Ken Paxton, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas v. Savergv, Sierra Club, and carrizo/comecrudo Nation of Texas, Inc.

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0237
══════════

Texas General Land Office and Dawn Buckingham, in her official
capacity as the Texas Land Commissioner,
Petitioners,

v.

SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas,
Inc.,
Respondents

~ and ~

══════════
No. 24-0407
══════════

Cameron County,
Petitioner,

v.

SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas,
Inc.,
Respondents

~ and ~
══════════
No. 24-0457
══════════

Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas,
Petitioner,

v.

SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas,
Inc.,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petitions for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued March 5, 2026

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1959, the Legislature declared by statute that Texans enjoy the
“free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the
state-owned beaches.” Open Beaches Act, 56th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 19, § 1,
1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 108, 108 (current version at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
§ 61.011(a)). With this statute’s passage, the notion that Texas beaches
are the public’s to enjoy became more deeply engrained in our culture.
When the occasional dispute regarding the public’s access to beaches
arose, and protection of open beaches proved necessary, it was the State
and local governments that shouldered the enforcement duty, with

2
relatively little need or opportunity for courts to define the statute’s
contours.
Fifty years after the statute’s passage, in 2009, Texas voters
enshrined the right of public beach access in our Constitution. The
constitutional amendment granted the public a right, described as a
permanent easement, to ingress, egress, and use of Texas beaches. TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 33(b). But while the amendment constitutionalized the
right to use state-owned beaches, it also specified what it was not
creating. Subsection (d) provides that the new Article I, Section 33 “does
not create a private right of enforcement.” Id. § 33(d).
Since Section 33’s adoption, the Legislature has enacted statutes
that permit temporary closures of Boca Chica Beach in South Texas to
safeguard the public from nearby rocket launches and related space
flight activities. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 61.011(d)(11), .132. This
case presents two related questions arising out of those closures. First:
are the closures (and the statutes authorizing them) constitutional given
that they are in tension with Section 33’s guarantee of an “unrestricted
right to use and a right of ingress to and egress from” public beaches?
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(b). Second: irrespective of the answer to that
question, who has the authority to enforce Section 33?
No governmental actor seeks to enforce Section 33 in this case.
Instead, the plaintiffs are private parties—organizations whose
beachgoing members claim the temporary closures of Boca Chica Beach
conflict with their constitutional right to access and use the beach.
Without attempting to specify the extent to which their “unrestricted”
right to beach use may give way to the State’s countervailing interest in

3
protecting public safety—a task we leave for another day—we hold that
subsection (d)’s express proviso that it creates no private right of
enforcement bars these private plaintiffs’ claims. Because the claims
are not viable, it follows that the defendants, all of whom are
governmental actors, retain their immunity from suit. The trial court
was thus correct to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse
the court of appeals’ contrary judgment and reinstate the trial court’s
judgment of dismissal.
I. Background
Enacted in 1959, the Open Beaches Act declares as “the public
policy of this state that the public, individually and collectively, shall
have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from
the state-owned beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of
Mexico.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.011(a). As we noted in Severance v.
Patterson, the Act strikes a careful balance between “preserv[ing]
private property rights” on the one hand and “guard[ing] the right of the
public to use public beaches against infringement by private interests”
on the other. 370 S.W.3d 705, 719 (Tex. 2012).
To that end, the Act makes it unlawful “for any person to create,
erect, or construct any obstruction, barrier, or restraint that will
interfere with” the public’s right to use and access public beaches. TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE § 61.013(a). It further “provides the State with a means
of enforcing” the statute’s guarantees, Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 710,
such as by charging governmental officials with the duty of filing “suit
to . . . remove or prevent any improvement, maintenance, obstruction,
barrier, or other encroachment on a public beach, or to prohibit any

4
unlawful restraint on the public’s right of access to and use of a public
beach,” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.018(a).
In 2009, Texas voters enshrined the rights described in the Open
Beaches Act in the Texas Constitution’s Bill of Rights. 1 Article I,
Section 33 states:
(b) The public, individually and collectively, has an
unrestricted right to use and a right of ingress to and
egress from a public beach.[ 2] The right granted by this
subsection is dedicated as a permanent easement in favor
of the public.
(c) The legislature may enact laws to protect the right of
the public to access and use a public beach and to protect

1 The Legislature proposed the constitutional amendment in the wake

of weather events that shifted the line of vegetation and caused private
structures to become located on the public beach. See, e.g., H. Rsch. Org., Bill
Analysis 2–3, Tex. H.J.R. 102, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009); H. Rsch. Org., Focus
Report No. 81-8, at 22 (Aug. 20, 2009); Tex. Legis. Council, Analyses of
Proposed Constitutional Amendments 50–51 (2009); see also TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE § 61.001(5) (defining “Line of vegetation” as “the extreme seaward
boundary of natural vegetation which spreads continuously inland”),
(8) (defining “Public beach” with reference to the line of vegetation).
Severance—the Court’s seminal case on the Open Beaches Act—addressed
whether such events caused the public easement to “roll” landward onto
privately owned property. 370 S.W.3d at 721–27. But Severance did not
address Section 33. See id. at 713 n.8.
2 “Public beach” is defined as

a state-owned beach bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf
of Mexico, extending from mean low tide to the landward
boundary of state-owned submerged land, and any larger area
extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation
bordering on the Gulf of Mexico to which the public has acquired
a right of use or easement to or over the area by prescription or
dedication or has established and retained a right by virtue of
continuous right in the public under Texas common law.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(a).

5
the public beach easement from interference and
encroachments.
(d) This section does not create a private right of
enforcement.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33.
A few years later, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX)
was reviewing potential sites for its new rocket launch facility. One such
location was next to Boca Chica Beach in Cameron County. The Federal
Aviation Administration, which licenses rocket launch sites, conditioned
its approval of this site on SpaceX’s ability to restrict public access to
the launch area, including Boca Chica Beach. To facilitate this process,
in 2013 the Legislature passed House Bill 2623, which amended the
Open Beaches Act and authorized SpaceX to request Boca Chica Beach’s
closure on days SpaceX would be conducting space flight activities. 3
Two provisions of HB 2623, now codified in the Natural Resources
Code, are at issue in this case. First, plaintiffs assail the provision that
permits the General Land Office (GLO)’s commissioner to promulgate
rules on “the closure of beaches for space flight activities.” TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE § 61.011(d)(11). Second, plaintiffs challenge Section 61.132,
which permits a county containing an FAA-approved launch site to

3 See H. Rsch. Org., Bill Analysis 2, Tex. H.B. 2623, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013)

(noting that Texas was competing with Florida, Georgia, and Puerto Rico to
house the SpaceX facility), 3 (“[HB] 2623 is necessary for the location at Boca
Chica Beach to be viable as a space launch site.”); S. Rsch. Ctr., Bill Analysis 1,
Tex. H.B. 2623, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013) (“[F]or safety reasons, areas within a
certain radius of a launch site must be closed before a launch . . . .”). It was
understood that HB 2623 would apply only to Cameron County as it was
then—and still remains—the only coastal county in Texas containing an
FAA-approved launch site. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.132(a); H. Rsch.
Org., Bill Analysis 1–2, Tex. H.B. 2623, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).

6
temporarily close the beach when a space flight is scheduled. That
section provides:
To protect the public health, safety, and welfare, the
commissioners court by order may temporarily close a
beach in reasonable proximity to the launch site or access
points to the beach in the county on a primary or backup
launch date . . . .
Id. § 61.132(c). 4
SaveRGV, a nonprofit environmental advocacy corporation, sued
the GLO, its commissioner, 5 and Cameron County in 2021. According
to SaveRGV’s pleadings, Boca Chica Beach and State Highway 4—the
beach’s only access road—have been closed multiple times for SpaceX
launches. SaveRGV alleges that the beach closures interfere with the
beach-access rights of its members, who perform conservation work at
Boca Chica Beach, enjoy the beach’s wildlife, and otherwise use the
beach for recreation. The lawsuit seeks several declarations, which are
largely predicated on the theory that HB 2623 “irreconcilably conflicts”
with Section 33 and is thus unconstitutional and void.
The Attorney General intervened to defend the statutes, and
Sierra Club and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas, Inc. (the Tribe)
intervened as plaintiffs. Like SaveRGV, Sierra Club and the Tribe

4 Section 61.132 requires GLO approval for beach closures on summer

weekends and certain holidays, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.132(d), and requires
compliance with the county’s “beach access and use plan” and “dune protection
plan” as adopted and certified under the Natural Resources Code, id.
§ 61.132(e).
5 When SaveRGV sued, George P. Bush was the GLO’s commissioner.

Dawn Buckingham succeeded him in office and was automatically substituted
in his place. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).

7
allege that the beach closures deprive their members of their
constitutionally protected right to access and use Boca Chica Beach.
The Attorney General, GLO and its commissioner, and Cameron
County each filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting lack of standing
and immunity. The Attorney General and GLO argued, among other
things, that Section 33(d)’s express disclaimer that it “does not create a
private right of enforcement” deprived plaintiffs of standing to sue. TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 33(d). Cameron County asserted a similar argument but
also framed it in terms of immunity. Plaintiffs 6 responded that courts
have inherent jurisdiction to determine a statute’s constitutionality and
that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) expressly waives
immunity for their claims. See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590
S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that the UDJA “provid[es] only
a limited waiver” of immunity “for challenges to the validity of an
ordinance or statute”); see generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 37.001–.011.
The trial court conducted a hearing, granted all three pleas, and
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The court of appeals
reversed. 722 S.W.3d 433, 446 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2024). The court first held that at least one plaintiff, Sierra Club,
established standing as to all defendants. Id. at 442–44, 442 n.4. The
court then rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiffs failed to
establish a waiver of immunity. Id. at 444–45. The court reasoned that
it was unnecessary to first examine whether plaintiffs’ claims were

6 We refer to SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and the Tribe collectively as
“plaintiffs.”

8
viable because they challenge the constitutionality of a statute and not
governmental actions. Id. at 445.
All defendants petitioned this Court for review. We granted the
petitions and consolidated the cases for oral argument.
II. Discussion
A
Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law we
review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 228 (Tex. 2004). A “plea to the jurisdiction can challenge the
plaintiff’s pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Busse
v. S. Tex. Indep. Sch. Dist., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1279764, at *2 (Tex.
May 8, 2026). When challenging the pleadings, we examine “whether
the plaintiff pleaded facts that affirmatively demonstrate subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. Only when the pleadings “affirmatively negate the
existence of jurisdiction” will we grant a plea to the jurisdiction without
allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
227 (emphasis added). When a plea challenges jurisdictional facts, our
standard of review mirrors summary judgment; we “consider relevant
evidence in the record” to determine whether a fact issue exists
regarding jurisdiction. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex.
2022).
In their pleas to the jurisdiction, defendants argued that plaintiffs
lack standing. The court of appeals held that at least one plaintiff had
established standing as to all defendants. See 722 S.W.3d at 442 n.4.
We have explained that when one “valid jurisdictional obstacle” exists,
“it is not necessary that every other potential jurisdictional defect be

9
raised, fleshed out, or resolved” by a reviewing court. Rattray v. City of
Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023). As we explain below, our
resolution of defendants’ immunity challenge is dispositive here, so we
need not also address standing.
Because sovereign or governmental immunity implicates subject
matter jurisdiction, a governmental defendant may assert its immunity
in a jurisdictional plea. Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex.
2021). To defeat an immunity challenge at the plea to the jurisdiction
stage, the plaintiff must plead facts that “affirmatively demonstrate” a
waiver or exception to immunity—otherwise, the plea must be granted.
Id. at 388–89. Suits seeking to vindicate constitutional rights are often
not barred by governmental immunity. See State v. Zurawski, 690
S.W.3d 644, 660–61 (Tex. 2024) (recognizing that the UDJA waives
immunity for suits to declare a statute unconstitutional); City of El Paso
v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) (holding that suits to
require governmental officials to comply with the Constitution are not
barred by immunity). Nevertheless, “immunity from suit is not waived
if the constitutional claims are facially invalid.” Klumb v. Hou. Mun.
Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2015).
Defendants argue that the court of appeals erred in concluding
their immunity was waived without first evaluating whether plaintiffs
alleged facially valid constitutional claims. See 722 S.W.3d at 445. The
court of appeals expressly declined to “determine the merits of
[plaintiffs’] constitutional arguments at this stage of the proceeding.”
Id. In doing so, the court acknowledged this Court’s decision in Klumb
but distinguished it on the basis that the plaintiffs there challenged the

10
constitutionality of governmental actions rather than, as here, a statute.
See id. (citing Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 3–4). In essence, the court of
appeals concluded it was unnecessary to evaluate the facial validity of
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims because they challenge a statute instead
of merely alleging that the defendants acted ultra vires—i.e., outside the
bounds of their lawful authority. See, e.g., Matzen, 659 S.W.3d at 388.
We agree with defendants that the court of appeals erred in
disregarding this critical analytical step. When, as here, a
governmental defendant asserts that it is immune from a claim
asserting a constitutional violation, Klumb requires courts to determine
whether the claim is facially valid. In Klumb, the plaintiffs alleged that
members of Houston’s pension board acted ultra vires and
unconstitutionally in restructuring contribution requirements for city
employees. 458 S.W.3d at 7. The pension board and its members
countered that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims because those claims were “facially invalid.” Id.
This Court agreed. First, it rejected the plaintiffs’ equal-
protection claims, stating that the claims “fail[ed] as a matter of law”
because “the board’s actions [we]re rationally related to at least two
legitimate government objectives which [we]re promoted by the
challenged classification.” Id. at 14. Second, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ due-course challenge because a prior dispositive decision
foreclosed the legal theory they pleaded. See id. at 15–17. The
consequence of these holdings was that the plaintiffs “failed to plead
actionable . . . constitutional claims,” and thus subject matter
jurisdiction over those claims was “lacking as a matter of law.” Id. at

11
17. Klumb did not turn on whether the plaintiffs challenged a statute
or conduct they alleged was ultra vires.
Since Klumb, this Court has undertaken the same analysis when
a plaintiff challenges a statute as unconstitutional. In Abbott v. Mexican
American Legislative Caucus, the plaintiffs challenged statutes that
reapportioned legislative districts. 647 S.W.3d 681, 687–88 (Tex. 2022).
The defendants asserted immunity in pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing
that the plaintiffs failed to establish an immunity waiver because their
constitutional claims were not “viable.” Id. at 688.
We concluded immunity was waived as to one constitutional
claim. Id. at 700. But we rejected another claim, explaining that the
plaintiffs’ reading of the constitutional provision at issue was not
supported by its text, context, or case law. Id. at 701–03. This latter
claim, we held, was “facially invalid and thus barred by sovereign
immunity.” Id. at 703.
More recently, in State v. Zurawski, we examined the validity of
claims raising constitutional challenges to the Human Life Protection
Act. See 690 S.W.3d at 661. At the outset, we reaffirmed that the UDJA
does not waive immunity for any and all claims against the government.
Id. at 660–61. Rather, we explained that “to obtain declaratory relief
against the government, it is necessary to show that the challenged law
is invalid because it is unconstitutional, preempted by superior
governing law, or barred for some similar reason.” Id. at 661.
We went on to examine whether the plaintiffs’ allegations—that
the Act violated the Texas Constitution’s due-course and equal-
protection guarantees—had merit. In doing so, we analyzed what those

12
who ratified the due-course clause in 1845 would have understood its
language to mean. Id. at 666–67. We ultimately dismissed the due-
course claim because the allegations did not demonstrate a viable
constitutional challenge to the Act. See id. at 668–69. We also rejected
the equal-protection challenge because the “record [did] not demonstrate
that the Act lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.” Id. at 671.
The court of appeals in this case, however, distinguished Klumb—
and determined no facial validity analysis was needed—because the
plaintiffs in Klumb challenged governmental conduct, whereas plaintiffs
here contend that the statutes codifying HB 2623 are themselves
unconstitutional. See 722 S.W.3d at 445. Our recent cases demonstrate
that this distinction does not hold up. Although the court of appeals did
not have the benefit of Zurawski, many other cases embrace the
principle we emphasize today: “immunity from suit is not waived if the
constitutional claims are facially invalid.” Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus,
647 S.W.3d at 698 (quoting Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 13); see also Matzen,
659 S.W.3d at 394 (explaining that “when sovereign immunity is
asserted,” the plaintiff has the “burden to plead facts that affirmatively
state a viable claim”); Andrade v. NAACP of Aus., 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.
2011) (stating that a governmental defendant “retains immunity from
suit unless the [plaintiffs] have pleaded a viable claim”). Whether such
claims are premised on allegedly unconstitutional governmental
conduct or allegedly unconstitutional statutes is immaterial.
The court of appeals was thus obligated to determine whether
plaintiffs’ claims are facially valid. Although we could remand for the

13
court of appeals to evaluate facial validity, in the interest of judicial
economy, we will exercise our discretion to address the question here.
See RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116, 124 (Tex. 2018)
(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4); Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g,
Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 495 (Tex. 2017) (“The parties have briefed and
argued the issue here, so in the interest of judicial economy we will
address it rather than remanding to the court of appeals.”).
B
We have described the task of addressing a constitutional claim’s
facial validity as a “jurisdictional inquiry [that] touches the merits.”
Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 699. And we have
emphasized that courts undertaking this analysis should “go no further
than necessary to determine jurisdiction,” id., and “address the
‘merits’ . . . only to the extent necessary to grant the opportunity to
replead,” id. at 700 n.9. See also Matzen, 659 S.W.3d at 394 (“[I]t is not
the [defendant]’s burden to show that the plaintiff could never state a
viable claim. Instead, it is the plaintiff’s burden to plead facts that
affirmatively state a viable claim.” (emphasis added)).
Here, the viability of plaintiffs’ challenge to HB 2623 is
“intertwined with” our interpretation of the constitutional provision
they invoke. See Zurawski, 690 S.W.3d at 661–62. So we examine
Section 33 in accordance with our principles of constitutional
interpretation to determine whether plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are
facially valid, which, in turn, determines whether defendants retain
immunity from suit. See Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 698
(explaining that whether “constitutional claims are facially invalid and

14
thus barred by immunity . . . hinges on our interpretation of the
provisions at issue”).
When interpreting the Constitution, “our bottom-line task is to
identify what the constitutional provision would have meant to those
who ratified it.” Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex.
2024). We “rely heavily on the literal text,” presume “the framers
carefully chose the language,” and “focus on the voters’
contemporaneous understanding” to identify “what the voters who
ratified the amendment would have understood it to mean.” Perez v.
City of San Antonio, 715 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Tex. 2025) (citations omitted).
We may also “consider contextual factors such as ‘the history of the
legislation, the conditions and spirit of the times, the prevailing
sentiments of the people, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good
to be accomplished.’” Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police & Fire Pension
Sys., 594 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist.
v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009)).
Because we take into account the historical context surrounding
the ratification of constitutional language, “we may consider evidence of
the contemporaneous explanations and understandings of the
legislature that proposed the language.” Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 716; see
also TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (describing the process for amending the
Constitution, which begins with a legislative proposal and ends with
majority approval by qualified voters). Whereas legislative history
accompanying a statute is “generally useless to courts,” we have
acknowledged that such history “can be relevant” to contextualize
constitutional ratification. Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 716 n.8 (citation

15
omitted). If historical context suggests that the framers chose words
that constitute “a legal term of art” or “carr[y] jurisprudential baggage
beyond [their] plain meaning,” we must factor such context into our
analysis. Hogan, 688 S.W.3d at 857, 858.
This Court has not yet had occasion to interpret Section 33. Cf.
Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 713 n.8 (acknowledging Section 33’s adoption
but noting it was “not at issue”). We also note that the text central to
our facial validity analysis—subsection (d)’s declaration that Section 33
“does not create a private right of enforcement”—is unique. TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 33(d). The phrase appears nowhere else in our Constitution or
our statutes. Unsurprisingly, the parties advance conflicting arguments
about what this language means.
In their jurisdictional pleas, defendants argued that
Section 33(d)’s declaration that it “does not create a private right of
enforcement” categorically precludes private-party claims seeking
Section 33(b)’s enforcement. Defendants assert that only governmental
actors may enforce Section 33 and that this reading harmonizes
subsection (d) with the Open Beaches Act’s longstanding enforcement
scheme. The logical endpoint of their claim that only governmental
actors may enforce Section 33 is that dismissal of the entire case is
warranted here, since all plaintiffs are private actors. 7
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they are private parties. Rather,
they respond that their suit is not a “private right of enforcement”

7 The Attorney General abandoned this argument in the court of
appeals, see 722 S.W.3d at 443 n.5, and does not press it in this Court. But the
GLO and Cameron County consistently pressed the argument in the courts
below and continue to do so in this Court.

16
because they do not seek damages or an injunction. For its part, the
court of appeals opined that the private right of enforcement referenced
in subsection (d) “would most likely take the form of an injunction
against a private entity, such as SpaceX, to prohibit their space flight
launches that lead to the closure of Boca Chica Beach.” 722 S.W.3d at
443. It is not clear whether the court of appeals concluded that a suit
must both be brought against a private party and seek injunctive relief
to fall within the scope of subsection (d). Regardless, we disagree with
the court’s conclusion because a request for injunctive relief is not
necessary to bring a claim within subsection (d)’s ambit and
subsection (d)’s applicability does not turn on whether the defendant is
a private actor.
To discern the meaning voters ascribed to subsection (d) when it
was ratified in 2009, we first consider the plain meaning of its text
according to contemporaneous sources. See Perez, 715 S.W.3d at
716–17. We begin by consulting dictionary definitions. See, e.g., id. at
718; In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 156–57 (Tex. 2024). “Private
right” means a “personal right, as opposed to a right of the public or the
state.” Private right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). “Public
right,” by contrast, means a “right belonging to all citizens and usu[ally]
vested in and exercised by a public office or political entity.” Public
right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). And “enforcement”
means the “act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate,
command, decree, or agreement.” Enforcement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also Enforcement, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (“the compelling of the fulfillment (as

17
of a law or order)”); Enforce, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY
(2001) (“compel observance of or compliance with (a law, rule, or
obligation)”).
As noted, the focal point of constitutional interpretation is how
voters contemporaneously understood the text. Within Section 33,
subsection (b) recognizes that the public has a right both “individually”
and “collectively” to access and use public beaches. TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 33(b). By contrast, subsection (d)’s proviso that the amendment “does
not create a private right of enforcement,” id. § 33(d) (emphasis added),
means Section 33 created no new personal right of enforcement for
private individuals. Instead, the plain meaning of the text suggests the
right to enforce Section 33 resides with public, or governmental, actors.
We next consult the background law that existed at the time of
Section 33’s adoption because, as a general matter, we “read the
constitutional text not in a vacuum but also through the lenses of history
and precedent.” Borgelt v. Aus. Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Loc. 975, 692
S.W.3d 288, 299 (Tex. 2024); see also Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 716 n.8
(collecting cases in which this Court looked to the drafters’
understanding of related law in interpreting the Constitution). Our
attention to context is especially important where, as here, the
constitutional text indicates that it was adopted with reference to
preexisting law. That Section 33 does not “create” a private right of
enforcement points our attention to the enforcement rights that were
already in place regarding open beaches—rights that would remain
unchanged after the amendment’s passage according to its text.

18
We thus turn to examine the law that existed at the time of
Section 33’s ratification—the Open Beaches Act itself. Our conclusion
above regarding the plain meaning of Section 33’s text coheres with the
Act’s preexisting enforcement scheme. The Act authorizes—indeed,
mandates—governmental enforcement of open beaches. For example,
the Act states that the GLO’s commissioner “shall strictly and
vigorously enforce the prohibition against encroachments on and
interferences with the public beach easement” and “shall promulgate
rules” on related matters. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.011(c), (d).
Further, the commissioner “may order the removal of a structure,
improvement, obstruction, barrier, or hazard from a public beach.” Id.
§ 61.0183(a). The Act also commands local governments to “adopt a plan
for preserving and enhancing access to and use of public beaches within
the[ir] jurisdiction” when private development is sought near the beach.
Id. § 61.015(a). And in a section titled “Enforcement,” the Act authorizes
“[a]ny county attorney, or the attorney general at the request of the
commissioner, [to] bring a suit for a declaratory judgment to try any
issue affecting the public’s right of access to or use of the public beach.”
Id. § 61.018(d) (emphasis added).
In contrast to several provisions vesting responsibility for the
Act’s enforcement with governmental actors, the Act contains a single
provision authorizing suits by private parties. Section 61.019 permits
property owners whose rights are affected by the Act to bring a
declaratory-judgment action against the State. Id. § 61.019. Notably,

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plaintiffs here allege no injury falling within this narrow category of
permitted private suits. 8
In short, the Act includes just one provision authorizing
private-plaintiff suits against the State in a particular scenario, and it
is inapplicable here. By contrast, multiple provisions authorize and
require governmental enforcement of the Act. Thus, Section 33’s
statement that it “does not create a private right of enforcement,” TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 33(d) (emphasis added), signals the framers’
understanding that the Act’s existing enforcement scheme, involving
almost exclusively governmental actors, would continue after
Section 33’s ratification.
Beyond considering text and context, we also consult
contemporaneous public sources to discern original public meaning. See,
e.g., Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 722 (citing a newspaper editorial to determine
public understanding of a constitutional amendment). Our research has
revealed only one contemporaneous publication that referenced
subsection (d), and it supports our interpretation. A 2009 editorial in
the Corpus Christi Caller–Times analyzed the proposed constitutional
amendment and warned voters of subsection (d)’s important caveat that
“enforcement . . . still would be the responsibility of authorities.”
Editorial, Yes on Prop. 9, with a couple reservations, CORPUS CHRISTI
CALLER–TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at 8A. In a similar vein, the House
Research Organization, which publishes reports on proposed

8 Although SaveRGV’s petition identifies a member who owned property

near Boca Chica Beach and alleges that the beach closures “impacted her
ability to use and enjoy her home,” she did not sue to determine her property
rights and eventually “s[old] her property and move[d] elsewhere.”

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constitutional amendments, noted supporters’ belief that Section 33
“would not change current practices,” H. Rsch. Org., Focus Report
No. 81-8, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2009)—the current practices being those set out
under the Open Beaches Act, which vested enforcement authority with
the State and local governments, save the one inapplicable provision
noted above.
To sum up, text, context, and contemporaneous sources all point
in the same direction: Section 33 constitutionalized the public’s right to
beach access, but it did not expand or confer on private citizens a right
of enforcement or otherwise alter the preexisting enforcement scheme,
which resided with governmental actors alone.
Plaintiffs respond that we must allow their suit to proceed
because of Section 33’s placement in Article I—our Constitution’s Bill of
Rights. This placement is critical, they argue, because constitutional
guarantees located within the Bill of Rights are self-executing and thus
invoke the judicial power to declare contrary laws void. To support this
argument, plaintiffs cite City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143
(Tex. 1995). In Bouillion, former officers of the Beaumont Police
Department sued the city, alleging they were punished for exercising
their free-speech and assembly rights when they disclosed the
Department’s legal violations to the press. Id. at 144–45. The officers
asked this Court to “recognize an implied private right of action for
damages” for constitutional violations, akin to the “federal Bivens-type
cause of action.” Id. at 146; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (authorizing suits
for damages against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations);

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 (authorizing suits against state officials for
constitutional violations).
This Court declined to recognize such a claim. Not only was there
“no historical basis to create the remedy sought,” the Court reasoned,
but “the text of the Texas Bill of Rights cuts against an implied private
right of action for the damages sought because it explicitly announces
the consequences of unconstitutional laws.” Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at
148. “When a law conflicts with rights guaranteed by Article 1,” the
Court explained, “the Constitution declares that such acts are void
because the Bill of Rights is a limit on State power.” Id. at 149.
Bouillion described this principle as emanating from Article I,
Section 29 of our Constitution, which states:
To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein
delegated, we declare that every thing in this “Bill of
Rights” is excepted out of the general powers of
government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all
laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall
be void.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 29; see also Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina
Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Tex. 2023) (“[T]he Bill of
Rights expressly provides for an equitable action to declare a law void.”).
We agree that Bouillion stands for the general principle that
private citizens can seek to declare statutes conflicting with Article I
void—subject, of course, to other legal obstacles any given case may
present. But we disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that Section 33’s
placement in Article I means that it, too, automatically invokes the
judicial power to award equitable relief from unconstitutional statutes.
Section 33 diverges from other Bill of Rights provisions by including

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express language that “[t]his section does not create a private right of
enforcement.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(d) (emphasis added).
We must give meaning, first and foremost, to subsection (d)’s text
and consider the backdrop of the Open Beaches Act against which that
constitutional provision was adopted. See, e.g., Oakley v. State, 830
S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[T]hose who are called on to
construe the Constitution should not thwart the will of the people by
construing it differently from its plain meaning.”). We cannot ignore
that the People disclaimed private enforcement suits when they enacted
Section 33—after Bouillion was decided—to create new constitutional
rights. Cf. BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d
76, 86 (Tex. 2017) (“Separation of powers demands that judge-
interpreters be sticklers . . . about not rewriting statutes under the
guise of interpreting them.”).
* * *
Section 33’s plain text and the historical and legislative context
in which it was adopted together compel our conclusion that
subsection (d) bars these private plaintiffs’ claims. We thus hold that
plaintiffs’ claims are facially invalid. 9 This jurisdictional defect—the
fact that plaintiffs are private, not governmental, actors—cannot be

9 Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims are facially invalid for a

second, independent reason: HB 2623 is a constitutional exercise of the State’s
police power. Because the jurisdictional challenge based on subsection (d) is
dispositive, we express no view on whether the beach closures, or the statutes
permitting them, violate the public’s “unrestricted” right described in
Section 33(b). See, e.g., Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 868 (“When defendants
challenge jurisdiction on multiple grounds, courts are . . . not duty-bound to
address them all if any one of them warrants dismissal . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).

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cured on remand. Rather, these pleadings “conclusively negate the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 17; see
also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 (“If the pleadings affirmatively negate
the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be
granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.”).
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the case with prejudice. 10
III. Conclusion
The court of appeals erred in concluding it was unnecessary to
examine whether plaintiffs alleged a facially valid constitutional claim
before determining whether the UDJA waives defendants’ immunity.
Determining whether a plaintiff’s constitutional claim is facially valid is
a prerequisite to answering whether immunity bars the suit. Here,
plaintiffs’ claims challenging HB 2623 as violative of Article I,
Section 33 are facially invalid because they constitute an attempted
“private right of enforcement,” which Section 33(d) forecloses. We
reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s
judgment dismissing all claims for lack of jurisdiction.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 19, 2026

10 We acknowledge that the Tribe’s allegations allude to a different kind

of injury the beach closures may inflict on its members: interference with their
religious practices. Today’s holding should not be construed to prohibit the
Tribe—or private parties generally—from seeking relief for such injuries they
suffer due to HB 2623. We hold only that Section 33 cannot serve as the basis
for that relief.

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