SCHEIDLER et al. v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.

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9 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
SCHEIDLER et al. v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 04–1244. Argued November 30, 2005—Decided February 28, 2006*
Respondents, a national nonprofit organization that supports the legal
availability of abortions and two health care clinics that perform abor
tions, filed a class action alleging that petitioners, individuals and orga
nizations that oppose legal abortion, engaged in a nationwide conspiracy
to shut down abortion clinics through violence and other unlawful acts.
Arguing that petitioners’ activities amounted in context to extortionate
acts that created a pattern of racketeering activity, respondents based
their claims on, inter alia, the Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal
crime to “obstruc[t], dela[y], or affec[t] commerce . . . by robbery or
extortion . . . or commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything
in violation of this section,” 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a), and on the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which defines a pro
scribed “pattern of racketeering activity,” § 1962(a), in terms of certain
predicate acts that include extortion, see § 1961(1). After trial, the jury
concluded that petitioners violated RICO’s civil provisions, the Hobbs
Act, and other extortion-related laws. In Scheidler v. National Orga
nization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393 (NOW II), this Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of the jury’s award of damages and the
District Court’s issuance of a permanent nationwide injunction. The
Court noted that the Hobbs Act defines “extortion” as necessarily in
cluding the improper “ ‘obtaining of property from another,’ ” id., at 400
(quoting § 1951(b)(2)); observed that the claimed “property” here con
sisted of a woman’s right to seek clinic services and the rights of clinic
staff to perform their jobs and of clinics to provide care free from wrong
ful threats, violence, coercion, and fear, id., at 400–401; decided that
characterizing petitioners’ actions as an “obtaining of property from”
respondents went well beyond permissible boundaries, id., at 402; and
held, therefore, that petitioners did not commit extortion as defined by
the Hobbs Act, id., at 397. The Court concluded that, because all of the
predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation had to
*Together with No. 04–1352, Operation Rescue v. National Organiza
tion for Women, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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10 SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
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Syllabus
be reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO must also be
reversed, id., at 411. On remand, the Court of Appeals decided that,
because this Court had not considered respondents’ alternative theory
that the jury’s RICO verdict rested not only on extortion-related con
duct, but also on four instances (or threats) of physical violence unre
lated to extortion, the cases must be remanded to the District Court to
determine whether these four acts alone might constitute Hobbs Act
violations (sufficient, as predicate acts under RICO, to support the
injunction).
Held: Physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the
Hobbs Act’s scope. Congress did not intend to create a freestanding
physical violence offense. It did intend to forbid acts or threats of
physical violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in what
the Act refers to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or con
spiracies). Pp. 16–23.
(a) The more restrictive reading of the statutory text—the one tying
the prohibited violence to robbery or extortion—is correct. For one
thing, it is the more natural reading. The text preceding the physical
violence clause does not forbid obstructing, delaying, or affecting com
merce; rather, it forbids obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce
“by robbery or extortion.” § 1951(a) (emphasis added). This means
that behavior that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce is a “violation”
of the statute only if it also involves robbery or extortion (or related
attempts or conspiracies). Consequently, the reference in the physical
violence clause to actions or threats of violence “in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to do anything in violation of this section” seems to mean
acts or threats of violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage
in robbery or extortion, for that is the only kind of behavior that the
section otherwise makes a violation. This restrictive reading is further
supported by the fact that Congress often intends such statutory terms
as “affect commerce” or “in commerce” to be read as terms of art con
necting the congressional exercise of legislative authority with the
constitutional provision (here, the Commerce Clause) granting that au
thority. See, e. g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265,
273. Such jurisdictional language may limit, but it will not primarily
define, the behavior that the statute calls a “violation” of federal law.
Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 854. Moreover, the statute’s
history supports the more restrictive reading: Both of the Hobbs Act’s
predecessor statutes made clear that the physical violence they prohib
ited was not violence in furtherance of a plan to injure commerce, but
violence in furtherance of a plan to injure commerce through coercion
or extortion (1934 Act) or through extortion or robbery (1946 Act). The

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11 Cite as: 547 U. S. 9 (2006)
Syllabus
Hobbs Act’s legislative history contains nothing to the contrary. That
the present statutory language is less clear than the 1946 version does
not reflect a congressional effort to redefine the crime. To the contrary,
Congress revised the Act’s language in 1948 as part of its general revi
sion of the Criminal Code, which “was not intended to create new crimes
but to recodify those then in existence.” Morissette v. United States,
342 U. S. 246, 269, n. 28. The Court will not presume the revision
worked a change in the underlying substantive law absent a clearly
expressed intent to do so. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200,
209. Here there is no evidence of any such intent. Finally, respond
ents’ interpretation broadens the Hobbs Act’s scope well beyond what
case law has assumed. It would federalize much ordinary criminal
behavior, ranging from simple assault to murder, that typically is the
subject of state, not federal, prosecution. Congress did not intend the
Hobbs Act to have so broad a reach. See, e. g., NOW II, supra, at 405.
Other Courts of Appeals have rejected respondents’ construction of the
Act. And in 1994, Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, 18 U. S. C. § 248(a)(3), which was aimed specifically at
the type of activity at issue in this litigation, thereby suggesting that
Congress did not believe that the Hobbs Act already addressed that
activity. Pp. 16–21.
(b) Respondents’ reliance on the canon of statutory construction fa
voring interpretations that give a function to each word in a statute,
thereby avoiding linguistic superfluity, is misplaced. They claim that,
because the definitions of robbery or extortion (or related attempts or
conspiracies) already encompass robbery or extortion that take place
through acts of violence (or related threats), see §§ 1951(b)(1) and (2),
there would be no reason for § 1951(a) to contain its physical violence
clause unless Congress intended to create a freestanding offense. Peti
tioners, however, have found a small amount of additional work for the
clause to do. The Scheidler petitioners point to a hypothetical mobster
who threatens violence and demands payment from a business. Those
threats constitute attempted extortion; but the subsequent acts of vio
lence against a noncomplying business by the mobster’s subordinates
might not constitute attempted extortion or be punishable as a conspir
acy to commit extortion if the subordinates were not privy to the mob
ster’s plan, absent the specific prohibition of physical violence in further
ance of a plan to commit extortion. The Government adds that the
clause permits prosecutors to bring multiple charges for the same con
duct; e. g., a robber who injured bystanders could be charged with the
separate Hobbs Act crimes of robbery and of using violence in further
ance of the robbery. While this additional work is concededly small,
Congress’ intent is clear. Interpretive canons are designed to help

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12 SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
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Syllabus
courts determine what Congress intended, not to lead them to interpret
the law contrary to that intent. Pp. 21–23.
91 Fed. Appx. 510, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem
bers joined, except Alito, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the cases.
Alan Untereiner argued the cause for petitioners in both
cases. With him on the briefs in No. 04–1244 were Roy T.
Englert, Jr., Kathryn S. Zecca, Noah Messing, Thomas Brej
cha, Deborah Fischer, and D. Colette Wilson. On the briefs
in No. 04–1352 were Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber,
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Stuart J. Roth, Vincent P. McCarthy,
Ann-Louise Lohr, Thomas P. Monaghan, John P. Tuskey,
Laura B. Hernandez, Shannon D. Woodruff, Larry L. Crain,
and Robert W. Ash.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were
Acting Solicitor General Kneedler, Acting Assistant Attor
ney General Richter, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben,
Kathleen A. Felton, and Frank Marine.
Erwin Chemerinsky argued the cause for the National Or
ganization for Women, Inc., et al., respondents in both cases.
With him on the brief were Paul Hoffman, Laurie Leven
son, Catherine Fisk, Fay Clayton, Lowell E. Sachnoff, Jack
L. Block, and Frank Susman.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the
State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and
Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane
Brady of Delaware, Phill Kline of Kansas, Michael A. Cox of Michigan,
Jim Petro of Ohio, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of
Texas, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt,
James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold; for Americans United for Life by
Clarke D. Forsythe, Denise M. Burke, and G. Robert Blakey; for Con
cerned Women for America by Theresa Schrempp and Mark L. Lorbiecki;

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13 Cite as: 547 U. S. 9 (2006)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
A section of Title 18 of the United States Code (called the
Hobbs Act) says that an individual commits a federal crime
if he or she “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce” by
(1) “robbery,” (2) “extortion,” or (3) “commit[ting] or threat
en[ing] physical violence to any person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section.” § 1951(a) (emphasis added). The dispute
in these cases concerns the meaning of the underscored
words, in particular the words, “in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to do anything in violation of this section.” Does
this phrase refer to (violence committed pursuant to) those
plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce through
robbery or extortion? Or does it refer to (violence com
mitted pursuant to) those plans or purposes that affect
interstate commerce, plain and simple? If the former, the
statute governs only a limited subset of violent behavior,
namely, behavior connected with robbery and extortion. If
the latter, the statute governs a far broader range of human
activity, namely, all violent actions (against persons or prop
erty) that affect interstate commerce. In our view, the
for Consistent Life et al. by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Joseph Ma
thias Cosgrove, and Jeffrey S. Kerr; and for the Life Legal Defense Foun
dation by Catherine W. Short and Andrew W. Zepeda.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for
the Feminist Majority Foundation et al. by Steven G. Gey; for NARAL
Pro-Choice America et al. by Maria T. Vullo; for the Religious Coalition
for Reproductive Choice et al. by Deanne M. Ottaviano and David J. Pfef
fer; and for Abner J. Mikva et al. by Molly S. Boast.
Briefs of amici curiae in both cases were filed for the Lawyers’ Commit
tee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Joseph R. Bankoff, Michael L.
Foreman, Sarah C. Crawford, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the Legal
Defense for Unborn Children by Alan Edward Ernest; for Emily Lyons
by Pamela L. Sumners; and for 47 Members of the United States Con
gress by Jon B. Eisenberg.
M. Reed Hopper filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus
curiae in No. 04–1244.

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14 SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
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Opinion of the Court
former, more restrictive reading of the Act is the correct
interpretation.
I
Petitioners are individuals (and organizations) who engage
in pro-life, anti-abortion protest activities. Respondents are
health care clinics that perform abortions and a pro-choice
national nonprofit organization that supports the legal avail
ability of abortions. In 1986, (pro-choice) respondents, be
lieving that (pro-life) petitioners had tried to disrupt activi
ties at health care clinics that perform abortions through
violence and various other unlawful activities, brought this
legal action, which sought damages and an injunction forbid
ding (pro-life) petitioners from engaging in such activities
anywhere in the Nation.
Respondents based their legal claims upon the Hobbs Act,
certain other laws that forbid extortion, and a federal anti
racketeering statute, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1962. Respondents
argued that petitioners’ clinic-related protest activities
amounted in context to extortion. They added that these
extortionate acts created a “pattern of racketeering activ
ity”—a pattern that RICO defines in terms of certain predi
cate acts that include acts of extortion. See § 1961(1) (2000
ed., Supp. III). And they sought a permanent injunction,
which they believed RICO authorized. See § 1964 (2000
ed.).
Initially, the District Court dismissed their complaint. It
concluded that RICO requires proof that the alleged criminal
acts were motivated by an economic purpose—a purpose
that is lacking here. National Organization for Women,
Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937 (ND Ill. 1991). The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. National Or
ganization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 612 (1992).
But this Court held that the statute “requires no such eco
nomic motive,” and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings. National

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Opinion of the Court
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249,
252 (1994).
After trial, the jury found that petitioners had engaged
in a host of extortionate, or extortion-related, acts. It
awarded treble damages to two of the respondents (a matter
not at issue here), and the District Court entered a nation
wide injunction. See §§ 1964(a), (c). The Court of Appeals
affirmed. 267 F. 3d 687 (2001).
This Court again reversed. Scheidler v. National Orga
nization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393 (2003) (NOW II).
We noted that the Hobbs Act defines “extortion” as necessar
ily including the improper “ ‘obtaining of property from an
other.’ ” Id., at 400 (quoting § 1951(b)(2)). We pointed out
that the claimed “property” consisted of “a woman’s right to
seek medical services from a clinic, the right of the doctors,
nurses or other clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the
right of the clinics to provide medical services free from
wrongful threats, violence, coercion and fear.” Id., at 400–
401 (internal quotation marks omitted). We decided that
“[w]hatever the outer boundaries may be, the effort to char
acterize petitioners’ actions here as an ‘obtaining of property
from’ respondents is well beyond them.” Id., at 402. Ac
cordingly, we held that “because they did not ‘obtain’ prop
erty from respondents,” petitioners “did not commit extor
tion” as defined by the Hobbs Act. Id., at 397. We found
that the state extortion law violations, and other extortion
related violations, were flawed for the same reason and must
also be set aside. Id., at 410.
Our opinion concluded:
“Because all of the predicate acts supporting the jury’s
finding of a RICO violation must be reversed, the judg
ment that petitioners violated RICO must also be re
versed. Without an underlying RICO violation, the in
junction issued by the District Court must necessarily
be vacated.” Id., at 411.

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On remand, the Court of Appeals did not order the District
Court to terminate the cases or to vacate its injunction. In
stead, the Court of Appeals considered respondents’ argu
ment that the jury’s RICO verdict rested not only upon many
instances of extortion-related conduct, but also upon four in
stances (or threats) of physical violence unrelated to extor
tion. 91 Fed. Appx. 510, 512 (2004). The Court of Appeals
decided that the parties had not presented this theory to this
Court and, as a result, we had no occasion to consider
whether these four acts alone might constitute Hobbs Act
violations (sufficient, as predicate acts under RICO, to sup
port the nationwide injunction). See id., at 513. The Court
of Appeals remanded the cases to the District Court to make
that determination. Ibid.
Petitioners sought certiorari to review this ruling. We
granted the writ to consider the following three questions:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals improperly disre
garded this Court’s mandate in NOW II by holding that
the injunction issued by the District Court might not
need to be vacated;
(2) Whether the Hobbs Act forbids violent conduct
unrelated to extortion or robbery; and
(3) Whether RICO authorizes a private party to ob
tain an injunction.
We now answer the second question. We hold that physical
violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the
scope of the Hobbs Act. And since our answer to the second
question requires an entry of judgment in petitioners’ favor,
we shall not answer the first or third questions.
II
We first set forth the Hobbs Act’s text. The relevant stat
utory section imposes criminal liability on
“[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or com

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Opinion of the Court
modity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or at
tempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in further
ance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section . . . .” 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a) (emphasis
added).
The question, as we have said, concerns the meaning of
the phrase that modifies the term “physical violence,”
namely, the words “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section.” Do those words refer
to violence (1) that furthers a plan or purpose to “affec[t]
commerce . . . by robbery or extortion,” or to violence
(2) that furthers a plan or purpose simply to “affec[t] com
merce”? We believe the former, more restrictive, reading
of the text—the reading that ties the violence to robbery or
extortion—is correct.
For one thing, the language of the statute makes the more
restrictive reading the more natural one. The text that pre
cedes the physical violence clause does not forbid obstruct
ing, delaying, or affecting commerce (or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce); rather, it forbids ob
structing, delaying, or affecting commerce “by robbery or
extortion.” Ibid. (emphasis added). This language means
that behavior that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce is
a “violation” of the statute only if that behavior also involves
robbery or extortion (or related attempts or conspiracies).
Consequently, the reference in the physical violence clause
to actions or threats of violence “in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to do anything in violation of this section” (empha
sis added) would seem to mean acts or threats of violence
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in robbery
or extortion, for that is the only kind of behavior that the
section otherwise makes a violation.
This restrictive reading is further supported by the fact
that Congress often intends such statutory terms as “affect
commerce” or “in commerce” to be read as terms of art con

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necting the congressional exercise of legislative authority
with the constitutional provision (here, the Commerce
Clause) that grants Congress that authority. See Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 273 (1995);
Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858, 859 (1985). Such ju
risdictional language may limit, but it will not primarily de
fine, the behavior that the statute calls a “violation” of fed
eral law. Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 854 (2000)
(holding that by using the term “affecting . . . commerce,”
“ ‘Congress did not define the crime described in [18 U. S. C.]
§ 844(i) as the explosion of a building whose damage or de
struction might affect interstate commerce,’ ” and noting
that the Court must look to other “qualifying language” in
the provision to define the offense).
For another thing, the statute’s history supports the more
restrictive reading. Congress enacted the Hobbs Act’s
predecessor in 1934. See Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, 48
Stat. 979 (reproduced in Appendix A, infra). That prede
cessor Act prohibited coercion and extortion appropriately
connected with interstate commerce, and placed these prohi
bitions in §§ 2(a) and 2(b), respectively. 48 Stat. 980. The
Act went on in § 2(c) to impose criminal liability on anyone
who, in connection with interstate commerce, “[c]ommits or
threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical
injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to violate sections (a) or (b).” Ibid.; see also NOW
II, 537 U. S., at 407. The 1934 Act explicitly linked § 2(c),
the physical violence subsection, with §§ 2(a) and 2(b). It
thereby made crystal clear that the physical violence that it
prohibited was not violence in furtherance of a plan to injure
commerce, but violence in furtherance of a plan to injure
commerce through coercion or extortion.
In 1946, Congress enacted a superseding law, namely, the
Hobbs Act. Ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (reproduced in Appendix
B, infra). The new law changed the old law in two signifi
cant respects: It added robbery while omitting coercion.

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NOW II, supra, at 407; see United States v. Culbert, 435
U. S. 371, 377 (1978) (“The bill that eventually became the
Hobbs Act . . . substituted specific prohibitions against rob
bery and extortion for the Anti-Racketeering Act’s lan
guage”). The new Act, like the old Act, was absolutely ex
plicit in respect to the point here at issue, the necessary link
between physical violence and other crimes (now extortion
and robbery).
The 1946 Hobbs Act reads as follows:
“Sec. 2. Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, de
lays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any arti
cle or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion,
shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 3. Whoever conspires with another or with
others, or acts in concert with another or with others
to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty
of a felony.
“Sec. 4. Whoever attempts or participates in an at
tempt to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be
guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 5. Whoever commits or threatens physical vio
lence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to do anything in violation of section 2 shall
be guilty of a felony.” 60 Stat. 420 (emphasis added).
As § 2 makes clear, the statute prohibits robbery and extor
tion. As § 5’s reference to § 2 makes clear, the statute pro
hibits violence only when that violence furthers a plan or
purpose to affect commerce by robbery or extortion. Each
of the statute’s other sections reflects the same approach;
each explicitly refers back to § 2’s prohibition against rob
bery and extortion.
The Act’s legislative history contains nothing to the con
trary. Indeed, the Committee Reports and floor debates
emphasized that “the purpose of the bill was ‘to prevent any
one from obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce, or the

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movement of any article or commodity in commerce by rob
bery or extortion as defined in the bill.’ ” Culbert, supra,
at 377 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 9
(1945); emphasis added in Culbert); see Culbert, supra, at
376–378 (discussing legislative history). They nowhere sug
gested that Congress intended to make physical violence a
freestanding crime.
The present Hobbs Act language is less clear than the 1946
version. But the linguistic changes do not reflect a congres
sional effort to redefine the crime. To the contrary, Con
gress revised the Hobbs Act’s language in 1948 as part of its
general revision of the Criminal Code. That “1948 Revision
was not intended to create new crimes but to recodify those
then in existence.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S.
246, 269, n. 28 (1952). This Court has written that it will
“not presume that the revision worked a change in the un
derlying substantive law ‘unless an intent to make such [a]
chang[e] is clearly expressed.’ ” Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U. S. 200, 209 (1993) (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227 (1957); alter
ation made in Keene). And here there is no evidence of any
such intent. Rather, the Reviser’s Notes indicate that the
linguistic changes to the Hobbs Act simply amount to
“changes in phraseology and arrangement necessary to effect
consolidation.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
A131 (1947).
Finally, respondents’ Hobbs Act interpretation broadens
the Act’s scope well beyond what case law has assumed. It
would federalize much ordinary criminal behavior, ranging
from simple assault to murder, behavior that typically is the
subject of state, not federal, prosecution. Decisions of this
Court have assumed that Congress did not intend the Hobbs
Act to have so broad a reach. See NOW II, 537 U. S., at
405 (noting that the Hobbs Act embodied extortion, which
required the obtaining of property, not coercion); id., at 411
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (coercion, which is not covered

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Opinion of the Court
by the Hobbs Act, “more accurately describes the nature of
petitioners’ [non-property-related] actions” (internal quota
tion marks omitted)); United States v. Enmons, 410 U. S. 396,
410 (1973) (Hobbs Act does not reach violent activity by
union members seeking higher wages because such violence
is not extortion and Congress did not intend to “cover all
overtly coercive conduct in the course of ” a labor dispute).
Not surprisingly, other Courts of Appeals that have con
sidered the question have rejected respondents’ construction
of the Act. See United States v. Yankowski, 184 F. 3d 1071
(CA9 1999); United States v. Franks, 511 F. 2d 25 (CA6 1975).
And in 1994, Congress enacted a specific statute aimed di
rectly at the type of abortion clinic violence and other activ
ity at issue in this litigation, thereby suggesting it did not
believe that the Hobbs Act already addressed that activity.
See Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U. S. C.
§ 248(a)(3) (imposing criminal liability on anyone who “inten
tionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or
attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproduc
tive health services”).
III
Respondents’ contrary claim rests primarily upon a canon
of statutory construction that favors interpretations that
give a function to each word in a statute, thereby avoiding
linguistic superfluity. See United States v. Menasche, 348
U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute’ ” (quoting
Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883))). They
claim that, because the definitions of robbery or extortion (or
related attempts or conspiracies) already encompass robbery
or extortion that takes place through acts of violence (or re
lated threats), “[t]here would be no reason for the statute to
include the clause prohibiting violence and threats of vio
lence” unless Congress intended to create a freestanding of
fense. Brief for Respondents 25; see 18 U. S. C. § 1951(b)(1)
(defining “robbery” as the “unlawful taking or obtaining of

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22 SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
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Opinion of the Court
personal property . . . by means of actual or threatened
force, or violence” (emphasis added)); § 1951(b)(2) (defining
“extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another . . .
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear” (emphasis added)).
Petitioners, however, have found a small amount of addi
tional work for the words to do. Brief for Petitioners in
No. 04–1244, pp. 33–36; see also Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 11–12. The Scheidler petitioners point to a
hypothetical mobster who threatens violence and demands
payment from a business. Those threats constitute at
tempted extortion; but the subsequent acts of violence
against a noncomplying business by the subordinates of that
mobster may not constitute attempted extortion and may not
be punishable as a conspiracy to commit extortion if the sub
ordinates were not privy to the mobster’s plan. A specific
prohibition of physical violence in furtherance of a plan to
commit extortion would bring the subordinates’ behavior
within the statute’s coverage. The United States adds that
the physical violence clause permits prosecutors to bring
multiple charges for the same conduct. For instance, the
clause would apply to a defendant who injured bystanders
during a robbery, permitting the Government to charge that
defendant with the Hobbs Act crime of robbery and the sepa
rate Hobbs Act crime of using violence in furtherance of the
robbery. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.
We concede that this additional work is small. But the
need for language to cover such instances, or perhaps simply
a desire to emphasize the problem of violence, led Congress
in the original 1946 version of the Hobbs Act to make clear
that the statute prohibited, not all physical violence, but only
physical violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to en
gage in robbery or extortion. See supra, at 19. And it
is similarly clear that Congress intended to carry this view
forward into the 1948 recodification. See supra, at 20–21.

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Appendix A to opinion of the Court
The canons of interpretation cannot lead us to a contrary
conclusion. Those canons are tools designed to help courts
better determine what Congress intended, not to lead courts
to interpret the law contrary to that intent. Chickasaw Na
tion v. United States, 534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that “can
ons are not mandatory rules” but guides “designed to help
judges determine the Legislature’s intent,” and that “other
circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome
their force”).
IV
We conclude that Congress did not intend to create a free
standing physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act. It did
intend to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in fur
therance of a plan or purpose to engage in what the statute
refers to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or
conspiracies). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re
versed, and the cases are remanded for entry of judgment
for petitioners.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of these cases.
APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT
A
The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979,
provided:
“AN ACT
“To protect trade and commerce against interference by
violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation.
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa
tives of the United States of America in Congress as
sembled, That the term ‘trade or commerce’, as used

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24 SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
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herein, is defined to mean trade or commerce between
any States, with foreign nations, in the District of Co
lumbia, in any Territory of the United States, between
any such Territory or the District of Columbia and any
State or other Territory, and all other trade or com
merce over which the United States has constitutional
jurisdiction.
“Sec. 2. Any person who, in connection with or in re
lation to any act in any way or in any degree affecting
trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving
or about to move in trade or commerce—
“(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or
attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coer
cion, the payment of money or other valuable considera
tions, or the purchase or rental of property or protective
services, not including, however, the payment of wages
of a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
“(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color
of official right; or
“(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical
violence or physical injury to a person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or
(b); or
“(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other per
son or persons to commit any of the foregoing acts; shall,
upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall
be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years or
by a fine of $10,000, or both.
“Sec. 3. (a) As used in this Act the term ‘wrongful’
means in violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State or Territory.
“(b) The terms ‘property’, ‘money’, or ‘valuable consid
erations’ used herein shall not be deemed to include
wages paid by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide em
ployee.” (Emphasis in original.)

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Appendix B to opinion of the Court
B
Title I of the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act of 1946, ch. 537,
60 Stat. 420, provided:
“Sec. 1. As used in this title—
“(a) The term ‘commerce’ means (1) commerce be
tween any point in a State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia and any point outside thereof, or between
points within the same State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia but through any place outside thereof, and
(2) commerce within the District of Columbia or any
Territory, and (3) all other commerce over which the
United States has jurisdiction; and the term ‘ Territory’
means any Territory or possession of the United States.
“(b) The term ‘robbery’ means the unlawful taking or
obtaining of personal property, from the person or in the
presence of another, against his will, by means of actual
or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, imme
diate or future, to his person or property, or property in
his custody or possession, or the person or property of
a relative or member of his family or anyone in his com
pany at the time of the taking or obtaining.
“(c) The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of prop
erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrong
ful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right.
“Sec. 2. Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, de
lays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any arti
cle or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion,
shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 3. Whoever conspires with another or with oth
ers, or acts in concert with another or with others to
do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of
a felony.
“Sec. 4. Whoever attempts or participates in an at
tempt to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be
guilty of a felony.

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26 SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
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Appendix C to opinion of the Court
“Sec. 5. Whoever commits or threatens physical vio
lence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to do anything in violation of section 2 shall
be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 6. Whoever violates any section of this title
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprison
ment for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not
more than $10,000, or both.”
C
The Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951, as amended in 1948,
provides:
“(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
or affects commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or at
tempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in further
ance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.
“(b) As used in this section—
“(1) The term ‘robbery’ means the unlawful taking
or obtaining of personal property from the person or in
the presence of another, against his will, by means of
actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,
immediate or future, to his person or property, or prop
erty in his custody or possession, or the person or prop
erty of a relative or member of his family or of anyone
in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
“(2) The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
“(3) The term ‘commerce’ means commerce within
the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession
of the United States; all commerce between any point in

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Appendix C to opinion of the Court
a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Colum
bia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between
points within the same State through any place outside
such State; and all other commerce over which the
United States has jurisdiction.
“(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal,
modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52, 101–
115, 151–166 of Title 29 or sections 151–188 of Title 45.”