HINCK et ux. v. UNITED STATES

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501 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
HINCK et ux. v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 06–376. Argued April 23, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
A 1986 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code permits the Treasury
Secretary to abate interest that accrues on unpaid federal income taxes
if the interest assessment is attributable to Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) error or delay. 26 U. S. C. § 6404(e)(1). Subsequently, the fed
eral courts uniformly held that the Secretary’s decision not to abate was
not subject to judicial review. In 1996, Congress added what is now
§ 6404(h), which states that the Tax Court has “jurisdiction over any
action brought by a taxpayer who meets the requirements referred to
in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) to determine whether the Secretary’s failure
to abate . . . was an abuse of discretion, and may order an abatement, if
such action is brought within 180 days after the date of the mailing
of the Secretary’s final determination not to abate . . . .” § 6404(h)(1).
Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) in turn incorporates 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(B),
which refers to individuals with a net worth not exceeding $2 million
and businesses with a net worth not exceeding $7 million. The IRS
denied petitioner Hincks’ request for abatement of interest assessed in
1999 for the period March 21, 1989, to April 1, 1993. The Hincks then
filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking review of the refusal
to abate. The court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that § 6404(h) vests exclusive juris
diction to review interest abatement claims in the Tax Court.
Held: The Tax Court provides the exclusive forum for judicial review of
a failure to abate interest under § 6404(e)(1). This Court’s analysis is
governed by the well-established principle that, in most contexts, “ ‘a
precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies,’ ”
EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, ante, at 433; it is also guided
by the recognition that when Congress enacts a specific remedy when
none was previously recognized, or when previous remedies were “prob
lematic,” the remedy provided is generally regarded as exclusive, Block
v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273,
285. Section 6404(h) fits the bill on both counts. In a single sentence,
it provides a forum for adjudication, a limited class of potential plaintiffs,
a statute of limitations, a standard of review, and authorization for judi
cial relief; it was also enacted against a backdrop of decisions uniformly
rejecting the possibility of any review of the Secretary’s § 6404(e)(1)

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502 HINCK v. UNITED STATES
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determinations. Though Congress failed explicitly to define the Tax
Court’s jurisdiction as exclusive, it is quite plain that the terms of
§ 6404(h)—a “precisely drawn, detailed statute” filling a perceived hole
in the law—control all requests for review of § 6404(e)(1) decisions, in
cluding the forum for adjudication. The Hincks correctly argue that
Congress’s provision of an abuse-of-discretion standard removed one of
the obstacles courts had held foreclosed judicial review of such determi
nations, but Congress did not simply supply this single missing ingredi
ent in enacting § 6404(h). Rather, it set out a carefully circumscribed,
time-limited, plaintiff-specific provision, which also precisely defined the
appropriate forum. This Court will not isolate one feature of this stat
ute and use it to permit taxpayers to circumvent the other limiting fea
tures in the same statute, such as a shorter statute of limitations than
in general refund suits or a net-worth ceiling for plaintiffs eligible to
bring suit. Taxpayers could “effortlessly evade” these specific limita
tions by bringing interest abatement claims as tax refund actions in the
district courts or the Court of Federal Claims, disaggregating a statute
Congress plainly envisioned as a package deal. EC Term of Years
Trust, ante, at 434. Equally unavailing are the Hincks’ contentions
that reading § 6404(h) to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Tax Court
impliedly repeals the pre-existing jurisdiction of the district courts and
Court of Federal Claims, runs contrary to the structure of tax contro
versy jurisdiction, and would lead to the “unreasonable” result that tax
payers with net worths exceeding the specified ceilings would be fore
closed from seeking judicial review of § 6404(e)(1) refusals to abate.
Pp. 506–510.
446 F. 3d 1307, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Thomas E. Redding argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Teresa J. Womack and Sallie
W. Gladney.
Jonathan L. Marcus argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Clement, Assistant Attorney General O’Connor, Deputy
Solicitor General Hungar, and Kenneth L. Greene.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Bad things happen if you fail to pay federal income taxes
when due. One of them is that interest accrues on the un

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503 Cite as: 550 U. S. 501 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
paid amount. Sometimes it takes a while for the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to determine that taxes should have
been paid that were not. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code permits the Secretary of the Treasury to
abate interest—to forgive it, partially or in whole—if the
assessment of interest on a deficiency is attributable to un
reasonable error or delay on the part of the IRS. Section
6404(h) allows for judicial review of the Secretary’s decision
not to grant such relief. The question presented in this case
is whether this review may be obtained only in the Tax
Court, or may also be secured in the district courts and the
Court of Federal Claims. We hold that the Tax Court pro
vides the exclusive forum for judicial review of a refusal to
abate interest under § 6404(e)(1), and affirm.
I
The Internal Revenue Code provides that if any amount
of assessed federal income tax is not paid “on or before the
last date prescribed for payment,” interest “shall be paid for
the period from such last date to the date paid.” 26 U. S. C.
§ 6601(a). Section 6404 of the Code authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to abate any tax or related liability in certain
circumstances. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Con
gress amended § 6404 to add subsection (e)(1), which, as
enacted, provided in pertinent part:
“In the case of any assessment of interest on . . . any
deficiency attributable in whole or in part to any error
or delay by an officer or employee of the Internal Reve
nue Service (acting in his official capacity) in performing
a ministerial act . . . the Secretary may abate the assess
ment of all or any part of such interest for any period.”
26 U. S. C. § 6404(e)(1) (1994 ed.).
In the years following passage of § 6404(e)(1), the federal
courts uniformly held that the Secretary’s decision not to
grant an abatement was not subject to judicial review. See,

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e. g., Argabright v. United States, 35 F. 3d 472, 476 (CA9
1994); Selman v. United States, 941 F. 2d 1060, 1064 (CA10
1991); Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 936 F. 2d 548,
554 (CA11 1991); see also Bax v. Commissioner, 13 F. 3d 54,
58 (CA2 1993). These decisions recognized that § 6404(e)(1)
gave the Secretary complete discretion to determine
whether to abate interest, “neither indicat[ing] that such au
thority should be used universally nor provid[ing] any basis
for distinguishing between the instances in which abatement
should and should not be granted.” Selman, supra, at 1063.
Any decision by the Secretary was accordingly “committed
to agency discretion by law” under the Administrative Proce
dure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2), and thereby insulated from
judicial review. See, e. g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 599
(1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830 (1985).
In 1996, as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Congress
again amended § 6404, adding what is now subsection (h).
As relevant, that provision states:
“Review of denial of request for abatement of interest
“(1) In general
“The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction over any action
brought by a taxpayer who meets the requirements
referred to in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) to determine
whether the Secretary’s failure to abate interest under
this section was an abuse of discretion, and may order
an abatement, if such action is brought within 180 days
after the date of the mailing of the Secretary’s final de
termination not to abate such interest.” 26 U. S. C.
§ 6404(h)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
Section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) in turn incorporates 28 U. S. C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(B), which refers to individuals with a net worth
not exceeding $2 million and businesses with a net worth
not exceeding $7 million. Congress made subsection (h) ef
fective for all requests for abatement submitted to the IRS

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after July 30, 1996, regardless of the tax year involved.
§ 302(b), 110 Stat. 1458.1
II
In 1986, petitioner John Hinck was a limited partner in an
entity called Agri-Cal Venture Associates (ACVA). Along
with his wife, petitioner Pamela Hinck, Hinck filed a joint
return for 1986 reporting his share of losses from the part
nership. The IRS later examined the tax returns for ACVA
and proposed adjustments to deductions that the partnership
had claimed for 1984, 1985, and 1986. In 1990, the IRS is
sued a final notice regarding the partnership’s returns, disal
lowing tens of millions of dollars of deductions. While the
partnership sought administrative review of this decision,
the Hincks, in May 1996, made an advance remittance of
$93,890 to the IRS toward any personal deficiency that might
result from a final adjustment of ACVA’s returns. In March
1999, the Hincks reached a settlement with the IRS concern
ing the ACVA partnership adjustments, to the extent they
affected the Hincks’ return. Shortly thereafter, as a result
of the adjustments, the IRS imposed additional liability
against the Hincks: $16,409 in tax and $21,669.22 in interest.
The IRS applied the Hincks’ advance remittance to this
amount and refunded them the balance of $55,811.78.
The Hincks filed a claim with the IRS contending that,
because of IRS errors and delays, the interest assessed
against them for the period from March 21, 1989, to April 1,
1993, should be abated under § 6404(e)(1). The IRS denied
the request. The Hincks then filed suit in the United States
Court of Federal Claims seeking review of the refusal to
1 The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 also modified 26 U. S. C. § 6404(e)(1)(A)
to add the word “unreasonable” before the words “error or delay” and to
change “ministerial act” to “ministerial or managerial act.” § 301(a), 110
Stat. 1457. These changes, however, only apply to interest accruing on
deficiencies for tax years beginning after July 30, 1996, see § 301(c), ibid.,
and thus are not implicated in this case.

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abate. That court granted the Government’s motion to
dismiss, 64 Fed. Cl. 71, 81 (2005), and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, 446 F. 3d
1307, 1313–1314 (2006), holding that § 6404(h) vests exclu
sive jurisdiction to review interest abatement claims under
§ 6404(e)(1) in the Tax Court. Because this decision con
flicted with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Beall v. United
States, 336 F. 3d 419, 430 (2003) (holding that § 6404(h) grants
concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction to the Tax
Court), we granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1162 (2007).
III
Our analysis is governed by the well-established principle
that, in most contexts, “ ‘a precisely drawn, detailed statute
pre-empts more general remedies.’ ” EC Term of Years
Trust v. United States, ante, at 433 (quoting Brown v. GSA,
425 U. S. 820, 834 (1976)); see also Block v. North Dakota ex
rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 284–286
(1983). We are also guided by our past recognition that
when Congress enacts a specific remedy when no remedy
was previously recognized, or when previous remedies were
“problematic,” the remedy provided is generally regarded as
exclusive. Id., at 285; Brown, supra, at 826–829.
Section 6404(h) fits the bill on both counts. It is a “pre
cisely drawn, detailed statute” that, in a single sentence, pro
vides a forum for adjudication, a limited class of potential
plaintiffs, a statute of limitations, a standard of review, and
authorization for judicial relief. And Congress enacted this
provision against a backdrop of decisions uniformly rejecting
the possibility of any review for taxpayers wishing to chal
lenge the Secretary’s § 6404(e)(1) determination. Therefore,
despite Congress’s failure explicitly to define the Tax Court’s
jurisdiction as exclusive, we think it quite plain that the
terms of § 6404(h)—a “precisely drawn, detailed statute” fill
ing a perceived hole in the law—control all requests for re
view of § 6404(e)(1) determinations. Those terms include
the forum for adjudication.

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The Hincks’ primary argument against exclusive Tax
Court jurisdiction is that by providing a standard of re
view—abuse of discretion—in § 6404(h), Congress eliminated
the primary barrier to judicial review that courts had pre
viously recognized; accordingly, they maintain, taxpayers
may seek review of § 6404(e)(1) determinations under stat
utes granting jurisdiction to the district courts and the Court
of Federal Claims to review tax refund actions. See 28
U. S. C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1); 26 U. S. C. § 7422(a). Or, as
the Fifth Circuit reasoned: “[T]he federal district courts
have always possessed jurisdiction over challenges brought
to section 6404(e)(1) denials[;] they simply determined that
the taxpayers had no substantive right whatever to a favor
able exercise of the Secretary’s discretion . . . . [I]n enacting
section 6404(h), Congress indicated that such is no longer the
case, and thereby removed any impediment to district court
review.” Beall, supra, at 428 (emphasis in original).
It is true that by providing an abuse-of-discretion stand
ard, Congress removed one of the obstacles courts had held
foreclosed judicial review of § 6404(e)(1) determinations.
See, e. g., Argabright, 35 F. 3d, at 476 (noting an absence
of “ ‘judicially manageable standards’ ” (quoting Heckler, 470
U. S., at 830)). But in enacting § 6404(h), Congress did not
simply supply this single missing ingredient; rather, it set
out a carefully circumscribed, time-limited, plaintiff-specific
provision, which also precisely defined the appropriate
forum. We cannot accept the Hincks’ invitation to isolate
one feature of this “precisely drawn, detailed statute”—the
portion specifying a standard of review—and use it to permit
taxpayers to circumvent the other limiting features Con
gress placed in the same statute—restrictions such as a
shorter statute of limitations than general refund suits, com
pare § 6404(h) (180-day limitations period) with § 6532(a)(1)
(2-year limitations period), or a net-worth ceiling for plain
tiffs eligible to bring suit. Taxpayers could “effortlessly
evade” these specific limitations by bringing interest abate

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ment claims as tax refund actions in the district courts or the
Court of Federal Claims, disaggregating a statute Congress
plainly envisioned as a package deal. EC Term of Years
Trust, ante, at 434; see also Block, supra, at 284–285; Brown,
supra, at 832–833.
The Hincks’ other contentions are equally unavailing.
First, they claim that reading § 6404(h) to vest exclusive ju
risdiction in the Tax Court impliedly repeals the pre-existing
jurisdiction of the district courts and Court of Federal
Claims, despite our admonition that “repeals by implica
tion are not favored.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535,
549 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the
implied-repeal doctrine is not applicable here, for when Con
gress passed § 6404(h), § 6404(e)(1) had been interpreted not
to provide any right of review for taxpayers. There is thus
no indication of any “language on the statute books that
[Congress] wishe[d] to change,” United States v. Fausto, 484
U. S. 439, 453 (1988), implicitly or explicitly. Congress sim
ply prescribed a limited form of review where none had pre
viously been found to exist.
Second, the Hincks assert that vesting jurisdiction over
§ 6404(e)(1) abatement decisions exclusively in the Tax Court
runs contrary to the “entire structure of tax controversy ju
risdiction,” Brief for Petitioners 30, under which the Tax
Court generally hears prepayment challenges to tax liability,
see § 6213(a), while postpayment actions are brought in the
district courts or Court of Federal Claims. In a related
vein, the Hincks point out that the Government’s position
would force taxpayers seeking postpayment review of their
tax liabilities to separate their § 6404(e)(1) abatement claims
from their refund claims and bring each in a different court.
Even assuming, arguendo, that we were inclined to depart
from the face of the statute, these arguments are under
cut on two fronts. To begin with, by expressly granting to
the Tax Court some jurisdiction over § 6404(e)(1) decisions,
Congress has already broken with the general scheme the

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Hincks identify. No one doubts that an action seeking re
view of a § 6404(e)(1) determination may be maintained in
the Tax Court even if the interest has already been paid, see,
e. g., Dadian v. Commissioner, 87 TCM 1344 (2004), ¶ 2004–
121 RIA Memo TC, p. 790–2004; Miller v. Commissioner, 79
TCM 2213 (2000), ¶ 2000–196 RIA Memo TC, p. 1120–2000,
aff ’d, 310 F. 3d 640 (CA9 2002), and the Hincks point to no
case where the Tax Court has refused to exercise jurisdiction
under such circumstances.
In addition, an interest abatement claim under § 6404(e)(1)
involves no questions of substantive tax law, but rather is
premised on issues of bureaucratic administration (whether,
for example, there was “error or delay” in the performance
of a “ministerial” act, § 6404(e)(1)(A)). Judicial review of de
cisions not to abate requires an evaluation of the internal
processes of the IRS, not the underlying tax liability of the
taxpayer. We find nothing tellingly awkward about chan
neling such discrete and specialized questions of administra
tive operations to one particular court, even if in some re
spects it “may not appear to be efficient” as a policy matter
to separate refund and interest abatement claims. 446 F. 3d,
at 1316.2
Last, the Hincks contend that Congress would not have
intended to vest jurisdiction exclusively in the Tax Court
because it would lead to the “unreasonable” result that tax
payers with net worths greater than $2 million (for individu
als) or $7 million (for businesses) would be foreclosed from
seeking judicial review of § 6404(e)(1) refusals to abate.
Brief for Petitioners 46; see also Beall, 336 F. 3d, at 430.
But we agree with the Federal Circuit that this outcome
“was contemplated by Congress.” 446 F. 3d, at 1316. The
net-worth limitation in § 6404(h) reflects Congress’s judg
ment that wealthier taxpayers are more likely to be able to
2 We note that the Hincks sought only interest abatement in the Court
of Federal Claims, thus failing to implicate the “claim-splitting” and effi
ciency concerns they condemn. See Brief for Petitioners 49.

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pay a deficiency before contesting it, thereby avoiding ac
crual of interest during their administrative and legal chal
lenges. In contrast, taxpayers with comparatively fewer re
sources are more likely to contest their assessed deficiency
before first paying it, thus exposing themselves to interest
charges if their challenge is ultimately unsuccessful. There
is nothing “unreasonable” about Congress’s decision to grant
the possibility of judicial relief only to those taxpayers most
likely to be in need of it.3
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
3 The Hincks also argue that the net-worth limitations on § 6404(h) re
view violate the due process rights of those taxpayers who exceed them.
The court below did not pass upon this constitutional challenge, nor do we,
for as the Hincks concede, the record contains no findings concerning their
own net worth, Brief for Petitioners 44, and they offer no reasons to devi
ate from our general rule that a party “must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties,” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 129 (2004)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975); internal quotation
marks omitted).