BOBBY, WARDEN v. BIES

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825 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
BOBBY, WARDEN v. BIES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 08–598. Argued April 27, 2009—Decided June 1, 2009
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, this Court held that the Eighth
Amendment bars execution of mentally retarded offenders. Prior to
Atkins, mental retardation merited consideration as a mitigating factor,
but did not bar imposition of the death penalty. See Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U. S. 302. Nearly a decade before Atkins, respondent Bies was
tried and convicted in Ohio of the aggravated murder, kidnaping, and
attempted rape of a ten-year-old boy. Instructed at the sentencing
stage to weigh mitigating circumstances (including evidence of Bies’
mild to borderline mental retardation) against aggravating factors (in
cluding the crime’s brutality), the jury recommended a death sentence,
which the trial court imposed. Ohio’s Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, each concluding that Bies’
mental retardation was entitled to “some weight” as a mitigating factor,
but that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating cir
cumstances. Bies then filed an unsuccessful petition for state postcon
viction relief, contending for the first time that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution of a mentally retarded defendant. Soon after Bies
sought federal habeas relief, this Court decided Atkins. The opinion
left to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to determine
when a person claiming mental retardation would fall within Atkins’
compass. Ohio heeded Atkins’ call in State v. Lott. The District Court
then stayed Bies’ federal habeas proceedings so that he could present
an Atkins claim to the state postconviction court. Observing that Bies’
mental retardation had not previously been established under the
Atkins-Lott framework, the state court denied Bies’ motion for sum
mary judgment and ordered a full hearing on the Atkins claim. Rather
than proceeding with that hearing, Bies returned to federal court, ar
guing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State from reliti
gating the mental retardation issue. The District Court granted the
habeas petition, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Relying on Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, the Court of Appeals determined that all re
quirements for the issue preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy
Clause were met in Bies’ case. It concluded, inter alia, that the Ohio
Supreme Court, on direct appeal, had decided the mental retardation
issue under the same standard that court later adopted in Lott, and that

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826 BOBBY v. BIES
Syllabus
the state court’s recognition of Bies’ mental state had been necessary to
the death penalty judgment. When the Sixth Circuit denied the State’s
petition for rehearing en banc, a concurring judge offered an alternative
basis for decision. He opined that, under Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,
537 U. S. 101, jeopardy attaches once a capital defendant is “acquitted”
based on findings establishing an entitlement to a life sentence; reason
ing that the Ohio courts’ mental retardation findings entitled Bies to a
life sentence, he concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred any
renewed inquiry into Bies’ mental state.
Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the Ohio courts from con
ducting a full hearing on Bies’ mental capacity. Pp. 833–837.
(a) The alternative basis for decision offered by the concurring opin
ion at the Sixth Circuit’s rehearing stage is rejected. The State did
not “twice put [Bies] in jeopardy,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, in the core
constitutional sense. Sattazahn offers Bies no aid, for there was no
acquittal here. Bies’ jury voted to impose the death penalty. At issue
is his attempt to vacate that sentence, not an effort by the State to retry
him or to increase his punishment. Nor did the state courts’ mental
retardation determinations entitle Bies to a life sentence. At the time
of his sentencing and direct appeal, Penry, not Atkins, was the guiding
decision, and the dispositive issue was whether the mitigating factors
were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. Pp. 833–834.
(b) The issue preclusion doctrine, on which the Sixth Circuit panel
primarily relied, does not bar a full airing of the issue whether Bies
qualifies as mentally retarded under Atkins and Lott. The doctrine
bars relitigation of issues actually determined and necessary to the ulti
mate outcome of a prior proceeding. Initially, it is not clear that the
issue of Bies’ mental retardation was actually determined under the
Lott test at trial or on direct appeal. Nor did the State concede that
Bies would succeed under Atkins and Lott, which had not then been
decided. More fundamental, it is clear that the state courts’ statements
regarding Bies’ mental capacity were not necessary to the judgments
affirming his death sentence. Instead, those determinations cut against
the ultimate outcome. In holding otherwise, the Sixth Circuit conflated
a determination necessary to the bottom-line judgment with a subsid
iary finding that, standing alone, is not outcome determinative. The
Sixth Circuit also erred in relying on Ashe’s statement: “[W]hen an issue
of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment,
that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any
future lawsuit.” 397 U. S., at 443. Bies’ case does not involve the kind
of “ultimate fact” addressed in Ashe. There, the State was precluded

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827 Cite as: 556 U. S. 825 (2009)
Opinion of the Court
from trying Ashe for robbing a poker player because he had already
been acquitted of robbing a different player in the same poker game,
and the acquittal was based on a determination that Ashe was not a
participant in the poker game robbery. Bies, in contrast, was not ac
quitted, and determinations of his mental capacity were not necessary
to the ultimate imposition of the death penalty. Moreover, even if the
core issue preclusion requirements had been met, an exception to the
doctrine’s application would be warranted due to the intervening Atkins
decision. Mental retardation as a mitigator and mental retardation
under Atkins and Lott are discrete legal issues. One difference is that
mental retardation, urged as a mitigating factor, may instead “enhance
the likelihood that [a jury will find] the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness.” Atkins, 536 U. S., at 321. This reality explains why
prosecutors, pre-Atkins, had little incentive to contest retardation evi
dence. Because the change in law substantially altered the State’s in
centive to contest Bies’ mental capacity, applying preclusion would not
advance the equitable administration of the law. The federal courts’
intervention in this case derailed the state-court proceeding. Recourse
first to Ohio’s courts is what this Court envisioned in remitting to the
States responsibility for implementing Atkins. The State acknowl
edges that Bies is entitled to such recourse, but rightly seeks a full and
fair opportunity to contest his plea under the Atkins and Lott prece
dents. Pp. 834–837.
519 F. 3d 324, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General of Ohio, argued the
cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard
Cordray, Attorney General, and David M. Lieberman and
Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy Solicitors.
John H. Blume argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Keir M. Weyble, Sheri L. Johnson,
Randall L. Porter, and S. Scott Haynes.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), this Court held
that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and un
usual punishments” bars execution of mentally retarded of
fenders. Prior to Atkins, the Court had determined that

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828 BOBBY v. BIES
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mental retardation merited consideration as a mitigating fac
tor, but did not bar imposition of the death penalty. See
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989).
In 1992, nearly a decade before the Court’s decision in At
kins, respondent Michael Bies was tried and convicted in
Ohio of the aggravated murder, kidnaping, and attempted
rape of a ten-year-old boy. Instructed at the sentencing
stage to weigh mitigating circumstances (including evidence
of Bies’ mild to borderline mental retardation) against aggra
vating factors (including the brutality of the crime), the jury
recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court im
posed. Ohio’s appellate courts affirmed the conviction and
sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court, in its 1996 opinion on
direct review, observed that Bies’ “mild to borderline mental
retardation merit[ed] some weight in mitigation,” but con
cluded that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] the
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Bies, 74 Ohio St. 3d 320, 328, 658 N. E. 2d 754, 761–762.
After this Court decided Atkins, the Ohio trial court or
dered a full hearing on the question of Bies’ mental capacity.
The federal courts intervened, however, granting habeas re
lief to Bies, and ordering the vacation of his death sentence.
Affirming the District Court’s judgment, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the Ohio Supreme Court, in 1996, had defini
tively determined, as a matter of fact, Bies’ mental retarda
tion. That finding, the Court of Appeals concluded, estab
lished Bies’ “legal entitlement to a life sentence.” Bies v.
Bagley, 519 F. 3d 324, 334, n. 6 (2008). Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit ruled, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal
Constitution barred any renewed inquiry into the matter of
Bies’ mental state.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The
Sixth Circuit, in common with the District Court, fundamen
tally misperceived the application of the Double Jeopardy
Clause and its issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) compo

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nent.1 First, Bies was not “twice put in jeopardy.” He was
sentenced to death, and Ohio sought no further prosecution
or punishment. Instead of “serial prosecutions by the gov
ernment[,] this case involves serial efforts by the defendant
to vacate his capital sentence.” Bies v. Bagley, 535 F. 3d
520, 531–532 (CA6 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, mental retardation for purposes of Atkins, and
mental retardation as one mitigator to be weighed against
aggravators, are discrete issues. Most grave among the
Sixth Circuit’s misunderstandings, issue preclusion is a plea
available to prevailing parties. The doctrine bars relitiga
tion of determinations necessary to the ultimate outcome of
a prior proceeding. The Ohio courts’ recognition of Bies’
mental state as a mitigating factor was hardly essential
to the death sentence he received. On the contrary, the re
tardation evidence cut against the final judgment. Issue
preclusion, in short, does not transform final judgment los
ers, in civil or criminal proceedings, into partially prevail
ing parties.
I
For his part in brutally causing the death of a ten-year
old boy, Bies was convicted by an Ohio jury of attempted
rape, kidnaping, and aggravated murder with three death
penalty specifications. App. 85; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2929.04(A)(3), (7) (Lexis 2006).
At sentencing, Bies presented testimony from clinical psy
chiatrist Donna E. Winter, who had evaluated him at the
court’s order during the guilt phase and again before the
mitigation hearing. App. 191, 202. Bies did not qualify for
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, Dr. Winter con
1 “[R]eplac[ing] a more confusing lexicon,” the term “issue preclusion,”
in current usage, “encompasses the doctrines [earlier called] ‘collateral
estoppel’ and ‘direct estoppel.’ ” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880, 892,
n. 5 (2008).

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cluded, because he knew the difference between right and
wrong at the time of the offense. Id., at 36, 51, 198–200.
Bies’ IQ, she further reported, fell in the 65–75 range, id., at
211–212, indicating that he is “mildly mentally retarded to
borderline mentally retarded,” id., at 20–21, 32, 199–200, 213.
Dr. Winter also observed: “[Bies] goes about the community,
unassisted [and] carries out the activities of daily life fairly
independently.” Id., at 199. The State responded to Bies’
mitigating evidence by emphasizing the brutality of the mur
der and the risk of Bies’ future dangerousness. Instructed
to weigh the mitigating circumstances against aggravating
factors, the jury recommended a death sentence, which the
trial court imposed. Id., at 88–89.
The Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court each inde
pendently reviewed the evidence and affirmed. Id., at 84–
108; Bies, 74 Ohio St. 3d 320, 658 N. E. 2d 754. Neither
court devoted detailed attention to the issue of retardation.
Both concluded that Bies’ mild to borderline mental retarda
tion merited “some weight” in mitigation, as did his youth
and lack of a criminal record. App. 105–106; 74 Ohio St. 3d,
at 328, 658 N. E. 2d, at 761. The aggravating circumstances,
each court found, overwhelmed the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. App. 106; 74 Ohio St. 3d, at 328,
658 N. E. 2d, at 762. We denied Bies’ petition for a writ of
certiorari. Bies v. Ohio, 517 U. S. 1238 (1996).
Bies then filed a petition for state postconviction relief,
contending for the first time that the Eighth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution prohibits execution of a mentally
retarded defendant. The trial court agreed that Bies was
“mildly mentally retarded,” but concluded that, under then
governing Ohio precedent, “a mildly mentally retarded de
fendant may be [p]unished by execution.” App. 153. The
Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, id., at 175–
176, and the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Bies’ appeal
without an opinion, State v. Bies, 87 Ohio St. 3d 1440, 719
N. E. 2d 4 (1999) (Table).

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Bies next filed a federal habeas petition in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
Soon after that filing, this Court held, in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U. S., at 321, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits exe
cution of mentally retarded offenders. Our opinion did not
provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for deter
mining when a person who claims mental retardation “will
be so impaired as to fall within [Atkins’ compass].” We
“le[ft] to the States the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction.” Id., at 317 (inter
nal quotation marks omitted).
Ohio heeded Atkins’ call six months later in State v. Lott,
97 Ohio St. 3d 303, 2002–Ohio–6625, 779 N. E. 2d 1011 (per
curiam). At an Atkins hearing, the Ohio Supreme Court
held, a defendant must prove: “(1) significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or
more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and
self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” 97 Ohio
St. 3d, at 305, 779 N. E. 2d, at 1014. “IQ tests,” the court
stated, “are one of the many factors that need to be consid
ered, [but] they alone are not sufficient to make a final deter
mination [of retardation].” Ibid. The court also announced
“a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally
retarded if his or her IQ is above 70.” Ibid.
The District Court stayed its proceedings on Bies’ federal
habeas petition while Bies presented an Atkins claim to the
state postconviction court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. Bies
there moved for summary judgment, arguing that the record
established his mental retardation, and that the State was
“precluded and estopped” from disputing it. Id., at 104a.
The state court recognized that Atkins and Lott had materi
ally changed the significance of a mental retardation finding.
The court observed that mental retardation had not pre
viously been established under the Atkins-Lott framework;
given those precedent-setting decisions, the court concluded,
“there is a serious issue as to Mr. Bies’ mental status.”

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832 BOBBY v. BIES
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 104a. Accordingly, the court denied
summary judgment and ordered a full hearing on the At
kins claim.
Rather than proceeding with the hearing directed by the
state court, Bies returned to the Federal District Court. He
argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amend
ment, barred the State from relitigating the issue of his
mental condition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 81a. The District
Court granted the habeas petition and ordered vacation of
Bies’ death sentence. Id., at 68a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 519 F. 3d, at 342. It con
cluded that Bies’ case was “controlled by” Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U. S. 436 (1970), which held that the doctrine of issue
preclusion “is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy.” 519 F. 3d, at 332 (quoting 397
U. S., at 445). The Court of Appeals found all requirements
for issue preclusion met in Bies’ case. It concluded, inter
alia, that the Ohio Supreme Court, in resolving Bies’ direct
appeal, had decided the issue of Bies’ mental retardation
under the same standard later adopted in Lott. 519 F. 3d,
at 336. Further, the Court of Appeals held, the state court’s
recognition that Bies qualified as mentally retarded had been
necessary to the judgment imposing the death sentence.
“[D]etermining which mitigating factors are actually pres
ent,” the court reasoned, “is a necessary first step to de
termining whether those factors outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.” Id., at 337.
The Court of Appeals denied the State’s petition for re
hearing en banc. 535 F. 3d 520. Judge Clay, concurring,
opined that Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U. S. 101 (2003),
provided an additional, independent basis for affirmance.
535 F. 3d, at 523–524. Under that decision, he noted, jeop
ardy attaches, and relitigation is precluded, once a judge or
jury has “acquitted” a capital defendant “by entering find
ings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to [a] life sen

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tence.” Id., at 522 (quoting Sattazahn, 537 U. S., at 108–
109). In Bies’ case, Judge Clay concluded, the Ohio courts’
determination of mental retardation “entitle[d]” Bies to a life
sentence, and thus the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
State from disputing the issue of Bies’ mental retardation.
535 F. 3d, at 523–524.
Judge Sutton dissented from the denial of rehearing en
banc. Sattazahn was inapposite, he maintained, because
Bies was never “twice put in jeopardy.” 535 F. 3d, at 531
(internal quotation marks omitted). Nor, in Judge Sutton’s
view, did Ashe support the panel’s decision, for issue preclu
sion did not come into play in Bies’ case. 535 F. 3d, at 532.
We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1131 (2009), and now
reverse.
II
A
The alternative basis for decision offered at the rehearing
stage in the Court of Appeals can be rejected without exten
sive explanation. The State did not “twice put [Bies] in
jeopardy,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, in the core constitutional
sense. “[T]he touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in
capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has been an
‘acquittal.’ ” Sattazahn, 537 U. S., at 109. Sattazahn offers
Bies no aid. In that case, the defendant’s first capital jury
had deadlocked at the penalty phase, and the court, as re
quired by state law, entered a life sentence. Id., at 104–105.
This Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the
State’s request for the death penalty at the defendant’s
retrial, noting that “neither the judge nor the jury had
acquitted the defendant in his first . . . proceeding by enter
ing findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the
life sentence.” Id., at 108–109 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, as in Sattazahn, there was no acquittal. Bies’ jury
voted to impose the death penalty. At issue now is Bies’

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“second run at vacating his death sentence,” 535 F. 3d, at
531 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc),
not an effort by the State to retry him or to increase his
punishment.
Nor did any state-court determination of Bies’ mental re
tardation “entitl[e]” him to a life sentence. Cf. id., at 523
(Clay, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). At the
time Bies was sentenced and on direct appeal, Penry, not
Atkins, was this Court’s guiding decision. Under Penry, no
single mitigator or aggravator was determinative of the
judgment. Instead, the dispositive issue, correctly compre
hended by the Ohio courts, was whether “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Bies, 74 Ohio St. 3d, at 328, 658 N. E.
2d, at 762.
B
The Court of Appeals panel relied primarily on the doc
trine of issue preclusion, recognized in Ashe to be “embodied
in” the Double Jeopardy Clause. 397 U. S., at 445. Preclu
sion doctrine, however, does not bar a full airing of the issue
whether Bies qualifies as mentally retarded under Atkins
and Lott.
Issue preclusion bars successive litigation of “an issue of
fact or law” that “is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and . . . is essential to the judg
ment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980)
(hereinafter Restatement). If a judgment does not depend
on a given determination, relitigation of that determina
tion is not precluded. Id., § 27, Comment h. In addition,
even where the core requirements of issue preclusion are
met, an exception to the general rule may apply when a
“change in [the] applicable legal context” intervenes. Id.,
§ 28, Comment c.
As an initial matter, it is not clear from the spare state
ments of the Ohio appellate courts that the issue of Bies’
mental retardation under the Lott test was actually deter

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mined at trial or during Bies’ direct appeal. No court found,
for example, that Bies suffered “significant limitations in two
or more adaptive skills.” Lott, 97 Ohio St. 3d, at 305, 779
N. E. 2d, at 1014. Nor did the State concede that Bies would
succeed under Atkins and Lott, which had not then been
decided.
More fundamental, it is clear that the courts’ statements
regarding Bies’ mental capacity were not necessary to the
judgments affirming his death sentence. A determination
ranks as necessary or essential only when the final outcome
hinges on it. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Fed
eral Practice and Procedure § 4421, p. 543 (2d ed. 2002).
“Far from being necessary to the judgment, the Ohio courts’
mental-retardation findings cut against it—making them
quintessentially the kinds of rulings not eligible for issue
preclusion treatment.” 535 F. 3d, at 533 (Sutton, J., dissent
ing from denial of rehearing en banc).
In finding the state court’s determination “necessary to
[the] judgment,” 519 F. 3d, at 342, the Court of Appeals panel
reasoned that the Ohio courts determined Bies’ mental
capacity pursuant to their “mandatory duty” to weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id., at 338.
“[W]eighing [aggravators against mitigators],” the panel ex
plained, “could not have occurred unless the court first de
termined what to place on either side of the scale.” Ibid.
This reasoning conflates a determination necessary to the
bottom-line judgment with a subsidiary finding that, stand
ing alone, is not outcome determinative. Issue preclusion
cannot transform Bies’ loss at the sentencing phase into a
partial victory.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals erred in its
repeated reliance on the following passage in Ashe: “When
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated be
tween the same parties in any future lawsuit.” 519 F. 3d,
at 331–333 (quoting 397 U. S., at 443). Bies’ case does not

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involve an “ultimate fact” of the kind our decision in Ashe
addressed. There, the State sought to try Ashe for robbing
a poker player even though a jury had already acquitted him
of robbing a different player in the same poker game. The
State’s second attempt was precluded, we held, because the
first jury had based its verdict of acquittal upon a determina
tion that Ashe was not one of the participants in the poker
game robbery. Id., at 445. Bies, in contrast, was not ac
quitted—and, as already observed, determinations of his
mental capacity were not necessary to the ultimate imposi
tion of the death penalty.2
Moreover, even if the core requirements for issue preclu
sion had been met, an exception to the doctrine’s application
would be warranted due to this Court’s intervening decision
in Atkins. Mental retardation as a mitigator and mental re
tardation under Atkins and Lott are discrete legal issues.
The Atkins decision itself highlights one difference: “[R]eli
ance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a
two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found
by the jury.” 536 U. S., at 321. This reality explains why
prosecutors, pre-Atkins, had little incentive vigorously to
contest evidence of retardation. See App. 65 (excerpt from
prosecutor’s closing argument describing as Bies’ “[c]hief
characteristic” his “sensitivity to any kind of frustration and
his rapid tendency to get enraged”); id., at 39–54 (cross
examination of Bies’ expert witness designed to emphasize
Bies’ dangerousness to others). Because the change in law
2 This case, we note, is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996. Bies plainly fails to qualify for relief under
that Act: The Ohio courts’ decisions were not “contrary to, or . . . an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1), and were not “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,”
§ 2254(d)(2). See also 535 F. 3d 520, 534 (CA6 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).

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substantially altered the State’s incentive to contest Bies’
mental capacity, applying preclusion would not advance the
equitable administration of the law. See Restatement § 28,
Comment c.
The federal courts’ intervention in this case derailed a
state trial court proceeding “designed to determine whether
Bies ha[s] a successful Atkins claim.” 535 F. 3d, at 534
(Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Recourse first to Ohio’s courts is just what this Court envi
sioned in remitting to the States responsibility for imple
menting the Atkins decision. The State acknowledges that
Bies is entitled to such recourse, but it rightly seeks a full
and fair opportunity to contest his plea under the postsen
tencing precedents set in Atkins and Lott.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap
peals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.