Jonathan James Luna v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued November 13, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00211-CR
———————————
JONATHAN JAMES LUNA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 10th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-2483

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant Jonathan James Luna of continuous violence

against the family. TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.11. The trial court assessed appellant’s

punishment at six years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. In a
single issue on appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting

extraneous offense evidence against him.

We affirm.

Background

Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction, only a brief recitation of facts is necessary to the

disposition of this appeal. Appellant was accused of assaulting two complainants

within a 12-month period, namely, his wife, Kelly-Anne, and son, J.L.1

The charged allegation with respect to Kelly-Anne was that appellant hit her

with a broom on or about October 5, 2022. The charged allegation with respect to

J.L. was that appellant slapped J.L. in the face and shoved him on or about July 3,

2023.

Prior to trial, the State sought preliminary rulings as to the admissibility of a

long history of alleged assaults by appellant against Kelly-Anne, relying on article

38.3712 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Appellant did not object to the

1
We use a pseudonym to refer to the minor complainant. See TEX. R. APP. P.
9.10(a)(3).
2
The court reporter transcribed these arguments as referencing article “38.37(1),”
and appellant correctly argues that article 38.37 is not applicable to this type of
case. Based on the context of the arguments in the record, however, we conclude
that the parties are discussing article 38.371, which applies in domestic violence
cases, and that the appearance of article “38.37(1)” in the record is the product of
typographical errors.

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admission of this evidence, responding, “Judge, as noted, it’s been a long history

between the complainant and the defendant. She also has arrests and convictions

for assaulting him. So, I think it would go both ways on that, Judge.” The trial

court ruled, as a preliminary matter, that the history of alleged assaults would be

generally admissible. Appellant did not make any objections during trial to the

testimony regarding the prior alleged, unadjudicated assaults.

During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the State sought to admit evidence

of appellant’s prior convictions for assaulting Kelly-Anne. This time, appellant

objected to the admission of previously adjudicated offenses, elaborating that their

admission “would unfairly prejudice the defendant, and it would not have

probative value as to the indictment we’re going to trial on.” The trial court ruled

that the prior judgments would be admissible. Appellant renewed his objection

before the prior judgments were admitted into evidence at trial, which objection the

trial court overruled.

The jury charge included the following language regarding extraneous

allegations:

You are further instructed that if there is any evidence before you in
this case regarding the defendant having engaged in conduct or acts
other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in this
case, you cannot consider such evidence for any purpose unless you
find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
engaged in such conduct or acts, if any, and even then you may only
consider the same in determining the intent, motive, common scheme,

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or plan of the defendant, if any, in connection with the offense, if any,
alleged against him in the indictment and for no other purpose.

The jury found appellant guilty of continuous violence against the family, as

charged in the indictment. The trial court assessed punishment at six years’

imprisonment.

Extraneous Offense Evidence

Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of extraneous offense

evidence against him at trial.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Valadez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 133, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022);

McDonnell v. State, 674 S.W.3d 694, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023,

no pet.). We will not reverse the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Valadez, 663 S.W.3d at 143; McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at

701. We must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct under any

theory of law applicable to the case. Fish v. State, 609 S.W.3d 170, 181 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d); Price v. State, 502 S.W.3d 278, 283

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

B. Preservation of Error

Before addressing the merits of an issue on appeal, an appellate court should

consider whether the issue has been preserved, regardless of whether preservation

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has been raised by the parties. Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 327-28 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show

that an objection was made to the trial court, that the grounds for relief were stated

with enough specificity, and that the trial court ruled upon the objection. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a); Schmidt v. State, 612 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). The party must explain to the trial court what he wants and

why he thinks he is entitled to it, and do so clearly enough for the judge to

understand it and at a time when the trial court is in a position to do something

about it. Singleton v. State, 631 S.W.3d 213, 217-18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

On this record, appellant objected to the prior judgments of adjudicated

assaults against Kelly-Anne both at the pretrial conference and once the judgments

were offered into evidence. Both times, the trial court ruled on his objections. Any

error in admitting those judgments of conviction in guilt-innocence was preserved

for our review. Singleton, 631 S.W.3d at 217-18.

However, appellant did not object during the pretrial conference or during

the complainants’ testimony at trial to the admission of testimonial evidence that

appellant was assaultive toward the complainants or that he had committed prior

assaults against the complainants. Any purported error in the admission of this

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testimony from Kelly-Anne and J.L. is therefore not preserved for our review. TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

C. The Evidence Was Properly Admitted

Evidence of a defendant’s prior extraneous offenses is typically inadmissible

“[b]ecause our system of justice recognizes that a defendant should be tried only

for the charged crime and not for his criminal propensities.” Moses v. State, 105

S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). But extraneous-offense evidence may

nevertheless be admissible if it is relevant to a material issue other than the

defendant’s criminal propensities and its probative value is not outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. See Valadez, 663 S.W.3d at 143.

Evidence of a person’s character trait is not admissible to prove that on a

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait. TEX.

R. EVID. 404(a)(1). Likewise, evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not

admissible to prove a person’s character to show that on a particular occasion the

person acted in accordance with the character. Id. R. 404(b)(1). The evidence may

be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Id.

R. 404(b)(2).

In addition to rule 404(b), article 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure applies to proceedings in the prosecution of an accused for an offense

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for which the complainant shares a family, dating, or household member

relationship with the accused. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.371(a). In such a

case, each party may offer testimony or other evidence of all relevant facts and

circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor

committed the offense, including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of the

relationship between the actor and the complainant. Id. art. 38.371(b). However,

this statutory rule is still subject to the Texas Rules of Evidence. Id. The article

does not permit the presentation of character evidence that would otherwise be

inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law. Id. art.

38.371(c).

Types of relevant and admissible extraneous-offense evidence to which

article 38.371 applies and that serve non-character-conformity purposes in

compliance with rule 404(b) include evidence that: (1) explains why a complainant

of domestic violence is unwilling to cooperate with the prosecution, (2) confirms

the complainant’s initial–and later recanted–statements to police, or (3)

contextualizes the nature of the relationship between complainant and accused.

McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at 702.

We have previously held that evidence of extraneous assaults was

admissible to rebut a fabrication defense in an assault of a family member case. See

McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at 703. In McDonnell, the appellant initially successfully

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objected to the admission of any testimony or reference to other assaults or threats

against the complainant. Id. at 702. As trial progressed, the appellant began to

admit evidence to support his fabrication defense, in the form of emails from the

complainant. Id. After the State re-urged its motion to offer extraneous offense

evidence, arguing that the appellant’s fabrication defense had opened the door to

such evidence, the trial court allowed its admission. Id. We held that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion, reasoning that the evidence fell within the type of

evidence courts have recognized is admissible, under both article 38.371 and rule

404(b), where it rebutted a defensive theory and contextualized the nature of the

relationship between the complainant and the accused. McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at

703.

In this case, appellant presented a fabrication defense, beginning with

counsel’s remarks in appellant’s opening statement that he expected the evidence

to show that Kelly-Anne is “a manipulative person, a conniving person, a jealous

person. And I expect the evidence to show that she has learned or knows how to

work the system, and now she’s even got her 15-year-old son that she has with

[appellant] in on it also.” Without deciding whether the trial court’s pre-trial ruling

was error, we hold that appellant opened the door to the adjudicated extraneous

offenses when he presented his fabrication defense in his opening statement. As in

McDonnell, the prior judgments became admissible under both article 38.371 and

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rule 404(b) to rebut this defensive theory and contextualize the relationship

between the complainant and the accused.

As such, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence.

McDonnell, 674 S.W.3d at 703.

D. Any Error Was Harmless

Even if the trial court had erred in admitting the prior judgments as

evidence, it was harmless in that the evidence of the extraneous bad acts was

otherwise admitted without objection through Kelly-Anne’s testimony.

If the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence, the error does

not warrant reversal unless it affected appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2(b); Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (stating

erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error that requires reversal

only if it affected appellant’s substantial rights). An error affects appellant’s

substantial rights only when the error has “a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599

(Tex. Crim. App. 2023). After examining the record as a whole, if we have fair

assurance that the error did not influence the jury—or had but a slight effect—we

will not reverse appellant’s conviction. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. In reaching

this conclusion, we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might

be considered in connection with other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence

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supporting the verdict, (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence

indicating guilt, and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained of error. Id.

Even without the prior judgments, the record contains ample evidence of

extraneous assaults by appellant against Kelly-Anne. Without objection, Kelly-

Anne testified about appellant’s history of abusing her, beginning with the first

time appellant slapped Kelly-Anne while she was holding J.L. when he was an

infant. Kelly-Anne also described an incident at the couple’s home in League City

when appellant struck and shoved Kelly-Anne until she lost consciousness. Kelly-

Anne testified about instances in which appellant was charged with assault and

Kelly-Anne asked that the cases be dismissed so that appellant could work to

support the family financially. Kelly-Anne explained that she separated from

appellant when they were in an argument about infidelity which “started verbal and

ended up physical very fast.” When the State asked Kelly-Anne how many times

appellant assaulted her over their 15 years together, Kelly-Anne responded, “too

many to count.” J.L. and his friend B.K. both testified that appellant assaulted J.L.

The jury also saw several threatening emails and text messages from appellant to

Kelly-Anne and photographs of injuries to Kelly-Anne and J.L., corroborating the

testimony. Even if the judgments were erroneously admitted by the trial court, the

judgments merely corroborated the extensive testimony and other evidence of

appellant’s assaultive history.

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Therefore, any error in admitting the extraneous judgments was harmless.

Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373.

Conclusion

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice

Panel Consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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