Hannah Mehta v. Manish Mehta

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 23-0507
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Hannah Mehta,
Petitioner,

v.

Manish Mehta,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued February 18, 2025

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE LEHRMANN filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Busby joined.

This case requires us to consider the nature of the evidence
needed to support an award of spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of
the Texas Family Code. The central inquiry is whether sufficient
evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the wife in this
case satisfied the statutory requirement to show that, absent an award
of spousal maintenance, she “will lack sufficient property . . . to provide
for [her] minimum reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051.
We hold that the court of appeals erred in reversing the
spousal-maintenance award. While we agree that comprehensive and
itemized evidence of a spouse’s post-divorce financial picture—including
assets, income, and expenses—is the ideal form of proof to support a
request for spousal maintenance, courts mustn’t require exacting
numerical detail or disregard competent qualitative evidence. Further,
in divorces involving children, a trial court taking child support into
account in assessing whether the spouse will have “sufficient property”
post-divorce to meet her own minimum reasonable needs must also
factor in child-related expenses in making that determination. Because
the record contains legally sufficient evidence to support the award of
spousal maintenance, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part
and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
Hannah and Manish Mehta married in 2000, and their triplets
were born seven years later. After their arrival, Hannah quit her job
and became their primary caregiver, while Manish continued to work
outside the home. One of the children, described in testimony as a
“medically fragile child,” was born with physiological and neurological
issues that continue to require extensive medical care. Hannah has
shouldered the responsibility of providing that care by, among other
things, arranging trips to Boston Children’s Hospital to meet with
specialists, attending weekly therapy appointments, administering

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regular intravenous immunoglobin infusions, and maintaining the
child’s feeding tube.
In 2019, Manish filed for divorce. The trial court issued
temporary orders granting Hannah exclusive use of the marital home
and requiring her to pay the mortgage and property taxes. The court
also ordered Manish to pay Hannah child support of $2,760 per month
and temporary spousal support of $2,000 per month for eight months
followed by three months of $1,000 per month. Hannah later negotiated
a paid executive-director position with Protect TX Fragile Kids, a
nonprofit organization she cofounded in 2016. This position provided an
annual salary of $30,000 and was guaranteed for one year.
During a three-day bench trial that largely focused on child
custody, Manish testified that the home needed repairs and that he had
concerns about Hannah’s ability to pay the mortgage and maintain the
home given her salary. He further testified that he twice had to make
the mortgage payment himself despite it being Hannah’s obligation.
Manish also told a court-appointed social worker that Hannah failed to
pay household bills. Hannah responded that she was unable to pay the
mortgage because Manish failed to provide “spousal support” or her
portion of federal funds that the couple received and that Manish “was
late on child support.”
In December 2021, the trial court issued the final divorce decree.
It appointed Hannah and Manish as joint managing conservators but
gave Hannah the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary
residence. Additionally, Manish was ordered to pay Hannah $2,760 per

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month in child support and $2,000 per month as spousal maintenance
for thirty-six months (or until Hannah remarried or died).
Manish requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. With
respect to the spousal-maintenance award, the trial court concluded that
Hannah “is eligible for maintenance under the provisions of Texas
Family Code chapter 8,” without specifying the evidentiary or statutory
basis. Manish objected on the grounds that “no evidence was presented
at the hearing to support the conclusion.” He requested additional
findings or conclusions, asking “[w]hat is the legal basis” for it and
several others. The trial court made no further findings or conclusions.
Manish appealed, challenging the spousal-maintenance award
and the property division. The court of appeals affirmed the property
division but reversed the award of spousal maintenance, holding that
Hannah failed to present legally sufficient evidence that she would lack
sufficient property to provide for her minimum reasonable needs.
703 S.W.3d 100, 115 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023).
In making this determination, the court detailed the quantitative
evidence regarding Hannah’s post-divorce financial picture. With
respect to expenses, the court noted that Hannah presented evidence
that her monthly mortgage payment was about $2,032 and that she
could expect to pay about $756 per month in property taxes. Id. at 113.
But according to the court, “no evidence established any other monthly
expenses—although [Hannah] undoubtedly has them—such as food,
utilities, clothing, medical expenses, child-care costs, or the monthly
automobile and insurance payments on the Toyota Highlander.” Id.
at 113–14.

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The court then examined property available to Hannah to meet
her minimum reasonable needs, concluding that it should consider “the
spouse’s monthly income, the value of the spouse’s separate property,
the value of the property awarded to the spouse through dividing the
marital estate, and child-support payments.” Id. at 114 (footnote
omitted). The court identified three accounts and two debts for which
specific evidence was presented, which left Hannah with “about $13,515
in liquid assets, which when divided over the 36-month-
spousal-maintenance term would leave her with about $375 per month
in additional assets.” Id. at 114–15. Combining this amount with
Hannah’s monthly child support of $2,760 and her monthly gross salary
of $2,500, the court determined that Hannah “has $5,635 in total
monthly income, which exceeds her $2,788 in evidence-based monthly
minimum reasonable needs by $2,847.” 1 Id. at 115. The court thus
concluded that “legally insufficient trial evidence supported the implied
finding that [Hannah] would lack sufficient property on the marriage’s
dissolution to provide for her minimum reasonable needs.” Id. The
court did not address Manish’s other arguments challenging the
spousal-maintenance award. Id.

1The court of appeals’ analysis of Hannah’s post-divorce financial
picture essentially reduces to this:
Monthly Assets Monthly Expenses
$2,500 gross salary ($30,000 ÷ 12 months) $2,032 mortgage payment
$2,760 child support $ 756 property taxes
$ 375 liquid assets ($13,515 ÷ 36 months) ________________________
$5,635 $2,788

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Hannah petitioned this court for review, which we granted.
II. Relevant law
A trial court’s decision to award spousal maintenance is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Sherman v. Sherman, 650 S.W.3d 897, 899
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.); Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251, 254
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); cf. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d
74, 78 (Tex. 2011) (“A court’s order of child support will not be disturbed
on appeal unless the complaining party can show a clear abuse of
discretion.” (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.
1990))). A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or
unreasonably or fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Iliff,
339 S.W.3d at 78. While insufficiency of evidence is not an independent
ground on which to challenge a spousal-maintenance award, an award
that is not supported by legally sufficient evidence may constitute an
abuse of discretion. See In re J.Y.O., 709 S.W.3d 485, 497 n.92 (Tex.
2024) (noting that legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in
assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion); Henry v. Cox,
520 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017) (“No abuse of discretion exists if some
evidence reasonably supports the court’s ruling.”).
Evidence is legally sufficient if there is “more than a mere
scintilla” to support a vital fact-finding, i.e., “the evidence rises to a level
that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
conclusions.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018).
Reviewing courts must consider evidence in the light most favorable to
the judgment and its findings, “indulg[ing] every reasonable inference

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that would support it.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822
(Tex. 2005).
The Texas Family Code authorizes spousal-maintenance awards
under enumerated circumstances. A spouse’s eligibility for spousal
maintenance is determined under Section 8.051, which provides, in
relevant part:
[T]he court may order maintenance for either spouse only
if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient
property, including the spouse’s separate property, on
dissolution of the marriage to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs and:
...
(2) the spouse seeking maintenance:
(A) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for
the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs because of
an incapacitating physical or mental disability;
(B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years
or longer and lacks the ability to earn sufficient
income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs; or
(C) is the custodian of a child of the marriage of any
age who requires substantial care and personal
supervision because of a physical or mental
disability that prevents the spouse from earning
sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051 (emphases added).
To qualify for maintenance under Section 8.051(2)(B), the spouse
seeking maintenance must also rebut the presumption that
maintenance is not warranted under that subsection:

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It is a rebuttable presumption that maintenance under
Section 8.051(2)(B) is not warranted unless the spouse
seeking maintenance has exercised diligence in:
(1) earning sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs; or
(2) developing the necessary skills to provide for the
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs during a
period of separation and during the time the suit for
the dissolution of the marriage is pending.
Id. § 8.053(a). No such presumption exists, however, if the spouse is
eligible for maintenance under Section 8.051(2)(A) or (C). Once a court
determines that a spouse is eligible for maintenance under
Section 8.051, it applies the factors set forth in Section 8.052 to
determine the “nature, amount, duration, and manner of periodic
payments.” Id. § 8.052.
“Minimum reasonable needs” is not defined in the Family Code.
Trial courts generally have discretion to determine these needs on a
case-by-case, fact-specific basis. See, e.g., Martinez v. Martinez, No. 02-
21-00353-CV, 2022 WL 17986023, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 29,
2022, no pet.) (“[T]he minimum reasonable needs for a particular
individual is a fact-specific determination that should be made by the
trial court on a case-by-case basis.”). Although an itemized list of
monthly income and expenses is the most “helpful” evidence to establish
eligibility, neither the Family Code nor our cases require exactitude.
Trueheart v. Trueheart, No. 14-02-01256-CV, 2003 WL 22176626, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2003, no pet.). As the court
of appeals recognized in this case, almost everyone has basic essential
needs such as food, utilities, and medical expenses. 703 S.W.3d

8
at 113–14; see also In re Marriage of Hale, 975 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (“The schedule of [the wife’s] expenses,
however, is just a generalized list and does not include other essential
needs that everyone has, such as her portion of health premiums,
uncovered medical expenses, drugs and medicines, clothing, and the
like.”).
Likewise, the Family Code does not expressly state what property
courts should consider available “to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051. But our courts of appeals
have repeatedly held that “the law does not require the spouse to spend
down long-term assets, liquidate all available assets, or incur new debt
simply to obtain job skills and meet short-term needs.” Schafman v.
Schafman, No. 01-20-00231-CV, 2022 WL 962466, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2022, no pet.); see also Dunaway v.
Dunaway, No. 14-06-01042-CV, 2007 WL 3342020, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2007, no pet.).
The purpose behind an award of spousal maintenance differs from
that of child support. Our courts have noted that spousal maintenance
is “intended to provide temporary and rehabilitative support for a
spouse whose ability to support herself has eroded over time while
engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets are
insufficient to provide support.” Sherman, 650 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting
In re Marriage of Hallman, No. 06-09-00089-CV, 2010 WL 619290, at *5
(Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 23, 2010, pet. denied)). Its purpose is to
ameliorate the “very real hardships” that would otherwise exist as the
result of a divorce. Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 143 (Tex. 2018)

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(Lehrmann, J., concurring) (quoting James W. Paulsen, Remember the
Alamo[ny]! The Unique Texas Ban on Permanent Alimony and the
Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS.
7, 8 (1993)). Conversely, child support acts to fulfill parents’ “natural
and legal duty to support their children during minority.” Gully v.
Gully, 231 S.W. 97, 98 (Tex. 1921). As such, child support does not
represent “a debt to [a] former spouse.” Off. of Att’y Gen. of Tex. v.
Scholer, 403 S.W.3d 859, 860 (Tex. 2013). Rather, the parent receiving
child-support payments is obligated to spend or hold the money for the
child’s welfare, upkeep, and benefit. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 151.001(a)(8)
(listing one of the duties of the custodial parent as “the right to receive
and give receipt for payments for the support of the child and to hold or
disburse funds for the benefit of the child” (emphases added)). In short,
child-support payments are designed to benefit children, not parents.
Bailey v. Bailey, 987 S.W.2d 206, 209 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no
pet.).
III. Analysis
The court of appeals reversed the spousal-maintenance award,
holding that the trial court erred in concluding that Hannah would lack
sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs. We
disagree, principally because the court of appeals erred by considering
only the incomplete quantitative evidence of Hannah’s expenses to the
exclusion of other evidence that established Hannah would lack
sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs. But the
court also erred by treating Manish’s child-support payments as
property that was entirely available for Hannah’s minimum reasonable

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needs without also considering the children’s expenses that the
child-support payments would not cover and thus would constitute
additional expenses for Hannah. Considering the totality of the record
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, we
hold that Hannah presented sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusion that she is eligible for spousal maintenance. 2
To determine whether a spouse is eligible for spousal
maintenance, a court should look to the property available “to provide
for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051
(emphasis added). The court of appeals included in its analysis
Hannah’s receipt of $2,760 in monthly child-support payments.
703 S.W.3d at 115. Several courts of appeals have likewise incorporated
100% of child-support payments when assessing a maintenance-seeking
spouse’s available property, though usually without analysis or any
objection by the spouse seeking maintenance. See Debrock v. Debrock,
No. 03-21-00308-CV, 2022 WL 17970214, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin
Dec. 28, 2022, pet. denied); In re Marriage of Elabd, 589 S.W.3d 280, 285
(Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.); Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 257
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
This blanket treatment of child-support payments as property
available in full to meet the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs absent
consideration of the children’s expenses is inconsistent with the Family
Code. The Family Code makes clear that child-support payments are

2 In the court of appeals, Manish challenged only Hannah’s eligibility

for spousal maintenance under Section 8.051. He did not challenge the amount
or duration of the payments awarded by the trial court under Section 8.052, so
we express no opinion on those determinations.

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paid and received “for the support of the child,” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 154.001(b) (emphasis added), which includes “providing the child with
clothing, food, shelter, medical and dental care, and education,” id.
§ 151.001(a)(3) (emphasis added). See also Hill v. Hill, 819 S.W.2d 570,
572 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied) (“Child-support payments are
for the benefit of the children, not the parents.”). Those payments do
not represent “a debt to [a] former spouse.” Scholer, 403 S.W.3d at 860.
Conversely, spousal maintenance is to “provide temporary and
rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability to support herself has
eroded over time while engaged in homemaking activities.” Sherman,
650 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting Marriage of Hallman, 2010 WL 619290,
at *5). Given the distinct purposes of child support and spousal
maintenance, Hannah argues that child-support payments may not be
considered in the spousal-maintenance eligibility analysis. That
argument, however, relies on the fiction that child-related expenses are
inherently irrelevant to the spousal-maintenance calculus.
In reality, families function as units. While many of the needs
and expenses of the spouse seeking spousal maintenance are discrete
from those that are shared with the children, some are not. Housing is
a classic example. If a spouse who receives child support uses it to pay
for housing, that housing provides shelter for both the child and the
spouse, even though the spouse may not have needed to spend as much
on housing had there been no children. In this sense, at least some
portion of the child-support award is property that “provide[s] for the
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051.

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At the same time, however, “both parents are charged with a
natural and legal duty to support their children during minority.” Gully,
231 S.W. at 98 (emphasis added). And child support may not cover all
child-related expenses. The spouse receiving child support is still
obligated to support the child and may need to contribute her share
toward the children’s expenses. 3 Therefore, when the spouse receiving
child support also seeks spousal maintenance, that spouse’s
child-related expenses—whether commingled, like housing, or
child-specific, like clothing or medical expenses—diminish the amount
of income that can be devoted to the spouse’s own reasonable needs. In
short, in a situation where the spouse seeking maintenance also receives
child support, both the child support and the children’s expenses
necessarily factor into the spousal-maintenance calculus.
To determine whether a spouse seeking spousal maintenance
would lack sufficient property to provide for her minimum reasonable
needs, a trial court may factor in all the spouse’s available assets,
including child support, on the income side of the ledger so long as it also
considers child-related expenses the spouse will incur, if any, on the
expense side of the ledger. Stated differently, in determining
maintenance awards, the trial court must avoid double-counting on
either side of the ledger, whether expenses or income. For example, if a
child-support award easily covers housing for the children and the
custodial parent, a maintenance award should not be based on a premise
that the spouse needs funds to pay for shelter. By contrast, if the child

3Here, for example, Hannah’s mortgage and property taxes alone
exceed the amount of child support awarded.

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support will pay only a portion of essential medical care for a child, the
trial court may recognize that the custodial parent’s burden for
providing that care has decreased, but it should not treat the funds that
must go to medical care as available for other needs, such as housing.
Because the court of appeals included all the child-support award as
income without also considering the children’s expenses Hannah would
bear, the court created an erroneous picture of the property Hannah
would have to provide for her minimum reasonable needs.
Additionally, in holding legally insufficient evidence supported
the trial court’s finding that Hannah was entitled to spousal
maintenance, the court of appeals took an inappropriately rigid view of
the nonquantitative evidence supporting the award. The court of
appeals acknowledged that a list of expenses “is not the only evidence
upon which a trial court can determine a person’s ‘minimum reasonable
needs.’” 703 S.W.3d at 113 (quoting Diaz, 350 S.W.3d at 254). Yet it
departed from this principle, faulting Hannah for failing to itemize her
expenses and sources of income. See id. (“[Hannah] provided no
itemized list of monthly expenses, nor did she testify about them.”).
The court of appeals failed to accord proper weight to other,
qualitative evidence demonstrating that Hannah would lack sufficient
property to meet her minimum reasonable needs. Manish testified
about his concern “that [Hannah] wouldn’t be able to maintain the home
due to not having the finances necessary.” He also testified that “the
home is, in many respects, in disarray, and things that need to be fixed
. . . aren’t being fixed, making parts of the home unfunctional.” He
testified that Hannah failed to pay the mortgage on more than one

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occasion even though the court’s temporary orders required her to do so.
Hannah’s testimony mirrors Manish’s in this regard—she explained
that on one occasion, she was unable to do so, so Manish “made the
[mortgage] payment after being late with his . . . child support.” Manish
also reported to a court-appointed social worker that “household bills
were unpaid.”
Of course, as our courts of appeals have recognized, the best
practice is for a spouse seeking support to present an itemized list of
expenses and sources of income available to pay those expenses. See,
e.g., Diaz, 350 S.W.3d at 254–55 (noting itemized lists of expenses are
helpful to trial courts tasked with determining minimum reasonable
needs). But Section 8.051 does not demand itemized lists or the degree
of specificity the court of appeals required here. When the quantitative
evidence is incomplete or otherwise imperfect, a trial court can credit
qualitative testimony about a spouse’s inability to pay essential, basic
living expenses of the sort Hannah adduced to conclude that a spouse
seeking maintenance will lack sufficient property to provide for his or
her minimum reasonable needs. Here, the evidence is legally sufficient
to support such a finding.
That brings us to the second prong of the test for determining
spousal-maintenance eligibility. TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(2). The court
of appeals did not address this requirement because it held Hannah was
ineligible under the statute’s first prong. We conclude the record
contains sufficient evidence to satisfy Section 8.051(2)(C). See Pedernal
Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 495 (Tex. 2017)
(“The parties have briefed and argued the issue here, so in the interest

15
of judicial economy we will address it rather than remanding to the court
of appeals.”).
Under the second prong of Section 8.051, the trial court must find
that Hannah:
(A) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for the
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs because of an
incapacitating physical or mental disability;
(B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or
longer and lacks the ability to earn sufficient income to
provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs; or
(C) is the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age
who requires substantial care and personal supervision
because of a physical or mental disability that prevents the
spouse from earning sufficient income to provide for the
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(2). The trial court did not specify which of these
requirements it found Hannah satisfied. Having considered the entire
record, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish that
Hannah satisfied Section 8.051(2)(C). 4
After the children were born, Hannah left her job to care for them.
She has been their “primary caregiver since birth and has made the
medical decisions for all three children since birth.” The trial court
found that one of the children, A.M., “is a medically fragile child.” Due
to his medical condition, “[A.M.] almost died multiple times throughout
his early life and his medical needs necessitated [Hannah] staying home

4 Based on this conclusion, we need not consider whether Hannah
presented evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 8.053. It applies
only if spousal maintenance is awarded under Section 8.051(2)(B). See TEX.
FAM. CODE § 8.053(a).

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to take care of him and his brothers.” The record reflects that A.M.’s
required treatments can “take a significant length of time, six to seven
hours,” and that “[A.M.] has daily and often hourly medical needs that
need to be attended to and personal-care needs throughout the day.” It
is undisputed that Hannah has cared for A.M. and that she has ably met
his needs over many years. This evidence is sufficient to support a
finding that Hannah “is the custodian of a child of the marriage . . . who
requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a physical
or mental disability that prevents [Hannah] from earning sufficient
income to provide for [her] minimum reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 8.051(2)(C).
IV. Conclusion
Legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that Hannah is eligible for spousal maintenance. First, there is legally
sufficient evidence that she will lack sufficient property to provide for
her minimum reasonable needs. Second, the evidence supports a finding
that Hannah is the custodian of a child with a physical disability
requiring substantial care and personal supervision that prevents her
from earning sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable
needs. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Hannah spousal maintenance under Family Code
Section 8.051. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part and
reinstate the portion of the trial court’s decree awarding Hannah $2,000
per month in spousal maintenance for thirty-six months.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

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OPINION DELIVERED: June 20, 2025

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