CARCIERI, GOVERNOR OF RHODE ISLAND, et al. v. SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.

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379 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
CARCIERI, GOVERNOR OF RHODE ISLAND, et al.
v. SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 07–526. Argued November 3, 2008—Decided February 24, 2009
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), enacted in 1934, authorizes the Sec
retary of the Interior, a respondent here, to acquire land and hold it in
trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians,” 25 U. S. C. § 465,
and defines “Indian” to “include all persons of Indian descent who are
members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdic
tion,” § 479. The Narragansett Tribe was placed under the Colony of
Rhode Island’s formal guardianship in 1709. It agreed to relinquish its
tribal authority and sell all but two acres of its remaining reservation
land in 1880, but then began trying to regain its land and tribal status.
From 1927 to 1937, federal authorities declined to give it assistance be
cause they considered the Tribe to be under state, not federal, jurisdic
tion. In a 1978 agreement settling a dispute between the Tribe and
Rhode Island, the Tribe received title to 1,800 acres of land in petitioner
Charlestown in exchange for relinquishing claims to state land based on
aboriginal title; and it agreed that the land would be subject to state law.
The Tribe gained formal recognition from the Federal Government in
1983, and the Secretary of the Interior accepted a deed of trust to the
1,800 acres in 1988. Subsequently, a dispute arose over whether the
Tribe’s plans to build housing on an additional 31 acres of land it had
purchased complied with local regulations. While litigation was pend
ing, the Secretary accepted the 31-acre parcel into trust. The Interior
Board of Indian Appeals upheld that decision, and petitioners sought
review. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Secre
tary and other officials, determining that § 479’s plain language defines
“Indian” to include members of all tribes in existence in 1934, but does
not require a tribe to have been federally recognized on that date; and
concluding that, since the Tribe is currently federally recognized and
was in existence in 1934, it is a tribe under § 479. In affirming, the
First Circuit found § 479 ambiguous as to the meaning of “now under
Federal jurisdiction,” applied the principles of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, and de
ferred to the Secretary’s construction of the provision to allow the land
to be taken into trust.

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380 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR
Syllabus
Held: Because the term “now under Federal jurisdiction” in § 479 unam
biguously refers to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction
when the IRA was enacted in 1934, and because the Narragansett Tribe
was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the Secretary does not have
the authority to take the 31-acre parcel into trust. Pp. 387–396.
(a) When a statute’s text is plain and unambiguous, United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 4, the statute must be applied according to its
terms, see, e. g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359. Here,
whether the Secretary has authority to take the parcel into trust de
pends on whether the Narragansetts are members of a “recognized In
dian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” which, in turn, depends on
whether “now” refers to 1998, when the Secretary accepted the parcel
into trust, or 1934, when Congress enacted the IRA. The ordinary
meaning of “now,” as understood at the time of enactment, was at “the
present time; at this moment; at the time of speaking.” That definition
is consistent with interpretations given “now” by this Court both before
and after the IRA’s passage. See, e. g., Franklin v. United States, 216
U. S. 559, 569; Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 310–311. It also
aligns with the word’s natural reading in the context of the IRA. Fur
thermore, the Secretary’s current interpretation is at odds with the Ex
ecutive Branch’s construction of § 479 at the time of enactment. The
Secretary’s additional arguments in support of his contention that “now”
is ambiguous are unpersuasive. There is also no need to consider the
parties’ competing views on whether Congress had a policy justification
for limiting the Secretary’s trust authority to tribes under federal juris
diction in 1934, since Congress’ use of “now” in § 479 speaks for itself
and “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat.
Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254. Pp. 387–393.
(b) The Court rejects alternative arguments by the Secretary and his
amici that rely on statutory provisions other than § 479 to support
the Secretary’s decision to take the parcel into trust for the Narra
gansetts. Pp. 393–395.
497 F. 3d 15, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed
a concurring opinion, post, p. 396. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 400.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 401.
Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs for petitioner Carcieri, Governor of Rhode

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Opinion of the Court
Island, were Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, and
Claire J. Richards. Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General
of Rhode Island, and Neil F. X. Kelly, Assistant Attorney
General, filed briefs for petitioner State of Rhode Island.
Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., filed briefs for petitioner Town of
Charlestown, Rhode Island.
Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre,
Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Deputy Solicitor Gen
eral Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, and Elizabeth Ann
Peterson.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA or Act) authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior, a respondent in this case, to
acquire land and hold it in trust “for the purpose of providing
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ala
bama et al. by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut,
and Robert J. Deichert, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama,
Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, Bill McCollum
of Florida, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Stephen N. Six
of Kansas, James D. Caldwell of Louisiana, Martha Coakley of Massachu
setts, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Jon
C. Bruning of Nebraska, Anne Milgram of New Jersey, Wayne Stenehjem
of North Dakota, Nancy H. Rogers of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of
Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of
South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for
the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation et al. by John Benjamin Carroll
and Bruce N. Goodsell; and for the Council of State Governments et al.
by Richard Ruda and Dan M. Kahan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Law Professors
Specializing in Federal Indian Law by Richard A. Guest, Colette Routel,
and Robert T. Anderson, pro se; for the Narragansett Indian Tribe by
Thomas C. Goldstein, Patricia A. Millett, and John F. Killoy, Jr.; for the
National Congress of American Indians by Ian Heath Gershengorn, Sam
Hirsch, and Riyaz A. Kanji; for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al. by
Douglas B. L. Endreson and William R. Perry; and for Frederick E.
Hoxie et al. by David T. Goldberg and Sean H. Donahue.

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382 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR
Opinion of the Court
land for Indians.” § 5, 48 Stat. 985, 25 U. S. C. § 465. The
IRA defines the term “Indian” to “include all persons of In
dian descent who are members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” § 479. The Secre
tary notified petitioners—the State of Rhode Island, its Gov
ernor, and the town of Charlestown, Rhode Island—that he
intended to accept in trust a parcel of land for use by the
Narragansett Indian Tribe in accordance with his claimed
authority under the statute. In proceedings before the In
terior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA), the District Court,
and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, petitioners
unsuccessfully challenged the Secretary’s authority to take
the parcel into trust.
In reviewing the determination of the Court of Appeals,
we are asked to interpret the statutory phrase “now under
Federal jurisdiction” in § 479. Petitioners contend that the
term “now” refers to the time of the statute’s enactment, and
permits the Secretary to take land into trust for members of
recognized tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in
1934. Respondents argue that the word “now” is an ambig
uous term that can reasonably be construed to authorize the
Secretary to take land into trust for members of tribes that
are “under Federal jurisdiction” at the time that the land is
accepted into trust.
We agree with petitioners and hold that, for purposes of
§ 479, the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to
a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the
statute’s enactment. As a result, § 479 limits the Secre
tary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of
providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal
jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934. Be
cause the record in this case establishes that the Narra
gansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction when the
IRA was enacted, the Secretary does not have the authority

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Opinion of the Court
to take the parcel at issue into trust. We reverse the judg
ment of the Court of Appeals.
I
At the time of colonial settlement, the Narragansett Indian
Tribe was the indigenous occupant of much of what is now
the State of Rhode Island. See Final Determination for
Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of
Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (1983) (hereinafter Final
Determination). Initial relations between colonial settlers,
the Narragansett Tribe, and the other Indian tribes in the
region were peaceful, but relations deteriorated in the late
17th century. The hostilities peaked in 1675 and 1676 dur
ing the 2-year armed conflict known as King Philip’s War.
Hundreds of colonists and thousands of Indians died. See
E. Schultz & M. Tougias, King Philip’s War 5 (1999). The
Narragansett Tribe, having been decimated, was placed
under formal guardianship by the Colony of Rhode Island in
1709. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, 6178.1
Not quite two centuries later, in 1880, the State of Rhode
Island convinced the Narragansett Tribe to relinquish its
tribal authority as part of an effort to assimilate tribal mem
bers into the local population. See Narragansett Indian
Tribe v. National Indian Gaming Comm’n, 158 F. 3d 1335,
1336 (CADC 1998). The Tribe also agreed to sell all but
two acres of its remaining reservation land for $5,000. Ibid.
Almost immediately, the Tribe regretted its decisions and
embarked on a campaign to regain its land and tribal status.
Ibid. In the early 20th century, members of the Tribe
sought economic support and other assistance from the Fed
1 The Narragansett Tribe recognized today is the successor to two
tribes, the Narragansett and the Niantic Tribes. The two predecessor
Tribes shared territory and cultural traditions at the time of European
settlement and effectively merged in the aftermath of King Philip’s War.
See Final Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 6178.

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eral Government. But, in correspondence spanning a 10
year period from 1927 to 1937, federal officials declined their
request, noting that the Tribe was, and always had been,
under the jurisdiction of the New England States, rather
than the Federal Government.
Having failed to gain recognition or assistance from the
United States or from the State of Rhode Island, the Tribe
filed suit in the 1970’s to recover its ancestral land, claiming
that the State had misappropriated its territory in violation
of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U. S. C. § 177.2 The
claims were resolved in 1978 by enactment of the Rhode Is
land Indian Claims Settlement Act, 92 Stat. 813, 25 U. S. C.
§ 1701 et seq. Under the agreement codified by the Settle
ment Act, the Tribe received title to 1,800 acres of land in
Charlestown, Rhode Island, in exchange for relinquishing its
past and future claims to land based on aboriginal title. The
Tribe also agreed that the 1,800 acres of land received under
the Settlement Act “shall be subject to the civil and crim
inal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.”
§ 1708(a); see also § 1712(a).
The Narragansett Tribe’s ongoing efforts to gain recogni
tion from the United States Government finally succeeded in
1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177. In granting formal recognition,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) determined that “the
Narragansett community and its predecessors have existed
autonomously since first contact, despite undergoing many
modifications. ” Id., at 6178. The BIA referred to the
Tribe’s “documented history dating from 1614” and noted
that “all of the current membership are believed to be able
to trace to at least one ancestor on the membership lists of
the Narragansett community prepared after the 1880 Rhode
2 Title 25 U. S. C. § 177 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o purchase,
grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto,
from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the Constitution.”

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Island ‘detribalization’ act.” Ibid. After obtaining federal
recognition, the Tribe began urging the Secretary to accept
a deed of trust to the 1,800 acres conveyed to it under the
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act. 25 CFR § 83.2
(2008) (providing that federal recognition is needed before
an Indian tribe may seek “the protection, services, and bene
fits of the Federal government”). The Secretary acceded to
the Tribe’s request in 1988. See Charlestown v. Eastern
Area Director, Bur. of Indian Affairs, 18 IBIA 67, 69 (1989).3
In 1991, the Tribe’s housing authority purchased an addi
tional 31 acres of land in the town of Charlestown adjacent
to the Tribe’s 1,800 acres of settlement lands. Soon thereaf
ter, a dispute arose about whether the Tribe’s planned con
struction of housing on that parcel had to comply with local
regulations. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett
Elec. Co., 89 F. 3d 908, 911–912 (CA1 1996). The Tribe’s pri
mary argument for noncompliance—that its ownership of the
parcel made it a “dependent Indian community” and thus
“Indian country” under 18 U. S. C. § 1151—ultimately failed.
89 F. 3d, at 913–922. But, while the litigation was pending,
the Tribe sought an alternative solution to free itself from
compliance with local regulations: It asked the Secretary to
accept the 31-acre parcel into trust for the Tribe pursuant to
25 U. S. C. § 465. By letter dated March 6, 1998, the Secre
tary notified petitioners of his acceptance of the Tribe’s land
into trust. Petitioners appealed the Secretary’s decision
to the IBIA, which upheld the Secretary’s decision. See
Charlestown v. Eastern Area Director, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 35 IBIA 93 (2000).
Petitioners sought review of the IBIA decision pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702. The
3 The Tribe, the town, and the Secretary previously litigated issues re
lating to the Secretary’s acceptance of these 1,800 acres, and that matter
is not presently before this Court. See generally Charlestown, 18 IBIA
67; Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F. 3d 685 (CA1 1994);
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F. 3d 16 (CA1 2006).

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District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Secretary and other Department of Interior officials. As
relevant here, the District Court determined that the plain
language of 25 U. S. C. § 479 defines “Indian” to include mem
bers of all tribes in existence in 1934, but does not require
a tribe to have been federally recognized on that date.
Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179–181 (RI 2003).
According to the District Court, because it is currently
“federally-recognized” and “existed at the time of the en
actment of the IRA,” the Narragansett Tribe qualifies “as
an ‘Indian tribe’ within the meaning of § 479.” Id., at 181.
As a result, “the secretary possesses authority under § 465
to accept lands into trust for the benefit of the Narragan
setts.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, first
in a panel decision, Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F. 3d 45 (2005),
and then sitting en banc, 497 F. 3d 15 (2007). Although the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[o]ne might have an
initial instinct to read the word ‘now’ [in § 479] . . . to mean
the date of [the] enactment of the statute, June 18, 1934,” the
court concluded that there was “ambiguity as to whether to
view the term . . . as operating at the moment Congress
enacted it or at the moment the Secretary invokes it.” Id.,
at 26. The Court of Appeals noted that Congress has used
the word “now” in other statutes to refer to the time of the
statute’s application, not its enactment. Id., at 26–27. The
Court of Appeals also found that the particular statutory
context of § 479 did not clarify the meaning of “now.” On
one hand, the Court of Appeals noted that another provi
sion within the IRA, 25 U. S. C. § 472, uses the term “now or
hereafter,” which supports petitioners’ argument that “now,”
by itself, does not refer to future events. But on the other
hand, § 479 contains the particular application date of
“June 18, 1934,” suggesting that if Congress had wanted to
refer to the date of enactment, it could have done so more

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specifically. 497 F. 3d, at 27. The Court of Appeals further
reasoned that both interpretations of “now” are supported
by reasonable policy explanations, id., at 27–28, and it found
that the legislative history failed to “clearly resolve the
issue,” id., at 28.
Having found the statute ambiguous, the Court of Appeals
applied the principles set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843
(1984), and deferred to the Secretary’s construction of the
provision. 497 F. 3d, at 30. The court rejected petitioners’
arguments that the Secretary’s interpretation was an imper
missible construction of the statute. Id., at 30–34. It also
held that petitioners had failed to demonstrate that the Sec
retary’s interpretation was inconsistent with earlier prac
tices of the Department of the Interior. Furthermore, the
court determined that even if the interpretation were a de
parture from the Department’s prior practices, the decision
should be affirmed based on the Secretary’s “reasoned expla
nation for his interpretation.” Id., at 34.
We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1229 (2008), and now
reverse.
II
This case requires us to apply settled principles of statu
tory construction under which we must first determine
whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous.
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 4 (1997). If it is, we
must apply the statute according to its terms. See, e. g.,
Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359 (2005); Lamie v.
United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 534 (2004); Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530
U. S. 1, 6 (2000); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470,
485 (1917).
The Secretary may accept land into trust only for “the
purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U. S. C. § 465.
“Indian” is defined by statute as follows:

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“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all
persons of Indian descent who are members of any rec
ognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,
and all persons who are descendants of such members
who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the pres
ent boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall
further include all other persons of one-half or more In
dian blood. . . . The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this
Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, or
ganized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one
reservation. . . . ” § 479 (emphasis added).
The parties are in agreement, as are we, that the Secre
tary’s authority to take the parcel in question into trust de
pends on whether the Narragansetts are members of a “rec
ognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Ibid.
That question, in turn, requires us to decide whether the
word “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to 1998, when
the Secretary accepted the 31-acre parcel into trust, or 1934,
when Congress enacted the IRA.
We begin with the ordinary meaning of the word “now,”
as understood when the IRA was enacted. Director, Office
of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collier
ies, 512 U. S. 267, 272 (1994); Moskal v. United States, 498
U. S. 103, 108–109 (1990). At that time, the primary defini
tion of “now” was “[a]t the present time; at this moment; at
the time of speaking.” Webster’s New International Dic
tionary 1671 (2d ed. 1934); see also Black’s Law Dictionary
1262 (3d ed. 1933) (defining “now” to mean “[a]t this time, or
at the present moment,” and noting that “ ‘[n]ow’ as used in
a statute ordinarily refers to the date of its taking effect
. . . ” (emphasis added)). This definition is consistent with
interpretations given to the word “now” by this Court, both
before and after passage of the IRA, with respect to its use
in other statutes. See, e. g., Franklin v. United States, 216
U. S. 559, 568–569 (1910) (interpreting a federal criminal
statute to have “adopted such punishment as the laws of the

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State in which such place is situated now provide for the
like offense” (citing United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (1832);
internal quotation marks omitted)); Montana v. Kennedy,
366 U. S. 308, 310–311 (1961) (interpreting a statute granting
citizenship status to foreign-born “children of persons who
now are, or have been, citizens of the United States” (inter
nal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added and deleted)).
It also aligns with the natural reading of the word within
the context of the IRA. For example, in the original version
of 25 U. S. C. § 465, which provided the same authority to
the Secretary to accept land into trust for “the purpose of
providing land for Indians,” Congress explicitly referred to
current events, stating “[t]hat no part of such funds shall
be used to acquire additional land outside of the exterior
boundaries of [the] Navajo Indian Reservation . . . in the
event that the proposed Navajo boundary extension meas
ures now pending in Congress . . . become law.” IRA, § 5,
48 Stat. 985 (emphasis added).4 In addition, elsewhere in
the IRA, Congress expressly drew into the statute contem
poraneous and future events by using the phrase “now or
hereafter.” See 25 U. S. C. § 468 (referring to “the geo
graphic boundaries of any Indian reservation now existing
or established hereafter”); § 472 (referring to “Indians who
may be appointed . . . to the various positions maintained,
now or hereafter, by the Indian Office”). Congress’ use of
the word “now” in this provision, without the accompanying
phrase “or hereafter,” thus provides further textual support
for the conclusion that the term refers solely to events con
temporaneous with the Act’s enactment. See Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 452 (2002) (“[W]hen Con
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute
4 The current version of § 465 provides “[t]hat no part of such funds shall
be used to acquire additional land outside of the exterior boundaries of
Navajo Indian Reservation . . . in the event that legislation to define the
exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation in New Mexico, and
for other purposes, or similar legislation, becomes law.”

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but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Furthermore, the Secretary’s current interpretation is at
odds with the Executive Branch’s construction of this pro
vision at the time of enactment. In correspondence with
those who would assist him in implementing the IRA, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, explained:
“Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act of June
18, 1934 (48 Stat. L., 988), provides, in effect, that the
term ‘Indian’ as used therein shall include—(1) all per
sons of Indian descent who are members of any recog
nized tribe that was under Federal jurisdiction at the
date of the Act . . . .” Letter from John Collier, Com
missioner, to Superintendents (Mar. 7, 1936), Lodging of
Respondents (emphasis added).5
Thus, although we do not defer to Commissioner Collier’s
interpretation of this unambiguous statute, see Estate of
5 In addition to serving as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier
was “a principal author of the [IRA].” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S.
206, 221, n. 21 (1983). And, as both parties note, he appears to have been
responsible for the insertion of the words “now under Federal jurisdiction”
into what is now 25 U. S. C. § 479. See Hearings on S. 2755 et al.: A Bill
to Grant to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Orga
nize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise, be
fore the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
p. 266 (1934). Also, the record contains a 1937 letter from Commissioner
Collier in which, even after the passage of the IRA, he stated that the
Federal Government still lacked any jurisdiction over the Narragansett
Tribe. App. 23a–24a. Commissioner Collier’s responsibilities related to
implementing the IRA make him an unusually persuasive source as to the
meaning of the relevant statutory language and the Tribe’s status under
it. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000) (explain
ing that an Executive Branch statutory interpretation that lacks the force
of law is “entitled to respect . . . to the extent that those interpretations
have the ‘power to persuade’ ” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992), we
agree with his conclusion that the word “now” in § 479 limits
the definition of “Indian,” and therefore limits the exercise
of the Secretary’s trust authority under § 465 to those mem
bers of tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the time
the IRA was enacted.
The Secretary makes two other arguments in support of
his contention that the term “now” as used in § 479 is ambig
uous. We reject them both. First, the Secretary argues
that although the “use of ‘now’ can refer to the time of enact
ment” in the abstract, “it can also refer to the time of the
statute’s application.” Brief for Respondents 18. But the
susceptibility of the word “now” to alternative meanings
“does not render the word . . . whenever it is used, am
biguous,” particularly where “all but one of the meanings is
ordinarily eliminated by context.” Deal v. United States,
508 U. S. 129, 131–132 (1993). Here, the statutory context
makes clear that “now” does not mean “now or hereafter”
or “at the time of application.” Had Congress intended to
legislate such a definition, it could have done so explicitly, as
it did in §§ 468 and 472, or it could have omitted the word
“now” altogether. Instead, Congress limited the statute by
the word “now” and “we are obliged to give effect, if pos
sible, to every word Congress used.” Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979).
Second, the Secretary argues that § 479 left a gap for the
agency to fill by using the phrase “shall include” in its intro
ductory clause. Brief for Respondents 26–27. The Secre
tary, in turn, claims to have permissibly filled that gap by
defining “ ‘Tribe’ ” and “ ‘Individual Indian’ ” without refer
ence to the date of the statute’s enactment. Id., at 28 (citing
25 CFR §§ 151.2(b), (c)(1) (2008)). But, as explained above,
Congress left no gap in 25 U. S. C. § 479 for the agency to fill.
Rather, it explicitly and comprehensively defined the term
by including only three discrete definitions: “[1] members of
any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,

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Opinion of the Court
and [2] all persons who are descendants of such members
who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and . . . [3] all other
persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” Ibid. In other
statutory provisions, Congress chose to expand the Secre
tary’s authority to particular Indian tribes not necessarily
encompassed within the definitions of “Indian” set forth in
§ 479.6 Had it understood the word “include” in § 479 to en
compass tribes other than those satisfying one of the three
§ 479 definitions, Congress would have not needed to enact
these additional statutory references to specific Tribes.
The Secretary and his amici also go beyond the statutory
text to argue that Congress had no policy justification for
limiting the Secretary’s trust authority to those tribes under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, because the IRA was intended
to strengthen Indian communities as a whole, regardless of
their status in 1934. Petitioners counter that the main pur
pose of § 465 was to reverse the loss of lands that Indians
sustained under the General Allotment Act, see Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U. S. 645, 650, n. 1 (2001), so the
statute was limited to tribes under federal jurisdiction at
that time because they were the tribes who lost their lands.
We need not consider these competing policy views, because
Congress’ use of the word “now” in § 479 speaks for itself
and “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”
6 See, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 473a (“Sections . . . 465 . . . and 479 of this title
shall after May 1, 1936, apply to the Territory of Alaska”); § 1041e(a) (“The
[Shawnee] Tribe shall be eligible to have land acquired in trust for its
benefit pursuant to section 465 of this title . . . ”); § 1300b–14(a) (“[Sections
465 and 479 of this title are] hereby made applicable to the [Texas] Band
[of Kickapoo Indians] . . . ”); § 1300g–2(a) (“[Sections 465 and 479] shall
apply to the members of the [Ysleta del Ser Pueblo] tribe, the tribe, and
the reservation”).

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Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254
(1992).7
III
The Secretary and his supporting amici also offer two al
ternative arguments that rely on statutory provisions other
than the definition of “Indian” in § 479 to support the Secre
tary’s decision to take this parcel into trust for the Narra
gansett Tribe. We reject both arguments.
First, the Secretary and several amici argue that the
definition of “Indian” in § 479 is rendered irrelevant by the
broader definition of “tribe” in § 479 and by the fact that
the statute authorizes the Secretary to take title to lands “in
the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe
or individual Indian for which the land is acquired.” § 465
(emphasis added); Brief for Respondents 12–14. But the
definition of “tribe” in § 479 itself refers to “any Indian
tribe” (emphasis added), and therefore is limited by the tem
poral restrictions that apply to § 479’s definition of “Indian.”
See § 479 (“The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall
be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band,
pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation” (emphasis
added)). And, although § 465 authorizes the United States
to take land in trust for an Indian tribe, § 465 limits the Sec
retary’s exercise of that authority “for the purpose of provid
ing land for Indians.” There simply is no legitimate way
to circumvent the definition of “Indian” in delineating the
Secretary’s authority under §§ 465 and 479.8
7 Because we conclude that the language of § 465 unambiguously pre
cludes the Secretary’s action with respect to the parcel of land at issue in
this case, we do not address petitioners’ alternative argument that the
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 92 Stat. 813, 25 U. S. C. § 1701
et seq., precludes the Secretary from exercising his authority under § 465.
8 For this reason, we disagree with the argument made by Justice Ste
vens that the term “Indians” in § 465 has a different meaning than the
definition of “Indian” provided in § 479, and that the term’s meaning in
§ 465 is controlled by later-enacted regulations governing the Secretary’s

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Opinion of the Court
Second, amicus National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI) argues that 25 U. S. C. § 2202, which was enacted as
part of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), Title II,
96 Stat. 2517, overcomes the limitations set forth in § 479
and, in turn, authorizes the Secretary’s action. Section
2202 provides:
“The provisions of section 465 of this title shall apply
to all tribes notwithstanding the provisions of section
478 of this title: Provided, That nothing in this section
is intended to supersede any other provision of Federal
law which authorizes, prohibits, or restricts the acquisi
tion of land for Indians with respect to any specific tribe,
reservation, or state(s).”
NCAI argues that the “ILCA independently grants author
ity under Section 465 for the Secretary to execute the chal
lenged trust acquisition.” NCAI Brief 8. We do not agree.
The plain language of § 2202 does not expand the power
set forth in § 465, which requires that the Secretary take
land into trust only “for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.” Nor does § 2202 alter the definition of “Indian” in
§ 479, which is limited to members of tribes that were under
federal jurisdiction in 1934.9 See supra, at 387–393. Rather,
§ 2202 by its terms simply ensures that tribes may benefit
from § 465 even if they opted out of the IRA pursuant to
recognition of tribes like the Narragansetts. See post, at 404–406, 409–
411 (dissenting opinion). When Congress has enacted a definition with
“detailed and unyielding provisions,” as it has in § 479, this Court must
give effect to that definition even when “ ‘it could be argued that the line
should have been drawn at a different point.’ ” INS v. Hector, 479 U. S.
85, 88–89 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 798
(1977)).
9 NCAI notes that the ILCA’s definition of “tribe” “means any Indian
tribe, band, group, pueblo, or community for which, or for the members of
which, the United States holds lands in trust.” § 2201. But § 2201 is, by
its express terms, applicable only to Chapter 24 of Title 25 of the United
States Code. Ibid. The IRA is codified in Chapter 14 of Title 25. See
§ 465. Section 2201, therefore, does not itself alter the authority granted
to the Secretary by § 465.

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Opinion of the Court
§ 478, which allowed tribal members to reject the application
of the IRA to their tribe. § 478 (“This Act shall not apply
to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians
. . . shall vote against its application”). As a result, there is
no conflict between § 2202 and the limitation on the Secre
tary’s authority to take lands contained in § 465. Rather,
§ 2202 provides additional protections to those who satisfied
the definition of “Indian” in § 479 at the time of the statute’s
enactment, but opted out of the IRA shortly thereafter.
NCAI’s reading of § 2202 also would nullify the plain
meaning of the definition of “Indian” set forth in § 479 and
incorporated into § 465. Consistent with our obligation to
give effect to every provision of the statute, Reiter, 442 U. S.,
at 339, we will not assume that Congress repealed the plain
and unambiguous restrictions on the Secretary’s exercise of
trust authority in §§ 465 and 479 when it enacted § 2202.
“We have repeatedly stated . . . that absent ‘a clearly ex
pressed congressional intention,’ . . . [a]n implied repeal will
only be found where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irrec
oncilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substi
tute.’ ” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551
(1974), and Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497,
503 (1936)).
IV
We hold that the term “now under Federal jurisdiction” in
§ 479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under
the federal jurisdiction of the United States when the IRA
was enacted in 1934. None of the parties or amici, including
the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the Tribe was
under federal jurisdiction in 1934. And the evidence in the
record is to the contrary. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177. Moreover, the
petition for writ of certiorari filed in this case specifically
represented that “[i]n 1934, the Narragansett Indian Tribe
. . . was neither federally recognized nor under the juris

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diction of the federal government.” Pet. for Cert. 6. Re
spondents’ brief in opposition declined to contest this asser
tion. See Brief in Opposition 2–7. Under our rules, that
alone is reason to accept this as fact for purposes of our deci
sion in this case. See this Court’s Rule 15.2. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with three qualifications. First,
I cannot say that the statute’s language by itself is determi
native. Linguistically speaking, the word “now” in the
phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction,” 25 U. S. C. § 479,
may refer to a tribe’s jurisdictional status as of 1934. But
one could also read it to refer to the time the Secretary of
the Interior exercises his authority to take land “for Indi
ans.” § 465. Compare Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308,
311–312 (1961) (“now” refers to time of statutory enactment),
with Difford v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 910
F. 2d 1316, 1320 (CA6 1990) (“now” refers to time of exercise
of delegated authority); In re Lusk’s Estate, 336 Pa. 465, 467–
468, 9 A. 2d 363, 365 (1939) (property “now” owned refers
to property owned when a will becomes operative). I also
concede that the Court owes the Interior Department the
kind of interpretive respect that reflects an agency’s greater
knowledge of the circumstances in which a statute was
enacted, cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944).
Yet because the Department then favored the Court’s pres
ent interpretation, see infra, at 397, that respect cannot help
the Department here.
Neither can Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), help the Depart
ment. The scope of the word “now” raises an interpretive
question of considerable importance; the provision’s legisla
tive history makes clear that Congress focused directly upon
that language, believing it definitively resolved a specific un

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Breyer, J., concurring
derlying difficulty; and nothing in that history indicates that
Congress believed departmental expertise should subse
quently play a role in fixing the temporal reference of the
word “now.” These circumstances indicate that Congress
did not intend to delegate interpretive authority to the
Department. Consequently, its interpretation is not entitled
to Chevron deference, despite linguistic ambiguity. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 227, 229–230
(2001).
Second, I am persuaded that “now” means “in 1934” not
only for the reasons the Court gives but also because an ex
amination of the provision’s legislative history convinces me
that Congress so intended. As I read that history, it shows
that Congress expected the phrase would make clear that
the Secretary could employ § 465’s power to take land into
trust in favor only of those tribes in respect to which the
Federal Government already had the kinds of obligations
that the words “under Federal jurisdiction” imply. See
Hearings on S. 2755 et al.: A Bill to Grant to Indians Living
Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Pur
poses of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise,
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 263–266 (1934). Indeed, the very Depart
ment official who suggested the phrase to Congress during
the relevant legislative hearings subsequently explained its
meaning in terms that the Court now adopts. See Letter
from John Collier, Commissioner, to Superintendents (Mar.
7, 1936), Lodging of Respondents (explaining that § 479 in
cluded “persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized tribe that was under Federal jurisdiction at the
date of the Act”).
Third, an interpretation that reads “now” as meaning “in
1934” may prove somewhat less restrictive than it at first
appears. That is because a tribe may have been “under
Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 even though the Federal Gov
ernment did not believe so at the time. We know, for exam

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Breyer, J., concurring
ple, that following the Indian Reorganization Act’s enact
ment, the Department compiled a list of 258 Tribes covered
by the Act; and we also know that it wrongly left certain
tribes off the list. See Brief for Law Professors Specializing
in Federal Indian Law as Amicus Curiae 22–24; Quinn, Fed
eral Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Historical
Development of a Legal Concept, 34 Am. J. Legal Hist. 331,
356–359 (1990). The Department later recognized some of
those Tribes on grounds that showed that it should have rec
ognized them in 1934 even though it did not. And the De
partment has sometimes considered that circumstance suffi
cient to show that a tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction”
in 1934—even though the Department did not know it at
the time.
The statute, after all, imposes no time limit upon recogni
tion. See § 479 (“The term ‘Indian’ . . . shall include all per
sons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction . . . ” (emphasis
added)). And administrative practice suggests that the De
partment has accepted this possibility. The Department, for
example, did not recognize the Stillaguamish Tribe until
1976, but its reasons for recognition in 1976 included the fact
that the Tribe had maintained treaty rights against the
United States since 1855. Consequently, the Department
concluded that land could be taken into trust for the Tribe.
See Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to
Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, Request for Reconsider
ation of Decision Not to Take Land in Trust for the Stillagua
mish Tribe (Oct. 1, 1980), Lodging of Respondents 6–7.
Similarly, in 1934 the Department thought that the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians had long
since been dissolved. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians v. Office of U. S. Attorney for Western
Dist. of Mich., 369 F. 3d 960, 961, and n. 2 (CA6 2004). But
later the Department recognized the Tribe, considering it to
have existed continuously since 1675. 45 Fed. Reg. 19321

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(1980). Further, the Department in the 1930’s thought that
an anthropological study showed that the Mole Lake Tribe
no longer existed. But the Department later decided that
the study was wrong, and it then recognized the Tribe. See
Memorandum from the Solicitor to the Commissioner of In
dian Affairs 2758, 2762–2763 (Feb. 8, 1937) (recognizing the
Mole Lake Indians as a separate Tribe).
In my view, this possibility—that later recognition re
flects earlier “Federal jurisdiction”—explains some of the
instances of early Department administrative practice to
which Justice Stevens refers. I would explain the other
instances to which Justice Stevens refers as involving the
taking of land “for” a tribe with members who fall under
that portion of the statute that defines “Indians” to include
“persons of one-half or more Indian blood,” § 479. See 1
Dept. of Interior, Opinions of the Solicitor Relating to Indian
Affairs, 1917–1974, pp. 706–707 (Shoshone Indians), 724–725
(St. Croix Chippewas), 747–748 (Nahma and Beaver Indi
ans) (1979).
Neither the Narragansett Tribe nor the Secretary has ar
gued that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
Nor have they claimed that any member of the Narragansett
Tribe satisfies the “one-half or more Indian blood” require
ment. And I have found nothing in the briefs that suggests
the Narragansett Tribe could prevail on either theory.
Each of the administrative decisions just discussed involved
post-1934 recognition on grounds that implied a 1934 rela
tionship between the Tribe and Federal Government that
could be described as jurisdictional, for example, a treaty
with the United States (in effect in 1934), a (pre-1934) con
gressional appropriation, or enrollment (as of 1934) with the
Indian Office. I can find no similar indication of 1934 fed
eral jurisdiction here. Instead, both the State and Federal
Government considered the Narragansett Tribe as under
state, but not under federal, jurisdiction in 1934. And until
the 1970’s there was “little Federal contact with the Nar

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400 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR
Opinion of Souter, J.
ragansetts as a group.” Memorandum from Deputy Assist
ant Secretary—Indian Affairs (Operations) to Assistant
Secretary—Indian Affairs, Recommendation and Summary
of Evidence for Proposed Finding for Federal Acknowledg
ment of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island Pursuant
to 25 CFR 83, p. 8 (July 29, 1982). Because I see no realistic
possibility that the Narragansett Tribe could prevail on the
basis of a theory alternative to the theories argued here,
I would not remand this case.
With the qualifications here expressed, I join the Court’s
opinion and its judgment.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Save as to one point, I agree with Justice Breyer’s con
curring opinion, which in turn concurs with the opinion of the
Court, subject to the three qualifications Justice Breyer
explains. I have, however, a further reservation that puts
me in the dissenting column.
The disposition of the case turns on the construction of the
language from 25 U. S. C. § 479, “any recognized Indian tribe
now under Federal jurisdiction.” Nothing in the majority
opinion forecloses the possibility that the two concepts, rec
ognition and jurisdiction, may be given separate content.
As Justice Breyer makes clear in his concurrence, the
statute imposes no time limit upon recognition, and in the
past, the Department of the Interior has stated that the fact
that the United States Government was ignorant of a tribe
in 1934 does not preclude that tribe from having been under
federal jurisdiction at that time. See Memorandum from
Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Assistant Secretary,
Indian Affairs, Request for Reconsideration of Decision Not
to Take Land in Trust for the Stillaguamish Tribe (Oct. 1,
1980), Lodging of Respondents 7. And giving each phrase
its own meaning would be consistent with established princi
ples of statutory interpretation.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
During oral argument, however, respondents explained
that the Secretary’s more recent interpretation of this statu
tory language had “understood recognition and under Fed
eral jurisdiction at least with respect to tribes to be one and
the same.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Given the Secretary’s posi
tion, it is not surprising that neither he nor the Tribe raised
a claim that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934:
they simply failed to address an issue that no party under
stood to be present. The error was shared equally all
around, and there is no equitable demand that one side be
penalized when both sides nodded.
I can agree with Justice Breyer that the current record
raises no particular reason to expect that the Tribe might be
shown to have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, but I
would not stop there. The very notion of jurisdiction as a
distinct statutory condition was ignored in this litigation,
and I know of no body of precedent or history of practice
giving content to the condition sufficient for gauging the
Tribe’s chances of satisfying it. So I see no reason to deny
the Secretary and the Narragansett Tribe an opportunity to
advocate a construction of the “jurisdiction” phrase that
might favor their position here.
I would therefore reverse and remand with opportunity
for respondents to pursue a “jurisdiction” claim and respect
fully dissent from the Court’s straight reversal.*
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Congress has used the term “Indian” in the Indian Reorga
nization Act of 1934 to describe those individuals who are
entitled to special protections and benefits under federal In
dian law. The Act specifies that benefits shall be available
to individuals who qualify as Indian either as a result of
*Depending on the outcome of proceedings on remand, it might be nec
essary to address the second potential issue in this case, going to the
significance of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U. S. C.
§ 1701 et seq. There is no utility in confronting it now.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
blood quantum or as descendants of members of “any recog
nized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25
U. S. C. § 479. In contesting the Secretary of the Interior’s
acquisition of trust land for the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode
Island, the parties have focused on the meaning of “now” in
the Act’s definition of “Indian.” Yet to my mind, whether
“now” means 1934 (as the Court holds) or the present time
(as respondents would have it) sheds no light on the question
whether the Secretary’s actions on behalf of the Narra
gansett were permitted under the statute. The plain text
of the Act clearly authorizes the Secretary to take land into
trust for Indian tribes as well as individual Indians, and it
places no temporal limitation on the definition of “Indian
tribe.” 1 Because the Narragansett Tribe is an Indian tribe
within the meaning of the Act, I would affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
I
This case involves a challenge to the Secretary of the Inte
rior’s acquisition of a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown,
Rhode Island, to be held in trust for the Narragansett Tribe.2
1 In 25 U. S. C. § 479, Congress defined both “Indian” and “tribe.” Sec
tion 479 states, in relevant part:
“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian
descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Fed
eral jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members
who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any
Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half
or more Indian blood. . . . The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall
be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the
Indians residing on one reservation.”
Notably the word “now,” which is used to define one of the categories
of Indians, does not appear in the definition of “tribe.”
2 In 1991, the Narragansett Tribe purchased the 31-acre parcel in fee
simple from a private developer. In 1998, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
notified the State of the Secretary’s decision to take the land into unre
served trust for the Tribe. The Tribe “acquired [the land] for the express
purpose of building much needed low-income Indian Housing via a con
tract between the Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authority

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Stevens, J., dissenting
That Tribe has existed as a continuous political entity since
the early 17th century. Although it was once one of the
most powerful tribes in New England, a series of wars, epi
demics, and difficult relations with the State of Rhode Island
sharply reduced the Tribe’s ancestral landholdings.
Two blows, delivered centuries apart, exacted a particu
larly high toll on the Tribe. First, in 1675, King Philip’s
War essentially destroyed the Tribe, forcing it to accept
the Crown as sovereign and to submit to the guardianship
of the Colony of Rhode Island. Then, in 1880, the State
of Rhode Island passed a “detribalization” law that abol
ished tribal authority, ended the State’s guardianship of the
Tribe, and attempted to sell all tribal lands. The Narra
gansett originally assented to detribalization and ceded
all but two acres of its ancestral land. In return, the Tribe
received $5,000. See Memorandum from Deputy Assis
tant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Operations) to Assistant
Secretary-Indian Affairs (Operations) 4 (July 29, 1982) (Rec
ommendation for Acknowledgment).
Recognizing that its consent to detribalization was a mis
take, the Tribe embarked on a century-long campaign to re
coup its losses.3 Obtaining federal recognition was critical
to this effort. The Secretary officially recognized the Nar
ragansett as an Indian tribe in 1983, Final Determination for
Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of
Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, and with that recognition
the Tribe qualified for the bundle of federal benefits estab
lished in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA or
(NIWHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).” App. 46a.
3 Indeed, this litigation stems in part from the Tribe’s suit against (and
subsequent settlement with) Rhode Island and private landowners on the
ground that the 1880 sale violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of
June 30, 1834, § 12, 4 Stat. 730, 25 U. S. C. § 177, which prohibited sales of
tribal land without “treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.”

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Act),4 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. The Tribe’s attempt to exer
cise one of those rights, the ability to petition the Secretary
to take land into trust for the Tribe’s benefit, is now vigor
ously contested in this litigation.
II
The Secretary’s trust authority is located in 25 U. S. C.
§ 465. That provision grants the Secretary power to take
“in trust for [an] Indian tribe or individual Indian” “any in
terest in lands . . . for the purpose of providing land for Indi
ans.” 5 The Act’s language could not be clearer: To effectu
ate the Act’s broad mandate to revitalize tribal development
and cultural self-determination, the Secretary can take land
into trust for a tribe or he can take land into trust for an
individual Indian.
Though Congress outlined the Secretary’s trust authority
in § 465, it specified which entities would be considered
4 The IRA was the cornerstone of the Indian New Deal. “The intent
and purpose of the [IRA] was ‘to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life
and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century
of oppression and paternalism.’ ” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U. S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6
(1934)). See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.05
(2005) (hereinafter Cohen); G. Taylor, The New Deal and American Indian
Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45
(1980).
5 Section 465 reads more fully:
“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire,
through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any in
terest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without
existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments
whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing
land for Indians.
. . . . .
“Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act . . . shall be
taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or
individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights
shall be exempt from State and local taxation.”

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“tribes” and which individuals would qualify as “Indian” in
§ 479. An individual Indian, § 479 tells us, “shall include all
persons of Indian descent who are members of any recog
nized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” as well as
“all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” A
tribe, § 479 goes on to state, “shall be construed to refer to
any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians re
siding on one reservation.” Because federal recognition is
generally required before a tribe can receive federal benefits,
the Secretary has interpreted this definition of “tribe” to
refer only to recognized tribes. See 25 CFR § 83.2 (2008)
(stating that recognition “is a prerequisite to the protection,
services, and benefits of the Federal government available
to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as tribes”); § 151.2
(defining “tribe” for the purposes of land acquisition to mean
“any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, community, ranch
eria, colony, or other group of Indians, . . . which is recog
nized by the Secretary as eligible for the special programs
and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs”).6
Having separate definitions for “Indian” and “tribe” is es
sential for the administration of IRA benefits. The statute
reflects Congress’ intent to extend certain benefits to indi
vidual Indians, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 471 (offering loans to Indian
students for tuition at vocational and trade schools); § 472
(granting hiring preferences to Indians seeking federal em
ployment related to Indian affairs), while directing other
benefits to tribes, e. g., § 476 (allowing tribes to adopt consti
6 The regulations that govern the tribal recognition process, 25 CFR
§ 83 et seq. (2008), were promulgated pursuant to the President’s general
mandate established in the early 1830’s to manage “all Indian affairs and
. . . all matters arising out of Indian relations,” 25 U. S. C. § 2, and to
“prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the
various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs,” § 9. Thus, con
trary to the argument pressed by the Governor of Rhode Island before
this Court, see Reply Brief for Petitioner Carcieri 9, the requirement that
a tribe be federally recognized before it is eligible for trust land does not
stem from the IRA.

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406 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR
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tutions and bylaws); § 470 (giving loans to Indian-chartered
corporations).
Section 465, by giving the Secretary discretion to steer
benefits to tribes and individuals alike, is therefore unique.
But establishing this broad benefit scheme was undoubtedly
intentional: The original draft of the IRA presented to Con
gress directed the Secretary to take land into trust only for
entities such as tribes. Compare H. R. 7902, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., 30 (1934) (“Title to any land acquired pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall be taken in the name of the
United States in trust for the Indian tribe or community
for whom the land is acquired” (emphasis added)), with 25
U. S. C. § 465 (“Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant
to this Act . . . shall be taken in the name of the United
States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for
which the land is acquired” (emphasis added)).
The Secretary has long exercised his § 465 trust authority
in accordance with this design. In the years immediately
following the adoption of the IRA, the Solicitor of the De
partment of the Interior repeatedly advised that the Secre
tary could take land into trust for federally recognized tribes
and for individual Indians who qualified for federal benefits
by lineage or blood quantum.
For example, in 1937, when evaluating whether the Secre
tary could purchase approximately 2,100 acres of land for
the Mole Lake Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, the Solicitor
instructed that the purchase could not be “completed until it
is determined whether the beneficiary of the trust title
should be designated as a band or whether the title should
be taken for the individual Indians in the vicinity of Mole
Lake who are of one half or more Indian blood.” Memoran
dum from Solicitor to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 2758
(Feb. 8, 1937). Because the Mole Lake Chippewa was not
yet recognized by the Federal Government as an Indian
tribe, the Solicitor determined that the Secretary had two
options: “Either the Department should provide recognition

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of this group, or title to the purchased land should be taken
on behalf of the individuals who are of one half or more In
dian blood.” Id., at 2763.
The tribal trust and individual trust options were similarly
outlined in other post-1934 opinion letters, including those
dealing with the Shoshone Indians of Nevada, the St. Croix
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, and the Nahma and Beaver
Island Indians of Michigan. See 1 Dept. of Interior, Opin
ions of the Solicitor Relating to Indian Affairs, 1917–1974,
pp. 706–707, 724–725, 747–748 (1979). Unless and until a
tribe was formally recognized by the Federal Government
and therefore eligible for trust land, the Secretary would
take land into trust for individual Indians who met the blood
quantum threshold.
Modern administrative practice has followed this well
trodden path. Absent a specific statute recognizing a tribe
and authorizing a trust land acquisition,7 the Secretary has
exercised his trust authority—now governed by regulations
promulgated in 1980 after notice-and-comment rulemaking,
25 CFR § 151 et seq.; 45 Fed. Reg. 62034—to acquire land
7 Although Congress has passed specific statutes granting the Secretary
authority to take land into trust for certain tribes, it would be a mistake
to conclude that the Secretary lacks residual authority to take land into
trust under §5 of the IRA, 25 U. S. C. §465. Some of these statutes place
explicit limits on the Secretary’s trust authority and can be properly read
as establishing the outer limit of the Secretary’s trust authority with re
spect to the specified tribes. See, e. g., § 1724(d) (authorizing trust land
for the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, the Passamaquoddy Tribe of
Maine, and the Penobscot Tribe of Maine). Other statutes, while identify
ing certain parcels the Secretary will take into trust for a tribe, do not
purport to diminish the Secretary’s residual authority under § 465. See,
e. g., § 1775c(a) (Mohegan Tribe); § 1771d (Wampanoag Tribe); § 1747(a)
(Miccosukee Tribe). Indeed, the Secretary has invoked his § 465 author
ity to take additional land into trust for the Miccosukee Tribe despite the
existence of a statute authorizing and directing him to acquire certain land
for the Tribe. See Post-Argument En Banc Brief for National Congress
of American Indians et al. as Amici Curiae 7 and App. 9 in No. 03–2647
(CA1).

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for federally recognized Indian tribes like the Narragansett.
The Grand Traverse Band of Ottowa and Chippewa Indians,
although denied federal recognition in 1934 and 1943, see
Dept. of Interior, Office of Federal Acknowledgement, Mem
orandum from Acting Deputy Commissioner to Assistant
Secretary 4 (Oct. 3, 1979) (GTB–V001–D002), was the first
Tribe the Secretary recognized under the 1980 regulations,
see 45 Fed. Reg. 19322. Since then, the Secretary has used
his trust authority to expand the Tribe’s land base. See,
e. g., 49 Fed. Reg. 2025–2026 (1984) (setting aside a 12.5-acre
parcel as reservation land for the Tribe’s exclusive use).
The Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana has similarly benefited
from administrative recognition, 46 Fed. Reg. 38411 (1981),
followed by tribal trust acquisition. And in 2006, the Secre
tary took land into trust for the Snoqualmie Tribe which,
although unrecognized as an Indian tribe in the 1950’s, re
gained federal recognition in 1999. See 71 Fed. Reg. 5067
(taking land into trust for the Tribe); 62 Fed. Reg. 45864
(1997) (recognizing the Snoqualmie as an Indian tribe).
This brief history of § 465 places the case before us into
proper context. Federal recognition, regardless of when it
is conferred, is the necessary condition that triggers a tribe’s
eligibility to receive trust land. No party has disputed that
the Narragansett Tribe was properly recognized as an In
dian tribe in 1983. See 48 Fed. Reg. 6177. Indeed, given
that the Tribe has a documented history that stretches back
to 1614 and has met the rigorous criteria for administrative
recognition, Recommendation for Acknowledgment 1, 7–18,
it would be difficult to sustain an objection to the Tribe’s
status. With this in mind, and in light of the Secretary’s
longstanding authority under the plain text of the IRA to
acquire tribal trust land, it is perfectly clear that the Secre
tary’s land acquisition for the Narragansett was entirely
proper.

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III
Despite the clear text of the IRA and historical pedigree
of the Secretary’s actions on behalf of the Narragansett, the
majority holds that one word (“now”) nestled in one clause
in one of § 479’s several definitions demonstrates that the
Secretary acted outside his statutory authority in this case.
The consequences of the majority’s reading are both curious
and harsh: curious because it turns “now” into the most im
portant word in the IRA, limiting not only some individuals’
eligibility for federal benefits but also a tribe’s; harsh be
cause it would result in the unsupportable conclusion that,
despite its 1983 administrative recognition, the Narragansett
Tribe is not an Indian tribe under the IRA.
In the Court’s telling, when Congress granted the Secre
tary power to acquire trust land “for the purpose of provid
ing land for Indians,” 25 U. S. C. § 465 (emphasis added), it
meant to permit land acquisitions for those persons whose
tribal membership qualify them as “Indian” as defined by
§ 479. In other words, the argument runs, the Secretary can
acquire trust land for “persons of Indian descent who are
members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction.” § 479. This strained construction, advanced
by petitioners, explains the majority’s laserlike focus on the
meaning of “now”: If the Narragansett Tribe was not recog
nized or under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the Tribe’s mem
bers do not belong to an Indian tribe “now under Federal
jurisdiction” and would therefore not be “Indians” under
§ 465 by virtue of their tribal membership.
Petitioners’ argument works only if one reads “Indians”
(in the phrase in § 465 “providing land for Indians”) to refer
to individuals, not an Indian tribe. To petitioners, this read
ing is obvious; the alternative, they insist, would be “nonsen
sical.” Reply Brief for Petitioner State of Rhode Island 3.
This they argue despite the clear evidence of Congress’ in
tent to provide the Secretary with the option of acquiring

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410 CARCIERI v. SALAZAR
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either tribal trusts or individual trusts in service of “provid
ing land for Indians.” And they ignore unambiguous evi
dence that Congress used “Indian tribe” and “Indians” inter
changeably in other parts of the IRA. See § 475 (discussing
“any claim or suit of any Indian tribe against the United
States” in the first sentence and “any claim of such Indians
against the United States” in the last sentence (emphasis
added)).
In any event, this much must be admitted: Without the
benefit of context, a reasonable person could conclude that
“Indians” refers to multiple individuals who each qualify as
“Indian” under the IRA. An equally reasonable person
could also conclude that “Indians” is meant to refer to a col
lective, namely, an Indian tribe. Because “[t]he meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become
evident when placed in context,” FDA v. Brown & William
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132 (2000), the proper
course of action is to widen the interpretive lens and look to
the rest of the statute for clarity. Doing so would lead to
§ 465’s last sentence, which specifies that the Secretary is to
hold land in trust “for the Indian tribe or individual Indian
for which the land is acquired.” Put simply, in § 465 Con
gress used the term “Indians” to refer both to tribes and
individuals.8
The majority nevertheless dismisses this reading of the
statute. The Court notes that even if the Secretary has au
thority to take land into trust for a tribe, it must be an “In
dian tribe,” with § 479’s definition of “Indian” determining
a tribe’s eligibility. The statute’s definition of “tribe,” the
majority goes on to state, itself makes reference to “Indian
tribe.” Thus, the Court concludes, “[t]here simply is no le
gitimate way to circumvent the definition of ‘Indian’ in delin
8 The majority continues to insist, quite incorrectly, that Congress meant
the term “Indians” in § 465 to have the same meaning as the term “Indian”
in § 479. That the text of the statute tells a different story appears to be
an inconvenience the Court would rather ignore.

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eating the Secretary’s authority under . . . § 479.” Ante,
at 393.
The majority bypasses a straightforward explanation on
its way to a circular one. Requiring that a tribe be an “In
dian tribe” does not demand immediate reference to the
definition of “Indian”; instead, it simply reflects the require
ment that the tribe in question be formally recognized as an
Indian tribe. As explained above, the Secretary has limited
benefits under federal Indian law—including the acquisition
of trust land—to recognized tribes. Recognition, then, is
the central requirement for being considered an “Indian
tribe” for purposes of the Act. If a tribe satisfies the strin
gent criteria established by the Secretary to qualify for fed
eral recognition, including the requirement that the tribe
prove that it “has existed as a community from historical
times until the present,” 25 CFR § 83.7(b), it is a fortiori an
“Indian tribe” as a matter of law.
The Narragansett Tribe is no different. In 1983, upon
meeting the criteria for recognition, the Secretary gave no
tice that “the Narragansett Indian Tribe . . . exists as an
Indian tribe.” 48 Fed. Reg. 6178 (emphasis added). How
the Narragansett could be an Indian tribe in 1983 and yet
not be an Indian tribe today is a proposition the majority
cannot explain.
The majority’s retort, that because “tribe” refers to “In
dian,” the definition of “Indian” must control which groups
can be considered a “tribe,” is entirely circular. Yes, the
word “tribe” is defined in part by reference to “Indian tribe.”
But the word “Indian” is also defined in part by reference to
“Indian tribe.” Relying on one definition to provide content
to the other is thus “completely circular and explains noth
ing.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318,
323 (1992).
The Governor of Rhode Island, for his part, adopts this
circular logic and offers two examples of why reading the
statute any other way would be implausible. He first argues

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that if § 479’s definition of “Indian” does not determine a
tribe’s eligibility, the Secretary would have authority to take
land into trust “for the benefit of any group that he deems,
at his whim and fancy, to be an ‘Indian tribe.’ ” Reply Brief
for Petitioner Carcieri 7. The Governor caricatures the Sec
retary’s discretion. This Court has long made clear that
Congress—and therefore the Secretary—lacks constitutional
authority to “bring a community or body of people within
[federal jurisdiction] by arbitrarily calling them an Indian
tribe.” United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 46 (1913).
The Governor’s next objection, that condoning the acquisi
tion of trust land for the Narragansett Tribe would allow the
Secretary to acquire land for an Indian tribe that lacks Indi
ans, is equally unpersuasive. As a general matter, to obtain
federal recognition, a tribe must demonstrate that its “mem
bership consists of individuals who descend from a historical
Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which combined
and functioned as a single autonomous political entity.” 25
CFR § 83.7(e). If the Governor suspects that the Narra
gansett is not an Indian tribe because it may lack members
who are blood quantum Indians, he should have challenged
the Secretary’s decision to recognize the Tribe in 1983 when
such an objection could have been properly received.9
9 The Department of the Interior found “a high degree of retention of
[Narragansett] family lines” between 1880 and 1980, and remarked that
“[t]he close intermarriage and the stability of composition, plus the geo
graphic stability of the group, reflect the maintenance of a socially distinct
community.” Recommendation for Acknowledgment 10. It also noted
that the Narragansett “require applicants for full voting membership to
trace their Narragansett Indian bloodlines back to the ‘Detribalization
Rolls of 1880–84.’ ” Id., at 16. The record in this case does not tell us
how many members of the Narragansett currently qualify as “Indian” by
meeting the individual blood quantum requirement. Indeed, it is possible
that a significant number of the Narragansett are blood quantum Indians.
Accordingly, nothing the Court decides today prevents the Secretary from
taking land into trust for those members of the Tribe who independently
qualify as “Indian” under 25 U. S. C. § 479.
Although the record does not demonstrate how many members of the
Narragansett qualify as blood quantum Indians, Justice Breyer never

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Stevens, J., dissenting
In sum, petitioners’ arguments—and the Court’s conclu
sion—are based on a misreading of the statute. “[N]ow,”
the temporal limitation in the definition of “Indian,” only af
fects an individual’s ability to qualify for federal benefits
under the IRA. If this case were about the Secretary’s deci
sion to take land into trust for an individual who was inca
pable of proving her eligibility by lineage or blood quan
tum, I would have no trouble concluding that such an action
was contrary to the IRA. But that is not the case before
us. By taking land into trust for a validly recognized In
dian Tribe, the Secretary acted well within his statutory
authority.10
IV
The Court today adopts a cramped reading of a statute
Congress intended to be “sweeping” in scope. Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 542 (1974). In so doing, the Court
theless assumes that no member of the Tribe is a blood quantum Indian.
Ante, at 399 (concurring opinion). This assumption is misguided for two
reasons. To start, the record’s silence on this matter is to be expected;
the parties have consistently focused on the Secretary’s authority to take
land into trust for the Tribe, not for individual members of the Tribe.
There is thus no legitimate basis for interpreting the lack of record evi
dence as affirmative proof that none of the Tribe’s members are “Indian.”
Second, neither the statute nor the relevant regulations mandate that a
tribe have a threshold amount of blood quantum Indians as members in
order to receive trust land. Justice Breyer’s unwarranted assumption
about the Narragansett’s membership, even if true, would therefore also
be irrelevant to whether the Secretary’s actions were proper.
10 Petitioners advance the additional argument that the Secretary lacks
authority to take land into trust for the Narragansett because the Rhode
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 92 Stat. 813, 25 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq.,
implicitly repealed the Secretary’s § 465 trust authority as applied to lands
in Rhode Island. This claim plainly fails. While the Tribe agreed to sub
ject the 1,800 acres it obtained in the Settlement Act to the State’s civil
and criminal laws, § 1708(a), the 31-acre parcel of land at issue here was
not part of the settlement lands. And, critically, nothing in the text of
the Settlement Act suggests that Congress intended to prevent the Secre
tary from acquiring additional parcels of land in Rhode Island that would
be exempt from the State’s jurisdiction.

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ignores the “principle deeply rooted in [our] Indian jurispru
dence” that “ ‘statutes are to be construed liberally in favor
of the Indians.’ ” County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 269 (1992) (quot
ing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 767–768
(1985)); see also Cohen § 2.02[1], p. 119 (“The basic Indian
law canons of construction require that treaties, agreements,
statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor
of the Indians”).
Given that the IRA plainly authorizes the Secretary to
take land into trust for an Indian tribe, and in light of the
Narragansett’s status as such, the Court’s decision can be
best understood as protecting one sovereign (the State) from
encroachment from another (the Tribe). Yet in matters of
Indian law, the political branches have been entrusted to
mark the proper boundaries between tribal and state juris
diction. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 192 (1989); Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832). With the IRA, Congress
drew the boundary in a manner that favors the Narra
gansett. I respectfully dissent.