In Re Azhar Chaudhary Law Firm, PC; And Azhar M. Chaudhary v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued February 4, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00865-CV
———————————
IN RE AZHAR MAHMOOD CHAUDHARY AND AZHAR CHAUDARY
LAW FIRM, PC, Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators, Azhar Mahmood Chaudhary and Azhar Chaudhary Law Firm, PC,

filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s July 25, 2024 order

granting the “Verified Motion to Reinstate” of real party in interest, Hamzah Ali.1

In their petition for writ of mandamus, relators argued that the trial court’s plenary

1
The underlying case is Hamzah Ali v. Azhar Mahmood Chaudhary and Azhar
Chaudhary Law Firm, PC, Cause No. 18-DCV-249370, in the 240th District Court
of Fort Bend County, Texas, the Honorable Surendran Pattel presiding
power had expired prior to the trial court signing the July 25, 2024 order, rendering

the order void. Relators therefore requested that the Court grant the petition and

direct the trial court to vacate its July 25, 2024 order.2

The Court requested a response to the petition for writ of mandamus, and real

party in interest filed a response in opposition to the request for mandamus relief.

Relators also filed a reply in support of their request for mandamus relief.

We conclude that relators have failed to establish they are entitled to

mandamus relief, and the Court therefore denies relators’ petition for writ of

mandamus. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

2
We note that relators’ petition for writ of mandamus was filed on October 16, 2025,
more than fourteen months after the trial court signed the order challenged in the
mandamus petition. However, relators’ petition failed to explain, or even
acknowledge, the fourteen-month delay in seeking relief. “Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances and issues only
in situations involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may
be addressed by other remedies.” In re Rogers, No. 26-0010, --- S.W.3d ---, 2026
WL 91655, at *1 (Tex. Jan. 13, 2026); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
839–40 (Tex. 1992). While mandamus relief is not an equitable remedy, its issuance
is largely controlled by equitable principles, with one such principle being “equity
aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights.” See In re Cox Ventures,
Inc., No. 01-12-00789-CV, 2013 WL 867433, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Mar. 7, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Generally, “[d]elay alone provides
ample ground to deny mandamus relief.” Id. However, Texas courts have
concluded that doctrines such as laches, waiver, or estoppel are not applicable when
the order subject of the mandamus is void. See In re Valliance Bank, 422 S.W.3d
722, 728–29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding). Where a trial court
signs an order after its plenary power has expired, such order is void. See In re
Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. 2008).

2
PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Johnson.

Gunn, J., concurring.

3

Opinion issued February 4, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00865-CV
———————————
IN RE AZHAR MAHMOOD CHAUDHARY AND AZHAR CHAUDARY
LAW FIRM, PC, Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

CONCURRING OPINION

When a statute requires a jurat to be in “substantially” a certain form, and the

jurat has everything it needs except the declarant’s birthday, what should happen?

The answer may depend on which court of appeals hears the case.

I.

Section 132.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows for

“an unsworn declaration [to] be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration,
verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by statute or required by rule,

order, or requirement adopted as provided by law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 132.001(a).

Any such unsworn declaration “must be: (1) in writing; and (2) subscribed by

the person making the declaration as true under the penalty of perjury.” See id.

§ 132.001(c). Additionally, an unsworn declaration made under this section must

also “include a jurat.” See id. §§ 132.001(d)–(f).

Helpfully, the Legislature provided exemplars of the required jurats and stated

that in an unsworn declaration, the jurat used must be “in substantially the . . . form”

provided. Id. The statute then offers sample forms in subsections (d), (e), and (f):

(d) Base form: name, birthday, address, reference to perjury

(e) Inmate form: name, birthday, inmate number, prison unit, reference to perjury

(f) Public employee form: name, agency, reference to perjury

Thus, two of the three sample forms speak of a birthday, whereas all of them require

a name and a reference to being made under penalty of perjury.

The general use unsworn verification must include a jurat which substantially

conforms to the following:

2
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001(d).

Given this form, one could reasonably conclude that the inclusion of the

declarant’s birthday was fairly insignificant, with the key lying in the statement

about being made under penalty of perjury. See Baylor Scott & White v. Project

Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 291 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied)

(“Although the declaration jurat fails to contain [the declarant’s] address and date of

birth, such an omission is not fatal . . . . Rather, the key to an unsworn declaration is

that it must be signed under penalty of perjury.” (internal quotations omitted)); see

also Gillis v. Harris Cnty., 554 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2018, no pet.). But that position might have come under a cloud after Hays Street

Bridge Restoration Group v. City of San Antonio. There the Supreme Court faced

an eleventh-hour effort by a respondent to establish mootness based on an unsworn

3
declaration by a city employee. Hays Street Bridge Restoration Grp. v. City of San

Antonio, 570 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. 2019).

The court rejected the city employee’s declaration as (A) conclusory and

(B) lacking a birthday in the jurat. Id. at 702–03 & n.15. The court did not explain

why a city employee needed to supply a birthday at all, given that subsection (f) of

the statute does not require one. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001(f).

In the wake of Hays Street, lower courts have gone different ways about birthdays.1

By way of example, in 2021, our sister court in Tyler concluded that an

unsworn declaration was sufficient despite the fact that its jurat did not include the

declarant’s address or date of birth, but it was in writing and signed under penalty of

perjury. See Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 291. The Tyler court’s conclusion

1
See Mock v. St. David’s Healthcare P’Ship, LP, LLP, No, 03-22-00708-CV, 2025
WL 3114017, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 7, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(concluding declaration failed to “substantially comply” with Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code section 132.001(d) because declarant failed to include birthdate
and address); but see In re Cook Compression, No. 04-20-00517-CV, 2020 WL
6928397, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.) (concluding unsworn declaration that failed to include declarant’s date of birth,
address, and county and state it was signed in nonetheless substantially complied
with section 132.001(d), because “main requirements are that the declaration be in
writing and subscribed by the person making the declaration as true under penalty
of perjury”); Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 291
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied) (concluding “declaration state[d] that it [was]
made under penalty of perjury, and . . . that its shortcomings [were] not fatal and
that [the declaration was] admissible”).

4
arguably runs afoul of Hays Street , but Hays Street was not discussed by the parties,

and the Texas Supreme Court denied a petition for review.

II.

In this original proceeding, relators, Azhar Mahmood Chaudhary and Azhar

Chaudhary Law Firm, PC, argued that the declaration jurat of Lloyd E. Kelley,

counsel for real party in interest, Hamzah Ali, in support of Ali’s motion to reinstate,

failed to substantially conform to the jurat exemplar identified in the statute.

Therefore, relators argued, the jurat was insufficient to support the motion to

reinstate, which was then not verified as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

165a(3). Absent a verified motion to reinstate, the trial court’s July 25, 2024 order

was signed after its plenary power had expired, and was therefore void.

The jurat of Kelley included in the motion to reinstate was as follows:

This jurat did not include Kelley’s date of birth.

As discussed, the intermediate courts have been of two minds about the role

of a declarant’s birthday in an unsworn declaration. In addition, a third possible

position would be that a no-birthday declaration is procedurally effective as a
5
verification but substantively ineffective at supplying any competent evidence. See

Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. 2004) (motion for new trial without filing

fee held procedurally effective to extend timetables, but not substantively effective

to present complaint). On that view, Kelley’s declaration kept plenary power alive

but did not supply any evidence that could be relied on.

Given this specific mandamus record, and mindful of the specifics relating to

error preservation regarding the form of this jurat, I agree in denying relief here. But

in a proper case, it would be helpful to have further clarification from the Texas

Supreme Court about what it means for an unsworn declaration jurat to

“substantially” conform with the statute.

David Gunn
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Johnson.

Gunn, J., concurring.

6