BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

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124 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum
sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously
convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Sec
tion 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense
classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while § 802(44)
defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense
[involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or for
eign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an
offense that ordinarily carries a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.
Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which
carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misde
meanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Bur
gess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under
§ 841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by
more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because
“felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately
defined in § 802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced
§ 841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under
the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per § 802(13); and (2) punishable
by more than one year’s imprisonment, per § 802(44). Rejecting that
argument, the District Court ruled that § 802(44) alone controls the
meaning of “felony drug offense” under § 841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Cir
cuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in § 841(b)(1)(A) is defined
exclusively by § 802(44) and does not incorporate § 802(13)’s definition of
“felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies
as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a
misdemeanor. Pp. 129–136.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used
“felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by § 802(44) without refer
ence to § 802(13). First, a definition such as § 802(44)’s that declares
what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated.

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Syllabus
E. g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392–393, n. 10. Second, be
cause “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by im
prisonment for more than one year, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a),
§ 802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense . . . punish
able by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for
§ 802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to in
corporate § 802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written
§ 802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year . . . .” Fourth,
the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both § 802(13)
and § 802(44) governed application of § 841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing en
hancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses
and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwith
standing the express inclusion of foreign offenses in § 841(b)(1)(A).
Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense”
leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in
state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or
misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of § 802(44) hardly renders
§ 802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the
many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 129–133.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In
1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an
offense that is a felony under . . . any law of a State” (emphasis added),
but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form.
By recognizing § 802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug of
fense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revi
sion: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifica
tions of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the
authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the
1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement
to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony
by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little
practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s
text and history. Pp. 133–135.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in
determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates § 802(13)’s
definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity
is statutory ambiguity. E. g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381,
387. Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a
manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is
no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. P. 135.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.

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126 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Jeffrey L. Fisher, by appointment of the Court, 552 U. S.
1138, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were Pamela S. Karlan, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Rus
sell, Laurence H. Tribe, and Thomas C. Goldstein.
Nicole A. Saharsky argued the cause for the United
States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clem
ent, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben, and Daniel S. Goodman.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
For certain federal drug offenses, the Controlled Sub
stances Act mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment
for ten years. 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A). That minimum
doubles to 20 years for defendants previously convicted of a
“felony drug offense.” Ibid. The question in this case is
whether a state drug offense classified as a misdemeanor, but
punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, is a “fel
ony drug offense” as that term is used in § 841(b)(1)(A).
Two statutory definitions figure in our decision. Section
802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “of
fense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a fel
ony.” Section 802(44) defines the compound term “felony
drug offense” to mean an offense involving specified drugs
that is “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign
country.”
The term “felony drug offense” contained in § 841(b)(1)(A)’s
provision for a 20-year minimum sentence, we hold, is defined
exclusively by § 802(44) and does not incorporate § 802(13)’s
definition of “felony.” A state drug offense punishable by
more than one year therefore qualifies as a “felony drug
*Kevin B. Huff, Peter Goldberger, Pamela Harris, and Mary Price filed
a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.

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offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a
misdemeanor.
I
Petitioner Keith Lavon Burgess pleaded guilty in the
United States District Court for the District of South Caro
lina to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U. S. C.
§§ 841(a) and 846.1 A violation of § 841(a) involving that
quantity of cocaine base ordinarily carries a mandatory mini
mum sentence of ten years. § 841(b)(1)(A). The minimum
sentence increases to 20 years, however, if the crime follows
a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense.” Ibid.
Burgess had previously been convicted of possessing co
caine in violation of S. C. Code Ann. § 44–53–370(c) and (d)(1)
(2002 and Supp. 2007). Although that offense carried a max
imum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, South Carolina
classified it as a misdemeanor. § 44–53–370(d)(1). Burgess’
prior South Carolina conviction, the Government urged,
raised the minimum sentence for his federal conviction to 20
years. The enhancement was mandatory, the Government
maintained, because Congress defined “felony drug offense”
to include state cocaine offenses “punishable by imprison
ment for more than one year.” 21 U. S. C. § 802(44).2
Burgess contested the enhancement of his federal sen
tence. The term “felony drug offense,” he argued, incor
porates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in
§ 802(13) to mean “any Federal or State offense classified by
1 Although Title 21 of the United States Code has not been enacted as
positive law, we refer to it rather than the underlying provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 801
et seq., for the sake of simplicity. The relevant provisions of Title 21 have
not changed from the time of Burgess’ offense, and all citations are to the
2000 edition through Supplement V.
2 Burgess received a one-year suspended sentence for his South Carolina
conviction, but does not dispute that the offense was “punishable by im
prisonment for more than one year.” § 802(44) (emphasis added).

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applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” A prior drug
offense does not rank as a “felony drug offense,” he con
tended, unless it is (1) classified as a felony under the law of
the punishing jurisdiction, per § 802(13); and (2) punishable
by more than one year’s imprisonment, per § 802(44).
Rejecting Burgess’ argument, the District Court ruled
that § 802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug of
fense” as that term is used in § 841(b)(1)(A). Although the
District Court’s ruling subjected Burgess to a 20-year mini
mum sentence, the Government moved for a downward de
parture based on Burgess’ substantial assistance in another
prosecution. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(e) (2000 ed., Supp. V).
The court granted the motion and sentenced Burgess to 156
months’ imprisonment followed by ten years’ supervised
release.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. The “ ‘commonsense way to interpret “felony
drug offense,” ’ ” that court said, “ ‘is by reference to the
definition in § 802(44).’ ” 478 F. 3d 658, 662 (2007) (quoting
United States v. Roberson, 459 F. 3d 39, 52 (CA1 2006)).
The Fourth Circuit found nothing in the “plain language
or statutory scheme . . . to indicate that Congress intended
‘felony drug offense’ also to incorporate the definition [of
‘felony’] in § 802(13).” 478 F. 3d, at 662.
Burgess, proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of certio
rari. We granted the writ, 552 U. S. 1074 (2007), to resolve
a split among the Circuits on the question Burgess presents:
Does a drug crime classified as a misdemeanor by state law,
but punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, rank
as a “felony drug offense” under 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)?
Compare 478 F. 3d 658 (case below) and Roberson, 459 F. 3d
39 (§ 802(44) provides exclusive definition of “felony drug of
fense”), with United States v. West, 393 F. 3d 1302 (CADC
2005) (both § 802(13) and § 802(44) limit meaning of “felony
drug offense”).

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II
A
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U. S. C. § 801
et seq., contains two definitions central to the dispute before
us; they bear repetition in full. Section 802(13) provides:
“The term ‘felony’ means any Federal or State offense
classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.”
Section 802(44) states:
“The term ‘felony drug offense’ means an offense that
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
under any law of the United States or of a State or for
eign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating
to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or de
pressant or stimulant substances.”
Burgess argues here, as he did below, that “felony drug
offense,” as used in § 841(b)(1)(A), should be construed to in
corporate both the definition of “felony” in § 802(13) and the
definition of “felony drug offense” in § 802(44). Under his
reading, the § 841(b)(1)(A) enhancement is triggered only
when the prior conviction is both “classified by applicable
Federal or State law as a felony,” § 802(13), and “punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year,” § 802(44).
The Government, in contrast, reads § 802(44) to provide
the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense.” Under the
Government’s reading, all defendants whose prior drug
crimes were punishable by more than one year in prison
would be subject to the § 841(b)(1)(A) enhancement, re
gardless of the punishing jurisdiction’s classification of the
offense.
The Government’s reading, we are convinced, correctly in
terprets the statutory text and context. Section 802(44) de
fines the precise phrase used in § 841(b)(1)(A)—“felony drug
offense.” “Statutory definitions control the meaning of stat
utory words . . . in the usual case.” Lawson v. Suwannee

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Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198, 201 (1949). See also Sten
berg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a stat
ute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that
definition . . . .”); 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction § 47:7, pp. 298–299, and nn. 2–3 (7th
ed. 2007) (hereinafter Singer).
The CSA, to be sure, also defines the term “felony.” The
language and structure of the statute, however, indicate that
Congress used the phrase “felony drug offense” as a term
of art defined by § 802(44) without reference to § 802(13).
First, Congress stated that “[t]he term ‘felony drug offense’
means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.” § 802(44) (emphasis added). “As a
rule, [a] definition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . .
excludes any meaning that is not stated.” Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392–393, n. 10 (1979) (some internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Groman v. Commis
sioner, 302 U. S. 82, 86 (1937); 2A Singer § 47:7, p. 306, and
n. 20.
Second, the term “felony” is commonly defined to mean a
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a) (classifying crimes with a maxi
mum term of more than one year as felonies); Black’s Law
Dictionary 651 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “felony” as “[a] serious
crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year or by death”). Section 802(44)’s definition of “fel
ony drug offense” as “an offense . . . punishable by imprison
ment for more than one year,” in short, leaves no blank to
be filled by § 802(13) or any other definition of “felony.”
Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incor
porate the definition of “felony” in § 802(13), it easily could
have written § 802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug of
fense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year . . . .” See Roberson, 459 F. 3d, at 52.
Congress has often used that drafting technique—i. e., re

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peating a discretely defined word—when it intends to incor
porate the definition of a particular word into the definition
of a compound expression. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 1672(a)–(b)
(defining “earnings” and then defining “disposable earnings”
as “that part of the earnings” meeting certain criteria); 18
U. S. C. § 1956(c)(3)–(4) (defining “transaction” and then de
fining “financial transaction” as “a transaction which” meets
other criteria); § 1961(1), (5) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (defining
“racketeering activity” and then defining “pattern of rack
eteering activity” to require “at least two acts of racketeer
ing activity”).3
3 Burgess offers four examples of defined words nested within defined
phrases where, he asserts, the definition of the word is embraced within
the phrase, although the word is not repeated in the definition of the
phrase. See Reply Brief 11–12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 11–12. In all but one
of these examples, however, the definition of the phrase is introduced by
the word “includes.” See 2 U. S. C. § 1301(4), (6), (7); 18 U. S. C. § 2266(3)–
(4). “[T]he word ‘includes’ is usually a term of enlargement, and not of
limitation.” 2A Singer § 47:7, p. 305 (some internal quotation marks omit
ted). Thus “[a] term whose statutory definition declares what it ‘includes’
is more susceptible to extension of meaning . . . than where”—as in
§ 802(44)—“the definition declares what a term ‘means.’ ” Ibid. See also
Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 82, 86 (1937) (“[W]hen an exclusive
definition is intended the word ‘means’ is employed, . . . whereas here the
word used is ‘includes.’ ”).
Burgess’ fourth example is also inapposite. The definition of “debtor’s
principal residence” in the Bankruptcy Code, he notes, does not repeat the
word “debtor,” itself a discretely defined term. See 11 U. S. C. § 101(13),
(13A) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Section 101(13A) states: “The term ‘debtor’s
principal residence’—(A) means a residential structure, including inciden
tal property, without regard to whether that structure is attached to real
property; and (B) includes an individual condominium or cooperative unit,
a mobile or manufactured home, or trailer.” That definition, unlike 21
U. S. C. § 802(44), is incomplete on its face because nothing in the definition
of “debtor’s principal residence” elucidates the word “debtor’s.” Given
that void and 11 U. S. C. § 101(13A)’s placement in the Bankruptcy Code,
it is reasonable to assume that Congress wanted courts to read the phrase
“debtor ’s principal residence” in light of the separate definition of

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Fourth, our reading avoids anomalies that would arise if
both 21 U. S. C. § 802(13) and § 802(44) governed application
of the sentencing enhancement in § 841(b)(1)(A). Notably,
§ 802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by more than
one year, while § 802(13) includes only federal and state of
fenses. Incorporation of § 802(13) into § 841(b)(1)(A) would
exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwith
standing the express inclusion of foreign offenses in
§ 802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense.” Furthermore,
some States and many foreign jurisdictions do not label of
fenses as felonies or misdemeanors. See N. J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:1–4 (West 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, § 1252
(Supp. 2007); Brief for United States 35. Burgess’ com
pound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered
the appropriate classification of drug convictions in those ju
risdictions. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 937 F. 2d 68,
70 (CA2 1991) (relying on New Jersey common law to deter
mine that the State classifies offenses punishable by more
than one year as felonies). No such uncertainty arises
under the precise definition Congress provided in § 802(44).
Finally, reading § 802(44) as the exclusive definition of “fel
ony drug offense” hardly renders § 802(13) extraneous. Sec
tion 802(13) serves to define “felony” for many CSA provi
sions using that unadorned term. See, e. g., §§ 824(a)(2)
(revocation of license to manufacture controlled substances
upon conviction of a felony), 843(b) (use of a communication
facility to commit a felony), 843(d)(1)–(2) (sentencing en
hancements), 843(e) (prohibition on engaging in transactions
“debtor.” Indeed, a contrary reading would yield the absurd result that
every residential structure is a “debtor’s principal residence.”
At most, therefore, Burgess’ fourth example illustrates the importance
of considering context in applying canons of statutory construction.
There may well be other examples lurking in the United States Code of
nested terms that draw their meaning from two different statutory provi
sions without repeating one term in the definition of the other. But “fel
ony drug offense” is not among them.

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involving listed chemicals upon conviction of a felony involv
ing those chemicals), 848(c)(1) (definition of “continuing crim
inal enterprise”), 848(e)(1)(B) (mandatory minimum term for
killing a law enforcement officer to avoid prosecution for a
felony), 853(d) (rebuttable presumption that property ac
quired during commission of certain felonies is subject to
criminal forfeiture), 878(a)(3) (authority to make warrantless
arrest where there is probable cause to believe a felony has
been committed).
B
The drafting history of the CSA reinforces our reading of
§ 802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense.”
In 1988, Congress first used the term “felony drug offense”
to describe the type of prior conviction that would trigger a
20-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A).
See National Narcotics Leadership Act, Pub. L. 100–690,
§ 6452(a), 102 Stat. 4371. The 1988 definition of the term
was placed within § 841(b)(1)(A) itself; the definition covered
“an offense that is a felony under any . . . Federal law . . .
or . . . any law of a State or a foreign country” prohibiting
or restricting conduct relating to certain types of drugs.
§ 6452(a)(2), ibid.4 But in 1994, Congress amended the defi
nition, replacing “an offense that is a felony under . . . any
law of a State,” ibid. (emphasis added), with “an offense that
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
under any law . . . of a State,” Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103–322, § 90105(c)–(d), 108
4 The full definition stated:
“For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘felony drug offense’ means
an offense that is a felony under any provision of this title or any other
Federal law that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs,
marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances or a felony under any
law of a State or a foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct
relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant sub
stances.” National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–690,
§ 6452(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4371.

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Stat. 1988 (emphasis added). In lieu of incorporation within
§ 841(b)(1)(A), the new definition was placed in a discrete
§ 802 definition section. Ibid.
This alteration lends considerable support to our reading
of the statute. Before 1994, the definition of “felony drug
offense” depended on the vagaries of state-law classifications
of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. The 1994 amend
ments replaced that definition with a uniform federal stand
ard based on the authorized length of imprisonment. By
recognizing § 802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony
drug offense,” our reading serves an evident purpose of the
1994 revision: to bring a measure of uniformity to the appli
cation of § 841(b)(1)(A) by eliminating disparities based on
divergent state classifications of offenses.
By contrast, Burgess reads the 1994 alteration as merely
adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition
that already required—and, he contends, continues to re
quire—designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing
jurisdiction. That view, however, is difficult to square with
Congress’ deletion of the word “felony” and substitution of
the phrase “punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year.”
If Burgess were correct, moreover, the sole effect of the
1994 change would have been to exclude from the compass
of § 841(b)(1)(A) the few drug offenses classified as felonies
under the law of the punishing jurisdiction but subject to a
sentence of one year or less. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8.5 See
also Brief for Petitioner 15 (purpose of 1994 alteration was
to eliminate enhancement for “truly minor offenses” none
theless classified as felonies). Burgess concedes that under
5 The examples provided by Burgess of such atypical categorization,
Brief for Petitioner 22, all carry maximum sentences of exactly one year.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13–701(C)(5) (West 2001), 13–3405(B)(1) (West
Supp. 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2925.11(C) (Lexis 2007 Cum. Supp.),
2929.14(A)(5) (Lexis Supp. 2007); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 15A–1340.17,
90–95(d) (Lexis 2007).

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his reading of the statute “the language that Congress added
[in 1994] has very little practical effect,” but defends his
interpretation on the ground that Congress labeled the
changes “conforming amendments.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.
See also 108 Stat. 1987; Brief for Petitioner 12.
Burgess places more weight on the “Conforming Amend
ments” caption than it can bear. Congress did not disavow
any intent to make substantive changes; rather, the amend
ments were “conforming” because they harmonized sentenc
ing provisions in the CSA and the Controlled Substances Im
port and Export Act, 84 Stat. 1285, 21 U. S. C. § 951 et seq.
Treating the amendments as nonsubstantive would be incon
sistent with their text, not to mention Burgess’ own view
that § 802(44) added a new length-of-imprisonment require
ment to the definition of “felony drug offense.”
In sum, the 1994 alteration replaced a patchwork of state
and foreign classifications with a uniform federal standard
based on the authorized term of imprisonment. Burgess’ ar
gument that Congress added something—the definition now
in § 802(44)—but subtracted nothing encounters formidable
impediments: the text and history of the statute.
C
Burgess urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determin
ing whether the term “felony drug offense” incorporates
§ 802(13)’s definition of “felony.” “[T]he touchstone of the
rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The rule comes into operation at the end of the
process of construing what Congress has expressed,” Cal
lanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961), and “applies
only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory
construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute,” United
States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994). Here, Congress
expressly defined the term “felony drug offense.” The
definition is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive.

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Accordingly, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to
resolve.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap
peals for the Fourth Circuit is
Affirmed.