UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

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128 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 06–562. Argued April 23, 2007—Decided June 11, 2007
Sections 107(a) and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 allow private parties to recover
expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites. Section
107(a) defines four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
and makes them liable for, among other things, “(A) all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State
or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan”
and “(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with [such] plan,” §§ 107(a)(4)(A)–(B). Originally,
some courts interpreted § 107(a)(4)(B) as providing a cause of action for
a private party to recover voluntarily incurred response costs and to
seek contribution after having been sued. However, after the enact
ment of § 113(f), which authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribu
tion, many courts held it to be the exclusive remedy for PRPs. In
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161, this
Court held that a private party could seek contribution under § 113(f)
only after being sued under § 106 or § 107(a).
After respondent Atlantic Research cleaned up a Government site
it leased and contaminated while doing Government work, it sued the
Government to recover some of its costs under, as relevant here,
§ 107(a). The District Court dismissed the case, but the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that § 113(f) does not provide the exclusive remedy
for recovering cleanup costs and that § 107(a)(4)(B) provided a cause
of action to any person other than those permitted to sue under
§ 107(a)(4)(A).
Held: Because § 107(a)(4)(B)’s plain terms allow a PRP to recover costs
from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic Research with a cause
of action. Pp. 134–141.
(a) Applying the maxim that statutes must “be read as a whole,” King
v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221, subparagraph (B)’s language
can be understood only with reference to subparagraph (A). The provi
sions are adjacent and have similar structures, and the text denotes a
relationship between them. Subparagraph (B)’s phrase “other neces
sary costs” refers to and differentiates the relevant costs from those
listed in subparagraph (A). Thus, it is natural to read the phrase
“any other person” by referring to the immediately preceding subpara

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129 Cite as: 551 U. S. 128 (2007)
Syllabus
graph (A). Accepting the Government’s interpretation—that “any
other person” refers only to a person not identified as a PRP in
§§ 107(a)(1)–(4)—would destroy the symmetry of subparagraphs (A) and
(B) and render subparagraph (B) internally confusing. Moreover, be
cause the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in virtually all
persons likely to incur cleanup costs, accepting that interpretation
would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering
subparagraph (B) a dead letter. Pp. 134–137.
(b) Contrary to the Government’s argument, this interpretation will
not create friction between §§ 107(a) and 113(f). Their two clearly dis
tinct remedies complement each other: Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a
contribution action to PRPs with common liability stemming from an
action instituted under § 106 or § 107(a), while § 107(a) permits cost re
covery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has itself
incurred cleanup costs. Thus, at least in the case of reimbursement, a
PRP cannot choose § 107(a)’s longer statute of limitations for recovery
actions over § 113(f)’s shorter one for contribution claims. Similarly, a
PRP could not avoid § 113(f)’s equitable distribution of reimbursement
costs among PRPs by instead choosing to impose joint and several liabil
ity under § 107(a). That choice of remedies simply does not exist, and
in any event, a defendant PRP in a § 107(a) suit could blunt any such
distribution by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. Finally, permitting PRPs
to seek recovery under § 107(a) will not eviscerate § 113(f)(2), which pro
hibits § 113(f) contribution claims against “[a] person who has resolved
its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judi
cially approved settlement . . . .” Although that settlement bar does
not by its terms protect against § 107(a) cost-recovery liability, a district
court applying traditional equity rules would undoubtedly consider any
prior settlement in the liability calculus; the settlement bar continues
to provide significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs that
have inequitably reimbursed costs incurred by another party; and settle
ment carries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the
United States or a State. Pp. 137–141.
459 F. 3d 827, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mc-
Keown, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Ronald M. Spritzer, and
Ellen J. Durkee.

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130 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
Counsel
Owen Thomas Armstrong, Jr., argued the cause for re
spondent. With him on the brief was Frank L. Steeves.
Jay D. Geck, Deputy Solicitor General of Washington, ar
gued the cause for the State of Washington et al. as amici
curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Rob
ert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Maureen Hart, Solicitor
General, and Michael L. Dunning, Assistant Attorney Gen
eral, Linda Singer, Acting Attorney General of the District
of Columbia, Salvador J. Antonetti Stutts, Solicitor General
of Puerto Rico, and the Attorneys General for their respec
tive States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Col
berg of Alaska, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, John W. Suth
ers of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Bill
McCollum of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark
J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa
Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of
Iowa, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Charles C. Foti, Jr.,
of Louisiana, Steven Rowe of Maine, Douglas F. Gansler of
Maryland, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Michael A.
Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jim Hood of
Mississippi, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath
of Montana, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Kelly A. Ay
otte of New Hampshire, Stuart Rabner of New Jersey, Gary
K. King of New Mexico, Andrew M. Cuomo of New York,
Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North
Dakota, Marc Dann of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon,
Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of
Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah,
William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and J. B. Van Hollen of
Wisconsin.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Cooper Industries,
LLC, et al. by Dale E. Stephenson, Allen A. Kacenjar, Jay N. Varon, and
G. Michael Halfenger; and for the Huron Valley Steel Corp. by Jack D.
Shumate and Karen Pilat.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the City of New
York by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, and Daniel Greene; for

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131 Cite as: 551 U. S. 128 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensati on, and Liabi l ity Ac t of 1980
(CERCLA)—§§ 107(a) and 113(f)—allow private parties to
recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated
sites. 42 U. S. C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f). In this case, we must
decide a question left open in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Avi
all Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161 (2004): whether § 107(a)
provides so-called potentially responsible parties (PRPs), 42
U. S. C. §§ 9607(a)(1)–(4), with a cause of action to recover
costs from other PRPs. We hold that it does.
I
A
Courts have frequently grappled with whether and how
PRPs may recoup CERCLA-related costs from other PRPs.
The questions lie at the intersection of two statutory provi-
sions—CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f). Section 107(a) de
the Association of California Water Agencies et al. by Paul S. Weiland,
Frederic A. Fudacz, and Alfred E. Smith; for Aviall Services, Inc., by
Richard Faulk, Jeffrey M. Gaba, and Stacy R. Obenhaus; for E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours and Co. et al. by Mark I. Levy and William H. Hyatt,
Jr.; for Ford Motor Co. et al. by John McGahren; for Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York, Inc., by Carter G. Phillips, Angus Macbeth, Ste
phen B. Kinnaird, Woody N. Peterson, Richard W. Babinecz, and Peter P.
Garam; for Lockheed Martin Corp. by Miguel A. Estrada, Michael K.
Murphy, Amir C. Tayrani, and James R. Buckley; for the Metropolitan
Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago by Harvey M. Sheldon,
Joel D. Bertocchi, Stephen R. Swofford, and Frederick M. Feldman; for
the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Jerry S. Phillips; for the
Superfund Settlements Project et al. by Michael W. Steinberg; for the
United States Conference of Mayors by Paul E. Gutermann and Thomas
C. Goldstein; and for Former Administrator of the United States Environ
mental Protection Agency Carol M. Browner et al. by Joel M. Gross.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Reading Co. by James C. Martin;
and for James Kotrous by Jacqueline L. McDonald and Michael E.
Vergara.

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132 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
Opinion of the Court
fines four categories of PRPs, 94 Stat. 2781, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 9607(a)(1)–(4), and makes them liable for, among other
things:
“(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a State or an In
dian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan; [and]
“(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contin
gency plan.” §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B).
Enacted as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reau
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 100 Stat. 1613, § 113(f) au
thorizes one PRP to sue another for contribution in certain
circumstances. 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f).1
Prior to the advent of § 113(f)’s express contribution right,
some courts held that § 107(a)(4)(B) provided a cause of ac
tion for a private party to recover voluntarily incurred re
sponse costs and to seek contribution after having been sued.
See Cooper Industries, supra, at 161–162 (collecting cases);
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 816, n. 7
(1994) (same). After SARA’s enactment, however, some
Courts of Appeals believed it necessary to “direc[t] traffic
between” §§ 107(a) and 113(f). 459 F. 3d 827, 832 (CA8 2006)
(case below). As a result, many Courts of Appeals held that
§ 113(f) was the exclusive remedy for PRPs. See Cooper In
dustries, supra, at 169 (collecting cases). But as courts pre
vented PRPs from suing under § 107(a), they expanded
§ 113(f) to allow PRPs to seek “contribution” even in the ab
sence of a suit under § 106 or § 107(a). Aviall Servs., Inc. v.
1 Section 113(f)(1) permits private parties to seek contribution during or
following a civil action under § 106 or § 107(a). 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1).
Section 113(f)(3)(B) permits private parties to seek contribution after they
have settled their liability with the Government. § 9613(f)(3)(B).

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Opinion of the Court
Cooper Industries, Inc., 312 F. 3d 677, 681 (CA5 2002) (en
banc).
In Cooper Industries, we held that a private party could
seek contribution from other liable parties only after having
been sued under § 106 or § 107(a). 543 U. S., at 161. This
narrower interpretation of § 113(f) caused several Courts
of Appeals to reconsider whether PRPs have rights under
§ 107(a)(4)(B), an issue we declined to address in Cooper
Industries. Id., at 168. After revisiting the issue, some
courts have permitted § 107(a) actions by PRPs. See
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423
F. 3d 90 (CA2 2005); Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist.
of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coat
ings, Inc., 473 F. 3d 824 (CA7 2007). However, at least one
court continues to hold that § 113(f) provides the exclusive
cause of action available to PRPs. E. I. DuPont de Ne
mours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515 (CA3 2006).
Today, we resolve this issue.
B
In this case, respondent Atlantic Research leased property
at the Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot, a facility oper
ated by the Department of Defense. At the site, Atlantic
Research retrofitted rocket motors for petitioner United
States. Using a high-pressure water spray, Atlantic Re
search removed pieces of propellant from the motors. It
then burned the propellant pieces. Some of the resultant
wastewater and burned fuel contaminated soil and ground
water at the site.
Atlantic Research cleaned the site at its own expense and
then sought to recover some of its costs by suing the United
States under both §§ 107(a) and 113(f). After our decision
in Cooper Industries foreclosed relief under § 113(f), Atlantic
Research amended its complaint to seek relief under § 107(a)
and federal common law. The United States moved to
dismiss, arguing that § 107(a) does not allow PRPs (such as

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134 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
Opinion of the Court
Atlantic Research) to recover costs. The District Court
granted the motion to dismiss, relying on a case decided
prior to our decision in Cooper Industries, Dico, Inc. v.
Amoco Oil Co., 340 F. 3d 525 (CA8 2003).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Recognizing that Cooper Industries undermined the reason
ing of its prior precedent, 459 F. 3d, at 830, n. 4, the Court
of Appeals joined the Second and Seventh Circuits in holding
that § 113(f) does not provide “the exclusive route by which
[PRPs] may recover cleanup costs.” Id., at 834 (citing Con
solidated Edison Co., supra). The court reasoned that
§ 107(a)(4)(B) authorized suit by any person other than the
persons permitted to sue under § 107(a)(4)(A). 459 F. 3d, at
835. Accordingly, it held that § 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause
of action to Atlantic Research. To prevent perceived con
flict between §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1), the Court of Ap
peals reasoned that PRPs that “have been subject to §§ 106
or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use § 113,
thereby ensuring its continued vitality.” Id., at 836–837.
We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1177 (2007), and now affirm.
II
A
The parties’ dispute centers on what “other person[s]” may
sue under § 107(a)(4)(B). The Government argues that “any
other person” refers to any person not identified as a PRP
in §§ 107(a)(1)–(4).2 In other words, subparagraph (B) per
2 CERCLA § 107(a) lists four broad categories of persons as PRPs, by
definition liable to other persons for various costs:
“(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
“(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
“(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration

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mits suit only by non-PRPs and thus bars Atlantic Research’s
claim. Atlantic Research counters that subparagraph (B)
takes its cue from subparagraph (A), not the earlier para
graphs (1)–(4). In accord with the Court of Appeals, Atlan
tic Research believes that subparagraph (B) provides a cause
of action to anyone except the United States, a State, or an
Indian tribe—the persons listed in subparagraph (A). We
agree with Atlantic Research.
Statutes must “be read as a whole.” King v. St. Vincent’s
Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). Applying that maxim,
the language of subparagraph (B) can be understood only
with reference to subparagraph (A). The provisions are ad
jacent and have remarkably similar structures. Each con
cerns certain costs that have been incurred by certain enti
ties and that bear a specified relationship to the national
contingency plan.3 Bolstering the structural link, the text
also denotes a relationship between the two provisions. By
using the phrase “other necessary costs,” subparagraph
(B) refers to and differentiates the relevant costs from those
listed in subparagraph (A).
In light of the relationship between the subparagraphs, it
is natural to read the phrase “any other person” by referring
to the immediately preceding subparagraph (A), which per
mits suit only by the United States, a State, or an Indian
tribe. The phrase “any other person” therefore means any
person other than those three. See 42 U. S. C. § 9601(21)
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
“(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub
stance, shall be liable for [various costs].” 42 U. S. C. §§ 9607(a)(1)–(4).
3 “The national contingency plan specifies procedures for preparing and
responding to contaminations and was promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency . . . .” Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,
543 U. S. 157, 161, n. 2 (2004) (citing 40 CFR pt. 300 (2004)).

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136 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
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(defining “person” to include the United States and the vari
ous States). Consequently, the plain language of subpara
graph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by any private
party, including PRPs. See Key Tronic, 511 U. S., at 818
(stating in dictum that § 107 “impliedly authorizes private
parties to recover cleanup costs from other PRP[s]” (empha
sis added)).
The Government’s interpretation makes little textual
sense. In subparagraph (B), the phrase “any other neces
sary costs” and the phrase “any other person” both refer to
antecedents—“costs” and “person[s]”—located in some pre
vious statutory provision. Although “any other necessary
costs” clearly references the costs in subparagraph (A), the
Government would inexplicably interpret “any other person”
to refer not to the persons listed in subparagraph (A) but to
the persons listed as PRPs in paragraphs (1)–(4). Nothing
in the text of § 107(a)(4)(B) suggests an intent to refer to
antecedents located in two different statutory provisions.
Reading the statute in the manner suggested by the Govern
ment would destroy the symmetry of §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B)
and render subparagraph (B) internally confusing.
Moreover, the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep
in virtually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs. Hence,
if PRPs do not qualify as “any other person” for purposes of
§ 107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party would. The
Government posits that § 107(a)(4)(B) authorizes relief for
“innocent” private parties—for instance, a landowner whose
land has been contaminated by another. But even parties
not responsible for contamination may fall within the broad
definitions of PRPs in §§ 107(a)(1)–(4). See 42 U. S. C.
§ 9607(a)(1) (listing “the owner and operator of a . . . facility”
as a PRP); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
315 F. 3d 179, 184 (CA2 2003) (“CERCLA § 9607 is a strict
liability statute”). The Government’s reading of the text
logically precludes all PRPs, innocent or not, from recover
ing cleanup costs. Accordingly, accepting the Government’s

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interpretation would reduce the number of potential plain
tiffs to almost zero, rendering § 107(a)(4)(B) a dead letter.4
See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467,
475 (1911) (“We must have regard to all the words used by
Congress, and as far as possible give effect to them”).
According to the Government, our interpretation suffers
from the same infirmity because it causes the phrase “any
other person” to duplicate work done by other text. In the
Government’s view, the phrase “any other necessary costs”
“already precludes governmental entities from recovering
under” § 107(a)(4)(B). Brief for United States 20. Even as
suming the Government is correct, it does not alter our
conclusion. The phrase “any other person” performs a sig
nificant function simply by clarifying that subparagraph
(B) excludes the persons enumerated in subparagraph (A).
In any event, our hesitancy to construe statutes to render
language superfluous does not require us to avoid surplusage
at all costs. It is appropriate to tolerate a degree of surplus
age rather than adopt a textually dubious construction that
threatens to render the entire provision a nullity.
B
The Government also argues that our interpretation will
create friction between §§ 107(a) and 113(f), the very harm
courts of appeals have previously tried to avoid. In par
ticular, the Government maintains that our interpretation,
by offering PRPs a choice between §§ 107(a) and 113(f), effec
tively allows PRPs to circumvent § 113(f)’s shorter statute
4 Congress amended the statute in 2002 to exempt some bona fide pro
spective purchasers (BFPPs) from liability under § 107(a). See 42 U. S. C.
§ 9607(r)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The Government claims that these per
sons are non-PRPs and therefore qualify as “any other person” under its
interpretation of § 107(a)(4)(B). Prior to 2002, however, the statute made
this small set of persons liable as PRPs. Accordingly, even if BFPPs now
give some life to the Government’s interpretation of § 107(a)(4)(B), it would
be implausible at best to conclude that § 107(a)(4)(B) lay dormant until the
enactment of § 107(r)(1) in 2002.

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138 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
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of limitations. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 9613(g)(2)–(3). Further
more, the Government argues, PRPs will eschew equitable
apportionment under § 113(f) in favor of joint and several
liability under § 107(a). Finally, the Government contends
that our interpretation eviscerates the settlement bar set
forth in § 113(f)(2).
We have previously recognized that §§ 107(a) and 113(f)
provide two “clearly distinct” remedies. Cooper Industries,
543 U. S., at 163, n. 3. “CERCLA provide[s] for a right to
cost recovery in certain circumstances, § 107(a), and separate
rights to contribution in other circumstances, §§ 113(f)(1),
113(f)(3)(B).” Id., at 163 (emphasis added). The Govern
ment, however, uses the word “contribution” as if it were
synonymous with any apportionment of expenses among
PRPs. Brief for United States 33, n. 14 (“Contribution is
merely a form of cost recovery, not a wholly independent
type of relief ”); see also, e. g., Pinal Creek Group v. New
mont Mining Corp., 118 F. 3d 1298, 1301 (CA9 1997) (“Be
cause all PRPs are liable under the statute, a claim by one
PRP against another PRP necessarily is for contribution”).
This imprecise usage confuses the complementary yet dis
tinct nature of the rights established in §§ 107(a) and 113(f).
Section 113(f) explicitly grants PRPs a right to contribu
tion. Contribution is defined as the “tortfeasor’s right to
collect from others responsible for the same tort after the
tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share,
the shares being determined as a percentage of fault.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 353 (8th ed. 2004). Nothing in
§ 113(f) suggests that Congress used the term “contribution”
in anything other than this traditional sense. The statute
authorizes a PRP to seek contribution “during or following”
a suit under § 106 or § 107(a). 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1).5
Thus, § 113(f)(1) permits suit before or after the establish
5 Similarly, § 113(f)(3)(B) permits a PRP to seek contribution after it
“has resolved its liability to the United States or a State . . . in an adminis
trative or judicially approved settlement . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).

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ment of common liability. In either case, a PRP’s right to
contribution under § 113(f)(1) is contingent upon an inequita
ble distribution of common liability among liable parties.
By contrast, § 107(a) permits recovery of cleanup costs but
does not create a right to contribution. A private party
may recover under § 107(a) without any establishment of lia
bility to a third party. Moreover, § 107(a) permits a PRP to
recover only the costs it has “incurred” in cleaning up a site.
42 U. S. C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). When a party pays to satisfy a
settlement agreement or a court judgment, it does not incur
its own costs of response. Rather, it reimburses other par
ties for costs that those parties incurred.
Accordingly, the remedies available in §§ 107(a) and 113(f)
complement each other by providing causes of action “to
persons in different procedural circumstances.” Consoli
dated Edison, 423 F. 3d, at 99; see also E. I. DuPont de
Nemours, 460 F. 3d, at 548 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Section
113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to PRPs with com
mon liability stemming from an action instituted under § 106
or § 107(a). And § 107(a) permits cost recovery (as distinct
from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred
cleanup costs. Hence, a PRP that pays money to satisfy
a settlement agreement or a court judgment may pursue
§ 113(f) contribution. But by reimbursing response costs
paid by other parties, the PRP has not incurred its own costs
of response and therefore cannot recover under § 107(a).
As a result, though eligible to seek contribution under
§ 113(f)(1), the PRP cannot simultaneously seek to recover
the same expenses under § 107(a). Thus, at least in the case
of reimbursement, the PRP cannot choose the 6-year statute
of limitations for cost-recovery actions over the shorter limi
tations period for § 113(f) contribution claims.6
6 We do not suggest that §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) have no overlap at
all. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 816 (1994) (stating
the statutes provide “similar and somewhat overlapping remed[ies]”).
For instance, we recognize that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to

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140 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
Opinion of the Court
For similar reasons, a PRP could not avoid § 113(f)’s equi
table distribution of reimbursement costs among PRPs by
instead choosing to impose joint and several liability on an
other PRP in an action under § 107(a).7 The choice of reme
dies simply does not exist. In any event, a defendant PRP
in such a § 107(a) suit could blunt any inequitable distri
bution of costs by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. 459 F. 3d,
at 835; see also Consolidated Edison, supra, at 100, n. 9 (col
lecting cases). Resolution of a § 113(f) counterclaim would
necessitate the equitable apportionment of costs among the
liable parties, including the PRP that filed the § 107(a) action.
42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims,
the court may allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate”).
Finally, permitting PRPs to seek recovery under § 107(a)
will not eviscerate the settlement bar set forth in § 113(f)(2).
That provision prohibits § 113(f) contribution claims against
“[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States
or a State in an administrative or judicially approved
settlement . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(2). The settlement
bar does not by its terms protect against cost-recovery lia
bility under § 107(a). For several reasons, we doubt this
supposed loophole would discourage settlement. First, as
stated above, a defendant PRP may trigger equitable appor
a consent decree following a suit under § 106 or § 107(a). See, e. g., United
Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 33 F. 3d 96, 97
(CA1 1994). In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but
does not reimburse the costs of another party. We do not decide whether
these compelled costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a),
or both. For our purposes, it suffices to demonstrate that costs incurred
voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reim
bursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement
are recoverable only under § 113(f). Thus, at a minimum, neither remedy
swallows the other, contrary to the Government’s argument.
7 We assume without deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and sev
eral liability.

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141 Cite as: 551 U. S. 128 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
tionment by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. A district court
applying traditional rules of equity would undoubtedly con
sider any prior settlement as part of the liability calculus.
Cf. 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(2), p. 337 (1977)
(“No tortfeasor can be required to make contribution beyond
his own equitable share of the liability”). Second, the settle
ment bar continues to provide significant protection from
contribution suits by PRPs that have inequitably reimbursed
the costs incurred by another party. Third, settlement car
ries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the
United States or a State.8
III
Because the plain terms of § 107(a)(4)(B) allow a PRP to
recover costs from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic
Research with a cause of action. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
8 Because § 107(a) expressly permits PRPs to seek cost recovery, we
need not address the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that
§ 107(a) contains an additional implied right to contribution for PRPs who
are not eligible for relief under § 113(f). Cf. Cooper Industries, 543 U. S.,
at 171 (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S.
630 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77
(1981)).