CourtListener 10856255

Testo completo

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0782
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Ryan Busse, Josh Klostermann, Russel Klostermann, Layne
Klostermann, Mitch Thomas, Olivia Rincones, Robert Rincones,
Ruben Rincones, Enrica Rincones, Angelita Garcia, Adelaida
Garcia, Aniceto Garcia, Betty Garcia, Railey Rincones, Gary
Busse, Alison Savage, and Lyford Consolidated Independent
School District,
Petitioners,

South Texas Independent School District,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE YOUNG, with whom Justice Devine, Justice Sullivan, and
Justice Hawkins join, concurring.

I gladly join the opinion of the Court, which emphasizes that
courts should adjudicate cases when a plaintiff satisfies the traditional
requirements for standing and should not allow collateral matters to be
smuggled into that standing analysis. Less abstractly, when a plaintiff
asserts a direct injury that is caused by the conduct he challenges and is
remediable by the judicial relief he demands, his standing is secure. As
a general matter, that should be the end of it. The law of standing is
complicated enough without larding it with extraneous matters, such as
whether a win on the merits would pose a great inconvenience to the
government. Plenty of other doctrines deal with how courts should rule,
and many of them give the government a substantial edge. The antecedent
question of whether the named plaintiff has the requisite stake to invoke
judicial power is all that the standing doctrine concerns. The Court today
does a great service by enhancing the internal coherence and integrity of
the law of justiciability in Texas.
Protecting the law of standing does not just mean eliminating
vestigial and improper requirements; it also means being ready to restore
essential requirements that have in practice been allowed to erode or decay.
To that end, I note that the Court’s clean resolution of the dispute before us
may come at a delayed reckoning with the concept of “taxpayer standing,”
which the Court references in footnote four. See ante at 11 n.4. This concept
has some basis in our precedents, of course, but our precedents’ most
important relevant teaching is the fundamental requirement that courts
honor the separation of powers by rooting justiciability doctrines in the
Constitution. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots
Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 867, 871 (Tex. 2025). Justiciability
limitations exist because the judiciary is not always a proper
decisionmaker. The promise of self-government limits the role of the
judiciary over disputes that, at their core, implicate only generalized
objections that any citizen could make to governmental decisions or actions.
See id. at 869. Such objections are not justiciable unless governmental

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conduct injures an individual in a way that causes legally cognizable and
distinct harm to that individual. Otherwise, no matter how much he
dislikes it, his objection to governmental choices should be directed to the
other two branches, including through the ballot box.
Directing those objections to the courts, by contrast, aggrandizes the
power of the courts in an especially insidious way: it robs the People and
their representatives of both the power and the duty to struggle over and
ultimately resolve disputes that sound in policy and politics. Having the
courts resolve any dispute about the meaning of the law or the wisdom
of government action may be satisfying for the victor in his moment of
triumph. But the roots of self-governance are damaged every time that
happens. Relying on “taxpayer standing” for authority to resolve a matter
of public policy can get dangerously close to releasing an advisory opinion.
One reason that the Texas judiciary so thoroughly repudiates its own
authority to issue advisory opinions is that doing so impairs and forestalls
the work of the other branches and of the People. See, e.g., id. at 871–72.
Properly understood, our taxpayer-standing cases likely pose no
serious threat to the Constitution’s limitations and do not encroach upon
the prerogatives of the political branches or the rights of the People to use
the political process to resolve disputes. For example, suits against local
governments constitute the bulk of cases that invoke the concept of
“taxpayer standing.” Such suits are materially different in kind from suits
against State entities or officials because local governments have sprung
from corporate law, which is why Article XI of the Constitution is entitled
“Municipal Corporations.” While it does not follow that any suit against a
local government is permissible, it at least means that there may be some

3
areas in which the “corporation” is answerable in ways that the government
more generally is not. Cases like Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191 (Tex.
2022), for example, reflect the special obligations of municipal corporations.
Likewise, “taxpayer standing” may be an imprecise or mistaken label.
Cases that invoke the words “taxpayer standing” may in fact involve
plaintiffs who assert genuine and personal stakes sufficient to invoke the
judicial power without that label adding anything. This case is one such
example. There are many others. Even our recent decision in Perez was at
its heart about the illegal collection of tax funds, not merely a contention by
a taxpayer that the city was spending money unlawfully. Id. at 200.
A separate doctrine of “taxpayer standing” is no more necessary for
someone trying to avoid paying an illegal tax than a separate doctrine of
“property-owner standing” is necessary for someone demanding just
compensation for a taking. The general rules of constitutional standing
authorize both suits because both plaintiffs allege an individualized injury
traceable to the defendant and redressable by a judgment; neither suit
needs an “exception.” Our cases, indeed, never have required any such
“exception” for a plaintiff to challenge the collection of an unlawful tax. See,
e.g., Shaw v. Phillips Crane & Rigging of San Antonio, Inc., 636 S.W.2d
186, 188 (Tex. 1982) (“So long as there exists between the taxpayer and the
Tax Assessor-Collector a legitimate controversy over the amount of the
taxes” owed, “the taxpayer may bring a suit to enjoin the collection of the
alleged illegal taxes pending a hearing on the legality of same.”); Davis v.
Burnett, 13 S.W. 613, 614 (Tex. 1890) (concluding that a plaintiff may sue
to enjoin the unlawful collection of funds); Morris v. Cummings, 45 S.W.
383, 385 (Tex. 1898) (same) (collecting early cases).

4
Many taxpayers may challenge the same tax; a single government
project may affect many property owners. Even so, any given plaintiff’s
claim is still tethered to his own, distinct injury. It would therefore be a
grave mistake to (1) properly find constitutional standing in a case where
the parties mistakenly call it “taxpayer standing” and then (2) improperly
exercise judicial power in a future case where constitutional standing is
lacking by bootstrapping the “taxpayer standing” label from the first case.
Today’s case does not require me to take a firm position on the
merits of any further application of what is called “taxpayer standing.” If
we ever confront a case in which that theory alone purports to justify the
exercise of judicial authority, and in which it cannot be explained under
one of the two grounds I have described, we will have time enough to
consider the question. When we do, I hope it will come with the able
assistance of lower courts, the bar, amici, and scholars. Cf., e.g., Turner v.
Robinson, 534 S.W.3d 115, 130–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
pet. denied) (Busby, J., concurring) (identifying sources that likely will be
relevant to the analysis). But our need to do so may be greatly lessened if
the Court’s main teaching today is followed with rigor: that parties and
courts should not label as “taxpayer standing” that which is covered by the
true and orthodox test for constitutional standing.

Evan A. Young
Justice

OPINION FILED: May 8, 2026

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0782
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South Texas Independent School District,
Respondent

Argued November 5, 2025

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Devine, Justice Sullivan, and Justice Hawkins joined.

This case asks whether a school district and a group of individual
taxpayers in Willacy County have standing to contest the county’s
collection of an ad valorem tax for South Texas Independent School
District. We hold that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the
taxpayers’ claims for lack of standing but correctly determined that the
school district lacks standing. Because the court of appeals did not
consider whether other jurisdictional hurdles bar the taxpayers’ claims,
we remand the case to that court to decide those issues in the first
instance.
I. Background
Before federal law required public schools to provide free and
appropriate education for students with disabilities, Texas enacted
Education Code Chapter 26, which authorized the creation of
“Rehabilitation Districts” to “provide education, training, special
services, and guidance” for persons with mental or physical disabilities.
Act of May 1, 1963, 58th Leg., R.S., ch. 106, § 2, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws
186, 187 (repealed 1995); see Act of June 2, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 889,
§§ 26.01–.72, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2735, 2974–83 (codifying Education
Code Chapter 26). The enabling legislation authorized counties to
establish a rehabilitation district or join an existing district through a
countywide election. See Act of May 1, 1963, § 8(b), (g). The statute
provides that a district’s creation gives it the “power to levy taxes for
residence centers and such other facilities, if any, as the [district’s]
Board of Directors may deem necessary or proper for the training and
guidance of such persons and for maintenance and operation of” the
district. Id. § 8(c). The Legislature did not provide procedures for
leaving or disbanding a rehabilitation district, by vote or otherwise.
South Texas Independent School District (STISD) was originally
formed under Chapter 26 as the Rio Grande Rehabilitation District for

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Handicapped Persons. It was established by Cameron County voters in
1963, and Hidalgo County voted to join the following year. Willacy
County voters did the same in 1974. The Willacy County Commissioners
Court order calling for the special election stated that the vote would
authorize the district to “annually levy ad valorem taxes on all taxable
property within its boundaries at a rate not exceeding five cents (5¢) on
each One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) of assessed valuation.”
In 1983—after Congress passed legislation requiring public
schools to educate students with disabilities 1—the Texas Legislature
amended Chapter 26, permitting rehabilitation districts to “provide the
opportunity for vocational training to handicapped and nonhandicapped
scholastics.” Act of May 24, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 506, § 3,
sec. 26.73(a), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2957, 2958–59 (repealed 1995). The
Rio Grande Rehabilitation District changed its name to STISD.
Although Chapter 26 was eventually repealed, STISD continues to
operate under its provisions today. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.301(a)
(authorizing the continued operation of rehabilitation districts
established before May 1, 1995).
In 2023, as in years past, STISD’s board of directors adopted an
ad valorem tax rate below the statutory maximum. But that year, the
tax assessment drew a lawsuit by a group of Willacy County taxpayers
and Lyford Consolidated Independent School District (LCISD), a school
district located within Willacy County. The Taxpayers and LCISD

1 Congress initially enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. The Act was later
amended and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482.

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allege that STISD now serves a different purpose than the one Willacy
County voters approved in 1974. Whereas the voters authorized a
rehabilitation district serving disabled persons, plaintiffs allege that is
no longer STISD’s principal mission, as evidenced by the fact that
individuals with disabilities make up a negligible percentage of STISD’s
student population. LCISD also alleges that STISD’s assessment
increases the financial hardship on it and other school districts within
STISD’s boundaries by burdening their voters with double taxation.
Plaintiffs seek declarations that the tax is unlawful, and thus
cannot be collected, for two reasons. First, they claim it violates the
“contract with the voters” doctrine, which derives from Article I,
Section 16 of the Texas Constitution. Second, they allege STISD’s
decision to levy a tax that lacks voter approval violates Article VII,
Section 3(e) of the Texas Constitution, thus constituting ultra vires
conduct. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction barring STISD from
levying the tax and barring Willacy County and its tax
assessor–collector from collecting the tax. 2
STISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiffs
lack standing and governmental immunity bars their claims. The trial
court denied the plea, and STISD filed an interlocutory appeal. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).
The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for STISD,
dismissing all claims for lack of standing. 696 S.W.3d 773, 787 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024). Relying on Bland Independent

2 The County defendants are not parties to this appeal.

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School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000), the court held that
the Taxpayers failed to demonstrate taxpayer standing because their
claims risk significant “disruption of government operations,” given
STISD’s reliance on the tax for the last several decades. 696 S.W.3d at
783 (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 558). As for LCISD, the court
concluded standing was lacking because LCISD failed to allege a
concrete or particularized injury that could be redressed by the courts.
See id. at 786–87. Given these holdings, the court of appeals did not
reach STISD’s two alternative jurisdictional challenges: (1) plaintiffs’
claims present a nonjusticiable political question; 3 and (2) plaintiffs’
claims are barred by governmental immunity. See id. at 777, 787.
The Taxpayers and LCISD jointly filed a petition for review,
which we granted.
II. Discussion
A defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction can challenge the plaintiff’s
pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When a
jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, courts determine whether
the plaintiff pleaded facts that affirmatively demonstrate subject matter
jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex. 2004). In ascertaining whether jurisdiction exists, we
“construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the

3 STISD did not raise the political question doctrine in the trial court.

But because the “political question doctrine is an issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction,” Van Dorn Preston v. M1 Support Servs., L.P., 642 S.W.3d 452,
459 (Tex. 2022), STISD could raise this argument for the first time on appeal.
See Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. 2000).

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pleaders’ intent.” Id. A court may grant the plea without affording the
plaintiff the opportunity to amend when the pleadings “affirmatively
negate the existence of jurisdiction.” Id. at 227.
Conversely, when a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the
existence of jurisdictional facts, the court considers relevant evidence
submitted by the parties to determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770–71. When
reviewing a trial court’s ruling on such a plea, our standard of review
mirrors that of traditional summary judgment. Id. at 771. We “take as
true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and “indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts” in her favor. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 228. Importantly, a jurisdictional plea “does not authorize an
inquiry so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs
are required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction.” Bland,
34 S.W.3d at 554. However, if the evidence fails to raise a fact question
regarding jurisdiction, the plea must be granted. City of San Antonio v.
Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 529 (Tex. 2022); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit.” Heckman v.
Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). Our standing test
mirrors the federal test for Article III standing, which requires the
plaintiff to have personally suffered an injury-in-fact that is traceable to
the defendant’s conduct and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. Id. at 154–55 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992)).
To plead an injury sufficient to confer standing, the plaintiff must
allege an “invasion of a legally protected interest,” id. at 154 (quoting

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Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560), that is “concrete and particularized, actual or
imminent, not hypothetical,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252
S.W.3d 299, 304–05 (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted). The plaintiff, rather
than a third party or the general public, “must be personally injured.”
Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155; see also S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223
S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2007) (“[A]s a general rule, to have standing an
individual must demonstrate a particularized interest in a conflict
distinct from that sustained by the public at large.”). Even so, the mere
fact that other people suffer the same injury as the plaintiff does not
automatically deprive the plaintiff of standing to sue. See Data
Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021).
The second element of the standing test, traceability, requires a
causal connection—that the plaintiff’s alleged injury “fairly can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant, . . . [not] the
independent action of some third party not before the court.” Heckman,
369 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S.
26, 41–42 (1976)). And the third element, redressability, is met where
the requested relief will likely remedy the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at
155–56. Because standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, our
review is de novo. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
A. The Taxpayers have standing
In reversing the trial court’s denial of STISD’s plea to the
jurisdiction, the court of appeals viewed the Taxpayers’ claims through
the lens of the taxpayer standing doctrine and reasoned that taxpayer
standing was lacking due to “equitable considerations.” 696 S.W.3d at
785. This was error. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the

7
Taxpayers’ allegations demonstrate standing under our traditional
three-part constitutional standing test. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at
154–55.
First, the Taxpayers have satisfactorily alleged an injury-in-fact.
They allege that STISD’s unlawful and unconstitutional assessment of
the ad valorem tax causes personal injury to each of them because they
must pay the tax with money out of their pockets. Their injury is
imminent because STISD decides whether to levy the tax, and Willacy
County collects the tax, each year. And the injury affects each taxpayer
in “a personal and individual way”—the tax will be collected from each
one of them personally and individually. See Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d
at 696 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016)).
Second, the Taxpayers’ alleged injury is directly traceable to the
defendants’ conduct. STISD’s board of directors has discretion to levy
the ad valorem tax, including choosing what rate to assess (within the
limits set by former Chapter 26), each year. And Willacy County collects
the tax. The Taxpayers’ alleged injury is, therefore, not the result of the
“independent action of some third party [who is] not before the court.”
Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 42).
Third, the remedy the Taxpayers seek would redress their injury.
If the trial court were to grant the relief the Taxpayers seek—a
declaration that the tax is unlawful and an injunction prohibiting its
collection—the Taxpayers would no longer suffer the pocketbook injury
about which they complain. This is all that our standing test requires.
STISD’s response is two-fold. First, it contends that the
Taxpayers’ alleged injury is not particularized because it is suffered by

8
other members of the public—i.e., other residents of Willacy County who
are also subject to the ad valorem tax. But the mere fact that the
Taxpayers experience the same injury as other residents does not mean
the Taxpayers’ injury is not particularized. See Data Foundry, 620
S.W.3d at 696; see also Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d
681, 693 (Tex. 2022) (concluding that the alleged injury was not a
“generalized grievance,” even though it was “shared among county
residents,” because the injury was “not abstract but quite specific”).
Indeed, we have recognized the type of pocketbook injury complained of
here as a quintessential form of injury-in-fact sufficient to confer
standing. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Luminant Energy Co., 691
S.W.3d 448, 457–58 (Tex. 2024); Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien,
674 S.W.3d 234, 251 (Tex. 2023).
Second, STISD contends that the Taxpayers cannot demonstrate
the tax is illegal under either constitutional provision referenced in their
petition. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 (barring, among other things, “any
law impairing the obligation of contracts”), art. VII, § 3(e) (authorizing
school districts to collect ad valorem taxes where a majority of the
district’s voters approve the tax “at an election to be held for that
purpose”); see also San Saba County v. McCraw, 108 S.W.2d 200, 203
(Tex. 1937) (“[T]he vital conditions and safeguards surrounding the tax
voted at the time of the election thereon became a part of the very
election itself.”). STISD argues that demonstrating the tax’s illegality
is required to establish taxpayer standing. This improperly conflates
standing with the merits. Standing “in no way depends on the merits of
the [plaintiff’s] contention that particular conduct is illegal.” Data

9
Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696 (alteration in original) (quoting Andrade v.
NAACP of Aus., 345 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2011)); see also Perez v. Turner,
653 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that plaintiffs need not
“demonstrate that the allegedly illegal activity was actually illegal” to
establish taxpayer standing). But more importantly, as we explain
below, resorting to the taxpayer standing doctrine was unnecessary in
this case.
The parties and the court of appeals assessed the standing
question through the lens of “taxpayer standing.” 696 S.W.3d at 783–85.
This Court has applied the doctrine in cases where a plaintiff who lacks
a particularized injury seeks to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public
funds. See, e.g., Perez, 653 S.W.3d at 199; Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d
319, 323 (Tex. 2022); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001).
But in those cases, we emphasized—and reiterate today—that the
doctrine has an exceedingly narrow scope given the general rule that
taxpayers have no right to “bring suit to contest government
decision-making.” Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555; see also Osborne v. Keith,
177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1944) (calling such suits “drastic” and
emphasizing that government operations would be hamstrung if citizens
could challenge allegedly “unwise or indiscreet expenditures” in court).
In short, the mere fact that a plaintiff’s claim involves his
payment of a tax does not require invocation of the taxpayer standing
doctrine. Where, as here, a plaintiff satisfies our three-part
constitutional standing test, the taxpayer standing doctrine should play
no role in the analysis. The Taxpayers here each allege a particularized
injury-in-fact that is traceable to the defendants, and they seek a

10
remedy that would redress that injury: an injunction barring STISD’s
unlawful assessment and the County defendants’ impending unlawful
collection of the challenged tax. 4 Because these allegations establish the
Taxpayers’ constitutional standing, the court of appeals erred in relying
on the taxpayer standing doctrine to determine that standing was
lacking.
The court’s application of the taxpayer standing doctrine was
problematic for an additional reason. The court ultimately held that the
Taxpayers failed to demonstrate taxpayer standing because of the effect
the suit, if allowed to proceed, could have on STISD. See 696 S.W.3d at
785 (concluding that the Taxpayers lacked standing because their suit
“would cause a significant disruption to government operations and
disturb the settled expectations of other taxpayers”). But the standing
inquiry evaluates whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient personal
stake in the controversy—at the case’s outset—to guarantee genuine
adversity. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (“In Texas, the standing
doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy
between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”); Tex. Ass’n of
Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993)
(“Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court . . . .”).
The court of appeals’ focus on how the suit could burden STISD wrongly

4 We acknowledge there may be claims within plaintiffs’ petition that

appear to seek an injunction against the particular expenditure of funds, such
as expenditures for purposes other than those approved by Willacy County
voters in 1974, rather than against the collection of a tax. If the case is
ultimately remanded to the trial court, our holding does not preclude that court
from analyzing whether the taxpayer standing doctrine applies to those claims.

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shifted the focus away from the plaintiffs’ actual circumstance at the
time of filing toward the suit’s impact on the defendant.
The court’s “significant disruption” rationale seemingly was
premised on its overreading Bland. In Bland, two taxpayers sued to
enjoin a school district from making payments under a construction
contract that had already been substantially performed. 34 S.W.3d at
549, 556. This Court dismissed, explaining that “[w]hen all that
remains is a school district’s repayment of a loan for work completed,
allowance of a taxpayer action to prohibit such repayment threatens a
substantial interference with governmental actions.” Id. at 558. The
Court emphasized its concern that the taxpayers’ lawsuit threatened
disruption of government operations and of the “settled expectations of
other taxpayers in the district” who were “also served by the high
school.” Id. But in so holding, the Court placed great weight on the fact
that performance of the contract at issue was nearly complete. See id.
(“We need not decide here whether a governmental entity’s receipt of
something less than full performance under an allegedly illegal
agreement is enough to preclude a taxpayer suit to prohibit future
performance.”).
Bland does not support the court of appeals’ standing analysis.
Whether substantial disruption would result from a court’s judgment is
not a proper standing inquiry. It does not inform whether there is a real
controversy between parties for a court to resolve. See Heckman, 369
S.W.3d at 154. Nor is it tethered to our standing test’s constitutional
underpinnings. See Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 304 (explaining that the
standing requirement derives from our Constitution’s provisions

12
“den[ying] the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract” and
“provid[ing] court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him’” (first
citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444; and then quoting TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 13)).
At this preliminary stage, our task is to determine whether the
Taxpayers sufficiently alleged an injury that satisfies our three-part
constitutional standing test. We hold that they did. 5
B. LCISD lacks standing
LCISD argues that STISD’s tax creates an unequal funding
landscape, harming LCISD in a number of ways: first, STISD’s failure
to service an appropriate percentage of disabled students increases
LCISD’s financial burden; second, LCISD is unable to collect higher
taxes from its residents because those residents are victims of “double
taxation” at the hands of STISD; and third, STISD’s funding structure
gives it a competitive advantage over LCISD to attract teachers and
staff. LCISD contends that an injunction barring STISD from levying
its tax would allow LCISD to raise its own tax rate, thereby enabling
LCISD to meet its financial obligations, pay off debt sooner, and offer
competitive teacher salaries.

5 STISD offers two additional arguments in support of its claim that the

Taxpayers lack standing: abrogation and ratification. STISD contends that
the Legislature abrogated any “contract with the voters” that formed during
the 1974 Willacy County special election by expanding the purpose of
rehabilitation districts to allow vocational training for all students. STISD
also argues that the Taxpayers have effectively ratified this change in purpose
by electing board members who continue to levy the tax. These are merits
arguments that do not impact standing. See, e.g., Perez, 653 S.W.3d at 201;
Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696.

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We conclude that LCISD lacks standing. To begin, we agree with
the court of appeals that LCISD’s claimed injury is speculative, not
concrete. See 696 S.W.3d at 786. At the trial court’s hearing on STISD’s
plea to the jurisdiction, LCISD’s superintendent testified that disabled
individuals make up about eleven percent of LCISD’s student
population, which approximates the state average. She also testified
that LCISD could call an election to raise its taxes at any time and
STISD could not prevent LCISD from doing so. LCISD’s admitted
control over whether and when to call such an election frustrates its
argument that its alleged financial difficulty is an “injury” it has
suffered at the hands of STISD.
This admission is also fatal because it shows that LCISD’s alleged
injury is not traceable to STISD. Beyond admitting that LCISD can call
a vote to raise its tax rate regardless of STISD’s actions, LCISD’s
superintendent agreed that the Legislature controls the funding of
Texas schools. See generally TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 48.001–.317 (outlining
Texas’s public school finance system, which is administered through the
Foundation School Program). Thus, any harm flowing to LCISD from
STISD’s ad valorem tax assessment is indirect and attenuated.
Finally, unlike the individual Taxpayers, LCISD cannot show
redressability. LCISD makes no showing that granting the relief it
seeks would make it substantially likely that its voters will approve a
tax increase in a hypothetical future election. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d
at 155 (noting that a plaintiff who requests an injunction lacks standing
where “the injunction could not possibly remedy his situation”). Nor is
there any showing, besides pure speculation, that the requested relief

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would likely result in LCISD’s offering higher salaries to potential staff
or STISD’s servicing more individuals with disabilities. In sum, unlike
the individual Taxpayers, LCISD cannot meet the requirements of our
constitutional standing test.
LCISD seeks refuge in our prior cases recognizing school districts’
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the school funding system.
See, e.g., Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d
826, 847–48 (Tex. 2016). But LCISD’s allegations reveal that those
cases are not analogous to its claim here. The districts in those cases
challenged the funds they received directly from the State and the
method by which the State allocated funds. E.g., id. at 839–40; Neeley
v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 751–52
(Tex. 2005); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391,
391–92 (Tex. 1989). Here, by contrast, LCISD asserts claims against a
neighboring school district, complaining of funding mechanisms that
flow from the Legislature rather than the named district itself.
Taking as true all evidence favorable to LCISD, we conclude it
has failed to raise a fact question regarding standing. Thus, we hold the
court of appeals did not err in dismissing LCISD’s claims for lack of
standing.
III. Conclusion
The court of appeals correctly held that LCISD lacks standing,
and we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment to the extent it dismisses
LCISD’s claims on that basis. But we reverse the court of appeals’
judgment dismissing the Taxpayers’ claims for lack of standing. We

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remand the case to the court of appeals for it to consider STISD’s
unaddressed jurisdictional challenges in the first instance.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 8, 2026

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