RENTERIA, DAVID SANTIAGO v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. AP-77,118

EX PARTE DAVID SANTIAGO RENTERIA, Applicant

ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER ARTICLE I, § 12 OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION AND TEXAS CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11.05 AND MOTION TO STAY THE
EXECUTION IN CAUSE NO. 20020D00230
FROM THE 327TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EL PASO COUNTY

Per curiam. YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

Applicant appeals from a trial court order denying relief on the claims raised in his

Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under Article I, § 12 of the Texas Constitution

and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05.1 He also asks this Court to stay his

execution pending this appeal. Applicant presents four points of error. After reviewing

the issues, we find Applicant’s points to be without merit. Consequently, we affirm the

1
References to Articles in this opinion are to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
unless otherwise specified.
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trial court’s order denying relief.

I. Background

Applicant was convicted and sentenced to death in September 2003 for the capital

murder of five-year-old Alexandra Flores. See TEX. PENAL CODE §19.03(a). This Court

affirmed Applicant’s conviction on direct appeal, but reversed his death sentence. See

Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Applicant received a new punishment trial in 2008, and a jury again answered the

punishment questions in a manner requiring the judge to sentence him to death. This

Court affirmed his sentence on direct appeal. See Renteria v. State, No. AP-74,829 (Tex.

Crim. App. May 4, 2011) (not designated for publication).

This Court also denied relief on the claims raised in Applicant’s initial habeas

application and his initial habeas application after the punishment retrial. See generally

Art. 11.071; see also Ex parte Renteria, No. WR-65,627-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17,

2014) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Renteria, Nos. WR-65,627-02 and -03

(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2014) (not designated for publication). We further declared

several guilt/innocence points raised in the -02 writ application to constitute a subsequent

application and dismissed those allegations as an abuse of the writ. Renteria, Nos. WR-

65,627-02 and -03. And this Court dismissed Applicant’s most recent subsequent writ

application as an abuse of the writ. Ex parte Renteria, No. WR-65,627-05 (Tex. Crim.

App. Nov. 15, 2023) (not designated for publication).
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II. The Original Writ Application Filed in the Trial Court

In Applicant’s original writ application filed in the trial court, he raised three

claims. First, Applicant asserted that the manner in which Texas officials intend to carry

out his execution would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Specifically, he asserted that, among other reasons, the Director refused to

take precautions against “torture, ill treatment, or unnecessary pain” caused by the use of

adulterated pentobarbital.2 Second, Applicant complained that the Director’s “purposeful,

unnecessary, and unlawful use of degraded, adulterated chemicals” for executions

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Lastly, Applicant complained that the setting and resetting of his execution date violated

his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

III. The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court noted the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Glossip in which

that Court held that “prisoners cannot successfully challenge a method of execution

unless they establish that the method presents a risk that is ‘sure or very likely to cause

serious illness and needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”

Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 877 (2015). The trial court concluded that Applicant had

only provided speculation regarding his claims and therefore had failed to meet the

threshold requirement for relief. The trial court accordingly denied relief.

2
The “Director” is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ).
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IV. Applicant’s Arguments on Appeal and the Court’s Analysis

In his first point of error, Applicant contends that the trial court denied him due

process of law “when it purported to adjudicate his claims by merely copying verbatim

the text of an order from a different case in which [Applicant] was not a party, was not

served with either the petition or the response, and that raised different claims under

different legal theories and with different facts and evidence.” Although the trial court

may have worded its order somewhat inartfully and included a recitation of some claims

not actually raised in Applicant’s writ application, the order was not wrong in its ultimate

conclusion. The trial court properly found that Applicant had provided only speculation

concerning his claims and, thus, he had failed to meet the threshold requirement for relief.

Further, Applicant’s conclusory statements—that the trial court failed to consider the

claims he raised—are unsupported. Point of error one is overruled.

In his second and third points of error, Applicant asserts that the Director’s acts

and omissions have deprived him of due process of law. More particularly, Applicant

argues that Texas law requires the Director to refrain from acting in a manner that causes

him to suffer cruel and unusual punishment. Applicant asserts that the law requires the

Director to choose a “substance or substances” that can be injected in a “lethal quantity

sufficient to cause death.” He contends the Director’s practices in procuring, storing, and

using the substances (compounded pentobarbital) violate laws prohibiting “the infliction

of torture, ill treatment, and unnecessary pain on people who have been sentenced to
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death.” Applicant also argues that the Director is “deliberately indifferent” to laws

prohibiting the torture, ill treatment, and infliction of unnecessary pain on death-

sentenced inmates. But Applicant’s allegations are unsupported. Without more,

Applicant has failed to make a prima facie showing that any condemned inmate has been

subjected to cruel and unusual punishment from the use of pentobarbital, much less that

Applicant himself will be. Points of error two and three are overruled.

In his fourth point of error, Applicant contends that the trial court violated his right

to due process and equal protection by setting, vacating, and resetting his execution

without the 90 days notice he is entitled to under Texas law. Applicant’s argument lacks

merit. The trial court in June set Applicant’s November execution date. In late August,

the trial court vacated the date, but the State succeeded in getting the November date

restored by securing mandamus relief from this Court. See In re State of Texas ex rel. Bill

D. Hicks, No. WR-95,092-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2023) (not designated for

publication). Our grant of mandamus held that the trial court had withdrawn the

execution date without authority. Therefore, we ordered the reinstatement of the original

setting for which Applicant had received proper notice. Applicant’s fourth point of error

is overruled.

V. Conclusion

Finding no reversible error in the proceedings below, we affirm the trial court’s

order denying relief on Applicant’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under Article
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I, § 12 of the Texas Constitution and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05.

No motions for rehearing will be entertained and the Clerk is instructed to immediately

issue mandate. Applicant’s motion to stay his execution is denied.

Delivered: November 16, 2023
Do Not Publish