Triple G Ventures LLC and Robert D. Smith v. Thomas Wang, Aaron Boesky, Sharon So, and AT Gekko, LLC

Opinion issued August 28, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00634-CV
———————————
TRIPLE G VENTURES LLC AND ROBERT D. SMITH, Appellants
V.
THOMAS WANG, AARON BOESKY, SHARON SO, AND AT GEKKO,
LLC, Appellees

On Appeal from the 190th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-09695

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Triple G Ventures and Robert D. Smith sued nonresidents

Thomas Wang, Aaron Boesky, Sharon So, and AT Gekko, LLC for breach of

contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and breach of the Securities

Act of 1933 based on an investment transaction. The appellants maintain that the
trial court has personal jurisdiction over the nonresident appellees because they

reached out to Texas residents to solicit investment in a risky business deal.

The appellees assert that the parties’ communications about the investment

arose fortuitously. They argue that the jurisdictional evidence does not show either

that they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in

Texas or that the appellants’ claims are related to the appellees’ contacts with

Texas. Thus, the appellees maintain that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is not

proper in this case. The trial court agreed with the appellees, and so do we.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the appellees’ special

appearance and dismissal of all the appellants’ claims against them.

Background

I. Wang and Boesky raise capital for a small clean-energy company.

Heliogen was a privately-held, California-based clean energy company that

was incorporated in Delaware. Heliogen was founded by Bill Gross, “one of the

world’s most successful entrepreneurs,” and backed by private investors, including

Microsoft Corporation co-founder, Bill Gates. In early 2021, Heliogen sought to

raise $75 million through a Simple Agreement for Future Equity (“SAFE”).

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Heliogen was also planning to go public, possibly through a merger with a special

purpose acquisition company, or “SPAC.”1

Investors Thomas Wang, who lives in Puerto Rico, and Aaron Boesky, who

lives in Hong Kong, have experience in startup technology companies, venture

capital, asset management, and hedge fund management. In order to invest in

Heliogen, Wang and Boesky created two companies: A. T. Gekko, LLC (“AT

Gekko”) and AT Gekko SPV1, LLC (“SPV1”). Both were Delaware corporations,

with their principal place of business in Pennsylvania. AT Gekko was the manager

of SPV1 and provided investment and investment-related services to SPV1.2 Wang

and Boesky planned to raise over $10 million in the Heliogen SPV, which they

hoped would realize a positive return by selling shares of stock when Heliogen

eventually went public.

AT Gekko would receive a standard 2% up-front fee for management, and

SPV1 retained a 20% carried interest in distributions. All investors in SPV1 signed

both an LLC Agreement and a Subscription Agreement. Wang and Boesky, on

behalf of AT Gekko, solicited investments in SPV1 based on an offering memo

1
Heliogen merged with Athena Technology Acquisition Corp. (the ‘SPAC’) on
December 30, 2021. The merged company was also called “Heliogen.”
2
Sharon So, who also lived in Hong Kong was the executive assistant for AT
Gekko.
3
that explained the investment opportunity, the details of the investment scheme, its

risks, and their conflicts of interest.

II. Wang and Boesky meet Smith and Casey, who decide to invest in SPV1.

Early 2021, Chris Zaber introduced his childhood friend, Wang, to his

colleague, Robert Smith, who lives in Dallas, Texas.3 Zaber connected them

because they both collect sports cards. Smith and Wang began communicating by

telephone, text, email, and WhatsApp.

According to Smith, their conversations “quickly turned to [Wang’s] new

venture, which was raising money for a company called Heliogen.” In his

deposition,4 Smith testified that it was possible that he had asked Wang about his

business. Smith was interested in investing in Heliogen; Wang introduced Smith to

Boesky; and all of them discussed the opportunity.

Smith and Wang had a text conversation about the investment on February

15, 2021. Wang told Smith that he had increased his personal investment to “1m”

based on information he received that the SPAC merger would occur “probably in

4-6 weeks instead of 3-6 months.” Smith asked where “the entity” was based, what

its “take” was, and Wang’s relationship to it. Wang told him that it was in

3
The limited jurisdictional evidence does not demonstrate exactly when Zaber
introduced Smith and Wang.
4
The trial court permitted jurisdictional discovery, including limited party
depositions.
4
Pittsburgh, the “take” was “2/20,” and that he was a partner in the “entity.” Wang

also told Smith, “It’s oversubscribed, if you want less or back out it’s ok. There is

[sic] people that actually want more right now.” Smith then asked Wang how

confident he was that Heliogen would IPO “trading publicly in the next 6 months”

and whether he would be able to sell the shares as he wished once it was public.

Wang told him that he was confident enough that he was “putting in 1m,” but he

cautioned Smith, “If you’re concerned you don’t have to invest[.] I don’t want you

to feel like you need to.” Wang twice told Smith that he would be able to sell his

shares “after the lockup.” Finally, Smith told Wang that his friend, Kevan Casey,

also wanted to invest $200K, and he gave Wang Casey’s email.

About twenty minutes later, according to the text message and email time

stamps, Wang sent an email to Smith, Casey, and Sharon So, the executive

assistant for AT Gekko. In the email, Wang directed So to send Casey “documents

for Heliogen investment.” Less than 24 hours later, Casey sent to Wang and So, by

email, signed copies of the Subscription Agreement and the SPV1 LLC agreement,

both of which were required for investment in SPV1.5 Casey signed on behalf of

“Triple G Ventures, LLC,” a Wyoming company that Casey used for investment

5
In his deposition, Casey said that he first heard about AT Gekko from Smith in
2021, and that he may have spoken to Smith multiple times before having an
introductory call with Boesky. Casey said that Boesky later pursued him to work
as an investment consultant. Casey funded Triple G’s SPV1 investment from a
“Texas” Bank of America account because although he was semi-retired, he
considered Texas his principal place of business for investing through Triple G.
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purposes. In the transmittal email, Casey stated: “[Smith] emailed these to me and I

filled them out. Please confirm you have everything that you need. Upon receipt of

the countersigned docs then I will immediately wire. Thanks!” That same day,

February 16, 2021, Smith signed both the subscription agreement and the SPV1

LLC agreement.

Smith’s signed documents showed a Dallas, Texas address, and Triple G’s

documents (signed by Casey) showed a Houston, Texas address, even though

Triple G is registered in Wyoming, and its articles of organization list an address in

Cheyenne, Wyoming as its principal office. Smith, individually, and Casey, acting

for Triple G, each indicated that they wished to purchase 200 units of SPV1 for a

total cost of $200,000 each. Wang countersigned the SPV1 LLC agreement on

February 23, 2021.

III. Heliogen share prices drop before SPV1 distributes shares, and Smith
and Triple G file suit.

The SPAC merger closed in December 2021, but AT Gekko did not

distribute shares of Heliogen to Smith and Triple G immediately. The jurisdictional

evidence demonstrates that there were emails and other communications in late

December and early January, many of which concerned the existence and timing of

a lockup, a period when certain early investors and insiders would not be permitted

to trade shares of Heliogen. By the time Triple G and Smith received their shares

of the merged Heliogen stock, the price per share had dropped below their initial

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investment. They sold the stock at a loss and sued appellees Wang, Boesky, AT

Gekko, and So, none of whom are Texas residents. Triple G and Smith alleged that

AT Gekko improperly waited to distribute their shares of Heliogen after it went

public in order to maximize the 20% carried interest; that Wang, Boesky, and So

made fraudulent statements about a lockup; and that AT Gekko did not properly

calculate the fees it collected on Triple G and Smith’s investment in SPV1.

Triple G and Smith asserted that the court had personal jurisdiction over the

appellees because they had reached out to Texas residents—Smith and Casey—to

solicit investment in SPV1. Appellants rely on numerous communications, some

allegedly fraudulent, about this investment to support the trial court’s exercise of

specific personal jurisdiction.

In a verified special appearance, the appellees argued that the inception of

the investment arrangement was fortuitous, growing out of discussions between

Wang and Smith over an unrelated shared interest. The appellees denied that any

of their activities created a substantial connection with Texas, and they argued that

assertion of personal jurisdiction would not comport with traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice. The appellees supported their special appearance with

jurisdictional evidence that included:

• excerpts from jurisdictional depositions of Casey, Smith, and So;

• emails among Wang, So, AT Gekko, Casey, and Smith about Smith and
Triple G’s investment, the lockup period, and distribution of shares;
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• a redacted statement for Triple G’s Bank of America checking account,
which showed a Delaware business address for Bank of America, a
Florida customer service address for Bank of America, and a Texas
address for Triple G;

• copies of the SPV1 LLC agreement and subscription agreement signed by
Smith and by Casey on behalf of Triple G and providing, in part, for
communications by email, the application of Delaware law, and Smith’s
and Triple G’s addresses;

• signature and execution pages for the subscription and LLC agreements
showing Wang’s countersignature on behalf of AT Gekko;

• a Confidential Private Placement Memorandum, summarizing the deal,
including risks and conflicts of interest;

• the plaintiffs’ second amended petition;

• text messages between Smith and Wang; and

• the Articles of Organization for Triple G, showing its registration and
principal place of business in Wyoming.

Smith and Triple G supported their response with jurisdictional evidence,

including:

• excerpts from depositions of Smith, Casey, Boesky, and Wang, who
testified as a representative of AT Gekko;

• a declaration from Bill Gross about the Heliogen investment and the
SPAC merger; and

• emails about the SPV1 investment, the lockup, and distribution of shares,
as well as an email from Boesky to Casey in March 2021 about working
together in the future; and email from April 2021 from So to Boesky and
Wang, copied to Smith, about a potential investment in SPV2 for a
different company, Turntide Technologies;

• the SPV1 distribution notice;

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• and duplicate copies of documents attached to the appellees’ verified
special appearance.

Granting the special appearance, the trial court agreed with the appellees. On

appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Triple G and Smith’s claims, so do we.

The appellees’ communications with Casey and Smith do not establish minimum

contacts and the jurisdictional evidence supports a conclusion that there is not a

substantial connection between the underlying facts of the claims and the State of

Texas. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Analysis

The sole question presented in this case is whether the trial court erred by

granting the appellees’ special appearance. The answer to this question depends

entirely on whether personal jurisdiction over the appellees exists here. Triple G

and Smith alleged only specific personal jurisdiction, so we focus our analysis on

that.

I. We review a court’s ruling on a special appearance de novo.

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question

of law we review de novo, although the court may have to resolve questions of

fact. BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, No. 23-0756, 2025 WL 1727903, at *3

(Tex. June 20, 2025) (citing Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d

550, 558 (Tex. 2018)); see also LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341,

346 (Tex. 2023). When a trial court does not issue findings of fact when ruling on

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a special appearance, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by

the record are implied. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789,

795 (Tex. 2002). These implied findings may be challenged on appeal for legal and

factual sufficiency in the same way an appellate court reviews findings of fact at

trial. Bryan v. Gordon, 384 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2012, no pet.).

II. A shifting burden applies when personal jurisdiction is challenged.

Initially, the plaintiff has the burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring

the nonresident defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute. LG Chem, 670

S.W.3d at 346. A nonresident defendant may then challenge a Texas court’s

personal jurisdiction over it by filing a special appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.

The nonresident defendant must then negate all alleged bases of personal

jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis. LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346. Both

the defendant in its special appearance and the plaintiff in its response may support

their arguments with jurisdictional evidence. Id.

III. A court must consider several factors, notably the defendant’s actions,
when determining whether personal jurisdiction exists in a particular
case.

“A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding

judgment.” LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346. Texas courts may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident when (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the

10
exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with

federal due process guarantees. Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625

S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021). “Federal due-process requirements limit a state’s power

to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Moki Mac River

Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). “Personal jurisdiction is

proper when the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the

forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Personal jurisdiction may be general or, as is relevant to this case, specific.

See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358

(2021). A court exercising general personal jurisdiction may hear any and all

claims against a nonresident defendant. Id. “Specific jurisdiction is different: It

covers defendants less intimately connected with a [s]tate, but only as to a

narrower class of claims.” Id. at 359. A court exercising specific personal

jurisdiction may hear claims that arise out of or relate to the nonresident

defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Id. at 359–60 (quoting Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262

(2017)). In the context of specific personal jurisdiction, the “minimum contacts”

standard requires that (1) the nonresident defendant has purposefully availed itself

11
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, and (2) there exists a

“nexus between the nonresident defendant, the litigation, and the forum.” Luciano,

625 S.W.3d at 14 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579 (emphasis added)).

A. Purposeful Availment

We consider three factors to determine whether a nonresident defendant has

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas:

First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not
the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the
contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random,
fortuitous, or attenuated. Thus, sellers who reach out beyond one state
and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state are subject to the jurisdiction of the latter in suits based
on their activities. Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit,
advantage or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.

Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013)

(emphasis added) (quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278

S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tex. 2009)); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 473, 475 (1985). We consider all the evidence and focus on “the quality and

nature of the contacts, not the quantity.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151. With

respect to a particular claim, the defendant’s activities must be deliberate and

“justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called

into a Texas court.” Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801,

806 (Tex. 2002) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,

297 (1980)).

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Such deliberate activities could include exploiting a Texas market or

communications. See BRP Rotax, 2025 WL 1727903, at *4. When a plaintiff

alleges that communications are the basis for personal jurisdiction, a reviewing

court must consider the quality and nature of the communications to determine

whether they constitute purposeful availment. See Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at

560–61. “On their own, numerous telephone communications with people in Texas

do not establish minimum contacts . . . .” Id. at 560. And the Texas Supreme Court

has noted that “changes in technology may render reliance on phone calls obsolete

as proof of purposeful availment,” since a phone number no longer indicates

anything about the location of a person receiving a call. Id. Moreover, “the plaintiff

cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum,” and a proper

“minimum contacts analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state

itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v.

Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).

B. Nexus

The relatedness—or nexus—component of minimum contacts requires that

there be a connection between the nonresident defendant’s purposeful contacts

with Texas and the plaintiff’s suit. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14. The relatedness

inquiry requires that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with

the forum.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362. “[S]pecific jurisdiction requires us to

13
analyze jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis.” Moncrief Oil, 414

S.W.3d at 150 (citing Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 660

(Tex. 2010)). Due to the difference between general jurisdiction and specific

jurisdiction, “[i]f a defendant does not have enough contacts to justify the exercise

of general jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of

jurisdiction over any claim that does not arise out of or result from the defendant’s

forum contacts.” Id. (citing Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266,

274–75 (5th Cir. 2006)). “A court, however, need not assess contacts on a claim-

by-claim basis if all claims arise from the same forum contacts.” Id. at 150–51.

C. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

“Once minimum contacts have been established, we must still consider

whether, for other reasons, exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant

would nevertheless run afoul of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’” Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 18 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). “Only

in rare cases, however, will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play

and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposefully established

minimum contacts with the forum state.” Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868,

878 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng. China

Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex. 1991)). “We consider the nonresident

defendant’s contacts in light of (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of

14
the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining

convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in

obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest

of several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Luciano,

625 S.W.3d at 18

IV. The appellees did not have sufficient minimum contacts to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in Texas.

Triple G and Smith argue that the appellees had sufficient minimum contacts

with Texas based on their communications relating to the SPV1 investment, on

which they base their lawsuit. Considering only the appellees’ actions, we

disagree.

A. Defendants’ actions and the quality and nature of
communications do not demonstrate personal jurisdiction.

First, the appellants argue that the appellees communicated with them by

email, phone calls made to their Texas phones, and WhatsApp communications

and video conferencing when they were in Texas. They also argue that the

appellees sent documents to them in Texas. The jurisdictional evidence does not

demonstrate that any of the appellees knew of Smith, Casey, or Triple G’s

locations before they received the signed subscription agreements and

accompanying paperwork. In addition, the evidence shows that Triple G is not a

Texas company but a Wyoming company.

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Even if the appellees did know where the appellants were located, we must

consider the quality and nature of the communications. See Old Republic, 549

S.W.3d at 560. Smith testified that that his first couple of conversations with Wang

were about sports cards, and he said that he may have initiated a conversation with

Wang about his business. And the appellants concede that some of the

communications, after they signed the subscription agreements, were about having

a continuing business relationship or investment in other companies. The

appellants’ lawsuit does not arise out of or relate to sports cards, unrelated

investments, or a continuing business relationship. Thus, they do not support a

finding of specific personal jurisdiction. See Ford Motor Co, 592 U.S. at 359.

Appellants argue that they executed the documents in Texas and were

physically present in Texas when communicating with the appellees about the

SPV1 investment. But we do not consider the appellants’ actions in our analysis,

only the actions of the appellees. But it is only the defendant’s contacts with a

forum state that relevant to specific personal jurisdiction. See id.; Moncrief Oil

Int’l, 414 S.W.3d at 151.

The appellants argue that the appellees pursued them to pitch the investment

deal, upon which their lawsuit is based. Smith testified that that his first couple of

conversations with Wang were about sports cards, and he said that he may have

initiated a conversation with Wang about his business. The record establishes that

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Smith, not the appellees, initially pitched the idea to Casey, who forwarded a copy

of the LLC Agreement and the Subscription Agreement to the appellees, signed on

behalf of Triple G, before the appellees sent the documents to him. In addition, text

messages in the record show Wang dissuading Smith from investing if he had

misgivings. In short, the evidence supports a conclusion that the appellees did not

pursue the appellants seeking an investment but that the communication was

initially fortuitous and later consensual. Thus, this evidence does not show that the

appellees reached out to Texas to create continuing relationships with citizens of

Texas. See Moncrief Oil Int’l, 414 S.W.3d at 151.

B. The contracts did not create continuing obligations involving
multiple contracts over a long period of time.

Relying on Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985), the

appellants argue, however, that their contracts with the appellees are sufficient to

show minimum contacts because the contracts created continuing obligations

involving multiple contracts over many months related to Heliogen. This case is

not like Burger King. In Burger King, a Michigan defendant sought and entered

into a 20-year franchise agreement with Florida-based Burger King. 471 U.S. at

464–67. That agreement provided for ongoing receipt of “market research and

advertising assistance; ongoing training in restaurant management; and accounting,

cost-control, and inventory-control guidance.” Id. at 464–65.

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The SPV1 deal provided members with a passive investment giving them no

right to comment or control anything with regard to Heliogen, and the deal

contemplated that the investment would be liquidated by distribution and sale of

shares of stock after Heliogen went public. The Supreme Court has held that an

individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot establish personal

jurisdiction. Id. at 478. Here, the limited prior negotiations, as evidenced by the

text messages in the record, and the limited anticipated future consequences of the

contracts do not support a conclusion that the parties’ contracts provide the

minimum contacts necessary for specific personal jurisdiction. See id. at 479.

C. Neither the alleged fraudulent nature of the communications nor
communications with other parties supports specific personal
jurisdiction.

Triple G and Smith argue that the appellants had sufficient minimum

contacts with Texas to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction because their

suit is based on the appellants’ allegedly fraudulent statements. We cannot conflate

the jurisdictional inquiry with the underlying merits of the case. See Old Republic,

549 S.W.3d at 560. “Jurisdiction cannot turn on whether a defendant denies

wrongdoing—as virtually all will. Nor can it turn on whether a plaintiff merely

alleges wrongdoing—again as virtually all will.” Michiana Easy Livin’ Country,

Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 2005). The fact that the appellees’

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statements were allegedly fraudulent does not play a part in our specific

jurisdiction analysis. See id.

The appellants also argue that the appellees pursued continuing business

relationships and did business with other, unrelated parties in Texas. This

implicates the relatedness inquiry. See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14. Here, the

appellants have never argued or pleaded that the court has general personal

jurisdiction over the appellees. And in the absence of general jurisdiction, the

exercise of specific jurisdiction must be limited to those claims arising out of the

defendant’s forum contacts. Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150. The lawsuit in this

case alleges several causes of action based on the same underlying operative facts

related to the SPV1 investment, the timing of distribution of Heliogen shares, and

the fees paid to AT Gekko. Unrelated investment opportunities and unrelated

investors are just that: unrelated. Thus, those contacts cannot support the court’s

exercise of specific personal jurisdiction in this case. See id.

D. Appellees’ actions were directed at Texans, not Texas.

Finally, the appellants argue that the appellees directed their

communications to Texas, sent the LLC Agreement and Subscription Agreement to

them in Texas, profited from their investments in SPV1. We have explained that

the evidence does not show that the appellees knew that they were communicating

with anyone in Texas before they received the signed subscription agreements.

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That includes the transmittal of the LLC and Subscription Agreements. We find the

argument that the appellees profited from the SPV1 investment deal unhelpful to

the jurisdictional analysis because a proper “minimum contacts analysis looks to

the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts

with persons who reside there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. The Supreme Court has

held: “Common sense and everyday experience suggest that, absent unusual

circumstances, the bank on which a check is drawn is generally of little

consequence to the payee” and “is not an appropriate consideration when

determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to

justify an assertion of jurisdiction.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416–17 (1984). The record in this case does not show any such

unusual circumstances that make the source of the money used for the investments

an appropriate jurisdictional consideration. That is, the fact that the appellees

allegedly profited from the SPV1 deal, when Smith and Casey wired money from

bank accounts in Texas, is not a relevant jurisdictional contact.

Conclusion

Considering the evidence and arguments as a whole, we conclude that

appellees lack the minimum contacts necessary for a court to exercise specific

personal jurisdiction in this case. Because we conclude that the appellees have not

established minimum contacts with Texas, we do not need to consider whether the

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exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575; TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. We

hold that the trial court did not err by granting the special appearance and

dismissing the appellants’ suit against the appellees.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.

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