In Re Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued February 10, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00984-CV
———————————
IN RE PAIGE ELAINE LAUREN AND RAYMOND HENRY TAYLOR,
Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

OPINION

Relators, Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor, filed a petition for

writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s October 23, 2025 order granting the

motion for new trial filed by real party in interest, DV Communities LLC. 1 Real

1
The underlying case is Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor v. DV
Communities, LLC, Doorvest, Inc., Kundra Sachin, Quyen Le, and Jackie “Jack”
Sheely, Cause No. 2022-71961, pending in the 80th District Court of Harris County,
Texas, the Honorable Sonya L. Aston presiding.
parties in interest, DV Communities, LLC, Doorvest, Inc., Kundra Sachin, Quyen

Le, and Jackie “Jack” Sheely, filed a response to the petition. We conditionally grant

the petition.

Relators sued real parties in interest for breach of contract and the case was

tried to a jury. On June 5, 2025, the jury returned a verdict in favor of relators,

awarding relators damages in the amount of $2,344.67 and attorney’s fees in the

amount of $93,545.10. After announcing the verdict, the trial court advised the jury

that it was going to visit with the jurors for a few minutes in the jury room and stated

that the jurors might be asked to give a written statement though there was no

obligation to do so. Nothing further appears in the trial transcript.

Relators stated in their petition and Christopher A. Stevenson, attorney for

real parties in interest, stated in his affidavit attached to the motion for new trial, that

after the attorneys had been dismissed and left the courthouse on June 5, 2025, they

received a call from the bailiff instructing them to return to the courtroom. The jury

had already been dismissed.

According to Stevenson, once they arrived, the trial court advised the

attorneys for both parties that the trial court “had witnessed a juror, who was a

paralegal at a large, prestigious law firm, tell other jurors that lawyers at her firm

charged over $1000 per hour.” The post-verdict meeting between the trial court and

the attorneys was not recorded.

2
Stevenson stated in his affidavit that he moved for a mistrial, which the trial

court granted. Despite the apparent grant of a mistrial (no order appears in the

mandamus record), the trial court signed a final judgment on the verdict on June 17,

2025. On July 10, 2025, real party in interest DV Communities, LLC filed a motion

for new trial, supported by Stevenson’s affidavit concerning the unrecorded

statement the trial court made about witnessing a juror telling other jurors about fees

charged by attorneys at the law firm where she worked. Stevenson stated in his

affidavit that the source for the statements in his affidavit came from the trial court

and Stevenson thought it was inappropriate to seek an affidavit from the trial court.

Stevenson added that he did not believe affidavits from any of the jurors were

necessary and he stated he was uncomfortable contacting jurors.

The motion for new trial was set for submission on July 28, 2025, but on July

25, 2025, the trial court signed an order stating:

After considering defendant, DV Communities, LLC’s motion for new
trial, the response, the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court
GRANTS the motion and orders a new trial.

On August 8, 2025, relators filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that

no evidence was submitted in support of the motion for new trial, no hearing was

held, and no reasons were stated in the order. The trial court signed an order on

August 21, 2025, denying relators’ motion for reconsideration.

3
Relators then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court on September

15, 2025. A response was requested and filed. On October 9, 2025, the Court issued

a memorandum opinion, conditionally granting mandamus relief and holding that

the trial court abused its discretion in granting a motion for new trial without stating

its reasons. See In re Lauren, No. 01-25-00742-CV, 2025 WL 2857118, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). On October

23, 2025, the trial court signed an order vacating the July 25, 2025 order granting

new trial and granting the motion for new trial, but providing the following reasons:

The case was tried before a jury. The jury had been instructed to
not share their personal experiences, expertise or knowledge or those
of others with their fellow jury members. A verdict was reached and
read on June 5, 2025. After the jury was excused, the Court visited with
the jurors with the bailiff present to thank them for their participation.
The jurors had questions and provided comments about the process.

One of the jurors who is a retired paralegal from a large Houston
law firm, announced that she had explained to the other jurors that her
firm regularly charges $1,000 or more per hour for their attorneys and
that the amount that the [p]laintiff’s attorneys were requesting was
reasonable compared to what her firm charges. She also explained that
she and one other juror worked to convince the other 10 jurors to come
to the final determination on the jury charge.

Attorney’s fees issue is a central issue in this matter. The
statement regarding the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees made by
the juror was based on information from outside of courtroom and in
violation of the instructions that the Court had provided to the jurors.
The juror’s statements were shared with the attorneys for both parties.
Plaintiff’s counsel stated that they had heard similar comments and that
the jurors had used a lower amount to calculate the attorney’s fees for
the verdict.

4
Defendants moved for a [n]ew [t]rial based on the information
shared after the Court and [c]ounsel visit[ed] with the jury.

The Court finds that the juror’s statements and influence
constitute an impermissible outside influence and is juror misconduct.

It is therefore, ORDERED, that the Motion for New Trial is
GRANTED.

Mandamus relief is available “to correct a clear abuse of discretion or

violation of a duty imposed by law, when an adequate remedy by appeal does not

exist.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204,

207 (Tex. 2009) (internal citations omitted). The requirement of an abuse of

discretion is established “where a trial court acts without reference to guiding rules

or principles or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.” In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d

836, 840 (Tex. 2018).

Concerning the adequacy of relators’ remedy by appeal, the Texas Supreme

Court has held that when a motion for new trial is timely filed and the motion is

granted during a trial court’s plenary power, the order granting new trial is not

reviewable on appeal. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Here, the

motion for new trial was timely filed in that it was filed within thirty days of the date

the trial court signed its judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a). When a timely

motion for new trial has been filed, the trial court’s plenary power extends until thirty

days after the motion is overruled, whether by written order or by operation of law,

5
whichever occurs first. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). Therefore, we conclude that

relators have no adequate remedy by appeal. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d

at 209.

However, to establish their right to mandamus relief, relators must also show

that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148

S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). Relators argue that the trial court abused its

discretion in granting a new trial because the reasons stated in the order were not

supported by the record, there was no record support for a finding of juror

misconduct, statements made during deliberations were not jury misconduct unless

it concerned an outside influence, and the alleged statements made by a juror in this

case did not constitute an outside influence.

A trial court has broad discretion in granting new trial, but that discretion is

not limitless. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210. A writ of mandamus

shall issue to correct a trial court’s clear abuse of discretion in granting a new trial.

See In re Nissan N. Am., Inc., 711 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2024, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). A trial court does not abuse its discretion

in granting a new trial if its stated reason is “(1) legally appropriate and (2) specific

enough to indicate that the trial court derived the reasons from the particular facts

and circumstances of the case at hand.” See id. Here, the trial court stated specific

facts that led it to conclude that misconduct in the form of an outside influence had

6
occurred. But “[s]imply articulating understandable, reasonably specific, and legally

appropriate reasons is not enough; the reasons must be valid and correct.” In re

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 759 (Tex. 2013).

Whether jury misconduct occurred and caused injury is a question of fact for

the trial court. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Tex.

2000). To obtain a new trial based on jury misconduct, the movant must show that

misconduct occurred, it was material, and it probably caused injury. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 327; Golden Eagle Archery, 24 S.W.3d at 372. A court may admit competent

evidence of juror misconduct from any source. See Golden Eagle Archery, 24

S.W.3d at 369.

In this case, the motion for new trial was not supported by a juror’s affidavit

alleging outside influences were brought to bear on the jury, but on the trial court’s

statement about its post-verdict discussion with jurors. Relators claim that this

evidence was insufficient to show jury misconduct. Real parties in interest argue

that an affidavit from a juror was not necessary because the trial court heard about

the misconduct while speaking with the jury. We need not decide if this is sufficient

to support a motion for new trial because, even if this evidence were sufficient, the

alleged misconduct did not constitute an outside influence.

“An outside influence ‘must emanate from outside the jury and its

deliberations.’” Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 359

7
S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 2012, pet. denied). To

constitute an outside influence, the source of information must be someone outside

the jury. See Perry v. Safeco Ins. Co., 821 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Information gathered by a juror and shared with other

jurors by that juror, even if introduced to prejudice voting, does not constitute an

outside influence. See, e.g., Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V., 259 S.W.3d at 324.

For instance, statements during deliberations made by one juror to the other jurors

that “the plaintiff had probably already gotten a big settlement” and “did not need

any more money out of this case,” were juror statements about matters occurring

during deliberations and were not proof of outside influence. Golden Eagle Archery,

24 S.W.3d at 366, 370–71 (internal quotations omitted). And a jurors’ sharing of

personal experience with diverticulosis and its symptoms and her conclusions about

the plaintiff’s condition based on that experience, during deliberations in a medical

negligence case was not an outside influence. See Wichman v. Kelsey-Seybold Med.

Grp., PLLC, No. 14–18–00641–CV, 2020 WL 4359734, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] July 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Here, the alleged juror statement made by one juror to the other jurors that the

trial court determined was proof of an outside influence was a juror telling the other

jurors information about her knowledge of fees charged by attorneys at the law firm

where she had previously worked. “A juror’s injection of the juror’s personal

8
experiences, knowledge, or expertise into the jury deliberations, though improper,

does not constitute an ‘outside influence’ on the jury because it emanates from inside

the jury.” Id., 2020 WL 4359734, at *4; see also Soliz v. Saenz, 779 S.W.2d 929,

932 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 1989, writ denied) (holding juror’s

improper discussion of personal knowledge of bar involved in wrongful-death case

based on his prior experience did not constitute outside influence); Baker v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53, 54–55 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1987, no writ)

(holding not outside influence where nurse serving as juror explained effect of

medication plaintiff was taking that could have caused plaintiff’s fall resulting in

injuries).

Real parties in interest argue that they did not have to meet the definition of

an outside influence under the unique facts of this case. Real parties in interest cite

Perry v. Safeco Insurance Co., 821 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1991, writ denied), but Perry does not support their argument. In Perry, a panel of

this Court held that, because jurors may not testify to any matter or statement

occurring during the jury’s deliberations, and the proof in Perry did not establish an

outside influence, there was a question as to whether the juror affidavits and

testimony was admissible. See id. at 281. However, the Texas Supreme Court

subsequently cited Perry negatively, noting that the decision had relied on a prior

case that was overly broad and that competent evidence of juror misconduct can

9
come from other sources, not just from jurors. See Golden Eagle Archery, 24 S.W.3d

at 369 & n.3. Thus, Perry concerned the type of evidence admissible to show juror

misconduct and we do not address that issue here.

Real parties in interest also assert that the juror’s statement to the rest of the

jurors about attorney fee amounts emanated from that law firm rather than from the

jury. But the members of the jury heard about the fees charged by attorneys at the

legal assistant juror’s former law firm, from another juror and not from any attorney

at the firm. Thus, these statements do not constitute an outside influence. See, e.g.,

id. at 370 (holding jurors speculating whether alcohol was involved in accident,

whether plaintiff may have received settlement, or whether jurors traded answers,

were statements that occurred during deliberations and were not proof of outside

influences); Baker, 727 S.W.2d at 54–55 (holding statement by juror nurse

concerning effect of medication plaintiff was taking and whether that medication

could have caused plaintiff’s fall resulting in injuries did not constitute outside

influence).

Real parties in interest further assert that the juror’s misconduct injured them.

To obtain a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct, the movant must show that

misconduct occurred, and that it was material and probably caused injury. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 327(a); Golden Eagle Archery, 24 S.W.3d at 372. Because there is no

proof supporting the trial court’s finding of juror misconduct in the form of an

10
outside influence, we need not consider whether real parties in interest suffered any

injury supporting the trial court’s grant of new trial.

Because we conclude that relators have established that the trial court abused

its discretion in granting the motion for new trial filed by real party in interest DV

Communities, LLC, we conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus

and order the trial court to vacate the order of October 23, 2025 granting the motion

for new trial and to reinstate the judgment. We are confident the trial court will do

so and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney and Morgan.

Morgan, J., concurring.

11

Opinion issued February 10, 2026.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00984-CV
———————————
IN RE PAIGE ELAINE LAUREN AND RAYMOND HENRY TAYLOR,
Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

CONCURRING OPINION

I empathize with the trial judge. Hearing a juror explain that a verdict was

based on something other than properly admitted evidence would be disturbing to

anyone sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the laws of this state.

But Texas courts have made the policy decision that whatever justice can be

gained by impeaching verdicts with juror testimony about deliberations does not

justify the significant costs of the practice. See Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122-
25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (describing centuries-long process of eliminating

common law practice of “harass[ing] the jury after trial to elicit admissions of juror

misconduct in support of a motion for new trial”). The Court’s opinion today is

correct that a juror conveying her own personal knowledge to other jurors during

deliberation is not an “outside influence,” and Rule of Evidence 606 forbids using a

juror’s statements about an inside influence to impeach a verdict.

I write to address a topic the court does not: Is a sitting judge’s personal

recollection of extra-judicial information a sufficient basis for a new trial? Although

the law is less developed on this issue, I think the answer is clear enough: No.

The only Texas case directly addressing this is State v. Krueger, 179 S.W.3d

663, 665 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.).* There, as here, the trial judge had

a post-trial discussion with former jurors and learned “they may have gone outside

the properly-introduced evidence in reaching their verdict.” Kreuger, 179 S.W.3d at

665. There, as here, a “motion for new trial was granted based on the recollections

of the trial judge without any testimony from any source.” Id. The Ninth Court held

that because a motion for new trial must be supported by evidence, and the trial

judge’s personal recollection of extra-judicial facts was not evidence, granting the

new trial was an abuse of discretion.

*
Kreuger is a criminal case. But Rule 606 is the same for civil and criminal cases,
and the evidentiary requirements for supporting motions for new trial in civil and
criminal cases are similar enough to make Kreuger on-point.
2
That strikes me as correct. As a general principle, trials and motions are not

decided by the personal, extrajudicial knowledge of judges. Article II of the Texas

Rules of Evidence allows judicial notice of certain facts, but those facts are things

known by people other than the judge—the law of other states (Rule 202), foreign

law (Rule 203), and local laws and agency rules (Rule 204). Rule 201 allows judicial

notice of adjudicative facts, but the fact noticed must be “generally known within

the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction,” or “be accurately and readily determined

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonable be questioned.” TEX. R. EVID.

201(b); see, e.g., Letson v. State, 805 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (fact that Astrodome was in Harris County was proper subject

of judicial notice).

What these matters have in common is that the parties can litigate whether

they’re right or wrong. If the parties disagree whether Florida has a law against

harassing alligators, or which sheriff has jurisdiction over the Eighth Wonder of the

World, that can be sorted out in open court.

But if the factual basis for a ruling is something only the judge is aware of,

that can’t. Or perhaps it can, but only if a party is willing to dispute the judge’s

personal memory. Such a dispute would be awkward for all involved, and it would

result in mandatory recusal, meaning the dispute would not be about the sitting

judge’s personal memory. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(3).

3
Thus, even if the matter revealed to the trial judge here was an outside

influence, there would need to be more evidentiary support than the sitting judge’s

personal recollection of an event that occurred outside the trial. Either the judge

would need to be recused and used as a witness, or the party seeking a new trial

would need to get testimony from someone with knowledge of the outside influence,

like the former juror.

With these comments, I join the Court’s opinion.

Clint Morgan
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.

Morgan, J., concurring.

4