, the circumstances of her interro
gation objectively indicate that its primary purpose was to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She was not acting as a wit
ness or testifying. Pp. 826–829.
3. Amy Hammon’s statements were testimonial. They were not
much different from those in Crawford. It is clear from the circum
stances that Amy’s interrogation was part of an investigation into possi

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815 Cite as: 547 U. S. 813 (2006)
Syllabus
bly criminal past conduct. There was no emergency in progress, she
told the police when they arrived that things were fine, and the officer
questioning her was seeking to determine not what was happening but
what had happened. Objectively viewed, the primary, if not sole, pur
pose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime. While
the formal features of Crawford’s interrogation strengthened her state
ments’ testimonial aspect, such features were not essential to the point.
In both cases, the declarants were separated from the defendants, the
statements recounted how potentially criminal past events began and
progressed, and the interrogation took place some time after the events
were over. For the same reasons the comparison to Crawford is com
pelling, the comparison to Davis is unpersuasive. The statements in
Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, unprotected by police, and
apparently in immediate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not
telling a story about the past. Pp. 829–832.
4. The Indiana courts may determine on remand whether a claim of
forfeiture by wrongdoing—under which one who obtains a witness’s ab
sence by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation—
is properly raised in Hammon, and, if so, whether it is meritorious.
Absent such a finding, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy
Hammon’s affidavit. Pp. 832–834.
No. 05–5224, 154 Wash. 2d 291, 111 P. 3d 844, affirmed; No. 05–5705, 829
N. E. 2d 444, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, post, p. 834.
Jeffrey L. Fisher, by appointment of the Court, 546 U. S.
1074, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 05–5224. With
him on the briefs was Nancy Collins. Richard D. Fried
man, by appointment of the Court, 546 U. S. 1088, argued
the cause for petitioner in No. 05–5705. With him on the
briefs was Kimberly A. Jackson.
James M. Whisman argued the cause for respondent in
No. 05–5224. With him on the brief were Norm Maleng,
Deborah A. Dwyer, and Lee D. Yates. Thomas M. Fisher,
Solicitor General of Indiana, argued the cause for respondent
in No. 05–5705. With him on the brief were Steve Carter,

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816 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON
Counsel
Attorney General, and Nicole M. Schuster and Julie A. Hoff
man, Deputy Attorneys General.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in
No. 05–5224. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Irving L.
Gornstein, and Joel M. Gershowitz.
Mr. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 05–5705. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Fisher, and Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the
American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Jordan Gross, Steven R. Shapiro,
Lenora Lapidus, Ken Falk, and Aaron Caplan; and for the National Asso
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Timothy P. O’Toole, Catha
rine F. Easterly, Andrea Roth, Corinne Beckwith, Pamela Harris, and
Sheryl McCloud.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the
State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Gary
Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael Scodro, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Linda D. Woloshin and Anderson M. Gansner, Assistant Attorneys
General, by Christopher L. Morano, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecti
cut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkan
sas, Bill Lockyer of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Dan
berg of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of
Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Michael A.
Cox of Michigan, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Jon Bruning of
Nebraska, George J. Chanos of Nevada, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mex
ico, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Lawrence E.
Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah,
William Sorrell of Vermont, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia,
and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for Cook County, Illinois, by Richard
A. Devine and Veronica Calderon Malavia; for the National Association
of Counsel for Children by Anthony J. Franze; for the National District
Attorneys Association by Mark Ryan Dwyer, David M. Cohn, Susan
Axelrod, and Joshua A. Engel; and for the National Network to End
Domestic Violence et al. by Antonia B. Ianniello, Michael D. Rips, Jen

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases require us to determine when statements
made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a
crime scene are “testimonial” and thus subject to the re
quirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
I
A
The relevant statements in Dav is v. Washington,
No. 05–5224, were made to a 911 emergency operator on
February 1, 2001. When the operator answered the initial
call, the connection terminated before anyone spoke. She
reversed the call, and Michelle McCottry answered. In
the ensuing conversation, the operator ascertained that
McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with her
former boyfriend Adrian Davis, the petitioner in this case:
“911 Operator: Hello.
“Complainant: Hello.
“911 Operator: What’s going on?
“Complainant: He’s here jumpin’ on me again.
“911 Operator: Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are
you in a house or an apartment?
“Complainant: I’m in a house.
“911 Operator: Are there any weapons?
“Complainant: No. He’s usin’ his fists.
“911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking?
“Complainant: No.
“911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started.
Stay on the line with me, okay?
“Complainant: I’m on the line.
nifer K. Brown, Lynn Hecht Schafran, Joan S. Meier, and Fernando R.
Laguarda.
Kym L. Worthy and Timothy A. Baughman filed a brief for Wayne
County, Michigan, as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 05–5705.

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“911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know
his last name?
“Complainant: It’s Davis.
“911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what’s his first name?
“Complainant: Adran
“911 Operator: What is it?
“Complainant: Adrian.
“911 Operator: Adrian?
“Complainant: Yeah.
“911 Operator: Okay. What’s his middle initial?
“Complainant: Martell. He’s runnin’ now.” App. in
No. 05–5224, pp. 8–9.
As the conversation continued, the operator learned that
Davis had “just r[un] out the door” after hitting McCottry,
and that he was leaving in a car with someone else. Id., at
9–10. McCottry started talking, but the operator cut her
off, saying, “Stop talking and answer my questions.” Id.,
at 10. She then gathered more information about Davis (in
cluding his birthday), and learned that Davis had told
McCottry that his purpose in coming to the house was “to
get his stuff,” since McCottry was moving. Id., at 11–12.
McCottry described the context of the assault, id., at 12,
after which the operator told her that the police were on
their way. “They’re gonna check the area for him first,” the
operator said, “and then they’re gonna come talk to you.”
Id., at 12–13.
The police arrived within four minutes of the 911 call and
observed McCottry’s shaken state, the “fresh injuries on her
forearm and her face,” and her “frantic efforts to gather her
belongings and her children so that they could leave the resi
dence.” 154 Wash. 2d 291, 296, 111 P. 3d 844, 847 (2005)
(en banc).
The State charged Davis with felony violation of a domes
tic no-contact order. “The State’s only witnesses were the
two police officers who responded to the 911 call. Both offi
cers testified that McCottry exhibited injuries that appeared

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to be recent, but neither officer could testify as to the cause
of the injuries.” Ibid. McCottry presumably could have
testified as to whether Davis was her assailant, but she did
not appear. Over Davis’s objection, based on the Confronta
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the trial court admitted
the recording of her exchange with the 911 operator, and
the jury convicted him. The Washington Court of Appeals
affirmed, 116 Wash. App. 81, 64 P. 3d 661 (2003). The Su
preme Court of Washington, with one dissenting justice, also
affirmed, concluding that the portion of the 911 conversation
in which McCottry identified Davis was not testimonial, and
that if other portions of the conversation were testimonial,
admitting them was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
154 Wash. 2d, at 305, 111 P. 3d, at 851. We granted certio
rari. 546 U. S. 975 (2005).
B
In Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05–5705, police responded late
on the night of February 26, 2003, to a “reported domestic
disturbance” at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.
829 N. E. 2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005). They found Amy alone on
the front porch, appearing “ ‘somewhat frightened,’ ” but she
told them that “ ‘nothing was the matter,’ ” id., at 446, 447.
She gave them permission to enter the house, where an offi
cer saw “a gas heating unit in the corner of the living room”
that had “flames coming out of the . . . partial glass front.
There were pieces of glass on the ground in front of it and
there was flame emitting from the front of the heating unit.”
App. in No. 05–5705, p. 16.
Hershel, meanwhile, was in the kitchen. He told the po
lice “that he and his wife had ‘been in an argument’ but
‘everything was fine now’ and the argument ‘never became
physical.’ ” 829 N. E. 2d, at 447. By this point Amy had
come back inside. One of the officers remained with Her
shel; the other went to the living room to talk with Amy,
and “again asked [her] what had occurred.” Ibid.; App. in
No. 05–5705, at 17, 32. Hershel made several attempts to

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participate in Amy’s conversation with the police, see id., at
32, but was rebuffed. The officer later testified that Hershel
“became angry when I insisted that [he] stay separated from
Mrs. Hammon so that we can investigate what had hap
pened.” Id., at 34. After hearing Amy’s account, the offi
cer “had her fill out and sign a battery affidavit.” Id., at 18.
Amy handwrote the following: “Broke our Furnace & shoved
me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the
chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore
up my van where I couldn’t leave the house. Attacked my
daughter.” Id., at 2.
The State charged Hershel with domestic battery and with
violating his probation. Amy was subpoenaed, but she did
not appear at his subsequent bench trial. The State called
the officer who had questioned Amy, and asked him to re
count what Amy told him and to authenticate the affidavit.
Hershel’s counsel repeatedly objected to the admission of
this evidence. See id., at 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21. At one
point, after hearing the prosecutor defend the affidavit be
cause it was made “under oath,” defense counsel said, “That
doesn’t give us the opportunity to cross examine [the] person
who allegedly drafted it. Makes me mad.” Id., at 19.
Nonetheless, the trial court admitted the affidavit as a “pres
ent sense impression,” id., at 20, and Amy’s statements as
“excited utterances” that “are expressly permitted in these
kinds of cases even if the declarant is not available to tes
tify,” id., at 40. The officer thus testified that Amy
“informed me that she and Hershel had been in an argu
ment. That he became irrate [sic] over the fact of their
daughter going to a boyfriend’s house. The argument
became . . . physical after being verbal and she informed
me that Mr. Hammon, during the verbal part of the ar
gument was breaking things in the living room and I
believe she stated he broke the phone, broke the lamp,
broke the front of the heater. When it became physical
he threw her down into the glass of the heater.
. . . . .

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“She informed me Mr. Hammon had pushed her onto
the ground, had shoved her head into the broken glass
of the heater and that he had punched her in the chest
twice I believe.” Id., at 17–18.
The trial judge found Hershel guilty on both charges, id., at
40, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant
part, 809 N. E. 2d 945 (2004). The Indiana Supreme Court
also affirmed, concluding that Amy’s statement was admissi
ble for state-law purposes as an excited utterance, 829 N. E.
2d, at 449; that “a ‘testimonial’ statement is one given or
taken in significant part for purposes of preserving it for
potential future use in legal proceedings,” where “the moti
vations of the questioner and declarant are the central con
cerns,” id., at 456, 457; and that Amy’s oral statement was
not “testimonial” under these standards, id., at 458. It also
concluded that, although the affidavit was testimonial and
thus wrongly admitted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, largely because the trial was to the bench. Id., at
458–459. We granted certiorari. 546 U. S. 975 (2005).
II
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment pro
vides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53–54
(2004), we held that this provision bars “admission of testi
monial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” A critical
portion of this holding, and the portion central to resolution
of the two cases now before us, is the phrase “testimonial
statements.” Only statements of this sort cause the declar
ant to be a “witness” within the meaning of the Confronta
tion Clause. See id., at 51. It is the testimonial character
of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that,
while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evi
dence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.

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Our opinion in Crawford set forth “[v]arious formulations”
of the core class of “ ‘testimonial’ ” statements, ibid., but
found it unnecessary to endorse any of them, because “some
statements qualify under any definition,” id., at 52. Among
those, we said, were “[s]tatements taken by police officers in
the course of interrogations,” ibid.; see also id., at 53. The
questioning that generated the deponent’s statement in
Crawford—which was made and recorded while she was in
police custody, after having been given Miranda warnings as
a possible suspect herself—“qualifies under any conceivable
definition” of an “ ‘interrogation,’ ” 541 U. S., at 53, n. 4. We
therefore did not define that term, except to say that “[w]e
use [it] . . . in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal,
sense,” and that “one can imagine various definitions . . . ,
and we need not select among them in this case.” Ibid.
The character of the statements in the present cases is not as
clear, and these cases require us to determine more precisely
which police interrogations produce testimony.
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification
of all conceivable statements—or even all conceivable state
ments in response to police interrogation—as either testimo
nial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases
to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made
in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the inter
rogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to estab
lish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crimi
nal prosecution.1
1 Our holding refers to interrogations because, as explained below, the
statements in the cases presently before us are the products of interroga
tions—which in some circumstances tend to generate testimonial re
sponses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the ab
sence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers

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III
A
In Crawford, it sufficed for resolution of the case before us
to determine that “even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely
concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary ob
ject, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall
squarely within that class.” Id., at 53. Moreover, as we
have just described, the facts of that case spared us the need
to define what we meant by “interrogations.” The Davis
case today does not permit us this luxury of indecision. The
inquiries of a police operator in the course of a 911 call 2 are
an interrogation in one sense, but not in a sense that “quali
fies under any conceivable definition.” We must decide,
therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to
testimonial hearsay; and, if so, whether the recording of a
911 call qualifies.
The answer to the first question was suggested in Craw
ford, even if not explicitly held:
“The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this
focus [on testimonial hearsay]. It applies to ‘witnesses’
against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear
testimony.’ 1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testi
mony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt an
swers to detailed interrogation. (Part of the evidence against Sir Walter
Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of
sustained questioning. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 27 (1603).) And
of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the
declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confron
tation Clause requires us to evaluate.
2 If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may
at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of
911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point),
we consider their acts to be acts of the police. As in Crawford v. Wash
ington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), therefore, our holding today makes it unneces
sary to consider whether and when statements made to someone other
than law enforcement personnel are “testimonial.”

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the English Language (1828). ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is
typically ‘a solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ Ibid.
An accuser who makes a formal statement to govern
ment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not.” 541 U. S., at 51.
A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitu
tional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely
its “core,” but its perimeter.
We are not aware of any early American case invoking the
Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confronta
tion that did not clearly involve testimony as thus defined.3
Well into the 20th century, our own Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial
context. See, e. g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145,
3 See, e. g., State v. Webb, 2 N. C. 103, 103–104 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794)
(per curiam) (excluding deposition taken in absence of the accused); State
v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 (Super. L. & Eq. 1807) (per curiam) (excluding prior
testimony of deceased witness); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59 (Err. &
App. 1821) (admitting written deposition of deceased deponent, because
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine); Finn v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. 701, 707–708 (1827) (excluding prior testimony of a witness still
alive, though outside the jurisdiction); State v. Hill, 20 S. C. L. 607 (App.
1835) (excluding deposition of deceased victim taken in absence of the
accused); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 436–439 (1837) (ex
cluding preliminary examination testimony of deceased witness because
the witness’s precise words were not available); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn.
344 (1842) (admitting deposition of deceased where defendant declined op
portunity to cross-examine); People v. Newman, 5 Hill 295 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1843) (per curiam) (excluding prior trial testimony of witness who was
still alive); State v. Campbell, 30 S. C. L. 124, 125 (App. L. 1844) (excluding
deposition taken in absence of the accused); State v. Valentine, 29 N. C.
225 (1847) (per curiam) (admitting preliminary examination testimony of
decedent where defendant had opportunity to cross-examine); Kendrick v.
State, 29 Tenn. 479, 491 (1850) (admitting testimony of deceased witness
at defendant’s prior trial); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 439–441 (1858)
(excluding deposition of deponent who was still alive).

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158 (1879) (testimony at prior trial was subject to the Con
frontation Clause, but petitioner had forfeited that right by
procuring witness’s absence); Mattox v. United States, 156
U. S. 237, 240–244 (1895) (prior trial testimony of deceased
witnesses admitted because subject to cross-examination);
Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 55–56 (1899) (guilty
pleas and jury conviction of others could not be admitted to
show that property defendant received from them was sto
len); Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 467, 470–471
(1900) (written deposition subject to cross-examination was
not admissible because witness was available); Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U. S. 325, 330–331 (1911) (facts regarding
conduct of prior trial certified to by the judge, the clerk of
court, and the official reporter did not relate to defendants’
guilt or innocence and hence were not statements of “wit
nesses” under the Confrontation Clause).
Even our later cases, conforming to the reasoning of Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980),4 never in practice dispensed
with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability
and prior cross-examination in cases that involved testimo
nial hearsay, see Crawford, 541 U. S., at 57–59 (citing cases),
with one arguable exception, see id., at 58, n. 8 (discussing
White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346 (1992)). Where our cases did
dispense with those requirements—even under the Roberts
approach—the statements at issue were clearly nontestimo
nial. See, e. g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171,
181–184 (1987) (statements made unwittingly to a Govern
ment informant); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 87–89 (1970)
(plurality opinion) (statements from one prisoner to another).
Most of the American cases applying the Confrontation
Clause or its state constitutional or common-law counter
4 “Roberts condition[ed] the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on
whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears ‘particu
larized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Crawford, 541 U. S., at 60 (quot
ing Roberts, 448 U. S., at 66). We overruled Roberts in Crawford by
restoring the unavailability and cross-examination requirements.

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parts involved testimonial statements of the most formal
sort—sworn testimony in prior judicial proceedings or for
mal depositions under oath—which invites the argument
that the scope of the Clause is limited to that very formal
category. But the English cases that were the progenitors
of the Confrontation Clause did not limit the exclusionary
rule to prior court testimony and formal depositions, see
Crawford, supra, at 52, and n. 3. In any event, we do not
think it conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation
Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking police
man recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant,
instead of having the declarant sign a deposition. Indeed, if
there is one point for which no case—English or early Amer
ican, state or federal—can be cited, that is it.
The question before us in Davis, then, is whether, objec
tively considered, the interrogation that took place in the
course of the 911 call produced testimonial statements.
When we said in Crawford, supra, at 53, that “interrogations
by law enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class”
of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that
was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at es
tablishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or
provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator. The product
of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing signed
by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps
notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial. It is, in
the terms of the 1828 American dictionary quoted in Craw
ford, “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” 541 U. S.,
at 51. (The solemnity of even an oral declaration of relevant
past fact to an investigating officer is well enough established
by the severe consequences that can attend a deliberate
falsehood. See, e. g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F. 3d 273,
288 (CA2 2006) (false statements made to federal investiga
tors violate 18 U. S. C. § 1001); State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53,

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¶ 30, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 85, 695 N. W. 2d 315, 323 (state criminal
offense to “knowingly giv[e] false information to [an] officer
with [the] intent to mislead the officer in the performance of
his or her duty”).) A 911 call, on the other hand, and at
least the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a
911 call, is ordinarily not designed primarily to “establis[h]
or prov[e]” some past fact, but to describe current circum
stances requiring police assistance.
The difference between the interrogation in Davis and the
one in Crawford is apparent on the face of things. In Davis,
McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually
happening, rather than “describ[ing] past events,” Lilly
v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion).
Sylvia Crawford’s interrogation, on the other hand, took
place hours after the events she described had occurred.
Moreover, any reasonable listener would recognize that Mc-
Cottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an ongoing emer
gency. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative
report of a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry’s
call was plainly a call for help against a bona fide physical
threat. Third, the nature of what was asked and answered
in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that the elicited
statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present
emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what
had happened in the past. That is true even of the opera
tor’s effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that
the dispatched officers might know whether they would be
encountering a violent felon. See, e. g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judi
cial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 186
(2004). And finally, the difference in the level of formality
between the two interviews is striking. Crawford was re
sponding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions,
with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her
answers; McCottry’s frantic answers were provided over the
phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as
far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe.

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We conclude from all this that the circumstances of
McCottry’s interrogation objectively indicate its primary
purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. She simply was not acting as a witness; she was
not testifying. What she said was not “a weaker substitute
for live testimony” at trial, United States v. Inadi, 475 U. S.
387, 394 (1986), like Lord Cobham’s statements in Raleigh’s
Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603), or Jane Dingler’s ex parte state
ments against her husband in King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561,
168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791), or Sylvia Crawford’s statement
in Crawford. In each of those cases, the ex parte actors
and the evidentiary products of the ex parte communi
cation aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues.
McCottry’s emergency statement does not. No “witness”
goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.
Davis seeks to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of a wit
ness by pointing to English cases. None of them involves
statements made during an ongoing emergency. In King v.
Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), for example,
a young rape victim, “immediately on her coming home, told
all the circumstances of the injury” to her mother. Id., at
200, 168 Eng. Rep., at 202. The case would be helpful to
Davis if the relevant statement had been the girl’s screams
for aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by
the time the victim got home, her story was an account of
past events.
This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an
interrogation to determine the need for emergency assist
ance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put it, “evolve
into testimonial statements,” 829 N. E. 2d, at 457, once that
purpose has been achieved. In this case, for example, after
the operator gained the information needed to address the
exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have
ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The op
erator then told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose
a battery of questions. It could readily be maintained that,

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from that point on, McCottry’s statements were testimonial,
not unlike the “structured police questioning” that occurred
in Crawford, 541 U. S., at 53, n. 4. This presents no great
problem. Just as, for Fifth Amendment purposes, “police
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety
of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimo
nial evidence from a suspect,” New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S.
649, 658–659 (1984), trial courts will recognize the point at
which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in re
sponse to interrogations become testimonial. Through in
limine procedure, they should redact or exclude the portions
of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do,
for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise
admissible evidence. Davis’s jury did not hear the complete
911 call, although it may well have heard some testimonial
portions. We were asked to classify only McCottry’s early
statements identifying Davis as her assailant, and we agree
with the Washington Supreme Court that they were not tes
timonial. That court also concluded that, even if later parts
of the call were testimonial, their admission was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis does not challenge that
holding, and we therefore assume it to be correct.
B
Determining the testimonial or nontestimonial character
of the statements that were the product of the interrogation
in Hammon is a much easier task, since they were not much
different from the statements we found to be testimonial in
Crawford. It is entirely clear from the circumstances that
the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly
criminal past conduct—as, indeed, the testifying officer ex
pressly acknowledged, App. in No. 05–5705, at 25, 32, 34.
There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating offi
cer testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and
saw no one throw or break anything, id., at 25. When the

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officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine,
id., at 14, and there was no immediate threat to her person.
When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and
elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to de
termine (as in Davis) “what is happening,” but rather “what
happened.” Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed
the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a
possible crime—which is, of course, precisely what the officer
should have done.
It is true that the Crawford interrogation was more for
mal. It followed a Miranda warning, was tape-recorded,
and took place at the station house, see 541 U. S., at 53, n. 4.
While these features certainly strengthened the statements’
testimonial aspect—made it more objectively apparent, that
is, that the purpose of the exercise was to nail down the
truth about past criminal events—none was essential to the
point. It was formal enough that Amy’s interrogation was
conducted in a separate room, away from her husband (who
tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her replies for
use in his “investigat[ion].” App. in No. 05–5705, at 34.
What we called the “striking resemblance” of the Crawford
statement to civil-law ex parte examinations, 541 U. S., at 52,
is shared by Amy’s statement here. Both declarants were
actively separated from the defendant—officers forcibly pre
vented Hershel from participating in the interrogation.
Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to police
questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and
progressed. And both took place some time after the events
described were over. Such statements under official inter
rogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because
they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination;
they are inherently testimonial.5
5 The dissent criticizes our test for being “neither workable nor a tar
geted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation]
Clause,” post, at 842 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis
senting in part). As to the former: We have acknowledged that our hold

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Both Indiana and the United States as amicus curiae
argue that this case should be resolved much like Davis.
For the reasons we find the comparison to Crawford compel
ling, we find the comparison to Davis unpersuasive. The
statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone,
not only unprotected by police (as Amy Hammon was pro
tected), but apparently in immediate danger from Davis.
She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past.
McCottry’s present-tense statements showed immediacy;
ing is not an “exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—or
even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation,”
supra, at 822, but rather a resolution of the cases before us and those like
them. For those cases, the test is objective and quite “workable.” The
dissent, in attempting to formulate an exhaustive classification of its own,
has not provided anything that deserves the description “workable”—un
less one thinks that the distinction between “formal” and “informal” state
ments, see post, at 836–838, qualifies. And the dissent even qualifies that
vague distinction by acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause “also
reaches the use of technically informal statements when used to evade the
formalized process,” post, at 838, and cautioning that the Clause would
stop the State from “us[ing] out-of-court statements as a means of circum
venting the literal right of confrontation,” ibid. It is hard to see this as
much more “predictable,” ibid., than the rule we adopt for the narrow
situations we address. (Indeed, under the dissent’s approach it is emi
nently arguable that the dissent should agree, rather than disagree, with
our disposition in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05–5705.)
As for the charge that our holding is not a “targeted attempt to reach
the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,” post, at 842, which
the dissent describes as the depositions taken by Marian magistrates,
characterized by a high degree of formality, see post, at 835–836: We do
not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance.
But we no longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as
our 18th-century forebears did not, examining police officers, see L. Fried
man, Crime and Punishment in American History 67–68 (1993)—who per
form investigative and testimonial functions once performed by examining
Marian magistrates, see J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal
Trial 41 (2003). It imports sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to
such officers are criminal offenses. Restricting the Confrontation Clause
to the precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe
for its extinction. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001).

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Amy’s narrative of past events was delivered at some re
move in time from the danger she described. And after
Amy answered the officer’s questions, he had her execute an
affidavit, in order, he testified, “[t]o establish events that
have occurred previously.” App. in No. 05–5705, at 18.
Although we necessarily reject the Indiana Supreme
Court’s implication that virtually any “initial inquiries” at
the crime scene will not be testimonial, see 829 N. E. 2d, at
453, 457, we do not hold the opposite—that no questions at
the scene will yield nontestimonial answers. We have al
ready observed of domestic disputes that “[o]fficers called to
investigate . . . need to know whom they are dealing with in
order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety,
and possible danger to the potential victim.” Hiibel, 542
U. S., at 186. Such exigencies may often mean that “initial
inquiries” produce nontestimonial statements. But in cases
like this one, where Amy’s statements were neither a cry
for help nor the provision of information enabling officers
immediately to end a threatening situation, the fact that they
were given at an alleged crime scene and were “initial in
quiries” is immaterial. Cf. Crawford, supra, at 52, n. 3.6
IV
Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their
amici, contend that the nature of the offenses charged in
these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater flexi
bility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particular
6 Police investigations themselves are, of course, in no way impugned by
our characterization of their fruits as testimonial. Investigations of past
crimes prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests. While prose
cutors may hope that inculpatory “nontestimonial” evidence is gathered,
this is essentially beyond police control. Their saying that an emergency
exists cannot make it be so. The Confrontation Clause in no way governs
police conduct, because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collec
tion of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that provision. But
neither can police conduct govern the Confrontation Clause; testimonial
statements are what they are.

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type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or
coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at
trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the
criminal a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate constitu
tional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the
guilty to go free. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27
(2001) (suppressing evidence from an illegal search). But
when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by
procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the
Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce.
While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving
their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in
ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system.
We reiterate what we said in Crawford: that “the rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds.” 541 U. S., at 62
(citing Reynolds, 98 U. S., at 158–159). That is, one who ob
tains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the
constitutional right to confrontation.
We take no position on the standards necessary to demon
strate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine,
have generally held the Government to the preponderance
of-the-evidence standard, see, e. g., United States v. Scott,
284 F. 3d 758, 762 (CA7 2002). State courts tend to follow
the same practice, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444
Mass. 526, 542, 830 N. E. 2d 158, 172 (2005). Moreover, if
a hearing on forfeiture is required, Edwards, for instance,
observed that “hearsay evidence, including the unavailable
witness’s out-of-court statements, may be considered.” Id.,
at 545, 830 N. E. 2d, at 174. The Roberts approach to the
Confrontation Clause undoubtedly made recourse to this doc
trine less necessary, because prosecutors could show the “re
liability” of ex parte statements more easily than they could
show the defendant’s procurement of the witness’s absence.

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Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability
of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.
We have determined that, absent a finding of forfeiture by
wrongdoing, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy
Hammon’s affidavit. The Indiana courts may (if they are
asked) determine on remand whether such a claim of forfeit
ure is properly raised and, if so, whether it is meritorious.
* * *
We affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washing
ton in No. 05–5224. We reverse the judgment of the Su
preme Court of Indiana in No. 05–5705, and remand the case
to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), we aban
doned the general reliability inquiry we had long employed
to judge the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Con
frontation Clause, describing that inquiry as “inherently,
and therefore permanently, unpredictable.” Id., at 68, n. 10
(emphasis in original). Today, a mere two years after the
Court decided Crawford, it adopts an equally unpredictable
test, under which district courts are charged with divining
the “primary purpose” of police interrogations. Ante,
at 822. Besides being difficult for courts to apply, this test
characterizes as “testimonial,” and therefore inadmissible,
evidence that bears little resemblance to what we have rec
ognized as the evidence targeted by the Confrontation
Clause. Because neither of the cases before the Court today
would implicate the Confrontation Clause under an appropri
ately targeted standard, I concur only in the judgment in
Davis v. Washington, No. 05–5224, and dissent from the
Court’s resolution of Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05–5705.

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I
A
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con
fronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 6. We have recognized that the operative phrase in
the Clause, “witnesses against him,” could be interpreted
narrowly, to reach only those witnesses who actually testify
at trial, or more broadly, to reach many or all of those whose
out-of-court statements are offered at trial. Crawford,
supra, at 42–43; White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 359–363
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Because the narrowest interpretation of the
Clause would conflict with both the history giving rise to the
adoption of the Clause and this Court’s precedent, we have
rejected such a reading. See Crawford, supra, at 50–51;
White, supra, at 360 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
Rejection of the narrowest view of the Clause does not,
however, require the broadest application of the Clause to
exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence. The his
tory surrounding the right to confrontation supports the con
clusion that it was developed to target particular practices
that occurred under the English bail and committal statutes
passed during the reign of Queen Mary, namely, the “civil
law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”
Crawford, supra, at 43, 50; White, supra, at 361–362 (opinion
of Thomas, J.); Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242
(1895). “The predominant purpose of the [Marian com
mittal] statute was to institute systematic questioning of
the accused and the witnesses.” J. Langbein, Prosecuting
Crime in the Renaissance 23 (1974) (emphasis added). The
statute required an oral examination of the suspect and the
accusers, transcription within two days of the examinations,
and physical transmission to the judges hearing the case.

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Id., at 10, 23. These examinations came to be used as evi
dence in some cases, in lieu of a personal appearance by the
witness. Crawford, supra, at 43–44; 9 W. Holdsworth, A
History of English Law 223–229 (1926). Many statements
that would be inadmissible as a matter of hearsay law bear
little resemblance to these evidentiary practices, which the
Framers proposed the Confrontation Clause to prevent.
See, e. g., Crawford, supra, at 51 (contrasting “[a]n off-hand,
overheard remark” with the abuses targeted by the Confron
tation Clause). Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Framers
intended the word “witness” to be read so broadly as to in
clude such statements. Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74,
94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (rejecting the “as
sumption that the core purpose of the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment is to prevent overly broad excep
tions to the hearsay rule”).
In Crawford, we recognized that this history could be
squared with the language of the Clause, giving rise to a
workable, and more accurate, interpretation of the Clause.
“ ‘[W]itnesses,’ ” we said, are those who “ ‘bear testimony.’ ”
541 U. S., at 51 (quoting 1 N. Webster, An American Diction
ary of the English Language (1828)). And “ ‘[t]estimony’ ”
is “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the pur
pose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” 541 U. S., at 51
(quoting Webster, supra). Admittedly, we did not set forth
a detailed framework for addressing whether a statement is
“testimonial” and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.
But the plain terms of the “testimony” definition we en
dorsed necessarily require some degree of solemnity before
a statement can be deemed “testimonial.”
This requirement of solemnity supports my view that the
statements regulated by the Confrontation Clause must in
clude “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions.” White, supra, at 365 (opinion of
Thomas, J.). Affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony

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are, by their very nature, taken through a formalized proc
ess. Likewise, confessions, when extracted by police in a
formal manner, carry sufficient indicia of solemnity to consti
tute formalized statements and, accordingly, bear a “striking
resemblance,” Crawford, supra, at 52, to the examinations of
the accused and accusers under the Marian statutes.1 See
generally Langbein, supra, at 21–34.
Although the Court concedes that the early American
cases invoking the right to confrontation or the Confronta
tion Clause itself all “clearly involve[d] testimony” as defined
in Crawford, ante, at 824, it fails to acknowledge that all of
the cases it cites fall within the narrower category of formal
ized testimonial materials I have proposed. See ante, at
824, n. 3.2 Interactions between the police and an accused
(or witnesses) resemble Marian proceedings—and these
early cases—only when the interactions are somehow ren
dered “formal.” In Crawford, for example, the interroga
tion was custodial, taken after warnings given pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 541 U. S., at 38.
Miranda warnings, by their terms, inform a prospective de
1 Like the Court, I presume the acts of the 911 operator to be the acts
of the police. Ante, at 823, n. 2. Accordingly, I refer to both the operator
in Davis and the officer in Hammon, and their counterparts in similar
cases, collectively as “the police.”
2 Our more recent cases, too, nearly all hold excludable under the Con
frontation Clause materials that are plainly highly formal. See White v.
Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365, n. 2 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). The only exceptions involve confessions of
codefendants to police, and those confessions appear to have either been
formal due to their occurrence in custody or to have been formalized into
signed documents. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 416 (1965)
(signed confession); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966) (signed confes
sion taken after accomplice’s arrest, see Brief for Petitioner in Brookhart
v. Janis, O. T. 1965, No. 657, pp. 10–11); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123, 124 (1968) (custodial interrogation); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293
(1968) (per curiam) (custodial interrogation following a warning that the
codefendant’s statement could be used against her at trial, see Brief in
Opposition in Roberts v. Russell, O. T. 1967, No. 920, pp. 5–6).

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fendant that “ ‘anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law.’ ” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428,
435 (2000) (quoting Miranda, supra, at 479). This imports
a solemnity to the process that is not present in a mere con
versation between a witness or suspect and a police officer.3
The Court all but concedes that no case can be cited for
its conclusion that the Confrontation Clause also applies to
informal police questioning under certain circumstances.
Ante, at 824–826. Instead, the sole basis for the Court’s
conclusion is its apprehension that the Confrontation Clause
will “readily be evaded” if it is only applicable to formalized
testimonial materials. Ante, at 826. But the Court’s pro
posed solution to the risk of evasion is needlessly overinclu
sive. Because the Confrontation Clause sought to regulate
prosecutorial abuse occurring through use of ex parte state
ments as evidence against the accused, it also reaches the
use of technically informal statements when used to evade
the formalized process. Cf. ibid. That is, even if the inter
rogation itself is not formal, the production of evidence by
the prosecution at trial would resemble the abuses targeted
by the Confrontation Clause if the prosecution attempted to
use out-of-court statements as a means of circumventing the
literal right of confrontation, see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012
(1988). In such a case, the Confrontation Clause could fairly
be applied to exclude the hearsay statements offered by the
prosecution, preventing evasion without simultaneously ex
cluding evidence offered by the prosecution in good faith.
The Court’s standard is not only disconnected from history
and unnecessary to prevent abuse; it also yields no predict
able results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to
comply with the law. Cf. Crawford, supra, at 68, n. 10 (criti
3 The possibility that an oral declaration of past fact to a police officer,
if false, could result in legal consequences to the speaker, see ante, at
826–827, may render honesty in casual conversations with police officers
important. It does not, however, render those conversations solemn or
formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.

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cizing unpredictability of the pre-Crawford test); White, 502
U. S., at 364–365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con
curring in judgment) (limiting the Confrontation Clause to
the discrete category of materials historically abused would
“greatly simplify” application of the Clause). In many, if not
most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime,
whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise,
the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspec
tive of the police, are both to respond to the emergency situa
tion and to gather evidence. See New York v. Quarles, 467
U. S. 649, 656 (1984) (“Undoubtedly most police officers [de
ciding whether to give Miranda warnings in a possible emer
gency situation] would act out of a host of different, instinc
tive, and largely unverifiable motives—their own safety, the
safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain
incriminating evidence from the suspect”). Assigning one
of these two “largely unverifiable motives,” ibid., primacy
requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely
be present—and is not reliably discernible. It will inevita
bly be, quite simply, an exercise in fiction.
The Court’s repeated invocation of the word “objectiv[e]”
to describe its test, see ante, at 822, 827, 828, 830, however,
suggests that the Court may not mean to reference purpose
at all, but instead to inquire into the function served by the
interrogation. Certainly such a test would avoid the pitfalls
that have led us repeatedly to reject tests dependent on the
subjective intentions of police officers.4 It would do so, how
ever, at the cost of being even more disconnected from the
4 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 655–656, and n. 6 (1984) (sub
jective motivation of officer not relevant in considering whether the public
safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), is applicable);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1980) (subjective intent of police
officer to obtain incriminatory statement not relevant to whether an inter
rogation has occurred); Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996)
(refusing to evaluate Fourth Amendment reasonableness in light of the
officers’ actual motivations).

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840 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON
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prosecutorial abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause.
Additionally, it would shift the ability to control whether a
violation occurred from the police and prosecutor to the
judge, whose determination as to the “primary purpose” of
a particular interrogation would be unpredictable and not
necessarily tethered to the actual purpose for which the po
lice performed the interrogation.
B
Neither the 911 call at issue in Davis nor the police ques
tioning at issue in Hammon is testimonial under the appro
priate framework. Neither the call nor the questioning is
itself a formalized dialogue.5 Nor do any circumstances sur
rounding the taking of the statements render those state
ments sufficiently formal to resemble the Marian examina
tions; the statements were neither Mirandized nor custodial,
nor accompanied by any similar indicia of formality. Finally,
there is no suggestion that the prosecution attempted to
offer the women’s hearsay evidence at trial in order to evade
confrontation. See 829 N. E. 2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005) (prose
cution subpoenaed Amy Hammon to testify, but she was not
present); 154 Wash. 2d 291, 296, 111 P. 3d 844, 847 (2005) (en
banc) (State was unable to locate Michelle McCottry at the
time of trial). Accordingly, the statements at issue in both
cases are nontestimonial and admissible under the Confron
tation Clause.
The Court’s determination that the evidence against Ham
mon must be excluded extends the Confrontation Clause far
beyond the abuses it was intended to prevent. When com
bined with the Court’s holding that the evidence against
Davis is perfectly admissible, however, the Court’s Hammon
5 Although the police questioning in Hammon was ultimately reduced
to an affidavit, all agree that the affidavit is inadmissible per se under
our definition of the term “ testimonial. ” Brief for Respondent
in No. 05–5705, p. 46; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in
No. 05–5705, p. 14.

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841 Cite as: 547 U. S. 813 (2006)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
holding also reveals the difficulty of applying the Court’s re
quirement that courts investigate the “primary purpose[s]”
of the investigation. The Court draws a line between the
two cases based on its explanation that Hammon involves
“no emergency in progress,” but instead, mere questioning
as “part of an investigation into possibly criminal past con
duct,” ante, at 829, and its explanation that Davis involves
questioning for the “primary purpose” of “enabl[ing] police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” ante, at 828.
But the fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating
Mr. Hammon’s past conduct does not foreclose the possibility
that the primary purpose of his inquiry was to assess
whether Mr. Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his
wife, requiring further police presence or action. It is
hardly remarkable that Hammon did not act abusively to
ward his wife in the presence of the officers, ante, at 829–830,
and his good judgment to refrain from criminal behavior in
the presence of police sheds little, if any, light on whether
his violence would have resumed had the police left without
further questioning, transforming what the Court dismisses
as “past conduct” back into an “ongoing emergency,” ante,
at 828, 829.6 Nor does the mere fact that McCottry needed
emergency aid shed light on whether the “primary purpose”
of gathering, for example, the name of her assailant was to
protect the police, to protect the victim, or to gather infor
mation for prosecution. In both of the cases before the
Court, like many similar cases, pronouncement of the “pri
6 Some of the factors on which the Court relies to determine that the
police questioning in Hammon was testimonial apply equally in Davis.
For example, while Hammon was “actively separated from the [victim]”
and thereby “prevented . . . from participating in the interrogation,” Davis
was apart from McCottry while she was questioned by the 911 operator
and thus unable to participate in the questioning. Ante, at 818, 830.
Similarly, “the events described [by McCottry] were over” by the time
she recounted them to the 911 operator. Ante, at 830. See 154 Wash. 2d
291, 295–296, 111 P. 3d 844, 846–847 (2005) (en banc).

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842 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON
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mary” motive behind the interrogation calls for nothing
more than a guess by courts.
II
Because the standard adopted by the Court today is nei
ther workable nor a targeted attempt to reach the abuses
forbidden by the Clause, I concur only in the judgment
in Davis v. Washington, No. 05–5224, and respectfully dis
sent from the Court’s resolution of Hammon v. Indiana,
No. 05–5705.